

# 1 Introduction

Since political theory took its “deliberative turn” (Dryzek 2000) in the 1990s, empirical political science has increasingly turned towards deliberation as well. There have been numerous studies about its requirements and consequences. This paper is concerned with the latter. Deliberative theory along with empirical science has developed manifold assumptions about the effects of deliberation, including transformation of preferences, epistemic quality, consensus and accommodation, as well as side-effects on civic virtues like political trust (cf. ???). Given the current decline of trust in governments and political institutions in many democracies across the world (cf. Foa & Mounk 2016), deliberation could be seen as a process to arrive at legitimate decisions in societies of increasing complexity (see for example: Habermas (1994: 7–8); Warren & Gastil (2015: 562)). This paper seeks to investigate what can be theorized as a side-effect of deliberation: political support for the regime. This study differs from previous ones in the following terms: It is the first to examine the effects of deliberation on regime support in a cross-national framework across a large dataset of 306,047 respondents from 113 countries across all continents. Moreover, the analysis is not restricted to democratic regimes, but also includes non-democracies.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, a recent theoretical development, the conceptualization of deliberation outside of democratic contexts, so called *authoritarian deliberation*, is taken into account (see: He (2014); He & Warren (2011); He & Thøgersen (2010)).

The main research question of this thesis states as follows: *What role does Deliberation play for regime support across the world?* The following section establishes the theoretical framework of political support and derives possible determinants of regime support. Next, the concept of deliberation is clarified and the link between deliberation and regime support is drawn, from which hypotheses are derived (Section 2). The next section presents the research design of this study and the results of the analysis (Section 3). In the end, the findings of the analysis will be summarized and the conclusion gives an answer to the research question along with a discussion of implications for further research (Section 4).

This is a great way to test whether 1233.34 really works in the way it is intended to work. This is different though because 34.876 might be better actually. Or how about  $4.4864 \times 10^4$ .

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The following subsection will conceptualize regime support and introduce possible explanatory frameworks that were gathered from the relevant literature (Section 2.1). In this section, the concept of deliberation is clarified (Section 2.2) and a link between deliberation and regime support is established, from which research hypotheses are subsequently derived (Section 2.3).

## Some Citations

This is an example introduction. Let’s cite someone here (Easton 1965). And in text as well: Habermas (1994) says

<sup>1</sup>For the purposes of this paper we consequently refer to political systems as non-democratic in accordance with the Polity IV project classification of autocracies and anocracies.

that we can cite people in text. Or we can write the name, and than use the citation thingy to print the year: Blabla states something about something (1975). Or how about multiple citations (Habermas 1994; Habermas 1994). Or we citation with a little of text around it (for example see Habermas 1994: 92-93).

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### **More Citations**

Blah blah (cf. Easton 1965: 33–5; also Easton 1975: 2).

Blah blah (Easton 1975: 33–5, 38–9).

Blah blah (Easton 1975; Habermas 1994).

Smith says blah (1975).

Easton (1975) says blah.

Habermas (1994: 33) says blah.

## **2 Theory**

### **2.1 Subcaption 1**

#### **2.1.1 Subsubcaption 1**

#### **2.1.2 Subsubcaption 2**

### **2.2 Subcaption 2**

### 3 Empirical Section

The following section will first introduce the data and its sources along with the data-merging approach. Next, the operationalization of regime support is discussed, which is followed by the operationalization of deliberation through the “Deliberative Component Index” from the “Varieties of Democracy”-Dataset and subsequently a description of the used control variables is given (Section 3.1). In the following subsection we take into account potential bias with the measurement of regime support and discuss possible adaptations (Section 3.2). Following this, the statistical methodology is explained (Section 3.3) and a short examination of descriptive statistics takes place (Section 3.4). Lastly, the results of estimated multilevel regression models are reported and examined for their implications regarding the research hypotheses (Section 3.5).

#### 3.1 Data Merging and Operationalization

##### needs new numbers

In order to test the hypotheses from the previous section a number of datasets will be combined. The analysis includes micro-level data from six cross-national survey projects spanning a time range from 2010 to 2015. The final dataset combines the Afrobarometer Survey Round 5 and Round 6 (data from 2011–2015), the Asian Barometer Survey Wave 3 and Wave 4 (2010–2015), the AmericasBarometer (2014), the European Social Survey Round 6 (2012), the Latinobarómetro (2015) and the World Values Survey (2010–2014). The final dataset accumulates the responses of 306,047 citizen in 113 countries across all continents and covers individual data from 58% of all independent countries that represent 86% of the world population.<sup>2</sup> Before the variables from different surveys are merged, they are standardized to a range of 0 to 1.

##### Dependent Variables: Regime Support and Democratic Performance Evaluation

In line with the theoretical definition of regime support discussed previously, the main dependent variable will be constructed from self-reported trust in the following regime institutions: trust/confidence in political leadership, police, courts and parliament (Questions and wordings can be found in Appendix Table ??). A range of studies focused on institutional trust and political support have operationalized regime support in a very similar way (Yang & Tang 2010; Chen 2017; Mauk 2017). We chose this specific operationalization because of two reasons: first, because it covers the three types of traditional political branches, executive (political leadership), judicial and legal system (courts and police) and legislation (parliament) and second, common availability in all used survey projects. Given that the analysis in this paper doesn’t seek to predict regime support of citizens in a specific year, but is more generally interested in the average regime support in a given country, surveys done in the same country in different years are collapsed into a single case, leaving us with a more general estimation of regime support.<sup>3</sup> **With the help**

<sup>2</sup>The following countries had to be excluded because of some form of political instability that made the reference point of the regime unclear: Egypt 2013 (imminent military coup), Libya in 2014 (post-revolutionary, transitional state), Mali in both 2012 and 2014 (civil war), Palestine in 2012 and 2013 (government split between Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in Westbank), as well as Yemen in 2014 (civil war) (cf. Mauk 2017: 14).

