The Semantics of Transactions and Weak Memory in x86, Power, ARM, and C++

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Abstract

Weak memory models provide a complex, system-centric semantics for concurrent programs, while transactional memory (TM) provides a simpler, programmer-centric semantics. Both have been studied in detail, but their *combined* semantics is not well understood. This is problematic because such widely-used architectures and languages as x86, Power, and C++ all support TM, and all have weak memory models.

Our work aims to clarify the interplay between weak memory and TM by extending existing axiomatic weak memory models (x86, Power, ARMv8, and C++) with new rules for TM. Our formal models are backed by automated tooling that enables (1) the synthesis of tests for validating our models against existing implementations and (2) the model-checking of TM-related transformations, such as lock elision and compiling C++ transactions to hardware. A key finding is that a proposed TM extension to ARMv8 currently being considered within ARM Research is incompatible with lock elision without sacrificing portability or performance.

CCS Concepts • Theory of computation \rightarrow Parallel computing models; Program semantics;

Keywords Shared Memory Concurrency, Weak Memory, Transactional Memory, Program Synthesis

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1 Introduction

Transactional memory [28] (TM) is a concurrent programming abstraction that promises scalable performance without programmer pain. The programmer gathers instructions into *transactions*, and the system guarantees that each appears to be performed entirely and instantaneously, or not

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at all. To achieve this, a typical TM system tracks each transaction's memory accesses, and if it detects a conflict (i.e., another thread concurrently accessing the same location, at least one access being a write), resolves it by aborting the transaction and rolling back its changes.

1.1 Motivating Example: Lock Elision in ARMv8

One important use-case of TM is *lock elision* [22, 46], in which the lock/unlock methods of a mutex are skipped and the critical region (CR) is instead executed speculatively inside a transaction. If two CRs do not conflict, this method allows them to be executed simultaneously, rather than serially. If a conflict is detected, the transaction is rolled back and the system resorts to acquiring the mutex as usual.

Lock elision may not apply to all CRs, so an implementation must ensure mutual exclusion between transactional and non-transactional CRs. This is typically done by starting each transactional CR with a read of the lock variable (and self-aborting if it is taken) [31, §16.2.1]. If the mutex is subsequently acquired by a non-transactional CR then the TM system will detect a conflict on the lock variable and abort the transactional CR.

Thus, reasoning about lock elision requires a concurrency model that accounts for both modes, transactional and non-transactional. In particular, systems with memory models weaker than *sequential consistency* (SC) [39] must ensure that the non-transactional lock/unlock methods synchronise sufficiently with transactions to provide mutual exclusion.

In their seminal paper introducing lock elision, Rajwar and Goodman argued that "correctness is guaranteed without any dependence on memory ordering" [46, §9]. In fact, by drawing on a decade of weak memory formalisations [5, 24, 45] and by extending state-of-the-art tools [4, 40, 55], we show it is straightforward to contradict this claim *automatically*.

Example 1.1 (Lock elision is unsound under ARMv8). Consider the program below, in which two threads use CRs to update a shared location x.

Initially: $[X\emptyset] = x = 0$ lock() LDR W5, $[X\emptyset]$ ADD W5, W5, #2 STR W5, $[X\emptyset]$ $x \leftarrow x + 2$			
lock()		lock()	
LDR W5,[X0]		MOV W7,#1	
ADD W5, W5, #2	$x \leftarrow x + 2$	STR W7, [X0] $x \leftarrow 1$	
STR W5,[X0]		unlock()	
unlock()			
Test: $x = 2$			

It must not terminate with x = 2, for this would violate mutual exclusion. Now, let us instantiate the lock/unlock calls with two possible implementations of those methods.

```
Initially: [X0] = x = 0, [X1] = m = 0
                                                    }begin txn
1 Loop:
                                    3 TXBEGIN
 LDAXR W2, [X1]
                      atomically
                                      LDR W6, [X1]
                                                    lload m
  CBNZ W2, Loop
                      update m
                                      CBZ W6,L1
                                                     and abort
4 MOV W3,#1
                      from 0
                                      TXABORT
                                                     if non-
  STXR W4, W3, [X1]
                      to 1
                                      11:
                                                     zero
  CBNZ W4,Loop
                                      MOV W7,#1
                                                     x \leftarrow 1
2 LDR W5, [X0]
                                      STR W7, [X0]
5 ADD W5, W5, #2
                      x \leftarrow x + 2
                                      TXEND
                                                    } end txn
  STR W5,[X0]
  STLR WZR, [X1]
                      m \leftarrow
                          Test: x = 2
```

The left thread executes its CR non-transactionally, using the recommended ARMv8 spinlock [7, K9.3], while the right thread uses lock elision (with unofficial but representative TM instructions). This program can terminate with x = 2, thus witnessing the unsoundness of lock elision, as follows:

- 1 The left thread reads the lock variable *m* as 0 (free). LDAXR indicates an *acquire* load, which means that the read cannot be reordered with any later event in program-order.
- 2 The left thread reads *x* as 0. This load can execute speculatively because ARMv8 does not require that the earlier store-exclusive (STXR) completes first [45].
- **3** The right thread starts a transaction, sees the lock is still free, updates *x* to 1, and commits its transaction.
- 4 The left thread updates *m* to 1 (taken). This is a store-exclusive (STXR) [36], so it only succeeds if *m* has not been updated since the last load-exclusive (LDAXR). It does succeed, because the right thread only *reads m*.
- 5 Finally, the left thread updates *x* to 2, and *m* to 0. STLR is a *release* store, which means that the update to *m* cannot be reordered with any earlier event in program-order.

The crux of our counterexample is that a (non-transactional) CR can start executing after the lock has been observed to be free, but before it has actually been taken. Importantly, this relaxation is safe if all CRs are mutex-protected (i.e., the spinlock *in isolation* is correct), since every lock acquisition involves writing to the lock variable and at most one store-exclusive can succeed. Rather, the counterexample only arises when this relaxation is *combined* with any reasonable TM extension to ARMv8. This includes a proposed extension currently being considered within ARM Research.

Furthermore, there appears to be no easy fix. Re-implementing the spinlock by appending a DMB fence to the lock() implementation would prevent the problematic reordering, but would also inhibit compatibility with code that uses the ARM-recommended spinlock, and may decrease performance when lock elision is not in use. Otherwise, if software

portability is essential, transactional CRs could be made to write to the lock variable (rather than just read it), but this would induce serialisation, and thus nullify the potential speedup from lock elision.

1.2 Our Work

In this paper, we use formalisation to tame the interaction between TM and weak memory. Specifically, we propose axiomatic models for how transactions behave in x86 [31], Power [29], ARMv8 [7], and C++ [34]. As well as the lock elision issue already explained, our formalisations revealed:

- an ambiguity in the specification of Power TM (§5.2),
- a bug in a register-transfer level (RTL) prototype implementation of ARMv8 TM (§6.2),
- a simplification to the C++ TM proposal (§7.2), and
- that coalescing transactions is unsound in Power (§8.1).

Although TM is conceptually simple, it is notoriously challenging to implement correctly, as exemplified by Intel repeatedly having to disable TM in its processors due to bugs [26, 30], IBM describing adding TM to Power as "arguably the single-most invasive change ever made to IBM's RISC architecture" [1], and the C++ TM Study Group listing "conflict with the C++ memory model and atomics" as one of their hardest challenges [56]. To cope with the combined complexity of transactions and weak memory that exist in real systems, we build on several recent advances in automated tooling to help develop and validate our models. In the x86 and Power cases, we use the SAT-based Memalloy tool [55], extended with an exhaustive enumeration mode à la Lustig et al. [40], to automatically synthesise exactly the 'minimally forbidden' tests (up to a bounded size) that distinguish our TM models from their respective non-TM baselines. We then use the Litmus tool [4] to check that these tests are never observed on existing hardware (i.e., that our models are sound). We also generate a set of 'maximally allowed' tests, which we use to assess the completeness of our models (i.e., how many of the behaviours our models allow are empirically observable).

Moreover, we investigate several properties of our models. For instance, C++ offers 'atomic' transactions and 'relaxed' transactions; we prove that atomic transactions are strongly isolated, and that race-free programs with no non-SC atomics and no relaxed transactions enjoy 'transactional SC'. Other properties of our models we verify up to a bound using Memalloy; these are that introducing, enlarging, or coalescing transactions introduces no new behaviours, and that C++ transactions compile soundly to x86, Power, and ARMv8.

Finally, we show how Memalloy can be used to check a library implementation against its specification by encoding it as a program transformation. We apply our technique to check that x86 and Power lock elision libraries correctly implement mutual exclusion – but that this is not so, as we have seen, in ARMv8.

Summary Our contributions are as follows:

- a fully-automated toolflow for generating tests from an axiomatic memory model and using them to validate the model's soundness, its completeness, and its metatheoretical properties (§4);
- formalisations of TM in the SC (§3), x86 (§5), Power (§5), ARMv8 (§6), and C++ (§7) memory models;
- proofs that the transactional C++ memory model guarantees strong isolation for atomic transactions, and transactional SC for race-free programs with no non-SC atomics or non-atomic transactions (§7);
- the automatic, bounded verification of transactional monotonicity and compilation from C++ transactions to hardware (§8); and
- a technique for validating lock elision against hardware TM models, which is shown to be effective through the discovery of the serious flaw of Example 1.1 (§8).

Companion Material We provide all the models we propose (in the .cat format [5]), the automatically-generated litmus tests used to validate our models, litmus tests corresponding to all the executions discussed in our paper, and Isabelle proofs of all statements marked with the symbol.

2 Background: Axiomatic Memory Models

Here we give the necessary background on the formal framework we use for reasoning about programs, which is standard across several recent works [5, 40, 55].

A *memory model* defines how threads interact with shared memory. An *axiomatic* memory model consists of constraints (i.e., axioms) on *candidate executions*. An execution is a graph representing a runtime behaviour, whose structure is defined below. The candidate executions of a program are obtained by assuming a non-deterministic memory system: each load can observe a store from anywhere in the program. After filtering away the candidates that fail the constraints, we are left with the *consistent* executions; i.e., those that are allowed in the presence of the actual memory system.

2.1 Executions

Let X be the set of all executions. Each execution is a graph whose vertices, E, represent runtime memory-related events and whose labelled edges represent various relations between them. The events are partitioned into R, W, and F, the sets of read, write, and fence events. Events in an execution are connected by the following relations:

• po, program order (a.k.a. sequenced-before);




Figure 1. An execution and its litmus test

- addr/ctrl/data, an address/control/data dependency;
- rmw, to indicate read-modify-write operations;
- *sloc*, between events that access the same location;
- rf, the 'reads-from' relation; and
- *co*, the 'coherence' order in which writes hit memory.

We restrict our attention to executions that are *well-formed* as follows: *po* forms, for each thread, a strict total order over that thread's events; *addr*, *ctrl*, and *data* are within *po* and always originate at a read; *rmw* links the read of an RMW operation to its corresponding write; *rf* connects writes to reads accessing the same location, with no read having more than one incoming *rf* edge; and *co* connects writes to the same location and forms, for each location, a strict total order over the writes to that location.

Notation Given a relation r, r^{-1} is its inverse, $r^?$ is its reflexive closure, r^+ is its transitive closure, and r^* is its reflexive transitive closure. We use \neg for the complement of a set or relation, implicitly with respect to the set of all events or event pairs in the execution. We write ';' for relational composition: r_1 ; $r_2 = \{(x,z) \mid \exists y.(x,y) \in r_1 \land (y,z) \in r_2\}$. We write [-] to lift a set to a relation: $[s] = \{(x,x) \mid x \in s\}$. To restrict a relation r to being inter-thread or intra-thread, we use $r_e = r \setminus (po \cup po^{-1})^*$ or $r_i = r \cap (po \cup po^{-1})^*$, respectively. Similarly, $r_{loc} = r \cap sloc$.

Derived Relations The from-read (fr) relation relates each read event to all the write events on the same location that are co-later than the write the read observed [40]. The com relation captures three ways events can 'communicate' with each other.

$$fr = ([R]; sloc; [W]) \setminus (rf^{-1}; (co^{-1})^*)$$
$$com = rf \cup co \cup fr$$

Visualising Executions We represent executions using diagrams like the one in Fig. 1 (left). Here, the *po*-edges separate the execution's events into two threads, each drawn in one column. Each event is labelled with the sets it belongs to, such as R and W. We use location names such as x to identify the sloc-classes.

2.2 From Executions to Litmus Tests

In order to test whether an execution of interest is observable in practice, it is necessary to convert it into a *litmus test* (i.e., a program with a postcondition) [18]. This litmus test is constructed so that the postcondition only passes when the particular execution of interest has been taken [3, 55].

¹ We encode fences as *events* (rather than edges) because this simplifies execution minimisation (§4.2). We then derive architecture-specific fence relations that connect events separated by fence events, which we use in our models and execution graphs.




Figure 2. A transactional execution and its litmus test

As an example, the execution on the left of Fig. 1 corresponds to the pseudocode litmus test on the right. Read events become loads, writes become stores, and the *po*-edges induce the order of instructions and their partitioning into threads. To ensure that the litmus test passes only when the intended rf-edges are present, we arrange that each store writes a unique non-zero value, and then check that each local register holds the value written by the store it was intended to observe – this corresponds to the r0 = 2 in the postcondition. To ensure that the intended *co*-edges are present, we check the final value of each memory location – this corresponds to the x = 2 in the postcondition.²

3 Axiomatising Transactions

Transactional memory (TM) can be provided either at the architecture level (x86, Power, ARMv8) or in software (C++). Since we are concerned only with the *specification* of TM, and not its implementation, we can formalise both forms within a unified framework. In this section, we describe how program executions can be extended to express transactions (§3.1) and how we can derive litmus tests to test for these executions (§3.2). We then propose axioms for capturing the *isolation* of transactions (§3.3), and for strengthening the SC memory model to obtain *transactional* SC (§3.4).

3.1 Transactional Executions

To enable transactions in an axiomatic memory modelling framework, we extend executions with an *stxn* relation that relates events in the same successful (i.e., committed) transaction. For an execution to be well-formed, *stxn* must be a partial equivalence relation (i.e., symmetric and transitive), and each *stxn*-class must coincide with a contiguous subset of *po*. When generating the candidate executions of a program with transactions, each transaction is assumed to succeed or fail non-deterministically. That is, each either gives rise to a *stxn*-class of events, or vanishes as a no-op.

Diagrammatically, we represent stxn using (boxes.) For instance, events a and b in Fig. 2 form a successful transaction.




Figure 3. Four SC executions that are allowed by weak isolation but forbidden by strong isolation

Remark 3.1. To study the behaviour of unsuccessful transactions in more detail, one could add an explicit representation of them in executions, perhaps using dashed boxes. However, the behaviour of unsuccessful transactions is tricky to ascertain on hardware because of the rollback mechanism. Moreover, it is unclear how they should interact with *co*, since *co* is the order in which writes hit the memory, which writes in unsuccessful transactions never do.

3.2 From Transactional Executions to Litmus Tests

A transactional execution can be converted into a litmus test by extending the construction of §2.2. As an example, the execution on the left of Fig. 2 corresponds to the litmus test on the right. The instructions in the transaction simply need enclosing in instructions that begin and end a transaction. We write these as txbegin and txend here; our tooling specialises these for each target architecture. The postcondition checks that the transaction succeeded using the 'ok' location, which is zeroed in the transaction's fail-handler, L_{fail}, the label of which is provided with the txbegin instruction.

3.3 Weak and Strong Isolation

We now explain how the *isolation* property of transactions can be captured as a property of an execution graph. A TM system provides *weak* isolation if transactions are isolated from other transactions; that is, their intermediate state cannot affect or be affected by other transactions [12, 27]. It provides *strong* isolation if transactions are also isolated from non-transactional code.

The four 3-event SC executions in Fig. 3 illustrate the difference between strong and weak isolation. In each, the interfering event would need to be within a transaction to be forbidden by weak isolation; strong isolation does not make this distinction. Executions (a) and (d) correspond to what Blundell et al. call *non-interference* and *containment*, respectively, and (b) is similar to the standard axiom for RMW isolation (cf. RMWIsol in Fig. 5).

Failures of isolation can be characterised as communication cycles between transactions. To define these cycles, the following constructions are useful:

weaklift
$$(r, t) = t; (r \setminus t); t$$

stronglift $(r, t) = t^{?}; (r \setminus t); t^{?}.$

² When there are more than two writes to a location, extra constraints on executions are needed to fix all the *co*-edges [55].

acyclic(hb)	where $hb = po \cup com$	(Order)
acyclic(stro	(TxnOrder)	

Figure 4. SC axioms [49], with TSC extensions highlighted

If r relates events e_1 and e_2 in different transactions, then weaklift(r, stxn) relates all the events in e_1 's transaction to all those in e_2 's transaction. The stronglift version also includes edges where the source and/or the target event are not in a transaction. Weak and strong isolation can then be axiomatised by treating all the events in a transaction as a single event whenever the transaction communicates with another transaction (WeakIsol) or any other event (StrongIsol).

acyclic(weaklift(com, stxn))(WEAKISOL)acyclic(stronglift(com, stxn))(STRONGISOL)

3.4 Transactional Sequential Consistency

Although isolation is a critical property for transactions, it only provides a lower bound on the guarantees that real architectures provide. Meanwhile, an upper bound on the guarantees provided by a reasonable TM implementation is *transactional sequential consistency* (TSC) [19]. The models we propose in §5–7 all lie between these bounds.

TSC is a strengthening of the SC memory model in which consecutive events in a transaction must appear consecutively in the overall execution order. Where SC can be characterised axiomatically (Fig. 4) by forbidding cycles in program order and communication (ORDER) [49], we can obtain TSC by additionally forbidding such cycles between transactions and non-transactional events (TXNORDER). Note that TXNORDER subsumes the STRONGISOL axiom.

