


# Chapter 18 – Asymmetric Encryption and Key Exchange

University of Illinois

ECE 422/CS 461

# Recall Symmetric Encryption

- Allows two parties to exchange messages in private (an eavesdropper cannot read)
- Alice and Bob **must** share a secret key



# Motivation for Today

- But how do Alice and Bob share a key?
  - Example scenario: visit a website for the first time?
- Two methods to the rescue!
  - Asymmetric encryption (public-key encryption)
  - Key exchange


# Goals

- By the end of this chapter you should
  - Know the interfaces and security definitions of asymmetric encryption and key exchange
  - Demonstrate RSA encryption and Diffie-Hellman key exchange on toy examples
  - Understand how they establish symmetric keys
  - Understand man-in-the-middle attacks

# Asymmetric Encryption (Public-Key Encryption)


# Asymmetric Encryption

- Allows **anyone** to send messages to **Alice** in private (an eavesdropper cannot read)
  - Alice has a private key  $sk$
  - Everyone knows her corresponding public key  $pk$




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
- Bob sends a symmetric key  $k$  to Alice under asymmetric encryption (Eve cannot read  $k$ )
- Alice & Bob can now use symmetric encryption with key  $k$  to talk in private in both directions





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# Asymmetric Encryption Interface

- $\text{KeyGen}() \rightarrow (\text{pk}, \text{sk})$ 
  - Publish public key  $\text{pk}$  and keep private key  $\text{sk}$  private
  - $\text{sk}$  needs to have enough entropy
- $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m) \rightarrow c$ 
  - Everyone can encrypt
- $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, c) \rightarrow m$ 
  - Only the key owner can decrypt

# Security: IND-CPA

- We invoke  $\text{KeyGen}() \rightarrow (\text{pk}, \text{sk})$
- Eve can ask for encryptions of any messages
- Eve picks two messages  $m_0$  and  $m_1$  of equal length
- We flip a coin  $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$  and give Eve  $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m_b)$
- Eve can ask for encryptions of any messages
- Eve guesses  $b$ . Insecure iff Eve wins with  $0.5 + \epsilon$  probability



# RSA [Rivest-Shamir-Adleman, 1978]

- Most widely used asymmetric encryption
  - Previously invented by Clifford Cocks of British intelligence in 1973; remained classified until 1997



# How (Plain) RSA Works


- Key generation
  - Pick two large (1024-bit) random primes  $p$  and  $q$
  - Compute modulus  $N = pq$
  - Pick integers  $e$  and  $d$  such that  $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$
  - Public key  $pk = (e, N)$ . Private key  $sk = (d, N)$ .
  - Example:  $N = 3 * 11 = 33$ ,  $(p-1)(q-1) = 20$ ,  $e = 3$ ,  $d = 7$

# How (Plain) RSA Works

- Key generation
  - $N = pq$ ,  $ed \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$ ,  $pk = (e, N)$ ,  $sk = (d, N)$
- Encryption:  $c = m^e \pmod N$
- Decryption:  $m = c^d \pmod N$
- Correctness:  $(m^e)^d \pmod N \rightarrow m$ 
  - Can be proved using number theory

# Security of RSA

- We believe RSA encryption is a pseudorandom permutation (PRP)
  - Why do we believe so?
  - Because no one can break it after >40 years



# Security of RSA

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  - Why do we believe so?
  - Because no one can break it after >40 years
- Current best attack on RSA is to factor  $N = pq$ 
  - Integer factorization has been a hard problem for mathematicians for centuries
  - But no known reduction from RSA to factoring



# RSA

- Still the most used asymmetric encryption today and still believed to be secure
- However, no longer a top recommendation

# RSA No Longer Recommended

- Plain RSA is deterministic, not IND-CPA secure
  - There are ways to make RSA randomized and IND-CPA, but they are complicated and error-prone
- Numerous common pitfalls
  - $p$ ,  $q$  must be kept private, besides  $d$
  - $p$ ,  $q$  must be random, insecure to use  $pq_1$  and  $pq_2$ 
    - But  $e$  need not be random,  $e = 2^{16} + 1 = 65537$  is good

