### Sequence Form Solver Documentation and Test Cases Reca Sarfati

March 2018

#### 1 Code Explained

The file sequence\_form.py contains the following main methods:

#### - decorate\_sequences(bt)

This function consumes a tree, and performs a breadth-first search so as to decorate each node with the unique sequences of player 1 and player 2's movement decisions from the root to itself. A decision is encoded as the index of the child, enumerating from left to right. (For example, if a given node has two children, and the sequence elects to move to the leftmost child, a 'o' is stored). The method then returns a list of nodes.

# extensive\_to\_strategic\_form(game) As it sounds, this method intakes a decorated game, and populates the A and B matrices, corresponding to players' payoff matrices.

### extensive\_to\_sequence\_form(game) This method, similarly, intakes a decorated game, and returns the A, B, E, F, e, f, matrices.

### solve\_strategic\_form(game) This method computes player 1's strategy for inputted strategic form matrices A, B.

### solve\_strategic\_form(game) This method computes player 1's strategy for inputted strategic form matrices A, B.


# solve\_strategic\_form(game) This method computes player 1's strategy for inputted sequence form matrices A, B, E, F, e, f.

The file sequence\_form\_test.py contains various named tests, annotated in the ensuing pages.

#### **Tests**

#### Von Stengel Test 2.1

In this test, we solve the same tree as in the paper: 1



<sup>1</sup> Colored blocks indicate information sets, where 1 implies player A's turn, and 2 implies player B's.


The associated payoff matrices for players A and B are as follows:

$$E = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & & & \\ -1 & 1 & 1 & \\ & -1 & & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad e = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$F = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & & \\ -1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \quad f = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

#### Test 2: Three Branches, Unbalanced

In this test, we solve the following zero-sum game:




The associated payoff matrices for players A and B are as follows:

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & r & m & & & \varnothing & 1 & r & m \\ 1 & & & & & \\ & & 4 & & & \\ & & 2 & & & \\ & & 3 & & & \\ & & & & 5 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \varnothing & & & & \\ L & & & & \\ RS & & & B = \begin{bmatrix} -1 & & & & & \\ -1 & & & & & \\ & & & -4 & & \\ & & & -2 & & & \\ & & & & -3 & & \\ & & & & & -5 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} \varnothing & & & \\ L & & & \\ RS & & & \\ RT & & & \\ RT & & & \\ RU & & & & -5 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$F = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & & & \\ -1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \qquad f = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

### 2.3 Test 3: Complete Binary Tree, Depth 3

In this test, we solve the following zero-sum game on a complete binary tree:




The associated payoff matrices for players A and B are as follows:

$$F = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & l & r \\ 1 & & \\ -1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix}, \qquad f = \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

### 2.4 Test 4: Highly Uneven Tree, Depth 5

In this test, we solve the following zero-sum game on a highly uneven tree:



The associated payoff matrices for players A and B are as follows: