|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Source | Construction | Coverage |
| **Fiorino et al. (2017)**  following Kaufmann (2004), with additional data from Hwang (2005) and Madroñal (2005)  DDI (Direct Democracy Index) | Qualitative and quantitative rating:  (1) radical democrat; (2) progressive; (3) cautious; (4) hesitant; (5) fearful; (6) beginner; (7) authoritarian.  we try to rely on a de facto measure of direct democracy. This implies that we consider the procedures a political system provides in order to propose, approve, amend, and delete laws through popular initiative and referenda, as well the actual practices of direct democracy and the general political condition a country experiences  subjective rating | 87 countries,  period 2000-2005 |
| **Altman (2017)**  V-DEM Data  Direct Democracy Practice Potential (DDPP) | This index results from the aggregation of the scores of four types of mechanisms of direct democracy:   * popular initiatives, * popular referendums, * obligatory referendums, * and authorities’ plebiscites   For each of the four mechanisms:   1. Ease of initiation    1. the existence of a direct democracy process    2. the number of signatures needed    3. time limits to collect signatures 2. Ease of approval: Quorums for    1. Participation    2. Approval    3. Supermajority    4. District majority   Regarding how consequential the vote is, it considers   * its decisiveness (whether the decision is binding), * and the threat capability of citizen-initiated mechanisms of direct democracy as measured by the frequency with which direct popular votes have been used and approved in the past (mit Gewichtung, wie weit zeitlich entfernt) | 200 countries,  Time Series 1900-2014 |
| **Varieties of Democracy**  **Altman**  **Direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd\_dd)** | **Im Prinzip fast gleich wie der DDPP-Index von Altman**  Regarding each type of citizen initiated popular vote (i.e., popular initiative), the  ease of initiation is measured by (a) the existence of a direct democracy process  (v2ddlexci), (b) the number of signatures needed (v2ddsigpci), (c) time-limits to  circulate the signatures (v2ddsigdci), and **(d) the level of government (national**  **and/or subnational)**. Easiness of approval is measured by the surface of the polygon  determined by (a) participation quorum (v2ddsigdci), (b) approval quorum  (v2ddpartci), and (c) supermajority (v2ddspmci). The resulting score is then  multiplied with (d) district majority (v2ddadmci). Consequences are measured by (a)  the legal status of the decision made by citizens (binding or merely consultative) (v2ddlexci), and (b) the frequency and degree of success with which direct popular  votes have been held in the past (v2ddthreci).  **Sub-indices:**  2.14 Citizen-initiated component of direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd\_cic)  2.15 Top-Down component of direct popular vote index (D) (v2xdd\_toc)  Obligatory referendum index (D) (v2xdd\_i\_or)  Plebiscite index (D) (vx2dd\_i\_pl)  Popular initiative index (D) (v2xdd\_i\_pi)  Popular referendum index (D) (v2xdd\_i\_rf) |  |
| Gherghina (2016)  most data from IDEA | referendums (mandatory and optional),  citizens’ initiative,  agenda initiative,  and recall.  Both variables, local and national level direct democracy, are count measures with 1 given for the existence of one tool.   * A country with legislation for all four direct democracy tools at national level gets a score of 5 on the national level variable (referendum is split in mandatory and optional). If it has legal provisions for all tools at the local level it gets a sore of 10 (local and regional levels are counted together). * The use of referendums at national level is calculated with a formula that accounts for the number of referendums (deﬁned as a question/issue put to a vote), what happens after the vote (binding or not), and how easy a referendum can succeed (required quorum).   The quorum may be different for the two types of referendums and has three values: (1) for both turnout and approval quorums, (2) turnout quorum only, and (3) no quorum required. These scores are calculated for the referendums organized between 1990 and 2008.  This indicator ignores the difference between top-down and bottom-up initiated referendums because citizens cannot use bottom-up referendums if they are not included in the country’s legislation | 38 European countries |

Allgemeine Fragen: Gehört decisiveness eher zu rules in form/use.. oder macht des keinen sinn?

