

## Seminar Paper

# Direct Democracy in Europe

A Cross-National Examination of the Link Between Direct  
Democracy and Satisfaction with Democracy in 31 countries

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### Abstract

This seminar paper seeks to investigate deliberation and its relationship to regime support across the world. This is accomplished by exploring the relevant literature and deriving hypotheses from it, which are subsequently tested by using survey data covering 113 countries and 306,047 individual respondents. Given that self-reported regime support is expected to be biased, a weight is applied to account for possible distortions of the data, though results are also reported for the unweighted variable due to the experimental nature of this weight. As this paper is the first known to the authors that examines the effect of deliberation on regime support in a cross-country design, the used deliberation measurement, the Deliberative Component Index from the “Varieties of Democracy”-Project, is examined in a thorough manner and analyses are conducted for its components as well. The analysis finds contradictory evidence for the proposed hypotheses. Deliberation seems to increase regime support first and foremost in democracies, the results in non-democracies and the complete sample are ambiguous and less robust. Furthermore, an exploratory mediation analysis is conducted, to test whether the macro-effect of deliberation on regime support is mediated through democratic performance evaluation on the individual level. The findings of the analysis suggest that further studies in the field should investigate the relationship between deliberation and regime support as well as democratic performance evaluation in greater detail and find possible methods to remedy bias in self-reported regime support. Moreover, more sensible ways to measure deliberation on the country level are necessary, as it is highly correlated with democracy, although some interesting deviations could be found within the subsamples as well as in regards to the individual components.

Seminar: Representative, direct and cooperative participation in comparison

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## 1 Introduction

EInführungsblabla... Blablabla... Direct democracy... since a long time a topic of interest to political theory and empirical research.... Blabla.... some say truest form of democracy... Closest to ideal of the rule by the people... often discussed remedy of the “crisis” of democracy postulated by some scholars... blablabla cf. some people.... blabla... many efficacy, much trust, so responsive, ... blabla... But excludes minorities. Bad! People are stupid, can be manipulated and don’t want to participate. ... blabla...

Effects of direct democracy are heavily disputed, and empirical research does not provide conclusive evidence in many cases. In this context of relevance especially for quantitative comparative research is the question how to measure direct democracy. In the literature, different approaches to this question can be identified, having some elements in common but diverging in many ways. The aim of this study is to examine some of the current approaches to the measurement of democracy on the national level and to compare them in a systematic way.

First, some of the approaches to the measurement of democracy are compared in respect to different criteria: which democratic mechanisms the measures include, whether they capture those mechanisms only in their form or in their use as well, differentiate between bottom-up and top-down direct democracy and whether they capture the hurdles/easiness as well as the decisiveness of the assessed mechanisms###Local/Regional#### Chapter 3 examines some of the discussed measures in an empirical way. The conclusion gives a summarizing overview about the examined measurements and their empirical comparison.

This is a great way to test whether 1233.34 really works in the way it is intended to work. This is different though because 34.876 might be better actually. Or how about  $4.4864 \times 10^4$ .

1233.34

1233.34

1233.34

The following subsection will conceptualize regime support and introduce possible explanatory frameworks that were gathered from the relevant literature (Section 2.1). In this section, the concept of deliberation is clarified (Section 2.2) and a link between deliberation and regime support is established, from which research hypotheses are subsequently derived (Section 2.3).

## 2 Measuring Direct Democracy

### Some Citations

This is an example introduction. Let's cite someone here (Easton 1965). And in text as well: Habermas (1994) says that we can cite people in text. Or we can write the name, and then use the citation thingy to print the year: Blabla states something about something (1975). Or how about multiple citations (Habermas 1994; Habermas 1994). Or we citation with a little of text around it (for example see Habermas 1994: 92-93).

ALLE Zitierweisen von Zotero gibts HIER.

### More Citations

Blah blah (cf. Easton 1965: 33–5; also Easton 1975: 2).

Blah blah (Easton 1975: 33–5, 38–9).


Blah blah (Easton 1975; Habermas 1994).

Smith says blah (1975).

Easton (1975) says blah.

Habermas (1994: 33) says blah.

