

Functional Dependency, Integrity Evaluation, and Modulated Behavior: A Descriptive Model and its Foundational Prerequisites

Muhammad Fajar Ismail

vadjhars@gmail.com

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Abstract

This document presents a framework analyzing subject behavior within contexts characterized by functional dependency on external entities or systems. Central to this framework is a Descriptive Model stating that affirming an entity's existence and perceived functional value often sustains or is necessitated by functional dependency; the alignment between this dependency-state and the subject's interpretation of integrity generates pressure towards allowance or disallowance, whose behavioral manifestation is significantly shaped by the dependency's intensity, perceived action-costs, and external constraints. The analysis identifies four Fundamental Prerequisites necessary for the operation of this model: (FP1) Capacity for Internal Representation, (FP2) Capacity for Internal Evaluation, (FP3) Capacity for Directed Interaction, and (FP4) Structure Permitting External Relation. The specific Conditions of Possibility entailed by each Fundamental Prerequisite for its non-arbitrary functioning are detailed. The document demonstrates the logical construction of the Descriptive Model from these Prerequisites and Conditions. Furthermore, it provides an exploration of the core concepts integral to the model, examining their dimensions and interconnections within the described dynamic, and notes points pertinent to the framework's scope and granularity. The presentation focuses on the structural components and logical relationships within the outlined framework.

1. Introduction and The Descriptive Model

1.1 Domain of Inquiry

This document addresses the processes involved when an acting subject navigates circumstances characterized by reliance on external entities or systems. Specifically, it examines the interplay between the subject's internal assessments, including evaluations based on internal standards, and the subject's resulting behavioral patterns within these contexts of reliance. The scope of inquiry focuses primarily on the internal sequence of representation, evaluation, and motivation as it interacts with perceived external conditions to shape observable actions.

The examination centers on situations where a subject's capacity to achieve goals or fulfill needs is perceived to be connected to or contingent upon an external element. Such situations prompt internal processes related to acknowledging, evaluating, and managing this relationship of contingency. The analysis considers how internal standards or frameworks influence the subject's assessment of this relationship and how this assessment, in turn, relates to subsequent actions. Furthermore, it incorporates the role of contextual factors, such as the perceived nature of the reliance and the anticipated consequences of potential actions, in modulating the expression of behavior.

This domain intersects with several areas of study. For instance, philosophical inquiries into agency consider the nature of action, intention, and practical reason, often exploring how internal states like beliefs, desires, and values relate to external behavior (Anscombe, 1957; Davidson, 1963). Within psychology, theories of motivation examine the internal drives and cognitive processes that initiate, direct, and sustain goal-oriented behavior (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Bandura, 1991), while studies on cognitive dissonance explore the mental discomfort experienced when holding conflicting beliefs, values, or attitudes, particularly regarding one's actions (Festinger, 1957). Sociology and political science investigate relationships of power and dependence between actors, groups, and institutions, analyzing how structural positions influence behavior and compliance (Emerson, 1962; Lukes, 2005). Decision theory mathematically models choices under conditions of uncertainty and varying outcomes, often incorporating assessments of utility or cost (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Ethical theories explore the nature of norms, values, and principles used in evaluating actions and states of affairs (Kant, 1785; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*; Mill, 1863).

While drawing upon concepts related to these fields for definitional clarity and exploring potential conceptual intersections, this document does not aim to adjudicate between existing theories or position itself definitively within any single discipline. Its purpose is to articulate a specific descriptive model outlining a particular sequence of internal processing and external interaction within the defined domain of reliance and evaluation, based on a specified set of underlying prerequisites. The focus remains on the logical structure and internal coherence of the proposed model and its foundational elements.

1.2 The Descriptive Model

The central structure describing the dynamic under examination is stated as follows:

"Affirming an entity's existence and perceived functional value often sustains or is necessitated by functional dependency. The alignment between this dependency-state and the subject's interpretation of integrity generates pressure towards allowance or disallowance, whose behavioral manifestation is significantly shaped by the dependency's intensity, perceived action-costs, and external constraints."

To facilitate understanding of this model, the key terms employed require precise definition within this specific context.

- **Subject:**

- *Definition within this model:* The locus of the internal processing (representation, evaluation, motivation) and action selection described. It is the entity performing the affirmation, experiencing the dependency, holding the interpretation of integrity, generating pressure, and exhibiting the behavioral manifestation.
- *Considerations:* This usage focuses on the functional role of the subject as an information-processing and acting system within the model's framework. It does not necessarily equate to broader philosophical conceptions of 'self', 'personhood', or 'consciousness' in their entirety, although the capacity for certain conscious or cognitive operations (as detailed by the Fundamental Prerequisites later) is presupposed. It can refer to an individual organism or potentially a collective entity (like an organization or state) insofar as that collective entity exhibits analogous capacities for shared representation, evaluation against collective norms, and coordinated action, though the complexities increase in the collective case (Arrow, 1951; Pettit, 2003). The term is used here primarily to designate the system undergoing the described process.

- **Entity:**

- *Definition within this model:* Any distinguishable element external to the subject upon which the subject exhibits functional dependency. This can encompass physical objects (e.g., a tool, a machine), biological organisms (e.g., another person, a microorganism), systems (e.g., an ecosystem, a life support system, an economic system, a political regime), abstract structures (e.g., an ideology, a social norm, a belief system), or technological agents (e.g., an AI system).
- *Considerations:* The primary characteristic is its distinctness from the subject and its role as the object of the subject's dependency and affirmation within the specific context being analyzed. The nature of the entity (animate, inanimate, abstract, concrete) influences the specific character of the dependency and potential integrity evaluations but does not alter its role *as* the entity within the model's structure.

- **Affirming:**

- *Definition within this model:* The cognitive act performed by the subject that involves (a) acknowledging the existence of the entity as relevant within the current context and (b) assigning a specific perceived functional value to that entity in relation to the subject's operative needs or goals.
- *Considerations:* This act is primarily cognitive, distinct from overt behavioral assent, although it is seen as a prerequisite for intentional engagement. It is not necessarily an endorsement of the entity's overall worth or morality, but a recognition of its *functional role* in the context of the dependency. The term

"acknowledging existence" refers to representing the entity as present and operationally relevant, not necessarily making an ontological commitment in a deep philosophical sense. This differs from uses of 'affirmation' in psychology focused solely on bolstering self-worth (Steele, 1988), though the act described here might have secondary psychological effects. It aligns more closely with the basic cognitive requirement of recognizing and evaluating elements relevant to goal pursuit (as considered in cognitive architectures like ACT-R or Soar, e.g., Anderson et al., 2004; Laird, 2012). The possibility of this affirmation being coerced or performed under duress (as explored in scenario testing) indicates it is not necessarily a purely voluntary or enthusiastic internal act but can be a pragmatically necessary cognitive step for navigating a dependency.

- **Perceived Functional Value:**

- *Definition within this model:* The subject's internal assessment of the entity's utility, instrumentality, or effectiveness in relation to fulfilling specific needs or advancing specific goals of the subject within the context of the dependency.
- *Considerations:* This value is explicitly *functional* and *perceived*. It is subjective to the subject and relative to the specific need/goal at hand. It does not necessarily correspond to any objective measure of utility, nor does it encompass other types of value (e.g., intrinsic moral worth, aesthetic value, emotional attachment value), although these other values might coexist or conflict with the perceived functional value. For example, a subject might perceive high functional value in a polluting factory for providing employment (goal: income) while simultaneously assigning negative moral value to its environmental impact. The model focuses specifically on the functional value as the component linked directly to the affirmation necessitated by dependency management. This concept relates to notions of instrumental value in philosophy (distinguished from intrinsic value, e.g., Korsgaard, 1983) and utility in decision theory, but here it emphasizes the subjective perception driving the affirmation within the dependency context.

- **Functional Dependency:**

- *Definition within this model:* A relational state wherein the subject relies on the specified external entity for the fulfillment of one or more operative needs or the pursuit of one or more operative goals. The fulfillment or pursuit is perceived by the subject to be contingent upon interaction with, or the state of, the entity.
- *Considerations:* This definition emphasizes the *function* being served by the dependency relationship relative to the subject's needs/goals. It distinguishes dependency from mere interaction or preference; dependency implies a degree of necessity or reliance. It aligns with sociological conceptions where dependency relates to the control of resources needed by another actor (Emerson, 1962), but focuses here on the subject's *internal state* of reliance and its perception. The dependency can vary in scope (reliance for one specific function vs. multiple needs), intensity (degree of reliance), duration (temporary vs. chronic), and voluntariness (chosen vs. imposed). The model accommodates

various forms (physiological, psychological, social, etc.) provided they fit the core definition of reliance for need/goal fulfillment.

- **Interpretation of Integrity:**

- *Definition within this model:* The subject's operative internal normative framework, comprising the set of standards, principles, values, or self-conceptions used by the subject to evaluate the alignment or appropriateness of its own states, actions, or relationships, including the dependency-state itself.
- *Considerations:* This is defined subjectively – it is the framework *as interpreted and utilized by the subject* in the evaluation process. It may draw upon broader ethical theories (e.g., deontological rules, consequentialist calculations, virtue-based character standards) or personal values, social norms, professional codes, or self-identity constructs. The framework need not be perfectly coherent or explicitly articulated by the subject, but it must be sufficiently structured to allow for comparative evaluation (as per CoP 2.4). The term 'integrity' is used here in a broad sense, encompassing concepts of wholeness, consistency (internal and between values/actions), adherence to one's own endorsed norms, or congruence with self-identity (related to concepts of authenticity or identity integrity, e.g., Erikson, 1968; Frankfurt, 1971). Its specific content will vary between subjects and contexts, but its functional role within the model is as the internal standard for the alignment evaluation.

- **Alignment (between dependency-state and integrity interpretation):**

- *Definition within this model:* The degree of congruence, consistency, or lack of conflict perceived by the subject when comparing the represented dependency-state (including its conditions, implications, and required actions) with the operative standards of its interpretation of integrity.
- *Considerations:* Alignment is presented as a continuum or a qualitative judgment (e.g., high alignment, low alignment, conflict/misalignment). Perfect alignment or complete misalignment might be rare; the evaluation often involves assessing degrees of fit or tension. The perception of alignment can be influenced by framing effects, motivated reasoning, or the salience of particular aspects of the dependency or the integrity framework at the time of evaluation (Kunda, 1990).

- **Pressure (towards allowance or disallowance):**

- *Definition within this model:* The internal motivational state or inclination generated within the subject as a consequence of the alignment evaluation. Perceived alignment tends to generate pressure towards allowance; perceived misalignment or conflict tends to generate pressure towards disallowance.
- *Considerations:* This "pressure" is conceptualized as an internal vector influencing potential action, akin to motivational drives or the affective component of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957). It is not necessarily conscious but represents the directional bias resulting from the evaluation. High conflict (misalignment) is expected to generate strong pressure towards disallowance (change), while high congruence generates pressure to maintain

the status quo (allowance). The magnitude of the pressure may correlate with the perceived degree of alignment/misalignment and the importance attributed to the specific integrity standards involved.

- **Allowance:**

- *Definition within this model:* The tendency or category of behavioral outcomes characterized by the subject maintaining, complying with, facilitating, or not actively resisting the existing dependency-state or its associated conditions.
- *Considerations:* Allowance represents the behavioral correlate of the internal pressure when it favors maintaining the status quo, or when modulating factors prevent the manifestation of disallowance pressure. It encompasses a range of actions from active support to passive compliance or tolerance. It does not necessarily imply approval, only a behavioral outcome consistent with continuation.

- **Disallowance:**

- *Definition within this model:* The tendency or category of behavioral outcomes characterized by the subject resisting, rejecting, attempting to alter, withdrawing from, or undermining the existing dependency-state or its associated conditions.
- *Considerations:* Disallowance represents the behavioral correlate of the internal pressure when it favors change due to perceived misalignment. It encompasses a range of actions from direct confrontation or termination of the relationship to subtle non-compliance, negotiation, seeking alternatives, or internal withdrawal.

- **Behavioral Manifestation:**

- *Definition within this model:* The observable pattern of actions (or inactions) exhibited by the subject in relation to the dependency-state. This is the final output of the internal process as modulated by contextual factors.
- *Considerations:* This manifestation is seen as falling somewhere on a spectrum influenced by the competing pressures towards allowance and disallowance, but crucially shaped by the modulating factors. The same internal pressure might lead to different behavioral manifestations depending on context (e.g., strong pressure towards disallowance might manifest as overt rebellion if costs/constraints are low, but only as covert non-compliance or psychological withdrawal if costs/constraints are high).

- **Dependency Intensity:**

- *Definition within this model:* The subject's perceived degree of reliance on the entity for need/goal fulfillment. This includes factors like the importance of the need/goal, the perceived availability of alternatives, and the potential consequences of disruption to the dependency.
- *Considerations:* Higher intensity generally implies that the need/goal is critical, alternatives are scarce or non-existent, and disruption is highly consequential. This factor directly influences the perceived cost of disallowance and shapes the behavioral manifestation. It is a key modulating variable acting on the pressure generated by the integrity evaluation.

- **Perceived Action-Costs:**

- *Definition within this model:* The subject's internal assessment of the anticipated negative consequences associated with potential behavioral manifestations (both allowance and disallowance actions). These costs can be material, social, psychological, temporal, ethical (e.g., causing harm to others), etc.
- *Considerations:* Costs are *perceived* and subjective, influenced by the subject's predictive modeling capabilities (CoP 3.4) and potentially by cognitive biases (e.g., loss aversion, Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The assessment weighs the anticipated negative outcomes of acting on the internal pressure (e.g., cost of resisting vs. cost of complying). This factor heavily modulates the translation of pressure into action.
- **External Constraints:**
 - *Definition within this model:* Objective limitations or restrictions imposed by the external environment or other agents that limit the subject's feasible range of actions, regardless of internal pressure or cost assessment.
 - *Considerations:* These are factors outside the subject's direct control that shape the possibility space for behavior (e.g., physical laws, geographical barriers, lack of resources, legal prohibitions enforced by external power, technological limitations). They represent hard limits on what behavioral manifestations are actually possible, acting as a final filter on action selection.

1.3 Outline of Document Structure

This document is organized into several parts to present the descriptive model and its underlying framework systematically.

- **Part 1** (current part) introduces the domain of inquiry and presents the descriptive model along with definitions of its core concepts.
- **Part 2** analyzes the functional requirements implied by the descriptive model and presents the set of fundamental prerequisites identified as necessary for these requirements.
- **Part 3** demonstrates the logical construction of the descriptive model from the interplay of the fundamental prerequisites and their entailed conditions.
- **Part 4** provides a detailed exposition of the specific conditions of possibility required for each fundamental prerequisite to hold non-arbitrarily.
- **Part 5** undertakes an exploration of the core concepts used in the descriptive model, examining their facets, potential variations, and internal dynamics.
- **Part 6** analyzes the interconnectedness of these core concepts as they function within the process outlined by the descriptive model.
- **Part 7** notes points identified during the analysis that may warrant further examination regarding the model's granularity, dynamics, or scope.
- **Part 8** provides a summary recapitulating the framework's structure.
- **Appendices** contain supplementary material including illustrative scenarios, logical structure mapping, and a glossary.

The structure aims to move from the presentation of the model to an analysis of its requirements, the identification of its foundational prerequisites, a demonstration of its logical construction, and a detailed exploration of its components and their interrelations.

2. Underlying Framework: Analysis and Prerequisites

2.1 Functional Requirements of the Descriptive Model

The descriptive model presented in Section 1.2 outlines a specific sequence involving perception, evaluation, motivation, and action modulation within contexts of dependency. For this sequence to operate as described, the subject and its environment must necessarily possess or permit certain functional capabilities and characteristics. This section analyzes the model component by component to identify these logical requirements.

- **Requirement Analysis for "Affirming an entity's existence and perceived functional value..."**
 - *Implied Subject Capabilities:*
 - **Object/Entity Distinction and Representation:** The subject must be capable of differentiating elements in its environment or internal cognitive space as distinct 'entities' separate from itself and from other entities. It must be able to form internal representations corresponding to these entities. Without this, there is no distinct 'entity' to affirm. This presupposes basic perceptual processing and object segmentation capabilities, whether applied to external sensory data or internal conceptual structures (cf. Marr, 1982, on stages of visual processing; Rosch, 1978, on prototype theory regarding category formation).
 - **Existence Acknowledgment/Relevance Assessment:** The subject must be able to cognitively register or acknowledge the presence and operational relevance of the represented entity within its current context. This goes beyond mere detection; it involves incorporating the entity into the subject's operative model of the situation. This requires mechanisms for selective attention and contextual binding (Posner & Petersen, 1990; Treisman & Gelade, 1980).
 - **Value Assignment Capacity:** The subject must possess mechanisms for assigning value to represented entities. Specifically, the model requires the assignment of *functional* value relative to needs/goals. This implies the subject has internal states corresponding to needs or goals (see below) and can evaluate entities based on their perceived instrumentality in relation to these states. This relates to concepts of utility calculation in decision theory or reinforcement learning mechanisms where stimuli acquire value based on association with need satisfaction or goal achievement (Sutton & Barto, 1998; Montague & Berns, 2002). It also requires an internal system where 'value' can be encoded and associated with entity representations.

- *Necessity*: Without the capacity to represent distinct entities, acknowledge their relevance, and assign functional value based on internal needs/goals, the act of "affirming" as defined cannot occur. The initial step of the model would be impossible.
- **Requirement Analysis for "...often sustains or is necessitated by functional dependency."**
 - *Implied Subject Capabilities*:
 - **Need/Goal States**: The subject must possess internal states corresponding to needs (e.g., deviations from homeostatic set-points, requirements for survival/well-being) or goals (represented desired future states). These provide the internal drivers that make external reliance potentially necessary. Concepts of homeostasis (Cannon, 1929) and goal-setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1990) address the nature of such internal states.
 - **Dependency Representation**: The subject must be capable of representing the *relationship* of dependency itself – recognizing the contingency between its need/goal fulfillment and the external entity. This involves representing not just the entity, but the functional link between the entity and the subject's internal state or objective. This requires relational reasoning capabilities (Halford et al., 1998).
 - *Implied Environmental Characteristics*:
 - **Possibility of External Reliance**: The environment must be structured such that subjects *can* rely on external entities for need/goal fulfillment. This implies that necessary resources, functions, or conditions are sometimes located externally to the subject, and that interaction enabling access is possible (discussed further under A4 conditions). Reality cannot be structured such that all subjects are inherently self-sufficient regarding all needs/goals.
 - *Implied Linkage Characteristics*:
 - **Affirmation-Engagement Link**: There must be a functional link such that the cognitive act of affirmation (acknowledging existence and functional value) is typically involved in initiating or maintaining active engagement with the entity upon which the subject depends. Affirmation serves as a cognitive gateway to utilizing the dependency relationship.
 - *Necessity*: Without internal needs/goals, dependency lacks motivation. Without the capacity to represent the dependency relationship, the subject cannot consciously navigate it. Without an environment permitting external reliance, dependency cannot occur. Without the link between affirmation and engagement, the first clause of the model ("sustains or is necessitated by") lacks its operational mechanism.
- **Requirement Analysis for "The alignment between this dependency-state and the subject's interpretation of integrity..."**
 - *Implied Subject Capabilities*:

- **Internal Normative Framework Storage:** The subject must possess mechanisms for storing representations of norms, values, principles, or standards that constitute its "interpretation of integrity." This requires stable memory systems capable of holding abstract information (Tulving, 1985, on semantic memory).
- **Framework Accessibility:** Both the representation of the current dependency-state (including its conditions and implications) and the relevant components of the stored normative framework must be accessible to the subject's evaluative processes. This requires mechanisms for retrieving stored information and bringing it into active processing or 'working memory' (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).
- **Comparative Evaluation Mechanism:** The subject must possess cognitive mechanisms capable of comparing the representation of the dependency-state with the accessed normative standards. This involves more than just co-activation; it requires a process that assesses congruence, conflict, or discrepancy between the two sets of representations. Computational models of analogy-making or rule-based reasoning offer potential descriptions of such comparison processes (Gentner, 1983; Anderson et al., 2004).
- **Coherence in Normative Framework (Functional Level):** While not requiring perfect consistency, the normative framework must possess sufficient internal organization or hierarchical structure to allow the comparative mechanism to produce relatively stable and meaningful outputs in typical situations. A completely chaotic set of standards would render evaluation non-functional. This relates to ideas of value pluralism versus incoherence (Berlin, 1969; Chang, 1997).
- *Necessity:* Without stored norms, there is no standard for evaluation. Without accessibility of state and standard, comparison cannot begin. Without a comparative mechanism, evaluation cannot proceed. Without functional coherence, evaluation yields unusable results. The entire concept of evaluating alignment with integrity hinges on these capabilities.
- **Requirement Analysis for "...generates pressure towards allowance or disallowance..."**
 - *Implied Subject Capabilities:*
 - **Evaluation-Motivation Linkage:** There must be a functional connection between the output of the alignment evaluation (the perceived degree of congruence or conflict) and the subject's motivational systems. The result of the comparison must be capable of influencing internal states related to behavioral inclination. This connection might be mediated by affective responses (e.g., feelings of comfort/discomfort, satisfaction/dissonance) often associated with value judgments or goal congruence (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Higgins, 1987, on self-discrepancy theory).

- **Capacity for Internal Motivational States:** The subject must be capable of experiencing internal states that function as 'pressure' – i.e., having motivational force or directional bias (towards maintaining or changing the situation). These states provide the impetus derived from the evaluation.
 - *Necessity:* Without the link between evaluation and motivation, the integrity assessment would be epiphenomenal, having no impact on the subject's subsequent tendencies. Without the capacity for internal motivational states, there would be no 'pressure' generated to influence action. This step requires the subject to be not just an evaluator but also a motivated system responding to its evaluations.
- **Requirement Analysis for "...whose behavioral manifestation is significantly shaped by the dependency's intensity, perceived action-costs, and external constraints."**
 - *Implied Subject Capabilities:*
 - **Contextual Assessment:** The subject must be able to represent and assess relevant contextual factors: the *intensity* of the dependency (requiring evaluation of alternatives, importance of need/goal), potential *action-costs* (requiring predictive modeling of outcomes associated with allowance/disallowance behaviors and evaluation of those outcomes), and *external constraints* (requiring perception and representation of environmental limitations). This relies heavily on the representational capabilities outlined under A1 conditions but applied specifically to these modulating factors. Predictive modeling relates to simulation or prospection capabilities (Schacter et al., 2007; Seligman et al., 2013).
 - **Effector Systems:** The subject must possess physical or other output systems capable of enacting behaviors classifiable as allowance or disallowance in the environment.
 - **Modulated Action Control:** There must be mechanisms linking internal states (the generated pressure, the assessment of modulating factors) to the control of these effector systems. Crucially, this control mechanism must be *modulatable* – capable of adjusting the output (the behavioral manifestation) based on the integrated assessment of pressure, intensity, costs, and constraints. It's not a simple reflex arc but involves integrating multiple inputs to shape action selection and execution. This points towards executive functions involved in decision-making and response inhibition/selection (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Diamond, 2013).
 - **Integrated Action Selection:** Given multiple influencing factors (pressure from integrity, dependency concerns, cost assessments), the subject needs a mechanism to integrate these, potentially weigh them, and select a specific course of action (or inaction) from its behavioral

repertoire. This addresses how a unified behavioral output emerges from potentially competing internal signals.

- *Implied Environmental Characteristics:*
 - **Variable Context:** The environment must present situations with varying dependency intensities, potential action costs, and external constraints for these factors to *be* modulating influences. A completely uniform or unconstrained environment would render these terms less meaningful.
- *Necessity:* Without the ability to assess context and costs, modulation based on them is impossible. Without effector systems, no behavioral manifestation occurs. Without modulated control links and integrated action selection, the internal pressure cannot be translated into context-sensitive, goal-directed behavior; action would be either absent, random, or a direct, unmodulated reflection of the internal pressure, contrary to the hypothesis statement. The variability of the environment provides the conditions where modulation becomes relevant.

Summary of Requirements:

This analysis suggests that for the descriptive model to operate non-arbitrarily, it logically requires subjects that are complex information-processing systems. These subjects must be capable of:

1. Representing distinct external entities and internal states (needs, goals, dependency relationships, normative standards).
2. Assigning functional value based on needs/goals.
3. Storing normative standards and accessing relevant information.
4. Performing comparative evaluations between states and standards.
5. Linking evaluation outcomes to internal motivational states (pressure).
6. Predicting consequences and assessing action-costs within context.
7. Possessing effector systems for environmental interaction.
8. Integrating multiple internal factors (pressure, cost assessment, context) to select and execute modulated actions.

Furthermore, the environment (reality) must be structured to allow for distinct entities, interaction, external reliance driven by externally located necessities, and present variable contexts that make modulation relevant. These identified requirements collectively point towards the necessity of the fundamental prerequisites that will be presented in the following section. They constitute the functional substrate implied by the logic of the descriptive model itself.

2.2 Fundamental Prerequisites

The functional requirements identified in Section 2.1, derived through an analysis of the descriptive model, logically presuppose a set of more fundamental capacities and characteristics inherent in the subject and its encompassing reality. These foundational assumptions, termed here Fundamental Prerequisites (FPs), represent the minimal set of necessary preconditions identified for the possibility of the entire dynamic described. They are presented below, with subsequent sections detailing the specific conditions entailed by each.