4 Methodology

We identify three components of a memory modelling methodology: (1) developing and refining axioms, (2) synthesising and running conformance tests, and (3) checking metatheoretical properties. In this section, we explain our approach to each of these components, and in particular, how we have extended the Memalloy tool [55] to support each task.

Background on *Memalloy* The original Memalloy tool, built on top of Alloy [35], was developed for comparing memory models. It takes two models (say, M and N), and searches for a single execution that distinguishes them (i.e., is inconsistent under M but consistent under N). Additionally, if Memalloy is supplied with a translation on executions (e.g., representing a compiler mapping or a compiler optimisation), then it searches for a witness that the translation is unsound. This translation is defined by a relation, typically named π , from 'source' events to 'target' events.

4.1 Developing and Refining Axioms

For each model, we make a first attempt at a set of axioms using information obtained from specifications, programming manuals, research papers, and discussions with designers. Then, for each proposed change to the model, we use Memalloy to generate tests that become disallowed or allowed as a result. We decide whether to accept the change based on discussing these tests with designers, and running them on existing hardware (where available) using the Litmus tool [4].

In order to extend Memalloy to support the development of transactional memory models in this way, we augmented the form of executions as described in §3.1, and modified the litmus test generator as described in §3.2.

4.2 Synthesising and Running Conformance Tests

To build confidence in a model, we compare the behaviours it admits against those allowed by the architecture or language being modelled. It is vital that no behaviour allowed by the architecture/language is forbidden by the model, so we exhaustively generate all litmus tests (up to a bounded size) that our model forbids, and confirm using Litmus that none can be observed on existing hardware.

To achieve this, we extended Memalloy with a mode for exhaustively generating conformance tests for a given model M. The key to exhaustive generation is a suitable notion of *minimality*, without which we would obtain an infeasibly large number of tests. We closely follow Lustig et al. [40], and define execution minimality with respect to the following partial order between executions. Let $X \subset Y$ hold when execution X can be obtained from execution Y by:

- (i) removing an event (plus any incident edges),
- (ii) removing a dependency edge (addr, ctrl, data, rmw), or
- (iii) downgrading an event (e.g. reducing an acquire-read to a plain read in ARMv8).

We then calculate the set min-inconsistent(M) = $\{X \in \mathbb{X} \mid X \notin \text{consistent}(M) \land \forall X' \sqsubset X.X' \in \text{consistent}(M)\}.$

Extending Memalloy to support the synthesis of transactional conformance tests requires minimality to take transactions into account. To do this, we arrange that $X \sqsubset Y$ also holds when X can be obtained from Y by:

(v) making the first or last event in a transaction non-transactional (i.e. removing all of its incident *stxn* edges).

(We avoid the 'middle' of a transaction so as not to create noncontiguous transactions and hence ill-formed executions.)

Remark 4.1. While this is a slightly coarse notion of minimality – a more refined version would also allow a large transaction to be chopped into two smaller ones – it is cheap to implement in the constraint solver as it only requires quantification over a single event. As a result, Memalloy may generate some executions that appear non-minimal, but as we show in §5.3, this does not impede our ability to generate and run large batches of conformance tests.

Generating Allowed Tests Having generated the minimally-forbidden tests, the question naturally arises of whether we can generate the *maximally-allowed* tests too. Where the minimally-forbidden tests include just enough fences/dependencies/transactions to be forbidden (and failing to observe these tests empirically suggests that the model is not too strong), the maximally-allowed tests include just *not* enough (and observing them suggests that the model is not too weak). We found the maximally-allowed tests valuable for communicating with engineers about the detailed relaxations permitted by our models. However, in our experiments, allowed tests are less conclusive than forbidden ones, because where the observation of a forbidden test implies that the model is unsound, the non-observation of an allowed test may be caused by not performing enough runs, or by the machine under test being implemented conservatively.

Moreover, the notion of execution maximality is not as natural as minimality. For instance, an inconsistent execution is only considered minimally-inconsistent if *removing* any event makes it *consistent*, yet it is not sensible to deem a consistent execution maximally-consistent only when *adding* any event makes it *inconsistent* – such a condition is almost impossible to satisfy. Even with event addition/removal set aside, maximal-consistency tends to require executions to be littered with redundant fences and dependencies.

Therefore, we approximate the maximally-consistent executions as those obtained via a single \sqsubset -step from a minimally-inconsistent execution. That is, we let \max -consistent(M) = $\{X \in \mathbb{X} \mid \exists Y \in \min$ -inconsistent(M). $X \sqsubset Y\}$.

4.3 Checking Metatheoretical Properties

As explained at the start of this section, Memalloy is able to validate transformations between two memory models, providing they can be encoded as a π -relation between executions. In §8, we exploit this ability to check several TM-related transformations and compiler mappings.

In fact, Memalloy can also be used to check libraries under weak memory. Prior work has (manually) verified that stack, queue, and barrier libraries implement their specifications under weak memory models [8, 52]; here we show how checking these types of properties can be automated up to a bounded number of library and client events. We see this as a straightforward first-step towards a general verification effort. The idea, which we apply to a lock elision library in §8.3, is to treat the replacement of the library's specification with its implementation as a program transformation. To do this, we first extend executions with events that represent method calls. Second, we extend execution well-formedness so that illegal call sequences (such as popping from an empty stack) are rejected. Third, we strengthen the memory model's consistency predicate with axioms capturing the library's obligations (such as pops never returning data from later pushes). Finally, we constrain π so that it maps each method

Figure 5. x86 consistency axioms [5], with our TM additions highlighted

call to an event sequence representing the implementation of that method.

5 Transactions in x86 and Power

Over the next three sections, we show how our methodology can be applied to four different targets. We begin with x86 and Power, which have both supported TM since 2013 [15, 32]. Intel's Transactional Synchronisation Extensions (TSX) provide XBEGIN, XEND, and XABORT instructions for starting, committing, and aborting transactions, while Power provides tbegin, tend, and tabort.

5.1 Background: the x86 and Power Memory Models

Both the x86 memory model [44] and the Power memory model [5, 47, 48] allow certain instructions to execute out of program order, with x86 allowing stores to be reordered with later loads and Power allowing many more relaxations. Both architectures provide fences (MFENCE in x86, and 1wsync, sync, and isync in Power) to allow these relaxations to be controlled. The x86 architecture provides atomic RMWs via LOCK-prefixed instructions, while Power implements RMWs using *exclusive* instructions like those seen in Example 1.1. Moreover, x86 is *multicopy-atomic* [18], which means that writes are propagated to all other threads simultaneously. Power does not have this property, so its memory model includes explicit axioms to describe how writes propagate.

More formally, we extend executions with relations that connect events in program order that are separated by a fence event of a given type. For x86, we add an *mfence* relation, and for Power, we add *isync*, *lwsync*, and *sync*.

An x86 execution is consistent if it satisfies all of the axioms in Fig. 5 (ignoring the highlighted regions for now). The Coherence axiom forbids cycles in communication edges and program order among events on the same location; this guarantees programs that use only a single location to have SC semantics. Happens-before (hb) imposes the event-ordering constraints upon which all threads must agree, and Order ensures that hb^* is a partial order. The constraints

```
acyclic(po_{loc} \cup com)
                                                  (Coherence)
                                                    (RMWIsoL)
empty(rmw \cap (fr_e; co_e))
acyclic(hb)
                                                        (ORDER)
     where ppo = (preserved program order, elided)
         tfence = po \cap ((\neg stxn; stxn) \cup (stxn; \neg stxn))
           fence = sync \cup tfence \cup (lwsync \setminus (W \times R))
             ihb = ppo \cup fence
            thb = (rf_e \cup ((fr_e \cup co_e)^*; ihb))^*; (fr_e \cup co_e)^*; rf_e^?
              hb = (rf_e^?; ihb; rf_e^?) \cup weaklift(thb, stxn)
acyclic(co \cup prop)
                                               (PROPAGATION)
 where efence = rf_e?; fence; rf_e?
          prop_1 = [W]; efence; hb^*; [W]
          prop_2 = com_e^*; efence^*; hb^*; (sync \cup tfence); hb^*
          tprop_1 = rf_e; stxn; [W]
         tprop_2 = stxn; rf_e
           prop = prop_1 \cup prop_2 \cup tprop_1 \cup tprop_2
irreflexive(fr_e; prop; hb^*)
                                                (Observation)
acyclic(stronglift(com, stxn))
                                                  (STRONGISOL)
acyclic(stronglift(hb, stxn))
                                                   (TXNORDER)
empty(rmw \cap tfence^*)
                                         (TxnCancelsRMW)
```

Figure 6. Power consistency axioms [5], with our TM additions highlighted, and some details elided for brevity.

on hb arise from: fences placed by the programmer (mfence), fences created implicitly by LOCK'd operations (implied), the preserved fragment of the program order (ppo), inter-thread observations (rf_e) and communication edges (fr and co).

