Binary Mechanisms under Privacy-Preserving Noise

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Abstract

We study mechanism design for public-good provision under a noisy privacy-preserving transformation of individual agents' reported preferences. The setting is a standard binary model with transfers and quasi-linear utility. Agents report their preferences for the public good, which are randomly "flipped," so that any individual report may be explained away as the outcome of noise. We study mechanisms that seek to preserve the public decisions made in the presence of noise (noise sensitivity), pursue efficiency, and mitigate the effect of noise on revenue. The paper analyzes the trade-offs between these competing considerations.

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1 Introduction

The field of mechanism design considers agents who hold private information about their preferences. Agents are asked to surrender this information when properly incentivized; but mechanism design ignores any potential *privacy concerns* that may add to agents' reluctance to reveal their true preferences.

Privacy concerns may arise because agents have an intrinsic "non-instrumental" aversion to revealing their preferences, or because agents worry that such information can be used against them in future interactions. This may occur in the provision of both private and public goods. With private goods, an agent who surrenders their willingness to pay for a good to a seller will lose surplus in future interactions with this seller. With public goods, someone who reveals their utility from enjoying a public good may, when asked to fund future public good projects, lose future informational rent.

Our paper studies a specific mechanism design problem: a planner faces a standard binary public-good provision problem with quasilinear utility and monetary transfers. Our planner cares about individual agents' preferences for the public good, and about the revenue she can collect from its provision. In our version of the problem, privacy concerns are important, and dealt with using an embedded privacy-preserving operation.

Individual agents report their types to a trusted intermediary, who passes on their reports to the planner *after adding random noise*. The idea follows the literature on *differential privacy* (Dwork et al., 2006,; Dwork, 2008; Dwork and Roth, 2014), by which individual's privacy is preserved through the addition of random noise. The planner's mechanism takes as inputs the agents' perturbed reports. It can only access the agents' reported types after they have been subject to a privacy-preserving random transformation.

In our paper, agents' types are binary and encode how much utility they receive from the public good: high or low. Types take the value $+1$ or -1. The random noise is then simply a "flip," which occurs with probability $\delta \in (0, 1/2)$. If an agent reports a type $x_i \in \{-1, +1\}$, then the mechanism receives x_i with probability $1 - \delta$, and a "flipped" report $-x_i$ with probability δ. As a consequence, an agent can always explain away any evidence about their type as the outcome of a random flip. Their explanation is more credible the larger the value of δ. Noise is then desirable because larger values of δ offer a better protection of privacy.

The problem with adding noise to agents' reports—one might say the flip side—is, of course, that the quality of the planner's decision suffers. So we consider the probability that the planner's decision is affected by the noise we have added for reasons of privacy. A key concept is *noise sensitivity:* the probability that the planner's decision differs from what it

would have been, given true and noise-free reports. In addition to standard considerations in mechanism design (such as efficiency), our paper evaluates mechanisms on the basis of their noise sensitivity.

Noise affects transfers, as well as the public-good provision decision. In consequence, the planner's expected revenue suffers. Standard ideas in mechanism design mean that an agent with a low value for the public good (a -1 type) pays less than an agent with a high value (a $+1$ type). With noise, it is possible that a low type has their truthful report flipped, and is thus subject to the higher payment designed for high types. This, in turn, affects the whole problem by means of the low types' participation constraints. The end result is lower revenue for the planner as a whole. In sum, as the level of noise δ increases, revenue and social welfare decreases. There is thus a trade-off between the privacy protection afforded by noise, and the effectiveness of a given social choice function in terms of traditional economic objectives.

Our main result concerns choosing a mechanism to minimize noise sensitivity, given a target level of revenue and a fixed level of privacy-preserving noise. The resulting optimization problem is not convex, but we are nevertheless able to characterize the optimal mechanism asymptotically. Optimal mechanisms take the form of linear threshold functions (basically implementing the public good once the number of "votes" in favor, or high types, exceeds those against by a certain margin). We also characterize the mechanisms that optimize social surplus, subject to a target level of revenue.

A key trade-off in our paper involves noise sensitivity and revenue. A planner can make the mechanism more robust to noise (improve its noise sensitivity) at the cost of lower revenue. In sum, our paper describes a planner who balances several different objectives: privacy, efficiency, robustness and revenue. The different trade-offs involved are characterized through the theory developed in the paper.

Our model has other interpretations, in addition to the emphasis on privacy that we have focused on so far. First, agents may be unable to perfectly communicate their preferences to the mechanism. Second, agents may have imperfect information about their own preferences. Their reports are therefore only noisy versions of their underlying values for the public good. Miscommunication has been documented experimentally, see Budish and Kessler (2022), and pushed as an agenda by, for example, McFadden (2009). Imperfect knowledge of preferences has been considered a key motivation for studying information acquisition in mechanism design. Two recent examples are Gleyze and Pernoud (2022) and Thereze (2022).

1.1 Overview of Results

In section 2, we explain our model of noisy preference reporting. The central element of the model is that the individuals' reported messages undergo a noisy transformation before being received by the planner. Subsequently, we define what it means for a social choice function (henceforth, SCF) to be Bayes-Nash or dominant strategy incentive compatible in our setting; and argue that *marginal monotonicity* (resp. monotonicity) of the SCF is necessary and sufficient for Bayes-Nash (resp. dominant strategy) incentive compatibility. Then, we examine the individual rationality of public-good mechanisms and offer a version of a *revenue equivalence* theorem for any implementable SCF. Specifically, we present an expression for the maximum expected revenue associated with any Bayes-Nash implementable and individually rational SCF.

We define the notion of *noise sensitivity* of SCFs in section 3; and present the preliminaries of the Fourier analysis of Boolean functions, a tool that proves very useful for our subsequent results. We then show that the expected revenue and expected social surplus of any implementable SCF can be expressed in terms of the zero and first degree Fourier weights. Hence, we can show that both of these variables are decreasing in the noise level δ.

Subsequently, in Proposition 3.7, we characterize the allocation rule f, that achieves the maximum expected social surplus, subject to a revenue (budget) constraint, and an incentive compatibility constraint (so that the SCF is Bayes-Nash implementable). To this end, we first show among all implementable SCFs the simple majority function, i.e., $f(x) = \mathbb{1}\left\{\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \geqslant 0\right\}$, asymptotically achieves the maximum revenue as $n \to \infty$. Next, employing a linear program, we show if one demands a lower revenue than what is raised under the simple majority, then another *linear threshold function* (LTF) achieves the surplus efficiency. Its threshold is a negative level (instead of the 0 threshold under the simple majority). Specifically, let R be the required revenue, and denote its normalization by $r := R/(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}$. We show that the surplus-efficient SCF, subject to raising a certain level of revenue R, is the linear threshold function $\mathbb{1}\left\{\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \geqslant -\varphi^{-1}(r) + o(1)\right\}$, where φ^{-1} is the inverse of the standard Gaussian density function on $\mathbb{R}_+$. This particular LTF is also constrained surplus-efficient in another setting that we study in section 5, in that individuals do not have perfect knowledge of their preferences for the public good, and what they report is a noisy signal of their underlying type.

Section 4 is devoted to the trade-off between noise sensitivity and revenue. It contains the main result of the paper (Theorem 4.6), which characterizes the SCF with the minimum noise sensitivity—subject to the same revenue constraint as above. The resulting optimization

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problem is not convex, and presents some important challenges. The constraint set is convex (induced by the implementability conditions and the revenue constraint), but the objective function is not, and hence standard extreme point theory cannot be applied for a characterization of the minimum. The characterization we obtain holds in an asymptotic sense.

Our proof technique involves a series of steps. We show that there are two SCFs that are asymptotically optimal, in the sense that they are (dominant strategy) implementable, satisfy the revenue constraint, and their noise sensitivity is $o(1)$ away from the constrained minimum. These two are LTFs with respective cutoffs at $-\varphi^{-1}(r)$ and $\varphi^{-1}(r)$. The former LTF has the additional advantage of being constrained surplus efficient as shown in Proposition 3.7, and allocates the public good with higher probability. Analogous to our result on constrained surplus efficiency (i.e., Proposition 3.7), the optimality here also holds for the setting studied in section 5, namely agents holding imperfect knowledge about their preferences for the public good.

The proof relies on a *Gaussian isoperimetric inequality* first established by Borell (1985). This inequality shows that among all subsets with a certain Gaussian volume, a half-space has the smallest noise sensitivity. We use a variant of this inequality that is proved by Mossel et al. (2010) and carries the claim to the n-dimensional discrete hypercube, i.e., $\{-1, +1\}^n$, equipped with the uniform measure.

An important consequence of our theorem is to describe the trade-off between revenue and noise sensitivity. Essentially, the more revenue the planner is willing to give up, the more robustness against noise can be attained. And in fact this is optimally achieved (among all variations that one can make in the SCF) by lowering the provision threshold in the class of LTFs. In addition, we will see in higher noise levels, where the mechanism better protects the privacy of individuals' types, the trade-off between the revenue and noise robustness is sharper.

Lastly, in section 5, we study a setting in which the communication between agents and the planner is perfect, but agents have incomplete knowledge about their underlying type. We recast our former results on incentive compatibility, individual rationality, revenue equivalence, constrained surplus efficiency and finally constrained minimization of noise sensitivity in this new setting. Importantly, we argue the same two LTFs that were shown to be asymptotically optimal in Theorem 4.6, are still asymptotically optimal for the minimization of the noise sensitivity given the revenue and implementability constraints in this environment.

1.2   Related Literature

We are not the first to study mechanism design together with a device for ensuring privacy. There is a literature on mechanism design and differential privacy. The first paper is McSherry and Talwar (2007), who shows that differential privacy can be a useful tool in obtaining incentive compatibility. By dampening the effect that any individual report has on the mechanism's decision, differential privacy can help ensure truthful behavior among agents. Nissim et al. (2012) develop these ideas in a construction that achieves approximately optimal virtual implementation. Their focus is therefore closer to the problem of full implementation, and not the standard mechanism design problem. Huang and Kannan (2012) proposes mechanisms that are both incentive compatible and differentially private, but does not incorporate the analysis of the trade-offs that are the focus of our paper. The works of Nissim et al. (2012), Xiao (2013), and Chen et al. (2016) all consider preferences over privacy explicitly in their mechanism design analysis. This is of course an important direction, but not the one we pursue here. Nissim and Xiao (2015) provides an overview of the literature on mechanism design and differential privacy.

Our model of public good provision with privacy-protection concerns is formally equivalent to a setting in which agents cannot perfectly report their preferences to the planner. In that sense our paper is a theoretical contribution to a mostly empirical literature that documents preference *misrepresentation* in incentive compatible environments because of variety of reasons such as cognitive limitations or simply lack of perfect communication between participants and the planner. In his tribute to Hurwicz and Laffont, McFadden (2009) states that "in reality, mistakes that agents make in processing and drawing inferences from communications and information, and in exercising control and responding to incentives, can undermine the ideal efficiency of mechanisms, making it important to consider the robustness of mechanisms involving human agents."

A growing body of literature in applied mechanism design documents preference misrepresentation. For example, Hassidim et al. (2017) and Hassidim et al. (2021) show that students misreport their funding preference when applying to graduate programs, despite the fact that the underlying matching mechanism is strategy-proof (in this case it is Deferred-Acceptance). In the context of residency matching mechanisms Rees-Jones (2018) and Rees-Jones and Skowronek (2018) present evidences that some students make futile attempts misrepresenting their preference ranking. In an experiment Budish and Kessler (2022) show that students fail to report their preferences accurately enough in a course scheduling mechanism.

2 A Model of Noisy Preference Reporting

We consider the problem of providing a public good in an economy with n agents and quasilinear preferences. The decision is binary: a public good is either provided or not. Agents' types, which are denoted by $x_i \in \{-1, +1\}$, encode their value for the public good. An individual with a low (resp. high) type has low (resp. high) preference for the public good. Ideally, a decision on whether to provide the public good is based on the agents' realized types, but these are private information. We have access to monetary transfers that may be used to incentivize agents in reporting their types.

We focus on direct-revelation mechanisms. A (direct revelation) public-good mechanism consists of an *allocation rule* $f : \{-1, +1\}^n \to \{0, 1\}$, and n *transfer rules*, denoted by $t_i : \{-1, +1\}^n \to \mathbb{R}$ for all $i \in [n]$. The allocation rule f takes in the $\{-1, +1\}$ messages sent by the individuals, and returns the provision decision, where an output of 1 means the public good is being provided, and a 0 output means otherwise. Often in the paper we call an allocation rule a *social choice function*.