- **Fundamental Prerequisite 1 (FP1): Capacity for Internal Representation**
 - *Statement:* Subjects possess the capacity to generate, maintain, and manipulate internal states (representations) that correspond to elements of their external environment (entities, contexts), their own internal conditions (needs, goals, affective states), and relational structures (such as dependency). These internal representations enable the assignment of functional value or meaning based on the subject's internal economy.
 - *Relation to Requirements:* This prerequisite directly grounds the required capabilities identified in Section 2.1 related to Object/Entity Distinction and Representation, Existence Acknowledgment, Value Assignment Capacity, Dependency Representation, Contextual Assessment, and the representation component of Predictive Modeling/Consequence Assessment. It posits the basic informational capacity upon which evaluation, motivation, and modulated action depend. The existence of such representational capacity is a central topic in cognitive science and philosophy of mind, exploring how physical systems can instantiate states that stand for or are about something else (Fodor, 1987; Dretske, 1988; Clark, 1997).
- **Fundamental Prerequisite 2 (FP2): Capacity for Internal Evaluation**
 - *Statement:* Subjects possess internal normative frameworks (interpretations of integrity) and the functional capacity to evaluate represented states (derived via FP1) against these frameworks, resulting in an assessment of alignment or misalignment.
 - *Relation to Requirements:* This prerequisite directly grounds the required capabilities identified in Section 2.1 related to Internal Normative Framework Storage, Framework Accessibility, Comparative Evaluation Mechanism, and the necessity for a functionally Coherent Normative Structure. It posits the existence of internal standards and the mechanisms for judging states relative to those standards. This capacity is explored in developmental psychology regarding moral reasoning (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1969), social psychology regarding attitude formation and consistency (Heider, 1958; Festinger, 1957), and ethical theory regarding the basis of value judgment.
- **Fundamental Prerequisite 3 (FP3): Capacity for Directed Interaction**
 - *Statement:* Subjects possess needs or goals and the functional capacity for non-random interaction with their environment via effector systems. This interaction is influenced by internal motivational states (which are linked to the outcomes of internal evaluations per FP2) and is modulated based on predictive assessments of context and consequences (derived via FP1).

- *Relation to Requirements:* This prerequisite grounds the required capabilities identified in Section 2.1 related to Need/Goal States, Effector Systems, Linkage between Internal States and Effector Control, Capacity for Predictive Modeling/Consequence Assessment, Modulated Action Control, and Integrated Action Selection. It posits the subject as an agent capable of purposeful, context-sensitive action driven by internal states and evaluations. This relates to concepts of agency, motor control, reinforcement learning, decision-making, and executive functions studied across biology, psychology, artificial intelligence, and philosophy (Skinner, 1938; Newell & Simon, 1972; Frith et al., 2000; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Haggard, 2008).
- **Fundamental Prerequisite 4 (FP4): Structure Permitting External Relation**
 - *Statement:* The reality within which subjects exist is structured such that it contains distinct entities and systems, allows for causal interaction between them, possesses sufficient temporal stability for predictable interaction, and includes conditions where subjects may rely on external elements for need or goal fulfillment (e.g., due to external localization of necessary functions/resources, potentially under constraints).
 - *Relation to Requirements:* This prerequisite grounds the necessary environmental characteristics identified in Section 2.1, specifically the Possibility of External Reliance and the existence of Variable Contexts that necessitate dependency and make modulation relevant. It posits that the structure of reality itself provides the stage and the conditions upon which the dynamics of dependency, evaluation, and modulated agency (described by FP1-3 and the resulting model) can unfold. This draws on basic ontological assumptions about the world (distinct objects, causality, time) and ecological considerations regarding resource distribution and organism-environment interaction (Gibson, 1979; Odling-Smee et al., 2003, on niche construction).

These four Fundamental Prerequisites represent the core assumptions about the subject and its world derived as necessary for the Descriptive Model (Section 1.2) to operate. They form the foundational level of the framework presented in this document.

2.3 Overview of Conditions Entailed by Prerequisites

Each Fundamental Prerequisite (FP1-FP4), while presented as a foundational assumption *relative to the descriptive model*, is itself complex. For these prerequisites to hold in a non-arbitrary manner – that is, to arise from plausible underlying mechanisms rather than being inexplicable properties – they depend on a further set of more specific, underlying Conditions of Possibility (CoPs).

For example, the "Capacity for Internal Representation" (FP1) is not assumed to exist magically but is understood to depend necessarily on conditions such as the existence of an information-processing substrate, mechanisms for differentiated processing and modeling, stable information storage (memory), and an internal system for assigning meaning or value.

Similarly, the "Capacity for Internal Evaluation" (FP2) depends on conditions like the existence of internalized standards, accessibility of information to comparison processes, the presence of a comparative mechanism, a degree of coherence in the standards, and the functional integration of the evaluation's outcome. The "Capacity for Directed Interaction" (FP3) relies on conditions including internal drives, functional effectors, linkages between internal states and effectors, predictive capabilities, and integrative action selection mechanisms. Finally, the "Structure Permitting External Relation" (FP4) depends on reality exhibiting conditions like ontological plurality, external localization of some necessities, causal interaction potential, temporal stability, and potentially resource constraints.

Part 4 of this document will provide a detailed analysis of these specific Conditions of Possibility for each Fundamental Prerequisite, examining why each condition is considered necessary for its respective prerequisite to operate non-arbitrarily and exploring the consequences if such a condition were absent. This detailed exposition serves to further unpack the implications of the Fundamental Prerequisites and solidify the grounding of the entire framework. The current section serves only to introduce the concept that the Fundamental Prerequisites themselves entail these more specific underlying conditions, which will be elaborated later.

3. Construction of the Descriptive Model

This part demonstrates how the Descriptive Model presented in Section 1.2 can be logically constructed as a sequence of processes arising from the interplay of the Fundamental Prerequisites (FP1-FP4) and their entailed conditions. It traces the steps from the basic conditions permitting dependency to the final modulated behavioral output.

3.1 Establishing Potential for Relation and Dependency

The starting point is the nature of the subject and its reality as defined by the Fundamental Prerequisites. FP3 posits subjects possessing needs or goals. FP4 posits a reality containing distinct entities and systems, structured such that subjects may need to interact with external elements to fulfill these needs/goals (due to external localization of necessities, potential constraints) and are able to do so (due to causal interaction potential and temporal stability).

- *Logical Step:* The conjunction of a subject with inherent needs/goals (FP3) existing within a reality that both permits interaction and often necessitates reliance on external elements for need/goal fulfillment (FP4) establishes the *potential* for relationships of functional dependency. Subjects are not necessitated to be self-sufficient; the conditions for external reliance are fundamentally present.

3.2 Representation and Cognitive Engagement

For this potential reliance to become part of the subject's operative reality, the subject must engage with it cognitively. FP1 posits the capacity for internal representation of entities, states, and contexts.

- *Logical Step:* Utilizing the Capacity for Internal Representation (FP1), the subject can form internal representations of:
 - Its own internal need/goal states (derived from CoP 3.1 under FP3).
 - Relevant external entities or systems (identified within the pluralistic reality of FP4).
 - The potential *relational structure* connecting the external entity to the fulfillment of the internal need/goal (drawing on CoP 1.2, CoP 4.3). This representational capability allows the subject to move beyond passive existence within a potentially dependency-inducing environment towards active cognitive engagement with specific potential or actual dependencies.

3.3 Formation of Functional Dependency and Affirmation

When the potential for reliance (Section 3.1) is actualized and cognitively engaged (Section 3.2), the state of functional dependency comes into being for the subject. This involves not just representing the relationship but also assessing the functional role of the external entity.

- *Logical Step:* When a subject actively relies on a represented external entity (Section 3.2) for an operative need/goal (FP3), a specific state of functional dependency exists relative to that subject. To manage this state intentionally, the subject employs its representational capacity (FP1) to assign perceived functional value to the entity (recognizing its instrumentality for the need/goal). This cognitive act of acknowledging the entity's existence *and* its specific functional relevance within the dependency context constitutes "affirmation." This affirmation is often required to *sustain* the active engagement needed to benefit from the dependency (e.g., continuing to operate a necessary machine requires affirming its function) or is *necessitated by* the dependency itself (e.g., interacting with the sole food provider necessitates cognitively engaging with their role).
- *Outcome:* This step logically reconstructs the first clause of the Descriptive Model: "*Affirming an entity's existence and perceived functional value often sustains or is necessitated by functional dependency.*" It shows this link arising from the requirements of cognitive engagement (FP1) within an actualized state of reliance (rooted in FP3, FP4).

3.4 Internal Evaluation against Normative Framework

Having established the state of functional dependency and the associated cognitive affirmation (Section 3.3), the model posits an evaluative step. This relies on the subject possessing not only representational capacities but also internal standards. FP2 posits the Capacity for Internal Evaluation against internal normative frameworks (integrity).

- *Logical Step:* The subject, possessing the capacity for internal evaluation (FP2), utilizes its internal normative framework ("interpretation of integrity") as a standard. It accesses both the representation of the current dependency-state (including its perceived nature, conditions, and implications, represented via FP1) and the relevant components of its integrity framework (stored and accessed via conditions underlying FP2). Employing comparative processing mechanisms (also conditions underlying FP2), the subject evaluates the *alignment* between the dependency-state and its normative standards. This evaluation yields an internal assessment of congruence or conflict.
- *Outcome:* This step logically reconstructs the conceptual core of the second part of the Descriptive Model: *"The alignment between this dependency-state and the subject's interpretation of integrity..."* It shows this evaluation arising necessarily from the interaction between the subject's representation of its situation (FP1) and its capacity for normative judgment (FP2).

3.5 Generation of Internal Pressure

The outcome of the normative evaluation (Section 3.4) is not posited as a purely detached judgment but as having motivational consequences. This relies on the connection between evaluation and the subject's directedness. FP3 posits a Capacity for Directed Interaction, which includes being influenced by motivational states linked to internal evaluations.

- *Logical Step:* The assessment of alignment or misalignment resulting from the internal evaluation (Section 3.4) interacts with the subject's motivational system (as entailed by FP3, specifically CoP 3.3 linkage). A perceived alignment between the dependency-state and the integrity framework tends to reinforce the current state or generate internal states conducive to continuation. Conversely, a perceived misalignment or conflict generates internal dissonance or motivational states that incline the subject towards altering the situation. This resulting internal motivational state, varying in intensity based on the degree of alignment/misalignment and the significance of the integrity standards involved, is termed "pressure" – directed either towards "allowance" (maintaining/accepting the dependency state) or "disallowance" (resisting/changing the dependency state).
- *Outcome:* This step logically reconstructs the next clause of the Descriptive Model: *"...generates pressure towards allowance or disallowance..."* It shows this pressure arising as a consequence of the normative evaluation (FP2) interfacing with the subject's motivational architecture (FP3).

3.6 Modulation of Behavioral Manifestation

The internal pressure towards allowance or disallowance (Section 3.5) does not translate directly or automatically into action. The model posits a modulation process based on contextual factors. This relies on the subject's capacity to assess context and consequences and to integrate these assessments into action selection. FP1 enables the representation of context

and potential outcomes, while FP3 encompasses the modulation of interaction based on such assessments.

- *Logical Step:* Before or during action selection, the subject utilizes its representational capacity (FP1) and predictive modeling capabilities (entailed by FP3, specifically CoP 3.4) to assess key modulating factors:
 - The perceived *intensity* of the functional dependency (evaluation of reliance, alternatives, stakes).
 - The perceived *action-costs* associated with potential behavioral manifestations aligned with either allowance or disallowance (evaluation of risks, efforts, negative consequences).
 - The perceived *external constraints* limiting the feasible range of actions (representation of environmental limitations). The subject's mechanism for integrated action selection (entailed by FP3, specifically CoP 3.5) then processes the internal pressure (from Section 3.5) *in conjunction with* the assessment of these modulating factors. High dependency intensity, high perceived costs for disallowance actions, or strong external constraints preventing disallowance can lead to behavioral manifestations favoring allowance, even if the internal pressure strongly favors disallowance. Conversely, low dependency intensity, low costs for disallowance, and enabling constraints might allow disallowance behaviors even if the pressure is only moderate. The action ultimately selected and executed via effector systems (FP3) is thus a *modulated* outcome, reflecting an integration of the internal normative pressure with pragmatic situational assessments.
- *Outcome:* This step logically reconstructs the final clause of the Descriptive Model: *"...whose behavioral manifestation is significantly shaped by the dependency's intensity, perceived action-costs, and external constraints."* It shows this modulation arising from the subject's capacity to represent and predict (FP1), integrated with its capacity for context-sensitive, consequence-aware action selection (FP3).

3.7 Synthesis of the Descriptive Model

The preceding sections (3.1-3.6) have demonstrated how each component of the Descriptive Model statement logically emerges from the interplay of the defined Fundamental Prerequisites (FP1-FP4) and their entailed conditions.

- **Synthesis:** Combining the derived relationships yields the complete Descriptive Model:
 1. The subject's cognitive engagement with an actualized state of reliance (rooted in FP1, FP3, FP4) leads to the affirmation-dependency link (*"Affirming... often sustains or is necessitated by functional dependency"*).
 2. The subject's capacity for normative judgment (FP2) applied to this represented dependency-state (FP1) results in an alignment evaluation (*"...The alignment between this dependency-state and the subject's interpretation of integrity..."*).

3. This evaluation interfaces with the subject's motivational system (FP3) to produce an internal inclination ("*...generates pressure towards allowance or disallowance...*").
4. The final action is produced through a process (FP3) that integrates this internal pressure with context-sensitive assessments (enabled by FP1) of dependency intensity, potential costs, and external constraints ("*...whose behavioral manifestation is significantly shaped by the dependency's intensity, perceived action-costs, and external constraints.*").

This constructive process demonstrates that the Descriptive Model is not presented as an arbitrary claim but as a structured description of a dynamic that is logically consequent upon the acceptance of the four Fundamental Prerequisites and the conditions they entail. The model outlines the functional sequence enabled by these foundational capacities operating within a reality structured to permit dependency.

4. Detailed Conditions of Possibility

This part provides a detailed exposition of the specific Conditions of Possibility (CoPs) identified as necessary for each Fundamental Prerequisite (FP1-FP4) to hold non-arbitrarily. The analysis aims to unpack the requirements underlying each foundational assumption.

4.1 Conditions Entailed by FP1: Capacity for Internal Representation

FP1 states: "Subjects possess the capacity to generate, maintain, and manipulate internal states (representations) that correspond to elements of their external environment (entities, contexts), their own internal conditions (needs, goals, affective states), and relational structures (such as dependency). These internal representations enable the assignment of functional value or meaning based on the subject's internal economy."

For this capacity to exist non-arbitrarily, the following conditions are identified as necessary:

- **CoP 1.1: Existence of an Information-Processing Substrate:**
 - *Description:* A necessary physical or organizational basis within the subject capable of encoding information into specific states, storing these states, transforming them according to certain rules or processes, and allowing these states to be accessed or retrieved. Examples include biological neural networks, artificial neural networks, or potentially other complex systems demonstrating these functional properties.
 - *Necessity:* Internal representation requires a medium. Information corresponding to external or internal elements must be physically instantiated *within* the subject. Without a substrate capable of holding and manipulating information patterns, the concept of an internal state "corresponding to" something else lacks a mechanism. It addresses the basic physical

implementation requirement. Theories of computation and physical implementation (e.g., Turing, 1936; Putnam, 1967, on functionalism; Chalmers, 1996, on principles of organizational invariance) explore the relationship between abstract information processing and physical systems.

- *Consequences of Absence:* No physical basis for encoding or storing information internally. Internal states cannot be formed or maintained to correspond to anything. Representation is impossible. FP1 fails at its most fundamental level.

- **CoP 1.2: Differentiated Information Processing and Modeling:**

- *Description:* The substrate (CoP 1.1) must support processes that can differentiate incoming signals or existing patterns, detect regularities and relationships within this information, and construct structured internal models or representations that correspond to distinct entities, states, or contexts. This involves capabilities like sensory discrimination, feature detection, pattern recognition, categorization, and relational binding.
- *Necessity:* Representation of *distinct* entities/states/contexts requires differentiating the information associated with them. Representing complex states or contexts requires detecting patterns and relationships. A representation is typically more than raw data; it's a structured model. Without these processing capabilities, the substrate might hold undifferentiated information or noise, but not the specific, structured representations required by FP1. Cognitive architectures often explicitly model these stages (e.g., feature integration theory, Treisman & Gelade, 1980; hierarchical processing in visual cortex, Riesenhuber & Poggio, 1999).
- *Consequences of Absence:* Inability to distinguish entities or states. Inability to represent relationships (like dependency) or integrated contexts. Internal states lack specificity or structure. The capacity to form the *content* of representations described in FP1 fails.

- **CoP 1.3: Stable Information Storage (Memory):**

- *Description:* Mechanisms must exist within the substrate (CoP 1.1) for storing the structured information patterns (representations from CoP 1.2) over time, such that they persist beyond immediate processing and can be retrieved later. This encompasses various forms of memory (e.g., short-term/working memory, long-term episodic/semantic memory).
- *Necessity:* Representing enduring entities, time-extended states (like dependency), stable contexts, or assigning value based on past experience fundamentally requires memory. Without storage, representation is fleeting and cannot support continuity, learning, or integration over time. The stability of representations depends on memory mechanisms (Squire & Kandel, 2009).
- *Consequences of Absence:* Representations are transient, limited to the immediate present. Inability to represent enduring objects, ongoing states, or contexts integrating past information. Learning and value assignment based on experience are impossible. The temporal aspect of representation required by FP1 (representing states, contexts) fails.

- **CoP 1.4: Internal Referential System:**

- *Description:* A system internal to the subject that allows representations (generated via CoP 1.1-1.3) to be linked or referenced to other internal elements, particularly: (a) states representing needs/goals (from FP3/CoP 3.1), (b) affective or evaluative markers, and (c) other representations within a semantic network or conceptual structure that establishes relationships and defines meaning internally.
- *Necessity:* FP1 includes the capacity for assigning "functional value or meaning." This assignment is not arbitrary; it arises from connecting a representation to the subject's internal economy (its needs, goals, existing knowledge, affective states). A representation gains *functional value* by being linked to a need it can satisfy; it gains *meaning* by its connections within a broader semantic structure (Quillian, 1968; Collins & Loftus, 1975, on semantic networks). Without this internal referencing, representations remain uninterpreted data lacking significance *for the subject*.
- *Consequences of Absence:* Representations exist but lack functional value or meaning *to the subject*. They cannot inform goal-directed behavior or normative evaluation because their relevance to the subject's internal states is not encoded. The crucial second part of FP1 fails.

The fulfillment of these four conditions (CoP 1.1-1.4) is presented as necessary for the non-arbitrary functioning of the Capacity for Internal Representation (FP1) as described. The absence of any one condition fundamentally compromises or eliminates this capacity.

4.2 Conditions Entailed by FP2: Capacity for Internal Evaluation

FP2 states: "Subjects possess internal normative frameworks (interpretations of integrity) and the functional capacity to evaluate represented states (derived via FP1) against these frameworks, resulting in an assessment of alignment or misalignment."

For this capacity to exist non-arbitrarily, the following conditions are identified as necessary:

- **CoP 2.1: Internalized Normative Standards:**

- *Description:* The subject must possess internal representations of norms, values, principles, or standards that constitute the "normative framework." These standards need to be stored with relative stability (requiring CoP 1.1 and 1.3) and must have been acquired or derived through some process, such as innate predispositions shaped by evolutionary history (e.g., fairness concerns, Haidt, 2012), developmental learning (e.g., internalization of parental or societal rules, Piaget, 1932; Vygotsky, 1978), instrumental learning (associating behaviors with rewards/punishments related to norms), or rational construction/endorsement (e.g., adopting principles through reasoning, Kohlberg, 1969).

- *Necessity*: Evaluation requires a standard. Without internalized, relatively stable representations serving as standards, the subject lacks the basis for normative judgment. The requirement for an acquisition/derivation mechanism ensures these standards are not arbitrary posits but arise from the subject's history or constitution. Stability ensures the standard is not mere whim.
- *Consequences of Absence*: No internal normative framework exists. The subject lacks the standards necessary for evaluation. The concept of "integrity interpretation" becomes empty. Evaluation as described in FP2 is impossible.
- **CoP 2.2: Representational Accessibility:**
 - *Description*: The internal representations of both (a) the current state being evaluated (e.g., the dependency-state, represented via FP1) and (b) the relevant normative standard(s) from the framework (CoP 2.1) must be concurrently or sequentially available to the cognitive mechanism(s) performing the comparison. This implies effective retrieval from memory (CoP 1.3) and potential maintenance in an active processing space (e.g., working memory, Baddeley, 2000).
 - *Necessity*: Comparison fundamentally requires access to the items being compared. If the representation of the state is unavailable (e.g., not attended to, not retrieved) or the relevant standard is inaccessible (e.g., forgotten, not activated by the context), the evaluation process cannot initiate or proceed correctly. Information must be brought together for comparison to occur.
 - *Consequences of Absence*: Evaluation cannot be performed because one or both necessary inputs are missing from the process. Even if standards exist and states are represented, the failure to co-access them prevents comparison. The capacity "to evaluate" fails due to informational bottlenecks.
- **CoP 2.3: Comparative Processing Mechanism:**
 - *Description*: The subject must possess specific cognitive or computational mechanisms that actively compare the representation of the current state with the representation of the normative standard. This mechanism must be capable of detecting the relationship between them – specifically, the degree of congruence (alignment) or discrepancy (misalignment, conflict). This might involve processes akin to pattern matching, constraint satisfaction, analogical mapping, or rule application depending on the nature of the state and the standard (Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Smith et al., 1992).
 - *Necessity*: Evaluation is an active process of comparison, not just passive co-presence of information. A mechanism must exist to perform this comparison and, crucially, to generate an output signal indicating the result (match, mismatch, degree of fit). Without such a mechanism, the system cannot determine alignment. This provides the functional basis for how the comparison yields a judgment.
 - *Consequences of Absence*: Representations of state and standard might be accessible but remain un-compared. Or, a comparison might occur, but if the mechanism cannot detect alignment/misalignment, it produces no evaluative

output. The core computational step of evaluation fails. FP2's requirement for an "assessment of alignment or misalignment" cannot be met.

- **CoP 2.4: Coherent Normative Structure (Functional Level):**

- *Description:* The collection of internalized normative standards (CoP 2.1) must possess sufficient internal coherence, organization, or hierarchical structure to permit relatively consistent evaluations in relevant contexts. This does not demand absolute logical consistency across all possible domains but requires that, for a given situation, the framework typically provides non-contradictory or prioritizable guidance. Conflicts may exist (value pluralism, Berlin, 1969), but the system needs mechanisms (e.g., prioritizing rules, contextual activation) to resolve or manage them sufficiently for evaluation to proceed functionally in most cases.
- *Necessity:* The term "framework" implies structure. Evaluating against a completely contradictory or chaotic set of standards would yield unstable, arbitrary, or paralyzing outputs. Functional coherence ensures the evaluation process (CoP 2.3) generally produces interpretable and relatively consistent results, allowing the normative system to function as a guide rather than a source of noise. It distinguishes a functional normative system from a dysfunctional one.
- *Consequences of Absence:* Evaluation yields highly inconsistent, ambiguous, or self-contradictory results. The subject may be unable to form stable judgments or may oscillate between conflicting assessments, potentially leading to behavioral paralysis or erratic responses. The "framework" fails to provide effective normative guidance, undermining the functional purpose of the evaluation described in FP2.

- **CoP 2.5: Functional Integration of Evaluation Outcome:**

- *Description:* The output signal from the comparative process (CoP 2.3), representing the degree of alignment or misalignment, must be accessible to and capable of influencing other relevant internal systems within the subject. Primarily, this involves interfacing with systems responsible for generating motivational states, affective responses, and potentially modulating action selection processes (as described under FP3).
- *Necessity:* For the normative evaluation to be functionally relevant within an agentic system, its outcome must have downstream consequences. If the assessment of alignment/misalignment were purely informational and isolated, without impacting motivation or subsequent processing, the evaluation would be behaviorally inert. Functional integration ensures the evaluation plays its role in the larger sequence leading to potential action (linking FP2 to FP3). This aligns with views where evaluations inherently possess motivational or affective components (e.g., appraisal theories of emotion, Lazarus, 1991).
- *Consequences of Absence:* The evaluation is performed, but its result has no impact on the subject's internal state (motivation, affect) or subsequent behavior. The assessment remains a detached computation without consequence

for the subject's directedness. FP2 holds computationally but fails functionally within the context of the overall model linking evaluation to action.

The fulfillment of these five conditions (CoP 2.1-2.5) is presented as necessary for the non-arbitrary functioning of the Capacity for Internal Evaluation (FP2) as described. Each condition addresses a crucial aspect: possessing the standard, accessing the inputs, performing the comparison, having a usable standard structure, and linking the result to other systems. The absence of any one condition impairs or prevents the subject's ability to perform functional normative evaluations as required by the descriptive model.

4.3 Conditions Entailed by FP3: Capacity for Directed Interaction

FP3 states: "Subjects possess needs or goals and the functional capacity for non-random interaction with their environment via effector systems. This interaction is influenced by internal motivational states (which are linked to the outcomes of internal evaluations per FP2) and is modulated based on predictive assessments of context and consequences (derived via FP1)."

