NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF SPEECH ACTS: EXPLORATORY STUDY IN SASAK SPEECH COMMUNITY

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Abstract

This study investigates normative dimensions of speech acts. It analyzes the nature of normative dimension of speech acts. For having empirical data, 9 participants were chosen as sources of spoken language data: 2 tuan guru giving speeches in formal contexts; and 7 people engaging in casual conversations in informal context. To collect data, observation and recording was used. The data were analyzed by way of labeling, transcribing and classification. Findings reveals advocates the normative and moral dimensions of speech acts generated from agent change normative standing to hearers in terms of right, obligation and responsibility. As a result, the study argues that moral values embedded in speech act performance such honesty, truth, self-control and respect, obedience and so forth could be taught in order to foster children good character development in comprehensive ways including moral reasoning, affection and behaviors. For that reason, moral values teaching based on speech act normativity and morality might be used as an arena for bearing good character corresponding to the process of acquiring of the first language or learning the second/foreign language. It could be a starting point for teaching moral competence through language institution that are more affordable, accessible and learnable for all rational human being in all over the world. Furthermore, those moral values might be the foundation for moral action of children to bear the awareness of good interpersonal or intersubjective relationship. Based on the limitation of the study, it needs to hold further study as to the practical model of teaching moral values on the bases of moral values embedded in performing speech acts.

Keywords: *Speech acts, normative dimensions, moral teaching*

1. INTRODUCTION

Language is not only a means of communication, but also a means of value or moral education. The latter nature of language in the sense of normative dimensions of speech acts has attracted language philosopher and linguists (Searle, 2001; Alston, 2000; Cuneo, 2014) in order to delve into such dimensions. Based on universal nature of language, it is in need of studying such normative dimensions of Sasak language.

Sasak language is mostly spoken in Lombok Island, West Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia, near to the East region of Bali. Sasak language has five dialects: a) *Ngeno-ngene*, in the Central West coast and the Central East to the North East coast; b) *Meno-mene*, around Puyung and Praya, and in the East Lombok; c) *Ngeto-ngete*, around Suralaga, and Sembalun in the North East: d) Kuto-kute, around Bayan region and in the North; and e) *Meriaq-meriku,* in the South central area around Bonjeruk, and Sengkol.

This study concerned with the types of speech acts, specifically the existing kinds, and their nature of normative and moral dimensions of illocutionary acts by using samples of Tuan Guru speeches and casual conversations of *Meno-mene* dialect in the South Sikur village. In this area, local people speak Sasak as their mother tongue and Indonesian as their second language.

The South Sikur villagers are bilingual community. Sasak language, *Meno-mene* dialect, is used in daily communication with one another at home, in and around the Mosque, and other domains. These people speak Indonesian in formal setting and at school. Indonesian is also used when meeting with new comers.

Language is an utterance that has a communicative and performative function. This fact is Austin’s underlying assumption in generating his speech act theory. A locutionary act is produced by saying something and an illocutionary act is by doing something. Austin’s initiation led opponents and proponents to dispute on the nature and elements of speech acts. One of the most argued unit is the nature of illocutionary acts. Some believe illocutionary act (IA) is the basis of rule or conventional act such as Austin, Sbisa, Searle, and Vanderveken. On the contrary, others hold, it is grounded on intention or inference-based act like Grice, Strawson, Schiffer, Bach and Harnish, and Kissine. Given these different views, both sides have developed speech act theory in different ways. For instance, the criteria for speech act typology are based on illocutionary force and propositional attitude. Regarding with such tensions, the identification of these types of speech acts in Sasak language is needed.

The dispute on the role of attitude as the ground for distinguishing the types of illocutionary acts breaks down, since not every act has attitude uttered. For this reason, efforts of developing and exploring the normativity of speech acts have attracted the intention of linguists and analytical philosophers. Searle’s identification about the commitment that consists in illocutionary act is under desire-independent reason for action on the bases of conceptual apparatus like direction of fit, intention and the rest. Under other conditions, Alston extends Searle’s necessary condition of making promise to form the normative stance of taking responsibility in a given act (2001). By extension Searle and Alston and on the bases of moral realist, Cuneo (2014) argues that the normative dimensions of speech acts exist by way of agent’ having right, obligation and responsibility. These normative standings are altered by agent to H when performing illocutionary act by uttering locutionary acts. Furthermore, for Cuneo, the normative dimensions of speech acts are also moral. In this respect, his claim is that some of normative features embedded to speech acts are moral since they have moral aspect such as moral right, obligation and responsibility.

Dealing with Searle’s on commitment, Alston’s normative stance and Cuneo normative standing, it is important to identify and examine profoundly the types of normative and moral dimensions of speech acts in Sasak speech community. In addition, having moral dimension is representation of moral values of speech act that might be used for moral or character education.

Their notions have contributed into the normative state of speech act. However, for Searle, the commitment that is consisted in speech acts has nothing to do with moral domain, while in Austin’s account the role of social pressures is the main source for the existence of normative stance of a given act. Searle’s ignorance of moral issue, a person’s point of view, interpersonal communication in the case of commitment like obligation, responsibility in performing speech act is inconsistent with the nature of interpersonal communication, the fundamental principles of morality. Meanwhile, Alston’s claim is lacking internal factors in respect to normativity and has no speaker clear-cut point of view generated in speech act performance. Furthermore, Cuneo just analyzed three types of speech acts, assertive, commissive and imperatives, thus his account need to be extended to other types like expressive and declarative. Even the sample provided are limited and based on intuition. For these reason, the types of any category have any subtypes having special normative standing could be extended by analyzing empirical data for proving more adequate description on the normative and moral dimension of speech acts.

Based on these accounts, it is crucial to reanalyze and explore the normative and moral dimensions of speech acts that are universal in nature. Extension and reexamination on the natures of such normativity and morality of speech acts are needed in regard to speech acts’ normativity and morality since they are completely-complex concepts. Furthermore, moral values generated from moral dimension of speech could be identified that might be arena for moral or character education.

In addition, relationship between second language acquisition and speech acts conducted by Blum-Kulka and Ohlstain (1986), Kasper and Blum-Kulka (1993), Ellis (1992) and others seem to be focused only on the acquisition of particular speech acts such as promise, compliment and so forth as well as its relationship to classroom interaction. The studies are motivated in addressing the importance of improving students’ sociolinguistic and communicative competence. However, in reality the problem is not only about such competences, but also on student’s moral awareness.

Another recent study was conducted by Rakoczy and Tomasello (2009), Lohse, Grafenhein, Behne, and Rakoczy (2014) which focused on children’s understanding of speech act normativity. This study seems to be based on psychology and concerns with only the role of direction of fit as a benchmark in analyzing children’s understanding of speech act normativity. Their findings indicate the significant relationship of students understanding such normative dimension with the direction of fit as the criterion for the condition of satisfaction in speech act performance. However, in this case, other crucial apparatus like the role of intentionality and normative standing were ignored.

Based on the aforementioned gaps either in normative and moral dimension of speech acts and moral or character education, it is crucial to identify the types of speech acts and its normative and moral dimensions in Sasak language according to Tuan Guru speeches and casual conversations. Moreover, it is essential to extend, explore, and study about the nature of normative dimension of speech acts regarding to types, features, and other concept pertaining to normativity and morality of speech acts such as intentionality, reason for action and second person standpoint. This might be an expected starting point in moral teaching or character education by the means of language institution, which speech morality having moral values is possibly plausible for building children or student’s good character.

