

Housing and Heterogeneity: A Narrative and An Agenda

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**"Housing, Credit, and Heterogeneity:
New Challenges for Stabilization Policies"**

Riksbank, Stockholm, September 2018

Alternate History? ('History 2.0')

From 1998 We Had 2030 Tools:

2030 Data: *Panel* data at the household level:

- Integrated HH balance sheets
 - Registry, or Mint.com (<https://mint.com>)-type

2030 Data: *Panel* data at the household level:

- Integrated HH balance sheets
 - Registry, or Mint.com (<https://mint.com>)-type
- *With*
 - Expectations ('What will [asset] prices do?')
 - Explanations ('Why?')
 - Hypotheticals ('What would you do if?')
 - Uncertainty, Perceived Constraints ...
 - Whatever models say matters

2030 Models: Expectations Endogenized

Many competing theories right now

- Fading Memory
- Diagnostic
Expectations
- k-Level Thinking

Winner Will Have Two Features


1. Expectations have an important extrapolative component

- *Perception* of $\Delta p_t \Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta p_{t+1}]$

Winner Will Have Two Features

1. Expectations have an important extrapolative component

- *Perception of $\Delta p_t \Rightarrow E_t[\Delta p_{t+1}]$*



Winner Will Have Two Features

1. Heterogeneity in the interval used for extrapolation

- Shiller looks back 150 years
- Some don't remember events from 10 years ago
 - Low-memory types: Young people, e.g.

... Toy 2030 Theory: Anatomy Of Bubbles

1. Some genuine good news arrives

- Causing initial

$$\Delta p_{t+1} > \mathbb{E}_t[\Delta p_{t+1}]$$

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1. Extrapolative $E[\Delta p]$ spreads to "susceptible" like disease

- Dies out if not enough are "susceptible"
 - People with access to funds ...
 - ... and short 'memory'
 - ... who are optimists
- Infection \approx amount *marginal* extra demand

... Toy 2030 Theory: Anatomy Of Bubbles

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1. Bubble collapse: like "recovery" from infection

Prehistory

Mid-90's Productivity Acceleration

- Greenspan's "New Economy" (~1996)
- Becomes Consensus:
 - Economic Report of the President (2001)
(http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/economic_reports/2001.pdf)

Prehistory

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
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⇒ Boom in asset prices

- Stock Market (1994-2000)
- Also big ↑ in house prices (~1997-2002)

Housing Prices Started Rising: ~1997

Real House Prices



The Boom: History 1.0 - Facts

2000-01: Contra , housing was *not* the cycle

- Barely a blip in house prices or construction

2001-06: "Global Savings Glut ('GSG')"

- ⇒ Interest rates lowest since Great Depression
- Continuing ↑ in availability of credit across the board
 - Subprime *and* prime
 - Primary *and* nonprimary

The Boom: History 1.0 - Contemporaneous Views

- First prominent claims housing bubble is inflating?
 -
 -
- "That Hissing Sound"
- 'Financial innovation'
 - 'Something funny going on around here'
- Popular culture
 - "Flip That House" first episode: July 2005

The Boom: History 1.0 - Contemporaneous Views

"It is *Not* A Bubble"

- 2005 JEP
Paper

Instead, It's Improved Fundamentals

- "New Economy", Low **R**, 'financial innovation'

The Boom: History 2.0 (2002-2006)

- 2030 Theory: Improved fundamentals are *prereq* for a bubble
 - Not an argument against a bubble
 - Bubble? Depends on "infectiousness" of Δp
 - How new *marginal* demand
 - Buy *because of* $\Delta p_t \Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_{i,t+1}[\Delta p_{t+1}]$

The Boom: History 2.0 (2002-2006)

- 2030 Data: Many in "susceptible" (=marginal) pool in 2002-03

1. Beneficiaries of 'financial innovation'

- New people who *can* participate
 - (Mian and Sufi, Gramlich)
- Others who can borrow more
 - (Adelino et al)

2. "New Economy" beliefs + Bush tax cuts ...

