

Analysis of Cooperative Games with Matlab and Mathematica

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Contents

Foreword	i
Preface	iii
Contents	v
List of Figures	xiii
List of Tables	xv
List of Theorems	xvii
List of Algorithms	xxv
List of Definitions and Examples	xxvii

I A First Course in Cooperative Game Theory, MATLAB, and MATHEMATICA	1
1 A Refresher to Cooperative Game Theory	3
1.1 Cooperative Games in Characteristic Function Form	3
1.1.1 A first Glance on Game Classes	3
1.2 Some Solution Concepts	4
1.2.1 The Kernel and Pre-Kernel	4
1.2.2 The Nucleolus and Pre-Nucleolus	4
1.2.3 The Shapley Value	6
1.2.4 The Core and the Strong ϵ -Cores	7
1.2.5 The Anti-Core	11
1.2.6 Consistency of the Core and the Pre-Kernel	12
1.2.7 Stable Sets	14
1.2.8 The Bargaining Set $\mathcal{M}(N, v)$	16
1.2.9 Computing the Nucleolus for Three Person Games	17
1.3 Crucial Game Classes	21
1.3.1 Classes of Bankruptcy Games	21
1.3.2 Simple Games	22
1.3.3 The Potential of a Game	23
1.4 Bibliographical Notes	24
2 Basic Operations of MATLAB	25
2.1 Some Fundamentals of MATLAB	25
2.1.1 Variable Assignment, Names and Types	26
2.1.2 Operators and Expressions	31
2.2 Vectors, Matrices and Multidimensional Arrays	60
2.2.1 Initializing Arrays	62

2.2.2	Vector and Matrix Operations	64
2.2.3	Subscripted and Linear Indexing	65
2.2.4	Basic Linear Algebra	67
2.2.5	Multidimensional Arrays	87
2.2.6	Subarrays	89
2.3	Data Types: Cell and Structure Arrays	90
2.3.1	Cell Arrays	91
2.3.2	Structures	93
2.4	Essentials of MATLAB Graphics	95
2.4.1	Two Dimensional Graphics	95
2.4.2	Three Dimensional Graphics	99
2.4.3	Saving and Printing Figures	103
2.5	Fundamentals of Program Design	104
2.5.1	Top-Down Design Process	104
2.5.2	Modular Program	114
2.5.3	Types of Errors	116
2.6	User-defined Functions	122
2.6.1	Structure of a M-Function	122
2.6.2	Variable Scope	125
2.6.3	Variable Passing	126
2.6.4	Option Passing	126
2.6.5	Local Functions	127
2.6.6	Function Handles and Anonymous Functions	127
2.6.7	Function Functions	130
2.6.8	Command-Function Duality	132
2.7	Flow of Control	132
2.7.1	Branching Statement: if Construct	133
2.7.2	Branching Statement: switch Construct	144
2.7.3	Exception Handling: try/catch Construct	149
2.7.4	Counted Loop: for Construct	152
2.7.5	Vectorization of Code	159
2.7.6	Conditional Loop: while Construct	162
2.7.7	Recursion	168
2.8	Studying TU Games with MATLAB: Some Essential Insights	173
2.8.1	Defining a TU Game	173
2.8.2	Standard Solution	174
2.8.3	Shapley Value	174
2.8.4	Nucleolus for Three Person Games	176
2.9	Appendix: PreKernel	178
3	Basic Operations of Mathematica	185
3.1	Some Survival Rules	185
3.1.1	Be Careful with Products	188
3.1.2	Be Careful with Compound Symbols	189
3.1.3	How to use Brackets correctly	191
3.1.4	How to use the Operators Set, SetDelayed, and Equal correctly	192
3.1.5	How to use the operators Rule and ReplaceAll correctly	194
3.1.6	Be Careful in Defining Equations	195
3.1.7	Distinguish Functions and Value Variables	197

3.2	The Nature of Expressions	199
3.2.1	Internal Form of Expressions	199
3.2.2	Every Input is an Expression	200
3.2.3	Changing the Head of an Expression	201
3.2.4	A First Look on the Evaluation of Expressions	202
3.2.5	Non-Atomic Expressions	202
3.2.6	Atomic Expression	203
3.2.7	Compound Expression	206
3.2.8	The Global Rule Base	207
3.2.9	How Expressions are evaluated	207
3.2.10	Controlling the Evaluation	210
3.2.11	Pattern and Matching	214
3.3	Rewrite Rules	220
3.3.1	Built-in and User-defined Functions	220
3.3.2	Creating Rewrite Rules	220
3.3.3	Transformation Rules	233
3.4	Flow of Control	237
3.4.1	Branching Functions: The If command	238
3.4.2	Branching Functions: The Which command	240
3.4.3	Branching Functions: The Switch command	240
3.4.4	Iteration by Do and While Loop	241
3.4.5	Recursion	246
3.4.6	Comparison of Computation Time: While Loop versus Recursion	247
3.4.7	Pure Functions	247
3.5	Studying TU Games with Mathematica: Some Essential Insights	249
3.5.1	Weighted Majority Games	249
3.5.2	Bankruptcy Problems	257
3.5.3	The Greedy Bankruptcy Game: Some Code	263
3.5.4	Generalized Contested Garment Principle	265
3.5.5	Defining a TU Game	266
3.5.6	Standard Solution	268
3.5.7	Nucleolus for Three Person Games	270
3.5.8	Shapley Value	274
3.6	Optimization	275
3.6.1	Reconsidering Optimization Theory	275
3.6.2	Implementing Equality-Constrained Optimization Problems	280
3.6.3	Implementing Inequality-Constrained Optimization Problems	290
3.7	Computing the Nash Equilibrium	293

II Cooperative Game Theory with MATLAB

295

4 TU Games with a trivial Coalition Structure

297

4.1	Introduction	297
4.2	Some Preliminaries	297
4.3	Defining a Game	303
4.3.1	Two basic Examples	303
4.3.2	A more comprehensive Example	309
4.3.3	Market and totally balanced Games	311