A profile of types $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is drawn i.i.d. from the uniform distribution on $\{-1, +1\}$. Individuals have quasilinear preferences over the final allocation and the transfer. Specifically, the utility of individual i, with type x_i, from $(f, t_i) \in \{0, 1\} \times \mathbb{R}$ is

$$u_i(f, t_i; x_i) = \left(\frac{b + x_i}{2}\right) f - t_i \,. \tag{2.1}$$

The parameter $b \in [0, 1]$ captures a possible preference bias in favor of the public good. For example, when $b = 1$, the efficient outcome is to always provide the public good, and when $b = 0$, the preferences for public good are *symmetric* around zero, and the efficient outcome coincides with the simple majority rule. The negative sign before t_i means that the transfers are from the individuals to the planner.

A key innovation in our paper is noisy preference reports. We assume that there is a privacy-preserving device that deliberately adds noise to individuals' reports about their preferences. By randomly "flipping" an individual's reported type, their concerns over privacy are addressed. Any leaked information about an individual's preference can be explained away as the outcome of random noise.

Specifically, we assume the message $m_i \in \{-1, +1\}$ sent by individual i is going to flip to $-m_i$ with probability $\delta \in (0, 1/2)$. We assume these flips are independent across all individuals, and refer to δ as the noise probability. Agents can explain away any information about their type as the result of such random flips. Such explanations are more credible the larger the value of δ. Our model is the most basic implementation of differential privacy

(Dwork et al., 2006; Dwork and Roth, 2014). When δ is close to $1/2$, then any individual agent's report is approximately uniformly distributed on $\{-1, +1\}$, regardless of their actual report.[1]

An alternative explanation for noisy preference reports is that communication from the agents to the social planner can be lossy and imperfect. If the privacy interpretation of our model makes sense when δ is large, the lossy communication interpretation makes most sense when δ is small.

2.1 Incentive Compatibility

Suppose individual i reports message m_i to the planner. Denote the received message (that is subject to noise) by $y_i(m_i)$, so that $y_i(m_i) = m_i$ with probability $1 - \delta$, and $y_i(m_i) = -m_i$ with probability δ. Also, let us denote the vector of reported types by $m = (m_1, \ldots, m_n)$, and the vector of true types by $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$. A public-good mechanism $(f, t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ is *Bayes-Nash incentive compatible* (often abbreviated by BN-IC), if for every $i \in [n]$ and $x_i \in \{-1, +1\}$ one has

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\left(\frac{b + x_i}{2}\right) \mathsf{E}\left[f\big(y_i(x_i), y_{-i}(x_{-i})\big)\big|x_i\right] - \mathsf{E}\left[t_i\big(y_i(x_i), y_{-i}(x_{-i})\big)\big|x_i\right] \geqslant \\
&\left(\frac{b + x_i}{2}\right) \mathsf{E}\left[f\big(y_i(-x_i), y_{-i}(x_{-i})\big)\big|x_i\right] - \mathsf{E}\left[t_i\big(y_i(-x_i), y_{-i}(x_{-i})\big)\big|x_i\right],
\end{aligned}
\tag{2.2}
$$

where the expectations are taken w.r.t. x_{-i} and their flips, namely $y_{-i}(x_{-i})$, as well as the noise in $y_i(x_i)$. To shorten the notation, we use y_j instead of $y_j(x_j)$, and similarly, y_{-j} instead of $y_{-j}(x_{-j})$. Also, as a shorthand, for every integrable function $g : \{-1, +1\}^n \to \mathbb{R}$, define $\bar{g}_i(x_i) := \mathsf{E}\left[g(x_i, x_{-i})|x_i\right]$.

Additionally, the public-good mechanism is *dominant strategy incentive compatible* (abbreviated by DS-IC) if for every $i \in [n]$ and every $y_{-i} \in \{-1, +1\}^{n-1}$ it holds that

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\left(\frac{b + x_i}{2}\right) \mathsf{E}\left[f\big(y_i(x_i), y_{-i}\big)\big|x_i, y_{-i}\right] - \mathsf{E}\left[t_i\big(y_i(x_i), y_{-i}\big)\big|x_i, y_{-i}\right] \geqslant \\
&\left(\frac{b + x_i}{2}\right) \mathsf{E}\left[f\big(y_i(-x_i), y_{-i}\big)\big|x_i, y_{-i}\right] - \mathsf{E}\left[t_i\big(y_i(-x_i), y_{-i}\big)\big|x_i, y_{-i}\right].
\end{aligned}
\tag{2.3}
$$

Note the difference between the criteria for BN-IC in equation (2.2), and DS-IC in equation (2.3). In the equation for BN-IC, the expectation is also taken w.r.t. other agents' types,

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[1]A basic inspiration for differential privacy is the model of "randomized response" used in survey studies in the social sciences, see Chapter 2 in Dwork and Roth (2014), which is our model with $\delta = 1/4$. In the language of differential privacy, our model is ε-differentially private with $\delta \geqslant (1 + e^\varepsilon)^{-1}$.

namely over y_{-i}; whereas in the condition that defines DS-IC, y_{-i} is a fixed vector, and the expectation is only w.r.t. to the noisy flip turning x_i to $y_i(x_i)$.

In the following lemma, we characterize the space of all Bayes-Nash incentive compatible and all dominant strategy incentive compatible direct mechanisms.

Lemma 2.1. *A mechanism consisting of the allocation rule f and the transfer functions $t = (t_1, \ldots, t_n)$ is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible iff for every $i \in [n]$,*

$$\left(\frac{b+1}{2}\right)\left(\bar{f}_i(+1) - \bar{f}_i(-1)\right) \geqslant \bar{t}_i(+1) - \bar{t}_i(-1) \geqslant \left(\frac{b-1}{2}\right)\left(\bar{f}_i(+1) - \bar{f}_i(-1)\right). \quad (2.4)$$

It is further dominant strategy incentive compatible iff for every $i \in [n]$ and every vector $y_{-i} \in \{-1, +1\}^{n-1}$, it holds that

$$\left(\frac{b+1}{2}\right)\left(f(+1, y_{-i}) - f(-1, y_{-i})\right) \geqslant t_i(+1, y_{-i}) - t_i(-1, y_{-i})$$
$$\geqslant \left(\frac{b-1}{2}\right)\left(f(+1, y_{-i}) - f(-1, y_{-i})\right). \quad (2.5)$$

A corollary of the previous lemma is that the SCF f is implementable in the Bayes-Nash sense iff $\bar{f}_i(+1) - \bar{f}_i(-1) \geqslant 0$ for all $i \in [n]$. We call this property the *marginal monotonicity* of the allocation rule f. The concept of marginal monotonicity simply means on expectation the value of a function increases when the i-th input changes from -1 to $+1$. Furthermore, dominant strategy implementation (in the current Boolean setting) is equivalent to the *monotonicity* of the allocation rule f. That is holding other coordinates constant, the outcome should not fall when the i-th input changes from -1 to $+1$.

Another important implication of the previous lemma is that, in our Boolean environment, the incentive compatibility of a mechanism does not depend on the noise level δ. In other words, a mechanism is BN-IC (resp. DS-IC) in the noisy environment if and only if it is BN-IC (resp. DS-IC) in the noise-free setting.

2.2 Individual Rationality and Expected Revenue

Suppose that, by refusing to participate in the mechanism, any individual can guarantee themselves a utility of zero. The mechanism design problem then needs to incorporate *interim individual rationality* (often referred to by IIR) constraints:

$$\left(\frac{b + x_i}{2}\right) \mathsf{E}\left[f\left(y_i(x_i), y_{-i}(x_{-i})\right)\big|x_i\right] - \mathsf{E}\left[t_i\left(y_i(x_i), y_{-i}(x_{-i})\right)\big|x_i\right] \geqslant 0.$$

Employing a similar approach to the one used for the BN-IC constraints, that is taking the expectation w.r.t. the others' types and noisy flips, one can verify that the above equation reduces to

$$\left(\frac{b+1}{2}\right)\left((1-\delta)\bar{f}_i(+1) + \delta\bar{f}_i(-1)\right) \geqslant (1-\delta)\bar{t}_i(+1) + \delta\bar{t}_i(-1)\,, \qquad (2.6a)$$

$$\left(\frac{b-1}{2}\right)\left(\delta\bar{f}_i(+1) + (1-\delta)\bar{f}_i(-1)\right) \geqslant \delta\bar{t}_i(+1) + (1-\delta)\bar{t}_i(-1)\,. \qquad (2.6b)$$

The first (resp. second) equation above expresses the IIR condition for the high (resp. low) type.

We call a mechanism *ex post individually rational* (referred to by EIR) if for every $x_i \in \{-1, +1\}$ and $y_{-i} \in \{-1, +1\}^{n-1}$ it holds that

$$\left(\frac{b+x_i}{2}\right)\mathsf{E}\left[f\big(y_i(x_i), y_{-i}\big)\big|x_i, y_{-i}\right] - \mathsf{E}\left[t_i\big(y_i(x_i), y_{-i}\big)\big|x_i, y_{-i}\right] \geqslant 0\,.$$

Taking the expectation w.r.t. the noisy flip that turns x_i to $y_i(x_i)$ leads to

$$\left(\frac{b+1}{2}\right)\left((1-\delta)f(+1, y_{-i}) + \delta f_i(-1, y_{-i})\right) \geqslant (1-\delta)t_i(+1, y_{-i}) + \delta t_i(-1, y_{-i})\,, \qquad (2.7a)$$

$$\left(\frac{b-1}{2}\right)\left(\delta f(+1, y_{-i}) + (1-\delta)f(-1, y_{-i})\right) \geqslant \delta t_i(+1, y_{-i}) + (1-\delta)t_i(-1, y_{-i})\,. \qquad (2.7b)$$

The first (resp. second) inequality above expresses the EIR condition for the high (resp. low) type, and they both have to hold for every $y_{-i} \in \{-1, +1\}^{n-1}$.

Clearly, an EIR (resp. DS-IC) mechanism is always IIR (resp. BN-IC). Thus, we choose to define two notions of implementability for a mechanism (f, t): (i) it is Bayes-Nash implementable if it is BN-IC and IIR; (ii) it is dominant strategy implementable if it is DS-IC and EIR. Hence, a mechanism is Bayes-Nash implementable if it is dominant strategy implementable.

Viewing equations (2.6) and (2.7), one notices that the individual rationality constraints are in fact affected by the noise level δ. Since the mechanism can only rely on the noisy reports as the inputs, namely the y_i's, there is always a chance that the message sent by a low type individual flips, and she will end up paying the higher transfer $\bar{t}_i(+1)$ instead of $\bar{t}_i(-1)$ (in the BN sense). Therefore, she needs to be compensated for this unexpected flip in order to participate, and this will induce a drag on the space of implementable mechanisms as the noise level increases.

Our next proposition shows that decreasing the noise level weakly *expands* the space of implementable mechanisms (in either of the two senses).

Proposition 2.2. *Suppose a mechanism* (f, t) *is Bayes-Nash implementable (resp. dominant strategy implementable) at the noise level* δ*. Then, it will remain Bayes-Nash implementable (resp. dominant strategy implementable) for all* $\delta' < \delta$*.*

Proof. We present the proof only for the Bayes-Nash sense, because the verification for the other case follows similarly. One can express the IIR conditions in (2.6) as

$$\left(\frac{b+1}{2}\right)\bar{f}_i(+1) - \bar{t}_i(+1) \geq \delta\left[\left(\frac{b+1}{2}\right)\left(\bar{f}_i(+1) - \bar{f}_i(-1)\right) - \left(\bar{t}_i(+1) - \bar{t}_i(-1)\right)\right],$$
$$\left(\frac{b-1}{2}\right)\bar{f}_i(-1) - \bar{t}_i(-1) \geq \delta\left[\left(\bar{t}_i(+1) - \bar{t}_i(-1)\right) - \left(\frac{b-1}{2}\right)\left(\bar{f}_i(+1) - \bar{f}_i(-1)\right)\right].$$

The BN-IC constraints in equation (2.4) imply that the *rhs* to both of the above equations are non-negative. Therefore, decreasing δ relaxes the inequalities, and hence the claim follows. $\quad\square$

We say a SCF $f : \{-1, +1\}^n \to \{0, 1\}$ is Bayes-Nash implementable (resp. dominant strategy implementable) if there exist transfer rules $t_i : \{-1, +1\}^n \to \mathbb{R}$ for $i \in [n]$, that make the mechanism (f, t) Bayes-Nash implementable (resp. dominant strategy implementable).