<sup>3</sup>This is judged to appropriate, because the time distances between surveys do not exceed five years. Surveys done in the same country and in the same year from different research projects are also collapsed into the same case.

of a confirmatory factor analysis, regime support is modeled as a latent variable, which allows for measurement error being accounted for (results in Appendix Table ??). As a last step, regime support is recoded to range from 0 to 100 in order to facilitate interpretation.

### *KÜRZEN?*

Now that the dependent variable has been introduced, a discussion of the operationalization of the independent variables follows. The question how to measure deliberation is a major challenge to deliberative research. On the process level, a notable instrument is the Deliberative Quality Index (DQI) (cf. Steiner et al. 2004: 53–60). The DQI is designed to measure deliberation based on Habermasian criteria like participation, the level and content of justification, respect toward groups, demands and counterarguments and constructive politics. The truthfulness criterion is not implemented, as it poses severe difficulties in empirical measurement. The DQI has shown to be a reliable, considerably valid and widely used measure of deliberative quality (cf. Bächtiger & Wyss 2013: 165). Unfortunately, it is only applicable to assess and compare the quality of deliberation in actual speech acts/debates and not across whole political systems. The only available measurement of deliberation on the structural level that serves the purpose of quantitative cross-national comparison is the Deliberative Democracy Index or rather the Deliberative Component Index (DCI) of the “Varieties of Democracy(V-Dem)”-Project (see M. Coppedge, Gerring, S. I. Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Altman David, et al. 2017). The underlying conception of deliberative democracy “focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions [...]” (Coppedge et al. 2011: 253). The authors state that “[...] there should be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion” (Coppedge et al. 2011: 253). The DCI is constructed with a Bayesian factor analysis “attempting to measure the extent to which political elites offer public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels [...]” (Coppedge et al. 2016: 583; for the aggregation method see: M. Coppedge, Gerring, S. I. Lindberg, Skaaning, Teorell, Krusell, et al. 2017).

There are five indicators for deliberation of which the DCI is composed of, summarized in Table 1. Especially the first three indicators – Reasoned Justification, Common Good and Respect for Counter-Arguments – resemble some of the criteria of ideal deliberation and are also found in the DQI, though not all of the possible indicators are captured. As in the DQI, truthfulness is not accounted for. Beyond that, there is only an assessment of respect towards counterarguments, not towards groups or demands and no reference to constructive politics or participation. To assess the scope of deliberations, the DCI contains two indicators: range of consultation and engaged society. The focus of the DCI is on “the degree of deliberativeness that can be discerned across all powerful institutions in a polity (not just those explicitly designed to serve a deliberative function) and among the citizenry” (Coppedge et al. 2011: 254). Though it should be noted that the DCI concentrates mainly on deliberation on elite levels, as only the engaged society indicator asks for public instead of elite deliberation. Since this paper is the first known to the authors that examines the effects of deliberation on regime support on a macro-scale, the analyses are conducted for the DCI as well as its components respectively, to gain as much information as possible. The analysis in this paper

Table 1: DCI and Subcomponents

| <i>Indicator</i>                | <i>Question</i>  |
|---------------------------------|--|
| <b>Reasoned Justification</b>   | <i>When important policy changes are being considered, i.e. before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?</i> |
| <b>Common Good</b>              | <i>When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?</i>   |
| <b>Respect counterarguments</b> | <i>When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?</i>  |
| <b>Range of consultation</b>    | <i>When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at elite levels?</i>  |
| <b>Engaged society</b>          | <i>When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?</i>  |

See Coppedge et al. 2017: 202–7.

should therefore be seen as exploratory in nature that is meant to inspire future research.

For the empirical analyses, the mean values over 10 years (2000-2010) are estimated for the DCI and its components, as it is assumed that regime support arises not (only) on a daily basis but over a period of time and the lagging of the variable is meant to simulate the temporal order of causality. The same treatment applies to other independent macro-variables varying over time. In the analysis, only the DCI and not the whole Deliberative Democracy Index is used, as we have argued to theoretically distinguish between democracy and deliberation. Nevertheless, our sample shows that the deliberation indicators are highly correlated with democracy (see Table 2; a scatterplot of deliberation and democracy in Appendix ??), measured by an index that averages Freedom House and Polity2 values, which we name Polity/FH.<sup>4</sup>

Table 2: DCI and Subcomponents: Correlation with Polity/FH

|                        | DCI  | RJ          | CG          | CA   | RoC         | ES          | Polity/FH |
|------------------------|------|-------------|-------------|------|-------------|-------------|-----------|
| Complete Data (n=121)  | 0.81 | 0.68        | <b>0.36</b> | 0.80 | 0.70        | 0.78        | 1.00      |
| Democracies (n=66)     | 0.63 | 0.68        | <b>0.40</b> | 0.57 | 0.61        | <b>0.46</b> | 1.00      |
| Non-Democracies (n=55) | 0.65 | <b>0.29</b> | <b>0.10</b> | 0.66 | <b>0.49</b> | 0.72        | 1.00      |

0.5. Bold numbers indicate correlations below  $r = 0.5$ . Data Source: see Table ?? in the Appendix. Own calculations.

## NEW CORRS!


This is not due to the choice of the democracy measurement, as the correlation persists with similar popular democracy measures. With an  $r$  value of 0.82, the DCI itself correlates the strongest with Polity/FH, the components Reasoned Justification, Counter-Arguments, Range of Consultation and Engaged Society show almost as strong correlations, with  $r$  varying from 0.72 to 0.78. Only the Common Good component seems less related to democracy ( $r = 0.40$ ). A high correlation of democracy and deliberation measures isn't surprising, as they share underlying