4.3.4	Convex Games	322
4.3.5	Almost-Convex Games	334
4.3.6	Average-Convex Games	335
4.3.7	Assignment Games	344
4.3.8	Permutation Games	346
4.3.9	Flow Games	348
4.3.10	Weighted Graph Games	356
4.3.11	Minimum Cost Spanning Tree Games	362
4.4	Some Solution Concepts	380
4.4.1	The Shapley Value	380
4.4.2	The Tau Value	382
4.4.3	The Kernel and Pre-Kernel	383
4.4.4	The Nucleolus and Pre-Nucleolus	393
4.4.5	The weighted (Pre-)Kernel and (Pre-)Nucleolus	404
4.4.6	The Anti-Pre-Kernel and Anti-Pre-Nucleolus	413
4.4.7	The Least Square (Pre-)Nucleolus	422
4.5	Third Party Solvers	423
4.6	Some Game Properties and Convex Solution Sets	428
4.6.1	The Core of a TU Game and related Subjects	428
4.6.2	Investigation of Game Properties	430
4.6.3	The Core of a TU Game Reconsidered	434
4.6.4	The Anti-Core	435
5	TU Games with non-trivial Coalition Structures	445
5.1	Introduction	445
5.2	Solutions for a Coalition Structure	445
5.2.1	The Core and Super-Additive Cover	447
5.2.2	The Kernel and Pre-Kernel	454
5.2.3	The Nucleolus and Pre-Nucleolus	468
5.3	Fairness and Related Values for a Coalition Structure	474
5.3.1	The Solidarity and related Values	474
5.3.2	The Owen and related Values	476
5.3.3	The Myerson and related Values	479
5.3.4	The Position Value	483
5.4	Replication of some Game Solutions	485
5.4.1	Replication of the Nucleolus by Characterization Sets	486
5.4.2	Replication of a Pre-Kernel Element	510
5.4.3	Replication of the Shapley Value	514
6	Graphical Extension, and Real World Applications	521
6.1	Introduction	521
6.2	External Libraries and Graphical Features	521
6.2.1	Plotting the Core	522
6.2.2	Plotting the Core-Cover	523
6.2.3	Plotting the Weber Set	525
6.2.4	Plotting a strong ϵ -Core	526
6.2.5	The Geometric Property of the (Pre-)Kernel	528
6.3	Simple Game	529
6.4	Weighted Majority Game	535

6.4.1	The UN Security Council	535
6.4.2	Minimum Homogeneous Representation and Center Solution	543
6.4.3	Star-Shapedness of the (Pre-)Kernel	558
6.4.4	Florentine Marriage and Business Relations	568
6.5	Handling Numerical Errors When Seeking for a Pre-Kernel Point	604
7	Axiomatization of Selected Solutions	611
7.1	General Discussion of Some Solution Properties	611
7.2	Checking Some Basic Properties	615
7.3	Reduced Game Properties	619
7.4	Converse Reduced Game Properties	626
7.5	Reconfirmation Property	629
7.6	ISRG Property	631
8	Axiomatization and Computation of the Modiclus	635
8.1	Definition and Computation of the Modiclus	637
8.2	Wedge Games via the Modiclus	638
8.3	Discussion of its Axiomatization	644
8.4	Alternative Axiomatization of the Modiclus: A first Approach	673
8.5	The Derived Game Property	697
8.6	Market Side, Power Index, and Corners	701
8.7	The Anti-Derived Game Property	707
8.8	Coincidence of Modiclus and Anti-Pre-Nucleolus: Some Game Examples	710
8.9	Checking an Extended Kohlberg Criterion	730
8.10	Computing the Anti-Modiclus	730
9	The Axiomatization of the Proper Modified and Modified Pre-Kernel	733
9.1	Definition of the Modified and Proper Modified Pre-Kernel	734
9.2	Axiomatization of the Modified Pre-Kernel	743
9.3	Alternative Axiomatization of the Modified Pre-Kernel	747
9.4	Indirect Method to compute the Modiclus	752
10	Parallel and GPU Computing	755
10.1	Using the Parallel Computing Toolbox	755
10.2	(Average-) Convexity and Consistency Reconsidered	758
10.3	Replication of a Pre-Kernel Element Reconsidered	761
10.4	Replication of the Shapley Value Reconsidered	762
10.5	Weighted Majority Games: Game Solutions Reconsidered	763
10.6	For-Loop versus Parfor-Loop	767
10.7	How many MATLAB Workers are Optimal?	769
11	Class Object TuGame	771
11.1	Class Object TuProp	775
11.2	Class Objects TuSol and p_TuSol	776
11.3	Class Objects TuVal and p_TuVal	782
11.4	Class Object TuCore	792
11.5	Class Object TuVert	796
11.6	Class Object TuRep	799
11.7	Class Object TuShRep	804
11.8	Class Objects p_TuCons and p_TuKcons	809

III Cooperative Game Theory with Mathematica	819
12 The <i>Mathematica</i> Package TuGames	821
12.1 Introduction	821
12.2 Getting Started with TuGames	821
12.3 How to define Games?	822
12.4 Checking Game Properties	823
12.5 Computing Game Solutions	825
12.6 Graphical Features	826
12.6.1 The Core for Three Person Games	826
12.6.2 The Core for Four Person Games	828
12.6.3 Animate Geometric Property of the Kernel/Nucleolus	830
12.7 Defining more complex Games	832
12.7.1 Getting Started	832
12.7.2 Weighted Majority	833
12.7.3 Modest Bankruptcy	834
12.7.4 Greedy Bankruptcy	834
12.8 Nonlinear Method to Compute the (Pre-)Nucleolus	835
12.8.1 Some Definitions and Results	835
12.8.2 Extending the Results to the Pre-Nucleolus	839
12.8.3 Calculating the (Pre-)Nucleolus	839
12.9 Fenchel Transform Method to Compute the Pre-Nucleolus	845
13 Analysis of Industrial Cooperation by TuOligopoly	847
13.1 Cournot Cooperative Oligopoly Games	848
13.1.1 Quantity Competition under a homogeneous Good	849
13.1.2 Quantity Competition under Product Differentiation	850
13.1.3 Monopoly in Cournot Models	852
13.1.4 Pre-Merger Equilibrium in Cournot Models	853
13.1.5 Characteristic Function Forms	855
13.1.6 Supermodularity of linear Cooperative Oligopoly Games	857
13.1.7 Partition Function Approach	866
13.1.8 Post-Merger Equilibrium in Cournot Models	867
13.1.9 Cournot Model: Two Firms	867
13.1.10 Cournot Model: Four Firms	868
13.1.11 Aggregation across Firms: A Fallacy	873
13.2 Bertrand Cooperative Oligopoly Games	888
13.2.1 Price Competition under Product Differentiation	888
13.2.2 Monopoly in Bertrand Models	890
13.2.3 Pre-Merger Equilibrium in Bertrand Models	891
13.2.4 Post-Merger Equilibrium in Bertrand Models	893
13.2.5 Bertrand Model: Two Firms	893
13.2.6 Bertrand Model: Four Firms	895
14 Parallel Computing with the <i>Mathematica</i> Package TuGames	897
14.1 Parallel Computing: An Overview	897
14.2 Parallel Computing: A more Advanced Approach	898
15 Calling TuGames from MATLAB	901