Remark 2.3. Since the Bayes-Nash implementability is a weaker notion, henceforth, whenever we point to the implementability (without an explicit reference to its sense) we mean the Bayes-Nash notion.

We now present a *revenue equivalence* type result for implementable SCFs in the current Boolean environment.

Proposition 2.4. *A social choice function* $f : \{-1, +1\}^n \to \{0, 1\}$ *is Bayes-Nash implementable (resp. dominant strategy implementable) iff it satisfies marginal monotonicity (resp. monotonicity). In addition, the maximum expected revenue that the planner can raise from implementing* f *is*

$$\mathsf{R}_\delta[f] := (1 - 2\delta)\mathsf{E}\left[f(x)\sum_{i=1}^n x_i\right] + \left(\frac{b-1}{2}\right)\mathsf{E}[f(x)], \tag{2.8}$$

where the expectation is taken w.r.t. the uniform measure on $\{-1, +1\}^n$*.*

Therefore, for every implementable SCF the expected revenue *falls* as the noise level *increases*. We explore the response of the expected social surplus to the noise level as we introduce further tools in the upcoming analysis. Finally, the above revenue equivalence representation implies the following result.

Corollary 2.5. In the space of all implementable Boolean SCFs, the majority rule *asymptotically* extracts the maximum expected revenue, where

$$f_{\text{maj}}(x) = \mathbb{1}\left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \geq 0 \right\}. \tag{2.9}$$

To see this, note that $\mathsf{R}_\delta[f]$ is linear in f, thus the following linear threshold function maximizes the expected revenue:

$$\hat{f}_n(x) = \mathbb{1}\left\{ \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \geq \frac{2}{(1-b)(1-2\delta)} \right\}.$$

Let us denote the above threshold by $\tau := \tau(b, \delta)$. The expected revenue associated with this SCF is

$$\mathsf{R}_\delta[\hat{f}] = (1-2\delta)\mathsf{E}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i; \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \geq \tau \right] + \left(\frac{b-1}{2} \right) \mathsf{P}\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \geq \tau \right) = \frac{1-2\delta}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \sqrt{n}\big(1 + o(1)\big),$$

where the last equality follows from the application of the central limit theorem as $n \to \infty$ over the i.i.d. random variables $\{x_i : i \in [n]\}$. A similar approach shows that the expected revenue associated with f_{maj} is equal to $\frac{1-2\delta}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \sqrt{n}\big(1 + o(1)\big)$, thus it asymptotically achieves the maximum expected revenue. Motivated by this analysis, we henceforth normalize the expected revenue of any implementable SCF by the pre-factor $(1 - 2\delta)\sqrt{n}$.

3 Noise in the Allocation Rule

We have seen that noise affects revenue, but it can also affect the intended public-good decision. Starting from an implementable SCF, individual agents will find it optimal to report their true types. But as a result of random flips of their reported types, the planner receives messages $y \in \{-1, +1\}^n$, instead of the true vector of types $x \in \{-1, +1\}^n$. Therefore, the implemented outcome that was supposed to be $f(x)$, now changes to $f(y)$.

If $f(x)$ is a desired decision regarding the public good, we may be concerned that $f(y) \neq f(x)$. The probability that this occurs is termed the *noise sensitivity* of the SCF f. Specifically, we define

$$\mathsf{NS}_\delta[f] = \mathsf{P}\big(f(x) \neq f(y)\big),$$

where $x \sim \text{Unif}\big(\{-1, +1\}^n\big)$, and y is the noisy version of x.

We believe that this quantity is important in and of itself. For one, the planner does not want to pick an allocation rule that frequently takes the individuals by surprise. This would affect the credibility and commitment power of the planner.

Second, increasing the noise level δ adds to the privacy preservation power of the mechanism, at the expense of making the SCF more sensitive to the noise. Therefore, studying the dependency of noise sensitivity to δ quantifies this trade-off.

Third, from a welfare standpoint, we are interested in the sensitivity of social surplus to noise. How does the level of noise affect the resulting welfare of individuals in the economy? Denote by $S(x, f)$ the social surplus (namely the individuals' utility plus the revenue raised by the planner) when the true vector of types is x and the implemented outcome is $f \in \{0, 1\}$. Formally, one has

$$S(x, f) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(\frac{b + x_i}{2} \right) f .\qquad(3.1)$$

We can define the surplus distortion as the L^1 distance between what could have been achieved (i.e., $S(x, f(x))$) and what was ultimately realized (i.e., $S(x, f(y))$) as a result of noisy reports. A simple application of Cauchy-Schwarz inequality implies that

$$\mathsf{E}\Big[\big|S(x, f(y)) - S(x, f(x))\big|\Big] = \mathsf{E}\left[\sum_{i=1}^{n} \left(\frac{b + x_i}{2} \right) |f(x) - f(y)| \right]$$

$$\leqslant \frac{\sqrt{b^2 n^2 + n}}{2} \sqrt{\mathsf{NS}_\delta[f]} .$$

Therefore, the *per-capita* distortion in the social surplus is bounded above by

$$\frac{1}{n}\mathsf{E}\Big[\big|S(x, f(y)) - S(x, f(x))\big|\Big] \leqslant \frac{\sqrt{\mathsf{NS}_\delta[f]}}{2} (b + o(1)) .$$

Hence, an allocation rule with minimal noise sensitivity leads to a decent upper bound on the distortion of the social surplus with respect to the noise.

Motivated by the need to study comparative statics with respect to the noise level δ, and further studying the notion of noise sensitivity, in the next part, we briefly present a self-contained introduction to the Fourier analysis of Boolean functions. A tool that can be applied extensively to many questions in the Boolean environments. The interested reader is encouraged to refer to the book by O'Donnell (2014) and read further topics in this area.

3.1   Fourier Analysis of Boolean Functions

Let the n-dimensional hypercube $\{-1, +1\}^n$ be equipped with the uniform probability measure. The space of $\mathbb{R}$-valued and square integrable functions on this hypercube, denoted by $H := L^2\left(\{-1, +1\}^n\right)$, is in fact a separable Hilbert space with the inner product operator:

$$\langle f, g \rangle = \mathsf{E}\left[f(x)g(x)\right] = \frac{1}{2^n} \sum_{x \in \{-1, +1\}^n} f(x)g(x), \qquad \forall f, g \in H .$$

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For every subset $S \subseteq [n]$, define $\chi_S(x) := \prod_{i \in S} x_i$. Then, it can be readily checked that the collection of functions $\{\chi_S(\cdot) : S \subseteq [n]\}$ constitutes an *orthonormal* basis for H. In particular, for $S = \varnothing$, one has $\chi_\varnothing(\cdot) \equiv 1$. Every function $f \in H$ thus has a *unique* Fourier expansion in terms of these basis elements, namely

$$f(x) = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \hat{f}(S) \chi_S(x), \tag{3.2}$$

in that $\hat{f}(S)$ is called a Fourier coefficient of f, and is the projection f onto χ_S, that is

$$\hat{f}(S) = \langle f, \chi_S \rangle = \mathsf{E}\left[f(x)\chi_S(x)\right].$$

In particular, $\hat{f}(\varnothing)$ is equal to the mean value of f (i.e., $\mathsf{E}[f]$), and $\hat{f}(\{i\}) = \mathsf{E}\left[f(x)x_i\right] = \left(\bar{f}_i(+1) - \bar{f}_i(-1)\right)/2$ is called a *degree*-1 Fourier coefficient.

Example 3.1. Let $f(x) = \max\{x_1, x_2\}$, then one can write $f(x)$ as

$$f(x) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2}x_1 + \frac{1}{2}x_2 - \frac{1}{2}x_1 x_2,$$

therefore, $\hat{f}(\varnothing) = \hat{f}(\{1\}) = \hat{f}(\{2\}) = 1/2$, $\hat{f}(\{1,2\}) = -1/2$ and all other Fourier coefficients are zero.

Next, we introduce the concept of *noise stability* that proves very useful in the analysis of noise sensitivity.

Definition 3.2 (Noise Stability). Let $f : \{-1, +1\}^n \to \mathbb{R}$ belong to H. Suppose y is the δ-noisy version of the vector $x \sim \mathrm{Unif}\left(\{-1, +1\}^n\right)$. That is, each y_i is independently distributed from other y_j's and $\mathsf{P}(y_i \neq x_i) = \delta$. Then, the noise stability of the function f is defined as

$$\mathsf{Stab}_\delta[f] := \mathsf{E}\left[f(x)f(y)\right]. \tag{3.3}$$

From the Fourier expansion in equation (3.2) one has

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{E}\left[f(y)|x\right] &= \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \hat{f}(S) \prod_{i \in S} \mathsf{E}\left[y_i|x_i\right] \\ &= \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \hat{f}(S) \prod_{i \in S} (1 - 2\delta)x_i = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \hat{f}(S)(1 - 2\delta)^{|S|} \chi_S(x), \end{aligned} \tag{3.4}$$

where $|S|$ refers to the cardinality of the set S. Therefore, an equivalent representation for noise stability (in terms of the Fourier coefficients) would be

$$\mathsf{Stab}_\delta[f] = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} (1 - 2\delta)^{|S|} \hat{f}(S)^2.$$

Using the concepts introduced above, in the next part we explore the comparative statics of the social surplus and the expected revenue (in the public-good mechanisms) with respect to the noise level.

3.2 Noise-Efficiency Trade-off

We saw in Proposition 2.4 that increasing the noise level δ decreases the expected revenue in every implementable SCF. Now we see how the ideas from spectral analysis offered in the previous section may be directly applied to study the comparative statics of expected social surplus with respect to the noise.

Equation (3.1) expresses the *realized* social surplus, when the individuals' true type is x, and the implemented outcome is $f \in \{0, 1\}$. Therefore, in the noisy setting where $f(y)$ is directed instead of $f(x)$, the expected social surplus would be equal to

$$\mathsf{S}_\delta[f] = \mathsf{E}\left[S(x, f(y))\right] = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathsf{E}\left[\left(\frac{b + x_i}{2}\right) f(y)\right]. \tag{3.5}$$

In the next proposition, we offer the comparative statics of (R, S) with respect to the noise. Before that, we highlight an important connection between implementability and Fourier coefficients.

Remark 3.3. A SCF f is implementable iff all of its degree-1 Fourier coefficients are non-negative. This is the case because (Bayes-Nash) implementability is equivalent to marginal monotonicity, and that in turn means $\bar{f}_i(+1) - \bar{f}_i(-1)$ must be non-negative for all $i \in [n]$. The former difference is simply equal to $2\hat{f}(\{i\})$, and thus the claim follows.

Proposition 3.4. *For every implementable SCF f, as the noise level $\delta \in (0, 1/2)$ increases, the expected revenue R and the expected social surplus S decrease linearly with δ.*

Proof. It was previously shown in the revenue equivalence expression in equation (2.8) that R_δ is a decreasing function of δ. Next, using the expression (3.5) and the expansion for the conditional expectation in (3.4), one obtains the following representation for S_δ:

$$\mathsf{S}_\delta[f] = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathsf{E}\left[\left(\frac{b + x_i}{2}\right) f(y)\right] = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \mathsf{E}\left[\left(\frac{b + x_i}{2}\right) \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \hat{f}(S)(1 - 2\delta)^{|S|}\chi_S(x)\right]$$

$$= \frac{b\,n}{2}\,\hat{f}(\varnothing) + \frac{1 - 2\delta}{2} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \hat{f}(\{i\}).$$

The final identity follows because $\mathsf{E}\left[\chi_S(x)\right] = 0$ for all $S \neq \varnothing$, and $\mathsf{E}\left[x_i\chi_S(x)\right] = 1$ if $S = \{i\}$ and otherwise is equal to zero. Since f is implementable, then all of its degree-1 Fourier coefficients are non-negative, and hence S_δ becomes a decreasing function in δ. $\square$

The intuition behind this result is rather simple. As it relates to the expected revenue, a low type agent must be compensated enough to participate, because there is always a chance

that her message flips and she ends up paying the high type transfer, even though she enjoys no utility from the public good. The higher the noise level, the more a low type agent ought to be compensated. On the other hand, a positive transfer from the planner to a low type agent seems alluring to a high type individual. Therefore, to deter her from misreporting her type, the planner has to reduce the transfer *paid* by a high type agent. Both of these two effects create a negative pressure on the expected revenue raised by the planner as the noise level increases. For the expected social surplus, observe the complementarity between the outcome f and the agent's type in the utility function (see equation (2.1)). Introducing the noise breaks the optimal assortative allocation with some positive probability and thus lowers the expected social surplus.