<sup>4</sup>The index is taken from the V-Dem Dataset and originally stems from Freedom House Freedom House (2017). The index constructors imputed missing polity values by regressing Polity2 on the average Freedom House measure. The Variable is scaled from 0 - 10. As with deliberation, the mean values from 2000-2010 are estimated for the analysis. To apply the Polity2-classification of democracies, anocracies and autocracies, the variable was rescaled to range from -10 to +10. Polity set their cut-off values at 6 and -6 (-10 - -6 = Autocracy; -5 - 5 = Anocracy; 6-10 = Democracy). However, in the process of rescaling the variable and calculating the ten year average, values have been produced that lie between the cut-off values. Numbers were rounded to integers and the usual cut-off values of Polity2 were used to classify the countries.

principles. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to assume that the range of consultation or level of public justification isn't inherently higher in democracies than in non-democracies. Nonetheless, a correlation as high as 0.82 brings up challenges for the analysis. For instance, one could call into question the validity of the DCI. More specifically, it might be proposed that the index merely captures a general perception of the minimal deliberative quality that naturally comes along with any democracy, instead of actual differences in the quality of deliberation. However, the strong empirical correlation contradicts the assumption that deliberation and democracy should be considered distinct phenomena. If this assumption is to be maintained, the effect democracy has on regime support must be separated from the effect of deliberation, which would lead to issues of collinearity / multicollinearity in a multivariate model. Within the subsample of democracies ( $\text{Polity}/\text{FH} \geq 6$ ), the correlation between the DCI and Polity/FH drops to  $r = 0.55$ , similar patterns can be observed for the component indicators that previously showed high correlations in the whole sample. For the subsample of non-democracies ( $\text{Polity}/\text{FH} < 6$ ), the correlations are also smaller, albeit not as much as for democracies. All deliberation indicators shows smaller correlations within the respective subsamples than in the complete sample. For both subsamples, though especially in the democracy sample, we can therefore assume problems of collinearity to be less severe. Nevertheless, such problems are especially expected for the deliberation indicators strongly correlated with Polity/FH. Within democracies, besides the DCI, two of the components show correlations with  $r$  above 0.5: Reasoned Justification ( $r = 0.62$ ) and Range of Consultation ( $r = 0.55$ ). Within non-democracies there are four indicators that fulfill this criterion: the DCI, Counter-Arguments ( $r = 0.64$ ), Range of Consultation ( $r = 0.58$ ) and Engaged Society ( $r = 0.74$ ). Accordingly, for the indicators Common Good, Counter-Arguments and Engaged Society in democracies, and Reasoned Justification along with Common Good in non-democracies, we expect tolerable levels of collinearity.

Even though deliberation and democracy are empirically strongly connected, a closer look at the deviations seems worthwhile. Figure 1 depicts a scatterplot. The cases coloured in green resemble democracies, blue cases are anocracies and red cases autocracies, as classified by the PolityIV-Project. In sum, the sample contains 61 democracies, 45 anocracies and 7 autocracies. Interestingly, the previous example of deliberation in non-democracies, China, appears on the top of the list, closely followed by Vietnam and Singapore, both countries identified by researchers as non-democracies with consultative institutions (cf. Jayasuriya & Rodan 2007: 779). As China specifically was already theorized to be a case of a non-democracy with deliberative institutions, the empirical results indicate that there is some accuracy in the V-Dem measurement of deliberation – despite the strong relation to democracy. There are not many deviating cases, much less cases that deviate strongly, but if there are differences, the results imply that they could be meaningful. Therefore, we decide to use the DCI and its subcomponents in the analysis, with the assumption that the diverging patterns are indeed representative of two empirically distinct phenomena. A second interesting finding is, that non-democracies, if they deviate, tend to score higher on the DCI than the democracy measurement, whereas it is the other way around with democracies. This might suggest that non-democracies do indeed need a higher level of deliberation in order to satisfy their population with democratic performance. However, it is more likely that democracies simply score higher on both measurements of deliberation and democracy and therefore they have less variation between them than non-democracies.

Figure 1: Scatterplot between Polity/FH and the DCI



Data Source: see Table ?? in the Appendix. Own calculations.

### 3.2 Possible Bias and Correction


Given that the main variable of interest *regime support* consists of self-reported attitudes in different societies and political systems across the world, a critical examination of the data is appropriate. A very widespread problem within survey research is the so-called *social desirability bias*, which especially applies to sensible survey items that concern very personal topics associated with a social stigma, like overt racism or sexual activity (cf. Krumpal 2013). Some respondents might choose to give responses they know to be untruthful because they either want to comply with some strong social norms or they fear repercussions by their social environment and the government. Especially the fear of government repression seems to be relevant in autocratic regimes, where expressing the wrong opinions might lead to physical harm. That is why in such repressive environments, respondents in surveys tend to practice *preference falsification*, where they will express uncontroversial regime-friendly opinions in public and conceal their real convictions (cf. Kuran 1997). Tannenberg analyzed such sensible survey items relating to trust in political institutions in the context of 36 African countries and was able to show that there is considerable bias when respondents believe that the survey is administered by a government agency, which is especially prevalent in more autocratic regimes [cf. tannenberg2017autocratic 21].

There is therefore strong grounds on which one might assume that the data is affected by social desirability bias, since we analyze sensible survey items relating to regime support in environments of varying repressiveness. In order to reveal such bias, we investigate the relationship between our democracy measurement (Polity/FH) and regime support, as well as a comparison of means between democracies, anocracies and autocracies, shown in Figure 2. Judging from the bivariate relationship, one can notice that there seems to be a quadratic effect of democracy on regime support. Very autocratic regimes score high on regime support and it decreases for countries that are semi-democratic until it rises again in democratic regimes. **A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test between autocratic regimes in regards to anocratic and democratic regimes reveals that the average regime support is significantly higher in an autocratic context  $H(2) = 7.63$ ,  $p = 0.037$  and  $H(2) = 7.95$ ,  $p = 0.025$ , respectively, though it doesn't significantly differ between anocracies and democracies,  $H(2) = 0.03$ ,  $p = 0.420$ .**

In order to investigate whether high regime support in autocracies is due to some form of bias, a measurement of Freedom of Discussion is introduced (cf. Coppedge Michael et al. 2017: 228–9). Freedom of Discussion measures “the extent to which citizens are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces [...] without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities”, which has the great advantage of not just focusing on repression of freedom of speech on behalf of the government, but also takes into account the degree to which other citizen impose speech prohibitions on each other. The relationship between Freedom of Discussion and regime support is examined in Figure 3, which shows a positive association between the two variables, suggesting that regime support is higher when discussion about political issues is more regulated. This might imply that revealing low support of the regime is socially undesirable and politically inconvenient in such societies and therefore citizen tend to falsify their preferences and express higher levels of regime support to avoid negative repercussions.