1. THEORETHICAL FRAMEWORK
   1. Searle’s Account On Commitment Of Speech Acts

Searle’s account on human rationality as the great capacity is on the basis of human capacity for creating and acting desire-independent reason for action (DIRA). His idea is not in line with the classical model arguing that the agent just does something in accordance with desires he has. Searle argumentation is with the classical model (see Searle 2001, chapter 1). DIRA has nothing to do with one’s preference of his choice. But as Searle points out DIRA exists, whenever we open our mouth or speaking a language. Whenever we do an action, we express our intentional content; a want or desire. However, the motivation for doing an action is based on either primary or secondary reason formed by the desire. For this reason, Searle’s motivation is to examine such a case i.e. where a desire comes from. For the classical model, there are two possibilities of that question: doing something as a desire for its own sake and performing for other desires we have.

In accordance with rational motivation, Williams argues there is no an external motivation and holds that the rational must be equivalence with an agent motivation set S (1981). This corroborates with Davidson’s idea on pro-attitude claiming that doing something for reason has to do with an agent pro attitude for doing the action (1968). However both notions seem not to give clear-cut distinction between direct dependent reason desire-independent reasons for action. Rather, they attempt to assimilate both kinds of reason. Either Williams or Davidson make assimilation between desires and DIRA. In other words, desires and person commitment and obligation become the set as the desires. There is, however, a matter of distinction between desires and DIRA. Searle’s argument on this case is based on the sources of reason for action i.e. the desire for promise is a result from desire-independent reason, while in the case of ‘ i want a chocolate, the desire is reason.

According to Searle, there are six condition of adequacy for DIRA:

1. Natural order of DIRA. It is about the way to create and function of the reason.
2. Specifying apparatus enabling to create DIRA.
3. Explaining the way people create DIRA by means of the apparatus i.e it involves the logical structures of the intentionality as the basis for creation DIRA.
4. Explaining the way rationality makes agent’s binding by such reasons.
5. Explaining how rational recognition of the reason is sufficient for motivation and how they could be the ground for secondary reason if they are indifferent.
6. Explaining the way the apparatus and intentionality answer the condition (1-5) is sufficient for creating and operating the reasons.

This set of adequacy is self-sufficient without involving the moral principles. If we believe one performs speech acts like promises or order conditions of satisfactions (COS) is eo ipso determined by the speaker or agent. For example, it is cloudy. Suppose S has intention to perform an assertion ‘it is cloudy’. The utterance it is cloudy is the condition of satisfaction as a result from S’s intention in actions must have the intention to the truth condition with downward direction of fit. By imposing the truth condition as COS on the utterance as COS, such utterance has a status function i.e. representing the truth claim on the state of weather. Thus, as Searle notes imposing COS on COS makes utterance has the function that I already commitment (2001).

In this case, S has freedom for the intentional action , then after producing the utterance, S undertakes the truth claim of his asserted proposition. As a result, S is committed to doing the propositional content. In other words, S’s imposition of COS on COS in term of the assertion, Searle said: ‘He takes responsibility for those COS being satisfied and that commitment is already DIRA’ (p.173).

Commitments as factitive entities grounded on the conditions of reason for actions have the propositional content and the direction of fit as its logical structure. Thus, such direction imposes the satisfaction of the commitments i.e. if the world matches to the content of the commitments (world-to-mind). Dealing with binding features of such commitments, obligations, it represents S’s relations to the speech act performed. In this respect, performing the acts, the agent or S creates himself commitments, obligation, and responsibility.

In the case of desire-independent commitment effecting the secondary reason and motivation, Searle’s account emphasizes that the recognition something on a valid reason as the ground for acting is to recognize the factitive entities in terms of S as subject and upward direction of fit. For Searle, such desire-independent reason commitment leading the motivation can be understood by means of relationship between third person and the first person viewpoint, not by way of a matter of causally sufficient condition. From the third point of views, people have a set of institutional structure binding the members by deontic structure by their given institution. Meanwhile, in the first person point of view, I myself create such DIRA voluntarily and intentionally (Searle, 2001). In this case, the institutional structure has nothing to do with how we create such deontic power, but only provide the possibility condition for I or agent to perform those commitment and obligation.

However, Searle deny the role of second person standpoint. This is different from Darwall (2006, 2010, 2011, 2013) argue that agent can be morally obliged to do action by way of second person standpoint. For Darwal, the second person standpoint is bound agent practical authority that is related to morality, respect and accountability. Moreover, the second person standpoint represents the relationship between rationality and morality. It seems plausible that in some cases of speech act performance having normative and moral dimension take second person standpoint in order to create practical reason for action. Furthermore, it seem to be more straightforward for agent that has moral obligation to give reactive attitude to the given speech act by S or H.

By this claim, it is true that creating reason for action include first person, second person and third person view points. In other words, there is transformation of view point for creating practical reason for action.

As for Searle, he states that he creates such obligation and the rest is a result from structure, his intentional and voluntary undertaking of them. In addition, for Searle, status functions that are subject to collective intentionality carry deontic power such as, rights, duty, obligation, permission and the rest (for detailed discussion on how the institutional structure related to conceptual apparatus: status functions, collective intentionality, deontic powers, DIRA, constitutive rules, and institutional facts, see Searle, 2010).

The following are Searle’s account how an assertion can fulfill its condition of satisfaction:

1. The account is naturalistic: though ape has intentionality but no second level for imposing COS on Cos, otherwise Human has the intentionality and human can undertake commitment on the truth of assertion.
2. The apparatus used for creating DIRA is the set of constitutive rules in speech acts and their realization in semantic structure oh human languages.
3. Creating DIRA is by imposing COS on COS. All the impositions are commitment, and all commitments create DIRA.
4. The commitment undertaken is binding on S due to S’s commitment.
5. The reason such reasons can be motivator since S create it; creating factitive entities with propositional content which has upward direction of fit and binding on the S.
6. Condition 1-5 fulfills the condition without any reference for any subtantive external principle. In other words, no external moral principle is needed for having the given commitment in which the commitment embedded in the structure of the intentionality of the assertion.

Regarding with the way the human-created commitment as the motivation for action, human has an ability to create the public sets of commitment through language use (Searle, 2001). In this respect, when we perform speech acts, COS is imposed intentionally and voluntarily. Furthermore, the existence of institutional structures is the condition giving the possibility for human to interact one another through uttering meaningful speech acts. Thus, such apparatus like intentionality, COS, institutional structure (background) result in the agent for undertaking commitment. For instance, when we promise, we commit ourselves the future action. This case is a result from the imposition of COS.

For Searle, there will be recognition providing an internal reason for action, the motivation is created. In this respect, Searle states ‘the acceptance of DIRA is rationally required as a matter of recognition rationality, once the agent has intentionally and freely created the reason in question’ (p.184). Searle’s account seems to emphasize that commitment created is internal to make speech acts. This is not in line with the classical model claiming to make statements [speaking language] has no reason in virtue of making the statement. As a result, for classical model, the reason seems to be for feeling bad consequences, holding moral principle, feeling inclination. However, Searle’s argument is that such reasons are independent of the nature of the statement.

In accordance with reason for the practical reasons, it is to create the reason for future action. Suppose when I go to the market and buy food. After having big deal with the seller, I freely and intentionally to buy it that creates the commitment and obligation for my self to pay for it. As a matter of fact, the self-commitment created is not like the classical model depending on the related desires of motivational set.

