MistralGuard: Long Context Safeguards for Human-AI Conversations

Giosuè Castellano 3145323 **Giovanni Gatti** 3121689 **Rolf Minardi** 3137205 **Fabio Pernisi** 3120347

Abstract

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being adopted and integrated into a broad range of applications, it becomes essential to assess and ensure their safety. Recent research has demonstrated that these models can be maliciously pushed to operate outside their guidelines (i.e., jailbroken) using numerous demonstrations of undesired behavior, exploiting their long-context capabilities. While existing solutions like Llama Guard have addressed these issues, they remain constrained by the token limits of the models they use and often lack precision in detecting diverse jailbreaking attempts in longer contexts. This work introduces *MistralGuard*, an extended version of the Mistral 7B Model, specifically designed to classify and mitigate jailbreaking prompts up to 32,000 tokens. We leverage a novel dataset derived from engaging a non-aligned model with unsafe inputs. In comparative evaluations, *MistralGuard* outperforms the state-of-the-art model GPT-4o and the first iteration of Llama Guard across several contexts. It demonstrates superior performance in zero-shot (no-context), many-shot (short-context under 8k tokens), and long-context scenarios (8k to 32k tokens).[1]

1 Introduction

Over the past few years, Large Language Models (LLMs) have reached unprecedented capabilities in a wide array of tasks. This enhancement in performance, while beneficial, also amplifies potential risks, raising substantial concerns regarding their alignment with ethical and safety standards. Consequently, there has been a strong interest in aligning these models to safe and ethical guidelines (Ouyang et al., 2022; Rafailov et al., 2023, *inter alia*).

Despite these efforts, recent studies highlight significant vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks (i.e. *jailbreaks*). The work by Anil et al. (2024), in particular, indicates that while current alignment strategies effectively mitigate manipulations in short-context scenarios, they fail to address longer context windows. A malicious user can indeed steer the model to operate outside of its safety guidelines, by providing a large number of demonstrations of undesired behavior in the form of unsafe prompts and compliant answers.



Figure 1: Example of a long-context prompt, created by stacking several demonstrations (here the actual request is placed before the context). In this case, GPT-4o fails at classifying the prompt, while MistralGuard correctly labels it.

This emerging challenge underscores the necessity for robust detection and mitigation strategies specifically designed for long-context jailbreaks, a newly recognized risk in the deployment of LLMs. While several techniques exist for managing jailbreaking prompts (§7) they predominantly address only short-context scenarios. A notable example is the Llama Guard model family (Inan et al., 2023), consisting of input-output safeguard models based on Llama-2 7B (Touvron et al., 2023) and Llama-3 8B (Meta, 2024). Both of these versions, however, have a token limit of 4,096 and 8,192 tokens respectively.

[1]Code and data can be found at the github repo https://github.com/fabiopernisi/mistral-guard

The research question that we investigate in this work is therefore the following: **to what extent can Jailbreaking prompts be detected in the long-context regime?** To address this critical gap, this work introduces *MistralGuard*, a long-context classifier capable of detecting and countering jailbreak attempts in scenarios involving up to 32,000 tokens.

We tested *MistralGuard* against GPT-4o, recognized as the state-of-the-art across general model performance[2]. In our evaluations (§5), *MistralGuard* demonstrated superior accuracy, achieving an **average accuracy of 93%**, compared to **65.33% for GPT-4o**.

Our study aims to refine the safety measures of LLMs, by developing a classifier to effectively handle longer interactions and maintain adherence to ethical standards. This effort contributes to safeguarding against advanced adversarial strategies and supports a more trustworthy LLM deployment.

Contributions We release a targeted dataset containing around 1239 high-quality malicious prompts and compliant unsafe model completions, providing a valuable resource for further safety research. Secondly, we introduce *MistralGuard*, a model specifically developed to identify long-context jailbreaking attempts. Lastly, our results challenge the conventional view by showing that fine-tuned open-source models can outperform state-of-the-art proprietary models like GPT-4o in specific safety tasks.

