

Theoretical Models {Lecture 24}

- * A theoretical model can aid in achieving a fool proof security system.
 - * Multi-level security
 - * A structure where information or assets are defined or classified in multiple categories
 - e.g. Top secret, secret, confidential, restricted, unclassified in military organizations.
- ### Bell LaPadula (BLP) Model
- * keeps data confidential (main goal)
 - * designed for multi-level security environments
 - * The simple security property prohibits people from reading information above their clearance level. (No read up)

- * The * security property prohibits people from writing information below their clearance level. (NO write down)

Biba integrity Model

- * keeps data integrity safe (main goal)
- * designed for multi-level security environments
- * The simple integrity property prohibits people from reading information below their clearance level
 - * (NO read down)
- * The * integrity property prohibits people from writing information above their clearance level
 - * (NO write up)

In slides:

Simple integrity: modify only if: $I(S) \geq I(O)$

Integrity confinement: read only if: $I(S) \leq I(O)$

Invocation property: invoke only if: $I(S_1) \geq I(S_2)$

Clark-Wilson Integrity model

- * built upon principles of change control rather than integrity levels.
- * No changes by unauthorized subjects.
- * No unauthorized changes by authorized subjects.

- * maintain internal and external consistency
- * well-formed transactions: a user can modify data only in constrained ways
- * separation of duty: one can create a transaction but not execute it.

- * Main Components:

→ users → CDI (constrained Data Items) → whose integrity should be preserved

→ UDI (un-constrained Items) → IVPs (Integrity verification

procedures) → TPs (transaction Procedures) → that change CDIs

- * Certification & Enforcement of Rules

These rules ensure integrity of data items

→ certification is performed by a security officer

→ enforcement is done by the system

C1: IVPs must ensure that all CDIs are in valid state

C2: All TPs must be certified (all CDIs involved must be valid)

E1: The system must maintain a list of relations in C2.

E2: The system must maintain a list of allowed (users, TPs, CDIs) combinations. i.e access tuples.

(more on slides)

* The Chinese Wall Model (Brewer & Nash Model)

→ Addresses the Conflict of Interest problem

→ Model Elements: * subjects: active entities interested in accessing protected objects

* information: objects, datasets, CI class

* access rules: rules for reading/writing data

→ Rules: $S = \text{subject}$, $O = \text{object}$, $CI = \text{conflict of Interest}$
 $DS = \text{dataset}$

* simple security rule: S can read O if O is in same DS as an object already accessed by S OR O belongs to new ~~same~~ CI

* property rule: S can write O only if S can read O AND all objects that S can read are in same DS as O .

Difference b/w CW & BLP

* CW is based on access history

* BLP is history-less

Intrusion Detection (Lec 23)

- * intrusion: break into a system
- * intruders may be outside or inside system
- * every intrusion is called an **incident**

Types of Intruders

- * **Masquerader**: unauthorized outsider gaining access to authorized user account
- * **Misfeasor**: inside legitimate user who exploit access or accesses unauthorized information
- * **Clandestine user**: a user who invades supervisory control & uses it to evade auditing and access controls.

Intrusion Detection System (IDS)

- * A security service that **monitors** & **analyzes** system events in real-time to warn for intrusions.
- * IDS look for **attack signatures**
- * **IDS components**: * Sensors * Analysers * User Interface

IDS Analysis Approaches

- * **Anomaly Based Detection**
- * **Signature Based Detection**

Anomaly Based Detection

- * train models on large data collected of

legitimate user's behaviour, to detect otherwise.

- * primary strength: detects novel attacks

- * but could generate many false alarms and thus reduce their effectiveness. ~~signature detection~~

Signature Based Detection

- * it looks at sensor data to detect already known intruder attack patterns (signatures)

- * new attack patterns must continually be added

- * simply matches patterns with signature database i.e. rule-based heuristic identification

- ① analyze historical audit records and define rules

- ② observe current data & match rules

- * rules/signature database

Host-based IDS

- * monitors activities on a single host

- * watch host OS or application logs

- * audit includes info like identification & authentication mechanisms, file opens & program executions, admin.

- * Drawbacks: → info needed to log comes from experience. ^(past)

- unselective logging: store everything (normal & sus logs) ^{users too} much storage

- selective logging: store only sus logs (risk of undetected attack)

- * strengths : → detects internal & external intrusions
- works even when network traffic is encrypted
- monitors key components → system specific activity
- near-real-time detection → no extra hardware.

Network Based Detection


- * monitors traffic at certain points in network
- * examines each packet to detect intrusion patterns
- * a filter is applied to discard or pass packets on attack recognition module.
- * strengths : → less cost of ownership → packet analysis
- real-time → mal-intent detection → OS independence

Honeypots

- * Decoy systems designed to lure attackers away from actual critical systems.
- * purpose : → divert attacker away → collect signatures
- detect new threats → engage attacker on system until admin responds.
- * Decoy Files : a marker, on read/write sends alert, used to give wrong info
- * Honey Net : collection of 2 or more decoys
- * Interaction level : capability to mimic a real asset
 - High → Low → Medium

- * Deception Technology: proactive cyber defense system using decoys. → uses AI generated traps
- immediate alerts

