

United in Diversity, Divided by Algorithms?

A Cross-National Examination of the Role of Ad Delivery Algorithms for Political Campaigns during the 2024 European Parliament Elections

Fabio Votta, Simon Kruschinski, Mads Fuglsang Hove, Anamaria Dutceac Segesten, Márton Bene, Christina Gahn, Linn Sandberg, Jan Zilinsky, Claes de Vreese, James P. Cross, Ruth Dassonneville, Tom Dobber and Benjamin Guinaudeau

January 9, 2025

Introduction

1. Representative democracy relies on the principle of fair competition between political entrepreneurs

Introduction

1. Representative democracy relies on the principle of fair competition between political entrepreneurs
2. Campaign regulations serve this purpose:
 - ▷ the "Equal-time rule" in US, "second counting" rule in Europe
 - ▷ regulation of campaign finances

Introduction

1. Representative democracy relies on the principle of fair competition between political entrepreneurs
2. Campaign regulations serve this purpose:
 - ▷ the "Equal-time rule" in US, "second counting" rule in Europe
 - ▷ regulation of campaign finances
3. Advent of social media and targeted advertisement disrupts traditional campaigns and challenge regulations

Party, Campaigns, and Social Media


1. Targeted advertising has transformed campaigns.
 - ▷ Targeted advertisement
 - ▷ Taylored messages

Party, Campaigns, and Social Media

1. Targeted advertising has transformed campaigns.
 - ▷ Targeted advertisement
 - ▷ Tailored messages
2. Uneven playing field for parties:
 - ▷ 'Natural': Over-represented voter bases on social media
 - ▷ Artificial: Market-specific cost advantages

Party, Campaigns, and Social Media

- ▶ 2023 Dutch election: 64% of total expenditures in the last campaign week



Research Questions

1. Do parties pay the same price for ads?

Research Questions

1. Do parties pay the same price for ads?
2. What drives price differences?

Why Is the Fairness of Online Competition Hard to Study?

1. Observational studies face many confounders:
 - ▷ content, account history, agenda, targeting criteria

Why Is the Fairness of Online Competition Hard to Study?

1. Observational studies face many confounders:
 - ▷ content, account history, agenda, targeting criteria
2. Sock-puppet experiments:
 - ▷ lack external validity

Why Is the Fairness of Online Competition Hard to Study?

1. Observational studies face many confounders:
 - ▷ content, account history, agenda, targeting criteria
2. Sock-puppet experiments:
 - ▷ lack external validity
3. Our approach: Audit study using real party accounts

Builds upon Votta et al. 2024



Political Communication >
Latest Articles

[Submit an article](#) [Journal homepage](#)

355
Views

0
CrossRef
citations to date

13
Altmetric

  Listen 

Research Article

The Cost of Reach: Testing the Role of Ad Delivery Algorithms in Online Political Campaigns

Fabio Votta   Tom Dobber  Benjamin Guinaudeau  Natali Helberger  & Claes de Vreese 

Published online: 23 Dec 2024

 Cite this article  <https://doi.org/10.1080/10584609.2024.2439317>  Check for updates

Design

1. **Context:**

- ▷ 2024 European elections (June)
- ▷ Facebook and Instagram

Design

1. **Context:**

- ▷ 2024 European elections (June)
- ▷ Facebook and Instagram

2. **Approach:**

- ▷ Real party accounts (30 parties across 8 countries)
- ▷ Identical "get-out-the-vote" ads with same targeting settings
- ▷ €1/day for 7 days (April 29, 2024 start)
- ▷ Outcome: Cost per 1,000 users reached

Design

1. Context:

- ▷ 2024 European elections (June)
- ▷ Facebook and Instagram

2. Approach:

- ▷ Real party accounts (30 parties across 8 countries)
- ▷ Identical "get-out-the-vote" ads with same targeting settings
- ▷ €1/day for 7 days (April 29, 2024 start)
- ▷ Outcome: Cost per 1,000 users reached

3. Targeting conditions:

- ▷ No targeting
- ▷ Interested in politics (most-likely)
- ▷ Below-university education (least-likely)

Design

1. Context:

- ▷ 2024 European elections (June)
- ▷ Facebook and Instagram

2. Approach:

- ▷ Real party accounts (30 parties across 8 countries)
- ▷ Identical "get-out-the-vote" ads with same targeting settings
- ▷ €1/day for 7 days (April 29, 2024 start)
- ▷ Outcome: Cost per 1,000 users reached

3. Targeting conditions:


- ▷ No targeting
- ▷ Interested in politics (most-likely)
- ▷ Below-university education (least-likely)

4. Implications:

- ▷ Equal prices would suggest that targeted ads do not distort competition

Do Parties Pay the Same Price?


► High variance across countries



Do Parties Pay the Same Price?


▷ Within-country differences:

- ▷ 4% average variation (max 27%)
- ▷ Small differences but millions of additional campaign reaches



Do Parties Pay the Same Price?

- ▶ **Most variation with "No Targetting"**
 - ▶ algorithm more free → more bias



Three Types of Factors Likely to Affect the Price Differences

1. **Account-level factors:**

- ▷ Spending history, engagement patterns

Three Types of Factors Likely to Affect the Price Differences

1. **Account-level factors:**

- ▷ Spending history, engagement patterns

2. **Party-level factors:**

- ▷ Ideology, electoral performance

Three Types of Factors Likely to Affect the Price Differences

1. **Account-level factors:**

- ▷ Spending history, engagement patterns



2. **Party-level factors:**

- ▷ Ideology, electoral performance


3. **Market-level factors:**

- ▷ Audience size, ad competition


What Drives Price Differences?

 Disclaimer: Low statistical power requires caution when drawing conclusions 


What Drives Price Differences?



What Drives Price Differences?



What Drives Price Differences?



Conclusion

1. Ad algorithms (unintentionally) favor some political actors

Conclusion

1. Ad algorithms (unintentionally) favor some political actors
2. Within-country price variation:
 - ▷ Average 4% (max 27%)
 - ▷ Significant exposure bias

Conclusion

1. Ad algorithms (unintentionally) favor some political actors
2. Within-country price variation:
 - ▷ Average 4% (max 27%)
 - ▷ Significant exposure bias
3. Key drivers:
 - ▷ Audience size
 - ▷ Spending history
 - ▷ Ideology (?)
 - ▷ Transnational parties (?)

Conclusion

1. Ad algorithms (unintentionally) favor some political actors
2. Within-country price variation:
 - ▷ Average 4% (max 27%)
 - ▷ Significant exposure bias
3. Key drivers:
 - ▷ Audience size
 - ▷ Spending history
 - ▷ Ideology (?)
 - ▷ Transnational parties (?)
4. Calls for stricter regulation to preserve democracy
 - ▷ Algorithmic fairness
 - ▷ Algorithmic access for independent researchers