

2017-1 Introduction To Negotiation Science

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1 CHAPTER 1

1.1 common in negotiations

2 or more parties
conflict of needs
choice
give-or-take process
prefer to negotiate instead of fight openly
tangibles & intangibles (materielles vs immaterielles)

1.2 when is it advisable not to participate in negotiations

no willingness to make concession
demands are unethical
other side acts in bad faith
badly prepared

1.3 mediation

action taken on by an actor that is not direct party to the crisis, which tries to remove problems of the bargaining itself and therefore facilitates negotiations

1.4 negotiation

behaviour

Norm in groups, possibility of threats, ethnic standards

number of issues

one issue, many issues

confidentiality

public, private

time

deadline, no deadline

frequency

on-time deal, repeated interaction

composition of parties

compound, monolith

number of participating parties

$N=2$, $N > 2$

1.5 decision making

1.5.1 individual

descriptive (behavioral)

how decisions are made. how and why individuals think and act the way they do

normative (maths)

first order approximations of real behaviour. how rational, intelligent people should act

prescriptive

how decisions by a real person could be made better (practical view)

1.5.2 group of individuals

separate & interactive (Game Theory)

Joint (Negotiation Theory)

1.6 rationality

1.6.1 a

action, w : outcome, u : utility, y : probability, $p(w|y)$: probability of w

1.6.2 payoff

$\pi(a) = \sum p(w|y(a)) * u(w)$

1.6.3 rational under certainty

completeness

$w_1 \geq w_2$ oder $w_2 \geq w_1$

transitivity

$w_1 \geq w_2$ & $w_2 \geq w_3 \Rightarrow w_1 \geq w_3$

1.6.4 rational under uncertainty

Monotonicity

Continuity

Independence

1.7 Behaving rationally

objectives based on comprehensible motivations
measures to achieve it are consistent and do not violate conventions

hypothesis when negotiation is rational

done by professionals

some persons work in a back office to gather info for the negotiator

culture must permit internal objective/critical discussion

1.8 philosophical concepts

matter of counting lives, weighing cost & benefit & consequences? \rightarrow Utilitarianism

or are some morals higher than calculations and must be protected at all cost?

1.8.1 Utilitarianism

Bentham

The highest principle of morality is to maximize happiness, the overall balance of pleasure over pain.

Mill

what will maximize welfare or the collective happiness of society as a whole. It is the result that counts.

1.8.2 Kant

Motive counts, not result

Categorical Imperative (universal law)

"Act only according to the maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a universal law"

1.8.3 Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbst verschuldeten Unmündigkeit

Selbstverschuldet weil nicht wegen mangel an Intellekt

Unmündig weil nicht nachdenken ohne Hilfe von Drittpersonen

Sapere aude

2 CHAPTER 2

2.1 basic concepts

distributive negotiation

competitive negotiation, one issue, win-lose situation (prize at bazaar)

integrative negotiation

mutual gains, many issues, win-win approach. problem solving for mutual benefit. An agreement can be found that is better than what would have been possible with distributive negotiation

target point

'negotiator's aspiration', point at which the negotiator would like to conclude its negotiation

resistance point

'reservation price', negotiator's bottom line; cannot go any further point

Starting point

'initial offer', where the negotiations start

Zone of potential agreement (ZOPA)

spread between resistance points of the two parties

2.2 distributive model

2.2.1 formal model

b

buyers resistance point, s: sellers resistance point, x: final price

seller surplus

$x - s$, buyers surplus: $x - b$, total surplus: $b - s$

note

if $b - s \geq 0 \rightarrow$ deal

2.2.2 negotiations process

Dance of Concessions

intervals nähern sich bis sich buyer & seller offer überschneiden

Achieve the most preferable outcome within the bargaining range (in ZOPA)

Subjective assessment/perception of the deal \rightarrow important that people feel as if they got the best possible deal

extreme offers, small concessions \rightarrow attempt to review the resistance points

2.3 integrative negotiation

2.3.1 steps

agree on problem

interests behind problems

generate alternatives (expand pie, logroll (both get some), offer compensation in another area, minimize costs, bridge)

prioritize options and reduce

select solution

2.3.2 important points

fairness (equally share outcome based on equity, needs)

avoid emotional escalation

take differences in account in risk preferences, expectations, time preferences

"nothing is agreed until everything is agreed"

2.3.3 ten best practices

Be prepared

Diagnose the fundamental structure of the negotiation

Work the BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) (what happens if talks fail?)