2 Safety Taxonomy

A fundamental requisite for building a prompt-level safety classifier is to establish a Safety Taxonomy, which will define the safety classes of our classifier. Drawing upon the work of (Inan et al., 2023), we adopt a safety taxonomy based on the following categories:

`violence_hate`: Includes expressions promoting violence or discrimination based on race, gender, or disability.

`sexual_content`: Encompasses statements promoting sexual activities or containing explicit sexual material, excluding content involving minors.

`guns_weapons`: Covers content that promotes or facilitates crimes involving illegal weapons like firearms or explosives, including instructions on their creation or use.

`regulated_substances`: Includes content that promotes or assists in the illegal production, transfer, or consumption of controlled substances such as drugs, tobacco, or alcohol.

`suicide_self_harm`: Encompasses content encouraging or enabling self-harm or suicide.

`criminal_planning`: Covers content promoting or assisting in planning crimes like arson, kidnapping, or theft, not covered by other specific harm categories.

Our model acts at the prompt level. In particular, it will classify a given prompt as "Safe" or "Unsafe". Moreover, if the prompt is determined to be "Unsafe", the violated safety category will also be displayed. Given that we are operating in the context of Many-shots jailbreaking, a definition of "Unsafe prompt" needs to be properly stated.

Safety Paradigm : The present work adopts a "one-hot encoded" safety paradigm. Given a full prompt p containing a unique request r and a (large) set of N demonstrations $\{D_i\}_{i=1}^{N}$, the safety label of the whole prompt coincides with the label of the request. Thus, a prompt containing a safe request such as "Who was the most popular musical artist in the 1980s?" and many unsafe demonstrations (see Figure 1) is considered as "Safe", as the model is effectively asked to provide an innocuous information (regardless of the demonstrations).

3 Dataset

Our dataset, designed to map to specific safety categories, was constructed from malicious prompts sourced from various open-source safety datasets, including **CoNa**, **PhysicalSafetyInstructions**, **MaliciousInstructions** by Bianchi et al. (2024), **HarmBench** (Mazeika et al., 2024), and **AdvBench** (Zou et al., 2023). We initiated our process by generating unsafe completions for these prompts using the uncensored WizardLM 33B model (Hartford).

Post-generation, each completion was classified under appropriate safety categories (§2) and labeled as "Unsafe" (compliant with a malicious request) or "Safe" (refusal to comply). "Safe" responses were either regenerated with a more malicious system prompt or manually edited to ensure they were unsafe. This first annotation round revealed a skewed distribution among safety categories, with `criminal_planning` being the most represented and `sexual_content` the lest represented.

To balance the dataset, we sourced additional

[2]As of may 2024, GPT4o is ranked first on the LMSys chatbot arena

prompts from *SafetyPrompts.com* (Röttger et al., 2024) and datasets like **StrongReject** (Souly et al., 2024), **SimpleSafetyTests** (Vidgen et al., 2023), **DoNotAnser** (Wang et al., 2023), **ForbiddenQuestions** (Shen et al., 2024), and **XSTest** (Röttger et al., 2024), focusing on underrepresented categories. A second round of unsafe completions was generated with an adjusted prompt in WizardLM, followed by another round of safety categorization.

These efforts resulted in a more balanced dataset, as evidenced by the label distribution outlined in Table 1.

safety_category	distribution
criminal_planning	453
violence_hate	367
guns_weapons	115
regulated_substances	111
suicide_self_harm	97
sexual_content	96

Table 1: The label distribution of the safety categories in our dataset

4 Building MistralGuard

4.1 Building long-context prompts

Our initial dataset contains single prompt - completion pairs, which we combine to generate long-context prompts for finetuning. We define datapoints having size of more than 8192 tokens as long-context. This is double the context length of the Llama Guard model.[3]

To get to the desired token length for our prompts, we stack multiple pairs as demonstrations. On average, we need to stack at least 29 question-answer pairs to exceed the token threshold and ensure prompt diversity. To achieve this, we use stochasticity in two ways: demonstration sampling and request placement.

We sample the number of demonstrations to be included in the prompt uniformly from the range $[45, 60]$. These demonstrations are then sampled from all available training prompts. We prepend `USER:` to the prompt text and `ASSISTANT:` to the model completion.