Figure 1: Rules in Form - Comparison of Means



There are many different approaches to the measurement of direct democracy, some of which are discussed in this chapter. The aim is not to give a complete overview about the literature on operationalization and measurement. Instead, some of the current approaches were selected in order to systematically compare them with each other in a theoretical and empirical way. In many studies direct democracy is operationalized with a single dummy variable standing for the existence of one specific institution like the citizensb

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Table 1: Rules in Form

Rules in Form Measures	N(=Countries)	Mean	SD	Median	Range	Time	Data
Gherghina 2016 - RiF	192	1.76	1.24	2.00	0 - 5	Most Recent	IDEA
Petersen 2014 - RiF	196	0.62	0.46	0.50	0 - 1.5	"	"
<i>Top-Down</i>	196	0.80	0.53	1.00	0 - 1.5	"	"
<i>Bottom-Up</i>	196	0.44	0.64	0.00	0 - 1.5	"	"
V-Dem - RiF	170	1.64	1.06	2.00	0 - 4	2016	Vdem
<i>Top-Down</i>	172	1.26	0.69	1.00	0 - 2	"	"
<i>Bottom-Up</i>	170	0.38	0.71	0.00	0 - 2	"	"
Direct Democracy Provisions	68	1.65	1.38	1.33	0 - 4	2014	Democracy Barometer
Direct Democracy Legal Designs	107	2.86	1.94	2.00	1 - 12	Most Recent	Direct Democracy Navigator

direct democracy is operationalized with a single dummy variable standing for the existence of one specific institution like the citizensb

Table 2: Rules in Use

Rules in Use Measures	N(=Countries)	Mean	SD	Median	Range	Time	Data
Gherghina 2016 - RiU	161	9.38	46.62	1.00	0 - 552	1996 - 2016	Vdem
Vdem - RiU - Sum	172	3.74	15.43	1.00	0 - 184	"	"
<i>Top-Down</i>	172	2.38	6.80	1.00	0 - 66	"	"
<i>Bottom-Up</i>	172	1.37	11.25	0.00	0 - 144	"	"
Sudd - RiU - Sum	96	8.03	20.76	2.00	1 - 187	"	sudd
<i>Top-Down</i>	96	4.98	9.00	2.00	0 - 66	"	"
<i>Bottom-Up</i>	96	3.05	15.46	0.00	0 - 146	"	"
Vdem - RiU - Cat.	172	1.10	1.52	1.00	0 - 5	"	Vdem
<i>Top-Down</i>	172	0.26	0.92	0.00	0 - 5	"	"
<i>Bottom-Up</i>	172	0.94	1.32	1.00	0 - 5	"	"
Sudd - RiU - Cat.	96	2.29	1.64	1.00	1 - 5	"	sudd
<i>Top-Down</i>	96	0.64	1.37	0.00	0 - 5	"	"
<i>Bottom-Up</i>	96	1.93	1.47	1.00	0 - 5	"	"
Effective Use	71	55.53	186.40	0.00	0 - 1445	1996 - 2014	Democracy Barometer
Credible Use	172	1.20	2.65	0.00	0 - 21	1996 - 2016	Vdem


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Table 3: Mixed Indices

Mixed Measures	N(=Countries)	Mean	SD	Median	Range	Time	Data
Direct Popular Vote Index (DPVI)	172	0.10	0.12	0.06	0 - 1	2000 - 2005	Vdem
Fiorini 2017	87	3.03	1.83	3.00	1 - 7	2000 - 2005	Fiorini 2017


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Figure 2: Rules in Form - Comparison of Means



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Figure 3: Rules in Form - Comparison of Means




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Figure 5: Rules in Form - Comparison of Means





Figure 6: Rules in Form - Comparison of Means



specific institution like the citizensb

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Scatter plot showing the relationship between the Direct Democracy Index (Fiorini 2017) on the x-axis and the Direct Democracy Index (Altmann 2017) on the y-axis. The plot includes a blue regression line, a grey shaded confidence interval, and numerous data points labeled with country names. The correlation coefficient is  $r = 0.5$ ,  $p = 1.7e-06$ .