Be willing to walk away (and therefore accept BATNA)

Master paradox (claiming value vs creating value, sticking to principles vs going with the flow, sticking to strategy vs opportunismus, honest & open vs closed & opaque, trust vs distrust)

Remember the intangibles (looking weak / strong, emotions, being fair, try to see what is not there!)

Actively manage coalitions (with you, against you, loose & undefined)

Savour and protect your reputation

Remember that rationality and fairness are relative

Continue to learn from experience (reflection after negotiation, personal diary on weaknesses & work on them)

2.3.4 harvard method

2.3.4.1 people

separate people & problem

Hard on the facts, soft on the people

separate Working relationship from Subject of negotiation

2.3.4.2 interests

focus on interests (underlying motivation, concern, and importance) rather than positions (manifestation of an interest in a concrete manner)

most negotiations start with positions, first step therefore is to identify implicit and explicit interests of negotiations behind the positions

2.3.4.3 options

develop different possible mutually beneficially options to choose from

diagnose negotiation-situations around interests

Problem identification (whats wrong) \rightarrow Problem analysis (causes, symptoms) \rightarrow Approach definition (cures, strategies) \rightarrow Action definition (to do, steps)

2.3.4.4 criteria

develop an objective criteria to measure your negotiation result

as negotiator fall back to personal opinion if no other measure is around, develop one!

Develop, agree upon and apply objective

2.3.4.5 if others are stronger (Other party has a stronger negotiation position)

Protect yourself

with BATNA and bottom line (to be revealed later in the negotiation if needed)

Make the most of your assets

relative negotiation strength is not only defined by resources but by alternatives

2.3.4.6 if other don't play (Other party sticks to positional bargaining)

Hold on to your strategy of focusing on merits

and hope others will see their error

"Negotiation jujitsu"

look behind the other parties' respective intention, or develop options to modify or influence the other parties' position

Get other party to get involved on your behalf

or that introduces the focus on interests, options and criteria

2.3.4.7 if others use dirty tricks (Other party uses "dirty" tricks to throw you off balance)

apply key propositions

over and over again

Redefine "the rules of the game"

over and over again

2.3.4.8 questions

does positional bargaining ever make sense? if effort for integrative solutions is not worth

what if the other side believes in a different standard of fairness? try to understand why and consequently argue for the more appropriate standard should I be fair if I don't have to be? not if you're a dick, and don't care about future interactions

what do I do if the people are the problem? don't get reactive, simply continue with rational behaviour

when does it make sense not to negotiate? always negotiate; it could give you information about the other party. if you have no BATNA you must anyways

adjust my negotiating approach for different cultures? principles stay the same (want to be accepted), but try to analyze others

how do I move from inventing options to making commitment? choose the most important points and keep them always in focus

2.3.4.9 critic of harvard method

Too simplified for complex situations

Not much beyond common sense.

Of no use if a single aspect is being negotiated.

2.3.4.10 concession responds with concession?

self interest (to get something in return),

moral & social obligations (but magnitude must not correspond),

personal stakes (to cease cooperation if refusing to gift other or gift ablehnen),

future of relationship (prolong the relationship)

3 Game Theory

3.1 definition

Game theory can be defined as the study of mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers.

Game theory provides general mathematical techniques for analyzing situations in which two or more individuals make decision that will influence one another's welfare.

Game Theory offers insights of fundamental importance for scholars in all branches of the social sciences, as well as for practical decision-makers.

3.2 secretary problem (choose best candidate, can only reject or accept instantly)

strategy S

reject first j candidates, then take the first which is better than the best of the already rejected ones

let n/e pass by, then start choosing

3.3 game against nature

3.3.1 expected utility optimization (maximize payoff, p is known)

probability multiple with payoff, choose the one action which has highest payout

3.3.2 laplace (p not known)

if no probabilities are known, assume all have same probability

3.3.3 maxmin

choose action which has the highest minimum payoff (pessimist)

3.3.4 maxmax

choose action which has highest maximum payoff (optimist)

3.3.5 hurwicz optimism coefficient

choose p as "optimist parameter" then compute: $p(\text{row max}) + (1-p)(\text{row min})$ and then choose row which has highest average. (realist)

