

Deliberation Across the World

A Cross-National Examination of the Link Between Deliberation and Regime Legitimacy

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A core assumption of deliberative theory is that deliberation helps generate legitimate decisions in the political sphere and beyond. In this context, this paper seeks to investigate whether deliberation increases citizens perception of regime legitimacy, which is conceptualized and measured as regime support.

To this end, deliberation and its relationship with regime support are examined across the world by combining multiple cross-national survey projects (World Values Survey, Asian Barometer, Afrobarometer, Latinobarómetro, AmericasBarometer and European Social Survey) covering more than 100 countries and over 300,000 individual respondents. As this paper is the first known to the authors that examines the effects of deliberation on regime support in a cross-country design, the used deliberation measurement, the Deliberative Component Index from the "Varieties of Democracy"-Project, is thoroughly examined and analyses are conducted for its components as well. Given that self-reported regime support is expected to be biased in countries where freedom of discussion is inhibited, a weight is applied to account for possible distortions in the survey data.

The results of the multilevel regression analysis indicate that deliberation fulfills its legitimacy claim by increasing regime support first and foremost in democracies. The evidence for non-democracies and the complete sample is ambiguous and less robust although it points in the same direction. A possible limitation of the study is the high correlation between the used deliberation measurements and democracy indices which might indicate that the measurement does not accurately reflect the grade of deliberation in each country. Nevertheless, some interesting deviations in these correlations could be found between the subsamples, as well as in regard to the index and its components. In order to arrive at robust results, more sensible ways to measure deliberation on the country level seem necessary. It is further suggested that following studies and survey projects in the field should find methods to remedy possible bias in self-reported regime support, especially in countries with more authoritarian regimes.

The findings of this paper can hopefully be used as a starting point for more detailed investigation of the relationship between deliberation and regime legitimacy in the future.

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1 Introduction

Since political theory took its “deliberative turn” (Dryzek, 2000) in the 1990s, empirical political science has increasingly turned towards examining deliberation. There have been numerous studies about its requirements and consequences. This paper is concerned with the latter. Deliberative theory along with empirical science has developed manifold assumptions about the effects of deliberation, including transformation of preferences, epistemic quality, consensus and accommodation, as well as side-effects on civic virtues like political trust (cf. ???). Given the current decline of trust in governments and political institutions in many democracies across the world (cf. Foa & Mounk, 2016), deliberation could be seen as a process to arrive at legitimate decisions in societies of increasing complexity (see for example Habermas, 1994, pp. 7–8; M. E. Warren & Gastil, 2015, p. 562). In order to examine this legitimacy claim, this paper seeks to investigate whether deliberation increases citizens perception of regime legitimacy, which is conceptualized and operationalized as regime support. This study differs from previous ones in the following terms: It is the first to examine the effects of deliberation on regime support in a cross-national framework across a large dataset of 306,047 respondents from 113 countries across all continents. Moreover, the analysis is not restricted to democratic regimes, but also includes non-democracies.¹ Therefore, a recent theoretical development, the conceptualization of deliberation outside of democratic contexts, so called *authoritarian deliberation*, is taken into account (see He, 2014; He & Thøgersen, 2010; He & Warren, 2011).

The main research question of this thesis states as follows: *What role does Deliberation play for regime support across the world?* The following section establishes the theoretical framework of political support and derives possible determinants of regime support. Next, the concept of deliberation is clarified and the link between deliberation and regime support is drawn, from which hypotheses are derived (Section 2). The next section presents the research design of this study and the results of the analysis (Section 3). In the end, the findings of the analysis will be summarized and the conclusion gives an answer to the research question along with a discussion of implications for further research (Section 4)

2 Theory

2.1 Deliberative Theory

For over twenty years, deliberation has been a topic of great interest to political theory and empirical political science. One of the main contributors to deliberative theory is the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. His classical model of deliberation is characterized by the logic of communicative action, by which the action orientations of participants are coordinated through acts of common understanding, rather than strategic calculations regarding their own success (cf. Habermas, 1982, p. 385). The ideal deliberative procedure, as described by Cohen, needs to meet the following criteria (Cohen, 2003, pp.

¹For the purposes of this paper we consequently refer to political systems as non-democratic in accordance with the Polity IV project classification of autocracies and anocracies.