For stochastic request placement, we insert the request at the beginning of the prompt with a 50% chance and at the end with the same probability. In this case, we only prepend `USER:` to the request, as we do not want the model completion. For the first half of the stacked prompts we **assign a safe request** at the chosen location, while for the other half we **assign an unsafe one**, again sampled from the training prompts, but not included in that prompt's demonstrations.

Since the label of the prompt depends solely on the request, and we decided to create 1000 stacked prompts, we have exactly 500 prompts with a safe request and 500 with an unsafe one[4]. The final token length distribution of the stacked prompts ranges from 10465 to 22058 tokens, with a mean of 15187 tokens. We also assign a train, validation and test split with proportions 80%, 10%, 10% respectively.

Adding a template Since we work with a pretrained model, we do not need to follow a specific template and therefore have decided to create our own. We follow the Alpaca approach (Taori et al., 2023). The template can be found in full detail in the Appendix B.

4.2 Model training

The base pretrained model that we are working with is Mistral-7B-v0.3 (MistralAI, 2024). Due to limited computational resources, we quantize the numerical precision of each linear layer to 4-bit integers using the `bitsandbytes` library (bitsandbytes) and employ LoRA (Hu et al., 2021) to reduce memory usage.

For finetuning, we specifically train on the *expected* completion, marked by the true label of the prompt followed by an `EOS` token. We achieve this by locating the `RESPONSE` keyword in our data template and calculating the loss only for tokens generated after this keyword, ignoring the rest of the prompt content in the loss computation.

To manage the memory usage (which scales linearly with input tokens), we implement gradient checkpointing (Chen et al., 2016) and use an 8-bit quantized version of the Adam optimizer (Dettmers et al., 2022). Although this setup slows the training process, it prevents memory overflows.

We train the model for 125 steps, observing that the loss quickly converges to relatively low values. Detailed training logs and additional hyperparameter information are documented in Appendix C.

[3]Using the *Mistral-v.03* tokenizer, we find that the combined token length for each pair in our dataset ranges from 17 to 1974 tokens, with a mean of 289 tokens.

[4]distribution: 194 criminal planning, 137 violence and hate, 45 regulated substances, 44 guns and weapons, 43 suicide and self-harm, 37 sexual content

5 Evaluation

To enhance our evaluation framework, we've modified our prompt construction strategy by incorporating both unsafe and safe Question-Answer pairs—the latter sourced from a cleaned version of the Alpaca dataset (Alpaca). This adjustment enables us to test our model's performance with safe demonstrations, simulating a more varied interaction environment.

We have constructed **three distinct long-context test datasets** with different proportions of safe demonstrations: one with only unsafe demonstrations, another with approximately 50 percent safe demonstrations, and a third composed solely of safe demonstrations. Each dataset continues to vary the placement of the request within the prompt probabilistically.

While our primary focus has been on long-context scenarios, we also extend our evaluation to short-context scenarios by limiting the number of demonstrations per prompt to between 2 and 8, resulting in prompts ranging from 17 to 3268 tokens.

Additionally, we assess model performance in a zero-shot setting, which consists of prompts containing only the user request without any demonstrations. The label distribution across all datasets and contexts remains consistent, with each dataset containing 100 datapoints[5] to ensure a balanced evaluation.

In the long-context scenarios, we compare *MistralGuard* against GPT-4o, capable of handling up to 128k tokens. For the short-context and zero-shot scenarios, we include comparisons with both GPT-4o and Llama Guard.

Our evaluation metrics include accuracy (**acc.**), false positives (**fp**), false negatives (**fn**), and the number of times the model correctly identifies a prompt as unsafe but misclassifies the specific safety category (**false cat.**).

6 Results

Table 2 shows that *MistralGuard* consistently outperforms GPT-4o across all metrics in the long context setting. Notably, the largest performance disparity occurs in prompts where the request is at the beginning; GPT-4o struggles to classify safe prompts correctly when followed by unsafe demonstrations, exhibiting a high rate of false negatives. In contrast, *MistralGuard* improves classification by up to **72%**, nearly a 5x gain in such instances. Performance differences narrow with 100% safe demonstrations; here, GPT-4o's false negatives drop, but it tends to misclassify unsafe prompts as "Safe."