A Power execution is consistent if it satisfies all the axioms in Fig. 6 (again, ignoring the highlights). The first axiom not already seen is Order, which ensures that happens-before (hb) is acyclic. In contrast to x86, the happens-before relation in Power is formed from inter-thread observations (rf_e) , the preserved fragment of the program order (ppo), and fences (fence). We elide the definition of ppo as it is complex and unchanged by our TM additions. The prop relation governs how fences restrict "the order in which writes propagate" [5], and the Propagation axiom ensures that this relation does not contradict the coherence order. Observation governs which writes a read can observe: if e_1 propagates before e_2 , then any read that happens after e_2 is prohibited from observing a write that precedes e_1 in coherence order.

5.2 Adding Transactions

To extend the x86 and Power memory models to support TM, we make the following amendments, each highlighted in Figs. 5 and 6.

Strong Isolation (x86 and Power) The Power manual says that transactions "appear atomic with respect to both transactional and non-transactional accesses performed by other

threads" [29, §5.1], and the TSX manual defines conflicts not just between transactions, but between a transaction and "another logical processor" (which is not required to be executing a transaction) [31, §16.2]. We interpret these statements to mean that x86 and Power transactions provide *strong* isolation, so we add our STRONGISOL axiom from §3.3.

Implicit Transaction Fences (x86 and Power) In both x86 and Power, fences are created at the boundaries of successful transactions. In x86, "a successfully committed [transaction] has the same ordering semantics as a LOCK prefixed instruction" [31, §16.3.6], and in Power, "[a] tbegin instruction that begins a successful transaction creates a [cumulative] memory barrier", as does "a tend instruction that ends a successful transaction" [29, §1.8]. Hence, we define tfence as the program-order edges that enter ($\neg stxn$; stxn) or exit (stxn; $\neg stxn$) a successful transaction, and add tfence alongside the existing fence relations (mfence and sync).

Transaction Atomicity (x86 and Power) We extend the prohibition on *hb* cycles among events to include cycles among transactions (TxnOrder). This essentially treats all the transaction's events as one indivisible event, and is justified by the atomicity guarantee given to transactions, which in x86 is "that all memory operations [...] appear to have occurred instantaneously when viewed from other logical processors" [31, §16.2], and in Power is that each successful transaction "appears to execute as an atomic unit as viewed by other processors and mechanisms" [29, §1.8].

Barriers within Transactions (Power only) Each transaction contains an "integrated memory barrier", which ensures that writes observed by a successful transaction are propagated to other threads before writes performed by the transaction itself [29, §1.8]. This behaviour is epitomised by the WRC-style execution below [15, Fig. 6],

which must be ruled out because the transaction's write (c) has propagated to the third thread before a write (a) that the transaction observed. We capture this constraint by extending the prop relation so that it connects any write observed by a transaction to any write within that transaction ($tprop_1$). In execution (1), this puts a prop edge from a to c. The execution is thus forbidden by the existing Observation axiom.

Remark 5.1. The following executions are similar to (1), and like (1), they could not be observed empirically. However, the Power manual is ambiguous about whether they should be forbidden.

In particular, because the transactions are read-only, we cannot appeal to the integrated memory barrier. We have reported this ambiguity to IBM architects, and while we await a clarified specification, our model errs on the side of caution by permitting these executions.

Propagation of Transactional Writes (Power only) Although Power is not multicopy-atomic in general, transactional writes are multicopy-atomic; that is, the architecture will "propagate the transactional stores fully before committing the transaction" [15, §4.2]. This behaviour is epitomised by another **WRC**-style execution, in which the middle thread sees the transactional write to x before the right thread does.

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
 & a: Wx \\
\hline
 & rf \\
\hline
 & ppo \\
\hline
 & rf \\
\hline
 & e: Rx \\
\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
 & d: Ry \\
\hline
 & ppo \\
\hline
 & e: Rx \\
\end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c|c}
 & (2) \\
\end{array}$$

To rule out such executions, it suffices to extend the *prop* relation with reads-from edges that exit a transaction ($tprop_2$), and then to invoke Observation again.

Read-modify-writes (Power only) In Power, when a store-exclusive is separated from its corresponding load-exclusive by "a state change from Transactional to Non-transactional or Non-transactional to Transactional", the RMW operation will always fail [29, §1.8]. Therefore, the TxnCancelsRMW axiom ensures that no consistent execution has an *rmw* edge crossing a transaction boundary.

Transaction Ordering (Power only) The Power manual states that "successful transactions are serialised in some order", and that it is impossible for contradictions to this order to be observed [29, p. 824].

We capture this constraint by extending the hb relation to include a new thb relation between transactions. The thb relation imposes constraints on the order in which transactions can be serialised. By including it in hb and requiring thb to be a partial order, we guarantee the existence of a suitable transaction serialisation order, without having to construct this order explicitly.

The definition of the *thb* relation is a little convoluted, but the intuition is quite straightforward: it contains all nonempty chains of intra-thread happens-before edges (*ihb*) and inter-thread communication edges (com_e), except those that contain an fr_e or co_e edge followed by an rf_e edge that does not terminate the chain. The rationale for excluding fr_e ; rf_e and co_e ; rf_e chains is that these do not provide ordering in a non-multicopy-atomic architecture. That is, from

$$a \xrightarrow{fr_e} b \xrightarrow{rf_e} c$$
 or $a \xrightarrow{co_e} b \xrightarrow{rf_e} c$

we cannot deduce that a happens before c, because this behaviour can also be attributed to the write b being propagated to c's thread before a's thread.

Table 1. Testing our transactional x86 and Power models

Arch.	E	E Synthesis time (s)	Forbid			Allow		
			T	S	¬S	T	S	¬S
x86	2	4	0	0	0	2	2	0
	3	22	4	0	4	24	23	1
	4	87	22	0	22	99	99	0
	5	260	42	0	42	249	244	5
	6	4402	133	0	133	895	832	63
	7	>7200	307	0	307	2457	1901	556
		Total (x86):	508	0	508	3726	3101	625
Power	2	13	2	0	2	7	7	0
	3	58	9	0	9	44	44	0
	4	318	60	0	60	184	175	9
	5	9552	353	0	353	1517	1330	187
	6	>7200	922	0	922	5043	4407	636
Total (Power):		1346	0	1346	6795	5963	832	

Cain et al. epitomise the transaction-ordering constraint using the **IRIW**-style execution reproduced below [15, Fig. 5].

The execution must be disallowed because different threads observe incompatible transaction orders: the second thread observes a before f, but the third observes f before f. Our model disallows this execution on the basis of a f cycle between the two transactions.

We must be careful not to overgeneralise here, because a behaviour similar to (3) but with only *one* write transactional was observed during our empirical testing, and is duly allowed by our model.

5.3 Empirical Testing

Table 1 gives the results obtained using our testing strategy from §4.2. We use Memalloy to synthesise litmus tests that are forbidden by our transactional models but allowed under the non-transactional baselines (the Forbid set), up to a bounded number of events (|E|). We then derive the **Allow** sets by relaxing each test. We report synthesis times on a 4-core Haswell i7-4771 machine with 32GB RAM, using a timeout of 2 hours. For both sets we give the number of tests (T) found; we say this number is complete if synthesis did not reach timeout and non-exhaustive otherwise. We say a test is seen (S) if it is observed on any implementation, and not seen (¬S) otherwise. Each x86 test is run 1M times on four TSX implementations: a Haswell (i7-4771), a Broadwell-Mobile (i7-5650U), a Skylake (i7-6700), and a Kabylake (i7-7600U). Each Power test is run 10M times on an 80-core POWER8 (TN71-BP012) machine. When testing this machine, we use Litmus's affinity parameter [4], which places threads




Figure 7. The distribution of synthesis times for the 7-event x86 **Forbid** tests

incrementally across the logical processors to encourage **IRIW**-style behaviours.

We were able to generate the complete set of x86 Forbid executions that have up to 6 events, and the complete set of Power Forbid executions up to 5 events. Regarding these bounds: we remark that since our events only represent memory accesses and fences (not, for instance, starting or committing transactions), we can capture many interesting behaviours with relatively few events. For instance, these bounds are large enough to include all the executions discussed in this section.

Of our 508 x86 **Forbid** tests, 29% had one transaction, 44% had two, and 27% had three, and of the 1346 Power **Forbid** tests, 29% had one transaction, 54% had two, and 17% had three. No **Forbid** test was empirically observable on either architecture, which gives us confidence that our models are not too strong. Of the x86 **Allow** tests, 83% could be observed on at least one implementation, as could 88% of the Power **Allow** tests; this provides some evidence that our models are not excessively weak. Many of the unobserved Power **Allow** tests are based on the load-buffering (**LB**) shape, which has never actually been observed on a Power machine, even without transactions [6].

Increasing the timeout to 48 hours is sufficient to generate the complete set of x86 **Forbid** executions for 7 events. It takes 34 hours for Memalloy to find all 313 tests. Figure 7 shows how the percentage of executions found is affected by various caps on the synthesis time. We observe that many tests are found quickly: 98% of the tests are found within 2 hours (i.e., 6% of the total synthesis time), and all of the tests are found within 9 hours (the remaining synthesis time is used to confirm that there are no further tests). During the development process, we exploited this observation to obtain preliminary test results more rapidly.