- People with money to invest ...
- ... pessimistic about stock market (after dot-com bust)
- ... but optimistic about house prices (extrapolating)

History 2.0 (2003/4-2006): Infection Spreading

- 2030 Data: We see expectations and options changing *heterogenously*
 - Among *marginal* buyers, we see \uparrow in $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}[\Delta p_{t+1}]$
 - We ask them why \uparrow in $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}[\Delta p_{t+1}]$
 - They say, basically, "momentum"
 - and the marginal buyers say *they are buying*:
 - because $\mathbb{E}_{i,t}[\Delta p_{t+}^h]$
 - Many are "real estate investors"
 - Among *nonbuyers* we *at the same time* see *decline* in expectations
 - Dispersion of beliefs may be predictive

History 2.0 (2003/4-2006): Infection Spreading

Before 2030 Data: "You know it's a bubble" when

- 1920s: Shoeshine boys give stock tips (Joe Kennedy)
- 2000s: 'Flip That House': Hairdressers, bartenders become flippers

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2018 Data Soo: News index gets us partway

2030 Data *are* the plural of anecdotes.

Boom to Bust (2007-2008): History 1.0


Competing Interpretations of Great Recession

1. Huge negative shock to credit supply
 - Eggertson and Krugman, Guerrieri and Lorenzoni, Mian and Sufi
2. Huge increase in uncertainty
 - Bloom, many others

Boom to Bust: History 2.0 (2007-08)

- In 2006-07, *expansion* of credit stops
 - *Low memory marginal types* extrapolate quickly:
 - Low memory former optimists become pessimists
 - $\Delta p_{2007}^h < \mathbb{E}_{2006}[\Delta p_{2007}^h]$
 - $\Rightarrow \mathbb{E}_{2007}[\Delta p_{2008}^h] < \mathbb{E}_{2006}[\Delta p_{2008}^h]$
 - Hissing sound gets loud
 - Explains slowdown 2006-2008q2
 - Guess: Does *not* explain collapse between 2008q2-2008q4

Year over Year Change in Retail Sales, Source: Census Bureau



Boom to Bust: History 2.0 (2008q2-2008q4)

2030 Data

- Consumption collapsed even:
 - For people who are never going to want to borrow
 - More for people whose expectations deteriorated more
 - In regions where there had not been a boom

2030 Theory

- Degree of uncertainty is a "fundamental"
 - We see huge increase in uncertainty
 - Those whose uncertainty increased more, cut C more

The Boom: History 2.0 (2002-2006, Macropru edition)

- Macropru regulators know how to do *micro* 'stress tests' <!-- * Prudence: $\mathbb{E}[u']$
 - At date t , see dist'n of balance sheets *and* $\mathbb{E}_t[\Delta p_{t+}^h]$
 - Can see unusual participation by *marginal* types -->
 - 2030 Theory: We know what circs cause defaults
 - *Different* for investors vs primary owners
 - Can simulate defaults under alternate *future* histories:
 - Productivity growth, interest rates, uncertainty
 - ,
- By 2006, micro stress tests reveal major fragility to minor shocks
 - Vulnerability to massive departure of *marginal* demand
 - "Investors" as well as primary

The Boom: History 2.0 (2002-2006, Macropru edition)

Which Macropru policies do what?

