Digital Forensics Assignment 2:

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Question 1:

Task 1 –

a,b)



Protocol	Percent Packets	Packets	Percent Bytes	Bytes	Bits/s	End Packets	End Bytes	End Bits/s
Frame	100.0	2197	100.0	961585	93 k	0	0	0
Ethernet	100.0	2197	3.2	30758	2978	0	0	0
Internet Protocol Version 6	1.3	29	0.1	1160	112	0	0	0
User Datagram Protocol	1.3	29	0.0	232	22	0	0	0
Simple Service Discovery Protocol	0.3	6	0.1	570	55	6	570	55
eXtensible Markup Language	0.9	20	1.3	12480	1208	20	12480	1208
DHCPv6	0.1	3	0.0	285	27	3	285	27
Internet Protocol Version 4	98.7	2168	4.5	43360	4199	0	0	0
User Datagram Protocol	14.2	312	0.3	2496	241	0	0	0
Simple Service Discovery Protocol	0.5	10	0.1	1154	111	10	1154	111
Multicast Domain Name System	0.1	2	0.1	565	54	2	565	54
eXtensible Markup Language	0.8	18	1.2	11232	1087	18	11232	1087
Dropbox LAN sync Discovery Protocol	0.1	3	0.0	399	38	3	399	38
Domain Name System	12.7	279	2.4	22607	2189	279	22607	2189
Transmission Control Protocol	84.5	1856	4.0	38048	3684	1304	27008	2615
Transport Layer Security	22.9	504	80.3	772477	74 k	504	693531	67 k
Hypertext Transfer Protocol	0.8	18	3.4	33144	3209	11	3047	295
Online Certificate Status Protocol	0.1	3	0.1	1405	136	3	1405	136
Media Type	0.2	4	2.9	27506	2663	4	27506	2663
FTP Data	0.1	2	0.1	1200	116	0	0	0
Line-based text data	0.1	2	0.1	1200	116	2	1200	116
File Transfer Protocol (FTP)	1.3	28	0.1	664	64	28	664	64

c)

Top 3 protocols by percentage of traffic:

- Transport Layer Security (TLS): 80.3% of bytes (772,477 / 961,585)
- Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP): 3.4% of bytes (33,144 / 961,585)
- Domain Name System (DNS): 2.4% of bytes (22,607 / 961,585)

d)

- Domain Names:



The filter applied to the TLS protocol is the ‘tls.handshake == 1’ which filters the packets where the client and server establish a communication and isolating all the TLS Client Hello packets.

The protocol TLSv1.2 is the dominant protocol as it is the most frequent packet.

3. Summary

Source IP	Destination IP	Domain Name (SNI)
192.168.76.131	52.230.85.180	client.wns.windows.com
192.168.76.131	52.230.89.150	office365-tas.msedge.net
192.168.76.131	13.107.3.128	edge.skype.com
192.168.76.131	52.114.128.43	events.data.microsoft.com
192.168.76.131	55.55.163.76	login.live.com
192.168.76.131	204.79.197.203	static-spartan-eas-s-msn-com.akamaized.net

TLS domain names

DNS -



The source packet for all Client Hello packets is 192.168.76.131 which indicates a single client machine within the local network.

There are multiple external destination IP addresses which are most likely public servers being hosted by various services.

The filter applied to the DNS protocol is the dns filter. The domain names are:

- config.edge.skype.com
  clientoffice365tas.msedge.net
  client.wns.windows.com
  cdn.onenote.net
  candycrush.king.com
  ocsp.digicert.com
  v10.events.data.microsoft.com
  wpad.localdomain
  tileservice.weather.microsoft.com
  cdn.content.prod.cms.msn.com

nexus.officeapps.live.com
login.live.com
arc.msn.com
skypeecs-prod-edge-a.trafficmanager.net
licensing.mp.microsoft.com
static-spartan-eas-s-msn-com.akamaized.net otf.msn.com
ctldl.windowsupdate.com
gmail.com
www.bing.com
www.msn.com
settings.data.microsoft.com
sam.msn.com
ocsp.pki.goog
iecvlist.microsoft.com