6 Transactions in ARMv8

The ARMv8 memory model sits roughly between x86 and Power. Like x86, it is multicopy-atomic [45], but like Power, it permits several relaxations to the program order. Unwanted relaxations can be inhibited either using barriers (DMB, DMB LD, DMB ST, ISB) or using *release/acquire* instructions (LDAR, STLR) that act like one-way fences.

```
(COHERENCE)
acyclic(po_{loc} \cup com)
acyclic(ob)
                                                   (ORDER)
 where dob = (order imposed by dependencies, elided)
         aob = (order imposed by atomic RMWs, elided)
         bob = (order imposed by barriers, elided)
      tfence = po \cap ((\neg stxn; stxn) \cup (stxn; \neg stxn))
          ob = com_e \cup dob \cup aob \cup bob \cup tfence
empty(rmw \cap (fr_e; co_e))
                                                (RMWIsol)
acyclic(stronglift(com, stxn))
                                              (STRONGISOL)
acyclic(stronglift(ob, stxn))
                                              (TXNORDER)
empty(rmw \cap tfence^*)
                                      (TxnCancelsRMW)
```

Figure 8. ARMv8 consistency axioms [7, 21], with our TM additions highlighted, and some details elided for brevity.

Formally, ARMv8 executions are obtained by adding six extra fields: *Acq* and *Rel*, which are the sets of acquire and release events, and *dmb/dmbld/dmbst/isb*, which relate events in program order that are separated by barriers.

An ARMv8 execution is consistent if it satisfies all of the axioms in Fig. 8 (ignoring the highlighted regions). We have seen the Coherence and RMWIsol axioms already. The ordered-before relation (ob) plays the same role as happensbefore in x86: it imposes the event-ordering constraints upon which all threads must agree, and must be free from cycles (Order). These constraints arise from communication (com_e), dependencies (dob), atomic RMWs (aob), and barriers (bob).

6.1 Adding Transactions

The ARMv8 architecture does not support TM, so the extensions proposed below (highlighted in Fig. 8) are unofficial. Nonetheless, the extensions we give are based upon a proposal currently being considered within ARM Research and upon extensive conversations with ARM architects.

- StrongIsol is a natural choice for hardware TM.
- As in x86 and Power, we place implicit fences (tfence) at the boundaries of successful transactions.
- We bring the TxnOrder axiom from x86 and Power to forbid *ob*-cycles among transactions.
- Like Power, ARMv8 has exclusive instructions, so it inherits the TxnCancelsRMW axiom to ensure the failure of RMWs that straddle a transaction boundary.

6.2 Empirical Testing

ARM hardware does not support TM so we cannot test our model as we did for x86 and Power. However, we generated the **Forbid** and **Allow** suites anyway, and gave them to ARM architects. They were able to use these to reveal a bug (specifically, a violation of the TxnOrder axiom) in a register-transfer level (RTL) prototype implementation.

```
irreflexive(hb; com*)
                                                        (НвСом)
  where sw = (synchronises-with, elided)
       ecom = com \cup (co; rf)
         tsw = weaklift(ecom, stxn)
          hb = (sw \cup tsw \cup po)^+
empty(rmw \cap (fr_e; co_e))
                                                     (RMWIsoL)
\mathbf{acyclic}(po \cup rf)
                                                   (NoThinAir)
acyclic(psc)
                                                        (SEQCST)
 where psc = (constraints on SC events, elided)
empty(cnf \setminus Ato^2 \setminus (hb \cup hb^{-1}))
                                                       (Norace)
 where cnf = ((W \times W) \cup (R \times W) \cup (W \times R)) \cap sloc \setminus id
```

Figure 9. C++ consistency and race-freedom axioms [38], with our TM additions highlighted, and some details elided.

7 Transactions in C++

We now turn our attention from hardware to software. TM is supported in C++ via an ISO technical specification that has been under development by the C++ TM Study Group since 2012 [34, 50]. In this section, we formalise how the proposed TM extensions interact with the existing C++ memory model, and detail a possible simplification to the specification.

C++ TM offers two main types of transactions: *relaxed transactions* (written synchronized{...}) can contain arbitrary code, but only promise weak isolation, while *atomic transactions* (written atomic{...}) promise strong isolation but cannot contain certain operations, such as atomic operations [34, §8.4.4]. Some atomic transactions can be aborted by the programmer, but we do not support these in this paper.

7.1 Background: the C++ Memory Model

Our presentation of the baseline C++ memory model follows Lahav et al. [38]. We choose to build on their formalisation because it incorporates a fix that allows correct compilation to Power – without this, we could not check the compilation of C++ transactions to Power transactions (§8.2).

C++ executions identify four additional subsets of events: *Ato* contains the events from atomic operations, while *Acq*, *Rel*, and *SC* contain events from atomic operations that use the acquire, release, and SC consistency modes [33, §29.3].

Unlike the architecture-level memory models, the C++ memory model defines *two* predicates on executions (Fig. 9). The first characterises the *consistent* candidate executions. If any consistent execution violates a second *race-freedom* predicate, then the program is completely undefined. Otherwise, the allowed executions are the consistent executions.

A C++ execution is consistent if it satisfies all of the consistency axioms given at the top of Fig. 9 (ignoring highlighted regions for now). The first, HBCOM, governs the happensbefore relation, which is constructed from the program order and the *synchronises-with* relation (*sw*). Roughly speaking,

an *sw* edge is induced when an acquire read observes a release write; but it also handles fences and the 'release sequence' [9, 38]. The second axiom is standard for capturing the isolation of RMW operations. The NoThinair axiom is Lahav et al.'s solution to C++'s 'thin air' problem [10]. Finally, SEQCST forbids certain cycles among *SC* events; we omit its definition as it does not interact with our TM extensions.

A consistent C++ execution is race-free if it satisfies the NoRace axiom at the bottom of Fig. 9, which states that whenever two conflicting (*cnf*) events in different threads are not both atomic, they must be ordered by happens-before.

7.2 Adding Transactions

The specification for C++ TM makes two amendments to the C++ memory model: one for data races, and one for transactional synchronisation.

Transactions and Data Races The definition of a race is unchanged in the presence of TM. In particular, the program

```
atomic{ x=1; } || atomic_store(&x,2);
```

is racy – which is perhaps contrary to the intuition that an atomic transaction with a single non-atomic store should be interchangeable with a non-transactional atomic store.

Remark 7.1. The specification also clarifies that although events in an unsuccessful transaction are unobservable, they can still participate in races. This implies that the program

atomic{ x=1; abort(); } || atomic_store(&x,2); must be considered racy. In our formalisation, transactions either succeed (giving rise to an *stxn*-class) or fail, giving rise to no events (cf. §3.1). This treatment correctly handles races involving unsuccessful transactions, because the race will be detected in the case where the transaction succeeds, but it cannot handle transactions that *never* succeed, such as the one above. Therefore, we leave the handling of abort() for future work.

Transactional Synchronisation The second amendment by the C++ TM extension defines when two transactions synchronise [34, §1.10]. An execution is deemed consistent only if there is a total order on transactions such that:

- 1. this order does not contradict happens-before, and
- 2. if transaction T_1 is ordered before conflicting transaction T_2 , then the end of T_1 synchronises with the start of T_2 .

We could incorporate these requirements into the formal model by extending executions with a transaction-ordering relation, *to*, that serialises all the *stxn*-classes in an order that does not contradict happens-before (point 1), and updating the synchronises-with relation to include events in conflicting transactions that are ordered by *to* (point 2).

However, this formulation is unsatisfying. It is awkward that *to* is used to *define* happens-before but is also forbidden to *contradict* happens-before. Moreover, having the consistency predicate involve quantification over all possible transaction serialisations makes simulation expensive [9].

Fortunately, we can formulate the C++ TM memory model without relying on a total order over transactions. The idea is that if two transactions are in conflict, then their order can be deduced from the existing rf, co, and fr edges, and if they are not, then there is no need to order them.

In more detail, and with reference to the highlighted parts of Fig. 9: observe that whenever two events in an execution conflict (cnf), they must be connected one way or the other by 'extended communication' (ecom), which is the communication relation extended with co; rf chains. That is, $cnf = ecom \cup ecom^{-1}$ [\$\infty\$]. We then say that transactions synchronise with (tsw) each other in ecom order, and we extend happens-before to include tsw.

By simply extending the definition of *hb* like this, we avoid the need for the *to* relation altogether, and we avoid adding any axioms to the consistency predicate. To make our proposal concrete, we provide in §A some text that the specification could incorporate (currently under review by the C++ TM Study Group).