Figure 2: Regime Support by Polity/FH




Data Source: see Table ?? in the Appendix. Own calculations.

This possible bias in the data poses a serious problem for the analysis. What is to be done to remedy the revealed problematic? Two such approaches might be suitable: 1.) exclude the countries that are most likely to be biased or 2.) design a weight that accounts for the possible bias. The first approach has serious problems and may severely limit the validity of the results because it is associated with a loss of information, and also systematically leaves out a certain group of countries. A designed weight seems the more appropriate adaptation, as Tannenberg recommends: “one avenue forward would be to construct reliability weights to enable the researcher to account for the biases in the analysis” (Tannenberg 2017: 21). Unfortunately, measurements of whether respondents believed the surveyors to be government representatives are not available for all surveys used in this analysis, therefore a weight on the country-level might be an alternative. We hereby propose the Freedom of Discussion measurement to weigh regime support, which is already proven to be positively associated with the dependent variable. Given that the proposed weight is highly experimental in nature, two bias boundaries will be introduced: a lower and a higher bound, whereby regime support in societies with somewhat and weakly respected Freedom of Discussion will be penalized with 10% and 15% (low bias) or 20% and 25% (high bias), respectively. Table 3 shows a summary for all weighted country cases, which only applies to anocratic and autocratic regimes.

**\*\* NEW CORR\*\***

One caveat comes with this approach: as it stands, Freedom of Discussion is positively associated with democracy (r

Figure 3: Regime Support by Freedom of Discussion



Data Source: see Table ?? in the Appendix. Own calculations.

= 0.80 for the whole sample, and  $r = 0.58$  within non-democracies) and therefore also associated with increased deliberative levels ( $r = 0.67$  with DCI for the complete sample, and  $r = 0.44$  for the non-democracy subsample). Thereby, weighting regime support with Freedom of Discussion inherently makes the dependent variable more similar to the independent variables. However, the usage of the weight can be well justified on theoretical grounds and it is thereby assumed that this adaptation improves the validity of measured regime support. Nevertheless, this step has to be critically evaluated, as we might over- or underestimate the bias severely. Therefore, models with unweighted regime support are always reported as well.

### 3.3 Statistical Methodology

Given that the dataset in this paper combines individual level data with country level data, a multilevel analysis is needed to account for hierarchical data structure, which will model a unique intercept for each country (cf. Gelman & Hill 2006: 237). This becomes necessary, because standard linear regression only produces accurate estimations of standard errors if the data points are independent of each other, which is not the case in our dataset. Furthermore, since the main independent variable is located on the country-level, it allows us to control its influence for individual-level control variables. We follow a recommendation by Enders and Torighi to use grand-mean centered

Table 3: Weighting of Regime Support


| Country                  | Regime Support<br><i>Original</i> | Regime Support<br><i>Low Bias (10 - 15%)</i> | Regime Support<br><i>High Bias (20 - 25%)</i> | Freedom of Discussion<br><i>(FoD)</i> |
|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|---|---------------------------------------|
| Qatar                    | 85.68                             | 72.83  | 64.26   | <i>Weakly Respected</i>               |
| Uzbekistan               | 82.97                             | 70.53  | 62.23   | <i>Weakly Respected</i>               |
| Singapore                | 68.06                             | 57.85  | 51.04   | <i>Weakly Respected</i>               |
| Kuwait                   | 66.50                             | 56.52  | 49.87   | <i>Weakly Respected</i>               |
| Swaziland                | 59.07                             | 50.21  | 44.30   | <i>Weakly Respected</i>               |
| Rwanda                   | 57.38                             | 48.77  | 43.03   | <i>Weakly Respected</i>               |
| Zimbabwe                 | 55.08                             | 46.82  | 41.31   | <i>Weakly Respected</i>               |
| Vietnam                  | 79.98                             | 71.98  | 63.99   | <i>Somewhat Respected</i>             |
| China                    | 71.28                             | 64.15  | 57.02   | <i>Somewhat Respected</i>             |
| Burundi                  | 68.80                             | 61.92  | 55.04   | <i>Somewhat Respected</i>             |
| Thailand                 | 58.17                             | 52.36  | 46.54   | <i>Somewhat Respected</i>             |
| Azerbaijan               | 56.78                             | 51.10  | 45.43   | <i>Somewhat Respected</i>             |
| Kazakhstan               | 52.24                             | 47.02  | 41.79   | <i>Somewhat Respected</i>             |
| Iraq                     | 49.90                             | 44.91  | 39.92   | <i>Somewhat Respected</i>             |
| Guatemala                | 38.52                             | 34.66  | 30.81   | <i>Somewhat Respected</i>             |
| Madagascar               | 36.67                             | 33.00  | 29.34   | <i>Somewhat Respected</i>             |
| Venezuela                | 34.76                             | 31.29  | 27.81   | <i>Somewhat Respected</i>             |
| <i>Correlation - FoD</i> | <i>0.14</i>                       | <i>0.06</i>                                  | <i>0.00</i>                                   | -                                     |

Pearson's r reported. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table ?? in the Appendix. Own calculation.

predictors, because a multilevel analysis with the focus on the influence of a level 2 predictor can then be controlled by the level 1 variables (as is our intent) (cf. Enders & Tofghi 2007: 128 - 129).