Lastly, Proposition 3.4 highlights the cost of protecting privacy. Adding noise to the individuals' reports does preserve the full revelation of their private types, but lowers the expected revenue and the social surplus associated with every implementable SCF.

In terms of differential privacy, Proposition 3.4 describes how privacy guarantees translate into efficiency and revenue losses. If we desire an ε-differentially private mechanism, then the relation $\delta = (1 + e^\varepsilon)^{-1}$, and the linear dependence of revenue and surplus on δ, quantify the economic consequences of a given privacy guarantee.

3.3 Revenue-Surplus Trade-off

Among all the implementable SCFs that raise a target expected revenue (say R), which one has the highest social surplus? This is the trade-off we study in this part. Formally, we solve the following optimization problem:

$$\max \mathsf{S}_\delta[f]$$
$$\text{subject to: } \mathsf{R}_\delta[f] \geqslant R, \text{ and } f \text{ being implementable}. \tag{3.6}$$

Following the remarks in corollary 2.5, let us normalize the expected revenue, and define $r := R/(1 - 2\delta)\sqrt{n}$. We further assume $r \leqslant 1/\sqrt{2\pi}$, as otherwise when $n \to \infty$, there is no SCF that extracts such a high expected surplus. In addition, one can alternatively maximize the per-capita surplus, that is $n^{-1}\mathsf{S}_\delta[f]$ in the above problem.

Note that since the range of all allocation rules is the binary set $\{0, 1\}$, the above problem always has a solution. Also, for future use let us denote the sum $\sum_{i=1}^n x_i$ by $\nu_n(x)$. When it is clear from the context, we often drop x from the argument of ν_n.

Remark 3.5. Since the above problem features no ex ante heterogeneity across the input coordinates $\{x_i : i \in [n]\}$, then there always exists a solution to it that respects the *anonymity*

of the type vector x. Formally, the optimal solution only depends on the number of $+1$'s (or equivalently -1's) in the input vector. Therefore, without any loss, we can restrict the constraint set in the above optimization problem to all functions that also satisfy the anonymity condition. Henceforth, with some abuse of notation, we refer to $f(x)$ by $f(\nu_n(x))$ or $f(\nu)$.

From Proposition 2.4, we know one can always find a set of transfers, that extract the maximum expected revenue from an implementable SCF f. Hence, thanks to the anonymity condition the expression (2.8) simplifies to:

$$\mathsf{R}_\delta[f] = (1 - 2\delta)\mathsf{E}\left[f(\nu_n)\,\nu_n\right] + \left(\frac{b-1}{2}\right)\mathsf{E}[f(\nu_n)]\,. \tag{3.7}$$

Taking the previous remark as given, and borrowing the expression found for the expected social surplus in the proof of Proposition 3.4, we can recast the above optimization problem as follows:

$$\max\left\{\frac{b}{2}\,\mathsf{E}[f(\nu_n)] + \frac{1-2\delta}{2n}\,\mathsf{E}\left[f(\nu_n)\nu_n\right]\right\}$$

$$\text{subject to: } \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\mathsf{E}\left[f(\nu_n)\nu_n\right] + \frac{b-1}{2(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}}\,\mathsf{E}\left[f(\nu_n)\right] \geqslant r\,, \tag{3.8}$$

$$\text{and } f \text{ being implementable}\,.$$

Notation 3.6. We use $\varphi(\cdot)$, $\Phi(\cdot)$ and $\bar{\Phi}(\cdot)$ to respectively denote the density, cumulative distribution function, and counter-cumulative distribution function of the standard Gaussian. Also, we denote the inverse function of the Gaussian density (taking values in $\mathbb{R}_+$) by φ^{-1}, and the inverse function of the Gaussian cumulative function by Φ^{-1}.

Proposition 3.7. *The optimal solution in the surplus-revenue trade-off problem in* (3.8) *is the linear threshold function:*

$$\underline{\ell}_n(x; r) = \mathbb{1}\left\{\frac{\nu_n(x)}{\sqrt{n}} \geqslant -\varphi^{-1}(r) + o(1)\right\}\,. \tag{3.9}$$

This proposition claims that if one is willing to give up some expected revenue (relative to the amount raised by the majority function), then the *optimal* way to gain expected social surplus is to reduce the majority threshold below 50%. The lower the provision threshold, the higher is the expected social surplus, and the smaller is the expected revenue. Additionally, this trade-off is optimally struck by the threshold function $(R, \delta) \mapsto -\varphi^{-1}(R/(1-2\delta))$. Therefore, fixing a target revenue level R, one observes that securing the mechanism by increasing the noise level δ, raises the provision threshold (meaning the public-good is provided with smaller ex ante probability, so less often), and thus lowers the expected social surplus. In that sense, one comes at the trade-off between privacy protection and social surplus.

4   Revenue-Sensitivity Trade-off

It is standard in the optimal mechanism design literature to find the revenue maximizing allocation rule subject to the implementability conditions. It was noted in Corollary 2.5 that the majority rule asymptotically extracts the maximum expected revenue among all implementable SCFs. Motivated by the discussion about the noise stability of the allocation rules, we ask a different optimization question in this section. Among the set of all implementable allocation rules that extract a target level of expected revenue (say R), which one has the minimum noise sensitivity? Formally, we seek the solution to the following optimization problem:

$$\min \mathsf{NS}_\delta[f]$$
$$\text{subject to: } \mathsf{R}_\delta[f] \geqslant R \text{ and } f \text{ being implementable}.$$

(4.1)

The solution to this problem characterizes the trade-off between the noise sensitivity and the expected revenue in public-good mechanisms. In particular, for a fixed noise level δ, it outputs the SCF that raises the target revenue level and is also minimally affected by noise. For every implementable SCF, as the noise level increases, the privacy of individuals will be better protected, but the expected revenue falls, and the noise sensitivity naturally increases. The above program delineates the minimum attainable noise sensitivity one can aim for among all mechanisms that raise a certain revenue level.

In the sequel we progressively simplify the above problem and ultimately we provide a solution that is asymptotically optimal as $n \to \infty$. In short, our methodology consists of two steps: (i) simplifying the objective function and finding equivalent representation for the constraints in (4.1); (ii) relaxing the constraint set and offering an asymptotically optimal solution in the relaxed region that also satisfies the properties of the original constraint set.

To develop some intuition, we first study the revenue and the noise sensitivity of the majority rule (see equation (2.9)) in the next section. Using them as a stepping stone, we provide the solution to the optimization problem of (4.1) in section 4.2.

4.1   Majority Rule

The expected revenue extracted by the majority rule (followed by equation (2.8)) is equal to

$$\mathsf{R}_\delta[f_{\mathrm{maj}}] = (1 - 2\delta)\mathsf{E}\left[\nu_n; \nu_n \geqslant 0\right] + \left(\frac{b-1}{2}\right)\mathsf{P}\left(\nu_n \geqslant 0\right).$$

Since $\{x_i : i \in [n]\}$ are i.i.d. and uniformly distributed $\{-1, +1\}$-valued random variables, then by the central limit theorem $\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\nu_n$ converges in distribution to the standard Gaussian,

i.e., $Z \sim \mathcal{N}(0,1)$. Therefore, using the Lebesgue dominated convergence theorem one has

$$\lim_{n \to \infty} \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \mathsf{E}\left[\nu_n^+\right] = \mathsf{E}\left[Z^+\right] = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}, \quad \text{and} \quad \lim_{n \to \infty} \mathsf{P}\left(\nu_n \geqslant 0\right) = \frac{1}{2},$$

thus implying $\mathsf{R}_\delta[f_{\text{maj}}] = \frac{(1-2\delta)}{\sqrt{2\pi}}\sqrt{n}\left(1 + o(1)\right)$. Next, we examine the noise sensitivity of the majority function.[2] Let $\text{sgn}(\cdot)$ denote the sign function. For the vector of true types x, and its noisy variant y, one has

$$\mathsf{NS}_\delta[f_{\text{maj}}] = \mathsf{P}\left(\text{sgn}\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i\right) \neq \text{sgn}\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i\right)\right),$$

that in turn due to the symmetry between x and y is equal to

$$\mathsf{P}\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \geqslant 0 \text{ and } \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i < 0\right). \tag{4.2}$$

Observe that $\mathsf{E}\left[x_i y_j\right] = 1 - 2\delta$ when $i = j$ and zero otherwise. Then, because of the multi-dimensional version of central limit theorem the following weak convergence result holds as $n \to \infty$:

$$\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i, \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\sum_{i=1}^{n} y_i\right) \Rightarrow \left(Z_1, \rho Z_1 + \sqrt{1-\rho^2}Z_2\right),$$

where $\rho := 1 - 2\delta$, and (Z_1, Z_2) are independent standard Gaussians. Hence, the probability in expression (4.2) converges to

$$\mathsf{P}\left(Z_1 \geqslant 0 \text{ and } \rho Z_1 + \sqrt{1-\rho^2}Z_2 < 0\right),$$

which because of the rotational symmetry of (Z_1, Z_2) is equal to $\frac{\arccos \rho}{\pi}$, therefore,

$$\mathsf{NS}_\delta[f_{\text{maj}}] = \frac{\arccos(1 - 2\delta)}{\pi}\left(1 + o(1)\right).$$

The curve in Figure 1 traces the asymptotic values for the *normalized* expected revenue (on the x-axis) and the noise sensitivity (on the y-axis) of the majority function as $n \to \infty$, while the noise parameter δ varies from 0 to 0.5. As previously mentioned, higher levels of noise are associated with higher noise sensitivity and lower expected revenue for every SCF (and here in particular for f_{maj}).

Recall that δ may be connected to a privacy guarantee ε, using the language of differential privacy. So our results provide a quantitative relation between the promised level of privacy and the resulting noise sensitivity and revenue loss.

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[2]Chapter 5 of O'Donnell (2014) includes a comprehensive study of the spectral properties of the majority function. We present a self-contained section about its noise sensitivity here, that makes the reading of the upcoming results more accessible.

Figure 1: Revenue and Noise Sensitivity of the Majority Rule

As it appears from this graph, a small increase in δ relative to the noise-free environment changes the expected revenue by a little, but significantly raises the noise sensitivity. This is owed to the fact that expected revenue changes linearly in δ, but the noise sensitivity of the majority rule has "*infinite*" derivative at $\delta = 0$.

4.2 Asymptotic Pareto Frontier

In this section, we find the asymptotically optimal solution to the optimization problem in (4.1). Specifically, we ask whether one can find a curve which consistently stays below the one in Figure 1. That is, for a certain level of expected revenue, is there any implementable Boolean function that achieves a smaller noise sensitivity than the majority rule? We answer this question affirmatively and prove that it is indeed the same linear threshold function that maximized the expected social surplus subject to the revenue constraint (in Proposition 3.7), which strikes the right balance between noise sensitivity and revenue. In fact, there are two linear threshold functions, whose thresholds are symmetric around 50%, which are asymptotically optimal for optimization (4.1). We choose the one with the smaller provision threshold because that has the additional advantage of maximizing the expected social surplus $\mathsf{S}_\delta[\cdot]$.

Observe that since the allocation rules in problem (4.1) are $\{0, 1\}$-valued, then

$$\mathsf{NS}_\delta[f] = \mathsf{P}\big(f(x) \neq f(y)\big) = \mathsf{E}\left[\big(f(x) - f(y)\big)^2\right] = 2\mathsf{E}\left[f(x)^2\right] - 2\mathsf{E}\left[f(x)f(y)\right].$$

Hence, we can express the noise sensitivity function in terms of the noise stability defined in

equation (3.3), namely $\mathsf{NS}_\delta[f] = 2\left(\mathsf{E}[f] - \mathsf{Stab}_\delta[f]\right)$.[3] Also, the optimization problem in (4.1) features no exogenous asymmetry across input coordinates, thus the anonymity condition (explained in remark 3.5) holds for the optimal solution, and without loss we can search for the SCFs taking $\nu_n(x)$ as input instead of x (see remark 3.5).

The revenue constraint in our optimization problem in (4.1) is simplified (in a similar manner explained in section 3.3) using equation (3.7). Finally, recall that a SCF is implementable iff it is marginally monotone. Putting the previous derivations together, we can now express an *equivalent* optimization problem to the one in (4.1):

$$\min \left\{\mathsf{E}[f] - \mathsf{Stab}_\delta[f]\right\}$$

$$\text{subject to: } \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\,\mathsf{E}\left[f(\nu_n)\nu_n\right] + \frac{b-1}{2(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}}\,\mathsf{E}\left[f(\nu_n)\right] \geqslant r, \tag{4.3}$$

$$\text{and } f \text{ being marginally monotone}.$$

We denote the optimal value of the above minimization problem by $\mathcal{V}_n(r)$, that is equal to *half* of the minimum noise sensitivity of the implementable SCFs that raise the normalized expected revenue of r.

Remark 4.1. Even if one is willing to convexify the constraint set in program (4.3), by letting f to be $[0,1]$-valued, the objective function is still not concave in f, and hence the extreme point theory (commonly used in mechanism design literature) cannot be applied.

We continue the analysis by *indexing* the above problem with the bias (or the mean) of the SCFs. Specifically, we find the minimum bias of the SCFs that satisfy the above revenue constraint. The solution to this problem helps us to relax the constraint set in (4.3). For that let us define,

$$\alpha_n(r) := \inf \left\{\mathsf{E}[f] : \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\mathsf{E}\left[f(\nu_n)\nu_n\right] + \frac{b-1}{2(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}}\,\mathsf{E}\left[f(\nu_n)\right] \geqslant r, \ f \in H_{[0,1]}\right\}, \tag{4.4}$$

where $H_{[0,1]}$ is the closed subset of L^2 functions from $\{-1,+1\}^n$ to $[0,1]$. Since this is a compact subset, and the revenue constraint induces a closed region, the above infimum is achieved. In the next lemma, we offer asymptotic properties of $\alpha_n(r)$ and the optimal solution as $n \to \infty$. Before that, we encourage the reader to review the notations introduced in 3.6.

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[3]Here, we used the fact that $\mathsf{E}[f^2] = \mathsf{E}[f]$ because f is $\{0,1\}$-valued.

Lemma 4.2. *Let us denote the optimal solution to the minimization problem of* (4.4) *by* $\bar{\ell}_n$, *and the minimum value by* $\alpha_n(r)$, *then*

$$\bar{\ell}_n(x; r) = \mathbb{1}\left\{\frac{\nu_n(x)}{\sqrt{n}} \geqslant \varphi^{-1}(r) + o(1)\right\}, \tag{4.5a}$$

$$\lim_{n\to\infty} \alpha_n(r) = \bar{\Phi}\left(\varphi^{-1}(r)\right). \tag{4.5b}$$

This result tells us among all SCFs that raise a target level of expected revenue the *linear threshold functions* have the smallest mean. In addition, the associated threshold depends on the normalized revenue r. Specifically, higher levels of normalized revenue corresponds to smaller thresholds, thus getting closer to the majority rule. It is also worthwhile to mention here that the threshold in $\bar{\ell}_n$ in equation (4.5a) is the negative of the threshold of $\underline{\ell}_n$ in equation (3.9)—we will soon show that these two LTFs are the promised asymptotically optimal candidates for the optimization problem of (4.3).

Remark 4.3. Since $\delta > 0$, equation (4.5b) implies that $\lim_{n\to\infty} \alpha_n(r) < 1/2$, and hence for all n larger than a certain level, one has $\alpha_n(r) < 1/2$. Therefore, we can define the *mirrored* optimization problem to the one in (4.4) as

$$\sup\left\{\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\mathsf{E}\left[f\nu_n\right] + \frac{b-1}{2(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}}\mathsf{E}\left[f\right] : \mathsf{E}[f] \geqslant 1 - \alpha,\ f \in H_{[0,1]}\right\}.$$

Since the distribution of ν_n is symmetric around 0, one can see that there exists an $o(1)$ sequence such that, replacing α with $\alpha_n(r) + o(1)$ in the above constraint leads to a supremum of r. That is

$$\mathsf{E}[f] \geqslant 1 - \left(\alpha_n(r) + o(1)\right) \text{ implies } \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\mathsf{E}\left[f\nu_n\right] + \frac{b-1}{2(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}}\mathsf{E}\left[f\right] \leqslant r. \tag{4.6}$$

Our next step is to use the idea of bias indexing to relax the constraint set in (4.3). Observe that the definition of $\alpha_n(\cdot)$ in equation (4.4) and the condition (4.6) jointly imply the following set inclusion:

$$\left\{f \in H_{[0,1]} : \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\mathsf{E}\left[f\nu_n\right] + \frac{b-1}{2(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}}\mathsf{E}\left[f\right] \geqslant r \text{ and } f \text{ being marginally monotone}\right\}$$

$$\subseteq \left\{f \in H_{[0,1]} : \alpha_n(r) \leqslant \mathsf{E}\left[f\right] \leqslant 1 - \left(\alpha_n(r) + o(1)\right)\right\}.$$

Therefore, the value to the following *relaxed* minimization problem is *smaller than or equal* to the value of the optimization problem in (4.3):

$$\min\left\{\mathsf{E}[f] - \mathsf{Stab}_\delta[f]\right\}$$
$$\text{subject to: } \alpha_n(r) \leqslant \mathsf{E}\left[f\right] \leqslant 1 - \left(\alpha_n(r) + o(1)\right) \text{ and } f \in H_{[0,1]}. \tag{4.7}$$

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Let us denote the value to this minimization problem by $\mathcal{V}_n^{\mathrm{rel}}(r)$, that satisfies $\mathcal{V}_n^{\mathrm{rel}}(r) \leqslant \mathcal{V}_n(r)$.

We next show that the linear threshold functions $\bar{\ell}_n(\cdot\,; r)$ (in equation (4.5a)) and $\underline{\ell}_n(\cdot\,; r)$ (in equation (3.9)) are approximately optimal for the above problem. The former function achieves the bias lower bound in (4.7), and the latter function achieves the bias upper bound. Additionally, since both functions satisfy the constraints of the original optimization problem in (4.3)—namely raising precisely r and being marginally monotone—they will remain asymptotically optimal for the original problem. The approximation error due to choosing them as suboptimal solutions for (4.3) converges to zero as $n \to \infty$.

To justify the previous claims, we borrow from a seminal result in the analysis of Boolean functions, that goes under the name of "majority is the stablest", and its proof mainly relies on the Gaussian isoperimetric inequality (first proved by Borell (1985)). In the following lemma we present a version of this result that suits our need, and we provide a rough sketch of its proof in the appendix.[4] Before that we need to define a notation for the two dimensional CDF of correlated Gaussians.

Definition 4.4. Let (Z_1, Z_2) be two standard Gaussian random variables, that are ρ-correlated, namely $\mathsf{E}\,[Z_1 Z_2] = \rho$. We define $\Phi_\rho : \mathbb{R}^2 \to [0, 1]$ as $\Phi_\rho(t_1, t_2) := \mathsf{P}_\rho\,(Z_1 \leqslant t_1, Z_2 \leqslant t_2)$. In particular, when $t_1 = t_2 = t$, with some abuse of notation we use $\Phi_\rho(t) \equiv \Phi_\rho(t, t)$.

Lemma 4.5 ("majority is the stablest"). *Let* $f : \{-1, +1\}^n \to [0, 1]$ *be an anonymous function, and* $\delta \in (0, 1/2)$, *then*

$$\mathsf{Stab}_\delta[f] \leqslant \Phi_{1-2\delta}\big(\Phi^{-1}(\mathsf{E}[f])\big) + o(1)\,,$$

where the $o(1)$ *approximation term is uniform across all anonymous functions.*

Our main theorem is expressed below, which gives an $o(1)$-suboptimal solution to the minimization problem of (4.3).

Theorem 4.6. *The linear threshold functions* $\{\underline{\ell}_n(\cdot\,; r), \bar{\ell}_n(\cdot\,; r)\}$ *are asymptotically optimal choices for the revenue constrained noise sensitivity minimization problem in (4.3). Formally, one has*

$$2\,\mathcal{V}_n(r) \leqslant \mathsf{NS}_\delta[\ell_n] \leqslant 2\,\mathcal{V}_n(r) + o(1), \quad \text{for } \ell_n \in \{\underline{\ell}_n(\cdot\,; r), \bar{\ell}_n(\cdot\,; r)\}\,. \tag{4.8}$$

Proof. Taking the previous lemma as given, the objective function in the relaxed optimization problem of (4.7) is lower bounded by

$$\mathsf{E}[f] - \mathsf{Stab}_\delta[f] \geqslant \mathsf{E}[f] - \Phi_{1-2\delta}\big(\Phi^{-1}(\mathsf{E}[f])\big) + o(1)\,,$$

---

[4]The original proof is rather long, and has several steps. The curious reader should consult Mossel et al. (2010) or chapter 11.7 of O'Donnell (2014) for the complete proof.

where the $o(1)$ term is uniform across all anonymous SCFs. The expression on the *rhs* above—up to the exclusion of the $o(1)$ term—is symmetric around $\mathsf{E}[f] = 1/2$. In particular, it is increasing (resp. decreasing) on the region where $\mathsf{E}[f] \leqslant 1/2$ (resp. $\mathsf{E}[f] \geqslant 1/2$). Therefore, for any anonymous f that belongs to the constraint set of the relaxed problem in (4.7), one has

$$\mathsf{E}[f] - \Phi_{1-2\delta}\big(\Phi^{-1}(\mathsf{E}[f])\big) \geqslant \alpha_n(r) - \Phi_{1-2\delta}\big(\Phi^{-1}(\alpha_n(r))\big) + o(1),$$

where the inequality binds for $f \in \{\underline{\ell}_n(\cdot; r), \bar{\ell}_n(\cdot; r)\}$, because by the construction of Lemma 4.2 and Proposition 3.7, respectively one has $\mathsf{E}\big[\bar{\ell}_n(\nu_n; r)\big] = \alpha_n(r)$ and $\mathsf{E}\big[\underline{\ell}_n(\nu_n; r)\big] = 1 - \big(\alpha_n(r) + o(1)\big)$. This in turn implies that

$$\mathsf{NS}_\delta[\ell_n] \leqslant 2\,\mathcal{V}_n^{\mathrm{rel}}(r) + o(1), \quad \text{for } \ell_n \in \{\underline{\ell}_n(\cdot; r), \bar{\ell}_n(\cdot; r)\},$$

and hence the second inequality in equation (4.8) follows because $\mathcal{V}_n^{\mathrm{rel}}(r) \leqslant \mathcal{V}_n(r)$. The first inequality readily holds because $\{\underline{\ell}_n(\cdot; r), \bar{\ell}_n(\cdot; r)\}$ also belong to the constraint set of the original problem in (4.3), as they both raise the normalized expected revenue of r and are monotone functions. $\qquad\square$

In a nutshell, our main theorem proves that one can reduce the noise sensitivity by sacrificing a certain amount of expected revenue. The simple majority function indeed raises the maximum expected revenue, but if one wants to improve upon its noise sensitivity, then the optimal way, among all implementable Boolean functions, is to increase the 50% threshold of the majority function (or decrease it by a similar amount). The more one increases (or decreases) this threshold, the more noise sensitivity decreases and more expected revenue is lost. The optimal trade-off is struck by the linear threshold functions $\{\underline{\ell}_n(\cdot; r), \bar{\ell}_n(\cdot; r)\}$. The normalized expected revenue that they raise are equal to r, hence the (unnormalized) expected revenue is $(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}\,r$. Furthermore, since $\mathsf{E}[\ell_n] = \bar{\Phi}\big(\varphi^{-1}(r)\big) + o(1)$, for $\ell_n \in \{\underline{\ell}_n(\cdot; \bar{r}), \bar{\ell}_n(\cdot; \bar{r})\}$, then the noise sensitivity takes the following form:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathsf{NS}_\delta[\ell_n] &= 2\Big\{\mathsf{E}[\ell_n] - \Phi_{1-2\delta}\big(\Phi^{-1}(\mathsf{E}[\ell_n])\big)\Big\} \\
&= 2\Big\{\Phi\big(-\varphi^{-1}(r)\big) - \Phi_{1-2\delta}\big(-\varphi^{-1}(r)\big)\Big\} + o(1).
\end{aligned}$$

In Figure 2, we take $1 - \mathsf{NS}_\delta$ as a proxy for robustness against noise, and insert it on the y-axis. On the x-axis, we locate the normalized expected revenue (by $\sqrt{n}$ not $(1 - 2\delta)\sqrt{n}$). The graphs indicate the asymptotic Pareto frontier for three different noise levels as $n \to \infty$, that are achieved by the LTFs in Theorem 4.6.

Recall the negative impact of noise on the revenue and social surplus. As we explained in Proposition 3.4, both of these variables are decreasing in the noise level. However, on

the bright side, indicated by Figure 2, as one *increases* the noise level, the frontier becomes *steeper*, and that in turn means one could gain more robustness against noise by giving up a fixed level of revenue. In other words, this means in higher noise levels, where the mechanism better protects the privacy of individuals' types, the trade-off between the revenue and noise robustness is amplified.


Figure 2: Asymptotic Pareto Frontier

One should be aware of the contrast between Figure 1 and Figure 2. In the former one, the SCF is fixed for all noise levels, and we plotted the noise sensitivity/normalized revenue *curve* for the majority function as the noise parameter δ varies from 0 to 0.5. In the latter one however, we fixed the noise level for each graph, and then we plotted the *maximum* noise robustness (i.e., $1 - \mathsf{NS}$) against the normalized revenue. This highlights the complementarity between the expected revenue and the noise level. In particular, lowering the required revenue is more effective for gaining noise robustness at higher levels of noise.

Remark 4.7. Both of the linear threshold functions that were shown to be asymptotically optimal for the noise-revenue trade-off are indeed monotone functions. Therefore, because of Proposition 2.4, they are not just Bayes-Nash implementable but also implementable in the sense of dominant strategies.

5 Imperfect Knowledge of Preferences

So far, we have studied a setting in which individuals perfectly know their preferences, and the noisy flips take place when they send their messages to the planner. We associated two interpretations with this setting: (i) noise is deliberately added for privacy preserving concerns;

(ii) miscommunication between individuals and the planner is inevitable and reported types could alter as a result.

In this section, we turn to an interpretation of our model where individuals simply do not know their own preferences and observe a noisy signal instead. The idea that agents have imperfect knowledge of their own preferences has received some attention in the mechanism design literature, including the recent work of Gleyze and Pernoud (2022) and Thereze (2022). Now individuals' reported preference may differ from their underlying true type, not necessarily because of the strategic issues, but because of the lack of perfect knowledge about their type. Formally, let x_i be uniformly distributed on $\{-1, +1\}$, representing the true type of agent i, that is hidden to herself. Instead, she receives a noisy signal $y_i \in \{-1, +1\}$ that is correlated with her true type, in the sense that $\mathsf{P}(y_i = x_i) = 1 - \delta$ for $\delta \in (0, 1/2)$. This means the probability that the agent's signal (information) matches her true type is higher than the probability that it differs. As before, we assume the pairs $\{(x_i, y_i) : i \in [n]\}$ are independently distributed and each has the same distribution explained before.

A mechanism (f, t) is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible in this setting, when each agent reports her signal (i.e., y_i) truthfully, while taking expectations w.r.t. the others' types. Let $y = (y_1, \ldots, y_n)$ be the vector of signals received by the individuals. Then, in a BN-IC mechanism the planner outputs $f(y)$ and charges agent i by the amount $t_i(y)$ for each $i \in [n]$. The interim incentive constraint for the agent i with signal y_i is:

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\mathsf{E}\left[\left(\frac{b + x_i}{2}\right) f(y_i, y_{-i}) \big| y_i\right] - \mathsf{E}\left[t_i(y_i, y_{-i}) \big| y_i\right] \geqslant \\
&\mathsf{E}\left[\left(\frac{b + x_i}{2}\right) f(-y_i, y_{-i}) \big| y_i\right] - \mathsf{E}\left[t_i(-y_i, y_{-i}) \big| y_i\right].
\end{aligned}
\tag{5.1}
$$

Lemma 5.1. *In the present setting, where agents do not have perfect knowledge about their types, a mechanism (f, t) is BN-IC iff for every $i \in [n]$,*

$$
\left(\frac{b+1}{2} - \delta\right)\left(\bar{f}_i(+1) - \bar{f}_i(-1)\right) \geqslant \bar{t}_i(+1) - \bar{t}_i(-1) \geqslant \left(\frac{b-1}{2} + \delta\right)\left(\bar{f}_i(+1) - \bar{f}_i(-1)\right). \tag{5.2}
$$

We skip the proof of this lemma. It follows directly from equation (5.1), observing that because of the independence, the conditional distribution of y_{-i} given y_i is the same as the unconditional distribution of x_{-i}. The first (resp. second) inequality in (5.2) refers to the interim IC constraint when $y_i = +1$ (resp. $y_i = -1$). In a sharp contrast with the previous setting, where noise came around in the communication stage, the incentive constraints are now affected by the noise level δ. This is so because in the former case, the noise could flip the individual's message and alter her expected transfer, but in the current setting when an

agent sends her signal y_i, the transfer she expects, namely $\bar{t}_i(y_i)$, is not further modified by the noise. Finally, equation (5.2) also confirms that as the noise level δ increases the space of Bayes-Nash incentive compatible mechanisms shrinks.

Next, we express the interim individual rationality constraint for the agent i who received the signal y_i, and has an outside option of zero:

$$\mathsf{E}\left[\left(\frac{b+x_i}{2}\right)f(y_i,y_{-i})\Big|y_i\right] - \mathsf{E}\left[t_i(y_i,y_{-i})\big|y_i\right] \geqslant 0\,.$$

One can simplify this constraint into two inequalities, that respectively indicate the IR conditions for the high (i.e., $y_i = +1$) and low (i.e., $y_i = -1$) signals:

$$\left(\frac{b+1}{2}-\delta\right)\bar{f}_i(+1) \geqslant \bar{t}_i(+1)\,, \tag{5.3a}$$

$$\left(\frac{b-1}{2}+\delta\right)\bar{f}_i(-1) \geqslant \bar{t}_i(-1)\,. \tag{5.3b}$$

We now state the counterpart of proposition 2.4 in the current setting.

Proposition 5.2. *In the present setting, where agents do not have perfect knowledge about their types, a SCF $f : \{-1,+1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$ is implementable iff it satisfies marginal monotonicity, namely $\bar{f}_i(+1) - \bar{f}_i(-1) \geqslant 0$ for all $i \in [n]$. In addition, the maximum expected revenue that the planner can collect from implementing f is*

$$\widetilde{\mathsf{R}}_\delta[f] := (1-2\delta)\mathsf{E}\left[f(x)\sum_{i=1}^n x_i\right] + \left(\frac{b-1}{2}+\delta\right)\mathsf{E}[f(x)]\,, \tag{5.4}$$

where the expectation is taken w.r.t. the uniform measure on $\{-1,+1\}^n$.

Proof sketch. Following the similar steps of the the proof of Proposition 2.4, we can show that marginal monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the Bayes-Nash implementability of the SCF f. Next, observe that the expected transfer from agent i to the planner is $\left(\bar{t}_i(-1)+\bar{t}_i(+1)\right)/2$. It is then straightforward to show that in the optimum the BN-IC constraint for the high type (namely the first inequality in (5.2)) and the IR condition for the low type (i.e., equation (5.3b)) bind. Hence, the optimum transfers are:

$$\bar{t}_i(-1) = \left(\frac{b-1}{2}+\delta\right)\bar{f}_i(-1)\,,$$

$$\bar{t}_i(+1) = \left(\frac{b+1}{2}-\delta\right)\bar{f}_i(+1) - (1-2\delta)\bar{f}_i(-1)\,.$$

Since $\bar{f}_i(z) = \mathsf{E}[f] + z\,\mathsf{E}\left[f(x)x_i\right]$ for $z \in \{-1,+1\}$, then summing the above expressions over i (followed by division by two) yields the representation for the maximum expected revenue (attainable from the SCF f) in equation (5.4). $\qquad\square$

We continue by studying the revenue-surplus trade-off when agents have imperfect knowledge of their preferences. Observe that, in the new setting the implemented outcome is $f(y)$ while the agents' true vector of types is x. Therefore, the expected social surplus follows the same expression of equation (3.5). Hence, the revenue-surplus trade-off is pinned down by the following program:

$$\max \mathsf{S}_\delta[f]$$
$$\text{subject to: } \widetilde{\mathsf{R}}_\delta[f] \geqslant R, \text{ and } f \text{ being implementable}.$$

Likewise before, we normalize the lower bound on the expected revenue by $r = R/(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}$. Then, using the same apparatus as in the proof of Proposition 3.7, one can show that the same linear threshold function, namely $\underline{\ell}_n(\cdot;r)$, solves the above problem. In that the public good is allocated so long as $\frac{\nu_n}{\sqrt{n}} \geqslant -\varphi^{-1}(r) + o(1)$. Suppose the required revenue R remains fixed, and one looks at the response of the constrained efficient allocation rule in the above problem to the noise. As the agents' information about their preferences deteriorate (corresponding to an increase in δ), the normalized revenue r increases, and correspondingly the provision threshold gets closer to simple 50% majority from *below*. Conversely, an improvement in the agents' knowledge about their type, decreases the threshold and thus increases the chances of provision. This means in the societies where agents have better knowledge about their preferences for public good, the expected likelihood of provision in the efficient allocation rule is higher.

Next, we study the revenue noise sensitivity trade-off. Specifically, we ask the similar question expressed in the optimization problem of (4.1), in that one seeks the SCF with the minimum noise sensitivity subject to raising a target level of expected revenue, in the present setting where agents have imperfect knowledge of their types:

$$\min \mathsf{NS}_\delta[f]$$
$$\text{subject to: } \widetilde{\mathsf{R}}_\delta[f] \geqslant R \text{ and } f \text{ being implementable}.$$

A quick inspection on the expressions for expected revenue in these two settings, namely equations (2.8) and (5.4), implies that

$$\frac{1}{(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}} \left| \widetilde{\mathsf{R}}_\delta[f] - \mathsf{R}_\delta[f] \right| = o\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}} \right).$$

Therefore, one can follow the same steps taken in section 4.2, and show that the two LTFs with approximate thresholds (up to $o(1)$ variations) at $-\varphi^{-1}(r)$ and $\varphi^{-1}(r)$ are asymptotically optimal for the above problem. Hence, we select the former one, i.e.,

$$\underline{\ell}_n(x;r) = \mathbb{1}\left\{ \frac{\nu_n(x)}{\sqrt{n}} \geqslant -\varphi^{-1}(r) + o(1) \right\},$$

29

because not only it minimizes the noise sensitivity (subject to the revenue constraint) but it is also constrained efficient, as it maximizes the expected social surplus given the revenue constraint.

Quite naturally, the noise sensitivity of the optimal SCF increases as the agents' knowledge of their preferences deteriorate. But more importantly, similar to the interpretation we attached to Figure 2, the worse are the agents' knowledge about their preferences (equivalently the higher is δ), the *smaller* expected revenue the planner has to give up in order to gain a certain level of robustness against noise.

6   Conclusion

We have studied the trade-offs between privacy preservation, the standard economic objectives of efficiency and revenue, and the stability of the public-good decision rule. Privacy preservation compromises the pursuit of other objectives, but in a large economy we are able to characterize the asymptotically optimal decision rules, and uncover the underlying quantitative trade-offs.

Our model is standard, but stylized, assuming binary types and a yes/no decision on the provision of a public good. It seems natural to ask the same question in other environments. Preservation of privacy is an overarching concern, and one can imagine private goods models, as well as public-good settings that are richer than the ones we have focused on here, in which to analyze the effect of privacy-preserving noise. We can only hope that our paper proves a useful starting point for further work.

A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1

When the true type of agent i is x_i, the incentive constraint in equation (2.2) boils down to

$$\left(\frac{b+x_i}{2}\right) \mathsf{E}\left[f\big(y_i(x_i), y_{-i}\big)\big|x_i\right] - \mathsf{E}\left[t_i\big(y_i(x_i), y_{-i}\big)\big|x_i\right] \geqslant$$
$$\left(\frac{b+x_i}{2}\right) \mathsf{E}\left[f\big(y_i(-x_i), y_{-i}\big)\big|x_i\right] - \mathsf{E}\left[t_i\big(y_i(-x_i), y_{-i}\big)\big|x_i\right] .$$

Since the flips are independent across the individuals, the joint distribution of $\big(y_i(x_i), y_{-i}\big)$ is the same as $\big(y_i(x_i), x_{-i}\big)$. Therefore, one can summarize the previous condition as

$$\left(\frac{b+x_i}{2}\right) \mathsf{E}\left[\bar{f}_i\big(y_i(x_i)\big)\big|x_i\right] - \mathsf{E}\left[\bar{t}_i\big(y_i(x_i)\big)\big|x_i\right] \geqslant$$
$$\left(\frac{b+x_i}{2}\right) \mathsf{E}\left[\bar{f}_i\big(y_i(-x_i)\big)\big|x_i\right] - \mathsf{E}\left[\bar{t}_i\big(y_i(-x_i)\big)\big|x_i\right] ,$$

in that the expectation operators only refer to the noisy flips. When $x_i = +1$, we expand this expression and cancel the appearing term $1 - 2\delta$ from both sides, thereby showing the first inequality constraint in equation (2.4). Similarly, when $x_i = -1$, the interim incentive constraint reduces to the second inequality in (2.4).