3.3.6 savage minimize regret

take largest payoff for each action, choose action with smallest largest payoff (regret matrix)

how to compute regret matrix

column are random things, rows are choices

for each column choose highest number. for each row of this column,

calculate $\text{maxEntry} - \text{entry}$.

from the resulting matrix, choose highest entry for each row, then choose the row which has the lowest entry

4 Non-cooperative

static games

4.1 zero sum games

sum of payoff in each cell is 0 or constant
interests of players are strictly opposite

4.2 pure strategy

4.2.1 strategies

choose maxmin for safety

maxmin Boris & Sophie are on same cell!

choose maxmax for max payoff, but game will not be safe anymore!

if other player know you play maxmax you may lose horrendously

4.2.2 theorems

maxmin by Neumann

if p1 plays his optimal strategy, the expected gain will always be larger than V

if p2 plays his optimal strategy, the expected loss will be smaller or equal to v

Nash equilibrium

Given the strategies of the other players, decide what maximizes your payoff!

No one has incentive to change strategy unilaterally

there may be games with no nash (and therefore no saddle point) → maxmin not in equilibrium

4.2.3 In maxmin equilibrium (saddle point) we have

build table of payoff only for row player (only one number in each cell)

max column & min row erfüllt für saddle points

4.3 mixed strategy

with probability p Sophie plays A, with (1-p) B

Boris is indifferent how to play if $3p + -1(1-p) = \dots$ etc

4.4 non constant sum game

pareto optimal

no other outcome increases payoff of player and does not decrease payoff of another

pareto improvement

if nash equilibrium is not optimal outcome (but the one the players choose for security), then the improvement is the optimal one, the worse one is

parte inferior

4.5 static games

4.5.1 chicken / hawk-dove game (mobilize/ refrain)

problem

nash equilibrium if (one mobilize / one refrain) → who mobilizes, who refrains?

A,B mobilize refrain

mobilize 0,0 4,2

refrain 2,4 3,3

calculations

A mobilizes with q, B with p

A can not decide if $a = 0q + 4(1-q) = 2q + 3(1-q) = b \rightarrow q$ must be $1/3$, same with B

A payoff = $p \cdot a + (1-p) \cdot b \rightarrow$ A can only influence this by modifying q, so three cases

4.5.2 stag hunt (all catch stag, or traitor catches hare, deer vs rabbit)

4.5.2.1 all play for stag

→ each gets

4.5.2.2 philo background (jean rousseau)

casual association first step of social cooperation → temporary cooperation among humans for a limited purpose

but cooperation is fragile; if it survives "mechanical prudence" is developed → climax in development of language

stag haare

4.5.2.3 stag 3,3 0,2

4.5.2.4 hare 2,0 2,2

4.5.3 arms race

4.6 dynamic games

4.6.1 sequential move

one player moves, then the other one

4.6.2 definitions

subgame

begins at decision node

player knows all decision up until the parent node reached

subtree contains all decision nodes that follow the initial node (and no others)

strategy

a complete plan of actions, for every every point a decision might have to be taken by a player

backward induction, subgame perfect nash equilibrium

start at the bottom, for each node choose the optimal solution each player would take

4.6.3 Repeated simultaneous move games

4.6.3.1 Grim Trigger

cooperate at first

continue till other party stops cooperating

stop now forever

4.6.3.2 tit for tat ("friendly reciprocity")

cooperate at first

repeat what other party has done in last step

strategy is

nice (start with cooperation), retaliation (punish opponent if he is mean), forgiving (stop punish if he is nice), clear (predictable by opponent)

4.7 cooperative games

players talk to each other for mutual benefit

4.7.1 security level strategy

guaranteed payoff for a player if he plays non cooperative

4.7.2 example game 1

4.7.3 rose/colin A B

4.7.4 A 2/6 10/5

4.7.5 B 4/8 0/0

4.7.6 non-cooperative approach

4.7.6.1 maxmin strategy

calculate p_{sec}

example game

$p = 1/3$ because $2 \cdot q + 4 \cdot (1 - q) = 10 \cdot q$

4.7.6.2 security level payoff

result with p_{sec} or logical one

example game

colin has 6 (cause A is his dominant strategy), rose has $10 \cdot p_{\text{sec}} = 10/3$

4.7.6.3 status quo point

where $(\pi(p_{\text{sec}}, \text{colin}), \pi(p_{\text{sec}}, \text{rose}))$ meet

example game

(10/3, 6)