HTTP-

3. IP Addresses

The **Source** and **Destination IPs** are already visible:

Source IP	Destination IP
192.168.76.131	117.18.237.29
192.168.76.131	8.253.181.235
192.168.76.131	172.217.31.14
192.168.76.131	8.253.224.254
8.253.181.235	192.168.76.131

The domain names from the extracted sample of visible HTTP GET requests are:

- msdownload.update.microsoft.com
- ocsp (OCSP responses – no domain just protocol context)
- v3/static/trusted – part of a subpath for updates (assumed Microsoft-related)

These domains indicate:
Microsoft services (updates and OCSP for certificate validation).

- User Agents



Filter the packets by http to isolate HTTP packets from other packets. All HTTP requests were made from the user agent: Microsoft-CryptoAPI/10.0\r\n.

User agents for the DNS protocol are the same as the user agents for HTTP protocol

User agents for the TLS protocol cannot be fetched as the connections are encrypted. Therefore, the only way to get the user agent is by getting either the decryption key or to capture the HTTP requests in the traffic (which is not applicable here).

- IP Addresses

3. IP Addresses

The following **source and destination IP addresses** were extracted:

Source IP	Destination IP
192.168.76.131	192.168.76.2
52.230.85.180	52.114.128.43
185.48.81.186	23.50.21.104
104.111.199.225	103.95.86.112
117.18.237.29	13.107.3.128
52.232.69.150	52.229.207.60
52.175.39.99	8.253.181.235
172.217.31.5	23.99.125.55
204.79.197.203	13.107.21.200
67.27.41.254	67.24.13.254

Task 2 –

a)







By following the TCP Stream for the pcap files we get the following keylogger.

b)



c)



After we opened pcap file using Network Miner we find that we have 50 hosts and 1 credential. The credentials are displayed in b) are:

- Client IP: 192.168.76.131
- Server IP: 140.82.59.185
- Protocol: FTP
- Username: test_user
- Password: Nipun@123
- Valid Login: unknown
- First Login: 2018-11-29 5:57:33 UTC

d) The files needed are the ones that have their protocol as FTP as this is the protocol that the attacker is using to receive the data from the keylogger.



Frame nr.	Filename	Extension	Size	Source host	S. port	Destination host	D. port	Protocol
33	login.live.com[5].cer	cer	2 309 B	65.55.163.76 [vs.login.msa.akadns6.net] [login.msa.akadn...	TCP 443	192.168.76.131	TCP 51647	TlsCertifi
33	Microsoft IT TLS CA 2[5].cer	cer	1 464 B	65.55.163.76 [vs.login.msa.akadns6.net] [login.msa.akadn...	TCP 443	192.168.76.131	TCP 51647	TlsCertifi
41	wns.windows.com[2].cer	cer	1 720 B	52.230.85.180 [sg2p.wns.notify.windows.com.akadns.net] ...	TCP 443	192.168.76.131	TCP 51649	TlsCertifi
41	Microsoft IT TLS CA 5[2].cer	cer	1 464 B	52.230.85.180 [sg2p.wns.notify.windows.com.akadns.net] ...	TCP 443	192.168.76.131	TCP 51649	TlsCertifi
93	wns.windows.com[3].cer	cer	1 720 B	52.230.85.180 [sg2p.wns.notify.windows.com.akadns.net] ...	TCP 443	192.168.76.131	TCP 51650	TlsCertifi
93	Microsoft IT TLS CA 5[3].cer	cer	1 464 B	52.230.85.180 [sg2p.wns.notify.windows.com.akadns.net] ...	TCP 443	192.168.76.131	TCP 51650	TlsCertifi
145	Keys_2018-11-28_16-04-42[1].html	html	579 B	192.168.76.131	TCP 51651	140.82.59.185	TCP 18439	FTP

1) The infected system is the system with IP 192.168.76.131 as we can see that the first few requests the destination host is the same but the it changed.
2) As soon as the protocol changed to FTP in which the system became the source and the destination host changed to the attacker's destination host of 140.82.59.185.
3) These were the files that were sent to the attacker



11:28 [29 November 2018] : nipun : Start - Microsoft Edge

http://gmail.com/

4) In addition to the keystrokes, we found the time the file was created and uploaded.

