## Stable Matching Problem" "Perfect Match" \* Self-enforcing Process: where we take care of preferences every body in one set is \* Matching: A matching 'S' is a set of ordered pairs, each from IXE with property that each member of I and each member of E. appears in atmost one pair in S \* Perfect Matching: S' is a perfect matching with property that each member of I & each member of E appears in exactly one pair in S' · We are assuming twe have same number of objects in both sets nxn. \*Also. -> Ties in preference -> Ranking can not change once denied. II (Inten 1) : LUMS, LSE LSE: n=2 2.9 Iz (Inten 2): LUMS, LSE LUMS: · One parent moth is SEE(1, 188) LUMS S={ (I, LUMS), (I, LOE)} (dely if 15% offas entra scholaustip to II, II will not change preference (self inframent) If Izoffas be coz its fact preference is money to LUMS. both profer roch other CUMS will not WMS. so No instability change preference.

Sz = { (I, LSE), (I2, LUMS)}

(II, LUHS) is an instability wat Sz.

becoz it does not belong to Se.

\*(Ix, Ey) is an instability uxt a matching 'S', if Ix prefers
Ey to it's current partner and Ey prefers Ix to its curent
partners.

→ GIALE - SHAPLEY ALGIORITHM:    INTERNS						EMPLOYERS				
*	I	E.	D0/13	EÆ	En	ED	* EA	T <sub>3</sub>	Ts	I2 I, I4
	T <sub>2</sub>	EADay	EB	Ex	Ec	En	EB	Is	$I_2$	I, I4 I3
	$I_3$	ED	Ec	ER	EA	٤٤	Ec	Ių	$I_3$	Is I, I2
	Ių	EADoys	Ec	En	EB	E	En	I,	I2	Is In Is
	Is	Ea	EB	ED	EB	Ec	Ee	I <sub>2</sub>	I <sub>3</sub>	I4 I, Is
	n=S								mill.	N. A. SHI

Employers	Day 1	Day 2	Day 3	Day 4	5.17
Ea	I/, I/4, Is	Is	Is'	(15)	
EB	Sho	und I2	I/, I2	) I2(	> Stable
Ec	II bece	J. Iy	Iq	Iy	matchin
Ep	I3 emplo	yes I3 boxes and	I <sub>3</sub>	) Is	
EE	HAVE BUILDING	by od or		/ I. (	A COLUMN
NO STATE OF THE PARTY OF THE PA			COLUMN AND		

\* What is the "Progress Measure"? At and of day, somebody will cross out a condidate.

Depose no. of cross-outs

• It will take almost $O(n^2)$ $n \times (n-1)$	2(n)-n
1 Show Gi-S Algo produces a perfect matching.	
<ul> <li>⇒ Proof by Contradiction: Assume G1-5 does not produce a p</li> <li>Some intern I which is rejected by every employer.</li> <li>Every employer has a better candidate than I.</li> </ul>	perfect matching.
CITACICION.	
2 Show GI-S algo produces a stable matching.	1 salar salar sa
⇒ Preof: by Gontradiction: (I,E) is a pain not in S.  Show (I,E) is not an instability	Alignos St.
<u>Case I</u> : Employer E must have rejected I.	
case II: I have interviewed at E.	← I went to E' which is preffered over E.

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The state of the s

· Article in

I,	82	-> if we do not take preference of employees or then we will
I2	23	get a Stable metch, but it includes Unfairness.
- 1	1	
In	E	

\* In a Bipartite graph we are sure to get a stable match.

\* Divide and Conquer:

· Collaborative Filtering =

-> Similarily metric:

n set	lovics'n'	Mz	MA	MB	My	Mp
	Personx	U	2	3	4	5 - sevted nating of person x.
	Me	3	1	, 2	5	14
100		aı		322	- 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12	an \a'numbers.

"Inversions" ai Laj where i Lj

Suppose as ... 5 - 2 ... an The inversion is with person x. (becer person x's data is sorted)


How many inversions in above example? Easier way to check it:


1 02 03 4 05 "No. of crossings or intersections
3 1 2 5 4 are inventions in our data"


→ There are 3 inversions; (1,3), (2,3), (4,5)


## my algo's better than yours


Takes











$$T(n)=b$$

$$T(n)=T(n/2)+cn$$

$$T(m) = T(m/2) + cm$$
  $\rightarrow$  basic template where  $m = n/2$ .