15.1	Starting the MathKernel from Matlab	901
15.2	Generating TU Games with Mathematica	902
15.3	Studying Game Properties	905
15.4	Computing Game Solutions and Analyzing its Properties	906
16	Calling the MATLAB Toolbox MatTuGames from Mathematica	913
16.1	Getting Started	913
16.2	Defining a Game under Matlab	913
16.3	Computing Game Solutions under Matlab	913
17	Limitations	917
IV	Appendices	919
A	PreKernel Computation Timing Tables	921
B	Propositional Logic	923
B.1	Conditional Statements and Truth Tables	923
B.2	Various Proof Techniques	923
B.2.1	The direct Proof	923
B.2.2	The contrapositive Proof	923
B.2.3	The indirect Proof	923
B.2.4	The Deduction Theorem	924
B.2.5	Incorrect Application of the indirect Proof	925
C	Computational Errors	929
C.1	Kinds of Numerical Errors	929
D	A Quick Overview to Group Theory	931
E	A Quick Overview to Representation Theory	933
F	Installing the MATLAB Toolbox MatTuGames	935
F.1	Installation	935
F.1.1	Requirements	935
F.1.2	General Instruction	936
F.1.3	Quick Start with MatTuGames	936
F.1.4	More Sophisticated Instruction	938
G	Installing the MATHEMATICA Package TuGames	941
G.1	Installation	941
G.1.1	Custom Installation	941
G.1.2	Requirements	942
G.1.3	First Steps with TuGames	942
G.1.4	Running the Package in Parallel	944
G.1.5	MATLink and MatTuGames	945
G.1.6	The Cddmathlink-Library	945
G.1.7	Running the cddmathlink libraries in Parallel	948
G.1.8	Trouble Shooting	949
G.1.9	Documentation of the Package	949

H Maple Program of Leng and Parlar	951
H.1 Maple Code to Compute the Nucleolus for Three Person Games	951
Bibliography	953
Subject Index	963

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Subject Index

*!?

\Rightarrow , 235
 $\#$, 191, 248
 $\&$, 191, 248
 \rightarrow , 194, 233
 c -set, 488
 characterization set, 488
 dually essential, 494
 essential, 494
 l_p - k -nucleolus, 836
 l_p - k -pre-nucleolus, 839
 $/$, 280, 841
 $/.$, 194, 282
 $/;$, 228
 $:=$, 192
 $:>$, 235
 $=$, 192
 $==$, 192, 196
 $===$, 193, 238
 $[[\]]$, 203
 $\$ContextPath$, 207
 $_?EvenQ$, 218
 $_?OddQ$, 218

A

AbsoluteTiming, 261
 achange, 168
 additive_game, 361, 431, 719
 additivity, 7
 adjoint matrix, 60
 ADvalue, 475, 766, 785
 AIGame, 518
 airport cost allocation problem, 107
 airport_game, 327
 Algorithm
 pre-kernel, 387
 pre-kernel for a c.s., 465
 algorithm
 exponential time, 506
 polynomial time, 506
 strongly polynomial time, 507
 AllMarginalContributions, 329, 374
 AlmostAverageConvexQ, 338
 anti-balanced TU game, 12
 anti-core, 11, 436
 anti-kernel, 369, 414
 anti-nucleolus, 369, 417
 anti-outweighs, 414
 anti-pre-kernel, 414
 anti-pre-nucleolus, 417
 Anti-Property I, 419
 Anti-Property II, 421
 Anti_balancedCollectionQ, 420, 728
 Anti_Kernel, 377
 Anti_Modiclus, 731
 Anti_modiclusQ, 731
 Anti_Monotonic_Cover, 368
 Anti_Nucl, 370
 Anti_Nucl_llp, 377
 Anti_PreKernel, 417, 910
 Anti_PrekernelQ, 418
 Anti_PreNucl, 418, 728

AntiReduced_game_propertyQ, 674
 Apply, 200, 201, 282
 ApproxNuc, 841, 843
 ApproxPreNuc, 841, 843
 apu_SolidarityValue, 479, 786
 array, 25
 assignment_game, 345, 773, 917
 AtomQ, 203
 Attributes, 208
 Flat, 208
 HoldAllComplete, 210
 Listable, 208
 NumericFunction, 208
 OneIdentity, 208
 Orderless, 208
 Protected, 208
 average_convexQ, 338, 433, 906
 AverageConvexQ, 840
 axiom
 Additivity (ADD), 612
 Anonymity (AN), 6, 612
 Converse Consistency (COCONS), 743
 Converse Derived Game Property (CDGP), 747
 Converse Reduced Game Property (CRGP), 13, 612
 Covariance under Strategic Equivalence (COV), 6, 612
 Dual Cover Property (DCP), 653
 Dual Floor Property (DFP), 676
 Dual Replication Property (DRP), 653
 Efficiency (EFF), 612
 Equal Treatment Property (ETP), 612
 Excess Comparability (EC), 653
 HM-Reduced Game Property (HMS-RGP), 612
 HM-Reduced Game Property set-valued (HMS-RGP, 612
 HMS-Converse Reduced Game Property (HMS-CRGP), 612
 HMS-Weak Reduced Game Property (HMS-WRGP), 612
 HMS-Weak Reduced Game Property set-valued (HMS-WRGP), 612
 Imput. Saving Reduced Game Property (ISRGP), 613
 Individual Rationality (IR), 612
 Large Excess Difference Consistency (LEDCONS), 653, 672
 Large Excess Difference Converse Consistency (LEDCONCONS), 743
 Nonemptiness (NE), 6, 612
 Null-Player Property (NP), 612
 Pareto Optimal (PO), 6, 612
 Primal Replication Property (PRP), 676
 Reasonable (RE), 653
 Reasonable from above (REAB), 653
 Reasonable from below (REBE), 653
 Reconfirmation Property (RCP), 13, 612
 Reduced Game Property (RGP), 6, 612
 Reverse Excess Comparability (REC), 676
 Single-Valuedness (SIVA), 6, 612
 Small Excess Difference Consistency (SEDCONS), 676, 695
 Strong Converse Derived Game Property (SCDGP), 751
 Strong Converse Reduced Game Property (SCRGP), 612
 Strong Dual Cover Property (SDCP), 665
 Strong Dual Floor Property (SDFP), 692
 Symmetry (SYM), 612
 Weak Reduced Game Property (WRGP), 612