A range of multilevel models are then estimated in order to test Hypothesis H1. Given the expected high levels of multicollinearity, the influence of DCI and its subcomponents on regime support is tested separately for the Polity/FH variable, in order to control for possible distortions caused by the strong overlap between the two variables. In the interest of accounting for the slight quadratic effect in the relationship between democracy and regime support in the complete sample, the Polity/FH variable will be split into three dummies, Autocracy, Anocracy and Democracy, as recommended by Tabachnik et al. (cf. Tabachnick et al. 2013: 43–4). Moreover, in order to avoid issues of multicollinearity, the sample is further divided into democracies (Polity/FH  $\geq 6$ ) and non-democracies (Polity/FH  $< 6$ ), where the sub-hypotheses of H1 are tested separately. In these subsamples, the continuous Polity/FH variable can be used again, because the quadratic relationship only appears in the full sample. These divisions of the data, in addition to estimating all models for three separate dependent regime support variables (no bias, low bias, high bias) and six separate independent deliberation variables, leave us with 84 multilevel models to be estimated. In addition, we estimate seven models with Polity/FH only and none of the deliberation indicators, for the purpose of comparison, which adds up to a total of 91 estimated models. Given the exploratory nature of the analysis and the many problems with expected multicollinearity and quadratic effects, the estimation of so many models seems justified as this allows us to test for robustness of the findings. To facilitate an intuitive communication of the results, we will only visualize the relevant effects in the main text and report the detailed results in tables in the appendix.

Figure 4: Regime Support Across the World 2010 - 2015




### 3.4 Descriptives

This section will examine some of the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations, focusing on the relationship between deliberation and regime support, but also including levels of democracy to account for the necessity to separate democracy and deliberation. As a first overview, Figure 4 depicts a map with levels of regime support across the world. The countries were grouped in quintiles, darker shades indicate quintiles with higher support. Completely white coloring means that data for the country wasn't available. First, it comes to attention that there is no clear regional pattern of regime support in our sample, although some general trends can be observed. The countries with the highest aggregated regime support are located at quite different places of the world. Firstly, Northern Europe stands out with higher levels of support, with much of Western and especially Southern and Eastern Europe being located in lower quintiles. Then, available cases in Southern and Eastern Africa are located mostly in higher quintiles, whereas Western Africa shows a rather mixed pattern. Including the MENA countries, it becomes visible that Africa is a highly underrepresented continent in the sample. Turning the attention to Asia, the relatively high average regime support, especially in parts of Eastern and Southeastern Asia stand out. Across Central and South America, there is no country within the fourth or fifth quintile and not so many in the third one, indicating rather low aggregate levels of regime support within the broader region.

Figure 5 shows a world map indicating the level of deliberation (DCI) across the countries of our sample, also grouped into quintiles, with darker shades indicating higher quintiles and therefore higher levels on the DCI. Notably, the distribution of the DCI in our sample is rather skewed, which leaves us with narrow ranges for the upper quintiles. The regional patterns for the DCI differ from the ones of regime support. First, Northern as well as Western and Southern Europe are all placed within the higher quintiles. Concerning the Americas, no clear pattern is visible and mix of all levels of deliberation can be found. The same can be said for Africa, though not many countries there are

Figure 5: Deliberation Across the World 2000 - 2010



Data Source: see Table ?? in the Appendix. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Own calculations.


found in the fourth or fifth quintile. In Asia, the pattern is rather mixed as well, though especially Southeastern Asia stands out with comparably dark shades and, therefore, higher scores on the DCI.

Figure 6 shows six scatterplots that visualize the distribution of average regime support<sup>5</sup> (weighted with the high bias boundary) per country over levels of deliberation (the DCI and its components, respectively). The dashed line shows the overall correlation. The coloring of the cases is red for autocracies, green for anocracies and blue for democracies, the respective lines show the correlation within the groups. When only observing overall correlations, it comes to attention that all the independent variables reveal a weak positive correlation with regime support, with  $r$  varying from 0.12 to 0.26. In two cases the correlation becomes significant, with  $p$ -values below 0.01: Reasoned Justification ( $r = 0.26$ ) and Range of Consultation ( $r = 0.26$ ). Interestingly, when grouped into regime type categories, there is a consistent pattern that shows mostly stronger or sometimes equal positive correlations within the groups compared to the overall relationship (with two exceptions for anocracies: Engaged Society and Common Good have weaker within-group correlations). In contrast to the relatively small bivariate correlation within the full dataset, the deliberation indicators seem to be consistently positively related to regime support within groups of similar levels of democracy.

So far, only results for high bias regime support were reported, therefore a short discussion of low and no bias regime support is warranted. At first, it has to be recalled that democracies are not affected by the weighting at all. The correlations and  $p$ -values within the subgroups anocracies and autocracies do not vary strongly, when weighing the dependent variable. On the other hand, the overall correlations show great increases both in  $p$ -values and effect sizes. The most remarkable increase can be observed for the Reasoned Justification indicator ( $r = 0.089$ ,  $p = 0.35$  for the unweighted regime support compared to  $r = 0.26$ ,  $p = 0.0054$ ).

<sup>5</sup>Only variables with the high bias boundary will be analyzed in this section. The bivariate relationships between the two other variants of regime support can be found in Appendix Figure ?? and ??.

Figure 6: Bivariate Relationships between Deliberation Indicators and Regime Support (High Bias)



Data Source: see Table ?? in the Appendix. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Persons's r is reported. Own calculations.

In sum, the findings of the bivariate correlations indicate that deliberation has an effect on regime support first and foremost in democracies (strong effects within autocracies are not reliable, as this group has only seven cases). This could imply that deliberation is - in fact - a predominantly democratic concept that only works within the freedoms that come along with democratic regimes. As the results discussed here are not controlled for other variables, this should be seen as a first indication rather than an explicit finding.