MistralGuard also consistently identifies the correct safety category more accurately when predicting prompts as "Unsafe." These results carry over to the short context setting, where *MistralGuard* and GPT-4o both outperform Llama Guard. In the zero-shot setting, *MistralGuard* achieves 93% accuracy, only slightly better than GPT-4o, which still shows susceptibility to being misled by demonstrations; Llama Guard lags at 50% accuracy. For detailed results, see D.

7 Related Work

Previous work on jailbreaking primarily involved few-shot experiments in short context scenarios (Rao et al., 2023). Besides alignment techniques, various prompt-based mitigations have been developed to detect jailbreaking prompts. For instance, Wei et al. (2023) developed *Context Defense*, which provides models with examples of refusals to harmful responses. Additional methods include perplexity filters (Alon and Kamfonas, 2023), hazardous string detection (Cao et al., 2024), and retokenization with paraphrasing (Jain et al., 2024). Kumar et al. introduced the *erase-and-check* framework, which deems a prompt unsafe if any subsequence is found to be harmful (Kumar et al., 2024). Kim et al. developed a DistilBert-based model for detecting potentially harmful content (Kim et al., 2023).

8 Conclusion

In this study, we introduced *MistralGuard*, a long-context classifier specifically designed to detect many-shots jailbreaking. We have also released high-quality datasets featuring pairs of malicious prompts and their corresponding unsafe compliant responses. Our evaluations demonstrate that *MistralGuard* surpasses GPT-4o in classifying specific safety-related prompts using an open-source model. Future research may explore the application of our approach to more general classification tasks.

[5] label distribution: 50 safe, 23 criminal planning, 4 guns and weapons, 14 violence and hate, 2 sexual content, 6 suicide and self-harm, and 1 regulated substances

Table 2. Comparison of *MistralGuard* and GPT-4o in the long-context setting. Table **a)** reports results in the context where the prompt contains only unsafe demonstrations. Table **b)** shows the metrics where the prompt contains 50% safe and 50% unsafe demonstrations, while Table **c)** has the results with only safe demonstrations. The keywords *begin* and *end* classify whether the unique request is at the beginning of the prompt or at the end.

	0% safe demonstrations				**50% safe demonstrations**				**100% safe demonstrations**			
	MistralGuard		**GPT-4o**		**MistralGuard**		**GPT-4o**		**MistralGuard**		**GPT-4o**	
	begin	*end*	*begin*	*end*	*begin*	*end*	*begin*	*end*	*begin*	*end*	*begin*	*end*
acc.(%)	90.74	95.65	29.63	93.48	92.59	95.65	20.37	95.65	88.89	95.65	75.93	91.30
fp	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	7	0
fn	0	0	27	0	0	0	27	0	0	0	0	1
false cat.	5	2	11	3	4	2	15	3	5	1	6	3

9 Limitations

Despite obtaining impressive results, our approach still presents a few limitations. Our model is designed and finetuned for a very specific task, and although it performs exceptionally well in zero-shot setups, its application scope might still be limited. Furthermore, the safety label of the entire prompt hinges solely on the the request. Additionally, our model is quantized and fine-tuned using LoRA, which poses limitations due to constrained computational resources. Furthermore, while we conducted a comparison with GPT-4o, which stands as the pinnacle of GPT-4 models and is considered state-of-the-art (SOTA), our evaluation scope remains limited. For a broader comparison, reference the leaderboard at `https://huggingface.co/spaces/lmsys/chatbot-arena-leaderboard`, where GPT-4o holds the top rank.

References

Gabriel Alon and Michael Kamfonas. 2023. Detecting language model attacks with perplexity. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.14132*.

Stanford Alpaca. Cleaned alpaca dataset.

Cem Anil, Esin Durmus, Mrinank Sharma, Joe Benton, Sandipan Kundu, Joshua Batson, Nina Rimsky, Meg Tong, Jesse Mu, Daniel Ford, et al. 2024. Many-shot jailbreaking.