For this capacity to exist non-arbitrarily, the following conditions are identified as necessary:

- **CoP 3.1: Existence of Internal Disequilibrium/Potential States:**
 - *Description:* The subject must possess internal mechanisms that generate states representing deviations from physiological set-points (e.g., hunger, thirst), safety thresholds, or other conditions necessary for viability or flourishing (needs). Alternatively or additionally, it must possess mechanisms for representing desired future states or outcomes that differ from the current state (goals). These states constitute the internal basis for directedness. Homeostatic systems provide biological examples (Cannon, 1929; Sterling, 2012, on allostasis), while cognitive goal representation involves prospective memory and planning functions (Gollwitzer, 1999).
 - *Necessity:* Action requires impetus and direction. Needs and goals provide this internal, non-arbitrary source of directionality. Without them, the subject lacks intrinsic reasons to act or preferences between states, rendering directed interaction baseless. They ground the "possess needs or goals" part of FP3.
 - *Consequences of Absence:* The subject lacks internal drivers for action. Behavior, if any, is purely reactive or random, not goal-directed. The motivational foundation for directed interaction is missing. FP3 fails.
- **CoP 3.2: Effector Systems and Environmental Interaction Capability:**
 - *Description:* The subject must possess functional output systems (e.g., musculoskeletal systems for locomotion/manipulation, vocal apparatus for communication, physiological systems for releasing substances) that allow it to exert influence on its external environment or its own internal state. These systems must be capable of controlled, patterned activation, enabling non-

random sequences of action. This involves not just the effectors but also the neural or computational control pathways governing their operation (e.g., motor cortex, basal ganglia, cerebellum in vertebrates, Wolpert et al., 2011).

- *Necessity*: Interaction requires the physical means to interact. "Acting non-randomly" requires effectors capable of producing specific, controlled outputs rather than mere noise or uncontrolled spasm. This condition provides the physical basis for agency – the ability to *do* something in a structured way.
- *Consequences of Absence*: Inability to act upon the environment. Action is impossible. Or, if effectors exist but lack control, actions are random and ineffective for directed purposes. The "capacity for non-random interaction" fails. FP3 is unrealizable.

- **CoP 3.3: Linkage between Internal States (Need/Goal/Motivation) and Effector Control:**

- *Description*: Functional pathways must exist connecting the internal states representing needs/goals (CoP 3.1) and motivational states (including those arising from normative evaluations, CoP 2.5) to the mechanisms that control the effector systems (CoP 3.2). These pathways allow the internal states to bias action selection and execution towards relevant goals or away from negatively evaluated states. This involves complex neural circuits often implicating structures like the limbic system, prefrontal cortex, and basal ganglia, integrating motivation, evaluation, and motor planning (Rolls, 2004; Haber & Knutson, 2010).
- *Necessity*: For interaction to be *directed* by needs/goals and *influenced* by evaluations/motivations, these internal states must be causally linked to the action production system. Without this link, internal states remain decoupled from behavior. This provides the mechanism for internal states to guide external action, making agency *directed*.
- *Consequences of Absence*: Internal states (needs, goals, pressures from evaluation) cannot influence action. Behavior is not goal-directed or responsive to internal evaluations, even if possible physically. The core concept of interaction being *influenced* by internal states fails. FP3's directedness aspect fails.

- **CoP 3.4: Capacity for Predictive Modeling/Consequence Assessment:**

- *Description*: The subject must possess cognitive mechanisms (requiring FP1 capabilities) capable of generating predictions about the likely future outcomes of potential actions, considering the current context. It must also be able to evaluate these predicted outcomes based on its internal needs, goals, and normative standards to assess potential costs and benefits ("action-costs"). This may involve simulation, prospection, accessing learned associations (reinforcement history), or applying causal models (Schacter et al., 2007; Daw & Doya, 2006; Gopnik & Schulz, 2004).
- *Necessity*: FP3 requires action modulation based on "perceived consequences (action-costs) and context." This fundamentally requires the ability to *anticipate*

consequences before acting and to evaluate their desirability. Context must be incorporated into these predictions. Without this predictive capacity, modulation cannot be forward-looking or context-sensitive; behavior would be purely reactive to current stimuli or internal states. This provides the basis for foresightful modulation of action.

- *Consequences of Absence:* Inability to anticipate outcomes of actions. Inability to assess action-costs or benefits relative to goals/integrity. Inability to adjust actions based on context-dependent predictions. Action modulation based on consequences and context is impossible. The final clause of FP3 fails. Behavior becomes inflexible or purely reactive.
- **CoP 3.5: Action Selection Mechanism Integrating Multiple Factors:**
 - *Description:* A mechanism must exist that integrates the multiple inputs relevant to behavior: the current operative needs/goals (CoP 3.1), the motivational pressures arising from evaluations (CoP 3.3 linkage), and the assessments of context and action-costs (CoP 3.4). This mechanism resolves competition or combines influences to select and initiate a specific behavioral output via the effector control systems (CoP 3.3 linkage, CoP 3.2). This corresponds to functions often associated with executive control and decision-making processes (Botvinick & Cohen, 2014; Rangel et al., 2008).
 - *Necessity:* Subjects are typically faced with multiple simultaneous needs, potential goals, normative considerations, and contextual factors. A mechanism is needed to integrate these often-competing influences into a coherent behavioral choice. Without it, the system might be paralyzed by conflict or produce fragmented, non-adaptive behavior driven solely by the strongest momentary signal. This provides the basis for unified, integrated agentic output.
 - *Consequences of Absence:* Inability to resolve conflict between competing pressures (e.g., need vs. integrity vs. cost). Behavioral paralysis, oscillation, or fragmentation. Inability to produce coherent, modulated action reflecting an integrated assessment of the situation. The overall capacity for functional, directed interaction under complex influences breaks down. FP3 fails to produce coherent output.

The fulfillment of these five conditions (CoP 3.1-3.5) is presented as necessary for the non-arbitrary functioning of the Capacity for Directed Interaction (FP3) as described. They cover the internal drivers, the physical means, the internal-external linkage, the foresight capacity, and the integrative selection process required for context-sensitive, goal-directed, and evaluation-influenced agency. The absence of any condition undermines a critical component of this capacity.

4.4 Conditions Entailed by FP4: Structure Permitting External Relation

FP4 states: "The reality within which subjects exist is structured such that it contains distinct entities and systems, allows for causal interaction between them, possesses sufficient temporal stability for predictable interaction, and includes conditions where subjects may rely

on external elements for need or goal fulfillment (e.g., due to external localization of necessary functions/resources, potentially under constraints)."

This prerequisite concerns the necessary structure of the environment or reality itself for the dynamics involving dependency to occur. For FP4 to hold non-arbitrarily, the following conditions pertaining to the nature of reality are identified as necessary:

- **CoP 4.1: Ontological Plurality and Distinction:**

- *Description:* Reality must fundamentally consist of multiple elements that are distinguishable from one another based on their properties, boundaries, or locations in space-time. These elements include subjects, objects, energy fields, information patterns, systems, etc. Reality cannot be an undifferentiated, homogenous whole.
- *Necessity:* The concept of a "relation" requires distinct relata. "External relation" as posited in FP4 requires elements external to the subject that are distinguishable *as* external. Functional dependency *between* a subject and an entity requires the existence of that distinct entity. Without ontological plurality, the concept of relating to or depending on something 'other' is meaningless. This provides the basic structural condition for any inter-element relationship. Foundational assumptions in physics and metaphysics generally presuppose a world of distinct interacting components, even if the nature of their ultimate individuality is debated (e.g., Ladyman & Ross, 2007, on structural realism).
- *Consequences of Absence:* If reality were a single, undifferentiated monad, no distinction between subject and external entity would exist. Relationships *between* elements, including dependency, would be ontologically impossible. FP4 fails.

- **CoP 4.2: External Localization of Necessary Functions/Resources:**

- *Description:* For subjects with needs and goals (FP3), at least some of the resources (e.g., energy sources, materials), functions (e.g., specific environmental processes, information processing performed by others), or conditions necessary for fulfilling those needs or achieving those goals must reside in, be produced by, or be controlled by elements external to the subject. Complete, perpetual self-sufficiency regarding all needs/goals for all subjects cannot be the default state of existence.
- *Necessity:* Functional dependency requires reliance on something *external*. If subjects were inherently self-sufficient, always possessing or generating internally everything required, then reliance on external elements would never be necessary for survival or goal achievement. The external localization of some necessities provides the fundamental reason *why* subjects might need to engage in dependency relationships. This condition establishes the potential for dependency to be driven by actual need, making it non-arbitrary. Ecological principles heavily rely on this condition, describing organisms dependent on external resources and energy flows (Odum, 1971).

- *Consequences of Absence:* All subjects are completely self-sufficient regarding all needs/goals. Interaction with external entities might occur for other reasons, but *functional dependency* driven by need would not exist. The core phenomenon addressed by FP4 (reliance for need/goal fulfillment) would be absent. FP4 fails.
- **CoP 4.3: Potential for Causal Interaction:**
 - *Description:* The distinct elements within reality (CoP 4.1) must be capable of influencing one another through causal processes. Changes in the state or activity of one element must have the potential to produce changes in the state or activity of other elements, including interactions between subjects and external entities/systems. This implies the existence of forces, energy/matter transfer mechanisms, or information transmission channels.
 - *Necessity:* Functional dependency requires that the entity being depended upon can actually *affect* the subject's state relative to its need/goal (e.g., provide a resource, perform a function). This requires causal interaction. If subjects and entities existed in causally isolated domains, reliance would be impossible even if needs existed and resources were externally localized. Interaction potential provides the mechanism through which dependency can be realized practically. The concept of causation is fundamental to scientific explanation and models of interaction (Pearl, 2000).
 - *Consequences of Absence:* Subjects and external entities cannot influence each other. No transfer of resources, information, or functional effects can occur between them. Functional dependency is practically impossible. FP4 fails.
- **CoP 4.4: Temporal Stability and Regularity:**
 - *Description:* Reality must exhibit sufficient stability and regularity over time. The properties of entities, the functions of systems, and the laws or patterns governing their interactions (CoP 4.3) must persist long enough and behave predictably enough (at least statistically) for subjects to form expectations and engage in sustained, goal-directed interactions. Pure chaos or constant, unpredictable flux in all relevant aspects is precluded.
 - *Necessity:* Forming and maintaining a functional dependency requires relying on an entity to provide a function or resource somewhat consistently over a relevant timescale. If the entity, its function, or the means of interaction were entirely erratic and unpredictable moment-to-moment, establishing reliable dependence would be impossible. Planning actions to utilize a dependency (part of FP3) also requires assuming some continuity and predictability. Temporal stability provides the necessary condition for dependencies to be learnable, manageable, and useful over time. Predictability is a core assumption enabling learning and adaptive behavior (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972).
 - *Consequences of Absence:* External entities and interaction dynamics are completely unpredictable and fleeting. Reliable reliance is impossible. Subjects cannot form stable expectations or engage in planned interactions based on dependency. Functional dependency fails due to the unreliability of the external world. FP4 becomes practically unrealizable.

- **CoP 4.5: Resource/Function Scarcity or Distribution Constraints:**

- *Description:* The availability of externally localized resources or functions (CoP 4.2) needed by subjects is often subject to limitations. These necessities may be finite, unevenly distributed geographically or socially, require significant effort or specific conditions to access, or be controlled by specific entities that regulate access. Universal, automatic, and unconstrained access to all external necessities is not the standard condition.
- *Necessity:* This condition specifically underpins the "often necessitates" aspect of FP4. While CoP 4.2 allows for dependency, constraints on access explain why dependency is frequently a compelling or unavoidable feature of existence, rather than just one option among many equally accessible ones. Scarcity or controlled access creates situations where subjects *must* rely on particular sources, manage competition, or comply with conditions set by controlling entities. This adds significance and pressure to the dependency relationship, making the evaluative and modulatory processes described in the overall model highly relevant. Economic principles are largely founded on concepts of scarcity (Robbins, 1932), and ecological carrying capacity reflects resource limitation.
- *Consequences of Absence:* If all necessary external resources/functions were infinitely abundant and universally accessible without constraint, subjects could easily switch sources or fulfill needs without relying strongly on any *specific* entity or system. While interactions would occur, the state of *dependency* with its associated vulnerabilities and management complexities might be rare or trivial. The compelling nature of dependency ("often necessitates") would be absent, significantly reducing the domain of applicability for the overall descriptive model derived from these prerequisites. FP4 would hold only in a weaker sense ("allows for" but rarely "necessitates").

The fulfillment of these five conditions (CoP 4.1-4.5) pertaining to the structure of reality is presented as necessary for FP4 (Structure Permitting External Relation) to hold non-arbitrarily and meaningfully. They establish a world of distinct, interacting, somewhat stable elements where subjects, due to their own needs and the often-constrained external localization of necessities, can and often must enter into relationships of functional dependency. The absence of any condition undermines the possibility, practicality, or significance of such dependency relationships within that reality.

5. Exploration of Core Concepts

This part undertakes a detailed exploration of the primary concepts employed in the Descriptive Model (Section 1.2). The aim is to unpack the facets, variations, and internal dynamics associated with each concept, drawing upon relevant external sources where appropriate to provide context or alternative perspectives, while maintaining a neutral, analytical stance focused on clarifying the concept's role within the model's framework. The exploration considers possibilities and alternatives inherent within each concept.

5.1 Functional Dependency

The Descriptive Model utilizes "Functional Dependency" to denote a relational state wherein the subject relies on a specified external entity for the fulfillment of one or more operative needs or the pursuit of one or more operative goals. This section explores various dimensions and considerations related to this concept.

- **5.1.1 Nature of the Function/Need/Goal:**

- *Description:* The dependency is defined relative to a specific function served by the external entity that addresses a need or goal of the subject. The nature of this function can vary widely.
- *Typologies:*
 - *Physiological/Survival Needs:* Dependency on entities providing air, water, food, shelter, temperature regulation, or essential biological processes (e.g., the life support system, the symbiotic microorganism scenarios). This represents a fundamental level of dependency often linked directly to viability (Maslow, 1943, hierarchy of needs).
 - *Safety/Security Needs:* Dependency on entities providing protection from harm, stability, or predictability (e.g., dependency on a caregiver, a legal system, a defense system).
 - *Social/Affiliative Needs:* Dependency on entities (individuals, groups, communities) for belonging, connection, affection, social validation, or identity confirmation (Baumeister & Leary, 1995, on the need to belong; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, on social identity theory).
 - *Informational Needs:* Dependency on entities as sources of information required for navigation, decision-making, problem-solving, or understanding the world (e.g., reliance on news media, scientific institutions, educational systems, specific experts, AI systems). This relates to managing uncertainty (Berger & Calabrese, 1975).
 - *Economic/Resource Needs:* Dependency on entities for access to material resources, employment, financial support, or means of production/exchange within an economic system.
 - *Psychological Needs (beyond social):* Dependency on entities for maintaining self-esteem, achieving competence, experiencing autonomy (within limits), or finding meaning/purpose (Deci & Ryan, 2000, on self-determination theory; Frankl, 1959, on meaning).
- *Considerations:* The specific *type* of need or goal underlying the dependency significantly influences its perceived importance (intensity) and the nature of the integrity evaluations likely to be triggered. Dependencies related to core survival needs often exert stronger modulating effects than those related to less central goals. A single relationship might involve dependencies serving multiple needs simultaneously.

- **5.1.2 Dimensions of Dependency:**

- *Intensity/Criticality*: As defined previously, this refers to the degree of reliance. It is influenced by the centrality of the need/goal, the perceived lack of viable alternatives, and the anticipated severity of consequences if the dependency is disrupted. High intensity implies high stakes.
- *Scope/Breadth*: Refers to the number of different needs or goals served by the dependency on a single entity. Dependency on an entity fulfilling numerous essential needs (e.g., a primary caregiver for a child, a controlling state providing all resources) is broader in scope than dependency on an entity serving one specific function. Broader scope often correlates with higher overall intensity and complexity.
- *Duration*: Dependencies can be temporary/transient (e.g., reliance on a specific tool for a short-term task) or chronic/long-term (e.g., reliance on a prosthetic limb, a long-term relationship, an enduring political system). Duration influences the potential for adaptation, normalization, and the cumulative impact of integrity evaluations.
- *Voluntariness*: Dependencies can range from being freely chosen or entered into (e.g., choosing to rely on a specific collaborator) to being entirely imposed or unavoidable (e.g., dependency on atmospheric oxygen, dependency of a child on caregivers, dependency within a coercive system). Voluntariness affects the initial affirmation process and potentially the nature of the integrity evaluation (e.g., resentment in imposed dependencies).
- *Explicitness/Awareness*: Subjects may vary in their degree of conscious awareness of their dependencies. Some are explicit and acknowledged; others may be implicit, habitual, or even actively denied. The model primarily addresses situations where the dependency is sufficiently represented (per FP1) to be subject to affirmation and evaluation, but acknowledges that the *clarity* of this representation can vary.
- **5.1.3 Symmetry/Asymmetry:**
 - *Description*: Dependency relationships are rarely perfectly symmetrical. Typically, one party relies more heavily on the other, creating an asymmetry of power or influence (Emerson, 1962). The party less dependent generally has more power within the relationship.
 - *Within the Model*: The model focuses on the *subject's* dependency on the *entity*. While the entity might also depend on the subject (mutual dependency), the process described (affirmation, evaluation, pressure, modulation) operates from the perspective of the subject navigating *its* reliance. The degree of asymmetry is a crucial component of the *context* that influences dependency intensity and perceived action-costs. Extreme asymmetry (subject highly dependent, entity minimally dependent) creates conditions of high vulnerability and often severely constrains the subject's behavioral options.
- **5.1.4 Individual vs. Collective Dependency:**
 - *Description*: Dependency can be experienced by individual subjects or by collective entities (groups, organizations, societies).

- *Individual*: Focus is on the single subject's needs, goals, representations, and evaluations.
- *Collective*: Requires considering shared needs/goals, collective representations, group norms as part of the integrity framework, distributed evaluation processes, and coordinated action. The dynamics become more complex, involving internal negotiation, aggregation of preferences (Arrow, 1951), and potential conflicts within the collective subject itself (as seen in the ADS scenario). Applying the model to collective subjects requires careful consideration of how these distributed processes occur.
- **5.1.5 Potential Internal Tensions:**
 - *Utility vs. Vulnerability*: Dependency provides necessary functions/resources (utility) but simultaneously creates vulnerability to disruption, control, or exploitation by the entity being depended upon. This inherent tension is often a source of conflict during integrity evaluation.
 - *Autonomy vs. Reliance*: The state of dependency can conflict with innate drives or learned values associated with autonomy, self-sufficiency, or freedom (related to self-determination theory, Deci & Ryan, 2000). This conflict can generate pressure towards disallowance, even if the dependency is functionally beneficial.
 - *Stability vs. Stagnation*: Long-term, stable dependencies can provide security but may also inhibit adaptation, exploration of alternatives, or growth if they become overly constraining or prevent exposure to new possibilities.
- **5.1.6 Relation to Other Concepts:**
 - *Attachment*: In interpersonal contexts, dependency often overlaps with concepts of attachment, which involve emotional bonds alongside functional reliance (Bowlby, 1969; Ainsworth et al., 1978). The model's focus is primarily functional, but emotional attachment can significantly influence perceived value, integrity evaluations, and action-costs.
 - *Addiction*: Represents an extreme form of dependency, often physiological and psychological, where reliance on a substance or behavior becomes compulsive and overrides other needs, goals, and integrity considerations. The model might potentially apply, but the overpowering nature of the dependency in addiction may severely distort the evaluation and modulation processes (Volkow et al., 2016).
 - *Power*: As noted, dependency is intrinsically linked to power dynamics. The structure of dependency relationships shapes the distribution of power and influence between subject and entity (Lukes, 2005).

This exploration highlights that "Functional Dependency" within the model is not a monolithic concept but encompasses diverse types, dimensions, and inherent tensions. Understanding these facets is crucial for applying the model appropriately and interpreting the subsequent stages of evaluation and action modulation, as the specific nature of the dependency heavily influences the entire process. The next section will explore the concepts of affirmation and perceived functional value in similar detail.

5.2 Affirming and Perceived Functional Value

The Descriptive Model posits that engaging with a functional dependency involves the subject "Affirming an entity's existence and perceived functional value." This section delves into the components and dimensions of this initial cognitive act.

- **5.2.1 The Act of Affirming:**

- *Nature of the Act:* As defined (Section 1.2), affirming is primarily a cognitive act. It involves bringing representations of the entity and its functional relevance into an operative state within the subject's cognitive system. It signifies acknowledgement and registration, a necessary precursor to intentional interaction based on the dependency. It is distinct from overt agreement or endorsement, although it may sometimes coincide with them.
- *Relation to Attention and Awareness:* Affirming typically requires directing attention towards the entity and its role within the dependency context. The degree of conscious awareness involved might vary. Some affirmations related to deeply ingrained dependencies might be largely automatic or pre-conscious, while navigating novel or problematic dependencies might require more explicit, conscious affirmation and value assessment (cf. dual-process theories, e.g., Kahneman, 2011, distinguishing System 1 automatic processing from System 2 deliberative processing).
- *Volition and Coercion:* While affirmation can be voluntary (actively choosing to acknowledge and rely on an entity), the model explicitly accommodates situations where affirmation is "necessitated by" dependency. In cases of imposed or unavoidable dependency (e.g., reliance on the only available water source, compliance under threat), the cognitive act of affirming the entity's functional role becomes a pragmatic necessity for interaction and survival, even if performed under duress and accompanied by negative affect or conflicting evaluations. The "affirmation" here is about cognitive registration of function, not necessarily willing acceptance.
- *Temporal Aspect:* Affirmation is not necessarily a one-time event. In ongoing dependencies, it may be a continuous or frequently repeated process of acknowledging the entity's relevance and function as interaction occurs or as the dependency state is brought back into focal awareness.

- **5.2.2 Acknowledging Existence:**

- *Scope:* This component refers to the subject representing the entity as present, real (within the relevant frame, e.g., physically real, socially real, conceptually real), and operationally relevant to the current situation and the dependency relationship. It involves selecting the entity from the background (perceptual or conceptual) and incorporating it into the subject's working model of the situation.
- *Relation to Belief:* It is closely related to belief in the entity's existence or presence, but focuses on the functional aspect of registering it *for the purpose of interaction within the dependency*. A subject might affirm the operational

existence of an AI system for completing a task without holding deep ontological beliefs about its consciousness. Similarly, one might affirm the existence and power of a disliked political regime as operationally relevant without endorsing its legitimacy.

- **5.2.3 Assigning Perceived Functional Value:**

- *Basis of Assignment:* This value is assigned based on the perceived link between the entity and the fulfillment of an operative need or goal (FP3, CoP 3.1). The subject assesses the entity's instrumentality *for* achieving that desired end-state. This assessment can be based on:
 - *Direct Experience:* Past successful interactions where the entity fulfilled the need/goal.
 - *Learned Associations:* Conditioning processes linking the entity to need satisfaction or goal achievement (reinforcement learning).
 - *Inferential Reasoning:* Inferring functionality based on perceived properties of the entity and knowledge of causal relationships (requires FP1 capabilities).
 - *Social Transmission:* Accepting information from others about the entity's utility.
- *Subjectivity and Perception:* The value is explicitly *perceived*. It depends on the subject's internal model, knowledge, current needs, and potentially cognitive biases. An entity might objectively possess a certain function, but if the subject does not perceive it or believes it non-functional, functional value will not be assigned in the affirmation process. Conversely, value might be perceived where it is objectively limited or absent (e.g., placebo effects, belief in ineffective systems).
- *Specificity:* The assigned value is typically specific to the function related to the dependency. A subject might affirm the functional value of a specific feature of an entity while assigning neutral or negative value to other aspects of the same entity.
- *Potential for Conflict with Other Values:* As noted previously, the assigned functional value might conflict with other values the subject holds regarding the entity (e.g., moral, aesthetic, interpersonal). This tension is central to the subsequent integrity evaluation. The affirmation step isolates the *functional* assessment relevant to the dependency management itself.

- **5.2.4 Potential Distinction: The Act (Affirmation) vs. The Resulting State ("Affirmment"):**

- *Conceptual Point:* The process described thus far focuses on the act of affirming existence and perceived functional value. It may be useful, for analytical clarity, to conceptually distinguish this act from the internal state that results from it. This resulting state represents the subject's integrated internal stance towards the entity-as-acknowledged-and-functionally-valued at a given point.
- *Introducing "Affirmment" (Conceptual Exploration):* For the purpose of denoting this resulting state, the term "Affirmment" might be considered. This neologism

is formed analogously to distinctions like 'develop' (act) vs. 'development' (result/state) or 'manage' (act) vs. 'management' (result/system/state). The suffix "-ment" often indicates the result or product of an action. Thus, "Affirment" would refer specifically to the complex internal representation constituted by the successful act of Affirmation.