### 3.5 Multilevel Regression Analysis

In this section, the results of the multilevel regression analyses are reported and analyzed in regard to their implications for the research hypotheses.<sup>6</sup> First, in order to assess whether multilevel modeling is warranted, a null model for each dependent variable is estimated (weighted and unweighted) with a random-intercept and no predictors (cf. Hox 2010: 300). The intraclass correlations (ICCs) for the null models show that indeed 44.45% (unweighted), 41.18% (low boundary weight) and 40.64% (high boundary weight) of the variance of regime support is bound on the country-level. The results strongly indicate that a multilevel analysis is appropriate.

Figure 7 summarizes the standardized regression coefficients, the lines indicating a 90% confidence interval for the effects of DCI and its components (estimated separately, not included in one model) on three different dependent variables: regime support with no weighting (colored in green), weightings applied with low (blue) and high boundaries (red), respectively (the full report of all 36 estimated models can be found in appendix Table ?? and ??). In the first column, the effects are controlled for variables on the individual level (Age, Sex, Education, Financial Security, Employment) along with country level variables (logged GDP, Ethnic Fractionalization, logged Population). It has to be noted that the models reported here do not separate the effects of democracy and deliberation, which suggests that the effects might be strongly interwoven, given the high correlation between both measures.

When investigating the results for the unweighted dependent variable, the findings are mixed. The components Reasoned Justification (Beta = 0.06), Common Good (Beta = 0.07) and Range of Consultation (Beta = 0.04) are positively related to regime support, whereas Counter-Arguments (Beta = -0.03) and Engaged Society (Beta = -0.04) together with the DCI (Beta = -0.02) have negative coefficients. The effect for none of the deliberation indicators reaches statistical significance. A continuous pattern catches one's attention: the weighting of the dependent variable causes the coefficients for all deliberation indicators to shift towards (stronger) positive effects. With the low boundary dependent variable none of the effects are negative anymore, and the previously positive effects reach weak statistical significance on the 90% level or higher. For the high boundary weighting, the effect sizes grow, while only Counter-Arguments and Engaged Society have p-values below 0.1.<sup>7</sup>

The second column of Figure 7 depicts the results for models that include individual- and country-level variables including dummies for Polity/FH (Autocracies and Democracies with Anocracies as reference category). As discussed



<sup>6</sup>Since multicollinearity was expected for many of the estimated models, it should be noted right at the beginning that none of the 91 estimated regression models in the analysis showed problematic VIF-values for any of the included variables ( $VIF < 5$  in all estimated models). Furthermore, regression diagnostics for one of the full models involving the DCI and all control variables has been conducted and no major violation of statistical assumption are revealed (see Figures ?? and ?? in the Appendix).

<sup>7</sup>The shift towards more positive effects is (maybe just partly) an inherent consequence of the weighting, as discussed before ( $r = 0.67$  for Freedom of Discussion and the DCI). Of course, the unweighted results have the problem of assumably being (more) biased, and therefore estimates should be interpreted with caution.

before, we refrain from using a continuous variable because the specification of a quadratic term for Polity/FH would increase already existing problems of multicollinearity. For the interpretation of the reported results, it has therefore to be noted that the effect of democracy is controlled for in a restricted manner and with some potential loss of the controlling function.



Figure 7: Complete Sample: Models A1.1 to F1.6



\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , †  $p < 0.1$ . Standardized regression coefficients and 90% confidence intervals are reported. Reference category for Polity/FH dummies is Anocracy. For the full models see Appendix Table ?? and ?. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table ?? in the Appendix. Own calculations

Including the Polity/FH dummies has a striking impact on the coefficients of all six deliberation indicators. Even for the unweighted regime support, there are notable changes, all effects statistically significant at the 95% level or higher (Beta varying from 0.10 to 0.22). Contrary to the results without control for the dummies, the weighting doesn't have as much of an impact on the coefficients for the respective deliberation indicators, but rather on the coefficients for the dummy variables themselves. This is not surprising as the variable used to calculate the weightings correlates stronger with Polity/FH as with the deliberation indicators. In general, the coefficients of the Polity/FH dummies show that regime support is higher in autocracies than in anocracies and in turn lower in democracies than in anocracies. The respective differences decrease when the dependent variable is weighted with either of the boundaries, though stronger with the high bias variant. This indicates that the weighting procedure works as intended. It has to be noted though, that in most cases even the high boundary weighting doesn't diminish the positive or negative effects of the Autocracy or Democracy dummies, respectively. This could mean, that our weighting is not accurate or strong enough. On the other hand, the possibility that autocracies and anocracies actually do enjoy more or at least equal support from their citizens than democracies has to be considered. For example, citizens in democracies could be more "assertive" than "allegiant" (cf. Welzel & Dalton 2015). In light of the current "disconnect" many democracies are said to experience (cf. Foa & Mounk 2016), the assumption that regime support is not higher in democracies does not seem completely far-fetched. It has to be noted, though, that the negative and positive effects for the Democracy and Autocracy dummies, respectively, are notably weaker and for democracies insignificant, when only the dummies and control variables, but none of the deliberation indicators are included (Models P.1.1 to P.1.3, see Appendix Table ??/ Figure ??).

Lastly, we compare the estimated models reported on the left and right side of Figure 7, with the help of AIC, BIC and deviance (-2 times the log-likelihood). The models are compared with the respective Polity/FH only models. The purpose of this comparison is to evaluate whether the sometimes striking effect-increase of deliberation indicators when including the Polity/FH dummies is due to the dummies alone or if deliberation indicators significantly contribute to a better model fit. Table ?? and Figures ?? to ?? in the Appendix visualize the differences in AIC, BIC and deviance for the three dependent variables, respectively. The models A1.1 to F1.3 (including only the deliberation indicators) are shown in red, while the green bars indicate the models A2.4 to F2.6 (with Polity/FH dummies and the deliberation indicators included). Lastly, the blue bars show the models P1.1-P1.3. AIC and deviance consistently indicate that the models including deliberation indicators and Polity/FH dummies have the lowest values and therefore the best fit (with the exception of the AIC for the high bias model that only includes Common Good, Model C1.6). Although BIC shows contradictory trends, the discrepancy might not be troublesome as BIC tends to prefer models of lesser complexity. Overall, this could indicate that including Polity/FH dummies into the model causes the respective deliberation indicator to fully unfold its effect on regime support, thereby increasing model fit, a so-called suppressor effect. This might be further substantiated by the fact that deliberation indicators alone seem to fit less well than the Polity/FH dummies alone (blue bars compared to red bars). However, given the high overlap between Polity/FH dummies and most of the deliberation indicators, it might as well be that a statistical artefact has been produced.