B

B0_balancedCollectionQ, 402, 404
 backslash operation, 561
 balanced collection, 10
 balanced contributions property, 7
 balanced TU game, 10
 BalancedCollectionQ, 841
 balancedCollectionQ, 399, 403, 607
 bankruptcy game, 21
 bankruptcy situation, 21
 bankruptcy_game, 303, 756
 banzhaf, 533, 538, 765
 BanzhafOwenValue, 579
 bargaining set, 16
 coalition structure, 447
 BaryCenter, 644
 Belief
 δ -, 866
 γ -, 866
 breakup, 866
 loyal, 866
 bell_number, 579
 belongToAntiCoreQ, 369, 437
 belongToCoreQ, 435, 437, 538, 717, 911
 belongToImputationSetQ, 447
 belongToWeberSetQ, 330
 Best reply of a firm, 854, 891
 Best response set, 856
 binary
 addition, 119
 arithmetic, 118
 division, 120
 multiplication, 120
 subtraction, 119
 bint_AssignmentGame, 345
 Blank, 188, 198, 240
 Blanks, 214
 Block, 229, 230
 bottom-up design, 104
 bs_PreKernel(), 561

C

CanonicalOrder, 299
 Cartel
 see coalition, 849
 Cases, 217
 Cdd_CSCorePlot, 454
 Cdd_CSCoreVertices, 448
 Cdd_CSImputationVertices, 447
 Cdd_CSInterImpSupAddCover, 452
 Cdd_InterImpCSImpSet, 452
 CddAntiCoreVertices, 369, 437
 CddCfrCoreVertices, 489
 CddCfrNucl, 493
 CddCoreCoverPlot, 525
 CddCoreCoverVertices, 524
 CddCoreMovie, 528, 794
 CddCorePlot, 522, 794
 CddCoreQ, 784
 CddCoreVertices, 436, 522, 538, 910
 CddImputationVertices, 447
 CddLeastCore, 528
 CDDMEX, 428
 CddStrongCorePlot, 527, 794
 CddWeberSetPlot, 525, 794
 center, 558, 581
 cfr_Kernel, 492
 cfr_kernelQ, 492
 cfr_nucl, 491
 cfr_PreKernel, 492
 cfr_PrekernelQ, 492
 cfr_PreNucl, 492
 character
 null-player, 545
 step, 545
 sum, 545
 Characteristic function
 α -, 855
 β -, 855
 δ -, 866
 γ -, 866
 s-type, 856
 characteristic function, 3
 characteristic vector, 396, 730
 characterizationSetNucleolus, 489
 Characters, 204
 class object
 p_TuCons, 809, 811
 p_TuKcons, 809, 814
 p_TuRep, 799
 p_TuShRep, 804
 p_TuSol, 776, 781
 p_TuVal, 782, 792
 TuACore, 792
 TuCons, 809
 TuCore, 792, 796
 TuGame, 773
 TuKcons, 809
 TuProp, 775
 TuRep, 799, 804
 TuShRep, 804, 808
 TuSol, 776, 781
 TuVal, 782, 792
 TuVert, 796, 799
 Clear, 223
 ClearAttributes, 211
 closed ball, 275
 closed neighborhood, 275
 CLP, 428
 clToMatlab, 302, 531
 coalition, 3
 closure, 509
 irreducible saturated, 509
 saturated, 509
 structure, 438, 445
 vital, 496
 coalition formation restrictions, 486
 CoalitionSolidarity, 478, 767, 786
 Cobb-Douglas
 see Function, 163, 285
 communication structure, 479
 Complement, 263
 Complex, 186, 205
 ComposeMarkets, 321
 Composition, 316
 compromiseAdmissibleQ, 525, 797
 compromiseStableQ, 525, 797
 ComputeRoot, 245, 246
 ComputeRoot2, 245
 concave TU game, 372
 concave_gameQ, 373
 concave_gameQ(), 328
 cone program, 425
 conic optimization, 425
 consistency
 reduced game property, 6, 612
 weak reduced game property, 612
 consistent solution, 68
 constant elasticity of substitution
 see Function, 285
 constant-sum game, 22
 ConstantSumQ, 431

Context, 187, 207
 Context'Name, 187, 207
 converse consistency
 converse reduced game property, 13, 612
 HMS converse reduced game property, 612
 converse reduced game property, 13, 612
 Converse_DGP_Q, 750
 Converse_RGP_Q, 626
 convex TU game, 4, 323
 convex_gameQ, 359, 433, 758, 784
 convex_gameQ(), 328
 ConvexQ, 840
 core, 7
 coalition structure, 447
 least-, 9
 strong ϵ -, 9
 CorePlot, 522, 794
 CoreQ, 840
 coreQ, 434, 534, 538
 CoreVertices, 435, 521
 cost matrix, 363
 counter-objection, 16, 447
 counting_basis, 518
 COV_propertyQ, 362
 COV_propertyQ(), 618
 cp_kernel, 425
 cp_prekernel, 425
 CPLEX, 428
 cplex_cfr_nucl, 493
 cplex_kernel, 427
 cplex_prenucl, 607
 cplex_weightedPreNucl, 607
 critical point, 277
 critical_value1, 527
 critical_value2, 527
 critical_value_star, 527
 cs_balancedCollectionQ, 472
 cs_Banzhaf, 578
 cs_belongToCoreQ, 452
 cs_belongToImputationSetQ, 452
 cs_CoreQ, 448
 cs_GetNc, 474
 cs_GetPrk, 467
 cs_GetPrn, 474
 cs_PreKernel, 467
 cs_PrekernelQ, 467
 cs_PreNucl, 472
 cs_Weak_balancedCollectionQ, 472
 CVX, 428
 cvx_kernel, 427
 cycle in the decomposition, 496

D

D, 195, 212, 281
 data type, 25
 DCP_propertyQ, 669
 DecomposeGame, 515, 608, 615
 DecomposeVN, 517
 DecVar, 288
 DeeganPackel, 540, 543
 DefineTuGame, 267
 Depth, 254
 derivative
 directional, 72, 73, 76
 Derived_game_propertyQ, 700
 DetMarketSide, 701
 DirectSumVN, 518
 Distribute, 261
 division
 left, 31
 right, 31

DixitGammaGame, 727, 729
 DM_Derived_game, 697
 DM_Reduced_game, 619, 642
 Do, 238, 241, 242
 domination-equivalent, 317
 Dot, 282
 DRP_propertyQ, 668
 DTImatrix, 518
 dual game, 22
 dual problem, 73, 278
 dual_game, 305
 DualBankruptcy, 265
 DualCover, 646
 DualEssentialSet, 495
 DuallySgnzSet, 498
 dummy player, 7

E

EC_propertyQ, 670
 ECCoverGame, 651, 721
 ECFloorGame, 721
 efficiency, 7
 Equal, 192
 equal_treatmentQ, 617
 Equilibrium
 Bertrand, 891
 Cournot, 854
 Nash, 854, 891
 post-merger, 866
 pre-merger, 854, 891
 Stackelberg, 856
 equilibrium
 subgame perfect, 12
 error
 catastrophic cancellation, 116
 floating-point exception, 116
 index overflow, 117
 index underflow, 117
 integer overflow, 118
 logical, 118
 magnification, 116
 negligible addition, 116
 round-off, 116
 runtime, 116, 117
 syntax, 116
 truncation, 116
 underflow, 116
 EssentialQ, 431
 essentialSet, 494
 Euclidean inner product, 60
 Euclidean norm, 60
 Euclidean scalar product, 60
 Evaluate, 210
 exact_game, 702
 exact_gameQ, 702
 excess, 4, 383
 excess code, 53
 Exp, 242
 Extract, 252
 extreme point, 275

