Game-theoretic Foundations of Multi-agent Systems

Lecture 5: Games in Extensive Form

Seyed Majid Zahedi



Outline

- 1. Perfect-info Extensive-form Games
- 2. Pure Strategies in Perfect-info Games
- Subgame-perfect Equilibrium
- 4. Imperfect-info Extensive-form Games
- 5. Randomized Strategies in Extensive-form Games

Extensive-form Games

- So far, we have studied strategic-form games
 - Agents take actions once and simultaneously



Extensive-form Games

- So far, we have studied strategic-form games
 - Agents take actions once and simultaneously
- Next, we study extensive-form games (a.k.a. sequential or multi-stage games)
 - Extensive-form games can be conveniently represented by game trees

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- A is set of actions
- *H* is set of choice nodes (internal nodes of game tree)
- Z is set of terminal nodes (leaves of game tree)

- $\alpha: H \to N$ is agent function
 - Maps each choice node to an agent who chooses an action at that node



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
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- $\rho: H \times A \rightarrow H \cup Z$ is successor function
 - Maps each choice node and action pair to new choice node or terminal node
 - If $\rho(h_1, a_1) = \rho(h_2, a_2)$ then $h_1 = h_2$ and $a_1 = a_2$



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 - If $\rho(h_1, a_1) = \rho(h_2, a_2)$ then $h_1 = h_2$ and $a_1 = a_2$
- $u = (u_1, \ldots, u_n)$, where $u_i : Z \to \mathbb{R}$ is agent i's utility function
 - Maps each terminal node to a real value

Example: Sharing Game

- Brother and sister share two gifts
- Brother suggests a split first
- Sister then chooses to accept or reject
- If she accepts, they get suggested gifts
- Otherwise, neither gets any gift



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History in Extensive-form Games

- If height of game tree (i.e, number of stages) is finite, then game is finite-horizon game
- Otherwise, the game is called infinite-horizon game
- For perfect-information games, each node maps to unique history (and vice versa)
- Since choice nodes form a tree, we can unambiguously identify a node with its history
 - I.e., sequence of choices leading from the root node to it



Pure Strategies


• Agent i's pure strategy defines contingency plan for all choice nodes mapped to i

$$a_i \in A_i = \prod_{h \in H, \alpha(h)=i} \beta(h)$$

- Strategy must specify a decision at each choice node
 - Regardless of whether it is possible to reach that node




Pure Strategies: Example



- $A_B = \{ \text{"2-0"}, \text{"1-1"}, \text{"0-2"} \}$
- $A_S = \{(R, R, R), (R, R, A), (R, A, R), (A, R, R), (R, A, A), (A, R, A), (A, A, R), (A, A, A)\}$




• What are pure strategies for A2?






- What are pure strategies for A2?
 - $A_{A2} = \{(L, L), (L, R), (R, L), (R, R)\}$






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- What about A1?






- What are pure strategies for A2?
 - $A_{A2} = \{(L, L), (L, R), (R, L), (R, R)\}$
- What about A1?
 - $A_{A1} = \{(L, L), (L, R), (R, L), (R, R)\}$



Normal-form Representation of Extensive-form Games

• For every perfect-info game, there is corresponding normal-form game

		A2			
		(L, L)	(L, R)	(R, L)	(R, R)
A1	(L, L)	2,4	2,4	5,3	5,3
	(L, R)	2,4	2,4	5,3	5,3
	(R, L)	3, 2	1,5	3, 2	1,5
	(R, R)	3, 2	0,1	3, 2	0, 1






Transformation from Extensive form to Normal From


- It can always be performed for perfect-information games
- It can cause redundancy
 - E.g., (2,4) occurs once in extensive form but 4 times in normal form
- It can result in exponential blowup of game representation
- Reverse transformation does not always exist
 - E.g., there is no extensive-form representation for Prisoner's Dilemma
 - Perfect-information extensive-form games cannot model simultaneity




Nash Equilibrium of Perfect-info Games in Extensive Form


- [Theorem] Every (finite) perfect-info extensive-form game has pure-strategy NE
- ullet Agents see everything before each action \Rightarrow randomness is not required
- This is not the case for every finite game in normal form





















- Strategy of A1 is called a threat
 - Committing to choose R forces A2 to avoid that part of the tree







- Strategy of A1 is called a threat
 - Committing to choose R forces A2 to avoid that part of the tree
- A2 may not consider A1's threat to be credible
 - Would A1 really follow through on this threat if final decision node is reached?