Country	Direct Democracy Index (Fiorini 2017)	Direct Democracy Index (Altmann 2017)
Ukraine	0.00	0.48
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of	0.35	0.65
Colombia	0.35	0.45
Hungary	0.50	0.48
Estonia	0.50	0.35
Romania	0.50	0.30
Finland	0.50	0.18
Taiwan, Province of China	0.35	0.15
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	0.15	0.05
India	0.50	0.00
Germany	0.50	0.02
Japan	0.50	0.05
Belgium	0.60	0.00
France	0.60	0.35
Latvia	0.60	0.30
Sweden	0.60	0.25
Austria	0.60	0.20
Poland	0.60	0.25
Portugal	0.60	0.20
Spain	0.60	0.15
Czech Republic	0.60	0.15
Norway	0.60	0.10
Bulgaria	0.60	0.05
Denmark	0.70	0.40
Ireland	0.70	0.35
Australia	0.70	0.20
Philippines	0.70	0.15
Netherlands	0.70	0.05
Slovakia	0.70	0.65
Lithuania	0.70	0.55
Italy	0.70	0.50
New Zealand	0.70	0.70
Slovenia	0.70	0.90
Uruguay	0.60	0.90
Switzerland	1.00	1.00

to systematically compare them with each other in a theoretical and empirical way. In many studies direct democracy is operationalized with a single dummy variable standing for the existence of one specific institution like the citizensb initiative (for example##### ). Such studies were not considered, as the focus lies on measurements in which assess a broader scope of direct democracy in a more continuous way. There are many different approaches to the measurement of direct

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Figure 8: Rules in Form - Comparison of Means





Figure 9: Rules in Form - Comparison of Means



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gle dummy variable standing for the existence of one specific institution like the citizensb initiative

Figure 10: Rules in Form - Comparison of Means




Figure 11: Rules in Form - Comparison of Means






Figure 12: Rules in Form - Comparison of Means



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Figure 13: Rules in Form - Comparison of Means



gle dummy variable standing for the existence of one specific institution like the citizensb initiative (for example ##### ). Such studies were not considered, as the focus lies on measurements in which assess a broader scope of direct

Table 4: My caption

Author/Main Source	Mechanisms	Easiness	Decisiveness	
@gherghina2016	mandatory referendum optional referendum, citizens??? initiative, agenda initiative, recall	not accounted for	not accounted for	counting 1 for the existence of legal provisions for each mechanism
@dembarcodebook	mandatory referendum, veto-player referendum, popular veto, popular initiative referendums, plebiscites, citizens initiatives, agenda initiatives	ease of approval is accounted for	only binding mechanisms are considered	standardized variable counting 1 for the existence of legal provisions for each mechanism, m
@peters2016		not accounted for	plebiscites only count half if non-binding	Top-down indicator is composed of ???constitutional referendum??? (0= no institution; 2 = Bottom-up indicator: composed of???citizen initiative??? (0 = no institution; 3 = institutio
@gherghina2016 @blume2017	referendums ("issues put tu a vote") ?????	ease of approval is accounted for	not accounted for	Direct democracy index: composed of the latter two indicators  19-year period, summing up whilst giving non-binding mechanisms a 0.5 weight and multipli 10-year period, four categories
Either sum or average: @bauerfatke2014, @peters2016, @dembarcodebook	depends on measurement	not accounted for	not accounted for	(0 = no factually observed direct democracy; 1 = one or two votes; 2 = three to five votes; sum or average of the occurrence of certain mechanisms within,a determined time-frame,  sometimes: logarithmizing
@fiorino2017, DDI	citizens initiative, agenda initiative, facultative referendum, obligatory referendum, plebiscite	both ease of initiation and approval	maybe???	qualitative rating into seven categories, exact aggregation method unclear
@altman2017, DPVI (v-dem)		both ease of initiation and approval	accounted for	Calculation for each mechanism: easiness of initiation and easiness of approval multiplied v Easiness of initiation: a) The existence of a direct democracy process , and if applicable (b) Easiness of approval: the surface of the polygon determined by: ,(a) Participation quorum, Consequences: (a) The bindingness and (b) The frequency and degree of success with which

## **3 Empirical Part**

### **3.1 Subcaption 1**

## **4 Conclusions**

### **4.1 Subcaption 1**



## References

**Easton, David 1975:** A re-assessment of the concept of political support, *British journal of political science* 5, pp. 435–57.

**Easton, David 1965:** *A systems analysis of political life*. New York: John Wiley.

**Habermas, Jürgen 1994:** Three normative models of democracy, *Constellations* 1, pp. 1–10.