1. Timestamps of file creation and upload:

- Keys_2018-11-28_16-04-42[1].html:
  - Timestamp: 28 November 2018 [16:04].
- Web_2018-11-29_11-28-13[1].html:
  - Timestamp: 29 November 2018 [11:28].
- Both timestamps indicate when the files were likely generated by the keylogger and uploaded to the FTP server.

Question 2:



Apply a display filter ... <Ctrl-/>

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000000	212.252.18.251	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	18026 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
2	0.000001800	147.227.17.36	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	17730 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
3	0.000003500	212.212.4.163	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	11714 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
4	0.000005200	200.80.27.215	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	19322 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
5	0.000178000	95.173.168.10	10.0.63.131	TCP	64	2338 → 1986 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=4096 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
6	0.000173000	219.99.40.17	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	21271 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
7	0.000201700	212.252.18.223	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	17998 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
8	0.000203700	147.227.17.67	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	17761 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
9	0.000215700	147.227.17.142	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	17836 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
10	0.000217800	147.227.17.78	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	17772 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
11	0.000219500	212.212.4.215	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	11766 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
12	0.000221300	123.83.1.151	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	15405 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
13	0.000223000	123.83.1.102	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	15356 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
14	0.000224800	147.227.17.137	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	17831 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
15	0.000226500	147.227.17.140	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	17834 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
16	0.000228200	194.74.28.121	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	19478 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
17	0.000229900	147.227.17.48	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	17742 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
18	0.000231600	147.227.17.86	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	17780 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
19	0.000233400	212.252.19.85	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	18116 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
20	0.000235200	212.252.19.3	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	18034 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
21	0.000236800	212.212.4.224	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	11775 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
22	0.000238600	212.252.19.83	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	18114 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
23	0.000240300	219.99.39.181	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	21179 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
24	0.000495700	Cisco_46:1b:71	Broadcast	ARP	60	Who has 10.0.63.129? Tell 10.0.63.130
25	0.000520100	219.99.39.200	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	21198 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
26	0.000524500	147.227.17.159	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	17853 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
27	0.000526200	206.126.36.130	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	19387 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
28	0.000528000	147.227.17.152	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	17846 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
29	0.000529000	212.212.4.232	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	11783 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
30	0.000531500	206.126.36.156	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	19413 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
31	0.000533200	206.126.36.118	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	19375 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
32	0.000534900	206.126.36.157	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	19414 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
33	0.000536600	206.126.36.217	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	19474 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
34	0.000538400	212.252.19.92	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	18123 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
35	0.000540200	131.171.39.242	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	20912 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
36	0.000589300	95.173.168.10	10.0.63.132	TCP	64	2339 → 1986 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=4096 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
37	0.000591500	147.227.17.42	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	17736 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]
38	0.000593300	142.142.28.129	10.0.64.129	TCP	64	16554 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=16384 Len=0[Packet size limited during capture]

1) As we can see this is a SYN Flood Attack (or a DDOS Attack) in order to crash the server service and prevent the real users from being able to access the server. The attack overwhelms the server with TCP Requests without waiting to listen to the server response (ACK or NACK). We can tell this is a SYN Flood Attack as the attacker is using different IPs to ping the same server port in very short periods of time (milliseconds).
2)

IP Address	35.195.39.218
Location	Brussels, Brussels Capital, Belgium (BE), Europe
Network	35.195.32.0/21

This range covers 2048 IP addresses which all likely belong to the same geographical location (Brussels, Belgium, Europe).