The formal features enabling S to create such reason: ‘Agent A has created himself to perform the act X in the future’ (Ibid, p.187). In term of embarking the creation, for Searle, it seems to highlighted on the logical problem of condition of satisfaction. As in the case, after making deal with the seller, it becomes the case that put me under the obligation as my reason for future action.

Searle’s account also point out the parallel mechanism between commitment and obligation in the case of making statement. Since the statement has an upward direction of fit, the agent undertakes an obligation. In this regard, the satisfaction of obligation is determined by whether or not the world change or behavior of one who has that obligation.

The notion of freedom is a fundamental aspect of an obligation. For Searle, the first-person standpoint denotes how I intentionally undertake for the creation of reason for myself. The manifestation of the desire becomes the reason for me. Therefore, my future free will is bound by the exercise of such will in the present. It denotes that the reason as the ground of the desire not conversely. Searle concludes the relation between reason, rationality and desire: ‘the recognition of something as binding obligation is already the recognition of something whose ontology is that of external motivators, upward direction ... ‘ (p.190).

Searle’s argumentation on Kant’s pure reason criticizes if the pure reason can be practical. For Kant, such case is related to the interest of the Categorical Imperative in which the reason is a cause for action. Kant states:

“If we are to will actions for which reason by itself prescribe an ought to a rational ... it is admittedly necessary that the reason should have power of infusing a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction in the fulfillment of duty, and consequently that it should posses a kind of causality by which it can determine sensibility in accordance with rational principle’ (p.128).

Thus for Kant, to perform the action is based on the pure reason causing a feeling of pleasure to actually do the action in terms of the dictate of pure reasons. Searle is not in line with Kant’s view on the dependency of DIRA towards a feeling of pleasure. As Searle argues Kant fails to identify the role of direction of fit (2001). It is plausible to believe that a feeling of pleasure is not an absolute necessary condition for the reason of the action. Not all action done is to fulfill the desire. Thus recognition of the valid reason is one of the most fundamentals to motivate the action (ibid). Though the primary desire has a motivation for secondary desire, it is not by means the primary desire (desire-dependent) as the only reason to the action. For instance borrowed from Searle, ‘I get my tooth drilled to satisfy my tooth fixed’. In this example, my tooth drilled is the secondary desire (desire-independent), and my tooth fixed is the primary desire. Even though the primary desire might lead to the secondary one, it has no effect to the secondary desire in term of satisfaction. For Searle, though every action is the expression of desire for action, but not all are done for the satisfaction of the purposes.

Another core point is about the status of promises since it has been disputed by the classical model. In accordance with promising as special case, Searle argue for a number of mistakes of the classical model avoiding the idea of obligation on keeping the promise as the internal to the act of promising. He point out some mistakes as follow:

1. There is some moral obligation for keeping the promise. In this case, Searle’s objection emphasizes that there is no moral issue related to obligation for keeping promise.
2. Evil promise has no obligation. Searle’s suggestion is to describe that it has still obligation for evil promise, but it is disallowed by negative feature of the promised act.
3. The obligation to keep promise is prima facie obligation. Searle’s argumentation on Ross’s prima facie obligation is by asserting that the prima facie is not predicative of the obligation type but an epistemic through a sentence modifier. Thus it is not plausible to the description of the obligation conflict through prima facie obligation in which A disallows B’s obligation.

Other common mistakes in the cases of obligation to keep promise like to be as prudential, derivative from the acceptance of moral principle, obligation not internal to promise, and obligation as descriptive and evaluative sense (see Searle, 2001, p.195-200).

All above discussion just the bare level of the rationality. The higher one is to take into account the role of DIRA in social aspect. In understanding the role of DIRA for social life, according to Searle there five chief features (ibid.): a)temporality, b) language and institutional structure, c) freedom, d) self and first-person point of view, and e) rationality. All are intertwined. First, temporality dealing with time represents present doing by which the future action is grounded. Borrowing from Searle, see example:

a) I set the alarm to wake up at 06.00.

b) I ask someone to wake me up at 06.00.

* 1. Alston’s Normative Stance of Illocutionary acts

Alston’s account on the normative aspect of speech act embedded in illocutionary act includes taking responsibility for conditions of satisfaction and rule-subjection acts. His claim on such states is grounded on a number of candidate analyses in expounding the notion of taking responsibility (R’ing) as follow:

D5. In uttering S, U R’d that *p*—in uttering S, U knowingly took on a liability to blame in case of not-*p.*

D6. In uttering S, U R’d that *p*—U recognized herself to be rightfully subject to blame , etc., in case of not-*p.*

D7. In uttering S, U R’d that *p*—in uttering S, U knowingly took on liability to being incorrect in case of not-*p*.

D8. In uttering S, U R’d that *p*—in uttering S, U subjects his utterance to a rule that, in application to this case, implies that it is permissible for U to utter S only if p.

D9. U R’s that *p* in uttering S—In uttering S, U purports to know that *p.*

D10. U R’s that *p* in uttering S—In uttering S, U represents *p* as being the case.

Alston’s aim is to extend Searle’s concept on the condition of satisfaction in promising H to do action. In this respect, he argues that U is not the only one who take responsibility for unsatisfied condition of satisfaction (Alston example see p.54). That is to say, though the condition is satisfied on the basis of Searle’s condition 4 or 6, it remain unsatisfied the condition in U takes responsibility to blame or U recognize to be rightfully subject to blame in case of not-*p* D5 and D6.

His preference to select D5 to D6 is on the basis being able to expose taking responsibility for that *p* that relate to what U does. It also includes establishing U’s state of affair rather than recognizing the existing state of affair. So, the state of affair means that it relates to normative aspects in which U’s utterance being a subject to blame in case of not-*p*. He refuses the idea U being subject to requirement that *p* on the reason of being an utterance of S. Thus for Alston, U’s voluntary control is very crucial into case of promising to do A. In other words, one’s utterance is subject to blame under one’s voluntary control.This implies there is possibility for speakers’s objection to the H if not-*p*.

Dealing with the problem of D5 in terms of epistemic complexity, either S’s belief and H’s preference argued by Searle on his COS is not sufficiently and necessarily satisfied to be blameworthy. In other words, even though both are not satisfied, it is false for them to blameworthiness. It is similar case with Searle’s condition 6 where S intends to do A, there is no clear-cut distinction between what justifiably believe and what the case is. Hence, for Alston, blameworthiness based on speaker epistemic position is a vis a vis to the case. That one, however, is blameworthy seems not to be blamed for issuing the utterance by virtue of prima facie blameworthy and the lack of significant case for warranting one’s taking responsibility (ibid.).

Consequently, it leads the problem as to the formulation of U takes responsibility in promising H to do action. Considering Searle’s condition 4 or 6, though the utterance satisfy the condition, it does not, or even Alston’s candidate analysis D5 for blameworthiness, neither does it. Thus, Alston suggests a further analysis D7 i.e. the motivation for Utterer/U to take responsibility for incorrect or being out of order (ibid.57).

In accordance with the way to identify R’ing either D5 or D7, another aspect in case of the existence of normative states is the chief point. Alston state ‘thus the possibility . . . depend on the existence of a system of rules that in force within the community the U include’ (p. ).

The rule is prescribed socially. In this case, R’s in performing illocutionary act, it is not individual variation but interpersonal case. Thus for Alston, R that *p* is related to give one’s utterance normative state in community (ibid.59). Moreover, in assertion *p* it represents putting oneself to reproach in the case of being believed that *p*. In this regard, one has nothing to do with expressing his commitment. Rather, it is the way one’s behavior fit into systems of rules in speaker linguistic community.