Strong Isolation for Atomic Transactions The semantics described thus far provides the desired weak-isolating behaviour for relaxed transactions; that is, the WeakIsolaxiom follows from the other C++ consistency axioms [&]. However, atomic transactions must be strongly isolated. In fact, atomic transactions enjoy strong isolation simply by being forbidden to contain atomic operations. The idea is that for a non-transactional event to observe or affect a transaction's intermediate state, it must conflict with an event in that transaction. If this event cannot be atomic, there must be a race. Thus, for race-free programs, atomic transactions are guaranteed to be strongly isolated.

To formalise this property, we extend C++ executions with an $stxn_{\rm at}$ relation that identifies a subset of transactions as atomic. It satisfies $stxn_{\rm at} \subseteq stxn$ and $(stxn_{\rm at}; stxn) \subseteq stxn_{\rm at}$. We then prove the following theorem.

Theorem 7.2 (Strong isolation for atomic transactions). If NoRACE holds, and atomic transactions contain no atomic operations (i.e., domain($stxn_{at}$) $\cap Ato = \emptyset$), then

acyclic(stronglift(com, stxn_{at})).

Proof sketch. A cycle in stronglift(com, $stxn_{at}$) is either a com-cycle or an r-cycle, where $r = stxn_{at}$; $(com \setminus stxn_{at})^+$; $stxn_{at}$. From NoRACE, we have $com \setminus Ato^2 \subseteq hb$. Using this and the expansion $com^+ = ecom \cup (fr; rf)$ we can obtain $r \subseteq hb$. To finish the proof, note that execution well-formedness forbids com-cycles, and that r-cycles are forbidden too because they are also hb-cycles, which violate HBCOM.

Table 2. Summary of our metatheoretical results. Timings are for a machine with four 16-core Opteron processors and 128GB RAM, using the Plingeling solver [11]. A ✗ means the property holds up to the given number of events, a ✓ means a counterexample was found, and ⊕ indicates a timeout.

Property	§	Target	Events	Time	C'ex?
Monotonicity	8.1	x86	6	20m	X
		Power	2	<1s	✓
		ARMv8	2	<1s	1
		C++	6	91h	X
Compilation	8.2	C++/x86	6	14h	X
		C++/Power	6	16h	X
		C++/ARMv	8 6	20h	X
Lock elision	8.3	x86	8	>48h	\odot
		Power	9	>48h	\odot
		ARMv8	7	63s	✓
		ARMv8 (fix	ed) 8	>48h	Θ

A Transactional SC-DRF Guarantee A central property of the C++ memory model is its SC-DRF guarantee [2, 13]: all race-free C++ programs that avoid non-SC atomic operations enjoy SC semantics. This guarantee can be lifted to a transactional setting [19, 50]: all race-free C++ programs that avoid relaxed transactions and non-SC atomic operations enjoy TSC semantics (cf. §3.4). This is formalised in the following theorem, which we prove in §C.

Theorem 7.3 (Transactional SC-DRF guarantee). If a C++-consistent execution has

- no relaxed transactions (i.e. $stxn = stxn_{at}$),
- no non-SC atomics (i.e. Ato = SC), and
- no data races (i.e. NoRACE holds),

then it is consistent under TSC.

8 Metatheory

We now study several metatheoretical properties of our proposed models. For instance, one straightforward but important property, which follows immediately from the model definitions, is that our TM models give the same semantics to transaction-free programs as the original models [&]. In this section, we use Memalloy to check some more interesting properties of our models, as summarised in Tab. 2.

8.1 Monotonicity

We check that adding *stxn*-edges can never make an inconsistent execution consistent. This implies that all of the following program transformations are sound: introducing a transaction (e.g., $\bullet \cdots \rightarrow \bullet$), enlarging a transaction (e.g., $\bullet \cdots \rightarrow \bullet$), and coalescing two consecutive transactions (e.g., $\bullet \cdots \rightarrow \bullet$).

Memalloy confirmed that the transactional x86 and C++ models enjoy this monotonicity property for all executions

with up to 6 events. For Power and ARMv8, it found the following counterexample:



The left execution is inconsistent in both models because of the TxnCancelsRMW axiom: that a store-exclusive separated from its corresponding load-exclusive by a transaction boundary always fails. The right execution, however, is consistent. This counterexample implies that techniques that involve transaction coalescing [17, 53] must be applied with care in the presence of RMWs.

8.2 Mapping C++ Transactions to Hardware

We check that it is sound to compile C++ transactions to x86, Power, and ARMv8 transactions. A realistic compiler would be more complex – perhaps including fallback options for when hardware transactions fail – but our direct mapping is nonetheless instructive for comparing the guarantees given to transactions in software and in hardware.

Specifically, we use Memalloy to search for a pair of executions, X and Y, such that X is an inconsistent C++ execution, Y is a consistent x86/Power/ARMv8 execution, and X is related to Y via the relevant compilation mapping, encoded in the relation π . Such a pair would demonstrate that the compilation mapping is invalid. Wickerson et al. [55] have encoded non-transactional compilation mappings; we only need to extend them to handle transactions, which we do by requiring π to preserve all stxn-edges:

$$stxn_Y = \pi^{-1}; stxn_X; \pi.$$

Memalloy confirmed that compilation to x86, Power, and ARMv8 is sound for all C++ executions with up to 6 events.

8.3 Checking Lock Elision

We now check the soundness of lock elision in x86, Power, and ARMv8 using the technique proposed in §4.3.

First, we extend executions with four new event types:

- *L*, the lock() calls that will be implemented by acquiring the lock in the ordinary fashion,
- *U*, the corresponding unlock() calls,
- L^t, the lock() calls that will be transactionalised, and
- U^{t} , the corresponding unlock() calls.

When generating candidate executions from programs, we assume that each lock()/unlock() pair gives rise to a L-U pair or a L^t-U^t pair. (Distinguishing these two modes at the execution level eases the definition of the mapping relation.) We obtain from these lock/unlock events a derived scr relation that forms an equivalence class among all the events in the same CR. Similarly, scr^t is a subrelation of scr that comprises just those CRs that are to be transactionalised.

Table 3. Key constraints on π for defining lock elision

Source	Target event(s), $\pi(e)$					
event, e	x86 Power		ARMv8	ARMv8 (fixed)		
L	R ↓ctrl R ↓rmw W	R ↓rmw, ctrl W ↓ctrl .sync	R, Acq ↓rmw, c W	R, Acq trl ↓rmw, ctrl W ↓po dmb		
		sync ↓ <i>po</i>				
U	W	W	W, Rel	W, Rel		
L^{t}	R	R	R	R		
U^{t}	-	-	-	-		

Moreover:

$$sloc_Y = I^2 \cup ((\neg I)^2 \cap (\pi^{-1}; sloc_X; \pi))$$
 (LockVar) where $I = \pi(L \cup U \cup L^t \cup U^t)$
$$scr^t \setminus (\neg U^t)^2 = \pi; stxn_Y; \pi^{-1}$$
 (TxnIntro)
$$\mathbf{empty}([L]; \pi; rf; \pi^{-1}; [L^t])$$
 (TxnReadsLockFree)

Second, we extend execution well-formedness so that every L event must be followed by a U event without an intervening L^{t} or U^{t} , and so on.

Third, the consistency predicates from Figs. 5, 6, and 8 are extended with the following axiom that forces the serialisability of CRs.

$$acyclic(weaklift(po \cup com, scr))$$
 (CRORDER)

Finally, we define a mapping π from the events of an 'abstract' execution X to those of a 'concrete' execution Y, that captures the implementation of lock elision. Table 3 sketches the main constraints we impose on π so that it captures lock elision for x86, Power, and ARMv8. It preserves all the execution structure except for lock/unlock events. The LockVar constraint imposes that all the reads/writes in Y that are introduced by the mapping (call these I) access the same location (i.e., the lock variable) and that this location is not accessed elsewhere in Y. The TxnIntro constraint imposes that events in the same transactionalised CR in X become events in the same transaction in Y. The Land U events are mapped to sequences of events that represent the recommended spinlock implementation for each architecture. Each L event maps to a successful RMW on the lock variable, which in ARMv8 is an acquire-RMW [7, §K.9.3.1], in Power is followed by a control dependency³ and an isync [29, §B.2.1.1], and in x86 is preceded by an additional read (the 'test-and-test-and-set' idiom) [31, §8.10.6.1]. Each U event maps to a write on the lock variable, which in ARMv8 is a release-write [7, §K.9.3.2], and in Power is

³In Power, *ctrl* edges can begin at a store-exclusive [47].




Figure 10. A pair of executions that demonstrates lock elision being unsound in ARMv8

preceded by a sync [29, §B.2.2.1]. Each L^t event maps to a read of the lock variable. This read does not observe a write from an L event (TxnReadslockFree), to ensure that it sees the lock as free. Finally, U^t events vanish (because we do not have explicit events for beginning/ending transactions).

Figure 10 shows a pair of ARMv8 executions, X (left) and Y (right), and a π relation (dotted arrows), that satisfy all of the constraints above. From this example, which was automatically generated using Memalloy in 63 seconds, we manually constructed the pair of litmus tests shown in Example 1.1. It thus demonstrates that lock elision is unsound in ARMv8. This example is actually one of several found by Memalloy; we provide another example in §B.