- First IP: 35.195.32.0 (Network Address)
- Last IP: 35.195.32.0 (Broadcast Address)
- Network: 35.195.32.0/21
- Range: 35.195.32.0 to 35.195.39.255



This range covers 1024 IP addresses which all likely belong to the same geographical location (Brussels, Belgium, Europe).

- First IP: 35.195.40.0 (Network Address)
- Last IP: 35.195.43.255 (Broadcast Address)
- Network: 35.195.40.0/22
- Range: 35.195.40.0 to 35.195.43.255



This range covers 65,536 IP addresses which all likely belong to the same geographical location (Ashburn, Virginia, United States, North America).

- First IP: 44.204.1.208 (Network Address)
- Last IP: 44.204.255.255 (Broadcast Address)
- Network: 44.204.0.0/16
- Range: 44.204.0.0 to 44.204.255.255



View results

IP Address	Location	Network
60.180.23.58	Wenzhou, Zhejiang, China (CN), Asia	60.180.0.0/19

This range covers 8192 IP addresses which all likely belong to the same geographical location (Wenzhou, Zhejiang, China, Asia).

- First IP: 60.180.0.0 (Network Address)
- Last IP: 60.180.31.255 (Broadcast Address)
- Network: 60.180.0.0/19
- Range: 60.180.0.0 to 60.180.31.255



View results

IP Address	Location	Network
60.180.37.170	Wenzhou, Zhejiang, China (CN), Asia	60.180.32.0/21

This range covers 2048 IP addresses which all likely belong to the same geographical location (Wenzhou, Zhejiang, China, Asia).

- First IP: 60.180.32.0 (Network Address)
- Last IP: 60.180.39.255 (Broadcast Address)
- Network: 60.180.32.0/21
- Range: 60.180.32.0 to 60.180.39.255

IP Address	Location	Network	Postal Code
61.141.14.50	Shenzhen, Guangdong, China (CN), Asia	61.141.0.0/20	-
62.80.30.226	Burscheid, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany (DE), Europe	62.80.28.0/22	51399

61.141.0.0/20 → 61.141.0.0 to 61.141.15.255 (Shenzhen, China).

62.80.28.0/22 → 62.80.28.0 to 62.80.31.255 (Burscheid, Germany).

IP Address	Location	Network
62.189.238.32	Milton Keynes, England, United Kingdom (GB), Europe	62.189.236.0/22
64.79.219.15	United States (US), North America	64.79.218.0/23
66.249.5.237	United States (US), North America	66.249.4.0/23

62.189.236.0/22 → 62.189.236.0 to 62.189.239.255 (Milton Keynes, UK).

64.79.218.0/23 → 64.79.218.0 to 64.79.219.255 (US).

66.249.4.0/23 → 66.249.4.0 to 66.249.5.255 (US).

3) We found a total of 9 countries for the IPs we analyzed.
   Belgium, Virginia, China, US, Germany, France ,Russia, Taiwan,Brazil



4)

- Brussels, Belgium: 64 packets.
- Ashburn, United States: 128 packets.
- Shenzhen, China: 96 packets.

4) These packets are most likely made by bots as the traffic originates from multiple IP addresses across different countries. This behavior is unusual for a normal device and legitimate network and suggests a botnet distributing attack traffic. The packet counts and IP distributions are typical indicators of automated bots rather than human behavior.

5) Normal TTL Range: Devices usually start with TTL values like 64, 128, or 255.

   Abnormal TTL: If the TTL values are unusually low, it may indicate that the packet has passed through many network hops, suggesting traffic is routed through unexpected or malicious paths. Consistent TTLs across many IPs may also indicate spoofed packets. If we had TTL values, we could compare them to standard device behavior to detect anomalies.