Since in uttering sentence one has no liability by virtue of inadequate belief that C or incorrect that not-C, Alston suggests another D8 analysis putting one’s utterance under subjection to a rule that require C. In D8, it presents one’s utterance that is dependent on the rule in the case of permissible utterance that *p*. By this rule, Alston argues the distinction between objective and subjective obligation can be identified (ibid.). That is to say one may do something with C is satisfied, then it is right in objective way. Even if one may do something that C is not satisfied, it is wrong in objective way, but it is right in subjective way. That is similar case to when C is satisfied, but S does not believe it, then S does not do it. As a result, one is wrong in objective but right in subjective way. Such phenomena support Alston to claim that blameworthiness and epistemic position that S is blame to… is a kind of subjective wrongness.

It is the strength of D8 that is not only related to rule for permissible utterance and epistemic position, but also dealt with objective and subjective wrongness. For Alston, the condition established in the terms of transforming sentential act into illocutionary act is on the ground of S’ will. This led him to admit the constraint of D8 rules i.e. it is about the assumption of rule-subjection act to social rule whatever speaker does (ibid). However, it seems ignored freedom, a good will and agent’s potential. The implication of D8, he adds another aspect of analysis; D9 and D10, In order to give more explanation of R’ing. D9 deals with explaining the possibility of one’s performing something depending on rule, one has to purport to know in so doing. Meanwhile to represent one’s doing something to be the case for the rule is the component of D10. However, Alston claims that D8 as the rule and the fundamental formulation of other candidate analysis. That is to say the idea of R’ing subjects to the rules is the chief unit in performing illocutionary acts, thus IA is rule-subjection acts (ibid.65).

Alston criticizes Searle’s necessary condition, especially for making promises. He argues that condition 1,4 and 6 is not necessarily satisfy the condition for making promise. However, he agrees with condition 4 and 6 in some degrees by adding the idea of taking responsibility for that *p* or S R’s. Based on his counterexample (see, p.64), his ideas grounded on such normative states point out that S has no responsibility in the case not-*p*, though condition 4 and 6 (S belief and H preference) are satisfied. Furthermore, condition 5 is excluded by virtue of the same status with 4 and 6. Thus, he replaces it.

5. It is possible for S to do A.

Another Searle’s condition modified is 7. Though he is in agreement with Searle in the case of the matter of the essential condition for making promise, the obligation is a kind of prima facie obligation. His suggestion is that the utterance does place him under an obligation rather than S intend to A. For this reason, condition 7 is reformulated:

1. In uttering S, U places himself under an obligation.

By this condition, as Alston notes, no other account is needed if it is just for representing an obligation. However, it will be not enough, if it is for making contrast with vowing and contracting (ibid.66).

Further Searle’s condition, 8, has by no means been required due to not giving rich account than 7. Alston argues 8 just emphasizes S’s speech act to propositional content. However, Alston argument is by no mean lacks considering Searle’s aim for 8 i.e. to represent the relationship between indentation and the meaning. It is crucial to take into account how the intention or speaker’s intention relates to the meaning of propositional content. Though Alston disagrees with condition 8, he reformulates it:

8. U intends to produce in H the knowledge that the previous condition has been satisfied.

Dealing with condition 9, Alston is in line with Searle in terms of illocutionary act potential of sentence meaning and IA as rule-governed/conventional, but condition 9 is not included in his account. In this respect, Alston argue that to explain IA potential is not as simple condition 9. His last critic is to condition 2 and 4. Such conditions are not needed since they just regard to the propositional content in which it has been included in account 4-6. Thus he omits those conditions.

As a result from his critique and reformulation Searle’s condition, Alston’s account on the condition emphasizes the normative stance R’ing. The following is his account:

I1. U promised to do A in uttering iff

1. In uttering S, U takes responsibility for
2. It is possible to do A.
3. H would prefer U’s doing A to U’s not doing A.
4. U intends to do A.
5. In uttering S, U places himself under an obligation to do A
6. In uttering S, U intended that H realize that condition1 and 2 are satisfied.

The account represents promises which speaker takes responsibility for the preparatory condition, the truth, and conventional effect. Furthermore, it describes that IA as rule based. In accordance with this account, Alston assert that utterance made from IA consist in normative fact rather than speaker belief or intention (ibid). In addition to Alston extension on description of the condition for other IA type, like order, request, thanks, and excercitive will not be described (see Alston, p.71-72).

* 1. Cuneo’s Acoount on Morality of Speech

The Normative dimension embedded in speech acts is a crucial element to perform locutionary acts. According to Cuneo (2014), speech act normativity exists in the performance of speech acts by the way of agents’ having right, obligation and responsibility. This implies that having properties or a set of necessary and sufficient conditions like arguing by perlocutionary intention and conventional/rule based is not adequately explanatory for illocutionary acts performed.

Searle's and Alston's view of normative stance highlighting the speaker, as for Cuneo's either the S or the H is bind by the normativity of speech act. Furthermore, the normative dimension encompasses the three related concepts such as right, obligation and responsibility. The normative dimension of speech counts actual or conditional right, actual and conditional generated obligation and responsibility (see Cuneo pp.29-43). By these principles, Cuneo's propose is a comprehensive concept of the normative dimension of speech acts, especially in case of assertives, commissives, and imperatives. His notions are more adequate than that of Searle's (2001) and Alston's (2000) arguing that normative featuresonly refer to commitment and responsibility respectively.

In addition, Cuneo had rejected the perlocutionary intention' view believing that some normative dimensions are derived from speech acts. As for his argument, if normative dimensions are generated from speech acts, it is not important to explain the normative theory of speech acts. This position seems to be underpinned by his belief that the performance of speech acts is subject to agents’ having right, obligation and responsibility. Such normative standing exist when the S alter his normative standing to the H or the audiences.

Another crucial claim by Cuneo is that the normative dimensions of speech acts are moral. In this respect, some normative dimensions have moral aspects. Moral aspect of such normativity in case of assertive, commissive and imperative is the account that is generated for moral right; obligation and responsibility (see Cuneo pp. 85-97). Based on his statements, it differs from Searle's (2001) view that normative dimensions of speech acts have no relationship with moral dimensions.

His claim that only some of normative dimensions have moral aspects is not in line with Adam's observation that all speech acts have moral dimensions. It seems that such notions based on philosophical positions taken. In Cuneo's view normative dimensions-- as view of a moral realist-- believing in pluralism is based on the assumption that such normative and moral dimensions might be overlapping to the concepts of prudential, legal, and practice based generating right, obligation and responsibility.

However, Cuneo's claim that normative, moral dimensions of speech acts that are embedded in speech acts do not care about other sources of reasons for actions, such as facts and intentional states. Such sources of reasons need to consider to provide an explanatory adequacy of speech act' argument. This implies practical reasons that become valid reasons for an action covering relationships of those sources of reasons in speech act performance. His notion also needs to be extended to empirical cases that cover all types and subtypes of speech acts because some might have special ways for performing speech acts and they are successful and non-defective grounded on normative and moral stance.