- 2030 Theory+Data: First-and-only mortgage: default when
 - Underwater + Negative income shock ('double trigger')


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 - Underwater + Negative income shock ('double trigger')
- 2030 Theory
 - : Theory that matches 'double trigger' facts implies
 - Debt-To-Value rules insulate against income shocks
 - Payment-To-Income rules insulate against p^h shocks
 - With ARMs, Debt-To-Income insures r shocks (?)
 - Calibrated stress tests tell you which to adjust

Khan (2018): Macropuru Effectiveness Vs Shock Kinds

Default Rate



The Boom: History 2.0 (2002-2006, Macropru edition)

New kinds of macropru rules

- Countercyclical rules that target "speculative" demand. Examples:
 - Risk-weighted capital rules where "riskiness" rises with
 - Proportion of aggregate lending for non-primary-residence
 - Proportion of buyers who *say* they are buying because $\mathbb{E}[\Delta p^h]$ high

The Boom: History 2.0 (2002-2006, Macropuru edition)

Consequence? History 2.0 differs from 1.0

- Size of bubble is smaller
- For a given bubble size, consequences are milder

Part 2: Agenda

Modeling (near term priorities)

Incorporate real estate investing in HH problem

- On top of "primary housing" choices
 - Difference: Less "utility cost" of defaulting
- Governed by same expectations, explanations
- In *model* eqbm, consumers face choice between:
 - Stock market
 - Real estate

New focus of models (and analysis thereof):

- *Tell us what to do on surveys*
 - Expectations and Explanations of *what?*
 - Whose expectations and explanations?

Examples

- Kaplan, Mitman, Violante (2018):
 - Expectations are central explanation of Great Recession
 - Their model: Changed beliefs about "fundamentals"
 - \Rightarrow *ask people beliefs about fundamentals*
 - 'I think R is permanently lower'? or
 - 'Prices have been going up (resp. down)'
- Garriga and Hedlund (2018):
 - Liquidity dries up when housing market tanks
 - \Rightarrow first-order precautionary effects
 - Who to target?
 - Marginal sellers in good and bad markets
 - *Ask them* how their behavior is affected by liquidity

Dynamics (not just steady states)

- *Especially* for the marginal players
- Sluggishness in p^h *and behavior* comes from:
 - Search frictions
 - Information frictions
 - Everybody knows everything instantly: won't work
- Very hard

Modeling Expectations and Explanations (Desiderata)

- Ideally, same deep model for *Everybody*
 - Difference in deep parameter like "memory"
 - Most diffs in behavior explained by circs
- Behavioral foundations strongly disciplined by evidence
 - "Other people are like me"
 - "Representativeness Heuristic"
 - Fading Memory
 - ...

Deep Improvements in Modeling Practice

Need a DYNARE for HA modeling

- ECB can run Riksbank model calibrated to Italy
- Riksbank can run Fed model calibrated to Sweden
- Pontus can run Pavel's model; etc

Feasible with modern collaborative software development tools:

- Modular
- Open-source
- Platform-Independent
- Automatic testing/debugging tools
- Robust reproducibility

Getting There?

- Institutional support of infrastructure development
 - Like DYNARE has had
 - As is done in other scientific/technical fields
 - Astronomy, Artificial Intelligence, Bayesian Statistics, Biology, ... (<https://www.scipy.org/topical-software.html>)
- Changes in professional equilibria
 - "Publication"
 - Referees need to be able to run your code
 - Readers need to be able to reproduce your results
 - Otherwise, it's not really "public"
- Beginning: Econ-ARK (<http://econ-ark.org>) project

Abolish Consumer Expenditure Surveys

Replace them with Consumer *Expectations* Surveys

- Get expenditures from admin data (Mint.com, registries)
- Use precious survey time asking:
 - expectations
 - explanations: 'Did you buy that second house because \uparrow in $\mathbb{E}_i[\Delta p^h]$?'
 - *whatever else models say is important*
- Oversample potential *marginal* decisionmakers
 - e.g. intensive focus on new homebuyers

"2030 Data" and "2030 Theory" By 2030?

- Depends, In Large Part, On You!
 - People in this room and people you know
- Great Recession cost trillions of dollars
 - "2030 Data" and "2030 Theory" might have prevented it
- Getting to "2030 Theory" and "2030 Data" - Cost
 - A few millions
- Central Banks, IMF, Statistical agencies:
 - Seems like a no-brainer
- Please make me a retrospective prophet!

References