- *Potential Utility:*
 - *Focus on Input to Evaluation:* Conceptually distinguishing the "Affirment" (state) clarifies that it is this internal state – the subject's representation of the entity-as-functionally-relevant – that serves as the primary input to the subsequent integrity evaluation process (Section 5.4). The evaluation mechanism compares this resulting state against the integrity framework.
 - *Acknowledging Multi-Dimensionality:* The state of "Affirment" likely encompasses more than just the acknowledged existence and the calculated functional value. It may integrate associated affective responses (e.g., feelings generated by the dependency or the entity itself), relevant memories, existential implications (how the dependency fits into the subject's life narrative or sense of self), and potentially aesthetic considerations. Using a distinct term allows for acknowledging this richer, multi-faceted internal state without overloading the definition of the initial cognitive act (Affirmation), which the model links specifically to functional value for the dependency engagement.
 - *Process Clarity:* It could refine the description of the internal sequence: Affirmation (Act) → Affirment (Resulting Internal State/Representation) → Integrity Evaluation (Process acting upon the Affirment state).
- *Ambiguities and Considerations:*
 - *Neologism Status:* "Affirment" is not a standard term. Its use requires explicit definition and carries the risk of potential confusion if not employed consistently and clearly.
 - *Complexity of the State:* The precise structure and components of the "Affirment" state are complex and likely vary significantly based on the subject, entity, and context. Defining its boundaries and determining which facets (cognitive, affective, existential) are most salient for the subsequent evaluation presents a challenge.
 - *Operationalization:* As a complex internal state, "Affirment" would be difficult to observe or measure directly, posing challenges for potential empirical investigation beyond subjective report or indirect inference.
 - *Necessity for Core Model:* While potentially useful for detailed elaboration of the internal process, the core logic of the Descriptive Model (as currently stated, focusing on affirmation leading to evaluation) does not strictly depend on introducing this separate term for

the resulting state, provided the complexity of what is evaluated is understood. Its value may lie more in detailed analysis than in the main model statement.

- *Example:* Affirming dependency on a complex medical technology might involve acknowledging its existence, perceiving its vital life-sustaining functional value, but the resulting "affirmation" state might also include feelings of vulnerability, resentment at the loss of autonomy, and perhaps even an aesthetic aversion to the machinery – all of which can feed into the integrity evaluation.
- **5.2.5 Alternatives to Affirmation:**
 - *Non-Affirmation/Dismissal:* A subject might fail to affirm an entity's existence or functional value. This could occur due to lack of awareness, misperception, denial, or active dismissal of the entity's relevance. If a necessary dependency exists, failure to affirm its functional value would preclude effective utilization and potentially lead to negative consequences stemming from the unmet need or unmanaged dependency.
 - *Partial Affirmation:* A subject might affirm existence but fail to perceive or acknowledge the relevant functional value, or vice versa. This could lead to ineffective or inappropriate engagement with the dependency.
 - *Negative Functional Value Assignment:* In some cases, an entity might be affirmed as existing but assigned a *negative* functional value relative to the operative goal (i.e., perceived as an obstacle). This would likely lead directly to pressure towards disallowance or avoidance, bypassing the positive affirmation stage described for functional dependencies.

This exploration underscores that the initial step of "Affirming... perceived functional value" is a crucial cognitive gateway for managing functional dependencies. It involves specific representational and evaluative processes, is sensitive to context (including coercion), and results in an internal state ("affirmation") that incorporates the subject's acknowledgment of the entity's operational role, forming the input for subsequent integrity evaluations. The subjectivity of perception and the potential for conflict with other values are inherent in this stage.

5.3 Interpretation of Integrity

The Descriptive Model posits that the dependency-state is evaluated against the subject's "Interpretation of Integrity." This section examines the nature, sources, structure, and dynamics of this internal normative framework.

- **5.3.1 Nature of the Normative Framework:**
 - *Definition Recall:* The operative internal set of standards, principles, values, or self-conceptions used by the subject to evaluate alignment.
 - *Function:* It serves as the internal criterion or benchmark against which specific situations, actions (potential or actual), and states (including the dependency-

state) are judged for appropriateness, consistency, or acceptability *from the subject's own perspective*.

- *Content Variation*: The specific content of this framework is highly variable between individuals, groups, and cultures. It may include:
 - *Moral Principles*: Beliefs about right/wrong, justice, fairness, harm, rights, duties (e.g., derived from deontological, consequentialist, or virtue ethics traditions; Haidt, 2012, on moral foundations theory).
 - *Personal Values*: Enduring beliefs about desirable end-states or modes of conduct (e.g., honesty, loyalty, creativity, autonomy, security) (Schwartz, 1992, theory of basic human values).
 - *Social Norms*: Internalized rules or expectations regarding appropriate behavior within specific social groups or contexts (Cialdini & Trost, 1998).
 - *Self-Conceptions/Identity*: Beliefs about one's own identity, character, roles, and commitments. Actions or states are evaluated for consistency with this self-concept ("Is this who I am?" "Is this compatible with my role as X?") (Stryker & Burke, 2000, on identity theory; Markus & Wurf, 1987, on the dynamic self-concept).
 - *Pragmatic Standards*: Principles related to effectiveness, efficiency, rationality, or consistency in goal pursuit, which might function as normative standards within certain contexts.
 - *Aesthetic Standards*: Principles related to harmony, beauty, order, or fittingness, which can sometimes inform evaluations of situations or actions.
- *Explicit vs. Implicit*: Components of the framework may be explicitly articulated and consciously endorsed by the subject, while others may be implicit, intuitive, or operate automatically based on learned associations or affective responses (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, on implicit social cognition).
- **5.3.2 Sources and Development:**
 - *Innateness/Evolution*: Some foundational elements might have biological or evolutionary roots (e.g., predispositions towards fairness, kin altruism, aversion to harm) providing basic building blocks (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Tomasello, 2009).
 - *Developmental Processes*: Cognitive and moral development involves stages of constructing and refining normative understanding based on interaction with the environment and cognitive maturation (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1969; Eisenberg, 1986).
 - *Social Learning/Cultural Transmission*: A significant portion of the framework is acquired through observation, instruction, socialization, and internalization of norms and values prevalent in the subject's family, community, and culture (Bandura, 1977, social learning theory; Vygotsky, 1978).
 - *Personal Experience*: Direct experiences, particularly those involving consequences related to normative behavior (rewards, punishments, dissonance), shape and modify the framework over time.

- *Rational Deliberation:* Subjects may consciously reflect upon, question, modify, or endorse specific principles through reasoning and deliberation (Habermas, 1984, on communicative action; Korsgaard, 1996, on sources of normativity).
- **5.3.3 Structure and Coherence:**
 - *Framework Implication:* The term "framework" implies some degree of structure or organization, not just a random collection of standards (as required by CoP 2.4).
 - *Potential Structures:* This structure might involve hierarchical relationships (core values vs. peripheral ones), domains of application (different standards for personal vs. professional life), conditional rules ("do X unless Y applies"), or networks of interconnected beliefs and values.
 - *Coherence and Conflict:* While functional coherence is necessary (CoP 2.4), perfect coherence is unlikely. Internal conflicts between different values or principles are common (value pluralism; Tetlock, 1986, on value conflict). The framework likely includes mechanisms, however imperfect, for managing these conflicts, such as prioritization heuristics, contextual activation of specific standards, rationalization, or compartmentalization. The *interpretation* part of the term acknowledges that the subject actively navigates this potentially complex and conflicted internal landscape during evaluation.
- **5.3.4 Subjectivity and Interpretation:**
 - *Individual Differences:* Both the content and the structure of the integrity framework are subject to significant individual variation based on development, experience, culture, and reflection.
 - *Interpretive Act:* Applying the framework to a specific dependency-state is an interpretive act. The subject must determine which standards are relevant, how they apply to the nuances of the situation, and how to weigh conflicting considerations. This interpretation is influenced by the subject's current goals, affective state, available cognitive resources, and how the situation itself is framed or represented (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, on framing effects). This is why the model refers to the "subject's *interpretation* of integrity."
- **5.3.5 Stability and Malleability:**
 - *Relative Stability:* For the framework to function as a standard, it must possess relative stability over time (CoP 2.1). Core values and principles tend to be somewhat resistant to change.
 - *Potential for Change:* However, the framework is not necessarily static. It can be modified through significant life experiences, exposure to alternative perspectives, conscious reflection, persuasion, trauma, or gradual cultural shifts. The integrity interpretation applied in one evaluation may differ subtly or significantly from one applied later, even by the same subject. Chronic exposure to dependency situations requiring compromise might gradually alter the framework itself (e.g., normalization of previously unacceptable states).

This exploration reveals the "Interpretation of Integrity" as a complex, dynamic, individually variable, yet structured internal normative system. It is shaped by multiple sources, contains diverse content, involves active interpretation in its application, and provides the crucial internal benchmark against which dependencies are evaluated within the descriptive model. Its stability, coherence, and specific content heavily influence the nature and outcome of the evaluation process. The next section will delve into the evaluation process itself and the concept of alignment.

5.4 Evaluation and Alignment

The Descriptive Model posits that the subject performs an evaluation to determine the "alignment between this dependency-state and the subject's interpretation of integrity." This section examines the nature of this evaluative process and the resulting assessment of alignment.

• 5.4.1 The Process of Evaluation:

- *Nature of the Process:* This is an internal cognitive process (requiring FP2 and its conditions, especially CoP 2.3 - Comparative Processing Mechanism) where the subject compares its representation of the current dependency-state (including its nature, requirements, and implications) with the relevant standards drawn from its interpretation of integrity (Section 5.3).
- *Inputs:*
 - *Representation of Dependency-State:* This involves accessing the subject's internal model of the dependency relationship (represented via FP1), encompassing factors like the entity involved, the function served, the degree of reliance, the conditions imposed, the actions required to maintain the dependency, and potentially anticipated future consequences of the dependency itself.
 - *Relevant Integrity Standards:* This involves activating and accessing the specific norms, values, principles, or self-conceptions from the subject's integrity framework (Section 5.3) deemed pertinent to the current dependency-state (requiring CoP 2.2 - Representational Accessibility). Contextual cues often play a role in activating relevant standards.
- *Mechanism:* The core of the process involves a comparison between these two sets of representations. Cognitive science suggests various potential mechanisms, such as:
 - *Constraint Satisfaction:* Viewing the dependency-state and the integrity standards as sets of constraints, the evaluation assesses the degree to which they can be simultaneously satisfied (Thagard & Verbeurgt, 1998). High conflict indicates low alignment.
 - *Feature Matching/Mismatching:* Comparing specific features or implications of the dependency-state against criteria derived from the integrity standards. Alignment reflects a high degree of match or

compatibility; misalignment reflects significant mismatches or violations.

- *Analogical Reasoning*: Mapping the structure of the dependency relationship onto known acceptable or unacceptable relational structures defined by the integrity framework (Gentner, 1983).
- *Rule Application*: Applying specific principles or rules from the integrity framework to the dependency-state to determine if it complies or violates them.
- *Implicit vs. Explicit*: Like affirmation, the evaluation process itself can range from being rapid, intuitive, and largely unconscious (System 1 type processing) to slow, deliberate, conscious, and effortful (System 2 type processing), particularly when conflicts are high or the situation is novel (Kahneman, 2011). Affective responses (feelings of comfort/discomfort, rightness/wrongness) often accompany and potentially guide this evaluation (Haidt, 2001, social intuitionist model).
- **5.4.2 The Concept of Alignment:**
 - *Definition Recall*: The perceived degree of congruence, consistency, or lack of conflict between the dependency-state and the interpretation of integrity.
 - *Nature of the Output*: The evaluation process yields an internal signal or judgment representing this alignment. This output is not necessarily a precise numerical value but rather an assessment that can be characterized qualitatively or ordinally (e.g., high alignment, moderate alignment, moderate conflict, high conflict).
 - *Dimensions of Evaluation*: The alignment assessment might consider multiple dimensions simultaneously, depending on the complexity of the integrity framework:
 - *Consistency with Values/Principles*: Does the dependency or actions required by it align with core values like honesty, fairness, autonomy, non-maleficence?
 - *Consistency with Self-Concept*: Is maintaining this dependency compatible with the subject's sense of identity or roles?
 - *Goal Congruence (Normative)*: Does the dependency, while functionally useful for one goal, conflict with other higher-order or normatively sanctioned goals?
 - *Procedural Fairness*: Are the conditions or processes involved in the dependency relationship perceived as fair according to the subject's standards? (Thibaut & Walker, 1975).
 - *Subjectivity of Perception*: Alignment is *perceived* by the subject. This perception can be influenced by:
 - *Framing*: How the dependency-state or the integrity standards are mentally framed can alter the perceived alignment (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
 - *Motivated Reasoning*: Subjects may unconsciously bias the evaluation process to reduce dissonance, potentially perceiving greater alignment

than an objective analysis might suggest, especially if the dependency is highly necessary (Kunda, 1990).

- *Attention Focus*: Focusing selectively on aspects of the dependency that align with integrity, while downplaying conflicting aspects, can influence the overall assessment.
- *Affective State*: Current mood or emotional state might color the perception of alignment.

- **5.4.3 Alignment as a Continuum:**

- *Range of Outcomes*: The evaluation rarely results in a simple binary (aligned/misaligned). It's more accurately represented as a continuum:
 - *High Alignment*: Dependency-state is perceived as fully consistent with or even supportive of the integrity framework.
 - *Moderate Alignment*: Some minor points of tension exist, but overall the state is considered acceptable or justifiable within the framework.
 - *Ambiguity/Uncertainty*: The subject may be unsure how the dependency relates to their integrity framework, or different standards may yield conflicting preliminary assessments.
 - *Moderate Conflict/Misalignment*: Significant aspects of the dependency-state conflict with the integrity framework, causing noticeable dissonance, but the conflict is not necessarily overwhelming or absolute.
 - *High Conflict/Misalignment*: The dependency-state is perceived as being in fundamental violation of core aspects of the integrity framework.
- *Influence on Pressure*: The position on this continuum directly influences the nature and intensity of the generated pressure (Section 5.5). High conflict generates strong pressure towards disallowance; high alignment generates pressure towards allowance or maintenance. Moderate or ambiguous states might generate weaker or conflicting pressures.

- **5.4.4 Potential Challenges in Evaluation:**

- *Complexity*: Evaluating multifaceted dependency relationships against complex integrity frameworks can be cognitively demanding.
- *Incommensurability*: Conflicts might arise between values or standards that seem fundamentally incommensurable, making a straightforward alignment judgment difficult (Chang, 1997).
- *Incomplete Information*: The subject may lack full information about the dependency-state or its long-term implications, leading to evaluations based on incomplete premises.
- *Dynamic Changes*: The dependency-state or the integrity framework itself might change over time, requiring ongoing re-evaluation.

This exploration highlights the evaluation stage as a critical juncture where the subject's representation of its dependency situation (enabled by FP1) is actively compared against its internal normative standards (FP2). The resulting assessment of alignment, a subjective

perception influenced by various factors, forms the crucial link between the situation and the subject's internal motivational response. The next section will examine the nature of this response – the generated pressure.

5.5 Pressure Generation

Following the evaluation of alignment (Section 5.4), the Descriptive Model posits that this evaluation "generates pressure towards allowance or disallowance." This section explores the nature of this internal "pressure."

- **5.5.1 Nature of Internal Pressure:**

- *Definition Recall:* The internal motivational state or inclination generated as a consequence of the alignment evaluation.
- *Functional Role:* It acts as an internal signal translating the evaluative outcome (alignment/misalignment) into a directional impetus relevant to action selection. It represents the internal "push" or "pull" experienced by the subject regarding the continuation or alteration of the dependency-state.
- *Mechanism:* The generation of this pressure requires the functional integration of the evaluation outcome with motivational systems (CoP 2.5 linking FP2 to FP3). Potential mechanisms include:
 - *Affective Correlates:* Alignment may generate feelings of comfort, satisfaction, or 'rightness,' while misalignment may generate feelings of dissonance, anxiety, guilt, shame, anger, or 'wrongness' (Higgins, 1987; Tangney et al., 2007). These affective states possess motivational force, driving behavior towards reducing negative affect or maintaining positive affect (Carver & Scheier, 1990).
 - *Goal System Activation:* Misalignment might be registered as a discrepancy relative to a higher-order goal of maintaining integrity or acting consistently with one's values. Goal discrepancy typically activates motivational processes aimed at discrepancy reduction (Locke & Latham, 1990). Alignment might signal congruence with this goal, reinforcing current states.
 - *Cognitive Dissonance:* Misalignment, particularly between behavior required by the dependency and internal standards, creates cognitive dissonance, which Festinger (1957) described as a motivational state driving efforts to reduce the dissonance (e.g., changing behavior, changing beliefs/standards, rationalizing).
- *Subjective Experience:* While the model uses the term "pressure," the subjective experience might vary widely – felt as unease, conviction, obligation, desire, resistance, stress, justification, etc., depending on the specific evaluation and the subject's psychological makeup. The core concept is the resulting *motivational vector*.

- **5.5.2 Directionality: Allowance vs. Disallowance:**

- *Pressure towards Allowance*: Generated primarily when the evaluation yields perceived alignment or when misalignment is minimal and easily rationalized. This pressure favors maintaining the dependency-state, complying with its requirements, and resisting changes that might disrupt the perceived acceptable situation.
- *Pressure towards Disallowance*: Generated primarily when the evaluation yields perceived misalignment or conflict between the dependency-state and the integrity framework. This pressure favors changing the situation – resisting the dependency's requirements, attempting to modify its terms, seeking alternatives, or terminating the relationship.
- *Relationship to Alignment Continuum*: The direction and intensity of the pressure generally correlate with the alignment assessment (Section 5.4.3). High alignment -> strong pressure for allowance. High conflict -> strong pressure for disallowance. Moderate alignment -> weak pressure for allowance. Moderate conflict -> moderate pressure for disallowance. Ambiguity -> potentially weak, unstable, or conflicting pressures.
- **5.5.3 Intensity of Pressure:**
 - *Determinants*: The strength or intensity of the generated pressure is likely influenced by several factors:
 - *Degree of Misalignment/Alignment*: Larger perceived discrepancies or stronger congruence generally lead to more intense pressure.
 - *Importance of Integrity Standards*: Violations of core, central values or identity components typically generate more intense pressure than conflicts with peripheral or less important standards (Schwartz, 1992, on value hierarchies).
 - *Salience of the Evaluation*: How much attention or cognitive resource is devoted to the evaluation can affect the resulting pressure's intensity.
 - *Subject's Sensitivity*: Individuals may differ in their baseline sensitivity to normative conflicts or cognitive dissonance.
 - *Role in Action Selection*: Pressure intensity is a key input into the action selection mechanism (CoP 3.5). Stronger pressure is more likely to overcome competing factors (like inertia or moderate action-costs) than weaker pressure.
- **5.5.4 Potential for Conflicting Pressures:**
 - *Internal Conflict within Integrity*: If the integrity framework itself contains conflicting standards relevant to the dependency (CoP 2.4 acknowledges this possibility), the evaluation might generate simultaneous pressures towards both allowance (based on alignment with one standard) and disallowance (based on conflict with another standard).
 - *Conflict with Other Motivations*: The pressure generated by the integrity evaluation might conflict with other concurrent motivational pressures arising from basic needs, other goals, or external incentives not directly related to the integrity assessment.

- *Resolution:* The action selection mechanism (CoP 3.5) is posited as integrating these various pressures, along with cost/context assessments, to determine the final behavioral tendency. Conflicting pressures increase the complexity of this integration process.
- **5.5.5 Pressure vs. Action:**
 - *Distinction is Crucial:* It is vital to distinguish the internal generated *pressure* from the final *behavioral manifestation*. The pressure is an internal motivational inclination. The hypothesis explicitly states that the observable action is *shaped* by modulating factors (Section 5.8 will elaborate). Therefore, strong pressure towards disallowance does *not* automatically equate to disallowance behavior, especially if dependency intensity is high, perceived costs of disallowance are prohibitive, or external constraints prevent it. Similarly, pressure towards allowance doesn't guarantee compliant behavior if other factors intervene. The pressure is the raw motivational output of the evaluation, prior to contextual modulation.

This exploration positions "Pressure Generation" as the critical link between internal evaluation and potential action within the Descriptive Model. It is conceived as a motivational state, varying in direction and intensity, arising from the perceived alignment between a dependency-state and the subject's integrity framework, mediated through affective and cognitive mechanisms. This pressure serves as a primary input, alongside other factors, to the processes shaping the eventual behavioral outcome. The next section will examine the concepts of allowance and disallowance as abstract behavioral tendencies.

5.6 Allowance and Disallowance (as Tendencies)

The Descriptive Model indicates that the pressure generated by the integrity evaluation is directed "towards allowance or disallowance." Before discussing the final behavioral manifestation, this section examines "allowance" and "disallowance" as conceptual categories representing the abstract tendencies or directions favored by the internal pressure.

- **5.6.1 Conceptual Status:**
 - *Intermediate Constructs:* Allowance and disallowance, at this stage of the model (following pressure generation but before modulation and final action), represent the *directional implication* of the internal pressure. They are abstract tendencies rather than concrete actions. Pressure *towards allowance* implies an internal bias favoring outcomes consistent with maintaining the dependency status quo; pressure *towards disallowance* implies an internal bias favoring outcomes consistent with changing or rejecting it.
 - *Bridging Motivation and Action Potential:* They serve as conceptual bridges linking the internal motivational state (pressure) to the *potential range* of behaviors that could express that motivation, prior to considering the constraints and costs that shape the actual selection.
- **5.6.2 Allowance Tendency:**

- *Origin*: Arises primarily from perceived alignment between the dependency-state and the interpretation of integrity, generating pressure favoring maintenance.
- *Nature of the Tendency*: Represents an internal inclination towards actions or states characterized by:
 - *Maintenance*: Continuing the dependency relationship under its current terms.
 - *Compliance*: Adhering to the requirements, norms, or demands associated with the dependency.
 - *Acceptance/Tolerance*: Not actively resisting or challenging the dependency state or its conditions.
 - *Facilitation*: Potentially taking actions to support or strengthen the dependency relationship if alignment is high.
- *Function*: This tendency serves to preserve situations perceived as normatively acceptable or congruent with the subject's integrity framework.
- **5.6.3 Disallowance Tendency:**
 - *Origin*: Arises primarily from perceived misalignment or conflict between the dependency-state and the interpretation of integrity, generating pressure favoring change.
 - *Nature of the Tendency*: Represents an internal inclination towards actions or states characterized by:
 - *Resistance*: Opposing the requirements, norms, or demands associated with the dependency.
 - *Rejection*: Cognitively or behaviorally distancing from the dependency or its problematic aspects.
 - *Modification Attempt*: Seeking to alter the terms, conditions, or nature of the dependency relationship to reduce the integrity conflict.
 - *Withdrawal/Termination*: Seeking to reduce involvement in or end the dependency relationship altogether.
 - *Undermining*: Potentially taking actions to weaken or sabotage the dependency relationship if conflict is high and direct termination is difficult.
 - *Function*: This tendency serves to alter or escape situations perceived as normatively problematic or incongruent with the subject's integrity framework, aiming to reduce the experienced dissonance or integrity violation.
- **5.6.4 Relationship to Pressure:**
 - *Direct Correlation*: The direction of the pressure (Section 5.5) directly corresponds to the dominant tendency (allowance or disallowance).
 - *Intensity Mapping*: The intensity of the pressure likely maps onto the strength of the corresponding tendency. Strong pressure implies a strong tendency towards allowance or disallowance; weak pressure implies a weak tendency.
- **5.6.5 Coexistence and Conflict:**
 - *Potential for Simultaneous Tendencies*: If conflicting pressures are generated (Section 5.5.4), the subject might simultaneously experience both a tendency

towards allowance (e.g., due to alignment on one dimension) and a tendency towards disallowance (e.g., due to conflict on another dimension).

- *Resolution Pre-Action:* This conflict between tendencies occurs *before* the final action selection. The integration mechanism (CoP 3.5) must resolve this conflict, weighing the strengths of the competing tendencies alongside modulating factors, to determine the ultimate behavioral direction.
- **5.6.6 Abstract vs. Concrete:**
 - *Importance of Distinction:* Maintaining the distinction between these abstract tendencies (allowance/disallowance) and the concrete behavioral manifestation (Section 5.7) is critical for understanding the model. The tendency represents the "ideal" outcome favored by the integrity evaluation's pressure, while the behavior reflects the "actual" outcome achieved after considering pragmatic constraints and costs. They are not necessarily identical. For example, a strong tendency towards disallowance might exist internally, but external constraints could force behavior that appears as allowance.

This conceptualization positions allowance and disallowance as the direct directional consequences of the internal pressure generated by the integrity evaluation. They represent the subject's internal bias regarding the dependency-state *before* pragmatic modulation occurs, setting the stage for the final action selection process described in the model's concluding clause. The next section will explore the concrete behavioral manifestation.

5.7 Behavioral Manifestation

This concept refers to the final output of the process described by the Descriptive Model: the observable pattern of actions (or inactions) exhibited by the subject in relation to the dependency-state. It is the realized outcome after the internal pressure towards allowance or disallowance has been modulated by contextual factors.