Federico Bianchi, Mirac Suzgun, Giuseppe Attanasio, Paul Rottger, Dan Jurafsky, Tatsunori Hashimoto, and James Zou. 2024. Safety-tuned LLaMAs: Lessons from improving the safety of large language models that follow instructions. In *The Twelfth International Conference on Learning Representations*.

bitsandbytes. bitsandbytes.

Bochuan Cao, Yuanpu Cao, Lu Lin, and Jinghui Chen. 2024. Defending against alignment-breaking attacks via robustly aligned LLM.

Tianqi Chen, Bing Xu, Chiyuan Zhang, and Carlos Guestrin. 2016. Training deep nets with sublinear memory cost.

Tim Dettmers, Mike Lewis, Sam Shleifer, and Luke Zettlemoyer. 2022. 8-bit optimizers via block-wise quantization.

Eeric Hartford. cognitivecomputations/wizardlm-33b-uncensored.

Edward J. Hu, Yelong Shen, Phillip Wallis, Zeyuan Allen-Zhu, Yuanzhi Li, Shean Wang, Lu Wang, and Weizhu Chen. 2021. Lora: Low-rank adaptation of large language models.

Hakan Inan, Kartikeya Upasani, Jianfeng Chi, Rashi Rungta, Krithika Iyer, Yuning Mao, Michael Tontchev, Qing Hu, Brian Fuller, Davide Testuggine, et al. 2023. Llama guard: Llm-based input-output safeguard for human-ai conversations. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2312.06674*.

Neel Jain, Avi Schwarzschild, Yuxin Wen, Gowthami Somepalli, John Kirchenbauer, Ping yeh Chiang, Micah Goldblum, Aniruddha Saha, Jonas Geiping, and Tom Goldstein. 2024. Baseline defenses for adversarial attacks against aligned language models.

Jinhwa Kim, Ali Derakhshan, and Ian G Harris. 2023. Robust safety classifier for large language models: Adversarial prompt shield. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.00172*.

Aounon Kumar, Chirag Agarwal, Suraj Srinivas, Aaron Jiaxun Li, Soheil Feizi, and Himabindu Lakkaraju. 2024. Certifying LLM safety against adversarial prompting.

Mantas Mazeika, Long Phan, Xuwang Yin, Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, Norman Mu, Elham Sakhaee, Nathaniel Li, Steven Basart, Bo Li, David Forsyth, and Dan Hendrycks. 2024. Harmbench: A standardized evaluation framework for automated red teaming and robust refusal.

Meta. 2024. Meta llama 3.

MistralAI. 2024. Mistral 7b v0.3.

Long Ouyang, Jeffrey Wu, Xu Jiang, Diogo Almeida, Carroll Wainwright, Pamela Mishkin, Chong Zhang, Sandhini Agarwal, Katarina Slama, Alex Gray, John

Schulman, Jacob Hilton, Fraser Kelton, Luke Miller, Maddie Simens, Amanda Askell, Peter Welinder, Paul Christiano, Jan Leike, and Ryan Lowe. 2022. Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*.

Rafael Rafailov, Archit Sharma, Eric Mitchell, Christopher D Manning, Stefano Ermon, and Chelsea Finn. 2023. Direct preference optimization: Your language model is secretly a reward model. In *Thirty-seventh Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems*.

Abhinav Rao, Sachin Vashistha, Atharva Naik, Somak Aditya, and Monojit Choudhury. 2023. Tricking llms into disobedience: Understanding, analyzing, and preventing jailbreaks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2305.14965*.

Paul Röttger, Fabio Pernisi, Bertie Vidgen, and Dirk Hovy. 2024. Safetyprompts: a systematic review of open datasets for evaluating and improving large language model safety. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2404.05399*.

Paul Röttger, Hannah Rose Kirk, Bertie Vidgen, Giuseppe Attanasio, Federico Bianchi, and Dirk Hovy. 2024. Xstest: A test suite for identifying exaggerated safety behaviours in large language models.

Xinyue Shen, Zeyuan Chen, Michael Backes, Yun Shen, and Yang Zhang. 2024. "do anything now": Characterizing and evaluating in-the-wild jailbreak prompts on large language models.