Outline


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Subgames: Definition


- Let G be a perfect-information extensive-form game
- Subgame of G rooted at node h is restriction of G to descendants of h
- Set of subgames of G consists of all of subgames of G rooted at some node in G























Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE)

- Let $s_{G'}$ be restriction of strategy profile s to subgame G'
- Profile s^* is SPE of game G if for every subgame G' of $G, s^*_{G'}$ is NE
- Loosely speaking, subgame perfection removes non-credible threats
 - Non-credible threads are not NE in their subgames
- How to find SPE?
 - One could find all of NE, then eliminate those that are not subgame perfect
 - But there are more economical ways of doing it



Computing Equilibrium: Backward Induction for Finite Games


- (1) Start from "last" subgames (choice nodes with all terminal children)
- (2) Find Nash equilibria of those subgames
- (3) Turn those choice nodes to terminal nodes using NE utilities
- (4) Go to (1) until no choice node remains

Backward Induction Procedure


Algorithm 1: Finding value of sample SPE of perfect-info extensive-form game

```
procedure Backward_Induction(node h)
if h \in Z then
    return u(h);
best_utility \leftarrow -\infty;
forall a \in \beta(h) do
    u = \text{Backward\_Induction}(\rho(h, a)):
    if u_{\alpha(h)} > best_utility then
        best_utility = u_{\alpha(h)};
return best_utility
```
















































- Two agents want to split c dollars
 - A1 offers A2 some amount $x \le c$
 - If A2 accepts, outcome is (c x, x)
 - If A2 rejects, outcome is (0,0)






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


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


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


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


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- What are A2's optimal strategies?






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 - Option 1: Yes for all $x \ge 0$





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- No offer of agent 1 is optimal
- Unique SPE of ultimatum game is A1 offers 0, and A2 accepts all offers

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- What are SPE of this modified ultimatum game?
 - A1 offers 0, and A2 accepts all offers
 - A1 offers 1 cent, and A2 accepts all offers except 0

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 - Option 1: Yes for all $x \ge 0$
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- What are A1's optimal strategies for each of A2's?
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- What are SPE of this modified ultimatum game?
 - A1 offers 0, and A2 accepts all offers
 - A1 offers 1 cent, and A2 accepts all offers except 0
- Show that every $\bar{x} \in [0, c]$, there exists NE in which A1 offers \bar{x}




Example: Discrete Ultimatum Game

- What are A2's optimal strategies if c is in multiple of cent?
 - Option 1: Yes for all $x \ge 0$
 - Option 2: Yes if x > 0, No if x = 0
- What are A1's optimal strategies for each of A2's?
 - For option 1, offer x = 0
 - For option 2, offer x = 1 cent
- What are SPE of this modified ultimatum game?
 - A1 offers 0, and A2 accepts all offers
 - A1 offers 1 cent, and A2 accepts all offers except 0
- Show that every $\bar{x} \in [0, c]$, there exists NE in which A1 offers \bar{x}
 - What is agent A2's optimal strategy?

Example: Bargaining Game

- ullet Two agents want to split c=1 dollar
- First, A1 makes her offer
- Then, A2 decides to accept or reject
- If A2 rejects, then A2 makes new offer
- Then, A1 decides to accept or reject
- Let $x = (x_1, x_2)$ denote A1's offer
- Let $y = (y_1, y_2)$ denote A2's offer





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 - Option 2: If $x_2 = 1$, accept, and reject otherwise
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- Second round is ultimatum game with unique SPE
 - A2 offers 0, and A1 accepts all offers
- What is A2's optimal strategy in round 1's subgame?
 - Option 1: If $x_2 \le 1$, reject
 - Option 2: If $x_2 = 1$, accept, and reject otherwise
- What are A1's optimal strategies in round 1 for each of A2's?
 - For both options, A1 is indifferent between all strategies




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
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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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
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 - For option 2, there is no optimal strategy





Unique SPE of Discounted Bargaining Game


- What are SPE strategies?
 - Agent 1's proposes $(1 \delta_2, \delta_2)$
 - Agent 2 only accepts proposals with $x_2 \geq \delta_2$
 - Agent 2 proposes (0,1) after any history in which1's proposal is rejected
 - Agent 1 accepts all proposals of Agent 2
- What is SPE outcome of game?
 - Agent 1 proposes $(1 \delta_2, \delta_2)$
 - Agent 2 accepts
 - Resulting utilities are $(1-\delta_2,\delta_2)$
- Desirability of earlier agreement yields positive utility for agent 1











Outline

- 1. Perfect-info Extensive-form Games
- 2. Pure Strategies in Perfect-info Games
- Subgame-perfect Equilibrium
- 4. Imperfect-info Extensive-form Games
- 5. Randomized Strategies in Extensive-form Games

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
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- If two nodes are in same info set, then agent cannot distinguish between them

Imperfect-info Extensive-form Games: Definition

- N, A, H, Z, α , β , ρ , u are the same as before
- $I = (I_1, ..., I_n)$, where $I_i = (I_{i,1}, ..., I_{i,k_i})$ is a partition of $\{h \in H : \alpha(h) = i\}$
- If h, h' are in the same equivalence class $I_{i,j}$, then $\beta(h) = \beta(h')$
- Perfect-info games are imperfect-info games with singleton equivalence classes

Example: Prisoners' Dilemma in Extensive Form

- P1 decides on D or C
- P2 then decides on D or C (without observing P1's decision)





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
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
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
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


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


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


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





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- In this game, every behavioral strategy corresponds to a mixed strategy and vice versa (more on this soon)




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


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


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




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




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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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 - They explicitly model agents' beliefs on where they are for every info set
 - E.g., sequential equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium

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