1. RESEARCH METHOD

Approach used in this study is pragmatics, namely speech act analyses. In this respect, the principle of analyzing linguistic data for speech act used illocutionary act element: illocutionary force and the propositional contents as the approach to categorize different types of speech acts. Searle and Vanderveken (2005) account on illocutionary force components was applied to categorize types of illocutionary acts of Tuan guru speeches and casual conversation. Furthermore, other approaches are crucial in analyzing and examining the types and natures of the normative dimensions of speech acts, namely, philosophy of the mind, philosophy of action, and philosophical ethics. These approaches combined are commonly used in analytical linguistics, especially in analysis of speech act normativity.

One of the most fundamentals in analyzing the type of speech acts is through analysis of double structure, namely its illocutionary force and propositional content. The method used is qualitative-exploratory. It means the study is in the form of qualitative and exploratory combinations. The type of exploratory is investigative in the sense of examining and analyzing in order to extend previous theoretical concept on normative and moral dimensions of speech. On that procedure, the generalization that is inductive derivation is about the normative and moral state of act in terms of language institution, its process, and necessary condition.

Observation and recording method are applied. The methods chosen covered the speech act phenomena and addressed speech act typology, dimensions of speech act normativity and morality grounded on the universality principle of analyzing double structure F (p) and set of successful conditions of each act. Spoken data from Tuan Guru speeches in formal setting and casual conversations in informal setting in South Sikur village using *Meno-mene* dialect were collected by observing and recording. Observation by recording was done for about 3 months. Tuan guru speech 1 was recorded on 5th August 2015 with duration 12 minutes 58 second. Tuan guru 2 was recorded on 9th September 2015 with duration 43 minutes and 49 second. The last, casual conversations were recorded in 12th October 2015 with duration 1 hour 23 minutes. Moreover, data recorded from Tuan Guru speeches and casual conversations in South Sikur village were conducted from August until October . The recorded data are transcribed into English.

1. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

**4.2** **The Nature of Normative Dimensions of Speech Acts**

Normative features of the types of illocutionary acts are derived from the normative standing of agents. Normative dimensions are embedded in speech acts and are generated from these agents’ as having right, obligation and responsibility. These normative features lead the normative standing of the agents (the S and the H). Such normative standing by agents are generated from performing illocutionary acts and the ways of locutionary acts. The followings are the results and types of normative features those that support how such normativity is generated in performing speech acts. The followings are subtypes of the assertive found in lines (1-14):

(1)

TG 1:*Ndeq araq sarat dengan saq rujuq*. (affirming)

No-D there-adv requirement-n people-n who-pron reconciliation

There is no requirement for people to reconcile.

(2)

TG1: *Sekalipun pegawean halal, saq aren beseang nuq kurang bagus*. (describing)

Though-P action-n allowed-A, What-RP called-v divorce-n not- good-A.

Though it is an allowed action, what is called divorce is not good.

(3)

TG1: *Lamun wah rujuq nuq wajib beng hak untuk senine*. (explaining)

If-conj already-adv reconcile-v obligatory-A give-v right-n for-P wife-n

If a husband has been reconciled, it is obligatory to give the right for his wife

(4)

TG 2: *Ndeq arak dengan ndek mele bagus leq dunia niq*. (concluding)

No-adv there-adv not-adv want-v good-A in-P world-n this-D

Everyone wants to be good in this world.

(5)

TG2: *Due model dengan berjamaah*. (describing/categorizing)

Two-D model-n pray together-PV

There are two models of praying together.

**Casual conversation (CC)**

(6)

C: //*Kan mako gecok talet wayah nuq*.(asserting)

Cut tobacco-NP plant-v parent-n

Cutting the tobacco planted by your parents.

(7)

A: Mahen mako gecok. (stating)

Expensive-A cut tobacco-NP

Cutting tobacco is expensive.

(8)

A:=*Timak mako gecok, mun selamet jaq, beleq mauk keping endah*. (remarking)

Though-conj cut tobacco-NP, If-conj successful-A, much-D money-n

Though it is just cutting tobacco, if it is successful, we earn much money.

(9)

A: *Ndeq iniq ngkah saqit semeniq onos anuq geres julun wiq nuq*.(telling)

Not-adv can-mod heal-v back-n beacause of-PP carrying-ger sand-n day before yesterday

My back cannot heal because I was carrying away the sand the day before yesterday.

(10)

A: *Saq tokon-tokon meni ampoq berirap.* (telling/informing)

When-adv sitting-ger felt-v

When I am just sitting like this, it feels painful.

(11)

E: *Nun, jaq mulen*. (agreeing)

Yes-adv it-pron does-mod

Yes, it does.

(12)

A: *Dunie nik congok congo:::k lat to bih mate.(*warn)

World-n this-D sit-v later-adv all-pron die-v

Just sit now, in this world later we all die.

(13)

D: *Sugih jari belian nane*. (remark/concluding)

Rich-A be-aux dukun-n now

It is rich to be a dukun now.

(14)

A: *Mun begadang jaq becat kurang daraq*. (concluding)

If-conj stay up-PV high-adv low-A blood-n

If you stay up, it makes low blood pressure.

In performing an assertion as in line (1-14), the speaker has a right to assert that (p), the S has an obligation to the truth of (p) and so on. In this case, the S' right, obligation, responsibility, and the H' right are both generated from agents altering the normative standing. Performing assertion involves intentional states (beliefs) of the S and the H, as well as normative dimensions generated from agents having right, obligation and responsibility. In the performance of assertion as in lines (1-14), the followings are normative features of assertions:

1. The S has an obligation to his argument asserted in the utterance
2. The S is responsible for his position if the assertion is failed to obtain the truth of proposition
3. The H has the right to correct/ blame if the S' statement is not true
4. The H has an obligation to believe the S' claim (TG)

Imperatives

(17) Lalo ngeraos pacu-pacu. (suggesting)

Go-v talks-n truly-adv

Go to who talks truly.

(18) Mun talaq telu, ndeq tekanggo tulakang saq ndeq man saq nine nuq merarik

if-con third-A divorce-not-adv allowed reconciling-v before-P woman-n marry-v

malik bekeq dengan lain. (prohibiting)

again-adv with-P Another-pron

It is not allowed to reconcile with a woman and get remarried with the same man if it was the third divorce.

(19) Wajib dore nae dengan nine mun ragu pengitan atau ndeq naedemen sujud.(order)

Obligatory-A leg-n woman-n if-conj uncovered or-cond nor-adv

It is obliged for women to check her legs if she is worried whether her legs are covered or not during bowing.

(20) Mun makmum nuq redo tepebelok ayat, sunat imam nuq pebelok ayat.(order)

If-conj congregation-n willing-A lengthen-v verse-n, sunnah-n imam-n lengthen-v verse-n

If the congregation is willing the verse to be lengthened, it is sunnah for imam to lengthen the verse.

(21) E:// angetang aik Awe tan! (order)

Boil-v water-n

Boil the water, Awe!

(22) C: Coba orah ang[kak! (suggesting)

Try-v massage-n

Try to get the massage!

(23)A: Masih ngoven mako to? (question as request)

Still-adv cutivate-v tobacco-n

Do you still dry tobacco in the oven?

D: Masih

Still-adv

still

(24) A: Dende:::q ndeq e gawek tie. (order/prohibiting)

Not-adv do-v that-pron

Don’t do that!

(25) A: Jagaq kakenan kance pikiran. (suggesting)

Control-v food-n and-conj thought-n

Control food and thought!

(26) D: Endeng tulung beliang gorengan aloh!

please-exc buy-v fried food-NP

Please, buy fried food!

(27) F: enteh awe milu lalo meli.(inviting)

Let-v Awe-PN join-v buy-v

Awe, let me join to buy.