Measurement of direct democracy

1. Considered DD Mechanisms

Top down vs Bottom up:

* Plebiscites
* Obligatory/Constitutional referendum
* Referendum
* Popular/Citizens initiative
* Agenda initiative
* Recall

V-Dem: e Note that we do not consider recall elections or citizen petitions to the legislature -> no agenda initiative, no recall

1. Dimensions

Rules in

1. Form
   1. Easiness

* Of initiation
* Of approval
  1. Binding & Non-Binding (Decisiveness)

1. Use

* Actual use of DD mechanisms
* Credible thread -> success of previous DD mechanisms

Subnational DD?

Excluded in all of the cited measurements: number of issues allowed/excluded

1. Aggregation

**1 Introduction**

Blablabla…Direct democracy… since a long time a topic of interest to political theory and empirical research…. Blabla.... some say truest form of democracy… Closest to ideal of the rule by the people... often discussed remedy of the “crisis” of democracy postulated by some scholars… blablabla cf. some people…. blabla… many efficacy, much trust, so responsive, … blabla… But excludes minorities. Bad! People are stupid, can be manipulated and don’t want to participate. ... blabla…

Effects of direct democracy are heavily disputed, and empirical research does not provide conclusive evidence in many cases. In this context of relevance especially for quantitative comparative research is the question how to measure direct democracy. In the literature different approaches to this question can be identified, having some elements in common but diverging in many ways. The aim of this study is to examine some of the current approaches to the measurement of democracy on the national level and to compare them in a systematical way.

First, some of the approaches to the measurement of democracy are compared in respect to different criteria: which democratic mechanisms the measures include, whether they capture those mechanisms only in their form or in their use as well, differentiate between bottom-up and top-down direct democracy and whether they capture the hurdles/easiness as well as the decisiveness of the assessed mechanisms. …Local/Regional... Chapter 3 examines some of the discussed measures in an empirical way. The conclusion gives a summarizing overview about the examined measurements and their empirical comparison.

**2 Theory**

There are many different approaches to the measurement of direct democracy, some of which are discussed in this chapter. The aim is not to give a complete overview about the literature on operationalization and measurement. Instead, some of the current approaches were selected in order to systematically compare them with each other in a theoretical and empirical way. In many studies direct democracy is operationalized with a single dummy variable standing for the existence of one specific institution like the citizens’ initiative (for example ... …. ... ). Such studies were not considered, as the focus lies on measurements in which assess a broader scope of direct democracy in a more continuous way.

**Definition**

Before the discussion of operationalization and measurement, the definition of the concept to be measured should be taken into account.

Direct democracy can broadly be defined as……..

On the other hand…..

What are the challenges and restrictions in defining direct democracy in a measurable way?

What are the challenges in measuring direct democracy in general? -> Altman 2011 93f “nightmare team”

The different measures compared in this study have diverging/or common????? underlying definitions….

As Altman states, the terminology used to refer to different direct democratic mechanisms if far from unified (…). For the sake of clarity, we adopt the terminology elaborated in the V-Dem Codebook (…), which defines four mechanisms:

…

**Dimensions of direct democracy**

The examination of the measurement approaches is structured according to dimensions of direct democracy which are explicitly or implicitly included. Not all indices relate all the dimensions, which can be explained by different data sources and conceptions of direct democracy to be measured. First, the examined measurements differ regarding which mechanisms of direct democracy they cover. All the examined indices are based on whether a certain set of direct democratic institutions exists, or not. The pool institutions referred to consists of: Obligatory Referendums, Plebiscites, Facultative Referendums, Citizen Initiatives, Agenda Initiatives and Recall.

An important distinction between the de jure direct democratic rules in form and de facto rules in use was made and operationalized for example by Bauer and Fatke 2014, Gherghina 2016, Blumer et al. 2007 and Peters 2016. The relevance of this distinction lies in the possibly different effects of the formal existence of direct democratic institutions and their actual usage. For example, Bauer and Fatke argue that the existence of direct democratic rights should be positively related to trust in authorities, whereas the exercise of such mechanisms increases distrust, especially if such mechanisms are used to reject laws (richtig?… Nochmal nachlesen).