F

Factorial, 186
 False, 195
 FindPreNucl, 355
 First, 282
 Flatten, 189
 flow problem, 348
 flow_game, 350
 flow_probMinCut, 354

Foc, 281
 For, 238, 241
 forest of spanning trees, 363
 formatPowerSet, 301
 FullForm, 185
 FullSimplify, 196
 Function
 α -characteristic, 855
 β -characteristic, 855
 δ -characteristic, 866
 γ -characteristic, 866
 s -type-characteristic, 856
 CES, 285
 characteristic, 3
 Cobb-Douglas, 163, 285
 concave, 276
 convex, 276
 cost, 849
 Lagrange dual function, 278
 Lagrangian, 277
 payoff, 849
 profit, 849
 quadratic, 458
 revenue, 850

G

Game
 Network Weighted Majority, 573
 game
 see TU game, 3, 266
 game_basis, 304
 gameToMama, 304, 327, 346, 917
 gameToMatlab, 304, 338, 917
 generalized inverse matrix, 78
 genUnionStable, 482, 786
 genWeightSystem, 404
 getgame, 305, 905
 getMinimalWinning, 568
 GetPartitions, 445
 getSymCostMatrix, 375
 global extremum, 275
 global maximizer, 275
 global maximum, 275
 global minimizer, 275
 global minimum, 275
 Global', 187, 207
 GLPK, 428
 Good
 differentiation, 851
 homogeneous, 850
 Gorman form, 874
 gradient, 72, 276
 greedy bankruptcy game, 21, 716
 greedy_bankruptcy, 305
 GreedyBankruptcy, 263
 grMaxFlowGame, 353
 GUROBI, 428
 gurobi_cfr_nucl, 493
 gurobi_kernel, 426
 gurobi_prenucl, 607

H

hadamard_basis, 518
 harsanyi_dividends, 305
 Head, 185
 Hessian matrix, 276
 HMS converse reduced game property, 612
 HMS-consistency
 see reduced game property (HMS), 612
 HMS-consistency set-valued

 see reduced game property (HMS), 612
 HMS-weak consistency
 see weak reduced game property (HMS), 612
 HMS_InputSavingReducedGame(), 631
 HMS_Reduced_game, 619
 Hold, 208, 210
 HoldAll, 210, 224
 HoldFirst, 221
 HoldForm, 201
 HoldFrom, 210
 HoldPattern, 210
 holler, 539
 Holler-Packel Index, 539
 homogeneous_representationQ, 536
 HSL, 428
 hypergraphQ, 485, 786

I

idempotent, 60
 identity matrix, 60
 If, 238
 Im, 206
 imputation
 coalition structure, 446
 imputation set, 3
 ImputationVertices, 383, 435
 InputSavingReducedGame, 631
 inconsistent solution, 68
 indexing
 linear, 65
 subscripted, 65
 indicator function, 10, 396, 730
 individual rationality, 3
 infix notation, 248
 Integer, 186, 197, 205
 IntegerDigits, 205
 interior point, 276
 interpreted language, 25, 185
 IntersectionEssDualEssSets, 495
 IntersectionMaxCoalCorners, 702
 IPOPT, 428
 IrredAntiCore, 379
 IrredCostMatrix, 372
 irreducible cost matrix, 371
 irreducible form, 371
 ISRG_propertyQ, 632

J

Johnston, 543

K

k_convexQ, 433
 Kernel, 391, 425
 kernel, 4
 coalition structure, 454
 kernelQ, 425
 KKT condition
 see Optimization, 279
 Kruskal's algorithm, 363

L

L, 281, 282
 Lagrange dual
 see Function, 73, 278
 Lagrange multiplier
 see Shadow Price, 73, 278
 Lagrangian
 see Function, 277
 large excess difference, 650
 least-core, 9

LED, 651
 LED__propertyQ, 652
 LedcoconsQ, 745
 Lexicographical
 minimum, 389
 smallest coalitions, 389
 smallest coalitions for a c.s., 466
 LexOrder, 300
 LieBracket, 209
 lin_weightedPreKernel, 607
 linear system, 68
 List, 185, 201, 282
 local extreme point, 276
 local extremum, 276
 local maximizer, 276
 local maximum, 276
 local minimizer, 276
 local minimum, 276
 London Heathrow, 145, 161
 Lorenz maximal, 622
 Lorenz set, 622
 Lorenz solution, 622
 LorenzDom, 623
 LorenzMaxCoreQ, 623
 LorenzSol, 623
 Loss of Significance, 388
 LS_Nucl, 423
 LS_Nucl(), 841
 LS_PreNucl, 422
 LS_PreNucl(), 841
 LSNuc, 841
 LSPreNuc, 841

M

m.c.s.t. game, 363
 m.c.s.t. problem, 363
 Map, 204, 233, 242, 262, 280, 841
 map
 linear, 61
 mapping
 linear, 61
 MapThread, 190, 211, 234, 265
 marginal contribution, 23
 marginal worth vector, 328
 restricted, 625
 Market
 Cournot, 849
 direct, 319
 price, 850
 price of brand, 851
 pure exchange economy, 311
 market_game(), 471
 MarketGameQ, 314, 472
 MatchQ, 214
 mathematical programming problem
 see optimization problem, 277
 MATLAB
 abs, 60
 ans, 27
 bin2dec, 55, 135
 blkdiag, 63
 cd, 154
 cell, 91
 cell2mat, 93
 char, 45
 class, 30
 clear, 28
 colon, 34
 ctranspose, 35
 dec2bin, 49, 135
 det, 80

diag, 63
 disp, 95
 double, 30
 eig, 86
 end, 37
 eps, 27
 exp, 27
 for, 133, 134, 152
 format long, 30
 format short, 30
 fprintf, 112
 if, 133
 index, 154
 Inf, 27
 input, 50
 intmax, 27
 intmin, 27
 inv, 70, 88
 issymmetric, 86
 ldivide, 36
 linprog, 339
 lt, 60
 lu, 84
 M-function, 122
 M-script file, 47
 minus, 31, 60
 mldivide, 31
 mpower, 31
 mrdivide, 31
 mtimes, 31
 namelengthmax, 29
 NaN, 27
 norm, 74
 null, 75
 numel, 158
 ones, 63
 pi, 27
 pinv, 78
 plot, 95
 plot3, 99
 plus, 31, 32
 pre-allocation, 88
 qr, 82
 randi, 39
 rank, 70
 rdivide, 36
 realmax, 27
 realmin, 27
 recursive M-function, 168
 save, 28
 single, 30
 size, 44
 str2func, 150
 string, 45
 struct, 94
 subplot, 98
 surf, 102
 svd, 83
 switch, 133, 144
 syms, 32
 tic/toc, 159
 times, 36
 title, 98
 tril, 64
 triu, 64
 true, 66
 try/catch, 149
 uminus, 31
 while, 133, 162
 whos, 28
 xlabel, 98
 ylabel, 98