(28) A: Apika:::n entan= laun tegoroke sik dengan. (advise)

Careful-A later-adv slaughter-v by-P other-pron

Be careful! You will be slaughtered byothers.

In case of imperatives as in lines (17-28), there are different ways of acquiring normative features. For instance, in lines (18-20), the order given is performed by TG invoke their standing power as a religious person. To be successful, the performance needs a specialized normative standing of the TG by cultural and social stipulation. The special feature of order given by the TG in line (18), the S lays an obligation not only to the H but also to the S to do *p.* To see how that order put a duty on the S himself is from a second person's standpoint that will be discussed further in the next unit. The normative standing generated in performing the speech act is by the way of the agent’s normative standing. The S has the right to put an obligation on himself on the Hto do the action in the future (the TG' order). The followings are normative features in performing commisive:

1. The S has a conditional right to get the H do something (authority, prudential, practice based).

2. The S has a conditionally generated obligation to believe that the H has the ability, possibility and willing to do the action.

3. The S has a generated obligation to believe that the S has the ability, the possibility and willing to do the action.

4. The S is responsible to proceed again if the S has no belief that the H has the ability, possibility and willingness to do the action.

5. The S is responsible to be corrected if the S has no belief of his ability, possibility and willingness to do the action.

6. The H has a conditional right to correct the H is there is no belief of his ability, possibility and willingness to do the action.

7. The H has an actual generated obligation if he believes he has the ability and possibility to do the action (the order).

8. The H has a conditionally generated obligation if he believes in his ability, possibility and willingness to do that action (suggestion, inviting, giving advice, and making a request).

Expressives

(29)

TG1: *Assalamualaikum warrahmatullahibaraqatuh*.( Greet/pray)

Peace be upon you!

(30)

TG1:*Tunas maaf lamun araq salaq dalam atur tiang*.(apologize)

Beg-v pardon-n if conj there-adv mistake-n in-P my speech-NP

I beg your pardon if there is mistake in my speech.

(31)

TG2: *Yang tiang hormati bapak-bapak/ibu-ibu*.(respect)

That-adv I-pron respect-v

His excellence mr/mrs.

(32)

TG2: *Mudah-mudahan arak manfaat*.( well-wish/pray)

hope-v goodness-n

I wish there is goodness.

(33)

TG2: *Terima kasih atas perhatiannya*.(thank)

Thank-excla for-P attention-n your

Thanks for your attention.

Casual conversations (CC)

(34)

A: *ee sakit ne*.(painful)

Painful-A it-pron

It is painful.

(35)

C: Mudah mudahan saq pade tekican selamet.(well-wish/pray)

May-mod all-pron safe-n

May all be safe.

(36)

A: *Sale sale doang tie*.(criticize)

wrong-A just-adv it-pron

It is just wrong.

(37)

C: *Kesengeh ambun parfum,*Gus.(compliment)

Fragrant-A smell-v parfume-n

Your perfume smells so fragrant, Agus.

Regarding to performing expressives as in lines (29-37), the S has the right to express his attitude to the H. The S has an obligation to the truth of the psychological state expressed and the rest is not only derived from the act itself, but also from agents: having right, obligation, and responsibility. The followings are the normative properties of performing expressive.

1. The S has the right to express something to the H.
2. The S has an obligation to the truth of the psychological states expressed.
3. The S is responsible for failing the truth of psychological states expressed.
4. The H has an obligation to respond to the S'psychological states.
5. The H has the right to express reproach/ correcting the S is he fails to fulfill the truth of psychological states expressed.

Commissive

(38)

B: *Lemak bian jam-jam 7 lalo bejango ojoq Selong*.(promising)

Tomorrow-adv evening-adv time-n go-v look out-PV to-P Selong-n

Tomorrow evening we go to look out to Selong around 7.

D: *Aoq wah*. (accepting/confirming)

ok-adv

OK.

(39)

B: *Bareh e ngeronde kance batur-batur nuq*.(promising)

Tonight-adv I-pron will-mod patrol with-P friends-n

Tonight, I will patrol with my friends.

B: *ed pade sugun bareh ngeronde menu?*

Will-mod you-pron all-pron patrol-v

Will you all patrol tonight?

C: *Aok. Bareh ke sugun malik jam-jam 12.(*promising)

Yes-adv, tonight I-pron will-mod go out-PV again-adv time-n

Yes, I will go to patrol around 12 tonight.

A: =*aok*

Yes-adv

Yes.

(40)

B: Mun sehat jaq, e puase seminggu.

If-conj recover-v, I-pron fast-v a week-adv

If I recover, I will fast for a week.

In case of commisive as in lines (38-40), the alteration of normative standing in performing a promise generates: the S' right to put himself in an obligation to do the action; the S and the H have an obligation to do them p (for collective-intention and we-commitment), the S has an obligation to do the action p (for I intention and I-commitment) and so on. Some of normative features in the performance of commisive are:

1. The S has the right to put a promise obligation on himself if the condition in the clause is fulfilled (I-commitment).
2. The S and the H has the right to put an obligation on themselves for their promise (we-/i-commitment)
3. The S has an obligation to do as promised in the proposition.
4. The S and the H have an obligation to do the action in the future as promised in the proposition.
5. The S is responsible for correcting, blaming if the his promise fails to be fulfilled. (involving his intention).
6. The S and the H are responsible for blaming if they fail to fulfill the promise.
7. The H has the right to correct the S if the promise is not being fulfilled.
8. The S is obligated to control/ reproach if he fails to fulfill his promise.

The generated or derivative nature of such normative dimensions also occur in declarative.

(41) B: *Kafir wah (ahmadiyah*). (naming)

Unbeliever-n

They are unbelievers.

By the way of performing declarative as in line( 41) the S has the right to declare and alter the states of affairs. The S has an obligation to alter the states of affairs. As indicated in line (41), the S has no right to declare such a status alteration. Hence, the declarative example in this study is successful, but defective. Some normative types of declarative:

1. The S has the right to alter the states of affairs being declared.
2. The S has an obligation to alter the states of affairs.
3. The S has a responsibility if the requirement in the declaration is not fulfilled.
4. The H has the right to correct/blame if the S has no authority to declare.

Intentionality has a crucial role for the describing agent’s mental state in performing speech acts. The reason for this is that intentionality has a psychological mode and propositional content. Furthermore, intentional states involved in speech acts are représentations of its condition of satisfaction and the direction of fit. In performing assertion as in lines (1-14), the speaker asserts the truth of the proposition grounded on his belief. The speaker's belief is the intentional state of assertion. Since intention has a psychological mode (S) and representation content (r) or S (r). As in line 1, the S asserted that there is no requirement for reconciliation. In this case, the S' belief as psychological mode or intentional state in assertion impose its direction of fit, while the representation content impose the condition of satisfaction (truth) on the condition of satisfaction (S' utterance). For this above reason, the assertion is true if the propositional /representation content is true. In case of the belief, it imposes the direction of fit, the content of assertion matches reality. So assertion has an intentional state, direction of fit and condition of satisfaction.

In case of performing imperatives as in lines (17-28), the intentional state is the S' desire or want. For instance, in line (21), the S wants the H to boil water. The S wants something by ordering the H to do that *p.* The condition of satisfaction is imposed by the representation content viz. The H obeys the order. Meanwhile, the direction of fit imposed by its psychological mode, the S desire or want is that the H do the action *p* to match the S' order. The properties of condition of satisfaction and direction of fit to other types of imperatives like suggesting, request, inviting, advising are similar to giving an order.

