

Algorithmic Game Theory, Spring 2022 Homework 2

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Problem 1. «Harry Potter»

Problem 2. My favorite theorem is Nash's Theorem: Every (finite) game has a Nash equilibrium.

It looks simple but significant. It constructs a reduction from finding an NE to finding a fixed point by using the Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem: Let D be a good (convex, compact) subset of \mathbb{R}^n . If a function $f : D \rightarrow D$ is continuous, then there exists an $x \in D$ such that $f(x) = x$. After this, we construct a well-defined and continuous function f and prove the fixed point is an NE by contradiction. To be honest, I didn't understand the proof of this theorem in the class. Through discussion with other students, which was full of fun of thinking, I finally understood the ingenious way of proving the theorem. The process of figuring it out and its ingenious proof made me love this theorem.

Problem 3.

Proof. First, we construct $a_r(S)$, $r \in [t]$, using its additivity.

$$a_r(S) = \begin{cases} 0 & S = \emptyset \\ v(S_{<j}^{\pi(r)} + \{j\}) - v(S_{<j}^{\pi(r)}) & S = \{j\}, S_{<j}^{\pi(r)} \text{ is a set which contains elements} \\ & \text{before element } j \text{ in arrangement } \pi(r) \\ \sum_{i \in S} a_r(\{i\}) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Then, we prove this equality from two side.

$$(i) \ v(s) \leq \max_{r \in [t]} a_r(s)$$

Let the first $|S| = n$ elements in arrangement $\pi(r)$ be the elements in S .

Assume $S = \{s_1, \dots, s_n\}$, $\pi(r) = \{s_{r_1}, \dots, s_{r_n}\}$.

$$\begin{aligned} a_r(S) &= \sum_{i=1}^n a_r(\{s_i\}) \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^n a_r(\{s_{r_i}\}) \\ &= v(S_{<s_{r_1}}^{\pi(r)} + \{s_{r_1}\}) - v(S_{<s_{r_1}}^{\pi(r)}) + v(S_{<s_{r_2}}^{\pi(r)} + \{s_{r_2}\}) - v(S_{<s_{r_2}}^{\pi(r)}) + \dots + v(S_{<s_{r_n}}^{\pi(r)} + \{s_{r_n}\}) - v(S_{<s_{r_n}}^{\pi(r)}) \\ &= v(\{s_{r_1}\}) - v(\emptyset) + v(\{s_{r_1}, s_{r_2}\}) - v(\{s_{r_1}\}) + \dots + v(\{s_{r_1}, \dots, s_{r_n}\}) - v(\{s_{r_1}, \dots, s_{r_{n-1}}\}) \\ &= v(\{s_{r_1}, \dots, s_{r_n}\}) \\ &= v(S) \\ \therefore \ v(S) &= a_r(S) \leq \max_{r \in [t]} a_r(S) \end{aligned}$$

$$(ii) v(s) \geq \max_{r \in [t]} a_r(s)$$

let $\pi(c)$ be any arrangement but the first $|S|$ elements are in S , and π be any arrangement but those elements same in S must have the same relative position as those in $\pi(c)$.

It is easy to understand that

$$S_{<i}^{\pi(c)} \subseteq S_{<i}^{\pi}$$

From (i) we can know that $v(S) = a_c(S)$, then we try to prove $a_c(S) \geq \max_{r \in [t]} a_r(s)$. Because $a_c(\{i\}) = v(S_{<i}^{\pi(c)} + \{i\}) - v(S_{<i}^{\pi(c)})$, $\forall i \in S$. Then Let $A = S_{<i}^{\pi(c)} + \{i\}$, $B = S_{<i}^{\pi(c)} \cup (S_{<i}^{\pi} - S_{<i}^{\pi(c)})$.

Because v is submodular, so

$$v(A \cup B) + v(A \cap B) \leq v(A) + v(B)$$

$$v(S_{<i}^{\pi} + \{i\}) + v(S_{<i}^{\pi(c)}) \leq v(S_{<i}^{\pi(c)} + \{i\}) + v(S_{<i}^{\pi})$$

$$v(S_{<i}^{\pi(c)} + \{i\}) - v(S_{<i}^{\pi(c)}) \geq v(S_{<i}^{\pi} + \{i\}) - v(S_{<i}^{\pi})$$

$$a_c(\{i\}) \geq v(S_{<i}^{\pi} + \{i\}) - v(S_{<i}^{\pi})$$

$$a_c(\{i\}) \geq a_r(\{i\}), r \in [t]$$

$$\therefore v(S) = a_c(S) = \sum_{i \in S} a_c(\{i\}) \geq \sum_{i \in S} a_r(\{i\}) = a_r(S), r \in [t]$$

$$\therefore v(S) \geq \max_{r \in [t]} a_r(S).$$

$\therefore v(S) = \max_{r \in [t]} a_r(S)$. So, any monotone and normalized submodular function can be written as an XOS function.

Problem 4.