For the dominant strategy incentive constraints, one can easily verify that applying the expectation w.r.t. the noise in inequality (2.3) amounts to the simplified version in equation (2.5). $\qquad\square$

A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4

We divide the proof into three parts: (i) showing the equivalence between marginal monotonicity and Bayes-Nash implementability; (ii) the equivalence between monotonicity and dominant strategy implementability; (iii) proof of the revenue equivalence representation in equation (2.8).

Part (i): As a rather immediate corollary of incentive constraints in (2.4), one can observe that the marginal monotonicity of SCF is necessary for every BN-IC mechanism (f, t). It is further sufficient, because if $\bar{f}_i(+1) - \bar{f}_i(-1) \geqslant 0$ for all $i \in [n]$, one can always find a set of transfer functions, $t = (t_1, \ldots, t_n)$, such that their induced marginals $\big(\bar{t}_i(-1), \bar{t}_i(+1)\big)$ satisfy the BN-IC condition in equation (2.4), and the two IIR conditions in (2.6) for each $i \in [n]$. To justify this claim, let $\big(\bar{t}_i(-1), \bar{t}_i(+1)\big) = (\beta_{-1}, \beta_{+1})$ be any pair that satisfies the BN-IC condition

of equation (2.4) and the IIR conditions of (2.6), induced by the marginally monotone pair $(\bar{f}_i(-1), \bar{f}_i(+1))$. We want to show that there exists a function $t : \{-1, +1\}^n \to \mathbb{R}$, whose marginals on the i-th coordinate (averaging out the other coordinates) match (β_{-1}, β_{+1}). To find such a function, we restrict the search to the smaller space of anonymous functions, whose value only depend on the number of $+1$'s in the input vector, namely on

$$m(x) := \#\{i : x_i = +1\} .$$

Therefore, we denote $t(x)$ by $t(m(x))$. Hence, it is required that

$$\beta_{-1} = \sum_{m=0}^{n-1} t(m) \binom{n-1}{m} \frac{1}{2^{n-1}} ,$$

$$\beta_{+1} = \sum_{m=0}^{n-1} t(m+1) \binom{n-1}{m} \frac{1}{2^{n-1}} .$$

Let us denote the anonymous function $t(\cdot)$ by the vector $\boldsymbol{t} \equiv (t(0), t(1), \ldots, t(n))$, and $\binom{n}{k}$ by $C_{n,k}$. Then, the above linear system is expressed by

$$\begin{bmatrix} C_{n-1,0} & C_{n-1,1} & \ldots & C_{n-1,n-1} & 0 \\ 0 & C_{n-1,0} & C_{n-1,1} & \ldots & C_{n-1,n-1} \end{bmatrix} \boldsymbol{t} = 2^{n-1} \begin{bmatrix} \beta_{-1} \\ \beta_{+1} \end{bmatrix} .$$

Since, the first and last columns of the coefficient matrix are linearly independent, then there always exists a solution to the above system. Therefore, one can always find an anonymous transfer function $t_i(\cdot)$ that implements the marginally monotone pair $(\bar{f}_i(-1), \bar{f}_i(+1))$.

Part (ii): That $b \in [0, 1]$ and a dominant strategy implementable f requires the DS-IC constraint in equation (2.5) imply that $f(+1, y_{-i}) - f(-1, y_{-i}) \geqslant 0$ for every coordinate i and every $y_{-i} \in \{-1, +\}^{n-1}$. Hence, monotonicity is a necessary condition for dominant strategy implementation. It is further sufficient, because for every $y_{-i} \in \{-1, +1\}^{n-1}$, one can always find a pair $\{t_i(-1, y_{-i}), t_i(+1, y_{-i})\}$ that satisfies the dominant strategy incentive constraints in equation (2.5) and the ex post IR conditions in equation (2.7).

Part (iii): Since every dominant strategy implementable f is also Bayes-Nash implementable, and we are interested in the expected revenue (not the ex post revenue), we present the proof of the revenue equivalence for the Bayes-Nash implementable SCFs. To find the maximum expected revenue associated with an implementable SCF f, observe that the planner receives the expected transfer

$$\frac{1}{2} \left(\bar{t}_i(+1) + \bar{t}_i(-1) \right) , \tag{A.1}$$

from individual i. Therefore, one should maximize this expression, subject to the BN-IC and IIR conditions, to achieve the maximum expected transfer obtained from the SCF f. To

solve this program, we first show the IIR condition for the low type (namely equation (2.6b)) together with the BN-IC condition for the high type (namely the first inequality in (2.4)) imply the IIR condition for the high type, which is equation (2.6a). From the low type IIR condition one has

$$\bar{t}_i(-1) \leqslant -\frac{\delta}{1-\delta}\bar{t}_i(+1) + \left(\frac{b-1}{2}\right)\left(\frac{\delta}{1-\delta}\bar{f}_i(+1) + \bar{f}_i(-1)\right), \qquad \text{(A.2)}$$

and the high type BN-IC condition implies

$$\bar{t}_i(+1) \leqslant \bar{t}_i(-1) + \left(\frac{b+1}{2}\right)\left(\bar{f}_i(+1) - \bar{f}_i(-1)\right).$$

Replacing the former upper bound on $\bar{t}_i(-1)$ in the above inequality and applying some rearrangements imply that

$$\bar{t}_i(+1) \leqslant \left(\frac{b+1}{2} - \delta\right)\bar{f}_i(+1) - (1-\delta)\bar{f}_i(-1). \qquad \text{(A.3)}$$

Next, let us investigate the validity of the high type IIR condition, i.e., equation (2.6a). We use equation (A.2) and (A.3) to obtain the following upper bound on the expected transfer paid by the high type, namely the *rhs* of equation (2.6a):

$$
\begin{aligned}
(1-\delta)\bar{t}_i(+1) + \delta\bar{t}_i(-1) &\leqslant \left(\frac{1-2\delta}{1-\delta}\right)\bar{t}_i(+1) + \delta\left(\frac{b-1}{2}\right)\left(\frac{\delta}{1-\delta}\bar{f}_i(+1) + \bar{f}_i(-1)\right) \\
&\leqslant \left(\frac{b+1-\delta(b+3)}{2}\right)\bar{f}_i(+1) + \left(\frac{\delta(b+3)}{2} - 1\right)\bar{f}_i(-1) \\
&= \left(\frac{b+1}{2}\right)\left((1-\delta)\bar{f}_i(+1) + \delta\bar{f}_i(-1)\right) - \left(\delta\bar{f}_i(+1) + (1-\delta)\bar{f}_i(-1)\right).
\end{aligned}
$$

This implies that equation (2.6a), which is the high type IIR condition, falls out of the high type BN-IC constraint and the low type IIR constraint.

As it relates to the dominant strategy implementation, one can follow the above recipe and show that the high type EIR condition (in equation (2.7a)) falls out of the high type DS-IC (namely the first inequality in equation (2.5)) and the low type EIR condition (in equation (2.7b)).

The above analysis implies that one needs to only maximize the expected transfer on the constrained set induced by the incentive constraints (i.e., equation (2.4)) and the low type IIR condition. Therefore, at the optimum the low type IIR condition as well as one of the incentive constraints must bind. One can show that since $\delta < 1/2$, the extreme point associated with the meet of the low type IIR and high type BN-IC achieves a higher expected

revenue than the meet of the low type IIR and low type BN-IC. Hence, the following profile of interim transfers pins down the optimum:

$$\bar{t}_i(-1) = -\delta \bar{f}_i(+1) + \left(\frac{b-1}{2} + \delta\right) \bar{f}_i(-1),$$

$$\bar{t}_i(+1) = \left(\frac{b+1}{2} - \delta\right) \bar{f}_i(+1) - (1 - \delta)\bar{f}_i(-1).$$

Therefore, the maximum expected transfer from individual i would be equal to

$$\frac{\bar{t}_i(+1) + \bar{t}_i(-1)}{2} = \left(\frac{b+1}{4} - \delta\right) \bar{f}_i(+1) + \left(\frac{b-3}{4} + \delta\right) \bar{f}_i(-1).$$

Since the types are distributed *uniformly* on $\{-1, +1\}^n$, one has

$$\bar{f}_i(+1) = \mathsf{E}[f] + \mathsf{E}[f(x)x_i],$$

$$\bar{f}_i(-1) = \mathsf{E}[f] - \mathsf{E}[f(x)x_i].$$

Hence, the maximum expected revenue from implementing f follows:

$$\mathsf{R}_\delta[f] = \sum_{i \in [n]} \frac{\bar{t}_i(+1) + \bar{t}_i(-1)}{2} = (1 - 2\delta)\mathsf{E}\left[f(x)\sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i\right] + \left(\frac{b-1}{2}\right)\mathsf{E}[f(x)],$$

thereby establishing the expression in (2.8). □

A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.7

The optimization problem in (3.8) falls under the class of linear programs, in that one needs to assign the optimal value to $f(\nu)$ for every $\nu \in \{-n, -n+2, \ldots, n\}$. The corresponding Lagrangian for the relaxed problem, where we skip the implementability condition, is

$$\mathcal{L} = \frac{b}{2}\mathsf{E}[f(\nu_n)] + \frac{1 - 2\delta}{2n}\mathsf{E}[f(\nu_n)\nu_n]$$

$$+ \lambda\left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\mathsf{E}[f(\nu_n)\nu_n] + \frac{b-1}{2(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}}\mathsf{E}[f(\nu_n)] - r\right).$$

Since the Lagrange multiplier λ is non-negative, then $\lambda + \frac{1-2\delta}{2\sqrt{n}} > 0$, and the candidate solution takes the following form

$$f(\nu_n) = \mathbb{1}\left\{\frac{\nu_n}{\sqrt{n}} \geqslant \frac{-\left(b + \frac{\lambda(b-1)}{(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}}\right)}{2\lambda + \frac{1-2\delta}{\sqrt{n}}}\right\}.$$

One can easily check that increasing λ in the above expression, raises the provision threshold, thus asymptotically (as $n \to \infty$) decreases the expected social surplus, while increasing

the expected revenue. This is so because the second term in $\mathsf{S}_\delta[f]$ is of order $O(1/\sqrt{n})$ and asymptotically vanishes compared to the first term, which in turn is decreasing in the provision threshold. Therefore, we should find the minimum λ that satisfies the revenue constraint. For this, let us denote the threshold by

$$\xi_n \equiv \xi_n(b, \delta, \lambda) := \frac{-\left(b + \frac{\lambda(b-1)}{(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}}\right)}{2\lambda + \frac{1-2\delta}{\sqrt{n}}} .$$

Hence, we seek the minimum λ satisfying the following inequality:

$$\mathsf{E}\left[\frac{\nu_n}{\sqrt{n}}; \frac{\nu_n}{\sqrt{n}} \geqslant \xi_n(b, \delta, \lambda)\right] + \frac{(b-1)}{2(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}} \mathsf{P}\left(\frac{\nu_n}{\sqrt{n}} \geqslant \xi_n(b, \delta, \lambda)\right) \geqslant r .$$

As $n \to \infty$, the normalized sum $\frac{\nu_n}{\sqrt{n}}$ converges in distribution to the standard Gaussian, thus the *lhs* in the above inequality converges. Specifically, the first term is asymptotically equal to $\varphi(\xi_n) + o(1)$, and the second term is also of $o(1)$. Therefore, one can express the above condition as

$$\varphi(\xi_n) \geqslant r + o(1) .$$

Since the provision threshold ξ_n is negative, then the above condition implies that the optimal threshold is $-\varphi^{-1}(r) + o(1)$, thereby verifying the optimality of the LTF in equation (3.9). $\quad\square$

A.4   Proof of Lemma 4.2

The minimization problem in (4.4) clearly falls under the class of linear programs. Therefore, one can express the Lagrangian for this problem as follows:

$$\mathcal{L} = \mathsf{E}\left[f(\nu_n)\right] + \lambda\left(r - \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\mathsf{E}\left[f(\nu_n)\nu_n\right] - \frac{b-1}{2(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}}\mathsf{E}\left[f(\nu_n)\right]\right) .$$