- zeros, 62
- matrix, 60
 - adjoint, 60
 - generalized inverse, 78
 - idempotent, 60
 - identity, 60
 - invertible, 68
 - isometric, 81
 - Moore-Penrose, 78
 - non-singular, 68
 - null, 60
 - orthogonal, 81
 - projection, 78
 - pseudo-inverse, 78
 - rectangular, 68
 - self-adjoint, 60, 460
 - singular, 68
 - square, 69
 - symmetric, 459
 - transpose, 60
- matrix factorization
 - Cholesky, 85
 - LU, 84
 - QR, 81
 - singular value, 82
- matrix theory, 60
- MatrixForm, 192, 252
- Max, 264
- Maximum surplus, 389
- maximum surplus, 4
- Maximum surplus for a c.s., 466
- maximum value, 275
- mcst_game, 366
- method
 - copy_p_TuRep, 804
 - copy_p_TuShRep, 808
 - copyTuSol, 803, 804, 808
 - p_copyTuCons, 811
 - p_copyTuKcons, 814
 - p_copyTuSol, 811, 813, 814
 - p_setADvalue, 792
 - p_setAllSolutions, 781
 - p_setAllValues, 791, 792
 - p_setAntiPreKernel, 782
 - p_setApuSolidarity, 792
 - p_setBanzhaf, 781
 - p_setCoalitionSolidarity, 792
 - p_setCoalitionStructures, 789, 791, 792
 - p_setConverse_RGP, 811
 - p_setKConverse_RGP, 814
 - p_setKReconfirmation_property, 814
 - p_setKReducedGameProperty, 814
 - p_setKStrConverse_RGP, 814
 - p_setMyerson, 792
 - p_setMyersonUS, 792
 - p_setOwen, 792
 - p_setPosition, 792
 - p_setPositionHS, 792
 - p_setPreKernel, 781
 - p_setPreNuc, 781
 - p_setReconfirmation_property, 811
 - p_setReduced_game_property, 811
 - p_setShapley, 781, 792
 - p_setSolidarity, 792
 - p_setSolidarityShapley, 792
 - p_setTauValue, 781
 - p_TuCons, 809, 811
 - p_TuKcons, 814
 - p_TuSol, 781
 - p_TuVal, 782, 785, 792
 - setADvalue, 792
 - setAllSolutions, 779, 781
 - setAllValues, 791, 792
 - setAllVertices, 798, 799
 - setAntiPreKernel, 779, 781
 - setApuSolidarity, 792
 - setBanzhaf, 779, 781
 - setCddCoverVertices, 799
 - setCddImpVertices, 799
 - setCddVertices, 799
 - setCoalitionSolidarity, 792
 - setCoalitionStructures, 786, 791, 792
 - setImpVertices, 799
 - setMyerson, 792
 - setMyersonUS, 792
 - setOwen, 792
 - setPosition, 792
 - setPositionHS, 792
 - setPreKernel, 778, 781
 - setPreNuc, 779, 781
 - setReplicate_Prk, 800, 804
 - setReplicate_Shapley, 806–808
 - setShapley, 778, 781, 792
 - setSolidarity, 792
 - setSolidarityShapley, 792
 - setStrongCores, 794
 - setTauValue, 779, 781
 - setVertices, 799
 - TuCore, 793
 - TuGame, 773
 - TuProp, 775
 - TuRep, 799, 804
 - TuShRep, 808
 - TuSol, 776, 781
 - TuVal, 782, 784, 785, 792
 - TuVert, 797, 799
- Min, 264
- min_game, 639
- min_homogrep(), 548
- minimal tree, 363
- minimal tree solution, 363
- minimal_winning, 536
- minimization a p -norm, 836
- Minimum cost spanning tree, 388
- minimum cost tree solution, 365
- minimum no-blocking payoff, 338
- minimum norm property, 78
- minimum representation, 544
- minimum value, 275
- minNoBlockPayoff, 339
- Mod, 186
- modest bankruptcy game, 716
- modest-bankruptcy game, 21
- ModestBankruptcy, 258, 262
- Modiclus, 637, 640, 728
- modiclusQ, 640, 728
- modified coalition array, 836
- ModPreKernel, 735, 736
- ModPrekernelQ, 736
- modular program, 114
- Module, 229, 230, 258, 264
- monotone_gameQ, 432, 532
- monotonic TU game, 3
- MOSEK, 428
- msk_cfr_nucl, 493
- msk_kernel, 425, 427
- msk_prekernel, 425
- MTRCostMatrix, 367
- myaa, 104, 522
- MyersonValue, 480, 578, 786
- N
- negative definite, 276