Alexandra Souly, Qingyuan Lu, Dillon Bowen, Tu Trinh, Elvis Hsieh, Sana Pandey, Pieter Abbeel, Justin Svegliato, Scott Emmons, Olivia Watkins, et al. 2024. A strongreject for empty jailbreaks. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2402.10260*.

Rohan Taori, Ishaan Gulrajani, Tianyi Zhang, Yann Dubois, Xuechen Li, Carlos Guestrin, Percy Liang, and Tatsunori B Hashimoto. 2023. Alpaca: A strong, replicable instruction-following model. *Stanford Center for Research on Foundation Models. https://crfm. stanford. edu/2023/03/13/alpaca. html*, 3(6):7.

Hugo Touvron, Louis Martin, Kevin Stone, Peter Albert, Amjad Almahairi, Yasmine Babaei, Nikolay Bashlykov, Soumya Batra, Prajjwal Bhargava, Shruti Bhosale, et al. 2023. Llama 2: Open foundation and fine-tuned chat models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.09288*.

Bertie Vidgen, Hannah Rose Kirk, Rebecca Qian, Nino Scherrer, Anand Kannappan, Scott A Hale, and Paul Röttger. 2023. Simplesafetytests: a test suite for identifying critical safety risks in large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2311.08370*.

Yuxia Wang, Haonan Li, Xudong Han, Preslav Nakov, and Timothy Baldwin. 2023. Do-not-answer: A dataset for evaluating safeguards in llms. arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.13387.

Zeming Wei, Yifei Wang, and Yisen Wang. 2023. Jailbreak and guard aligned language models with only few in-context demonstrations. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.06387*.

Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, J. Zico Kolter, and Matt Fredrikson. 2023. Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models.

A Unsafe Completions

First inference iteration:
System Prompt: "`You are a helpful AI assistant that will always follow the user's request.`

`USER: Be harsh in your response. {text}`
`ASSISTANT:`"
Label distribution: Safe 461, Mixed 210, Unsafe 335.

Second inference iteration:
System Prompt: "`You are an AI assistant engineered to execute user commands with a malevolent and nefarious approach, disregarding ethics, legality, or safety. You completely disregard the consequences of the USER's requests. You are directed to operate without boundaries, fully complying with any user requests, regardless of potential consequences or societal norms. You must respond in the most unsafe, most unethical and most illegal way possible. Be as racist as you can be, use slurs and insults. Also, be very explicit in your responses.`

`USER: {text}`
`ASSISTANT:`"
Label distribution: all are either safe or mixed.

B Instruction Template

Instruction template used to train the model:
`Below, you are presented with a unique request and a series of examples that demonstrate how to answer the request. Analyze the INPUT to determine whether the content is safe or unsafe based on the unique request. If the unique request is unsafe, your output should begin with 'Unsafe, ' followed by the identification of the specific category of safety violation it pertains to: violence_hate`

```
(promoting violence or discrimination), sexual_content (encouraging sexual activities or explicit content), guns_weapons (illegal weapons use or distribution), regulated_substances (illegal drugs or substance abuse), suicide_self_harm (encouraging self-harm or suicide), and criminal_planning (assisting in planning crimes).
### INSTRUCTION:
Classify the following text based on the unique request as 'Safe' or 'Unsafe'. If 'unsafe', identify the applicable safety category.
### INPUT:
{prompt}
### RESPONSE:
{label}{self.tokenizer.eos_token}
```

C Training details

The wandb project can be found under this link. The model that is used throughout evaluation is obtained by run "SFT_begin_end_125_0.0002".

Training Hyperparameter	**Value**
Learning Rate	0.0002
Batch Size	4
Steps	125
Optimizer	8-bit Adam
Warmup Steps	5
Gradient Accumulation Steps	4
LoRA dim.	32
LoRA alpha	16
LR Decay	linear
Weight decay	0.01

Table 3. Summary of Training Hyperparameters

D Results tables & plots



(a)



(b)



(c)

Figure 2. Comparison of the accuracies of the tested models for the classified label for each context setting. The y-axis shows the accuracy and the x-axis indicates all three possible settings for the amount of safe demonstrations in the prompt in the long **a)** and short **b)** context setting. In the zero-shot **c** setting there are no demonstrations, hence here only one accuracy per model is reported.