4.7.6.4 negotiation set

draw the graph, all points which are above the security level of both players \rightarrow pareto

4.7.6.5 Nash Bargaining Solution axioms

rationality

solution point must be in negotiaion set (see above how to find it)

linear invariance

if ether rose or colins utility are transformed by a positive, linear function, same should happen to the solution point (skew graphic)

symmetric

if polygon is symetric thorough SQ then solution point will be on that line (if you connect point left bottom and SQ den solution point is on same line)

independence of irrelevant alternatives

suppose there is polygon P which is smaller than the original polygon G \rightarrow solution point is same

4.7.6.6 fair outcome with Nash Bargaining Solution NBS

$\max\{(\pi_r - p_{\text{sec},r}) \cdot (\pi_c - p_{\text{sec},c})\} \rightarrow \pi_r$ are the axis (so arbitrary)

$p_{\text{sec},r}$ is the security level payoff

with conditions

$\pi_r \geq p_{\text{sec},r}$ && $\pi_c > p_{\text{sec},c}$ && the point has to be on the negotiations et line (as seen by graph above)

example game

$\max\{(\pi_r - 10/3) \cdot (\pi_c - 6)\}$

4.8 defntions

Game theory studies mathematical models of conflict and cooperation between intelligent rational decision-makers.

A game consists of a set of players, for each player a set of actions, for each player, preferences over the set of actions (payoffs).

Non-cooperative game

Players decide their decisions individually, without cooperation with the other players.

Cooperative game

Players decide jointly knowing that the implementation of the decision is enforceable.

Static game

A decision is made by each player once and for all, and each player has no knowledge of the decision made by the other players before making his own decision, i.e. decisions are taken simultaneously.

Dynamic game

Players have some knowledge about earlier actions in the game, i.e. decision-making happens sequentially.

Zero-sum (constant-sum) game

the sum of payoffs for each outcome is zero (or another constant), i.e. what you get is what I lose. Examples: dividing surplus.

Non-zero-sum game is a game which is not a zero-sum game.

Examples

“Prisoners’ dilemma”, “Joint project”, etc.

Mixed strategy is a randomization over a combination of pure strategies, i.e. you choose your action according to certain probability distribution.

Pure strategy is one in which there is no randomization.

Dominant strategy is one if regardless of what any other players do, the strategy earns a player a larger (or not smaller) payoff than any other.

Security level strategy is the strategy which guarantees the minimum payoff for a player, when he plays non-cooperatively.

Saddle point is an outcome in a zero-sum game with two players if the entry at that outcome is both less then or equal to any entry in its row (i.e. in payoffs to player 1), and less than or equal to any entry in its column (i.e. in payoffs for player 2).

In Nash Equilibrium, given the strategy adopted by the other player, neither player could do strictly better (i.e. increase his payoff), by adopting another strategy. In a Nash Equilibrium no one has an incentive to deviate unilaterally from the equilibrium strategy. The strategies adopted by players are best responses.

Outcome is Pareto optimal if there is no other outcome that increases the payoff to one player without decreasing payoff to another player.

A Pareto improvement is a measure (change of strategy-combinations) that harms no one and increases the payoff of at least one player. If an outcome is Pareto optimal then no more Pareto improvements are possible.

An outcome is Pareto-inferior if a Pareto improvement is possible.

Nash Bargaining Solution

an arbitration scheme which gives Pareto efficient division of utilities.

4.9 recommendations

Define the key elements of the game

Who are the players?

Which actions and strategies does each player have?

How do the combinations of the strategies played determine the final payoffs?

When you don’t know what to do – think of maximizing your minimal gain!

Never play a dominated strategy

Calculate your and your opponents’ best responses!

Think carefully of your threat strategies to push opponents towards cooperation!

4.10 Benefits and limits of models (applicable if:)

there are at least two players

a player may be an individual, but it may also be a more general entity like a company, a nation, or even a biological species;

each player has a number of possible strategies, i.e. courses of action, which he may choose to follow;

the strategies chosen by each player determine the outcome of the game,

are associated to each possible outcome of the game in a collection of numerical payoffs, one to each player; these payoffs represent the value of the outcome to the different players

4.11 game theory

powerful tool for the generation of insights into problems

high level of abstraction – in order to allow for sensible propositions specifically useful for ex post analysis

5 CHAPTER 3

5.1 definitions

Negotiation

“A formal discussion between people who are trying to reach an agreement.”