The optimal solution thus takes the following form

$$f(\nu_n) = \mathbb{1}\left\{\frac{\nu_n}{\sqrt{n}} \geqslant \frac{1}{\lambda} - \frac{b-1}{2(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}}\right\} . \tag{A.4}$$

Denote the threshold in the above function by $\eta_n \equiv \eta_n(b, \delta, \lambda)$. Since a linear threshold function with the above from is pointwise increasing in λ, and we want to actually minimize $\mathsf{E}\left[f(\nu_n)\right]$, then one needs to choose the minimum λ that satisfies the revenue constraint, namely:

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}\mathsf{E}\left[f(\nu_n)\nu_n\right] + \frac{b-1}{2(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}}\mathsf{E}\left[f(\nu_n)\right] \geqslant r .$$

Therefore, inserting the optimal form—presented in equation (A.4)—in the above inequality amounts to:

$$\mathsf{E}\left[\frac{\nu_n}{\sqrt{n}}; \frac{\nu_n}{\sqrt{n}} \geqslant \eta_n(b, \delta, \lambda)\right] + \frac{b-1}{2(1-2\delta)\sqrt{n}} \, \mathsf{P}\left(\frac{\nu_n}{\sqrt{n}} \geqslant \eta_n(b, \delta, \lambda)\right) \geqslant r \,.$$

Applying the central limit theorem followed by monotone convergence theorem imply that as $n \to \infty$, the *lhs* in the above inequality becomes equal to $\varphi(\eta_n) + o(1)$. Therefore, the optimal threshold in equation (A.4) satisfies:

$$\eta_n = \varphi^{-1}(r) + o(1) \,.$$

This verifies the expression for the optimal solution in equation (4.5a). Next, one can plug the above finding in equation (A.4) and obtain an expression for the optimal value of the minimization problem, namely $\alpha_n(r)$:

$$\alpha_n(r) = \mathsf{P}\left(\frac{\nu_n}{\sqrt{n}} \geqslant \varphi^{-1}(r) + o(1)\right) = \bar{\Phi}\left(\varphi^{-1}(r)\right) + o(1) \,.$$

The second equality above follows directly from the central limit theorem and thus justifying equation (4.5b). $\qquad\square$

A.5 Intuitive Proof of Lemma 4.5

We present a very high level sketch of the proof, explaining the pillars and the main ideas. The are a handful of different methods for proving this theorem (as recent as Eldan et al. (2022)), but we rely on the approach offered in Mossel et al. (2010).

The proof relies on two main ideas: (i) Borell's Gaussian isoperimetric inequality; (ii) *Invariance principle*. We first present some preliminaries that discipline the reading of how these two ideas come together and shape the proof.

A.5.1 Preliminaries

We start with the definition of the noise operator acting on the Hilbert space $H = L^2\left(\{-1, +1\}^n\right)$ with the uniform measure on the hypercube.

Definition A.1 (Noise Operator)**.** Let $\rho \in (0, 1)$ and define $\mathsf{T}_\rho : H \to H$ as

$$\mathsf{T}_\rho f(x) = \mathsf{E}\left[f(y)|x\right] \,,$$

where $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ is a point uniformly drawn from the hypercube, and y is its ρ-correlated version, such that $\mathsf{E}\left[y_i x_i\right] = \rho$ for each coordinate $i \in [n]$.

For every basis element $\chi_S \in H$, one has $\mathsf{T}_\rho \chi_S(x) = \rho^{|S|} \chi_S(x)$. Since, the noise operator is linear, applying that on the Fourier expansion in equation (3.2) implies

$$\mathsf{T}_\rho f(x) = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \rho^{|S|} \hat{f}(S) \chi_S(x) \,.$$

In addition, the noise operator is commutative and has the semi-group property, that is for $\rho_1, \rho_2 \in (0,1)$, one has $\mathsf{T}_{\rho_1} \mathsf{T}_{\rho_2} = \mathsf{T}_{\rho_2} \mathsf{T}_{\rho_1} = \mathsf{T}_{\rho_1 \rho_2}$. Furthermore, the above Fourier representation of the noise operator implies that for every $f, g \in H$, it holds that $\langle f, \mathsf{T}_\rho g \rangle = \langle \mathsf{T}_\rho f, g \rangle$.

Looking back at the definition of the noise stability in equation (3.3), one observes that

$$\mathsf{Stab}_\delta[f] = \langle f, \mathsf{T}_{1-2\delta} f \rangle = \langle \mathsf{T}_{\sqrt{1-2\delta}} f, \mathsf{T}_{\sqrt{1-2\delta}} f \rangle = \mathsf{E}\left[\left(\mathsf{T}_{\sqrt{1-2\delta}} f(x)\right)^2\right] \,. \tag{A.5}$$

Next, we present the passing from the Boolean to Gaussian environment. Let γ be the standard Gaussian measure on $\mathbb{R}^n$, and $L^2(\mathbb{R}^n; \gamma)$ be the Hilbert space of square integrable functions with respect to γ, equipped with its natural inner product.

Definition A.2 (Gaussian Evaluation). Let $z \in \mathbb{R}^n$ be distributed according to the standard Gaussian measure γ. For a Boolean function $f \in H$, we abuse the notation and define its Gaussian evaluation as

$$f(z) = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \hat{f}(S) \chi_S(z) \,.$$

Since $f \in H$, then

$$\mathsf{E}_\gamma\left[f(z)^2\right] = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \hat{f}(S)^2 = \mathsf{E}\left[f(x)^2\right] < \infty \,,$$

and hence the Gaussian passing of f belongs to $L^2(\mathbb{R}^n; \gamma)$.

Remark A.3. Inspired by the previous definition, one can extend the domain of other operators, such Stab_δ and T_ρ, to $L^2(\mathbb{R}^n; \gamma)$. For example, let z and z' be two n-dimensional standard Gaussian vectors, where their corresponding coordinates are ρ-correlated, then:

$$\mathsf{T}_\rho f(z) = \mathsf{E}\left[f(z')|z\right] = \sum_{S \subseteq [n]} \rho^{|S|} \hat{f}(S) \chi_S(z) \,,$$

$$\mathsf{Stab}_\delta[f] = \langle f, \mathsf{T}_{1-2\delta} f \rangle = \langle \mathsf{T}_{\sqrt{1-2\delta}} f, \mathsf{T}_{\sqrt{1-2\delta}} f \rangle = \mathsf{E}\left[\left(\mathsf{T}_{\sqrt{1-2\delta}} f(z)\right)^2\right] \,.$$

A.5.2   Borell's Isoperimetric Inequality

At this point it is recommended for the reader to refresh their memory with the definitions of Gaussian functions in the remarks 3.6 and 4.4.

Theorem A.4 (Borell (1985))**.** *Fix $\delta \in (0, 1/2)$. Then, for any $f \in L^2(\mathbb{R}^n; \gamma)$ with the range $[0, 1]$, and $\mathsf{E}[f] = \mu$, it holds that*

$$\mathsf{Stab}_\delta[f] \leqslant \Phi_{1-2\delta}\big(\Phi^{-1}(\mu)\big). \tag{A.6}$$

The *rhs* to the above inequality is *equal* to the noise stability of the indicator function of any half-space $H \subseteq \mathbb{R}^n$ with the Gaussian volume of $\mathrm{Vol}_\gamma(H) = \mu$.

An interesting corollary to this theorem is that among all measurable subsets of $\mathbb{R}^n$, with a fixed Gaussian volume, the half-spaces have the minimum sensitivity to noise. Formally, let us denote the n-dimensional standard Gaussian probability measure by P_γ. Consider any measurable subset A with $\mathrm{Vol}_\gamma(A) = \mu > 0$, and any half-space H with the same volume μ. Then, inequality (A.6) implies that

$$\mathsf{P}_\gamma\left(x \in A, y \in A\right) \leqslant \mathsf{P}_\gamma\left(x \in H, y \in H\right),$$

where $x \sim \gamma$ and y is its δ-noisy version, that is $\mathsf{E}[y_i|x_i] = (1 - 2\delta)x_i$ for each $i \in [n]$. Canceling $\mathsf{P}_\gamma(x \in A)$ from both sides amounts to

$$\mathsf{P}_\gamma\left(y \in A \middle| x \in A\right) \leqslant \mathsf{P}_\gamma\left(y \in H \middle| x \in H\right).$$

This means if one starts at a random point x inside the subset A, then the chances of leaving this region due to adding noise is minimal for half-spaces.

A.5.3   Invariance Principle

In this part, we offer an intuitive statement of the invariance principle. For that, we need to define the concept of *influence.*

Let $x^{i \mapsto +1}$ be the vector x, where its i-th coordinate is replaced with $+1$. Similarly, define $x^{i \mapsto -1}$. Then, holding all other coordinates constant, one can define the *derivative* operator $\mathsf{D}_i : H \to \mathbb{R}$ as

$$\mathsf{D}_i[f](x) = \frac{f(x^{i \mapsto +1}) - f(x^{i \mapsto -1})}{2}.$$

Definition A.5 (Coordinate Influence)**.** For $f : \{-1, +1\}^n \to \mathbb{R}$ and $i \in [n]$ define

$$\mathsf{Inf}_i[f] = \sum_{S \ni i} \hat{f}(S)^2.$$

That is the influence of coordinate i on f is the sum of f's squared Fourier weights containing i. One can immediately see that $\mathsf{Inf}_i[f] = \mathsf{E}\left[\mathsf{D}_i[f](x)^2\right]$. Hence, the influence of input i should be interpreted as the expected change that it makes on the function f.

Next, we explain what it means for a function $F : \{-1, +1\}^n \to \mathbb{R}$ to be *invariant*. For any x not belonging to the hypercube, we identify $F(x)$ by the evaluation of its Fourier representation at x. Hence, with some abuse of notation one can extend the domain of F to the entire $\mathbb{R}^n$.

Let $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ and $z = (z_1, \ldots, z_n)$ be two vectors with i.i.d. elements, such that their first few moments match, namely $\mathsf{E}[x_i] = \mathsf{E}[x_i^3] = \mathsf{E}[z_i] = \mathsf{E}[z_i^3] = 0$, $\mathsf{E}[x_i^2] = \mathsf{E}[z_i^2] = 1$ for all $i \in [n]$, and the fourth moment is finite. For example, x can be drawn uniformly from the hypercube $\{-1, +1\}^n$ and z from the n-dimensional standard Gaussian distribution on $\mathbb{R}^n$. Suppose the previously mentioned function F has *small* influence with respect to all of its input coordinates, that is there is no single coordinate that can determine the outcome with high probability.[5] Then, the invariance principle claims that for any sufficiently smooth function $\Psi : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$, as $n \to \infty$ one has

$$\left| \mathsf{E}\left[\Psi\big(F(x)\big) \right] - \mathsf{E}\left[\Psi\big(F(z)\big) \right] \right| = o(1). \tag{A.7}$$

The approximation error $o(1)$ becomes *uniform* over all F's, that put vanishingly small influence on every single coordinate.

A.5.4   Proof Sketch

The reader should now have good senses on how to put the previous two ideas together and reach to the conclusion. First, observe that in our setup, where f is supposed to be an anonymous SCF, the small influence condition automatically holds, because f treats all its input coordinates symmetrically, thus one can safely apply the invariance principle. Second, equation (A.5) hints at choosing Ψ to be the quadratic function, i.e., $t \mapsto t^2$—that is "sufficiently smooth"—and to assign $F(x) = \mathsf{T}_{\sqrt{1-2\delta}} f(x)$. Then, the invariance principle in equation (A.7) implies that

$$\left| \mathsf{E}\left[\big(\mathsf{T}_{\sqrt{1-2\delta}} f(x)\big)^2 \right] - \mathsf{E}\left[\big(\mathsf{T}_{\sqrt{1-2\delta}} f(z)\big)^2 \right] \right| = o(1).$$

Third, the Gaussian noise stability is upper bounded by the Borell's isoperimetric inequality in equation (A.6). Hence, the previous equation implies that for every anonymous SCF f:

$$\mathsf{Stab}_\delta[f] = \mathsf{E}\left[\big(\mathsf{T}_{\sqrt{1-2\delta}} f(x)\big)^2 \right] \leqslant \Phi_{1-2\delta}\big(\Phi^{-1}(\mathsf{E}[f])\big) + o(1),$$

thereby verifying the claim of Lemma 4.5.

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[5] Observe that we intentionally state these results qualitatively, as their quantitative versions require many approximation steps, which are carried out in Mossel et al. (2010).

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