- negative semi-definite, 276
- NetworkDeeganPackel, 576
- NetworkJohnston, 576
- NetworkMajorityGame, 576
- NetworkPGI, 575
- NetworkShapleyShubik, 577
- Normal form game, 849
 - oligopoly, 849
- normalized condition, 78
- NSolve, 281
- nucl, 394
- nucl_llp, 355
- nucleolus, 5, 273
- NucleolusThreePerson, 271
- null matrix, 60
- null space, 61
- null-player, 22
- NullPlayer_propertyQ, 616
- nullShapley, 516
- nullShapleyLB, 516
- number
 - fixed-decimal, 56
 - fixed-point, 56
 - normalized floating-point, 52
- O**
- OASES, 428
- object-oriented programming, 771
- objection, 16, 447
- oddeven_game, 504
- offset binary, 53
- ols_weightedPreKernel, 607
- open ball, 275
- open neighborhood, 275
- Optimization
 - weak duality, 278
 - complementary slackness, 278
 - constraint qualification, 279
 - Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions, 279
 - optimal duality gap, 278
 - optimization problem, 277
 - regularity condition, 279
 - strong duality, 278
- Options, 288
- orthogonal, 61
 - decomposition, 61
 - projection, 61
- Orthogonal projection, 387, 465
- Outer, 252
- outer product, 61
- outweighs, 4
- OwenValue, 477, 579, 766, 785
- P**
- p_ADvalue, 766
- p_average_convexQ, 759
- p_banzhaf, 765
- p_CddTotallyBalancedQ, 356
- p_CoalitionSolidarity, 767
- p_convex_gameQ, 758
- p_OwenValue, 766
- p_PreKernel, 756, 759, 764, 765, 768
- p_PrekernelQ, 757
- p_Reduced_game_propertyQ, 760, 761
- p_replicate_prk, 761
- p_replicate_Shapley, 762
- p_totallyBalancedQ, 356
- p_union_stableQ, 784
- p_weightedOwen, 767
- pairwise equilibrium procedure, 4
- parity_basis, 518
- Part, 202
- particular choice, 78
- Partition function game, 866
- PartitionGameQ, 565
- PartitionSL, 480
- path, 363
- payoff, 3
- permutation group, 328
- PermutationGame, 347, 446
- PGI, 539
- player, 3
- Plot, 212, 247
- PlotCostGraph, 365, 441
- Plus, 186, 201
- PModPreKernel, 735
- PModPrekernelQ, 735
- PositionValue, 484, 786
- positive definite, 276
- positive semi-definite, 276
- Potential, 274, 381
- potential, 23
- Power, 186, 215
- Power Index
 - Holler and Packel, 539
 - Shapley-Shubik, 577
- Power index
 - Banzhaf-Coleman, 533, 765
 - Deegan-Packel, 540, 542, 576
 - Holler, 575
 - Johnston, 543, 576
 - Public Good, 575
 - Shapley-Shubik, 539
- PowerSet, 260, 300, 308
- pre-bargaining set
 - coalition structure, 447
- pre-imputation
 - coalition structure, 446
- pre-imputation set, 3
- Pre-kernel, 388
 - algorithm, 387
- pre-kernel, 4
 - coalition structure, 454
- Pre-kernel for a c.s., 466
- pre-nucleolus, 5
- Predicate, 218
- predicate, 203
- PreKernel, 390, 533, 543, 756, 759, 764, 768, 769, 907, 917
- PreKernelEqualsKernelQ, 841
- PrekernelQ, 387, 392, 533, 543, 605, 757
- PreNucl, 356, 394
- PreNucl_llp, 355
- PrenuclQ, 355
- Prim's algorithm, 363
- primal problem, 73, 278
- principal minors, 276
- Principle of Explosion, 923
- PrkEqsModPrkQ, 739
- production_game_sq, 782
- profit_matrix, 344
- projection, 60
 - matrix, 78
 - operator, 463
 - orthogonal, 61, 463
- projective game, 564
- proper coalition, 9
- Property I, 397, 469, 487
- Property II, 397, 469
- Property II modified (IIM), 837
- PropModPreKernel, 737
- proposal, 4, 414
- PS property, 358

ps_gameQ, 360
 pseudo-inverse matrix, 78
 Pseudo-inverse of matrix, 387
 psstar_game, 361
 Public Good Index
 Holler and Packel, 539
 Pure Functions, 247

Q

QPBB, 428
 QPC, 428
 QuadraticForm, 288
 QuadRep, 288
 quotas, 382
 Quotient, 186

R

RandomInteger, 234
 RandomReal, 222
 Range, 260
 Rational, 186, 205
 Re, 206
 Real, 186
 RealDigits, 205
 reasonable set, 6
 REC_propertyQ, 693
 RecComputeRoot, 246
 Reconfirmation_propertyQ, 629
 rectangular matrix, 68
 Recursion, 168, 246
 reduced game property, 6, 612
 Hart and Mas-Colell (HMS), 612
 reduced game property set-valued
 Hart and Mas-Colell (HMS), 612
 Reduced_game_propertyQ, 620, 622, 643
 reference
 pass by, 126
 reflexive condition, 78
 Remove, 223
 Replace, 190
 ReplaceAll, 194, 201, 233
 ReplacePart, 202, 203
 ReplaceRepeated, 237
 ReplceAll, 255, 282
 replicate_nc, 503
 replicate_prk, 511
 replicate_Shapley, 514
 representation
 normalized floating-point, 52
 reversed normalized condition, 78
 Rewrite Rules, 220
 root_game, 339
 Rule, 194, 201, 233, 235, 255, 282
 RuleDelayed, 233, 235

S

SameQ, 193, 238, 261, 265
 satisfaction, 567
 SaveFrames, 528
 savings_game, 303
 SED_propertyQ, 694
 SeedRandom, 221
 select_starting_pt, 606
 self-adjoint matrix, 60, 460
 semi_convexQ, 433
 separating_collectionQ, 332, 568
 Set, 187, 192, 220
 SetDelayed, 187, 192, 224
 sgnzSet, 497

Shadow Price
 Lagrange multiplier, 73, 278
 Shapley value, 6, 388
 ShapleyQ, 359
 ShapleyValue, 359, 370, 380, 533, 539, 758, 760, 765, 785
 ShapleyValueLB, 380
 ShapleyValueM, 380
 shiftGame, 655
 ShubikBertGammaGame, 739
 side conditions, 219
 side-payment, 3
 significand, 52
 coefficient, 52
 fraction, 52
 matissa, 52
 simple committee game
 simple game, 530
 simple game, 22
 simple_game, 532, 537
 Simplify, 196
 singular matrix, 68
 Situation
 bankruptcy, 21
 Cournot, 849
 direct market, 319
 market, 311
 mcst, 388
 minimum cost spanning tree, 388
 oligopoly, 849
 small excess difference, 674
 snigSet, 502
 SOCP
 second-order cone program, 425
 SolidarityShapleyValue, 478, 786
 SolidarityValue, 475, 786
 Solow growth model, 162
 solow_capital, 164
 Solution
 consistent, 389, 466
 linear system of equations, 389, 466
 solution
 consistent, 68
 inconsistent, 68
 subgame perfect equilibrium, 12
 solution concept, 4
 anti-core, 11, 368, 436
 anti-imputation set, 414, 435
 anti-kernel, 369, 414
 anti-nucleolus, 369, 417
 anti-pre-kernel, 414
 anti-pre-nucleolus, 417
 bargaining set, 16
 bargaining set w.r.t. c.s., 447
 center solution, 545
 core, 7
 core w.r.t. c.s., 447
 irreducible anti-core, 372
 irreducible core, 372
 kernel, 4
 kernel for c.s., 454
 least-core, 9
 Lorenz, 622
 Lorenz set, 622
 Modiclus, 637
 nucleolus, 5
 pre-bargaining set w.r.t. c.s., 447
 pre-kernel, 4, 388
 pre-kernel for a c.s., 466
 pre-kernel for c.s., 454
 pre-nucleolus, 5
 quasi-core, 9
 self dual, 22

