

ECE 6775 Final Project: FPGA Acceleration of Post-Quantum Cryptography

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Introduction

With the increasing reliance on digital systems in the modern age, maintaining the security and privacy of important data is more critical than ever. As such, cryptographic algorithms for securely storing and communicating data have widespread usage. To maintain security, these algorithms are centered around computational problems that are infeasible for classical processors to solve; these are known as *NP-hard* problems, which have no known polynomial time solution. Users with a secret key are able to decrypt the encoded messages, but users without would have to solve this NP-hard problem to access the encrypted data, which are designed to take an astronomical number of years to solve with brute-force.

The advent of quantum computers have called the strengths of many of these algorithms into question. For example, both RSA (a popular asymmetric-key algorithm with widespread use) and Diffie-Hellman (an algorithm for securely establishing a common shared key, for use in symmetric-key encryption) rely on the difficulty of factoring large numbers for their security. Algorithms for quantum computers to solve such problems in polynomial time have existed for a while [1], but have never had a computer advanced enough to run them. However, modern advances in quantum computing have demonstrated that computers may be available soon that can crack these algorithms. Even just earlier this week, Google unveiled a new quantum computer, "Willow", that can achieve speedups over the fastest classical processors on select problems by a factor of 10^{30} [2].

While such computers aren't currently able to break modern cryptographic algorithms, many experts suspect it's only a matter of time before current cryptographic algorithms become insecure [3]. To this end, NIST (the National Institute of Standards and Technology) has standardized the use of RSA-2048 only until 2030, and noted that updated strengths are heavily affected by any progress on quantum computing [4]. Additionally, to prepare for the advance of quantum computing, NIST has standardized additional, *quantum-resistant* algorithms [5]. These algorithms are centered around different computational problems for which there is no known algorithm to efficiently solve for both classical and quantum computers. This *post-quantum cryptography* (PQC) will have increasing significance as advances in quantum computers are made. Additionally, since malicious adversaries could already be recording data to later decrypt once sufficient quantum computers are available, PQC algorithms are already being recommended and used for extremely sensitive data, such as government operations [6].

For public-key encryption (where the encrypting and decrypting keys are different), as well as key establishment (for securely establishing a shared secret key over an insecure network),




Figure 1: A timeline of when experts believe that RSA-2048 will be able to be broken by a quantum computer in 24 hours [3]

NIST recommends CRYSTALS-Kyber, or simply **Kyber**. Since such an algorithm would be widely used in communication, speeding up its operation would have large impacts for a variety of applications. For our project, we explored implementing Kyber using custom hardware on an FPGA.

References

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