Another important differentiation is the one between bottom-up and top-down mechanisms of direct democracy. Here, the core criterium is whether the direct democratic mechanisms are initiated by the citizens (bottom-up) or through the constitution or state organs, for example government or parliament (top-down). The use of the terms bottom-up and top-down is not uniform …. Find example.... The theoretical importance of the difference is once again rooted in possibly different assumptions about the effects of direct democracy according to whether it is citizen or top-down initiated (cf… the upside down study where they said something like that…)

Another dimension is the “easiness”, which captures the relevance of thresholds or quorums of direct democratic mechanisms. For example,… The term is adopted from Altman/V-Dem, who distinguishes explicitly between ease of approval and ease of initiation …

In addition to or sometimes without consideration of the easiness, the decisiveness of direct democratic mechanisms plays a crucial role. Decisiveness refers to whether the outcomes of direct democratic mechanisms are binding or merely consultative.

A rather rarely considered dimension is regional and local direct democracy. For some research questions not only direct democracy on the national level, but also national variations in direct democracy on subnational levels could be of importance.

A dimension rarely covered as well is the number and content of issues for which direct democratic mechanisms can be applied. n

**Approaches to the measurement of direct democracy**

The first examined index of direct democracy is the Direct Democracy Index (DDI) by Fiorino et al. 2017, 2007…, who use data from Kaufmann 2004, Madroñal 2005 und Hwang 2005…. Fiorino et al. apply Kaufmanns seven-point rating of direct democracy on the other two formerly four-point ratings, covering a dataset of 87 countries for the period 2000-2005. The seven categories are (1) radical democrat; (2) progressive; (3) cautious (4) hesitant; (5) fearful; (6) beginner; (7) authoritarian cf Fiorino 2017 148… each country’s score is based a qualitative assessment of the direct democratic quality of the political system. The mechanisms explicitly included in the coding scheme (as depicted in the Appendix of Blumer et al. 2007) are citizens and agenda initiatives, obligatory referendums and plebiscites/in the Fiorino 2017 article they speak of referendas and initiatives???. In regard to the distinction of rules in form and rules in use, the de jure rules are explicitly included. Therefore, Fiorino et al consider “the procedures a political system provides in order to propose, approve, amend, and delete laws through popular initiative and referenda, as well the actual practices of direct democracy and the general political condition a country experiences” Fiorino et al. 2017 148. The easiness of initiation and approval is covered by the consideration of entry hurdles, time limits and majority requirements/quorums (cf … Kaufmann, ansonsten sekundär von Blumer).

As Blumer et al 2007 point out, an important disadvantage of the DDI is that “the criteria used for weighing the different criteria remain completely opaque and that it does not tell anything on the relevance of institutional details” Blumer et al. 2007 12…. The actual importance for the index construction of the dimensions bottom-up/top-down, national/regional, easiness, decisiveness and de jure/de facto is therefore unclear, though some hints can be drawn. For example, the categories 7 and 6 are only appointed to countries who embody bottom-up mechanisms as well as obligatory referendums. Category 5 consists of countries who have practical experience, but where the procedures have plebiscitary character [Fussnote: Blumer et al. respond to this by using simple dummy variables coding the

approaches for the measurement of direct democracy are and compares them to the previously established criteria. After reconstructing some indicators from the literature, Chapter \ref{empiric} examines some of the discussed approaches empirically. As most of the indicators are derived from studies restricted to democracies, the \textit{democracy} dimension in direct democracy is neglected in most of them. We therefore assess the indices in whether their distributions differ in regard to their Freedom House classification.

Lastly, two important dimensions that are neglected in most of the measurement approaches discussed in this paper will be briefly mentioned. A rarely considered dimension is \*subnational direct democracy\* [for example @gherghina2016], although research that not only considers direct democracy on the national level, but also variations in direct democracy on subnational levels could be of importance. Moreover, one could argue that a country which provides direct democratic institutions at least at the subnational levels is more direct-democratic than a country that does not allow for any direct democratic processes at all, and thus neglecting this dimension might lead to suboptimal results. In this paper, we only focus on the national level for the sake of brevity, although still emphasizing that this is an important dimension that should be studied more intensely. A different dimension rarely covered, but nevertheless important is the scope and content of \*issues\* for which direct democratic mechanisms are allowed or restricted.