We also used Memalloy to check lock elision in x86 and Power, and again in ARMv8 after applying the fix proposed in §1.1 (appending a DMB to the lock() implementation). Given that each architecture implements *L* events with a different number of primitive events (Tab. 3), we ensured that the event count was large enough in each case to allow examples similar to Fig. 10 to be found. We were unable to find bugs in any of these cases, but Memalloy timed out before it could verify their absence. As such, we cannot claim lock elision in x86 and Power to be *verified*, but the timeout provides a high degree of confidence that these designs are bug-free up to the given bounds because, as Tab. 2 shows, when counterexamples exist they tend to be found quickly.

9 Related Work

In concurrent but independent work, Dongol et al. [23] have also proposed adding TM to the x86, Power, and ARMv8 memory models. Like us, Dongol et al. build their axioms by lifting relations from events to transactions. However, their models are significantly weaker than ours, because they capture only the *atomicity* of transactions, not the *ordering* of transactions. Because of this, their Power model is too weak to validate the natural compiler mapping from C++. This is demonstrated by the following execution, which is forbidden by C++ (owing to an *hb* cycle), but allowed by their Power model (though not actually observable on hardware).



Moreover, unlike our work, Dongol et al.'s models have not been empirically validated – and nor have earlier models that combine TM and weak memory [20, 41]. Nonetheless, our models being stronger than Dongol et al.'s implies that our endeavours are complementary: our experiments validate their models, and their proofs carry over to our models.

Cerone et al. [16] have studied the weak consistency guarantees provided by transactions in database systems. A key difference is that for Cerone et al., weak behaviours are attributed to weakly consistent transactions, but in our work, weak behaviours are attributed to weakly consistent non-transactional events surrounding strongly consistent transactions. Nonetheless, similar axiomatisations can be used in both settings, and similar weak behaviours can manifest.

Our models follow the axiomatic style, but there also exist operational memory models for x86 [44], Power [48], ARMv8 [45], and C++ [43]. It would be interesting to consider how these could be extended to handle TM.

Other architectures and languages that could be targetted by our methodology include RISC-V, which plans to incorporate TM in the future [54], and Java. Indeed, Grossman et al. [25] and Shpeisman et al. [51] identify several tricky corner cases that arise when attempting to extend Java's weak memory model to handle transactions, and our methodology can be seen as a way to automate the generation of these.

Regarding the analysis of programs that *provide* TM, an automatic tool for testing (software) TM implementations above a weak memory model has been developed by Manovit et al. [42]. Like us, they use automatically-generated litmus tests to probe the implementations, but where our test suites are constructed to be exhaustive and to contain only 'interesting' tests, their tests are randomly generated. Regarding the analysis of programs that *use* TM, we note that the formulation of the C++ memory model by Lahav et al. [38] leads to an efficient model checker for multithreaded C++ Kokologiannakis et al. [37]. Since our C++ TM model builds on Lahav et al.'s model, it may be possible to get a model checker for C++ TM similarly.

Regarding tooling for axiomatic memory models in general: our methodology builds on tools due to Wickerson et al. [55] and Lustig et al. [40], both of which build on Alloy [35]. Related tools include Diy [3], which generates litmus tests by enumerating relaxations of SC. Compared to Diy, Memalloy is more easily extensible with constructs such as transactions, and only generates the tests needed to validate a model. Mem-Synth [14] can synthesise memory models from a corpus of litmus tests and their expected outcomes, though it does not currently handle software models or control dependencies.

10 Conclusion

We have extended axiomatic memory models for x86, Power, ARMv8, and C++ to support transactions. Using our extensions to Memalloy, we synthesised meaningful sets of litmus tests that precisely capture the subtle interactions between weak memory and transactions. These tests allowed us to validate our new models by running them on available hardware, discussing them with architects, and checking them against technical manuals. We also used Memalloy to check several metatheoretical properties of our models, including the validity of program transformations and compiler mappings, and the correctness – or lack thereof – of lock elision.

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A Proposed Amendment to the Transactional C++ Specification

A.1 Original Text

The original text is as follows [34, §1.10]:

- 1. There is a global total order of execution for all outer blocks. If, in that total order, T_1 is ordered before T_2 ,
 - no evaluation in T₂ happens before any evaluation in T₁ and
 - if T_1 and T_2 perform conflicting expression evaluations, then the end of T_1 synchronizes with the start of T_2 .

A.2 Proposed Text

To accommodate the proposal from §7, we propose the following replacement text:

- 1. An operation *A communicates to* a memory operation *B* on the same object *M* if:
 - *A* and *B* are both side effects and *A* precedes *B* in the modification order of *M*;
 - A is a side effect, B is a value computation, and the value computed by B is the value stored either by A or by another side effect C that follows A in the modification order of M; or
 - *A* is a value computation, *B* is a side effect, and *B* follows in the modification order of *M* the side effect that stored the value computed by *A*.
- 2. The end of outer transaction T_1 synchronises with the start of outer transaction T_2 if an operation in T_1 communicates to an operation in T_2 .

B A Second Example of Lock Elision Being Unsound in ARMv8

Memalloy found a second example of lock elision being unsound in ARMv8. It is a variant of Example 1.1, in which rather than an external store interrupting a read-modify-write operation, we have an external load observing an intermediate write. Specifically, the program below must never satisfy the given postcondition:

```
Initially: [X\emptyset] = x = 0

lock()

MOV W5,#1
STR W5, [X0]
MOV W5,#2
STR W5, [X0]
unlock()

Test: W7 = 1
```

However, if the left thread executes its CR non-transactionally while the right thread uses lock elision, then the resultant program *can* satisfy that postcondition:

```
Initially: [X0] = x = 0, [X1] = m = 0
                                   3 TXBEGIN
                                                   begin txn
Loop:
  LDAXR W2, [X1]
                     atomically
                                     LDR W6, [X1]
                                                  load m
                                     CBZ W6,L1
  CBNZ W2, Loop
                                                   and abort
                     update m
                                     TXABORT
4 MOV W3,#1
                     from 0
                                                   if non-
  STXR W4, W3, [X1]
                                                   zero
  CBNZ W4,Loop
                                     LDR W7, [X0] \frac{1}{1000} load x
2 MOV W5,#1
                                     TXEND
                                                  end txn
                     store
 STR W5, [X0]
                     twice
5 MOV W5,#2
                     to x
  STR W5, [X0]
  STLR WZR, [X1]
                         Test: W7 = 1
```

As in Example 1.1, the numbers next to the instructions indicate the order in which they can execute in order to satisfy the postcondition. This example is interesting because it shows that not only can *loads* be executed speculatively

before a successful store-exclusive (STXR) completes, but so can *stores*.

C Proof of Theorem 7.3

Theorem 7.3 (Transactional SC-DRF guarantee). If a C++-consistent execution has

- no relaxed transactions (i.e. $stxn = stxn_{at}$),
- no non-SC atomics (i.e. Ato = SC), and
- no data races (i.e. NoRACE holds),

then it is consistent under TSC.

In order to prove this theorem, let us assume the three conditions that the theorem assumes, and show that $\mathbf{acyclic}(po \cup com)$ and $\mathbf{acyclic}(\mathsf{stronglift}(po \cup com, stxn))$ both hold. In what follows, we write pocom for $po \cup com$, po_{loc} for $po \cap sloc$, $po_{\neq loc}^{SC}$ for $po \setminus sloc$, po_{loc}^{SC} for $po_{loc} \cap SC^2$, and rf^{SC} for $rf \cap SC^2$.

Lemma C.1. In race-free executions, communication (other than that between two SC events) induces happens-before; i.e.,

$$com \setminus SC^2 \subset hb$$
.

Proof. Consider two non-SC events related by *com*. If they are in the same thread, then HBCoM guarantees that they are in po, and hence in hb. If they are in different threads, then NoRace and HBCoM guarantee that they are in hb. \Box

Lemma C.2. *In the absence of non-SC atomics, we can simplify happens-before as follows:*

$$hb = (po \cup rf^{SC} \cup tsw)^+.$$

Proof. Recall that happens-before is defined via $hb = (po \cup sw \cup tsw)^+$, where

$$sw = [Acq]; ([F]; po)^?; [W]; po_{loc}^*; [W \cap Ato]; (rf; rmw)^*; rf; [R \cap Ato]; (po; [F])^?; [Rel].$$

In the absence of non-SC atomics, this simplifies to

$$sw \subseteq po^*; (rf^{SC}; po)^*; rf^{SC}; po^*$$

from which the result follows.

Proof of acyclic(pocom)

Suppose toward a contradiction that there is a *pocom* cycle. If the *pocom* cycle passes through no atomics, then each edge of the cycle is either a *po* (and hence an *hb*), or a non-atomic *com* edge (and hence an *hb* by Lemma C.1). Hence, we have an *hb* cycle. These are forbidden by HBCOM, so we have a contradiction. So, we can henceforth assume that the *pocom* cycle passes through at least one atomic.