Another type of IA that has the same direction of fit with imperative is commissive. The direction of fit of commissive as in lines(38-40) is world to word. It is determined by its representation content. In the performance of commissive, its intentional states are intentions. This intentional state imposes the direction of fit of commissive. Meanwhile, the condition of satisfaction (COS) of commissive in case of giving a promise is the S' fulfillment of his intention to do *p.*

In regards to expressive as in lines (29-37), the performing of expressive has no intentional state expressed. Thus, expressive has no either direction of fit and condition of satisfaction. Rather, the truths of psychological states expressed are presupposed to the given belief. For instance, in line (36) the S criticizes that it is wrong for the hearer to be fake shaman. This expression involves the S' belief that is *p*. This indicates that such an expression is grounded on a given belief as the presupposition of the truth of propositional states expressed.

As for the last type, performing declarative in line (38), the intentional state is either a belief, a desire or a want to alter the state of affair. Thus, declarative has double direction of fit. In this case, to be successful, the S has to have a belief (↓) and his desire (↑) to change a status. These double intentional states make a declarative to have double direction of fit (↕).

The importance of reasons for action is completely related to giving the relationship of facts, human mind, and normative fact to the action. Reasons for action in terms of performing speech acts are grounded on facts, intentional states and normative entity (or factitive entity borrowed from Searle). In performing speech acts, the reasons for action include all the factitive entities or at least intentional states and normative entity. The followings are the results of reasons for action found in the study in terms of factitive entity as a valid reason for action.

1. Assertive

Reasons for performing assertion found include facts, intentional states and normative facts. For instance in line

(1) *Ndeq araq sarat dengan saq rujuq*. (asserting)

No-D there-adv requirement-n people-n who-pron reconcilation

There is no a requirement for people to reconcile.

Intentional state:

S believe that *p* is true.

So asserting🡪 Bel (p)

Normative facts:

The S has an obligation to believe that p is true.

The S has an obligation for making the H believe that p is true.

The S lays an obligation on the H to make him believe that p is true.

In this case, the assertion performed by TG includes intentional state and a normative fact as the reasons for action in performing it. These reasons for action are similar to other subtypes of assertive as in lines (2-14) involving both reasons for action. However, as indicated in lines (5, 8, 14), the truth of proposition is conditional since the its truth is subject to fulfillment of the if-clause. However, the normative fact that put an obligation on either the S or the H believing that the truth of p not conditional. Thus, the S' belief as intentional states that the truth of proposition is conditional is not the same with the S' obligation to believe that p is true or the S has an obligation to make the H believe that p is a conditional truth.

1. Imperative

As indicated in lines (17-28), to perform the subtypes of imperative is the most reason for action such as intentional states and normative facts. Its intentional states and normative fact of given subtypes as follow:

17)

TG1: *Lalo ngeraos pacu-pacu.* (suggesting)

Go-v talks-n truly-adv

Go to talks truly.

Intentional states:

The S wants the H to do something (p).

So suggesting🡪W (p).

Normative facts:

The S has an obligation to the H to do the action (p).

The S and the H both have an obligation to do the action (p).

The S and the H are responsible for not to do the action (p).

(18)

TG1: Mun talaq telu, ndeq tekanggo tulakang saq ndeq man saq nine nuq merarik

if-con third-A divorce-not-adv allowed reconciling-v before-P woman-n marry-v

malik bekeq dengan lain. (prohibiting)

again-adv with-P Another-pron

It is not allowed to reconcile before the woman get married with another if it is the third divorce.

Intentional states:

The S believes that p is true and want the H to do something (p).

So prohibiting🡪 Bel (p) &W (p).

Normative facts:

The S has an obligation to the H to do that (p).

The S and the H have an obligation to do that (p).

The S and the H are responsible for not to do that (p).

(19)

TG2: Wajib dore nae dengan nine mun ragu pengitan atau ndeq naedemen sujud.(order)

Obligatory-A leg-n woman-n if-conj uncovered or-cond nor-adv

It is an obligation for a woman to check her legs if she is worried whether her legs are covered or not during sujud**.**

Intentional states:

The S believes that (p) and want the H to do that (p).

So ordering🡪 Bel (p) & W (p).

Normative facts:

The S has an obligation for the truth of that (p)

The S lays an obligation tothe H to do that (p).

The H (woman) has an obligation to do that (p).

The S is responsible for the truth of that (p)

and H is responsible for not to do that (p).

21)

E:// Angetang aik Awe tan! (order)

Boil-v water-n

Boil water, Awe!

Intentional states:

The S wants the H to do that (p).

So order🡪W (p).

Normative facts:

The S has the right to lay an obligation to the H to do that (p).

The H has an obligation to do that (p).

The H is responsible for not to do that (p).

1. Commissive

Performing speech acts like making a promise or making a demand the S' intention is in order to be successful and a sincere promise. However, it is not sufficient to explain the reason for action. The followings are reasons for action when performing a promise as in lines (38, 40).

(38)

B: *Lemak bian jam-jam 7 lalo bejango ojoq Selon*g.(promising)

Tomorrow-adv evening-adv time-n go-v look out-PV to-P Selong-n

Tomorrow evening we go to look out for Selong around 7.

D: Aoq wah. (accepting/confirming)

ok-adv

OK

Intentional states:

The S and the H believe that it is possible to that p i.e to go to look out and S intend to (p).

So we-promising🡪 S & H Bel (◊ p) & W (p).

Normative facts:

The S and the H have an obligation to their belief that is possible to do (p).

The S and the H have an obligation to do that p.

The S and the H are responsible for not being (p) and not want to do (p).

The S and the H have theright to remind if the S or the H do not keep their promises.

40)

B: Mun sehat jaq, e puase seminggu.

If-conj recover-v, I-pron fast-v a week-adv

If I recover, I will fast for a week.

Intentional states:

The S' belief is it is possible for him to do (p) and wants to do that (p).

So, I-promising🡪S Bel (◊ p) and W (p) if (q).

Normative fact:

The S has an obligation if his belief on that (p) if q (if I recover) is fulfilled.

The S is responsible to his belief on the truth of being not (p).

Based on lines 38 and 40, the reasons for action differ in terms of intentional states and normative entity. In line (39), its intentional state is a collective belief and wants to do that (p). Furthermore, its normative entity is a collective obligation and responsibility. On the contrary, as in line (40), its intentional state is an individual belief and wants to do that (p). Meanwhile, its normative entity is an individual obligation and responsibility. These indicate that it is the We-intention and obligation (commitment) in line (39), while it is I-intention and I-obligation in line (40). In addition to case line (40), the content of proposition is also conditional. In other words, for its intentional state, the S believes that it is possible to do that (p) and wants to do that (p) if conditional sentence is fulfilled (if (q).

1. Expressive

Dealing with expressive, reasons for action include facts, intentional states and normative entity. The followings are reasons for action of expressive. The cases of expressive are in lines (29-37)

(30)

G1: Tunas maaf lamun araq salaq dalam atur tiang.(apologize)

Beg-v pardon-n if conj there-adv mistake-n in-P my speech-NP

I beg your pardon if there is mistake in my speech.

Intentional states:

The S believes to do that p and wants (~p).

So, apologizing🡪Bel (p) and W (~p).