Firewalls



- * insulates internal networks
- * single point of protection for LANs
- * Goals:
 - all traffic must pass through firewall (both directions)
 - only authorized traffic w.r.t Local policy allowed to pass
 - firewall is immune to penetration
- * Policies:
 - service control e.g filters for IP & ports
 - direction control e.g internal LAN or to external internet
 - user control e.g student vs faculty
 - behaviour control e.g filter frequent requests, spams etc.
- * can act as NAT, VPN endpoint
- * implemented on a router

* Types of Firewalls :

- * **Packet Filtering:** accepts/rejects packet based off Layer 3/4 packet headers
- * **Stateful packet inspection:** like packet filtering but considers state info (i.e. what happened previously)
- * **Circuit level proxy:** relay for transport connections
- * **Application proxy:** relay for application traffic

Packet Filtering

- * rule sets
- * **default policy:** Allow, Reject ← recommended
default policy applies to those packets that don't match.
- * **packet info** includes: IP, port, protocol, direction etc.
- * **Rules:** conditions to match packet info, wildcards, accept/drop.
- * **Advantages:** simple, speedy, transparent
- * **Disadvantages:** cannot prevent app specific attacks, limited logging, doesn't support advanced user authentication, can't prevent IP spoofing

Stateful Packet Inspection

- * considers past packets as well.
- * same as packet filtering besides state
- * packets arriving that belong to an existing

approved connection are accepted.

- * connections are accepted by packet filtering firewall
- * records connection info : src/dest IP, src/dest port, seq #, connection state (new, estab, close)

Circuit-level Proxy

- * circuit-level gateway
- * acts as a relay (intermediary server)
- * sets up 2 TCP connections: 1 with internal host and 1 with external host
- For incoming data : acts as server
- For outgoing data : acts as client
- * relays TCP segments without examining contents
- * security function : determine which connection to allow
- * any external data that is requested by internal users is allowed else if no requested, connection blocked.

Application-level Proxy

- * application level gateway
- * inspects app-level operation (HTTP response content, email content) & allows/denies based of predefined rules.
- * logs attempted access & allowed access events

- * maintains separate connections with internal and external hosts. (same as circuit-level proxy)
- * mostly used as proxy

Firewall Location

- * Located on host or network devices e.g. end-user computers or routers etc.
- * separate network into 2 zones:
 - ① public-facing zone e.g. web, email, DNS etc
 - ② End-user computers & internal servers e.g. DBs
- * public-facing is de-militarized zone (DMZ)



Security In TCP/IP (Lec 21-22)

- * implementation options: Channel Security, Message Security

Channel Security

- * transport layer security - TLS/SSL
- * channel security assures that the communication channel between two devices is secure.
- * commonly used protocol for channel security are:
 - Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) (predecessor of TLS)
 - Transport Layer Security (TLS)
- * key features: Encryption, Data Integrity, Authentication,

Date: _____

Forward Secrecy, secure hand-shakes -

message Security

- * end-to-end security
- * secures the content of messages or data packets sent over a network
- * ensures confidentiality, integrity and authenticity.
- * key features: Encryption, Data Integrity, Authentication

Security Internal to Applications


- * focuses on safeguarding softwares themselves i.e code, data etc.
- * implement security features within the app design

Security External to applications

- * focuses on securing the environment in which the softwares / apps execute .
- * protects systems, networks & resources

SSL/TLS

- * SSL : secure sockets layer
- * implemented between Layer 4 & Layer 5
- * above Transport Layer
- * SSL/TLS Protocol Stack :



- * Handshake : exchange cipher algo. and secret keys.
- * change cipher spec : indicates usage of secret key
- * Alert : signal problems with SSL connection, give status
- * Record : securely carries data to higher layers.

Handshake :

- * after TCP ESTAB
- * client Hello : ① TLS version client supports } sent options
 ② what cyphers client supports } by client
- * server Hello : ① choose one TLS version } selected
 ② chooses cypher algo } options by server .
- * server sends its certificate & public key
- * client verifies the certificate authenticity

* Lastly server sends 'Hello Done' which marks the end of TLS/SSL handshake.

* Now, key exchange takes place

* Client sends a session key (symmetric key) by encrypting it using public key of server.


* After both server & client have generated/received the same symmetric key the cipher-spec exchange takes place.

* The client sends its cipher spec.

* The server sends its cipher spec.

* Both send finished message.

* Now record protocol is used to exchange data.





IPsec: Internet Protocol Security

- * security at layer 3
- * IPsec ensures CIA
- * network layer security
- * within OS
- * above link layer
- * IPsec operating modes:
 - ① secure virtual ~~link~~ channel (tunnel-mode SA)
 - ② secure virtual channel (transport-mode SA)

Transport mode:

- * end-to-end security, used by hosts
- * computationally light but no protection of headers



Tunnel mode:

- * gateway-to-gateway
- * protects header but computationally heavy
- * used to create VPN

normal datagram	:	IPv4 header (end-to-end)	TCP/UDP + data header
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Tunnel IPsec	:	IPv4 header (tunnel)	IPv4 header (end-to-end)	TCP/UDP + data
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IPsec datagram	IPv4 header (tunnel)	IPsec header	IPv4 header (e2e)	TCP/UDP header + data
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* packet types

- ① **AH** (authentication header) ← protects the headers
- ② **ESP** (encapsulating security payload) ← protects the payload

* protocol for key exchange:

→ **IKE** (Internet Key Exchange)

* IPsec local databases

→ **SAD** (security associations database)


→ **SPD** (security policies database)

* check last slide of lec 21-22 for ESP, AH diagram

Original IP Packet



Transport Mode



Tunnel Mode