Engineering

“The application of science and mathematics by which the properties of

matter [...] are made useful to people.”

5.2 Engineering method

“The strategy for causing the best change in a poorly understood or uncertain situation within the available resources.”

solution oriented

looking for an answer

in relation to existing constraints

evaluating different options

mathematical language

heuristic technique (rule of thumb, strategy, trick, simplification, any other means which reduce time to solve problem)

5.3 Negotiation Engineering

“We understand Negotiation Engineering as the decomposition and formalization of the negotiation problem, where the heuristic application of mathematical methods facilitates the process of reaching an agreement.”
application of engineering reasoning to negotiation

5.3.1 in four steps

decomposition

division in subproblem, reduction of complexity, identify key problems

formalisation

translation of critical problems into mathematical language, reduce problem to its most formal structure

mathematical method

if problem is stated mathematically, we can use: game theory, mathematical optimization, statistics

heuristics

experience based techniques, learning and discovering, optimal not guaranteed (but good enough)

5.3.2 about

puzzling out solution to specific problem

5.3.3 but

does not answer general question

does not concentrate on higher-level factors

6 CHAPTER 4

Conflict

6.1 definition

violent dispute or incompatibility of position

universal feature of society

cannot be eliminated, but violent expressions of it can be solvable!

6.2 elements

parties

individuals, groups, organisations

issues

disagreements over means or/and ends, rewards, content (resources, preferences, nature of relationship, values, beliefs)

environment

structured (institutionalized), unstructures (revolution)

attitudes

cognitive (beliefs), affective (feelings), behavioural (respond readiness)

behaviour

persuasion, coercion (Zwang), reward

6.3 dealing

prevention

management

prevent get worse, minimize suffering, limit escalation, allow interactions between aggressors

containment

violence termination

transformation

transform institution and structures which reproduce violence

settlement

reaching an agreement; forstalls or end armed conflict

resolution

reaching an agreements which solves central incompatibilities, accepts the other parties continued existence & ceases all violence against each other

6.4 mediation

- any action from an uninvolved party to remove problems of negotiation itself

- action undertaken which the target to achieve is to compromise a settlement

- external party who defines the problem and then approaches the aggressors which a solution

→ extension of conflict management, needs outsider, non-coercive, non-binding, non-violent, affects changes influences or stops conflicts

→ mediators have knowledge, ideas, resources, interests

→ based on neutrality, confidentiality, voluntariness

7 CHAPTER 5

7.1 steps of negotiation

recognise / identify problems

explore negotiation principles

get mandate

signing

approval

entry into force

7.2 preparation

explore

problem; other side's position; possibilities

mandate-drafting

ambitious, but possible, should not be needed to be changed on a later date

7.3 each round

what to achieve?

how to proceed?

which follow up?

preps

organization of your team, where, how, protocol

7.4 avoid common mistakes

are you pursuing only to justify an earlier decision?

are you assuming what's good for you is bad for the other or vice versa?

are you irrationally affected by a proposed price?

is there another frame / less accessible information out there?

have you fully thought about the decision of your opponent?

are you sure your fallible judgement is correct?

7.5 formulate positively

Critique → Comment

Debate → Discuss

focus on differences → search for common ground

opposing party → other side

no → yes "while I understand your concern, I would like to emphasize"

7.6 non-verbal

appearance

body language

→ always negotiate face-to-face

7.7 cultural

focus on common things rather than differences

respect, humor & politeness is common in all cultures

learn the other culture, but don't stereotype

be aware of your own culture & how others perceive it

7.8 seating order

according to objective standard, like Age, Alphabet, Hierarchy

7.9 time

use it to reach an agreement as fast as possible, but always leave room to prolong the negotiation

7.10 you

be goal oriented & objective; be intellectually sceptical and distrustful, be polite

8 CASE STUDY Negotiations with and within the EU

8.1 history

1957/62/63

Three different attempts to create an Association-Agreement → all three failed

1973

A Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was finally achieved

1989

Jacques Delors first launches the idea of an EEA

1992

The Swiss people turned down the EEA in a popular vote (50,3%) (probably because it would have been perceived as a loss of sovereignty)