In conclusion, for the first hypothesis, which suggests that deliberation has a positive effect on regime support,

the findings are mixed. In models not controlling for Polity/FH dummies and using unweighted regime support, empirical evidence doesn't validate the hypothesis. Then again, when assuming that the data is biased and that the applied weightings actually remedy the bias, positive effects of some of the deliberation indicators can be assumed as well. As the assumption of the accuracy of the applied weighting isn't tested and the effects when including the Polity/FH dummies is suspicious due to expected multicollinearity (though it should not be as severe when including only three categories), we refer from confirming H1. Nonetheless, some evidence for predicted effect should be noted.

Figures ?? and ?? depict the same models shown in Figure 7, with the samples restricted to democracies (Polity/FH  $\geq 6$ ) and non-democracies, respectively (the full report of the 48 estimated models can be found in appendix ?? to ??). Instead of dummy variables, as before, the continuous Polity/FH variable is included in the models reported in the right column, since the relationship between Polity/FH and regime support is no longer quadratic within these subgroups. Moreover multicollinearity due to the correlation of Polity/FH is not as severe as for the complete sample (with the DCI its  $r = 0.55$  and  $r = 0.68$  for democracies and non-democracies, respectively, see Table 2 in Section 3.1). We do expect problems of multicollinearity, especially for the component indicators strongly correlated with Polity/FH.

Within democracies, three of the deliberation indicators show correlations with  $r$  above 0.5: the DCI, Reasoned Justification and Range of Consultation. Within non-democracies there are four indicators that fulfill this criterion: the DCI, Counter-Arguments, Range of Consultation and Engaged Society. Accordingly, for the indicators Common Good, Counter-Arguments and Engaged Society in democracies, and Reasoned Justification as well as Common Good in non-democracies, respectively, we expect tolerable levels of multicollinearity.

For the democracy sample, no systematic bias of regime support is assumed, as Freedom of Discussion is respected in all cases and our weighting doesn't apply. As already suggested by the bivariate correlations in Section 3.4, the multilevel models within democracies also show a positive effect on regime support for all deliberation indicators (see Figure ??, left column). The most remarkable effects are the ones of the DCI (Beta = 0.22) as well as its components Reasoned Justification (Beta = 0.25), Range of Consultation (Beta = 0.21) and Engaged Society ( $r = 0.20$ ), which all are significant with  $p < 0.001$ . Counter-Arguments (Beta = 0.14) and Common Good (Beta = 0.13) show smaller effects, both weakly significant on the 95% and 90% level, respectively. When including Polity/FH (see Figure ??, right column), the coefficients for the respective deliberation indicators don't change much and if so, in a direction towards slightly stronger positive effects. A rather puzzling finding are the insignificant and weak, but negative effects of Polity/FH, as the bivariate correlation indicated a somewhat positive relationship within democracies. Models that do not include any deliberation indicator, but include only Polity/FH show an effect that is weakly positive but still statistically insignificant (Beta = 0.06; Model P2.1, see Appendix Figure ??).

### democracy

As discussed before, multicollinearity should not be as much of an issue for the components Common Good, Counter-Arguments and Engaged Society compared to the the remaining three indicators. For the three more unproblematic models, Polity/FH has a rather small negative effect (Beta = -0.06 in Model D2.2) up to no discernible effect at all (in model C2.2) on regime support. For the assumably more problematic indicators, the negative coefficients are

slightly higher (Beta = -0.10 in Model E2.2; Beta = -0.12 in Models A2.2 and B2.2). Moreover, the effect sizes are greater and p-values smaller for the presumably problematic deliberation indicators. Coefficients for these vary between Beta = 0.24 (Model E2.2) and Beta = 0.29 (Model B2.2), while the coefficients for the unproblematic indicators range between Beta = 0.13 (in Model C2.2) and Beta=20 (in Model F2.2). This pattern could indicate that there actually are problems of multicollinearity that affect the results, even though the VIF Values are within non-problematic boundaries. Then again, the differences between the presumably unproblematic and problematic models are not as severe as they could be, which indicates a certain robustness of the results. Taking a look at the goodness of fit measures in the appendix Figure ??, it becomes visible that including the Polity/FH measure does not really lead to an increase of fit overall compared to the respective models with only the DCI or its components. It can also be safely assumed that the positive effects of the deliberation indicators are not due to the influence of the Polity/FH measure, as the model with only Polity/FH (P2.1) has the worst fit overall (the only exception being the BIC, which indicates worse fits for the Models C2.1 and D2.1 than for P2.1). The conclusion for H1.1 would be the same, even if we only considered the models expected to be unproblematic. The hypothesis states that, within democracies, the more deliberative a system, the higher the support for the regime. In light of the reviewed empirical evidence, we cautiously consider H1.1 to be preliminarily confirmed.