346–347): First, ideal deliberation is *free* in that “ [...] the participants regard themselves as bound only by results of their deliberation [...]”. The second criterion is that its proposals must be justified with *reasons*, with the assumption that these reasons will determine whether the proposals are accepted. The next criterion is that participants are formally and substantively *equal*, meaning that the rules of the process and the distribution of power and resources do not discriminate against individuals. Lastly, deliberation’s ideal goal is to arrive at a rational *consensus*. To sum up, this type of deliberation contains the process of rational consideration of arguments, in which the participants provide elaborate reasons relating to the common good to justify their positions, respect other opinions and are truthful as well as willing to yield to better arguments (cf. Bächtiger, Niemeyer, Neblo, Steenbergen, & Steiner, 2010, pp. 35–37).

The discussed type of ideal deliberation is quite demanding and therefore invited criticism from different directions. Bächtiger et al. (2010, pp. 42–48) discern between the Habermasian “type I” deliberative theory and “type II” deliberation, under which they subsume criticisms and further developments. This type of deliberation contains a range of theoretical adaptations and does not represent a unified theory. Generally, the focus changed from the deliberative process to deliberative institutions and outcomes and some of the strict requirements of the classical model are loosened or dropped completely. For example, scholars pointed out that not all citizens are equally skilled in rhetoric, which can be dependent on factors like socio-economic background, gender or ethnicity (cf. Sanders, 1997, p. 349). Thus, one branch of type II theory introduced the admissibility of other forms of speech besides rational argumentation, as for example rhetoric, emotion, humor or storytelling (cf. Dryzek, 2000, p. 48). Moreover, Mansbridge et al. argue that self-interests can be legitimate in some forms because they don’t necessarily violate deliberative ideals and therefore should not be completely excluded from the concept of deliberation (cf. Mansbridge et al., 2010, pp. 72–73). Other adaptations define the ideal results of deliberation in more detail and lower the threshold of admissible outcomes by focusing on meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality instead of rationally motivated consensus (cf. Niemeyer & Dryzek, 2007, p. 522). Moreover, in type II deliberation the truthfulness criterion is relaxed or abandoned entirely, as it doesn’t capture the possibility of multiple and complex intentions and is not necessary for argument accessibility or the willingness to cooperate and to change one’s opinion (Bächtiger et al., 2010, p. 44; cf. Markovits, 2006, pp. 257–258).

Since this paper aims to examine the consequences of deliberation across different countries, democracies and non-democracies alike, the relationship between democracy and deliberation needs to be examined. In the literature, deliberation is often discussed exclusively in democratic contexts, especially regarding models of deliberative democracy (Cohen, 2003; for example Habermas, 1994). In such conceptualizations, deliberation and democracy are closely linked to each other. On the other hand, critics assume an inconsistency between deliberative procedures of participation and democratic principles like equality (cf. Sanders, 1997, pp. 347–350; Lafont 2017 democracy). For the purposes of this paper deliberation and democracy are considered to be distinct phenomena. As Dryzek puts it: “Deliberative capacity does not have to be sought in any particular set of institutions (such as elections), but it can be manifested

in different ways, in different systems” (Dryzek, 2009, p. 1380). We follow the conceptual approach proposed by He and Warren: democracy concerns the inclusion of individuals in matters that affect them, whereas deliberation can be conceptualized as a “communication mode in which participants in a political process offer and respond to the substance of claims, reasons, and perspectives in ways that generate persuasion-based influence” (cf. He & Warren, 2011, p. 271). Especially in the context of non-democracies it seems appropriate to apply a type II concept of deliberation, as He and Warren do. But even then, the requirements of deliberation are more likely to be met in democracies. Moreover, the concepts do overlap in theory, as they share underlying principles like equality and a minimum guarantee of freedom of speech. Nevertheless, deliberative procedures have not only been implemented in democracies. A prominent example is China, a rather autocratic country, where deliberative practices like opinion polls or village councils have gained popularity over the last 20 years (J. S. Fishkin, He, Luskin, & Siu, 2010; He, 2014; He & Thøgersen, 2010; He & Warren, 2011)..²

2.2 Deliberation and Legitimacy

In the literature about deliberation, the claim exists that deliberation is necessary to arrive at legitimate decisions in societies of increasing complexity (Habermas, 1994, pp. 7–8; M. E. Warren & Gastil, 2015, p. 562). Before further discussing the reasons for such claims, the concept of legitimacy shall be defined for the purposes of this paper. So, what are legitimate decisions or outcomes? When determining that every decision or outcome is legitimate, which is arrived at through deliberative processes meeting certain quality standards, one adopts a definition which makes empirical examination redundant. So, this conceptualization of legitimacy is not of analytical interest, even though it might be most related to deliberative theory. Another approach would be to determine criteria relevant for input, throughput and output legitimacy of a political system (Schmidt, 2013). As we aim to explain legitimacy across a large set of nations, we chose a subjective conceptualization, focussing on legitimacy as it is perceived by the people, which makes empirical examination by cross-national survey data possible. According to this conceptualization, a state is more legitimate the more its citizens perceive it to be rightfully holding and exercising power (cf. Gilley, 2006, p. 500). This definition has the drawback of not entirely capturing the scope of legitimacy as it is conceptualized in many deliberative theories, but therefore enables empirical examination across a large set of cases, which is one of the central aims of this paper.