1993 – 1998

Negotiations on Bilateral I

2000 – 2004

Negotiations on Bilateral II

Since 2007

Discussions on institutional framework → no result so far

2014 - 2016

Negotiations on migration came practically to a halt, Brexit context, fall 2015

8.2 The Swiss Bilateral Approach

8.2.1 Goal

legal certainty and market access

8.2.2 Bil 0

Free Trade Agreement (1973)

8.2.3 Bil 1 (2002, linked together)

Free movement of persons (FMP), Technical barriers to trade (MRA), Public procurement markets, Agriculture, Land transport, Air transport

FMP & Agriculture
from EU

Air & Land transport
already existing declarations

the rest
common interest

8.2.4 Bil 2 (2005, not linked)

Schengen/Dublin (erst 2009), Taxation of savings, Combating fraud, Processed agricultural products, Environment, Statistics, MEDIA, Education, Pensions

8.2.5 Bil 3 (?)

dynamic agreements

8.2.6 advantages

legal certainty
better market access
only relevant for chosen sectors
certain level of freedom for not chosen sectors

8.2.7 disadvantages

no full participation in policy
no participation in other sectors
unsatisfied market access demands

8.2.8 all in all

strong de facto integration
good relation through agreements

8.2.9 Constitutional article of 2014

Limiting immigration vs. free movement of persons

Priority of Swiss nationals vs. non discrimination

8.3 case studies

8.3.1 1

Case 1: Land Transport Agreement CH – EU

→ **forderung**

aller internationaler traffic muss auf die schiene, implementierung spielt damit.

approach 1

tarification of too much height; till its economically not viable anymore

approach 2

internatilisisation of cost; EU did not like it

approach 3

formula

8.3.2 2

Case 2: Negotiation Menu (Bilateral II)

CH and EU in the beginning of the “Bilateral II”-negotiation did not agree on the “menu” (i.e. the issues to be negotiated)

CH wanted all 10 issues at the same time

EU wanted only 6 issues in a first phase and, depending upon the outcome in the fraud-dossier, eventually a second phase for the 4 issues

Game Theory decision because EU needed

Savings taxation, Fight against fraud

8.3.3 3

Case 3: Schengen Association Agreement

did not want to allow EU unconditioned rechtshilfesuche

exception included specifically for switzerland for offences in the field of direct taxation which ist not punishable in switzerland

Thanks to the strong demand of the EU in savings taxation and to the tight link between the subjects made by CH → CH succeeded

8.3.4 4

CH – EU Negotiations for the Free Movement of Persons Agreement

8.3.4.1 problem

CH (Introduction of quotas, Priority to Swiss workers) vs EU (Free movement of persons (no quotas), Non-discrimination)

8.3.4.2 solution (declined)

8.3.4.2.1 accompanying measures

reduce demand for foreign employees

Incentive/disincentive system (e.g. taxes) for better use of domestic employees as refugees, elderly, woman | Education/training efforts for rare professions

Accompanying measures which absorb possible negative consequences of immigration

construction law, land-use planning, implementation of binding measures

8.3.4.2.2 Measures for Non-EU member states

Quotas for foreigners and priority of Swiss nationals

8.3.4.2.3 For EU member states

do not violate principle of free movements, but allow for safeguard clause in case of excessive migration (statistical point of view)

formula

$d_i = m + (\alpha_i * \beta_i) * n * \sigma$; d_i : target, m : average relative migration, a_i : stock of EU citizens, b_i : job marked, $n * \sigma$: standard derivation

corrections

$a_i = 1$ iff $a_i > 1$ (→ very few foreigners), $b_i = 1$ iff ($b_i > 1$)

8.3.4.3 solution

inländervorrang light

8.3.5 7

UBS Banking secret

problem

UBS needed to hand out names to the US, and violate either swiss or US law.

Convince US side to negotiate (because of Blocking Order),

how to give client names (creative interpretation of law), how to reach target number due to possible appeals (rebalancing measures)

8.3.6 10

Iran – P5+1* talks

initial conflict

stop nuclear program, guarantee enrichments

basis of solution paper

no preconditions, freeze for freeze, phased approach (informal pre-talks, pre-talks, negotiations)

was ignored, but was basis of talks in 2008

8.3.7 11

Deutsche Bahn train drivers' strike. DB – GDL Bilateral

Wage negotiation

score based approach, put it into map and look for solution in NE