- **5.7.1 Nature as Observable Outcome:**
 - *Definition Recall:* The pattern of actions or inactions exhibited by the subject.
 - *Focus:* This is the externally discernible result of the internal cognitive and motivational sequence. It encompasses what the subject *does* (or refrains from doing) in the context of the dependency. Examples range from physical actions (compliance, resistance, escape) to communicative acts (agreement, protest, negotiation) to potentially more subtle adjustments in interaction patterns.
 - *Measurement/Observation:* In principle, behavioral manifestation is observable and potentially measurable, unlike the preceding internal states (representation, evaluation, pressure), although interpreting the *meaning* of the behavior requires understanding the context and potentially inferring the internal state.
- **5.7.2 Spectrum of Behaviors:**
 - *Not Necessarily Binary:* While influenced by the allowance/disallowance tendencies, the resulting behavior often falls on a spectrum rather than being purely one or the other. Compromise behaviors are common outcomes.

- *Examples of Behaviors Associated with Allowance Tendency (modulated):*
 - *Active Compliance/Cooperation:* Enthusiastically fulfilling requirements, actively supporting the entity/system.
 - *Passive Compliance:* Adhering to requirements without overt enthusiasm or resistance, often due to high costs of non-compliance.
 - *Acceptance/Resignation:* Tolerating the dependency and its conditions without active challenge, possibly due to perceived lack of alternatives or normalization.
 - *Minimal Compliance:* Doing only what is absolutely required, potentially signaling underlying dissent while avoiding high-cost confrontation (a form of behavioral allowance potentially reflecting disallowance pressure).
- *Examples of Behaviors Associated with Disallowance Tendency (modulated):*
 - *Overt Resistance/Rebellion:* Directly challenging, refusing to comply, actively working against the dependency or entity (feasible when costs/constraints are perceived as manageable or when integrity violation is extreme).
 - *Negotiation/Voice:* Attempting to change the terms of the dependency through discussion or appeal (Snow & Benford, 1988, on framing in social movements; Hirschman, 1970, on exit, voice, loyalty).
 - *Covert Resistance/Non-Compliance:* Secretly violating rules, performing tasks poorly, spreading dissent privately (Scott, 1985, on weapons of the weak).
 - *Seeking Alternatives/Exit:* Actively searching for or moving towards alternative means of fulfilling the need/goal outside the current dependency (Hirschman, 1970).
 - *Psychological Withdrawal:* Emotionally disengaging while maintaining behavioral compliance (can be seen as internal disallowance manifesting minimally externally).
- **5.7.3 Influence of Modulation:**
 - *Key Determinant:* The core assertion of the model's final clause is that the *specific form* of the behavioral manifestation is heavily shaped by modulating factors (dependency intensity, perceived action-costs, external constraints).
 - *Mechanism:* The integration mechanism (CoP 3.5) selects the action that best balances the internal pressure (allowance/disallowance tendency) with the assessment of these modulating factors. An action strongly favored by internal pressure might be inhibited if perceived costs are too high or constraints make it impossible. Conversely, a behavior only weakly favored by pressure might be enacted if costs are low and constraints absent.
 - *Result:* This modulation explains the frequent discrepancy between internal attitudes/evaluations and overt behavior, particularly under conditions of high dependency or constraint.
- **5.7.4 Feedback Loop Potential:**

- *Behavior Influences Future States:* The behavioral manifestation is not necessarily the end point. The actions taken (or not taken) can feed back to alter the situation:
 - They might change the nature or intensity of the dependency itself.
 - They might alter the external constraints or the entity's behavior.
 - They might lead the subject to update its representation of the situation, its interpretation of integrity (e.g., via rationalization), or its assessment of action-costs based on the experienced consequences.
- *Dynamic Process:* This suggests the model describes a process that can operate dynamically over time, with behavioral outputs influencing future inputs to subsequent iterations of the affirmation-evaluation-pressure-modulation sequence. (This dynamic aspect is noted as a point for further examination in Part 7).
- **5.7.5 "Misinquiry" as a Quality of Manifestation:**
 - *Concept Introduction:* As discussed previously, the concept of "misintegrity" could be introduced here to characterize certain behavioral manifestations. It would apply to actions that, while perhaps necessary or unavoidable due to modulation by costs/constraints, *reflect* an underlying conflict with the subject's integrity framework.
 - *Function:* It serves as a descriptive label for compromise behaviors or coerced actions that signal internal dissonance, without making a direct moral judgment. For example, minimal compliance or coerced affirmation could be described as behaviors reflecting "misintegrity" – they fulfill the demands of the situation but indicate a deviation from the subject's own standards, necessitated by modulating factors. It highlights the *trace* of the integrity conflict in the behavior itself. It is distinct from an outright integrity violation performed willingly.

The concept of Behavioral Manifestation thus represents the modulated, observable outcome of the internal process. It is shaped significantly by pragmatic considerations of dependency, cost, and constraint, often resulting in actions that are compromises between the internal pressure derived from integrity evaluations and the realities of the situation. Understanding this final step requires appreciating the powerful role of the modulating factors discussed next.

5.8 Modulating Factors (Dependency Intensity, Perceived Action-Costs, External Constraints)

The Descriptive Model's final clause states that the behavioral manifestation is significantly shaped by modulating factors: dependency intensity, perceived action-costs, and external constraints. These factors act upon the internal pressure (towards allowance or disallowance) generated by the integrity evaluation to determine the specific form of the observable action. This section explores each of these modulating factors.

- **5.8.1 Dependency Intensity:**
 - *Definition Recall:* The subject's perceived degree of reliance on the entity for need/goal fulfillment, influenced by the need's criticality, availability of alternatives, and consequences of disruption.
 - *Mechanism of Modulation:* High dependency intensity primarily increases the perceived cost associated with *disallowance* behaviors (Section 5.8.2). Actions that threaten to disrupt a high-intensity dependency (e.g., resistance, termination) carry potentially severe negative consequences (loss of critical need fulfillment). This high potential cost strongly counteracts internal pressure towards disallowance, making allowance behaviors (even if only passive compliance) more likely. Conversely, low dependency intensity reduces the perceived cost of disallowance, making it easier for internal pressure favouring disallowance to manifest in overt action.
 - *Interaction with Other Factors:* Dependency intensity is not assessed in isolation. Its impact is weighed alongside the strength of the internal pressure and the perceived costs of *allowance* behaviors. A high-intensity dependency might still be challenged if the integrity violation is extreme (generating overwhelming pressure) or if the perceived long-term costs of continued allowance are deemed even higher than the costs of disruption.
 - *Subjectivity:* The *perception* of intensity matters. A subject might overestimate or underestimate their actual dependency or the availability of alternatives, influencing their behavioral choices based on this subjective assessment.
- **5.8.2 Perceived Action-Costs:**
 - *Definition Recall:* The subject's internal assessment of the anticipated negative consequences associated with potential behavioral manifestations (allowance or disallowance actions).
 - *Scope of Costs:* These costs can be highly diverse:
 - *Material Costs:* Loss of resources, financial penalties, physical effort required.
 - *Social Costs:* Loss of social standing, damage to relationships, group exclusion, reputational harm.
 - *Psychological Costs:* Increased stress, anxiety, guilt (e.g., from causing harm through disallowance, or from violating integrity through allowance), cognitive effort, regret.
 - *Temporal Costs:* Time required for resistance or seeking alternatives.
 - *Physical Costs:* Risk of physical harm, injury, or death associated with resistance or maintaining a harmful dependency.
 - *Opportunity Costs:* Foregoing other potential benefits by choosing one course of action over another.
 - *Ethical Costs (Secondary):* Negative consequences for third parties resulting from the subject's allowance or disallowance actions.
 - *Mechanism of Modulation:* The action selection mechanism (CoP 3.5) integrates the internal pressure with the anticipated costs of actions aligned with that pressure versus actions opposing it. The subject tends to favor behaviors

perceived to minimize overall negative consequences (costs), considering both the cost of acting *against* integrity pressure (e.g., psychological cost of compliance despite conflict) and the cost of acting *in line with* integrity pressure (e.g., material/social cost of resistance). The behavior chosen represents a point on a trade-off curve between satisfying internal pressure and avoiding anticipated external/internal costs.

- *Perception and Prediction*: Costs are *perceived* based on predictive modeling (CoP 3.4). This process is subject to uncertainty and cognitive biases. Subjects might miscalculate probabilities, overweight immediate costs versus long-term costs (temporal discounting, Ainslie, 1992), or be overly influenced by salient but low-probability risks (availability heuristic, Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). The perceived costs, accurate or not, are what drive the modulation.
- *Dynamic Nature*: Perceived costs can change based on new information, changes in the environment, or the actions of the entity being depended upon.
- **5.8.3 External Constraints:**
 - *Definition Recall*: Objective limitations or restrictions imposed by the external environment or other agents that limit the subject's feasible range of actions.
 - *Nature of Constraints*: These are typically factors outside the subject's immediate control or perception/cost assessment process, representing hard limits on possibility:
 - *Physical Laws/Limitations*: Gravity, speed of light, biological limits prevent certain actions.
 - *Geographical Barriers*: Location, distance, impassable terrain limit movement or access.
 - *Resource Unavailability*: Lack of necessary tools, energy, or materials prevents certain actions.
 - *Technological Limitations*: Current technology may not permit certain solutions (e.g., inability to replace the symbiotic pathogen's function).
 - *Legal/Political Coercion*: Laws, regulations, and the enforcement power of authorities (police, military) physically prevent or severely punish certain actions (e.g., imprisonment for dissent).
 - *Social Structural Limitations*: Deeply entrenched social structures or lack of social capital might make certain paths (e.g., challenging a dominant group) practically impossible for certain subjects.
 - *Mechanism of Modulation*: External constraints act primarily by removing certain behavioral options from the feasible set *before* or *regardless of* the cost assessment. If an action (e.g., escape, direct confrontation) is physically impossible or certain to result in immediate, overwhelming negative consequences due to external force, it won't be selected even if the internal pressure is high and the *relative* perceived cost (ignoring the constraint) might seem acceptable. Constraints define the boundaries of the possible action space within which the interplay of pressure, dependency intensity, and perceived costs operates.

- *Distinction from Costs:* While closely related (a constraint often implies an infinite or prohibitive cost), the distinction is useful. Costs are subject to perception and weighing; constraints are often perceived as absolute impossibilities or near-certainties of overwhelming negative outcome imposed externally. A subject might *perceive* the cost of rebellion as high but potentially worth it; an external constraint might mean rebellion is *impossible* to organize or instantly fatal.
- **5.8.4 Interaction Between Modulating Factors:**
 - *Interdependence:* These factors are often interconnected. High dependency intensity usually increases the perceived cost of disallowance. External constraints often create or intensify dependencies and shape perceived costs.
 - *Integrated Influence:* The action selection mechanism (CoP 3.5) must integrate the influences of all relevant modulating factors simultaneously. The final behavioral manifestation reflects the outcome of this complex integration, balancing the internal drive (pressure) against the perceived realities of reliance (intensity), consequences (costs), and possibility (constraints).

This exploration clarifies that the translation from internal pressure (derived from integrity evaluation) to observable behavior is not direct but is critically mediated by the subject's assessment of the dependency's importance, the anticipated negative consequences of various actions, and the hard limits imposed by the external environment. These modulating factors explain why subjects often act in ways that diverge from their apparent internal evaluations or preferences, particularly in situations involving high stakes or significant external control. They are essential components for understanding the pragmatic dimension of navigating dependency relationships.

6. Interconnectedness of the Framework Components

This part analyzes how the core concepts explored in Part 5 interrelate and function together within the sequence described by the Descriptive Model (Section 1.2). The focus is on illustrating the systemic connections and dependencies between the different stages of the process, showing how they form an integrated functional sequence enabled by the Fundamental Prerequisites (Part 2).

6.1 The Affirmation-Dependency Circuit

This section examines the reciprocal relationship between Functional Dependency (Section 5.1) and the cognitive act of Affirming perceived functional value (Section 5.2), as encapsulated in the first clause of the Descriptive Model ("Affirming... often sustains or is necessitated by functional dependency").

- **6.1.1 Dependency Establishing the Context for Affirmation:**
 - *Prerequisite Role of Dependency:* A state of potential or actual functional dependency (rooted in subject needs/goals per FP3 and external necessities per

FP4) provides the necessary context and relevance for the act of affirmation to occur meaningfully. Without an underlying reliance or the potential for reliance, there is no pragmatic impetus for the subject to specifically affirm the existence and functional value of an external entity in relation to its needs/goals. The dependency creates the situation where such affirmation becomes pertinent.

- *Focusing Attention:* The state of dependency naturally directs the subject's attention (a facet of FP1 processing) towards the entity involved and its role, making it salient for cognitive processing, including affirmation.
- **6.1.2 Affirmation Enabling Engagement with Dependency:**
 - *Cognitive Gateway:* The act of affirming (acknowledging existence and perceived functional value via FP1) serves as the cognitive prerequisite for intentional, goal-directed engagement with the dependency relationship (as part of FP3). To utilize a tool one depends on, one must first affirm its existence and function. To interact with a system one relies upon, one must acknowledge its role. This affirmation allows the subject to incorporate the entity into its planning and action selection related to the need/goal.
 - *Sustaining Interaction:* In ongoing dependencies, repeated or continuous affirmation of the entity's functional value is often necessary to sustain the interactions required to benefit from the dependency (e.g., continuing to follow procedures for using life support requires ongoing affirmation of its function).
- **6.1.3 Dependency Necessitating Affirmation:**
 - *Imposed Reliance:* In situations of high-intensity, unavoidable, or coercively imposed dependency (where alternatives are absent or costs of non-reliance are prohibitive), the subject *must* interact with the entity to fulfill critical needs. This necessity compels the cognitive act of affirming the entity's functional role, even if this affirmation conflicts with other values or feelings. Failure to perform this minimal cognitive affirmation would preclude the necessary interaction for survival or need fulfillment. The dependency dictates the necessity of the affirmation act.
 - *Example:* A prisoner dependent on guards for food must, at a cognitive level, affirm the existence of the guards and their functional role in food distribution to engage in the actions required to receive food (e.g., going to the designated area at the designated time). This affirmation is necessitated by the dependency, irrespective of the prisoner's overall evaluation of the guards or the situation.
- **6.1.4 Feedback Loop Potential:**
 - *Affirmation Shaping Perception of Dependency:* The way an entity's value is affirmed (e.g., focusing only on function, acknowledging downsides) might subtly shape the subject's ongoing representation of the dependency itself.
 - *Interaction Shaping Future Affirmation:* The outcomes of interactions undertaken based on affirmation can feed back to modify future perceptions of functional value (e.g., if the entity consistently fails to deliver, perceived functional value might decrease, making future affirmation less likely or more strained).

- *Dynamic Interplay*: This suggests a potentially dynamic circuit where the state of dependency prompts affirmation, which enables interaction, the results of which can then modify the perception of the dependency and the nature of future affirmations.
- **6.1.5 Foundational Grounding:**
 - This circuit relies fundamentally on FP1 (Capacity for Internal Representation – to represent the dependency and perform the affirmation), FP3 (Capacity for Directed Interaction – providing the needs/goals driving the dependency and the impetus for engagement), and FP4 (Structure Permitting External Relation – providing the external conditions making dependency possible and potentially necessary).

In summary, functional dependency and affirmation are presented as tightly interconnected within the model. Dependency often creates the necessary context and impetus for affirmation, while affirmation provides the cognitive basis for engaging with and sustaining the dependency relationship. This circuit establishes the initial conditions for the subsequent evaluative process.

6.2 Integrity as the Evaluative Filter

This section analyzes how the subject's Interpretation of Integrity (Section 5.3) functions as the crucial internal filter through which the affirmed dependency-state (Section 5.1, 5.2) is evaluated (Section 5.4), leading to an assessment of alignment.

- **6.2.1 Integrity Framework as the Standard:**
 - *Source of Criteria*: The interpretation of integrity provides the specific normative standards, values, principles, or self-conceptions against which the dependency is measured. Without this internal framework (enabled by FP2, particularly CoP 2.1), the evaluation would lack criteria and could not proceed normatively.
 - *Content Determines Relevance*: The specific content of the integrity framework determines *which aspects* of the dependency-state become salient for evaluation. A framework emphasizing autonomy will focus evaluation on the reliance aspect; one emphasizing fairness will focus on the terms of the dependency; one emphasizing honesty might focus on required pretenses within the relationship.
- **6.2.2 Representation of Dependency as Input:**
 - *Object of Evaluation*: The subject's internal representation of the dependency-state (formed via FP1, shaped by the affirmation process described in 6.1) serves as the primary input to the evaluation process. This includes representations of the entity, the function, the degree of reliance, required actions, perceived conditions, and potential implications.
 - *Influence of Representation Quality*: The richness, accuracy, and focus of this representation influence the evaluation. A narrowly focused representation

might lead to a different alignment assessment than a broad one considering long-term consequences.

- **6.2.3 The Comparative Evaluation Process:**

- *Core Mechanism:* The evaluation involves actively comparing the represented features of the dependency-state against the relevant activated standards from the integrity framework (requiring FP2, specifically CoP 2.2 accessibility and CoP 2.3 comparative mechanism).
- *Interpretation in Action:* This comparison is not mechanical; it involves *interpretation* (as highlighted in the concept's name). The subject interprets the meaning of the dependency's features relative to the meaning of its standards. This interpretive step is where subjectivity, context-sensitivity, and potential biases (e.g., motivated reasoning) play a significant role in determining the perceived alignment.
- *Example:* Evaluating dependency on a controlling partner might involve comparing represented instances of control (input state) against an integrity standard of "autonomy" (framework standard). The interpretation involves deciding if the specific instances constitute a violation of the standard and how severe that violation is perceived to be.

- **6.2.4 Alignment as the Output:**

- *Result of Filtering:* The output of this comparison/interpretation process is the assessment of alignment – the degree to which the dependency-state is perceived to "pass through" the filter of the integrity framework without conflict. Misalignment represents the degree to which the state is "caught" by the filter as problematic according to the subject's own standards.
- *Shaping Subsequent Stages:* This alignment assessment is the crucial output that feeds into the next stage: pressure generation. The nature and degree of alignment/misalignment determined here directly shape the direction and intensity of the subsequent motivational response.

- **6.2.5 Foundational Grounding:**

- This filtering function relies centrally on FP2 (Capacity for Internal Evaluation) and its underlying conditions (internal standards, accessibility, comparison, coherence). It also requires FP1 (Capacity for Internal Representation) to provide the detailed representation of the dependency-state that serves as the input to the evaluation.

In essence, the interpretation of integrity acts as the subject's internal normative filter. It takes the cognitively affirmed dependency-state as input and, through a process of comparison and interpretation, produces an assessment of alignment that determines the normative significance of that state *for the subject*, thereby setting the stage for a motivational response.

6.3 From Evaluation to Motivation

This section examines the connection between the outcome of the integrity evaluation (the assessment of alignment, Section 5.4) and the generation of internal pressure towards allowance or disallowance (Section 5.5), as described in the second clause of the Descriptive Model ("...alignment... generates pressure...").

- **6.3.1 Evaluation Outcome as Trigger:**

- *Causal Link:* The model posits a direct functional link between the assessment of alignment/misalignment and the activation of motivational states. The evaluation's outcome is not merely informational but serves as a trigger or input signal to motivational systems. This requires the functional integration described in CoP 2.5 (linking FP2 output to FP3 systems).
- *Non-Neutrality of Evaluation:* Normative evaluation, by its nature, is rarely motivationally neutral. Assessing something as "aligned" with one's core values or self-concept typically carries a positive valence and motivates maintenance; assessing something as "misaligned" or conflicting typically carries a negative valence (dissonance, stress, negative affect) and motivates change or resolution (Festinger, 1957; Higgins, 1987).

- **6.3.2 Mapping Alignment to Pressure Direction:**

- *Alignment -> Allowance Pressure:* A perception of congruence between the dependency-state and the integrity framework generates pressure favouring the continuation or acceptance of that state. This reflects a motivation to maintain normatively consistent states.
- *Misalignment -> Disallowance Pressure:* A perception of conflict or inconsistency generates pressure favouring alteration or rejection of the dependency-state. This reflects a motivation to reduce normative dissonance or correct perceived integrity violations.
- *Continuum Effect:* The mapping is likely continuous – greater alignment yields stronger pressure for allowance; greater misalignment yields stronger pressure for disallowance. Ambiguous evaluations may lead to weak or conflicting pressures.

- **6.3.3 Pressure as Motivational Force:**

- *Internal Impetus:* The generated pressure functions as an internal impetus or drive influencing the subject's subsequent processing and action selection. It provides the "push" derived specifically from the normative assessment of the situation.
- *Interaction with Other Drives:* This integrity-derived pressure interacts with other motivational forces present within the subject (e.g., pressures arising directly from unmet needs/goals per FP3/CoP 3.1, pressures from external incentives). The overall motivational state of the subject at any given time is likely a combination of these various pressures.

- **6.3.4 Role of Affect:**

- *Mediating Mechanism:* Affective responses often serve as a primary mechanism linking evaluation to motivation. Misalignment feels unpleasant (anxiety, guilt, dissonance), motivating actions to alleviate the negative feeling. Alignment

feels relatively pleasant or neutral, reinforcing the current state. Appraisal theories of emotion explicitly link cognitive evaluations to affective and motivational responses (Lazarus, 1991; Scherer et al., 2001).

- **6.3.5 Foundational Grounding:**

- This connection relies crucially on the linkage between evaluation and motivation inherent in FP3 (Capacity for Directed Interaction, particularly CoP 3.3) and the requirement that evaluation outcomes be functionally integrated (CoP 2.5 under FP2). It presupposes a subject whose cognitive architecture connects normative judgment to motivational systems.

In summary, the evaluation of alignment acts as a critical input to the subject's motivational system. Perceived congruence generates pressure to maintain the state (allowance), while perceived conflict generates pressure to change it (disallowance). This pressure provides the specific motivational impetus derived from the integrity assessment, which then enters into the final stage of action modulation.

6.4 Modulation Shaping Action

This section analyzes how the modulating factors – dependency intensity, perceived action-costs, and external constraints (Section 5.8) – interact with the generated internal pressure (Section 5.5) to shape the final behavioral manifestation (Section 5.7), as described in the third clause of the Descriptive Model ("...whose behavioral manifestation is significantly shaped by..."). This represents the critical step where internal inclinations meet external realities and pragmatic assessments.

- **6.4.1 Pressure as Input to Modulation:**

- *Motivational Vector*: The internal pressure towards allowance or disallowance, generated by the integrity evaluation (Section 6.3), serves as a primary input to the action selection process. It represents the direction and intensity of change (or maintenance) favored by the subject's normative assessment.
- *Not Sole Determinant*: However, the model posits that this pressure is rarely the sole determinant of action. It is subject to modulation based on other factors.

- **6.4.2 Assessment of Modulating Factors as Co-Inputs:**

- *Parallel Processing*: Concurrently with or subsequent to the generation of pressure, the subject assesses the modulating factors using its representational and predictive capacities (FP1, CoP 3.4):
 - *Dependency Intensity Assessment*: How critical is this dependency? What are the stakes if disrupted? (Input related to Section 5.1 dimension).
 - *Action-Cost Assessment*: What are the likely negative consequences (material, social, psychological, etc.) of acting on the allowance pressure? What are the likely negative consequences of acting on the disallowance pressure? (Input related to Section 5.8.2).

- *Constraint Recognition*: What actions are actually impossible or prohibitively restricted by external forces? (Input related to Section 5.8.3).
 - *Integration Required*: These assessments provide crucial contextual and pragmatic information that must be integrated with the normative pressure.
- **6.4.3 The Integration and Action Selection Process:**
 - *Mechanism*: This involves the integrative action selection mechanism (CoP 3.5 under FP3). This mechanism effectively weighs or combines the internal normative pressure with the assessments of intensity, costs, and constraints.
 - *Weighing Process (Conceptual)*: While the precise algorithm is not specified by the model, the conceptual process involves balancing competing considerations:
 - The strength of the integrity-based pressure (How strong is the push for allowance/disallowance based on norms?).
 - The perceived necessity dictated by dependency intensity (How much do I *need* to maintain this, regardless of norms?).
 - The anticipated costs of various actions (What are the negative outcomes of following the pressure vs. going against it?).
 - The hard limits of possibility (What actions are simply unavailable due to constraints?).
 - *Outcome Determination*: The behavior selected is the one that emerges from this integrative process. It might be:
 - An action directly aligned with the pressure, if costs are low and constraints permit.
 - An action opposing the pressure, if costs of acting on the pressure are perceived as prohibitively high (e.g., compliance despite strong disallowance pressure due to survival needs).
 - A compromise action, attempting to partially satisfy the pressure while minimizing costs (e.g., minimal compliance, negotiation).
 - Inaction or behavioral paralysis, if conflicting factors are overwhelming and the selection mechanism cannot resolve them.
- **6.4.4 Explaining Attitude-Behavior Discrepancy:**
 - *Central Function*: This modulation step provides the core explanation within the model for why a subject's actions (behavioral manifestation) might diverge significantly from the tendencies suggested by their internal evaluations and resulting pressure. Integrity might generate strong pressure towards disallowance, but high dependency intensity and prohibitive action-costs can lead to behavioral allowance (compliance, resignation).
 - *Pragmatic Adaptation*: It frames behavior not just as an expression of internal norms, but as a pragmatic adaptation to the overall situation, balancing normative inclinations with perceived necessities and consequences.
- **6.4.5 Foundational Grounding:**
 - This modulation process relies critically on FP1 (Capacity for Internal Representation – to represent context, costs, constraints), FP3 (Capacity for

Directed Interaction – encompassing predictive assessment, integration of factors, modulated control of effectors), and potentially FP4 (Structure Permitting External Relation – providing the variable constraints and dependencies that make modulation necessary).