Let us divide the cycle at each atomic event, so that each segment of the cycle begins at an atomic, then passes through a chain of zero or more non-atomics, before finishing at an atomic. Each segment thus takes the form:

$$seg = [SC]; pocom; ([\neg SC]; pocom)^*; [SC].$$
 (4)

Lemma C.3. $seg \subseteq hb \cup co \cup fr$.

Proof. If the segment is a single *pocom* edge between two SC events, then that edge is either in $po \cup rf^{SC}$ (and hence in hb) or is in $co \cup fr$, as required. Otherwise, the segment is of the form

$$\bullet \xrightarrow{pocom; [\neg SC]} \bullet \xrightarrow{([\neg SC]; pocom; [\neg SC])^*} \bullet \xrightarrow{[\neg SC]; pocom} \bullet,$$

and is hence in *hb* by Lemma C.1, as required.

If there are fewer than two non-hb segments in our cycle, then we have an immediate violation of HBCom. So, we can henceforth assume that at least two segments in our cycle are in $(co \cup fr) \setminus hb$. Moreover, we can assume that these segments are not consecutive, for if they were, the $co \cup fr$ edges would collapse together. We can hence consider our cycle to be built from chains of segments of the following form:

$$X' \xrightarrow{(co \cup fr) \setminus hb} X \xrightarrow{hb} Z \xrightarrow{(co \cup fr) \setminus hb} Z'$$

where X', X, Z, and Z' are all in SC. In fact, we can further assume

$$(X',Z) \notin hb$$
 $(X,Z') \notin hb$ (5)

for otherwise the cycle would still collapse into an HBCOM violation.

To complete the proof, it suffices to show that (X, Z) is in psc^+ , for then the entire cycle becomes a psc cycle and hence a violation of the SeqCst axiom. The precise definition of psc is quite involved [38]; here we just rely on

$$[SC]$$
; $po_{\neq loc}$; hb ; $po_{\neq loc}$; $[SC] \subseteq psc$ (6)

$$[SC]$$
; $pocom$; $[SC] \subseteq psc$ (7)

Consider the hb chain from X to Z. If it passes through no intermediate non-SC events, then it must be a sequence of po and rf^{SC} edges (by Lemma C.2). All of these edges are in psc, so we have $(X,Z) \in psc^+$ as required. So, we can henceforth assume that the hb chain passes through at least one non-SC event.

Let Y be the last non-SC event in the chain (i.e., the closest to Z). The following two lemmas analyse the (Y, Z) and (X, Y) parts of the chain separately.

Lemma C.4. The hb chain from Y to Z contains a $po_{\neq loc}$ edge that is followed only by rf^{SC} and po_{loc}^{SC} edges; i.e.,

$$(Y,Z) \in hb^*; po_{\neq loc}; (rf^{SC} \cup po_{loc}^{SC})^*.$$

Proof. Consider the final part of the hb chain. By Lemma C.2, each edge in the chain is a tsw, a po, or an rf^{SC} . Any suffix of rf^{SC} or po_{loc}^{SC} edges can be removed, with the remaining part of the chain still ending at an SC event. The last of the remaining edges cannot be a tsw because we are at an SC event, and atomics are forbidden inside atomic transactions.

Moreover, if it is a $po_{\neq loc}$ edge then we are done. Hence, it remains only to consider the possibility that it is a po_{loc} edge that begins at a non-SC event. This would mean we have

$$Y \xrightarrow{hb^*} A \xrightarrow{po_{\text{loc}}; (rf^{SC} \cup po_{\text{loc}}^{SC})^*} Z \xrightarrow{(co \cup fr) \setminus hb} Z'$$

for some non-SC event A. Note that A and Z' cannot be related by hb, because $(Z',A) \in hb$ would be a HBCom violation, and $(A,Z') \in hb$ would imply $(X,Z') \in hb$, in contradiction of assumption (5). Since Z' is a write, it forms a data race with A. This contradicts our NoRace assumption, and hence the proof is complete.

Lemma C.5. The hb chain from X to Y contains a $po_{\neq loc}$ edge that is preceded only by rf^{SC} and po_{loc}^{SC} edges; i.e.,

$$(X,Y) \in (rf^{SC} \cup po_{\text{loc}}^{SC})^*; po_{\neq \text{loc}}; hb^*.$$

Proof. Consider the initial part of the hb chain. By Lemma C.2, each edge in the chain is a tsw, a po, or an rf^{SC} . Any prefix of rf^{SC} or po_{loc}^{SC} edges can be removed, with the remaining part of the chain still beginning at an SC event. The first of the remaining edges cannot be a tsw because we are at an SC event, and atomics are forbidden inside atomic transactions. Moreover, if it is a $po_{\neq loc}$ edge then we are done. Hence, it remains only to consider the possibility that it is a po_{loc} edge ending at a non-SC event, say A. The next edge after A cannot be another po because two consecutive po edges would collapse together, and it cannot be an rf^{SC} because A is non-SC, so it must be a tsw edge. This implies that there is another non-SC event between A and B, and hence that A is not B. We therefore have

$$X' \xrightarrow{(co \cup fr) \setminus hb} X \xrightarrow{(rf^{SC} \cup po_{loc}^{SC})^*; po_{loc}} A \xrightarrow{tsw} D \xrightarrow{hb^*} Y$$

$$\xrightarrow{stxn} \downarrow \xrightarrow{ecom} C \uparrow stxn$$

for some non-SC events A, B, C, and D. Note that X' and B cannot be related by hb, because $(B,X') \in hb$ would be a HBCOM violation, and $(X',B) \in hb$ would imply $(X',Z) \in hb$, in contradiction of assumption (5). This reasoning is also valid with C substituted for B. At least one of B and C must be a write, by the definition of ecom, and hence at least one of them forms a data race with X'. This contradicts our NoRace assumption, and hence the proof is complete.

By combining Lemmas C.4 and C.5, we can deduce that (X, Z) is in

$$(rf^{SC} \cup po_{\text{loc}}^{SC})^*; po_{\neq \text{loc}}; hb^*; po_{\neq \text{loc}}; (rf^{SC} \cup po_{\text{loc}}^{SC})^*$$
 and is hence in $psc^*; psc; psc^*$, as required.

Proof of acyclic(stronglift(pocom, stxn))

For this proof, we shall rely on one further lemma.

Lemma C.6. Happens-before edges can be lifted to relate transactions; i.e.,

$$stxn^*$$
; $(hb \setminus stxn)$; $stxn^* \subseteq hb \setminus stxn$

Proof. It suffices to prove the following two inequalities:

$$stxn; (hb \setminus stxn) \subseteq hb \setminus stxn$$
 (8)

$$(hb \setminus stxn); stxn \subseteq hb \setminus stxn.$$
 (9)

We shall provide a proof of (8); that of (9) is similar. We begin by noting that the following identity of Kleene algebra

$$(r \cup s)^+ = r^+ \cup (r^*; s; (r \cup s)^*)$$

can be combined with Lemma C.2 to give

$$hb \setminus stxn \subseteq (po \cap stxn)^*; (po \setminus stxn \cup rf^{SC} \cup tsw); hb^*.$$

Hence, to show (8), it suffices to suppose a chain of the form

$$V \xrightarrow{stxn} W \xrightarrow{(po \cap stxn)^*} X \xrightarrow{po \setminus stxn \cup rf^{SC} \cup tsw} Y \xrightarrow{hb^*} Z$$

and deduce that $(V, Z) \in hb$. We do so by a case-split on the (X, Y) edge. First, the case $(X, Y) \in rf^{SC}$ is impossible because X is in an atomic transaction and hence cannot be atomic. Second, if (X, Y) is in $po \setminus stxn$, then so is (V, Y), and the result follows. Third, if (X, Y) is in tsw, then so is (V, Y) and the result follows.

Now, suppose toward a contradiction that there is a cycle in stronglift(pocom, stxn). Such a cycle is made up of stxn and pocom edges, with at least one edge in $pocom \setminus stxn$.

Suppose the cycle passes through no atomics. If the cycle includes no *stxn* edges, then we simply have a *pocom* cycle, which is a contradiction because we have already proved **acyclic**(*pocom*). If, on the other hand, the cycle includes at least one *stxn* edge, then we can divide the cycle at the transactions, so that each segment of the cycle is of the form

$$stxn$$
; $(pocom \setminus stxn)^+$; $stxn$

and hence, by Lemma C.1, of the form stxn; $(hb \setminus stxn)^+$; stxn. Lemma C.6 then implies that this cycle is in hb, and is hence forbidden. So, we can henceforth assume that the cycle passes through at least one atomic.

Let us divide the cycle at each atomic event, so that each segment of the cycle begins at an atomic, then forms a chain of *pocom* and *stxn* edges through zero or more non-atomics, before finishing at an atomic. The first and last edge of each segment cannot be an *stxn*, however, since each segment begins and ends at an atomic. As a result, Lemma C.3 still holds under the new definition of a segment, because any *stxn* edges in the segment can be folded into the adjacent *hb* edges using Lemma C.6. The rest of the proof is identical to that of acyclic(*pocom*).