After the results concerning H1.1 were discussed, the empirical results for the contradicting hypotheses H1.2a and H1.2b are examined. In the left column of Figure ??, the effects of the deliberation indicators on regime support within the non-democracy subsample are reported. Rather similar to the results for the complete sample, the indicators DCI (Beta = -0.04), Counter-Arguments (Beta = -0.07), and Engaged Society (Beta = -0.12) have negative effects on the unweighted dependent variable, whereas Reasoned Justification (Beta = 0.05) as well as Common Good (Beta = 0.09) show positive coefficients, and Range of Consultation has no visible effect at all. Weighted or unweighted, none of the effects reaches statistical significance, with the exception of the Engaged Society coefficient for the unweighted regime support, with a p-value below 0.5. The results follow no clear pattern when changing the weighting of the independent variable, besides the previously observed shift towards more positive or less negative effects. The indicator least affected by the weighting is Common Good, for which the coefficients remain stable and only a small decrease in the confidence intervals is observable, which can be explained with the almost non-existent relationship of Common Good and the weighting variable within non-democracies ( $r = 0.04$ ). Recalling the previous discussion, deliberation indicators with Polity/FH correlations over  $r = 0.5$  are: the DCI ( $r = 0.68$ ), Counter-Arguments ( $r = 0.64$ ), Range of Consultation ( $r = 0.58$ ), and Engaged Society ( $r = 0.74$ ). Rather unproblematic indicators are Reasoned Justification ( $r = 0.39$ ) and Common Good ( $r = 0.15$ ). It appears, that the effect sizes follow almost the same order as the size of the correlations, for weighted and unweighted dependent variables alike. Engaged Society, correlating the strongest with Polity/FH, has the strongest negative effect on regime support, whereas Common Good, with the weakest correlation, has the highest positive coefficient. Only Counter-Arguments differs by having a stronger negative effect than the DCI. As noted before, the results on the left side of the Figures are not controlled for Polity/FH. The bivariate as well as the multilevel regression results reveal a negative relationship between regime support and Polity/FH, especially in non-democracies, which could be an explanation for the observed pattern. It should be noted, that no such pattern can be detected for the complete

sample or the democracy subsample.

### **nondemocracy**

Including the Polity/FH variable in the models has a similar impact as it had for the democracy subsample and as the dummies had in the complete sample (see Figure ??, right column): the effects of the respective deliberation indicators increase and reach weak statistical significance in almost all cases (with p-values varying between below 0.1 and above 0.01). For two of the components, the same components that showed the strongest negative tendencies in the corresponding models without Polity/FH, the coefficients are not significant for any of the dependent variables: Counter-Arguments (Models D3.4-D3.6) and Engaged Society (Models F3.4-F3.6). Weighting regime support has the same impact already observed before with the dummy variables, by shifting the effects of Polity/FH towards less negative coefficients. Notably, a different pattern for the deliberation indicators can be observed, with the exception of Engaged Society. For the other five indicators, there is a rather small decrease in effect sizes for the weighted dependent variables. Interestingly, the Engaged Society indicator is the one that correlates the strongest with the Polity/FH measure within non-democracies. But overall, no systematic differences can be detected in the results of the presumably problematic and unproblematic indicators. The same can be said for the effects of the Polity/FH measure, which has consistently negative coefficients of notable size, statistically significant on the 95% level or higher (with Model F3.6 being an exception with  $p < 0.1$  only). Slightly weaker but still notable negative effects of Polity/FH can be observed when excluding the deliberation indicators and including only Polity/FH (Models P3.1-P3.3, Appendix Figure ??). The Polity/FH coefficients for the assumably problematic indicators show no notable systematic differences compared to the two rather unproblematic variables Reasoned Justification and Common Good.

The empirical evidence is mixed for the two contradicting hypotheses, which assumed that, in non-democracies, the more deliberative a system, the higher (H1.2a) or lower (H1.2b) is regime support. In models not controlling for Polity/FH dummies (unweighted regime support), empirical evidence shows no clear pattern at all, with one indiscernible (Range of Consultation), two positive (Reasoned Justification, Common Good) and three negative effects (Counter-Arguments, Engaged Society, DCI), all besides one statistically insignificant. However, when including the Polity/FH variable, the results indicate a positive effect of deliberation, with all of the six indicators having positive coefficients, four of them with noteworthy effect sizes and being statistically weakly significant at the 90% or respective 95% level. Taking a look at the fit measurements in Figures ?? to ?? in the Appendix, one can see that the models that include Polity/FH as well as the deliberation components are amongst the best-fitting models (though the BIC shows contradictory trends in some cases). The only exception are the models with the independent variables Engaged Society and Counter-Arguments, where the best-fitting model is not the one that includes a deliberation indicator together with Polity/FH. The models including only Polity/FH (P3.1-P3.3) have the best fit in this cases, and always a better fit than the models only including the respective deliberation indicators. In general it has to be noted that the non-democracy subsample is affected by a possible bias in the self-reported regime support and that, as discussed before, the weighting measure has not been tested for its accuracy. In light of the discussed evidence we reject H1.2b, but refer from confirming H1.2a due to the mixed results and discussed restrictions. Nevertheless, some empirical indications for the effect proposed by H1.2a can be noted.

In sum, we did find evidence for an effect of deliberation on regime support, especially and least restricted by limitations within the democracy subsample. To begin with, general trends can be observed for the weighting of the dependent variable. In most cases, though not for the non-democracy subsample, the effects of the deliberation indicators shift towards more positive/less negative effects when the weighting is applied. For the Polity/FH dummies, the effects of the democracy dummies become less negative and for the autocracy dummy less positive (in reference to anocracies). Similarly, in the autocracy subsample, the effects of the continuous Polity/FH measure are less negative for the weighted dependent variables. A second trend can be observed when comparing the respective models with and without one of the Polity/FH measures. In all models, when including Polity/FH, negative effects of the deliberation indicators become positive and positive effects increase (only weakly in democracies, but rather strongly for the complete and the non-democracy sample). This applies to models both presumably problematic and unproblematic in regard to multicollinearity. The results could indicate that deliberation has a positive effect on regime support, but at the same time positively correlates with Polity/FH, which itself has a negative effect on regime support. This could be interpreted as a suppressor effect. However, this interpretation has to be done very cautiously, due to the restrictions of our study.

## 4 Analysis

### 4.1 Subcaption 1

## 5 Conclusions

### 5.1 Subcaption 1



## 6 References

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