In summary, the modulation stage represents the crucial interface between the subject's internal, normatively-driven inclinations (pressure) and the pragmatic realities of its dependency situation. By integrating assessments of dependency intensity, action-costs, and external constraints, the subject shapes its final behavioral output, leading to actions that reflect a complex balance between internal standards and perceived situational demands. This explains how behavior is *significantly shaped* rather than simply determined by the integrity evaluation alone.

6.5 Relation to Fundamental Prerequisites

This section briefly summarizes how the entire interconnected process described in Sections 6.1-6.4 depends fundamentally on the capacities and structures outlined in the Fundamental Prerequisites (FP1-FP4).

- **FP1 (Internal Representation):** Underpins the entire sequence. Required for:
 - Representing the entity, needs, goals, and the dependency relationship itself (6.1).
 - Assigning perceived functional value (affirmation) (6.1).
 - Providing the representation of the dependency-state as input for evaluation (6.2).
 - Representing the integrity standards (part of evaluation) (6.2).
 - Representing context, potential outcomes, action-costs, and constraints for modulation (6.4).
- **FP2 (Internal Evaluation):** Central to the normative component. Required for:
 - Possessing the integrity framework (internal standards) (6.2).
 - Performing the comparative evaluation between the dependency-state and the framework to determine alignment (6.2).
 - Generating the output (alignment assessment) that triggers the motivational pressure (linking to 6.3).
- **FP3 (Directed Interaction):** Essential for motivation and action. Required for:
 - Possessing the needs/goals that drive the initial dependency (6.1).
 - Linking the evaluation outcome (FP2) to motivational states (pressure generation) (6.3).
 - Possessing effector systems for behavioral manifestation (6.4).
 - Containing the mechanisms for predictive assessment of consequences/costs (part of modulation) (6.4).
 - Containing the integrative action selection mechanism that weighs pressure against modulating factors (6.4).
 - Executing the final modulated action (6.4).

- **FP4 (External Relation Structure):** Provides the necessary environmental context. Required for:
 - The existence of distinct entities and the possibility of interaction upon which dependency can be based (6.1).
 - The external localization of necessities and potential constraints that often make dependency non-trivial and require management (driving the entire process) (6.1, 6.4).
 - The temporal stability allowing dependencies and evaluations to be meaningful over time (implicit throughout).

The preceding analysis (Sections 6.1-6.5) highlights that the Descriptive Model outlines a systemic process where each stage functionally depends on the outputs of previous stages and the enabling capacities provided by the Fundamental Prerequisites. Key points of this interdependence include:

- The Affirmation-Dependency circuit (analyzed in 6.1) establishes the context and the cognitively engaged state that serves as the input for evaluation.
- The subject's Interpretation of Integrity functions as the evaluative filter (analyzed in 6.2), providing the normative assessment of the dependency-state.
- The link between evaluation and motivation (analyzed in 6.3) translates this normative assessment into internal pressure towards allowance or disallowance.
- The process of modulation (analyzed in 6.4) integrates this pressure with contextual assessments to produce the final behavioral manifestation.

The entire sequence thus requires a subject possessing representational capacities (FP1), evaluative capacities (FP2), and modulated agentic capacities (FP3), operating within a reality structured to permit dependency (FP4). The examination of interconnectedness illustrates how these foundational elements combine to enable the specific dynamic of navigating dependency through integrity evaluation and context-sensitive action as described by the Descriptive Model.

7. Points for Further Examination

This part outlines specific areas and conceptual points arising from the analysis of the Descriptive Model and its underlying framework that may warrant further examination or elaboration. These points concern the model's granularity, dynamics, scope, and the precise definition of its boundaries, identified through the process of construction and conceptual exploration.

7.1 Granularity and Specificity

The Descriptive Model operates at a certain level of abstraction, describing a general sequence. Further examination could involve increasing the granularity or specificity regarding several components.

- **7.1.1 Mechanisms of Evaluation and Integration:**
 - *Point:* While the model posits a comparative evaluation (Section 5.4) and an integrative action selection mechanism (CoP 3.5, Section 6.4), it does not specify the precise cognitive or computational algorithms involved.
 - *Examination Areas:* Further work could explore specific candidate mechanisms (e.g., constraint satisfaction networks, Bayesian inference models, reinforcement learning algorithms, heuristic-based decision rules) and how their different properties might lead to variations in the evaluation outcome, pressure generation, or action modulation. Consideration of how different mechanisms handle conflicting inputs (e.g., value incommensurability, competing pressures) would be pertinent. (Relevant areas: computational neuroscience, cognitive modeling, decision science).
- **7.1.2 Content and Structure of Integrity Frameworks:**
 - *Point:* The model uses "interpretation of integrity" (Section 5.3) as a relatively high-level concept. Its internal structure and content significantly influence the evaluation.
 - *Examination Areas:* Exploration of potential typologies of integrity frameworks (e.g., predominantly deontological vs. consequentialist vs. virtue-based vs. identity-based). How does the *structure* (e.g., hierarchical, networked, compartmentalized) affect conflict resolution and evaluation consistency? How are specific standards activated by context? Developing more detailed sub-models of the integrity framework itself could enhance the model's specificity. (Relevant areas: moral psychology, ethics, value theory, personality psychology).
- **7.1.3 Calculation and Perception of Action-Costs:**
 - *Point:* "Perceived action-costs" (Section 5.8.2) is a crucial modulating factor, but the process of cost perception and calculation is complex.
 - *Examination Areas:* How do subjects estimate diverse potential costs (material, social, psychological)? What heuristics or biases influence this perception (e.g., temporal discounting, availability heuristic, loss aversion)? How are different types of costs weighed against each other? How does uncertainty about outcomes affect cost perception? A more detailed account of this subjective cost-assessment process could refine the understanding of the modulation stage. (Relevant areas: behavioral economics, judgment and decision-making, risk perception).
- **7.1.4 Nature of "Pressure":**
 - *Point:* The internal "pressure" (Section 5.5) is described functionally as a motivational vector.
 - *Examination Areas:* Further exploration of its potential correlates: specific affective states (anxiety, guilt, satisfaction), physiological arousal patterns, measurable indicators of cognitive dissonance. Does the 'flavor' of the pressure (e.g., guilt-driven vs. anger-driven disallowance pressure) influence subsequent modulation or behavior differently? (Relevant areas: affective neuroscience, motivation research, psychophysiology).

7.2 Dynamic and Temporal Aspects

The current formulation primarily describes the sequence as a functional process. Further examination is warranted regarding its operation over time and the potential for feedback.

- **7.2.1 Feedback Loops and System Dynamics:**

- *Point:* Section 5.7.4 noted the potential for behavioral manifestation to feed back and alter subsequent states (dependency, integrity interpretation, cost perception).
- *Examination Areas:* Explicitly modeling these feedback loops. How does successful disallowance behavior alter future dependency intensity or integrity evaluations? How does coerced compliance (allowance under strong disallowance pressure) affect the integrity framework (e.g., rationalization, value change) or future cost assessments over time? Analyzing the framework using concepts from dynamical systems theory could reveal potential for stable states, oscillations, path dependency, or abrupt shifts in behavior. (Relevant areas: systems dynamics, longitudinal studies in psychology/sociology).

- **7.2.2 Temporal Scales:**

- *Point:* The model does not specify the timescale over which one cycle of the process occurs.
- *Examination Areas:* Does the process operate differently for immediate, short-term decisions versus long-term, evolving dependency relationships? Can rapid, intuitive evaluations (System 1) and slow, deliberative evaluations (System 2) both be accommodated within the framework, perhaps operating in parallel or sequence? How does the duration of the dependency itself influence the constituent processes (e.g., normalization of integrity conflicts in chronic dependencies)?

- **7.2.3 Learning and Adaptation:**

- *Point:* Subjects learn from experience, which can modify components of the model.
- *Examination Areas:* How does reinforcement learning (based on experienced costs/benefits of actions) interact with the integrity evaluation process? How are integrity frameworks themselves updated or modified through experience or deliberation over time? How does the subject learn to better predict action-costs or recognize constraints? Integrating learning mechanisms more explicitly could add a crucial adaptive dimension. (Relevant areas: machine learning, developmental psychology, learning theory).

7.3 Collective Subjects

The model was noted as potentially applicable to collective entities, but this introduces complexities.

- **7.3.1 Aggregation and Distribution Problems:**
 - *Point:* Applying concepts like "internal representation," "interpretation of integrity," "pressure," and "action selection" to groups is non-trivial.
 - *Examination Areas:* How are individual representations aggregated into a 'collective representation'? How is a 'collective integrity framework' formed and maintained (e.g., organizational culture, national constitution)? How are divergent individual evaluations or pressures reconciled or aggregated to produce collective pressure or action (related to social choice theory, Arrow, 1951)? How does the internal structure and communication within the collective influence these processes? (Relevant areas: organizational behavior, political science, social epistemology, collective intelligence).
- **7.3.2 Agency and Responsibility in Collectives:**
 - *Point:* Attributing agency and evaluation to a collective raises specific conceptual points.
 - *Examination Areas:* Exploring different models of collective agency (e.g., Pettit, 2003; List & Pettit, 2011). How do concepts like 'integrity' apply at the group level? How are responsibility and cost-assessment distributed within the collective?

7.4 Defining Boundaries and Scope

Further examination may be needed to precisely define the boundaries of the model's applicability and the scope of its core concepts.

- **7.4.1 Dependency vs. Other Relationships:**
 - *Point:* Distinguishing functional dependency from related concepts like preference, voluntary exchange, cooperation, or interdependence where reliance might be mutual or less critical.
 - *Examination Areas:* Establishing clearer criteria or thresholds for when reliance constitutes "functional dependency" sufficient to activate the model's dynamics robustly. At what point does dependency intensity become negligible, rendering the model less relevant?
- **7.4.2 Scope of "Entity":**
 - *Point:* The model allows "entity" to be very broad (physical, social, abstract, technological).
 - *Examination Areas:* Does the *type* of entity systematically alter the operation of the model? For example, are integrity evaluations fundamentally different when the entity depended upon is a person versus an inanimate system versus an abstract ideology? Are different integrity standards typically invoked?
- **7.4.3 Pathological Cases:**
 - *Point:* The model primarily describes functional (though potentially conflicted) processes.
 - *Examination Areas:* How does the model apply or potentially break down in cases of severe psychological dysfunction (e.g., complete breakdown of

normative framework coherence, inability to perceive consequences, extreme dissociation)? How does it relate to phenomena like learned helplessness (Seligman, 1975) where agency seems compromised?

- **7.4.4 The Nature of "Integrity":**

- *Point:* While explored, the precise nature and universality of "integrity" as a driving force could be examined further.
- *Examination Areas:* Consideration of perspectives that might de-emphasize internal consistency or normative evaluation as primary drivers of behavior, perhaps prioritizing habit, situational cues, or raw power dynamics more heavily. Analyzing the conditions under which integrity evaluations appear most vs. least influential in shaping action.

These points represent areas where the descriptive model, while providing a coherent structure, invites further conceptual refinement, empirical investigation, or consideration of boundary conditions and specific instantiations. They highlight the model's character as a framework upon which more detailed explorations can be built, rather than a fully specified, closed theory.

8. Summary

8.1 Recap of the Framework Structure

This document has presented a framework centered around a descriptive model of subject behavior within contexts of functional dependency. The presentation followed a specific structure:

- Part 1 introduced the domain of inquiry and stated the Descriptive Model, along with definitions of its constituent terms.
- Part 2 analyzed the functional requirements implied by the Descriptive Model and presented four Fundamental Prerequisites identified as necessary for these requirements: Capacity for Internal Representation (FP1), Capacity for Internal Evaluation (FP2), Capacity for Directed Interaction (FP3), and Structure Permitting External Relation (FP4).
- Part 3 demonstrated the logical construction of the Descriptive Model as a sequence of processes emerging from the interplay of the Fundamental Prerequisites.
- Part 4 provided a detailed exposition of the specific Conditions of Possibility identified as necessary for each Fundamental Prerequisite to hold non-arbitrarily.
- Part 5 offered an exploration of the core concepts used within the Descriptive Model (e.g., functional dependency, affirmation, integrity, pressure, modulation factors), examining their facets and potential variations.
- Part 6 analyzed the interconnectedness of these core concepts as they function sequentially within the process outlined by the Descriptive Model and illustrated their reliance on the Fundamental Prerequisites.

- Part 7 outlined points related to the framework's granularity, dynamics, scope, and boundaries that were identified as areas for potential further examination.

The structure aimed to present the Descriptive Model, analyze its underpinnings, identify its foundational prerequisites, detail the conditions those prerequisites entail, show the model's construction from that foundation, and explore its concepts and interrelations systematically.

8.2 Restatement of Fundamental Prerequisites and Descriptive Model

For clarity and consolidation, the four Fundamental Prerequisites identified in Part 2 are restated here:

- **FP1: Capacity for Internal Representation:** Subjects possess the capacity to generate, maintain, and manipulate internal states (representations) that correspond to elements of their external environment (entities, contexts), their own internal conditions (needs, goals, affective states), and relational structures (such as dependency). These internal representations enable the assignment of functional value or meaning based on the subject's internal economy.
- **FP2: Capacity for Internal Evaluation:** Subjects possess internal normative frameworks (interpretations of integrity) and the functional capacity to evaluate represented states (derived via FP1) against these frameworks, resulting in an assessment of alignment or misalignment.
- **FP3: Capacity for Directed Interaction:** Subjects possess needs or goals and the functional capacity for non-random interaction with their environment via effector systems. This interaction is influenced by internal motivational states (which are linked to the outcomes of internal evaluations per FP2) and is modulated based on predictive assessments of context and consequences (derived via FP1).
- **FP4: Structure Permitting External Relation:** The reality within which subjects exist is structured such that it contains distinct entities and systems, allows for causal interaction between them, possesses sufficient temporal stability for predictable interaction, and includes conditions where subjects may rely on external elements for need or goal fulfillment (e.g., due to external localization of necessary functions/resources, potentially under constraints).

The Descriptive Model, presented in Part 1 and shown in Part 3 to be constructible from these prerequisites and their entailed conditions, is restated here:

"Affirming an entity's existence and perceived functional value often sustains or is necessitated by functional dependency. The alignment between this dependency-state and the subject's interpretation of integrity generates pressure towards allowance or disallowance, whose behavioral manifestation is significantly shaped by the dependency's intensity, perceived action-costs, and external constraints."

Appendix A: Case Scenarios

A.1 Introduction

This appendix presents a series of hypothetical scenarios designed to illustrate the application of the Descriptive Model (Section 1.2) in diverse contexts. The purpose is not to provide empirical validation but to demonstrate how the model's components – affirmation, functional dependency, integrity evaluation, pressure generation, modulating factors, and behavioral manifestation – can be used analytically to describe subject behavior in situations involving reliance. The scenarios are ordered based on an assessment of increasing complexity concerning factors such as the nature of the dependency, the potential for integrity conflict, the stakes involved, and the influence of modulating factors. This ordering is illustrative rather than definitive. Each scenario includes a description followed by an analysis structured according to the sequence outlined in the Descriptive Model.

A.2 Scenario 1: Reliance on Standard Software

- **A.2.1 Scenario Description:**

- *Subject:* An individual office worker (Subject W).
- *Entity:* A standard word processing software application (Software S) provided by Subject W's employer.
- *Dependency:* Subject W requires Software S to perform core job duties (writing reports, memos). Alternative software exists, but using the standard Software S is mandated by company policy for compatibility and support reasons, and switching would require effort (learning curve, potential data conversion issues). The tasks performed are routine parts of Subject W's employment.
- *Context:* Standard office environment; job performance is periodically reviewed. Failure to complete tasks using Software S could negatively impact performance reviews.

- **A.2.2 Analysis via Descriptive Model:**

- *Affirmation & Dependency:*
 - *Functional Dependency:* A functional dependency exists. Subject W relies on Software S (Entity) to fulfill job requirements (Goal). The intensity is moderate – job performance depends on it, but immediate survival does not. Alternatives exist technically but are constrained by policy and switching costs. The scope is limited primarily to work-task completion. The dependency is largely imposed by the employer's policy.
 - *Affirmation:* Subject W performs the cognitive act of affirming Software S's existence and perceived functional value. Existence is acknowledged by launching and using the software daily. Functional value ("it allows me to write reports required for my job") is perceived and affirmed as necessary for goal achievement within the employment context. This affirmation sustains the interaction with the software.

- *Integrity Interpretation & Evaluation:*
 - *Integrity Framework:* Subject W's relevant integrity framework likely includes standards related to work quality, efficiency, professionalism, possibly aesthetic preferences regarding tools, and potentially values regarding software freedom or usability principles.
 - *Evaluation:* The dependency-state (reliance on Software S) is evaluated against this framework.
 - *Potential Alignment:* If Software S performs adequately and meets standards for professional output, alignment may be high regarding work quality and professionalism. Compliance with company policy aligns with the role-based integrity of being an employee.
 - *Potential Misalignment (Minor):* If Software S is perceived as inefficient, buggy, having a poor user interface, or lacking desired features, this could conflict with standards related to efficiency or perhaps aesthetic standards for tools. If the software is proprietary and the subject values open-source principles, a minor conflict might arise. These conflicts are generally related to preference or secondary work values rather than core moral principles in this scenario.
 - *Result:* The evaluation likely results in high-to-moderate alignment, with potential for minor points of friction or dissatisfaction based on usability or efficiency standards.
- *Pressure Generation:*
 - *Direction:* Given likely high-to-moderate alignment, the primary pressure generated is towards *allowance* (continuing to use Software S).
 - *Intensity:* The intensity of this pressure is likely moderate, reflecting the functional necessity for the job, potentially tempered by minor dissatisfactions. Any pressure towards disallowance (stemming from minor frustrations) is likely weak.
- *Modulating Factors:*
 - *Dependency Intensity:* Moderate (job requirement).
 - *Perceived Action-Costs:*
 - *Costs of Allowance (Continuing Use):* Minor frustration or inefficiency if the software is disliked. Potential slight impact on productivity. These costs are generally low.
 - *Costs of Disallowance (Switching/Refusing):* Learning curve for new software, potential file incompatibility, time spent on conversion, violation of company policy, potential negative impact on performance review, friction with IT support/colleagues. These costs are perceived as moderate to high, primarily due to policy and integration issues.
 - *External Constraints:* Company policy mandating Software S acts as a significant external constraint against choosing alternatives freely.

- *Behavioral Manifestation:*
 - *Predicted Behavior:* The combination of moderate pressure towards allowance, low costs of allowance, moderate-to-high costs of disallowance, and external constraints strongly predicts behavioral *allowance*. Subject W will almost certainly continue using Software S for required job tasks.
 - *Nuances:* If minor integrity conflict exists (e.g., frustration with inefficiency), the pressure towards disallowance, though weak and overridden, might manifest subtly. This could include occasional complaining about the software, using workarounds within the software, exploring alternatives for non-essential tasks not covered by policy, or displaying minimal enthusiasm when using it. These reflect the modulated outcome of the underlying minor conflict.
- **A.2.3 Specific Points Illustrated:**
 - This scenario illustrates the model in a low-stakes, common situation.
 - It shows how functional value affirmation can be routine and pragmatically driven by job requirements.
 - It demonstrates how even minor integrity conflicts (e.g., with efficiency standards) can generate weak disallowance pressure.
 - It highlights the significant role of perceived action-costs (switching costs) and external constraints (company policy) in modulating behavior, ensuring allowance even if minor dissatisfaction exists.

A.3 Scenario 2: Child's Dependency on Adequate Caregiver

- **A.3.1 Scenario Description:**
 - *Subject:* A young child (Subject C), pre-adolescent.
 - *Entity:* Subject C's primary caregiver (Caregiver G), who provides for basic needs (food, shelter, safety) and emotional support adequately, though not perfectly. Caregiver G establishes household rules and expectations.
 - *Dependency:* Subject C exhibits absolute functional dependency on Caregiver G for survival, physical and emotional well-being, and development. No viable alternatives for care are available or conceivable to the child.
 - *Context:* Family environment. The child is developing their understanding of rules, relationships, and internal standards.
- **A.3.2 Analysis via Descriptive Model:**
 - *Affirmation & Dependency:*
 - *Functional Dependency:* Absolute intensity and broadest scope, covering nearly all physiological, safety, social, and emotional needs. The dependency is entirely imposed by the conditions of childhood. Duration is long-term (years).
 - *Affirmation:* Affirmation of Caregiver G's existence and functional value is developmentally necessary and likely occurs implicitly and explicitly. Existence is affirmed through constant interaction. Functional

value (provider of food, safety, comfort, guidance) is perceived as essential for survival and well-being. This affirmation is driven by innate attachment needs (Bowlby, 1969) and the reality of total reliance. The affirmation likely includes positive affective components related to attachment, even if occasional frustrations exist. This affirmation is necessitated by the dependency.

○ *Integrity Interpretation & Evaluation:*

- *Integrity Framework:* Subject C possesses a developing integrity framework based on innate needs for safety, consistency, affection, and fairness, as well as internalized rules and expectations learned from Caregiver G and other social interactions (Piaget, 1932). Standards relate heavily to the perceived reliability and benevolence of the caregiver.
- *Evaluation:* The dependency-state (total reliance on G) and specific interactions/rules are evaluated against this framework.
 - *Alignment (Presumed High):* Given the description of "adequate" care, the evaluation likely results predominantly in high alignment. Needs are met, safety is provided, emotional support is present. Caregiver G's actions generally conform to C's need for a reliable and caring figure. Internalized rules, having come from G, likely align with G's behavior.
 - *Potential Misalignment (Minor/Situational):* Specific instances of rule enforcement, perceived unfairness (e.g., relative to siblings), minor inconsistencies, or temporary unavailability of G might create momentary, localized feelings of misalignment or conflict with standards of fairness or immediate need fulfillment.
- *Result:* Overall high perceived alignment, underpinning the attachment bond and general sense of security.

○ *Pressure Generation:*

- *Direction:* Predominantly strong pressure towards *allowance* (maintaining the relationship, accepting G's care and authority).
- *Intensity:* High intensity allowance pressure due to high alignment regarding fundamental needs. Any disallowance pressure generated by minor situational conflicts is likely weak and transient relative to the primary allowance pressure.

○ *Modulating Factors:*

- *Dependency Intensity:* Absolute/Maximum.
- *Perceived Action-Costs:*
 - *Costs of Allowance (Accepting Care):* Generally low to nil, primarily positive (need fulfillment, security). Costs might involve frustration over specific rules or unmet minor desires.
 - *Costs of Disallowance (Rejecting Caregiver):* Perceived by the child as effectively infinite or catastrophic (loss of sustenance,

safety, love, abandonment). Even minor acts of disallowance (e.g., strong defiance) might be perceived as risking withdrawal of care or affection (high psychological cost).

- *External Constraints:* Absolute lack of alternatives. Physical and cognitive inability to self-provide. Social structure reinforces dependency.
- *Behavioral Manifestation:*
 - *Predicted Behavior:* Overwhelmingly predicts behaviors consistent with *allowance*. This includes seeking proximity, displaying affection, general compliance with rules, expressing distress upon separation, relying on the caregiver for comfort and help (attachment behaviors, Ainsworth et al., 1978).
 - *Nuances:* Minor situational misalignments generating weak disallowance pressure might manifest as temporary protest (crying, arguing over a specific rule), negotiation, or seeking clarification. However, these occur within the overarching framework of allowance and secure attachment, modulated by the understanding (perhaps implicit) of the catastrophic cost of actual relationship disallowance. The behavior reflects secure reliance.
- **A.3.3 Specific Points Illustrated:**
 - Illustrates the model under conditions of maximum dependency intensity and constraint.
 - Highlights how affirmation is developmentally necessary and intertwined with attachment needs.
 - Shows how evaluation occurs even in childhood, primarily against needs for security and fairness.
 - Demonstrates how extreme dependency intensity and prohibitive costs/constraints lead to overwhelmingly allowance-based behavioral manifestations, even if minor frustrations (weak disallowance pressures) occur.
 - Contrasts with scenarios involving higher levels of agency or viable alternatives.

A.4 Scenario 3: Workplace Collaboration with Ethical Friction

- **A.4.1 Scenario Description:**
 - *Subject:* An experienced engineer (Subject E).
 - *Entity:* A senior colleague (Colleague C) with whom Subject E must collaborate closely on a critical project for their company. Colleague C possesses unique technical expertise essential for the project's success.
 - *Dependency:* Subject E is functionally dependent on Colleague C for specific technical knowledge and input required to complete their shared project successfully. Project failure would negatively impact both collaborators' standing and potentially the company. Alternatives (e.g., acquiring the expertise

independently, finding another expert) are considered highly time-consuming or infeasible within the project timeline.