$$T(n_2) = T(n_2) + c_{\frac{n}{2}}$$
  
 $T(n_2) = T(n_4) + c_{\frac{n}{2}}$ 

now m= n/4

$$T(n/4) = T(n/4) + cn = T(n/4) + cn = T(n/4) = T(n/8) + n/4$$

$$T(n) = T(n/2) + cn$$


put value of

$$T(n) = T(n/4) + cn + cn$$

$$put value of 2$$

$$T(n) = T(n/8) + cn + cn + cn$$

$$T(n) = X(n) + \left(\frac{n}{2^{j}}\right) + \left(\frac{cn}{2^{j+1}} + \dots + \frac{cn}{2^{j}} + cn\right)$$




\*eg 
$$T(n) = 2T(\frac{n}{2}) + (n^2)$$
 $T(2) = 6$ 

$$T(\gamma_2) = 2T(\frac{\gamma_2}{2}) + c(\gamma_2)^2$$

$$T(\frac{\eta}{4}) = 2T(\frac{\eta_{4}}{4}) + C(\frac{\eta}{4})^{2}$$

$$T(\frac{\eta_{4}}{4}) = 2T(\frac{\eta_{8}}{8}) + C\frac{\eta^{2}}{16}$$




$$T(n) = 2T(\frac{\pi}{2}) + cn^2$$
  
 $T(n) = 2\left[2T(\frac{n}{4})^{\frac{n}{2}} + c\frac{n^2}{4}\right] + cn^2$ 


principle della se man soll

10 437 10 m 15


stance of the second Party .


$$T(n) = 2 \left[ 2 \left[ 2 T \left( \frac{n}{8} \right) + cn^2 \right] + cn^2 + cn^2 \right]$$






They have to be placed in only 1 box.










What are your subproblems? numally of polynomial size, should NOT be too @ Define an ordering large eg in exponential 1 write recumana relation. \* 3 steps to Dynamic Programing: Define the recurrence relation to get your answer. Keep your space small - do not use larger slib problems Speafy the order + Weighted Interval Scheduling: number of classes that and ampatible with 1 & comes earlier them 1. p(4)=0 P(S)=3 P(6)=3 -> if Vn included in my final answer

+ Base case: f(0)=0, f(1)=v,


-That would be an exponential algo., Somemoration to do it in linear time in One with sonting (O (nlogn))







+ conat's the time complexity for this?




at every stage the time to add new root is constant time.

1501-n 1881-m


(n.m)


Implicit DAG




* Returbion = use already known answer to solve hew problem.
* (an we use EDIT DISTANCE!) In G J Har all C 100
in order to get sol- for LCS.
In ICS, we want to maximize the model cost.  and change the subs. with delete & insert (produce to disallow substitutions. (make subs.
* Maximum Monotonically increasing subsequence: here gaps
S= 3, 7 2, 9 5 6 8 7
$S = 3_{11} 7 2_{1} 9 5 6 8 7$ j i hun jzii
79 ← one possible Monotonically 17 subseq.
₹ ⇒ 2568
⇒ 2567
might be in our
S= 372 95 680 final and might not be!
A COUNTY OF SAME OF THE PARTY O
MMIS(n) = ?
returns the
max monotonically
inc. subsey.

CAN











VA.


+ Knap Sack Broblem: Résource constrained selection problems.
Knap Sack can hald a total weight of Wkg 'n' items of weights w, w, w, w, wn & value v, v, v, v,
Knap ( ) = man value that we can achieve with the Knap sack of capacity W and items i=1,2n
· We need to leep track of remaining capacity. and remaining items.
Knap(1 ,wc) = if (wn >wc)
Krack (n-1, we)
go to capacity remains me
i1, i2, i3 in
when Jakon willed the body best we can put it in our body best we one not sure that would sure that would Knap (n-1, Wc-Wn) - 1 item it go in if agoes final salution.  The does not go in.
Max Vn + knap (n-1, We-Wn) - then it go in
Knap (n-1, wc) Tiftgoes final salution.
if does not go in.
Base Case: Knap (0, Wc)=0
Knap(i, 0) = 0
La stelling
Was without repitation
i.e I don't have multipule copies of same item.
CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY OF





















Case where FF gives a wrong manflow?



SRPT

flow is propertional to C but actual


Then again SO, FT and this will go


Manflow = 200

G= (m+n) & O (C-m)
for BFS or DFS Time complexity = 0


This a "pseudo polynomial" complenity because it depends son on the value of our capacities.


+ Edward Kary Alg (built on basis of FF) uses the path which has min. no. of hops. (from S to T)





\* (3)-





coparity = 6 flow = 6 - 1

\* contributes to capacity · capacity - · contributes to flow.

2-1-3-2


(not 3 implies not 1) (1)-3

proof it by contrapositive to 73 -> 1 => f can be augmented so it could not previously have been the man flow.

How can I draw a mincut?

In my nevidual graph, I will look for the nodes that are reachable from S & these nodes will be part of Sets A and they will be put of the section where me have (S).

"good example in stides"



\*only PCIR readrable by from min cut