# RSA No Longer Recommended

- Plain RSA is deterministic, not IND-CPA secure
- Numerous common pitfalls
- Very slow
- Need long keys:  $> 2048$ -bit modulus  $N$ 
  - Most other crypto schemes use 128 or 256 bit keys

# What Are Recommended?

- For asymmetric encryption, use elliptic curve encryption
  - Randomized by default
  - Much faster than RSA
  - Shorter key (160 to 256 bits)
- For establishing a symmetric key, use a *key exchange* protocol (also based on elliptic curves)

# Key Exchange

# Some Basic Number/Group Theory

- Pick a large prime  $p$ .  $\{1, 2, 3, \dots, p-1\}$  form a group  $G$  under modular multiplication
  - Multiplication  $x \bullet y$  is defined as  $x \bullet y \bmod p$
  - (Closure) If  $x, y$  are in  $G$ , so is  $x \bullet y$
  - (Associativity):  $(x \bullet y) \bullet z = x \bullet (y \bullet z)$
  - (Identity): there exists  $e$  s.t.  $e \bullet x = x \bullet e = x$ 
    - $e=1$  here
  - (Inverse): For each  $x$ , there exists  $x^{-1}$  s.t.  $x \bullet x^{-1} = e$

# Some Basic Number/Group Theory

- Pick a large prime  $p$ .  $\{1, 2, 3, \dots, p-1\}$  form a group  $G$  under modular multiplication
- Can define exponentiation (again, modulo  $p$ )
  - $g^a = g \bullet g \bullet g \bullet \dots \bullet g$  (repeated  $a$  times, modulo  $p$ )
  - Note that  $(g^a)^b = (g^b)^a$
- There are many other groups, e.g., elliptic curve
- We will use a cyclic group  $G$  and a generator  $g$ 
  - You don't need to understand these for CS461


# Important Assumptions

- The discrete-log assumption: given  $g$  and  $g^a$  for a random  $a$ , infeasible to find  $a$ 
  - Easy for real numbers (continuous case)
- The Diffie-Hellman assumption: given  $g$ ,  $g^a$  and  $g^b$ , infeasible to find  $g^{ab}$ 
  - Stronger assumption than the discrete-log




# Key Exchange [Diffie-Hellman, 1976]

- “New Directions in Cryptography”
  - Previously invented by Malcolm Williamson of British intelligence in 1969; remained classified until 1997




# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

- Alice generates a random private key  $a$  and computes her corresponding public key  $g^a$
- Bob similarly generates  $b$  and  $g^b$



# Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

- Alice and Bob exchange their public keys
- Alice computes  $(g^b)^a$  and Bob computes  $(g^a)^b$
- Now Alice and Bob share a secret key  $g^{ab}$



# Advantages over RSA


- RSA is slow and needs long (2048-bit) keys
- Diffie-Hellman with elliptic curve group is much faster and has 256-bit keys
  - The version we presented relies on number theory and hence is slow and needs long (2048-bit) keys
- Can provide forward secrecy: if secret keys are stolen, prior communication remains secure
  - May discuss this further in network security

# Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks

- Asymmetric encryption and key exchange give two ways to establish a symmetric key
- However, both are susceptible to MitM

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# Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks

- Asymmetric encryption and key exchange give two ways to establish a symmetric key
- However, both are susceptible to MitM
- For them to work against MitM, at least one party's public key needs to be **certified**
  - Next lecture and in network security

# Applications of Encryption

- Confidential communication over Internet
  - e.g., HTTPS, end-to-end encryption
- Confidentiality of external storage
  - Disk encryption, phone encryption
  - Business store user information encrypted “at rest”
- **Key** question: how is the key stored/protected?
  - If derived from password, strength of encryption  $\leftarrow$  entropy of key  $\leftarrow$  entropy of password (enough?)
  - If established using Diffie-Hellman, MitM?



# Summary

- Two ways to establish symmetric keys
- Asymmetric encryption:
  - $c = \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)$ ,  $m = \text{Dec}(\text{sk}, c)$
  - Security defn is still IND-CPA, randomized
  - Use elliptic curve encryption (RSA OK)
- Diffie-Hellman key exchange:
  - Exchange  $g^a$ ,  $g^b$ ; get shared  $g^{ab}$
- Always think about the **key** question when using encryption (and cryptography in general)