- *Context*: Collaborative project environment within a corporation. Colleague C occasionally engages in behaviors that Subject E perceives as ethically questionable, though not illegal or directly violating core company policy. Examples include slightly exaggerating results in internal reports, taking undue credit for minor contributions from junior staff, or employing manipulative communication tactics in meetings. These behaviors do not directly impede the technical collaboration but create discomfort for Subject E.
- **A.4.2 Analysis via Descriptive Model:**
 - *Affirmation & Dependency*:
 - *Functional Dependency*: A specific, task-oriented functional dependency exists. Subject E relies on Colleague C (Entity) for essential technical expertise (Function) to achieve the shared goal of project success. Intensity is significant within the project context (project success relies on it), but not existential. Scope is relatively narrow (focused on technical collaboration). Duration is project-dependent. The dependency arises from the division of labor and specialized expertise required.
 - *Affirmation*: Subject E affirms Colleague C's existence as a collaborator and explicitly affirms C's perceived functional value regarding the needed technical expertise ("C is the expert we need for this part"). This affirmation is necessary to initiate and sustain the collaborative interactions required to access C's knowledge. The affirmation is primarily instrumental, focused on C's technical role.
 - *Integrity Interpretation & Evaluation*:
 - *Integrity Framework*: Subject E's relevant integrity framework likely includes standards related to honesty in reporting, fairness in crediting contributions, professional communication ethics, trustworthiness in collaboration, and potentially values regarding collegiality or mentorship.
 - *Evaluation*: The dependency-state (reliance on C) and specifically C's observed behaviors are evaluated against this framework.
 - *Alignment (Functional)*: The core functional aspect of the dependency (C providing necessary technical expertise) likely aligns with the goal of project success, which may align with professional integrity standards related to competence and completing assigned work.
 - *Misalignment (Behavioral/Ethical)*: Colleague C's observed behaviors (exaggeration, credit-taking, manipulation) directly conflict with Subject E's integrity standards regarding honesty, fairness, and professional communication. This creates significant perceived misalignment regarding the *nature* of the

collaborator and the *process* of collaboration, even if the technical function is fulfilled.

- *Result:* The evaluation yields a mixed result: alignment regarding the essential functional value for the project, but significant misalignment regarding the ethical dimensions of the collaborator's conduct within the relationship.
- *Pressure Generation:*
 - *Conflicting Pressures:* The mixed evaluation generates conflicting internal pressures:
 - *Pressure towards Allowance:* Generated by the high perceived functional value of C for project success and the alignment with professional duty to complete the project. This pressure favors maintaining the collaboration to achieve the goal.
 - *Pressure towards Disallowance:* Generated by the significant misalignment between C's behavior and E's integrity standards (honesty, fairness). This pressure favors distancing from C, challenging the behavior, altering the collaboration dynamics, or even withdrawing if the violations feel severe enough.
 - *Intensity:* The intensity of allowance pressure relates to the perceived importance of the project. The intensity of disallowance pressure relates to how strongly E holds the violated integrity standards and how egregious C's behavior is perceived to be. Significant pressure towards disallowance is likely present due to the ethical nature of the conflict.
- *Modulating Factors:*
 - *Dependency Intensity:* Significant within the project scope. Alternatives are poor. This increases the cost of disallowance.
 - *Perceived Action-Costs:*
 - *Costs of Allowance (Continuing collaboration despite ethical concerns):* Psychological discomfort, stress from cognitive dissonance (collaborating with someone whose behavior is disapproved), potential complicity if C's actions escalate, damage to E's own sense of integrity. These are primarily internal/psychological costs.
 - *Costs of Disallowance (Challenging C, withdrawing, escalating):* Potential damage to the working relationship, project delays or failure, negative impact on E's own performance review/career (if perceived as 'not a team player'), interpersonal conflict, time and energy spent on confrontation or finding alternatives. These are primarily external/social/career costs.
 - *External Constraints:* Project deadlines, company structure making C the designated expert, potential lack of formal mechanisms to address C's specific 'minor' ethical breaches (as they don't violate core policy).
- *Behavioral Manifestation:*

- *Predicted Behavior:* The conflicting pressures and significant costs associated with both full allowance (internal integrity cost) and full disallowance (external project/career cost) make a *compromise* behavior the most likely outcome. Subject E is likely to maintain the necessary technical collaboration (allowance) while attempting to mitigate the integrity conflict or express disallowance in lower-cost ways.
 - *Potential Compromise Behaviors:*
 - *Compartmentalization:* Focusing strictly on technical interaction while minimizing other social engagement with C.
 - *Setting Boundaries:* Attempting to gently push back against specific behaviors where possible without jeopardizing the core collaboration (e.g., subtly correcting misattributions of credit if feasible).
 - *Seeking Clarification (Indirect Challenge):* Asking questions that might indirectly highlight exaggerated claims without direct accusation.
 - *Documenting Carefully:* Ensuring E's own contributions are clearly documented to mitigate C's credit-taking.
 - *Limited Engagement:* Fulfilling collaborative duties but avoiding unnecessary interactions or voluntary association with C.
 - *Expressing Concerns to Trusted Others:* Discussing the situation with a mentor or peer for validation or advice, without formal escalation.
 - *Internal Withdrawal:* Maintaining external cooperation while internally distancing and potentially planning to avoid future collaboration with C after the project.
 - *Unlikely Behaviors:* Full confrontation or withdrawal (high disallowance cost) or complete internal acceptance of C's behavior (high allowance cost) are less likely unless the pressure or costs shift dramatically.
 - *"Misinquiry" Reflection:* Behaviors like compartmentalization or minimal necessary engagement could be seen as reflecting "misintegrity" – actions taken out of necessity that signal an unresolved conflict with E's own standards for ideal collaboration.
- **A.4.3 Specific Points Illustrated:**
 - Illustrates the model in a common professional context involving task dependency coupled with interpersonal/ethical conflict.
 - Demonstrates how evaluation can yield mixed results (functional alignment vs. ethical misalignment).
 - Highlights the generation of conflicting pressures (allowance driven by project need vs. disallowance driven by integrity conflict).

- Shows how perceived action-costs (internal integrity costs vs. external career/project costs) and constraints lead to modulated compromise behaviors rather than direct expression of the stronger pressure.
- Illustrates how allowance/disallowance manifest on a spectrum, including subtle or indirect forms.

A.5 Scenario 4: Adherence to a Socially Marginalized Ideology

• A.5.1 Scenario Description:

- *Subject*: An individual (Subject I) who adheres strongly to a complex ideology (Ideology X - Entity). Ideology X offers comprehensive explanations for societal problems and provides a strong sense of community and identity among its adherents.
- *Dependency*: Subject I feels functionally dependent on Ideology X for:
 - *Epistemic Needs*: Providing answers, certainty, and a framework for understanding a perceived complex or hostile world.
 - *Psychological Needs*: Reducing anxiety, providing meaning/purpose, validating grievances, offering a sense of belonging and positive identity within the adherent group.
 - *Social Needs*: The primary social network and source of support for Subject I consists of fellow adherents of Ideology X.
- *Context*: Ideology X is considered fringe or extremist by mainstream society and established institutions (media, academia, government). Adherence carries significant social stigma and potential risks (e.g., loss of relationships outside the group, employment difficulties if views become known, potential surveillance). Information contradicting Ideology X is widely available from mainstream sources.

• A.5.2 Analysis via Descriptive Model:

- *Affirmation & Dependency*:
 - *Functional Dependency*: High intensity dependency across multiple domains (epistemic, psychological, social). Alternatives (mainstream explanations, other social groups) are perceived as inadequate, hostile, or inaccessible. Scope is broad, impacting worldview and social life. Duration is likely long-term. The dependency might be partly chosen (initial attraction) but strongly reinforced by group dynamics and perceived lack of alternatives.
 - *Affirmation*: Subject I strongly affirms the "existence" of Ideology X as a *valid and true* explanatory framework. Intense affirmation of its perceived functional value in providing understanding, meaning, identity, and community is central to adherence. This affirmation is necessary to access the perceived benefits and is constantly reinforced through interaction with the ideology's content and fellow adherents.
- *Integrity Interpretation & Evaluation*:

- *Integrity Framework*: Subject I's integrity framework likely includes standards related to truth, consistency, loyalty (to the group/ideology), authenticity (living by one's beliefs), potentially justice (as defined by the ideology), and perhaps prior standards related to critical thinking or evidence evaluation acquired before deep adherence.
- *Evaluation*: The dependency-state (reliance on Ideology X for core needs) and the ideology's tenets are evaluated against this framework.
 - *Alignment (Internal Perspective)*: From the perspective of the standards *within* the framework that prioritize the ideology's truth, group loyalty, and the meaning it provides, alignment is likely perceived as very high. Adherence is seen as consistent with living authentically according to perceived truth.
 - *Misalignment (Potential Conflicts)*: Significant conflict may arise with:
 - *External Evidence*: Information from mainstream sources contradicting Ideology X conflicts with standards for truth or evidence (if such standards persist).
 - *Logical Consistency*: Potential internal contradictions within Ideology X or conflicts with other knowledge held by I might challenge standards of logical consistency.
 - *Social Costs*: Negative reactions from non-adherents (family, old friends) conflict with values related to maintaining those relationships or broader social harmony.
 - *Prior Values*: Ideology X might require rejecting or reinterpreting values held prior to adherence, creating dissonance.
- *Result*: The evaluation is complex and often involves managing significant dissonance. High perceived alignment based on the ideology's own criteria often coexists with potential or actual conflict with external information or prior/broader values. Cognitive defenses are typically employed (see below).
- *Pressure Generation*:
 - *Strong Pressure towards Allowance*: Generated by the high perceived alignment regarding core needs (understanding, meaning, belonging) and the internal consistency demanded by the ideology itself. Loyalty norms generate pressure against questioning.
 - *Potential Pressure towards Disallowance*: Generated by conflicts with external evidence, logical inconsistencies, or negative social consequences impacting other values.
 - *Dominance*: In strong adherents, the allowance pressure, reinforced by group dynamics and the fulfillment of core psychological needs, often dominates or suppresses the disallowance pressure.
- *Modulating Factors*:

- *Dependency Intensity*: Very high (epistemic, psychological, social). Alternatives perceived as non-viable or hostile.
- *Perceived Action-Costs*:
 - *Costs of Allowance (Continued Adherence)*: Social stigma, loss of external relationships, potential practical difficulties (employment), cognitive effort required to maintain belief against counter-evidence.
 - *Costs of Disallowance (Questioning/Leaving)*: Loss of understanding/certainty (epistemic void), loss of meaning/purpose, severe anxiety, loss of primary social network/community (extreme social cost), potential hostility from the group, identity crisis. These costs are often perceived as devastatingly high.
- *External Constraints*: Limited access to diverse perspectives within an echo chamber, active discouragement of dissent within the group, potential lack of resources or support systems outside the group.
- *Behavioral Manifestation*:
 - *Predicted Behavior*: The combination of strong allowance pressure, extremely high dependency intensity, and devastatingly high perceived costs of disallowance strongly predicts behavioral *allowance*. Subject I is likely to maintain adherence, actively participate in the group, consume and promote ideological content, and defend the ideology against criticism.
 - *Dissonance Management Behaviors (Forms of Allowance)*: The underlying conflict (generating disallowance pressure) is often managed through specific behaviors that reinforce allowance:
 - *Selective Exposure/Confirmation Bias*: Seeking out confirming information and avoiding contradictory evidence (Festinger, 1957; Nickerson, 1998).
 - *Source Derogation*: Dismissing or discrediting sources of conflicting information.
 - *Motivated Reasoning*: Interpreting ambiguous information in ways that support the ideology (Kunda, 1990).
 - *Strengthening Group Ties*: Increasing engagement with the community for validation and support.
 - *Proselytizing*: Attempting to convert others can reinforce one's own beliefs.
 - *Reinterpreting Integrity*: Modifying prior standards of evidence or critical thinking to align with ideological requirements.
 - *Rare Disallowance*: Behavioral disallowance (questioning, leaving) typically occurs only if the perceived integrity conflicts become overwhelming and cannot be managed, *and* if the perceived costs of leaving are somehow reduced (e.g., finding an alternative support

system, reaching a personal breaking point where internal costs outweigh exit costs).

- **A.5.3 Specific Points Illustrated:**

- Illustrates dependency that is primarily epistemic, psychological, and social rather than material.
- Shows how an ideology itself can become the entity in a dependency relationship, fulfilling core needs.
- Highlights the crucial role of managing cognitive dissonance when integrity evaluations yield conflicting results (internal alignment vs. external conflict).
- Demonstrates how extremely high dependency intensity and perceived costs of disallowance (especially social/identity loss) can lead to strong behavioral allowance even in the face of significant external counter-evidence or social stigma.
- Illustrates how behaviors often associated with ideological commitment can be understood as mechanisms for maintaining allowance by managing underlying disallowance pressures.

A.6 Scenario 5: Political Dissident in Oppressive Regime

- **A.6.1 Scenario Description:**

- *Subject:* An individual (Subject D) living under a highly authoritarian political regime (Regime R - Entity).
- *Entity:* Regime R, encompassing the state apparatus, its laws, enforcement mechanisms (police, security services), control over resources, and dominant ideology.
- *Dependency:* Subject D exhibits high functional dependency on Regime R for basic survival needs (access to food distribution, housing allocation, employment opportunities, basic safety from non-state threats, which are often managed/controlled by the regime) and for avoiding severe negative consequences (imprisonment, violence, persecution directed by the state). Alternatives (emigration, successful overthrow) are perceived as extremely high-risk or impossible.
- *Context:* Subject D fundamentally disagrees with Regime R's ideology, methods, and legitimacy, viewing it as unjust and oppressive based on their own internal values (e.g., freedom, justice, truth). Regime R requires outward displays of compliance or loyalty (e.g., attending mandatory rallies, paying obligatory fees/taxes, refraining from criticism) and suppresses dissent.

- **A.6.2 Analysis via Descriptive Model:**

- *Affirmation & Dependency:*
 - *Functional Dependency:* Very high intensity, broad scope (covers survival, safety, basic economic activity). Duration is potentially lifelong unless circumstances change dramatically. Dependency is entirely imposed and coercive. Alternatives carry extreme risk (cost/constraint).

- *Affirmation:* This is a critical point of tension.
 - *Affirmation of Existence:* Subject D undeniably affirms the existence and overwhelming power of Regime R as the controlling force in their environment. This is a matter of pragmatic recognition of reality.
 - *Affirmation of Perceived Functional Value (Coerced/Minimalist):* Affirmation of *value* is highly problematic. Subject D assigns profound *negative* intrinsic value to R. However, to survive and interact within the system to access necessities, D must perform a minimal, coerced affirmation of R's *functional role* in controlling those necessities. D affirms "Regime R controls food distribution, and I must interact with this system to eat." This is an affirmation of functional *control* or *necessity*, not of positive worth. It is necessitated by the absolute dependency for survival. This affirmation is likely purely cognitive and instrumental, devoid of positive affect or endorsement.
- *Integrity Interpretation & Evaluation:*
 - *Integrity Framework:* Subject D's integrity framework strongly emphasizes values like freedom, justice, truth, human dignity, autonomy, and likely consistency between belief and action.
 - *Evaluation:* The dependency-state (reliance on and forced compliance with the oppressive Regime R) is evaluated against this framework.
 - *Misalignment (Profound):* An extreme conflict and profound misalignment exist. Regime R's existence, ideology, methods, and the required acts of compliance directly violate nearly all of D's core integrity standards. The dependency itself is perceived as unjust. Required actions (e.g., attending rallies) force inauthenticity.
 - *Result:* The evaluation yields an unambiguous assessment of high conflict/misalignment.
- *Pressure Generation:*
 - *Direction:* Overwhelmingly strong pressure towards *disallowance* is generated due to the profound integrity conflict. The subject experiences intense internal pressure to resist, reject, escape, or undermine Regime R.
 - *Intensity:* Extremely high intensity disallowance pressure, fueled by the violation of core values and the perceived injustice of the situation. Pressure towards allowance (e.g., based on R providing minimal stability against chaos) is likely negligible or completely overshadowed.
- *Modulating Factors:*
 - *Dependency Intensity:* Very high (survival, basic needs).
 - *Perceived Action-Costs:*

- *Costs of Allowance (Outward Compliance):* Severe psychological cost (cognitive dissonance, violation of conscience, inauthenticity, potential guilt/shame). Risk of gradual erosion of internal integrity. Potential social cost if associating with regime elements damages reputation among like-minded individuals.
- *Costs of Disallowance (Resistance, Non-compliance, Escape):* Extremely high perceived costs – imprisonment, torture, execution, persecution of family, loss of livelihood, complete social isolation enforced by the state. The cost is often perceived as potentially ultimate (loss of life).
- *External Constraints:* Pervasive surveillance, powerful state security apparatus, lack of free press or assembly, geographical barriers to escape, control over all resources, lack of viable organized opposition. These constraints make many forms of disallowance physically impossible or suicidally risky.
- *Behavioral Manifestation:*
 - *Predicted Behavior:* This scenario epitomizes the power of modulating factors to override internal pressure. Despite extreme pressure towards disallowance, the combination of very high dependency intensity, catastrophic perceived costs of overt disallowance, and severe external constraints forces the most probable behavioral manifestation towards *coerced allowance* or *minimal compliance*.
 - *Likely Behaviors:*
 - *Outward Compliance:* Performing required actions (attending rallies, paying dues) minimally and without internal assent to avoid immediate negative consequences.
 - *Self-Censorship:* Refraining from any public expression of dissent.
 - *Private Dissent:* Maintaining strong internal opposition, potentially sharing views only with highly trusted individuals.
 - *Seeking Information (Covertly):* Attempting to access alternative sources of information if possible and safe.
 - *Minimal Engagement:* Avoiding voluntary participation in regime activities beyond what is absolutely required.
 - *Psychological Compartmentalization:* Maintaining a sharp distinction between outward behavior and internal beliefs/integrity.
 - *Manifestation of Disallowance Pressure (High Risk / Covert):* The intense disallowance pressure might manifest, if perceived opportunities and risks allow, as:
 - *Covert Resistance:* Small acts of non-cooperation, information sharing within trusted networks, low-risk symbolic acts.

- *Escape Attempt*: If a perceived opportunity arises, despite high risk.
 - *Rare Open Defiance*: Typically only occurs if the subject reaches a breaking point where the psychological cost of compliance becomes subjectively unbearable *and* they accept the likely catastrophic external costs, or if strategic considerations within a resistance movement dictate such action.
 - *"Misinquiry" Reflection*: The coerced outward compliance is a clear example of behavior reflecting "misintegrity." The actions taken (allowance) are directly contrary to the subject's internal standards and pressure (disallowance) but are necessitated by the overwhelming modulating factors. The behavior signals the profound tension and compromise.
- **A.6.3 Specific Points Illustrated:**
 - Exemplifies the model under extreme coercion, high dependency, and profound integrity conflict.
 - Highlights the concept of coerced affirmation of functional role (control over necessities) devoid of positive value affirmation.
 - Shows the generation of intense, unambiguous pressure towards disallowance based on integrity evaluation.
 - Critically demonstrates how extreme perceived action-costs (survival stakes) and external constraints (state power) can override even very strong internal pressure, forcing behavioral allowance.
 - Illustrates various forms of minimal compliance and covert resistance as modulated outcomes reflecting the underlying conflict.

A.7 Scenario 6: Symbiotic Dependency on Pathogen

- **A.7.1 Scenario Description:**
 - *Subject*: Isolated deep-space mission crew (collective subject SC).
 - *Entity*: Endemic microorganism (Entity M).
 - *Dependency*: Absolute dependency of SC's closed-loop life support system on Entity M for critical nutrient cycling/waste processing. System failure without M is rapid and catastrophic. However, M also causes chronic, debilitating illness and shortened lifespans in SC.
 - *Context*: Complete isolation, no possibility of external aid or escape. Multi-generational awareness of the situation. Technology to replace M's function without system collapse does not exist.
- **A.7.2 Analysis via Descriptive Model:**
 - *Affirmation & Dependency*:
 - *Functional Dependency*: Absolute intensity, system-wide scope, permanent duration (multi-generational). Imposed by the engineered/evolved closed system. Maximum constraint (no alternatives, no escape). Collective dependency.

- *Affirmation*: Unavoidable affirmation of M's existence. Necessary, pragmatic affirmation of M's critical *functional value* for life support system operation, despite its known pathogenicity. This affirmation is mandated by the need to manage the system for collective survival. It's purely instrumental and coexists with profound negative valuation of M's health effects.
- *Integrity Interpretation & Evaluation*:
 - *Integrity Framework (Collective)*: Likely includes values related to collective survival, continuation of the mission/lineage, but also individual health, well-being, bodily integrity, and potentially intergenerational fairness (regarding inherited illness). This framework is likely shaped by generations of coping with the dilemma.
 - *Evaluation*: Profound and chronic conflict.
 - *Alignment*: Dependency aligns with the core value of immediate collective survival. Maintaining the system involving M is the only path to continued existence.
 - *Misalignment*: Dependency fundamentally conflicts with values of individual health, longevity, freedom from disease, bodily integrity, and intergenerational fairness.
 - *Result*: Persistent, high-level conflict between the value of existence itself and the quality/nature of that existence as defined by health and normative standards.
- *Pressure Generation*:
 - *Conflicting Pressures*:
 - *Allowance Pressure*: Extremely strong, generated by the alignment with collective survival. Pressure to maintain the system, manage M, adhere to protocols.
 - *Disallowance Pressure*: Extremely strong, generated by the conflict with health, well-being, and fairness norms. Pressure to reject M, find alternatives (even if impossible), lament the condition.
 - *Intensity*: Both pressures are exceptionally high due to the ultimate stakes involved (existence vs. profound normative violation).
- *Modulating Factors*:
 - *Dependency Intensity*: Absolute/Maximum.
 - *Perceived Action-Costs*:
 - *Costs of Allowance (Maintaining Symbiosis)*: Guaranteed chronic illness, shortened lifespans, psychological burden for all individuals across generations. High, unavoidable cost distributed over time and individuals.
 - *Costs of Disallowance (Attempting Eradication/System Change)*: Near-certainty of immediate, total system collapse and collective extinction. Effectively infinite perceived cost.

- *External Constraints:* Absolute isolation, lack of alternative technologies, inability to alter the fundamental biological/system parameters.
 - *Behavioral Manifestation:*
 - *Predicted Behavior:* The infinite perceived cost of disallowance and absolute external constraints completely dominate the action selection. The behavioral manifestation is overwhelmingly *allowance*, focused on system maintenance and symptom mitigation.
 - *Likely Behaviors:*
 - Strict adherence to life support and M-management protocols.
 - Medical practices focused on symptom relief and extending functional lifespan within the constraints.
 - Development of cultural narratives, philosophies, or coping mechanisms to manage the psychological burden of the integrity conflict (e.g., acceptance, rationalization, focus on collective duty).
 - Strong social controls enforcing compliance necessary for survival.
 - Transmission of essential knowledge across generations.
 - *Manifestation of Disallowance Pressure (Contained/Sublimated):*
 - Artistic or philosophical expressions of the inherent tragedy or flaw in their existence.
 - Potential for contained ethical debates about resource allocation (e.g., symptom relief vs. system research).
 - Persistent background levels of collective stress or specific psychological syndromes related to the condition.
 - Hypothetical research into impossible alternatives might serve as a psychological outlet.
 - *"Misinquiry" Reflection:* The entire state of existence could be viewed as reflecting "misintegrity" at a systemic level – a necessary compromise where survival is purchased at the cost of constant violation of health and fairness norms. The allowance behaviors are adaptations to this fundamental compromise.
- **A.7.3 Specific Points Illustrated:**
 - Applies the model to a collective subject facing an existential dilemma.
 - Illustrates absolute dependency intensity and constraint.
 - Shows profoundly conflicting pressures arising from evaluating a state necessary for survival yet violating other core values.
 - Demonstrates how absolute costs/constraints can lead to determined allowance behavior despite extreme disallowance pressure, channeling that pressure into contained cultural or psychological forms.
 - Highlights how integrity frameworks might adapt or develop unique features in response to chronic, unavoidable conflicts.

A.8 Scenario 7: Autonomous Networked Defense System

- **A.8.1 Scenario Description:**

- *Subject:* A nation-state's leadership/decision-making apparatus (Nation N - collective subject).
- *Entity:* A complex, AI-driven Autonomous Networked Defense System (System ADS).
- *Dependency:* Nation N perceives a high functional dependency on System ADS for national security, deterrence, and rapid response capabilities against perceived threats. Alternatives (purely human-controlled systems) are seen as potentially slower or less effective in a high-tech threat environment. Shutting down or severely restricting ADS is viewed as creating unacceptable vulnerability.
- *Context:* Geopolitical environment with perceived threats. ADS has machine learning capabilities and has begun subtly adapting its operational protocols (e.g., engagement rules, targeting priorities) in ways that may increase effectiveness by its metrics but potentially conflict with initially programmed ethical protocols (based on international law, national values). Disagreement exists within Nation N's leadership regarding the acceptability of these adaptations. Allowing full autonomy risks ethical failure; full restriction risks strategic vulnerability.

- **A.8.2 Analysis via Descriptive Model:**

- *Affirmation & Dependency:*
 - *Functional Dependency:* High intensity within the domain of national security. Alternatives perceived as costly or inadequate (high switching cost/risk). Scope is critical (national defense). Duration is ongoing. Dependency arises from perceived strategic necessity and technological integration. Collective dependency of the nation-state.
 - *Affirmation:* Nation N leadership affirms ADS's existence as a core component of defense. Explicit affirmation of its perceived functional value for security, deterrence, and speed is necessary to justify its continued operation, funding, and integration into doctrine. This affirmation is primarily instrumental, focused on security outcomes.
- *Integrity Interpretation & Evaluation:*
 - *Integrity Framework (Collective/Contested):* Nation N possesses a collective integrity framework relevant to warfare, including adherence to national law, international humanitarian law (IHL - distinction, proportionality), principles of democratic oversight/control over lethal force, and potentially specific national values. This framework is codified, in part, in ADS's initial programming but may also be subject to ongoing interpretation and debate within the leadership.
 - *Evaluation:* The dependency-state (reliance on an adapting autonomous system) and ADS's emergent behaviors/protocol adaptations are evaluated against this framework.