In general, there is no recommendation as to which of the data sources a quantitative researcher should use in their empirical analysis. This decision depends heavily on the research question to be answered and the underlying concept of direct democracy. For example, many studies exclude the recall mechanism from their measurement, because it can be seen as a accountability function of representative democracy and not an element of direct democracy. If one is interested in examining provisions for institutions in regard to whether they are top-down or bottom up initiated, a researcher is better advised in using the V-Dem data, as it takes much more effort to obtain the information from other sources such as IDEA. Generally speaking, V-Dem data is the most convenient and user-friendly dataset to use in quantitative analyses, mostly numeric in nature and available in time-series format since 1900, with the drawback of some unavailable information (for example on agenda initiatives or the authors of ballot proposals). Although with IDEA, the documentation of legal provisions is more detailed and the corresponding constitutional paragraphs are often provided as background information, which makes it a valuable data source as well. The Democracy Navigator too is a rather detailed database, which is especially useful for cross-checking information or to gain additional information if a researcher is interested in legal designs in regard to the status of the initiating authority or the author of ballot proposals. Lastly, the sudd database should be considered by researchers who are specifically interested in the occurrence referendums and other mechanisms in practice (on the national level and in independent regions).

In conclusion, all of the examined approaches have in common that their measurements rely to some degree on the existence of a defined set of institutions, and in case of rules in use assessments, whether these institutions are used in practice within a certain time-frame. Some of the approaches give these mechanisms equal weighting in aggregation, but sometimes bottom-up institutions get a greater weight than top-down mechanisms, binding referendums get assigned higher values than consultative ones, or obligatory referendums weigh more than plebiscites. Mostly, those values seem to be rather arbitrary chosen, as there is, for example no reference to draw from when to decide if consultative mechanisms (in comparison with binding ones) should be given the same value [cf. @gherghina], a 0.75 weighting [cf. @altman2017], half the weight [cf. @peters2016], or be not considered at all [cf. @dembar]. Moreover, the approaches differ in regard to whether they consider the easiness of approval and/or initiation and if so, in which way they are included in the index aggregation. It is far from clear, if and how these dimensions should be weighted to assess the degree of direct democracy in a country most adequately, and besides @altman2017, most authors do not spend much words on elaborating on their index construction. In general, there is no recommendation in regard to which index construction to use in one’s empirical research, as it highly depends on the research question.

Erkenntnis In general, partly free countries score as high or even higher as the ones categorized as free on all indicators. This implicates that the previously discussed importance of the level of democracy should not be neglected when comparing direct democracy across a wider range of countries. One might argue that, given equal direct popular vote mechanisms, a semi-democratic country is still less direct democratic, than a “full” democracy. Nevertheless, this pattern is a noteworthy discovery that should be investigated further by future research.

Lastly, it has to be noted, that most of the discussed approaches are only applied to democracies [e.g. @peters2016, @gherghina2016], which makes the discussion of the \*democracy\* part of direct democracy unnecessary. Since we reconstruct the indicators for a range of all available countries, this question has to be addressed. The direct democratic mechanisms mentioned in this paper, even though called \*democratic\* are not necessarily limited to democratic countries. Interestingly, some autocratic or semi-democratic regimes have adopted direct popular vote instruments, using them to seemingly legitimate their rule, a group of countries Altman labels the “nightmare team” [@altman2011 pp. 92]. Of the discussed measurement approaches, which cover a wider range of countries, the rather qualitative rating of @fiorino2017 accounts for the general state of democracy a country experiences. The index provided by V-Dem itself is a sub-index of a much broader assessment of democratic quality, and not accidentally called Direct Popular Vote Index. Therefore, in the empirical comparison, we examine available as well as reconstructed indices in relation to their three-fold freedom house classification. An important notion for further research is to find valid ways to aggregate indices assessing direct popular votes and indicators representing the degree of democracy of a given country. Some might argue that any direct democracy index must account for the degree of authoritarianism or democracy in a country, or else it does not capture the concept well. Others could argue that authoritarian and semi-democratic regimes use direct popular votes for other reasons than democracies but that doesn’t mean that they should be generally excluded from the analysis. It’s not necessarily intuitive to determine the weighting of the two dimensions in regard to each other, and to decide whether the aggregation should be constructed multiplicatively, additively or by another mathematical operation.

Interessant auch mal die mixed mit den use und den foem usw zu vergleichen, aber beyond the socope