Normative entity:

The S is responsible for that (~p)

(31)

TG2: Yang tiang hormati bapak-bapak/ibu-ibu.(respect)

That-adv I-pron respect-v

His excellence mr/mrs

Intentional states: S believes to the truth of (p) and want to that (p).

So, respecting🡪Bel (p) & W (p)

(33)

TG2: Terima kasih atas perhatiannya.(thanking)

Thank-excla for-P attention-n your

Thanks for your attention.

Intentional states:

The S believes that the H has done something beneficial for the S and wants to that (p).

So thanking🡪Bel (p) and W (p)

Normative entity:

The S has an obligation to believe that (p) and to do that (p).

(35) C: Mudah mudahan saq pade tekican selamet.(well-wish/pray)

May-mod all-pron safe-n

May all be safe.

Intentional states:

The S believes in a future truth of an event (p) and to that (p).

So, praying🡪Bel (p) and W (p)

Normative entity:

The S and the H have a collective obligation to the truth of something p.

(36) A: Sale sale doang tie.(criticize)

wrong-A just-adv it-pron

It is just wrong.

Intentional states:

The S believe to that (p) is not good and don't want the H to do that (p) and believing someone is responsible for such and such (p)

So, criticizing🡪Bel (p) and W (~p) and Bel (H is responsible if that (p))

Normative entity: The S has an obligation for the truth of (p).

(37)

C: Kesengeh ambun parfum,Gus.(compliment)

Fragnant-A smell-v parfume-n

Yourperfume smells so fragrant, Agus.

Intentional states:

The S believes to that (p) and wants to that (p)

So, compliment🡪Bel (p) and W (p)

Normative entity:

The S has an obligation for the truth of (p).

As indicated in line (30) above, the reasons for action involves intentional states (believing (p) and want (~p). in other words, the reason for action is a belief that it is possible for him to make a mistake during the speech and he does not have the intention to make one. It means the S' belief on the truth of psychological state is expressed, presupposed the truth of states. Furthermore, the reason for action derives from normative that is the S has an obligation to believe that is possible for him to make a mistake. As other lines above indicated, most subtypes of expressive, the reason for action is either intentional states or normative entity in performing it.

1. Declarative

In these types, declarative is a unique type of speech having double directions of fit and without sincerity conditions. The following is the only example of declarative found in casual conversation.

(41)

B: *Kafir wah (ahmadiyah*). (naming)

Unbeliever-n

They are unbelievers.

Fact : Ahmadiyah violate the Islamicprinciples

Intentional states : The S believes that the Ahmadiyah follower violates the essence ofIslam' principles and the S wants to alter its status by calling the person ‘unbeliever.

So, Naming🡪Bel (p) & W (p)

Normative entity: The S has an obligation to the truth of (p).

The S is responsible for the belief if it is not true

In this case, the S succeeded to state his belief (p), but the S failed to change the status of Ahmadiyah based on his wants. This indicates that the reason for the S to perform it is geounded on the fact violation of the Islamic principle by ahmaiyah; and his intentional state viz. belief to that (p) and wants to change the state of Ahmadiyah by naming him as an unbeliever; and his normative reason is his obligation to the truth of that p.

In order to be successful in declarative, the S presuppose the institutional fact existing by the way of collective recognition and acceptance. Using institutional facts (religious board, school etc), we collectively impose the status function of someone or an institution. These facts have standing power or authority of generated standing right for certain people depending on contexts. This is the only way when a declarative can be successful and non-defective. Thus, in line (40), the S who has no power or authority included three sources of reasons, but still failed to name a collective belief. Furthermore, that failure is caused by S declaration grounded only on his individual belief and desire to that p.

1. Conclusion and Suggestion

All normative dimensions of any subtypes of illocutionary acts are moral. Such moral aspects include actual and conditional moral right; actual and conditional moral obligation; and actual and conditional moral responsibility. However, in case of comissive and declarative, the subtypes found are so limited that it is far from an adequate description of its normative and moral dimensions.

Above all the natures of normative and moral dimensions are generated; they're related to other factitive entities like facts (brute and institutional facts) and intertwined with the practical reason foraction. Generative characteristic of normative and moral dimensions are results from an agent having right, obligation, and responsibility. Actions are altered by an agent when performing speech acts for the H. Furthermore, intentional states include belief, want, and intention corresponding to types of speech acts those are also influenced by fact, normative and moral reason for actions. In other words, such factitive entities are both internal and external.

The concept of a second person's standpoint is also a remarkable role in explaining how free agents are bound by normative and moral standing encompassing right, obligation and responsibility. By this standpoint, it is more straightforward and practical for an agent to see that they are morally obliged to do as their interlocutor does. In this respect, for instance some cases in assertive and imperative, the H and the S are bound respectively by normative and moral standing to the belief what the S asserted and to do as the S ordered to the H. This position derives more practical reasons for action by given the agent to give his reactive attitude in terms of mutual normative and moral right, obligation, and responsibility. As a result, the first person’s, the second person's, and the third person's standpoints are interrelated to represent how freely agents are bound by the normative and moral reasons for action.

Having such properties of speech acts in Sasak language indicates that all languages have the same common grounds in terms of speech act normativity and morality, therefore, such domains are universal and necessity in nature. Furthermore, such dimensions might be categorical and conditional imperative for every agent corresponding to any kinds of speech acts. Any types of normativity are prudential, epistemic; practice based right, obligation and responsibility.

Finally, the moral dimensions of speech acts having moral values might be an arena for moral or character education. If moral aspects exist in speech acts, there are moral values generated. Thus, as indicated in findings and discussion a number of moral values pertains to any types of speech acts such as honesty, credibility, truth, obedience, self-respect, concern for others, and the rest could be taught to children or students. In this case, teachers, family, and community need to cooperate to build a moral character by ways of giving an understanding on a set of essential conditions of speech acts, including moral dimensions embedded to speech acts. The motivation for taking such morality of speech acts is the arena of moral and character education as for universality, accessibility, and practical reasons. In addition, moral values embedded in speech acts cover the core values that are necessarily to be addressed in character education such as reasoning, attitude, and good behavior.

This study's main concern was on the types of speech acts in formal and informal setting, natures of normative and moral dimensions, and preliminary notion on moral values for teaching. Thus, first, having a limited concern, it is needed to do further studies on analyzing the illocutionary force indicating device of different languages, indirect speech acts and other context of speech acts for increasing description and explanation on the basis of empirical linguistics. Second, the normative and moral dimensions of speech acts are complex things, therefore any relevant concepts to those notions like freedom, rationality, motivation, and the rest are in need of further scrutiny in order to have a more comprehensive argument for the domains of speech acts. Finally, the moral values of speech identified are far more from adequate identification in terms of modeling, principles, assessment, and management. Those need further analysis to provide an adequate foundation of moral and character education in every context and discipline.

This study's main concern was on the natures of normative and moral dimensions, and preliminary notion on moral values for teaching. Thus, first, having a limited concern, it is needed to do further studies on analyzing the illocutionary force indicating device of different languages, indirect speech acts and other context of speech acts for increasing description and explanation on the basis of empirical linguistics. Second, the normative and moral dimensions of speech acts are complex things, therefore any relevant concepts to those notions like freedom, rationality, motivation, and the rest are in need of further scrutiny in order to have a more comprehensive argument for the domains of speech acts. Finally, the moral values of speech identified are far more from adequate identification in terms of modeling, principles, assessment, and management. Those need further analysis to provide an adequate foundation of moral and character education in every context and discipline.

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