- set, 4
- Shapley value, 6, 388
- stable sets, 15
- standard solution, 7, 268
- strong ϵ -core, 9
- super-additive cover, 449
- value, 4
- von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions, 15
- solution scheme
 - see solution concept, 4
- Solve, 189, 243, 281
- SolveOpt, 281, 283, 290
- Sort, 262
- sortsets, 298, 904, 917
- space
 - null, 61
 - vector, 60
- spanning tree, 363
- SplitSimpleGame(), 555
- square matrix, 69
- StandardSolution, 269, 476
- star, 558, 581
- stationary point, 277
- Strategic-form game
 - see normal form game, 849
- StrConverse_DGP_Q(), 751
- strict local maximum, 276
- strict local minimum, 276
- String, 186
- strong ϵ -core, 9
- strong converse consistency
 - strong converse reduced game property, 612
- strong converse reduced game property, 612
- SubGame, 476
- subgame perfect equilibrium, 12
- Subsets, 252, 258, 261
- Subtractive Cancellation, 388
- super-additive cover, 449
- super-additive TU game, 3
- super_additiveQ, 318, 433
- superadditive_cover, 449
- superadditiveQ, 449
- Switch, 238, 240
- Symbol, 186, 206
- SymbolName, 206
- symmetricQ, 617
- symmetry, 7

T

- Table, 234, 242
- TableForm, 252
- Talmudic_Rule, 303, 390, 717, 757, 760
- TauValue, 382, 534, 543
- Term Rewriting, 208, 237
 - Rules, 208
- term rewriting, 220
- TImatrix, 518
- timeit, 159
- Times, 186, 201
- top-down design, 104
- ToSimplex3d, 96, 99
- ToString, 204
- totally anti-balanced TU game, 12
- totally balanced TU game, 10
- Trace, 194, 202, 209, 234
- TracePrint, 194
- transfer, 3
- transformation
 - linear, 60
- Transformation Rule, 199, 233
 - Local Rewrite Rule, 194, 233

- transpose matrix, 60
- tree, 363
- True, 193
- Trust
 - see coalition, 849
- TU game, 3, 266
 - α -, 855
 - β -, 855
 - δ -, 866
 - γ -, 866
 - s -type, 856
 - t -shift, 650
- additive, 3, 429
- airport cost, 107, 326
- almost average-convex, 337
- almost-convex, 334
- anti-balanced, 12
- anti-derived, 707
- anti-monotonic cover, 368
- anti-reduced, 673
- assignment, 344
- average-convex, 335
- balanced, 10, 313
- bankruptcy, 21
- concave, 326, 372
- constant-sum, 22, 429
- convex, 4, 323, 429
- cost savings, 326, 388
- derived, 697
- dual, 22, 429
- dual cover, 646
- dual extension, 645
- dual floor, 676
- essential, 5, 428
- excess comparability cover, 650
- excess comparability floor, 674
- flow, 349
- greedy bankruptcy, 21, 716
- homogeneous standard, 545
- inessential, 5, 429
- m.c.s.t., 365
- market, 312
- minimum, 639
- modest bankruptcy, 716
- monotonic, 3, 429
- partition, 562
- partition function, 866
- permutation, 346
- positive, 325
- primal extension, 645
- PS, 358
- reduced, 641
- root, 337
- rooted, 337
- satellite, 546
- shift, 650
- simple, 22
- strictly essential, 5, 22
- subgame, 3, 10
- submodular, 326
- super-additive, 3, 429
- super-modular, 429
- totally anti-balanced, 12
- totally balanced, 10, 313
- truncated, 545
- weakly super-additive, 429
- weighed graph, 356
- weighted majority, 22
- zero-normalized, 5
- zero-one-normalized, 5
- tug_AntiPreKernel, 909
- tug_AvConvexQ, 902, 906

tug_BalancedSelectionQ, 908, 911
 tug_BelongToCoreQ, 910
 tug_CollectionBalancedQ, 904
 tug_ConvexQ, 901
 tug_DetUCoord, 905
 tug_Mnuc, 909
 tug_Nuc, 909
 tug_PreKernel, 907, 911
 tug_PreNuc, 908
 tug_ShapleyValue, 906
 tug_SymGameSizeK, 903
 tug_SymGameType2, 902
 tug_SymGameType3, 903
 tug_SymGameType4, 903
 tug_ZeroMonotoneQ, 909

U

undirected edge, 363
 undirected graph, 356
 Unevaluated, 210
 union stable structure, 482
 union stable system, 481
 union_stableQ, 482, 578, 786
 UnionStableBasis, 481
 UtopiaPayoff, 524

V

Value

Aumann-Drèze, 475, 766
 Banzhaf, 533, 538
 Banzhaf with communication structure, 578
 Banzhaf-Coleman, 533
 Banzhaf-Owen, 579
 Coalition Solidarity, 478, 767
 Deegan-Packel, 540, 542, 576
 Holler, 575
 Johnston, 543, 576
 Myerson, 480, 578
 of a coalition, 3
 Owen, 477, 579, 766
 Position, 484
 Public Good, 575
 Shapley, 6, 380, 388, 539, 760, 765
 Shapley-Shubik, 533, 576
 Solidarity, 475
 Solidarity Shapley, 478
 Solidarity w.r.t. à priori unions, 479
 Tau, 382, 543
 weighted Owen, 767
 weighted Shapley, 381

value

eigen, 463
 pass by, 126

value_matrix, 348

variable

global, 125

local, 125
 scope, 125
 vclToMatlab, 306, 309, 403
 vector
 average marginal contributions, 6
 characteristic, 10
 coefficient, 60
 column, 60
 marginal contributions, 4
 null, 60
 vector space, 60
 veto-player, 22
 veto_players, 534, 537
 veto_rich_players, 338

W

walsh_basis, 518
 weak Anti-Property I, 421
 weak Anti-Property II, 422
 weak reduced game property, 612
 Hart and Mas-Colell (HMS), 612
 Weak_balancedCollectionQ, 401
 weakly_super_additiveQ, 318, 433
 weighted graph problem, 356
 weighted majority game, 22
 weighted_majority, 535, 764
 weighted_truncated, 550
 weightedBalancedCollectionQ, 406
 weightedExcess, 407
 weightedGraphGame, 359
 weightedKernel, 410
 weightedKernelQ, 410
 WeightedMajority, 250, 256
 weightedNucl, 410
 weightedOwen, 767
 weightedPreKernel, 410, 606
 weightedPrekernelQ, 410
 weightedPreNucl, 406
 weightedShapley, 381
 Which, 238, 240, 254
 While, 238, 242, 244
 winning player, 536, 545
 winning_coalitions, 531, 537
 winning_players(), 555
 With, 229
 worth
 see value of a coalition, 3
 WSysKernelQ, 411
 WSysNuclQ, 407
 WSysPreKernelQ, 411
 WSysPreNuclQ, 407

Z

zero_monotonicQ, 432, 532
 ZeroMonotoneQ, 840
 ZeroMonotonicQ, 840