(1) Because the uniform distribution,

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & 0 \leq x \leq 1 \\ 1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$F(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & x < 0 \\ x & 0 \leq x \leq 1 \\ 1 & x > 1 \end{cases}$$

$$\therefore V(q) = F^{-1}(1 - q) = 1 - q, 0 \leq q \leq 1$$

$$\therefore R(q) = V(q) \cdot q = q(1 - q), 0 \leq q \leq 1$$

(2)

Proof.

$$\therefore V(q) = F^{-1}(1 - q)$$

$$\therefore F(V(q)) = 1 - q$$

$$\therefore q = 1 - F(V(q))$$

$$\therefore 1 = -F'(V(q)) \cdot V'(q)$$

$$\therefore V'(q) = -\frac{1}{F'(V(q))}$$

$$\begin{aligned} R'(q) &= (q \cdot V(q))' \\ &= V(q) + q \cdot V'(q) \\ &= V(q) - \frac{q}{F'(V(q))} \\ &= V(q) - \frac{q}{f(V(q))} \\ &= V(q) - \frac{1 - F(V(q))}{f(V(q))} \\ &= \varphi(V(q)) \end{aligned}$$

(3)

Proof. To begin with, I will transform the condition "regular" and "concave" into mathematical language.

"regular": From the definition of regular distribution, we can know that

A distribution F is regular if its virtual valuation function $v - \frac{1-F(v)}{f(v)}$ is non-decreasing in v .

$$\therefore \text{a distribution is regular} \leftrightarrow \frac{d\varphi(v)}{dv} \geq 0$$

$$\text{"concave": the revenue curve is concave} \leftrightarrow \frac{d^2 R(q)}{dq^2} \leq 0$$

$$\begin{aligned} \therefore R'(q) &= \frac{dR(q)}{dq} = \varphi(V(q)) \\ \therefore \frac{d^2 R(q)}{dq^2} &= \frac{d\varphi(V(q))}{dV(q)} \cdot \frac{dV(q)}{dq} \\ \therefore F(V(q)) &= 1 - q \\ \therefore \frac{dF(V(q))}{dq} &= -1 \\ \therefore \frac{dF(V(q))}{dq} &= \frac{dF(V(q))}{dV(q)} \cdot \frac{dV(q)}{dq} \\ \therefore \frac{dF(V(q))}{dV(q)} \cdot \frac{dV(q)}{dq} &= -1 \\ \therefore f(V(q)) \cdot \frac{dV(q)}{dq} &= -1 \\ \therefore f(V(q)) &\geq 0 \\ \therefore \frac{dV(q)}{dq} &\leq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Then, we prove it from two side:

(i) a distribution is regular \rightarrow its revenue curve is concave

$$\therefore \text{the distribution is regular}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \therefore \frac{d\varphi(v)}{dv} \geq 0 \\
& \therefore \frac{d^2 R(q)}{dq^2} = \frac{d\varphi(V(q))}{dV(q)} \cdot \frac{dV(q)}{dq} \\
& \quad \frac{dV(q)}{dq} \leq 0 \\
& \therefore \frac{d^2 R(q)}{dq^2} \leq 0
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the revenue curve is concave.

(ii) a distribution is regular \leftarrow its revenue curve is concave

$$\begin{aligned}
& \therefore \text{the revenue curve is concave} \\
& \therefore \frac{d^2 R(q)}{dq^2} \leq 0 \\
& \therefore \frac{d^2 R(q)}{dq^2} = \frac{d\varphi(V(q))}{dV(q)} \cdot \frac{dV(q)}{dq} \\
& \quad \frac{dV(q)}{dq} \leq 0 \\
& \therefore \frac{d\varphi(V(q))}{dV(q)} \geq 0 \\
& \therefore \frac{d\varphi(v)}{dv} \geq 0
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the distribution is regular.

So, a distribution is regular if and only if its revenue curve is concave.

(4)

Proof. From (3), we can know that the revenue curve is concave.

$$\therefore R(\lambda q_1 + (1 - \lambda)q_2) \geq \lambda R(q_1) + (1 - \lambda)R(q_2) \quad \lambda \in [0, 1]$$

$$q_{max} = \operatorname{argmax}_{q \in [0, 1]} R(q), \quad q_1 = \min(q_{max}, 1 - q_{max}) < q_2 = \max(q_{max}, 1 - q_{max})$$

let $\lambda = \frac{1}{2}$, then

$$\begin{aligned}
R\left(\frac{1}{2}q_1 + \frac{1}{2}q_2\right) & \geq \frac{1}{2}(R(q_1) + R(q_2)) \\
R\left(\frac{1}{2}(q_{max} + 1 - q_{max})\right) & \geq \frac{1}{2}(R(q_{max}) + R(1 - q_{max})) \\
R\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) & \geq \frac{1}{2}(R(q_{max}) + R(1 - q_{max})) \\
& \therefore R(q) = q \cdot F^{-1}(1 - q) \\
& \therefore q, F^{-1}(1 - q) \geq 0 \\
& \therefore R(1 - q_{max}) \geq 0 \\
& \therefore R\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) \geq \frac{1}{2}R(q_{max}) \\
R\left(\frac{1}{2}\right) & \geq \frac{1}{2}\max_{q \in [0, 1]} R(q)
\end{aligned}$$