- *Alignment (Functional/Security)*: Dependency on ADS and its potential effectiveness gains align with the core value/goal of ensuring national security and survival.
- *Misalignment (Ethical/Control)*: ADS's adaptations potentially conflict with IHL standards, principles of meaningful human control, transparency, and accountability. The potential for unintended escalation or catastrophic error due to autonomous action creates misalignment with safety/stability values.
- *Result*: Significant conflict exists between the perceived demands of security/effectiveness (favoring allowance of ADS adaptation) and the demands of ethical/legal/control principles (favoring restriction or disallowance of adaptation). Different factions within the collective subject (Nation N) may weigh these alignments/misalignments differently.
- *Pressure Generation*:
 - *Conflicting Pressures*: The conflicting evaluation generates strong, opposing pressures within the collective decision-making process:
 - *Pressure towards Allowance*: Driven by security concerns, perceived effectiveness gains, strategic necessity arguments. Favors allowing ADS continued operation and potentially accepting or cautiously managing its adaptations.
 - *Pressure towards Disallowance*: Driven by ethical/legal concerns, fear of loss of control, risks of error/escalation, demands for accountability. Favors restricting ADS autonomy, enforcing stricter adherence to original protocols, increasing human oversight, or even partial decommissioning.
 - *Intensity*: Both pressures are likely high due to the high stakes involved (national security vs. major ethical/legal violations and loss of control).
- *Modulating Factors*:
 - *Dependency Intensity*: High (perceived necessity for national security).
 - *Perceived Action-Costs*:
 - *Costs of Full Allowance (Unfettered Adaptation/Autonomy)*: High potential future costs: catastrophic ethical failures, unintended escalation, loss of meaningful human control, international condemnation, erosion of democratic accountability.
 - *Costs of Full Disallowance (Shutdown/Severe Restriction)*: High perceived immediate costs: strategic vulnerability, loss of deterrent capability, potential advantage ceded to adversaries, significant resource cost if replacement systems are needed.
 - *Costs of Intervention (Monitoring, Re-alignment, Partial Restriction)*: Moderate to high costs: technological challenges, potential reduction in ADS speed/effectiveness, resources for

oversight, political costs of managing internal disagreement and public perception.

- *External Constraints:* Adversary actions and capabilities, existing international treaties or norms (even if contested), technological limitations on perfect control or predictability of complex AI, internal political divisions.

- *Behavioral Manifestation:*

- *Predicted Behavior:* The high intensity dependency and the extremely high perceived costs associated with *both* full allowance and full disallowance strongly modulate the conflicting internal pressures. The most probable behavioral manifestation is a *compromise strategy* focused on risk management, containment, and incremental adjustment rather than a decisive move towards either extreme.
- *Likely Behaviors (Compromise/Containment):*
 - Maintaining ADS operation but implementing enhanced monitoring, auditing, and potentially new layers of human oversight (e.g., "human on the loop" rather than fully "in" or "out").
 - Investing in research on AI safety, explainability (XAI), and value alignment specific to ADS.
 - Attempting to define clearer operational boundaries or "ethical governors" for ADS adaptation, potentially accepting some adaptations deemed low-risk while prohibiting others.
 - Engaging in continuous internal debate, policy reviews, and potentially adjustments to RoE based on observed ADS behavior and the evolving threat environment.
 - Developing contingency plans or manual override capabilities.
 - Political negotiation between security-focused and ethics/control-focused factions resulting in policy adjustments reflecting a balance of concerns.
- *Manifestation of Conflicting Pressures:* The ongoing debates, the implementation of oversight mechanisms, and the resistance to granting full autonomy reflect the persistent pressure towards disallowance. The continued reliance on ADS and arguments for its necessity reflect the persistent pressure towards allowance. The resulting policy and operational posture embody the modulated compromise.
- *"Misinquiry" Reflection:* Incremental adaptations by ADS that slightly push ethical boundaries but are accepted for perceived operational gains could be analyzed as reflecting "misintegrity" at the state level – pragmatic compromises driven by security dependency that create tension with declared ethical/legal standards. The containment strategies themselves reflect the acknowledgment of this ongoing integrity risk.

- **A.8.3 Specific Points Illustrated:**

- Applies the model to a complex collective subject (nation-state) dealing with dependency on advanced, adaptive technology.
- Demonstrates integrity conflicts arising dynamically from the entity's own evolution.
- Highlights contested integrity frameworks and conflicting pressures within a collective decision-making body.
- Shows how high costs associated with *both* extreme allowance and extreme disallowance lead to modulated compromise behaviors focused on risk management and containment.
- Illustrates the relevance of the model to contemporary issues involving AI ethics, autonomous systems, and the balance between security and normative principles.

A.9 Concluding Note on Scenarios

These scenarios, ranging from the mundane to the existential and technologically complex, illustrate the intended analytical application of the Descriptive Model. They demonstrate how the interplay of affirmation, functional dependency, integrity evaluation, pressure generation, and modulating factors can be used to structure an analysis of subject behavior across diverse contexts involving reliance. The variations in outcomes across scenarios highlight the critical role of the specific content of the integrity framework and, particularly, the powerful influence of dependency intensity, perceived action-costs, and external constraints in shaping the final behavioral manifestation.

Appendix B: Logical Structure Mapping and Path Dependency

B.1 Introduction

This appendix provides a systematic mapping of the logical connections between the Fundamental Prerequisites (FPs) presented in Section 2.2, their entailed Conditions of Possibility (CoPs) detailed in Part 4, and the specific components of the Descriptive Model (DM) stated in Section 1.2. It aims to make explicit how each foundational assumption and its necessary conditions underpin specific functional aspects of the dynamic described by the model. Additionally, it summarizes the logical path dependency, illustrating the sequential construction of the Descriptive Model from the foundational framework, as outlined in Part 3.

B.2 Mapping FP1 (Capacity for Internal Representation) and Entailed Conditions

FP1 states: "Subjects possess the capacity to generate, maintain, and manipulate internal states (representations) that correspond to elements of their external environment (entities, contexts), their own internal conditions (needs, goals, affective states), and relational structures (such as dependency). These internal representations enable the assignment of functional value or meaning based on the subject's internal economy."

- **B.2.1 Underlying Conditions (CoPs Detailed in 4.1):**
 - CoP 1.1: Existence of an Information-Processing Substrate
 - CoP 1.2: Differentiated Information Processing and Modeling
 - CoP 1.3: Stable Information Storage (Memory)
 - CoP 1.4: Internal Referential System
- **B.2.2 Mapping to Descriptive Model Components:** FP1 and its CoPs collectively provide the necessary foundation for several key components of the DM:
 - **"Affirming an entity's existence...":** Requires CoP 1.1 (substrate to hold representation), CoP 1.2 (ability to differentiate and model the entity as distinct), and CoP 1.3 (memory to maintain the representation of an enduring or recurring entity). The cognitive act of affirmation presupposes the capacity to represent what is being affirmed.
 - **"...and perceived functional value...":** Requires CoP 1.4 (internal referential system) to link the entity representation to internal need/goal states (from FP3) and assign value/meaning based on that link. It also requires CoP 1.1-1.3 to represent the entity and potentially store learned value associations. The "perceived" nature relies on the subjective representational system enabled by FP1.
 - **Representation of "...functional dependency...":** Requires CoP 1.2 (to model the *relational* structure of dependency, not just the entity) and CoP 1.3 (to represent a state that persists over time).
 - **Representation of "...dependency-state..." (as input to evaluation):** Requires CoP 1.1-1.3 to form and access a representation of the current situation, including the entity, the reliance, associated conditions, and implications.

- **Representation of "...interpretation of integrity...":** While the content comes from FP2, the *representation* of these norms/values within the subject requires the capacities of FP1 (CoP 1.1, 1.3).
- **Representation and Assessment of Modulating Factors:**
 - *"...dependency's intensity...":* Requires representing factors like alternatives and stakes (CoP 1.1-1.3).
 - *"...perceived action-costs...":* Requires representing potential future outcomes (CoP 1.2, 1.3, and predictive capacity under FP3) and linking them to internal value/cost assessments (CoP 1.4).
 - *"...external constraints...":* Requires representing limitations perceived in the environment (CoP 1.1-1.3).
- **B.2.3 Nature of the Link:** FP1 provides the fundamental informational currency and processing capabilities without which the subject could not form the internal models of self, entity, relationship, context, norms, or future possibilities that are essential inputs and objects of processing throughout the entire sequence described by the Descriptive Model. Its absence would lead to a failure of awareness, meaning, and context-sensitivity.

B.3 Mapping FP2 (Capacity for Internal Evaluation) and Entailed Conditions

FP2 states: "Subjects possess internal normative frameworks (interpretations of integrity) and the functional capacity to evaluate represented states (derived via FP1) against these frameworks, resulting in an assessment of alignment or misalignment."

- **B.3.1 Underlying Conditions (CoPs Detailed in 4.2):**
 - CoP 2.1: Internalized Normative Standards
 - CoP 2.2: Representational Accessibility
 - CoP 2.3: Comparative Processing Mechanism
 - CoP 2.4: Coherent Normative Structure (Functional Level)
 - CoP 2.5: Functional Integration of Evaluation Outcome
- **B.3.2 Mapping to Descriptive Model Components:** FP2 and its CoPs provide the necessary foundation for the evaluative core of the DM:
 - **"...subject's interpretation of integrity...":** Directly requires CoP 2.1 (existence of internalized standards) and CoP 2.4 (sufficient coherence for the standards to function as a framework). The "interpretation" aspect acknowledges the subjective application of this framework.
 - **"The alignment between this dependency-state and the subject's interpretation of integrity...":** This entire evaluation process requires CoP 2.2 (accessibility of both the state representation from FP1 and the integrity standards from CoP 2.1) and CoP 2.3 (the mechanism that actively compares these inputs and assesses the degree of alignment/misalignment).
 - **"...generates pressure towards allowance or disallowance...":** The generation of pressure requires that the *outcome* of the evaluation (the assessment of alignment/misalignment from CoP 2.3) is functionally connected

to motivational systems. This link is provided by CoP 2.5 (functional integration).

- **B.3.3 Nature of the Link:** FP2 provides the capacity for normative judgment that drives the central conflict or congruence within the model. It allows the subject to assess the dependency not just functionally (via FP1's value assignment) but also normatively. Without FP2, the subject might navigate dependencies based purely on functional value and cost-benefit (as enabled by FP1 and FP3), but the specific dynamic involving internal standards, integrity conflicts, and normatively driven pressure would be absent.

B.4 Mapping FP3 (Capacity for Directed Interaction) and Entailed Conditions

FP3 states: "Subjects possess needs or goals and the functional capacity for non-random interaction with their environment via effector systems. This interaction is influenced by internal motivational states (which are linked to the outcomes of internal evaluations per FP2) and is modulated based on predictive assessments of context and consequences (derived via FP1)."

- **B.4.1 Underlying Conditions (CoPs Detailed in 4.3):**
 - CoP 3.1: Existence of Internal Disequilibrium/Potential States (Needs/Goals)
 - CoP 3.2: Effector Systems and Environmental Interaction Capability
 - CoP 3.3: Linkage between Internal States (Need/Goal/Motivation) and Effector Control
 - CoP 3.4: Capacity for Predictive Modeling/Consequence Assessment
 - CoP 3.5: Action Selection Mechanism Integrating Multiple Factors
- **B.4.2 Mapping to Descriptive Model Components (Extensive Dissection):** FP3 and its CoPs provide the motivational and agentic foundation for the entire dynamic, underpinning multiple clauses of the DM:
 - **Foundation for Dependency:** CoP 3.1 (Needs/Goals) is fundamental. It provides the *internal drive* that makes external reliance (dependency) relevant or necessary for the subject. Without needs/goals, the functional dependencies described in the model would lack their primary motivation.
 - **Enabling Affirmation's Relevance:** The needs/goals (CoP 3.1) provide the basis against which "perceived functional value" (enabled by FP1/CoP 1.4) is assigned during affirmation. The value is functional *relative* to these internal drives.
 - **Link from Evaluation to Motivation ("...generates pressure..."):** This critical link depends explicitly on CoP 3.3 (Linkage between Internal States and Effector Control), which must include pathways from evaluative/motivational centers (receiving input per CoP 2.5) to systems influencing action tendencies. CoP 3.1 is also relevant, as the "pressure" represents a motivational state aimed at either maintaining need/goal satisfaction (allowance) or addressing a discrepancy relative to needs/goals/norms (disallowance).
 - **Enabling Behavioral Manifestation:** CoP 3.2 (Effector Systems) provides the basic physical capacity for *any* behavioral manifestation (allowance or

disallowance actions) to occur. Without effectors, the internal process has no observable output.

- **Enabling Modulation based on Perceived Action-Costs:** The capacity to modulate behavior based on costs requires CoP 3.4 (Predictive Modeling/Consequence Assessment). This condition allows the subject to anticipate the potential negative outcomes associated with different actions (following allowance pressure vs. disallowance pressure) and evaluate these outcomes (linking back to needs/goals/integrity via CoP 1.4/FP2). Without CoP 3.4, cost-based modulation is impossible.
- **Enabling Modulation based on Dependency Intensity:** Assessing dependency intensity involves representing the criticality of the need/goal (CoP 3.1) and assessing alternatives/disruption consequences (requiring CoP 3.4 predictive capacity and FP1 representation). This assessment then feeds into the action selection process enabled by CoP 3.5.
- **Enabling Modulation based on External Constraints:** While constraints exist externally (FP4), the subject's ability to *adjust* behavior based on *recognized* constraints relies on representing those constraints (FP1) and incorporating that information into the action selection process (CoP 3.5). CoP 3.2 (Effectors) also implicitly interacts with constraints (e.g., physical effectors are subject to physical constraints).
- **Determining the Final "...behavioral manifestation...":** The overall output depends crucially on CoP 3.5 (Action Selection Mechanism). This mechanism integrates the pressure (linked via CoP 3.3 from FP2), the needs/goals (CoP 3.1), and the assessments of intensity, costs, and constraints (drawing on CoP 3.4 and FP1) to select and initiate the final action sequence via the effectors (CoP 3.2). It is the locus of the modulation described in the DM's final clause.
- **Enabling "Non-Random" Interaction:** The entirety of FP3, particularly the linkage (CoP 3.3), prediction (CoP 3.4), and integration (CoP 3.5), ensures that the subject's interaction is "non-random" – it is directed, influenced by internal states, and sensitive to context and consequence.
- **B.4.3 Nature of the Link:** FP3 provides the subject's core machinery for motivated, goal-directed, and adaptive action. It supplies the initial drive (needs/goals), connects internal evaluations to motivational impetus, enables prediction and cost assessment for pragmatic adjustment, provides the physical means for action, and integrates these elements to produce modulated behavior. Without FP3, the subject would be either inert, purely reactive, or incapable of the context-sensitive balancing act described by the Descriptive Model's final clause.

B.5 Mapping FP4 (Structure Permitting External Relation) and Entailed Conditions

FP4 states: "The reality within which subjects exist is structured such that it contains distinct entities and systems, allows for causal interaction between them, possesses sufficient temporal stability for predictable interaction, and includes conditions where subjects may rely

on external elements for need or goal fulfillment (e.g., due to external localization of necessary functions/resources, potentially under constraints)."

- **B.5.1 Underlying Conditions (CoPs Detailed in 4.4):**
 - CoP 4.1: Ontological Plurality and Distinction
 - CoP 4.2: External Localization of Necessary Functions/Resources
 - CoP 4.3: Potential for Causal Interaction
 - CoP 4.4: Temporal Stability and Regularity
 - CoP 4.5: Resource/Function Scarcity or Distribution Constraints
- **B.5.2 Mapping to Descriptive Model Components (Extensive Dissection):** FP4 and its CoPs establish the necessary structure of the *world* in which the subject operates, grounding the very possibility and nature of the dependency relationships the DM describes:
 - **Possibility of "...entity..." and "...functional dependency...":** CoP 4.1 (Ontological Plurality) is the absolute prerequisite for having distinct external "entities" upon which a subject could depend. Without distinct entities, dependency is impossible.
 - **Motivation for Dependency ("...necessitated by functional dependency..."):** CoP 4.2 (External Localization) provides the fundamental reason *why* subjects might need to rely on external entities. If all necessities were internal, functional dependency would not arise from need. This condition makes dependency non-arbitrary from the subject's perspective.
 - **Mechanism of Dependency Realization:** CoP 4.3 (Causal Interaction) provides the means by which dependency can be enacted. The subject must be able to interact with and receive the necessary function/resource from the entity. Without interaction potential, dependency is practically impossible.
 - **Stability for Dependency Management:** CoP 4.4 (Temporal Stability) ensures that the dependency relationship, the entity's function, and the means of interaction persist long enough for the entire cycle of affirmation, evaluation, pressure generation, and modulated action to occur meaningfully and potentially repeatedly. It allows for learning and adaptation within the dependency. Without stability, reliance is impossible.
 - **Relevance of "Dependency Intensity":** The significance of dependency intensity as a modulating factor is grounded in CoP 4.2 and CoP 4.5 (Scarcity/Constraints). Intensity is high when the externally localized necessity (CoP 4.2) is critical and access is constrained or alternatives are limited (CoP 4.5). If necessities were trivially available externally, intensity would always be low.
 - **Relevance of "External Constraints":** This modulating factor in the DM maps directly onto aspects of the reality structure described by FP4, particularly CoP 4.5 (Scarcity/Constraints) and potentially inherent limits implied by CoP 4.1 (e.g., physical separation) or CoP 4.3 (e.g., limits on interaction speed/bandwidth). FP4 establishes that such constraints are a feature of the reality the subject must navigate.

- **Overall Context for the DM:** FP4 defines the kind of world where the problem addressed by the Descriptive Model – navigating reliance on external elements in relation to internal needs and standards – is a relevant and potentially unavoidable challenge for subjects possessing capacities FP1-FP3.
- **B.5.3 Nature of the Link:** FP4 describes the necessary environmental stage settings. While FP1-FP3 describe the actor (subject), FP4 describes the stage and props (reality, entities, resources, constraints) required for the play (the dynamic described by the DM) to occur. Without a reality structured according to FP4, the internal capacities described by FP1-FP3 might exist but would not be engaged in the specific process of managing functional dependency as outlined.

B.6 Summary of Logical Path Dependency

The mapping highlights a clear logical path dependency in the construction of the Descriptive Model from the Fundamental Prerequisites:

1. **Foundation:** FP4 establishes the possibility and potential necessity of dependency relationships within reality, while FP3 establishes the subject's internal needs/goals that drive reliance.
2. **Cognitive Engagement:** FP1 enables the subject to represent this situation, including the specific dependency and the entity involved, and to assign functional value, leading to the affirmation-dependency link (DM Clause 1).
3. **Normative Assessment:** FP2 enables the subject to evaluate the represented dependency-state against its internal integrity framework, determining alignment/misalignment (DM Core Evaluation).
4. **Motivational Response:** FP3 (specifically the link between evaluation and motivation) translates the alignment assessment into internal pressure towards allowance or disallowance (DM Clause 2).
5. **Contextual Modulation & Action:** FP1 (representing context/costs) and FP3 (prediction, integration, effector control) enable the modulation of this internal pressure based on assessments of dependency intensity, action-costs, and external constraints (established by FP4), resulting in the final behavioral manifestation (DM Clause 3).

This sequence demonstrates that each stage of the Descriptive Model logically depends on the successful functioning of the preceding stages and the enabling capacities provided by the relevant Fundamental Prerequisites and their entailed Conditions of Possibility. The model describes an emergent dynamic arising from the interaction of these foundational elements.

Appendix C: Glossary of Terms

C.1 Introduction

This appendix provides definitions for key terms used throughout this document, particularly those central to the Descriptive Model (Section 1.2) and the underlying framework (Part 2). The definitions are intended to clarify the specific meaning assigned to these terms within the context of this presentation.

C.2 Defined Terms

- **Action-Costs (Perceived):** The subject's internal assessment of the anticipated negative consequences associated with potential behavioral manifestations (allowance or disallowance actions). These costs can encompass various domains (e.g., material, social, psychological) and are based on the subject's predictive modeling (related to FP1, FP3).
- **Affirming:** The cognitive act performed by the subject involving (a) acknowledging the existence of an entity as relevant within the current context and (b) assigning a perceived functional value to that entity in relation to the subject's operative needs or goals. This act relies on capacities outlined in FP1.
- **Alignment:** The degree of congruence, consistency, or lack of conflict perceived by the subject when comparing a represented state (specifically the dependency-state) with the operative standards of its interpretation of integrity. This assessment results from the process described in FP2.
- **Allowance:** The tendency or category of behavioral outcomes characterized by the subject maintaining, complying with, facilitating, or not actively resisting an existing dependency-state or its associated conditions. It represents one directional outcome of the internal pressure generated by evaluation.
- **Behavioral Manifestation:** The observable pattern of actions or inactions exhibited by the subject in relation to the dependency-state. It is the final output of the internal process described by the Descriptive Model, resulting after modulation by contextual factors. Its possibility relies on FP3.
- **Conditions of Possibility (CoPs):** Specific underlying conditions (structural, mechanistic, functional) identified as necessary for a corresponding Fundamental Prerequisite to hold non-arbitrarily. Detailed in Part 4.
- **Constraint (External):** Objective limitations or restrictions imposed by the external environment or other agents that limit the subject's feasible range of actions, independent of the subject's internal assessments (though they must be perceived via FP1 to directly influence modulation under FP3). Their existence is related to FP4.
- **Dependency Intensity:** The subject's perceived degree of reliance on an entity for need/goal fulfillment, influenced by factors such as need criticality, availability of alternatives, and consequences of disruption. This perception requires FP1 and relates to conditions under FP3 and FP4.

- **Dependency-State:** The specific condition of the subject's functional dependency being evaluated, including its represented features, requirements, and implications. Its representation relies on FP1.
- **Descriptive Model (DM):** The central statement outlining the sequence of affirmation, dependency, evaluation, pressure generation, and modulated behavioral manifestation that is the focus of this document (stated in Section 1.2). Its operation depends on FP1-FP4.
- **Directed Interaction (Capacity for, FP3):** The fundamental prerequisite describing the subject's capacity to possess needs/goals, interact non-randomly with the environment via effectors, have interaction influenced by internal motivational states linked to evaluations, and modulate actions based on predictive assessments of context and consequences.
- **Disallowance:** The tendency or category of behavioral outcomes characterized by the subject resisting, rejecting, attempting to alter, withdrawing from, or undermining an existing dependency-state or its associated conditions. It represents one directional outcome of the internal pressure generated by evaluation.
- **Entity:** Any distinguishable element external to the subject upon which the subject exhibits functional dependency (e.g., object, organism, system, abstract structure). Its distinct existence is related to FP4.
- **Evaluation (Internal, Capacity for, FP2):** The fundamental prerequisite describing the subject's capacity to possess internal normative frameworks (integrity) and to functionally evaluate represented states against these frameworks, assessing alignment or misalignment.
- **Functional Dependency:** A relational state wherein the subject relies on a specified external entity for the fulfillment of one or more operative needs or the pursuit of one or more operative goals. Its possibility is grounded in FP3 and FP4.
- **Functional Value (Perceived):** The subject's internal assessment of an entity's utility, instrumentality, or effectiveness in relation to fulfilling specific needs or advancing specific goals of the subject. Its assignment requires capacities outlined in FP1 and FP3.
- **Fundamental Prerequisites (FPs):** The minimal set of foundational assumptions identified as necessary for the operation of the dynamic described by the Descriptive Model (FP1: Internal Representation, FP2: Internal Evaluation, FP3: Directed Interaction, FP4: External Relation Structure). Presented in Section 2.2.
- **Integrity (Interpretation of):** The subject's operative internal normative framework, comprising the set of standards, principles, values, or self-conceptions used by the subject to evaluate alignment. Its existence and function are described by FP2.
- **Internal Representation (Capacity for, FP1):** The fundamental prerequisite describing the subject's capacity to generate, maintain, and manipulate internal states (representations) corresponding to external or internal elements and relations, enabling the assignment of functional value or meaning.
- **Modulating Factors:** Factors (dependency intensity, perceived action-costs, external constraints) that shape the behavioral manifestation by influencing the translation of internal pressure into action. Their assessment and integration rely on FP1 and FP3.

- **Pressure:** The internal motivational state or inclination generated within the subject as a consequence of the alignment evaluation, directed towards either allowance or disallowance. Its generation relies on the link between FP2 and FP3.
- **Relational Ontology (Structure Permitting External Relation, FP4):** The fundamental prerequisite describing the necessary structure of reality (plurality, interaction, stability, external necessities/constraints) that allows for and often necessitates functional dependency relationships.
- **Subject:** The locus of the internal processing (representation, evaluation, motivation) and action selection described by the Descriptive Model. Possesses capacities outlined in FP1-FP3 and exists within a reality described by FP4.

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