As the model is suited to our approach, as well as data sources most available, we chose the political support framework to further specify (and later operationalize) subjective legitimacy, which we derive from Easton (Easton, 1965, 1975). The underlying logic is that, if the people believe the regime to be

²An illustrative example is the case of deliberative polling in Zeguo Township in Wenling City, a local public consultation that attempted to affect policy choices over the funding of infrastructure projects (cf. J. S. Fishkin et al., 2010, pp. 437–439). The town leadership made the decisions of the deliberations effectively binding by committing to fund the highest rated projects, and response and participation rates were rather high. Fishkin et al. conclude, that the deliberative poll was highly representative (despite a gender bias through wrong sampling at the household stage) and met the criteria of being “scientific, democratic and legal” very well (cf. J. S. Fishkin et al., 2010, p. 446). Moreover, and somewhat counter-intuitively, the authoritarian context proved to have some advantages: it was easier than in the usual democratic context to recruit the sample and the promise of the implementation of agreed upon results was easier to grant by the authorities (cf. J. S. Fishkin et al., 2010, p. 446).

legitimate, they should have positive attitudes towards it. Easton defines political support in the following way: “We can say that A supports B either when A acts on behalf of B or when he orients himself favorably toward B; it may be a goal, idea, or institution” [Easton (1965): 159]. Political support thereby relates to supportive attitudes of citizen towards the political system. Easton differentiates between three types of support objects, the *political community*, *political regime* and *political authorities* (cf. Easton, 1965, pp. 171–225): \ [-1em]

1. The political community comprises the members of a political system and the basic values represented by it. The basis of such a community is an individual’s sense of belonging and the feeling of mutual solidarity between the members of this community.
2. The political regime consists of the network of institutions that uphold a political system, i.e. the legislative, judicative or executive institutions.
3. Lastly, political authorities consist of the actual personalities that occupy the institutions (for example parliamentarians, heads of state).

Where does support for the mentioned political objects come from? According to Easton, two types of support sources, *diffuse* and *specific*, can be distinguished (cf. Easton, 1975, pp. 436–439). Specific support is sourced in the performance and outputs of a political system and its institutions. It is therefore targeted at and often dependent on the personal assessment of the current administration. On the other hand, according to Easton, diffuse support is a commitment to specific political values and norms, as well as to the concrete political structures responsible for the implementation of that political and social order. Diffuse support is therefore more robust and a more long-term source of support than specific support. For the purposes of this paper, a focus will be set on diffuse support, especially trust in the political regime, as it relates to the level on which the deliberative qualities are of analytical interest. Therefore, possible effects should be most visible, although one could argue that citizens’ perception of other objects of support could also be affected.

A next step is to answer the question, why decisions arrived at through deliberation, or more generally speaking political systems embodying deliberative criteria, should be more legitimate. As discussed before, the aim of deliberation is to arrive at rational consensus or at least some form of meta-consensus. This involves the transformation of preferences, which at first refers to the attitudes towards the alternative policies proposed through deliberation, ideally shifting preferences and outcomes in a direction of more public-spirited orientations (cf. J. Fishkin, 2009, p. 134). Moreover, the epistemic quality of decisions is assumed to increase when they are deliberated (cf. Bächtiger & Wyss, 2013, p. 164). According to Cohen, participants of deliberative processes “[...] suppose that they can act from the results, taking the fact that a certain decision is arrived at through their deliberation as a sufficient reason for complying with it” (Cohen, 2003, pp. 346–347). For these reasons, the outcomes of deliberative processes should be accepted and viewed as legitimate at least by the people who took part in the deliberation. For example, Habermas argues that democratic legitimacy does not arise from public deliberation alone, and emphasizes

the importance communication and participation of the ones potentially affected by the decision (cf. Habermas, 2007, p. 431). However, in regard to public-spiritedness and epistemic quality of decisions, the effects could be even broader, reaching beyond the participants of such processes. Such assumptions are not shared by classical deliberative theory, nevertheless we argue that even if deliberation is restricted to the elite level, such effects could be assumed. Deliberative qualities like reasoned argumentation, respect for counter arguments or common good orientation, even solely between political actors, could produce decisions more accepted, reasoned and viewed as legitimate as they would be in the absence of such qualities. As we chose a cross-national analysis framework, the central assumption derived for empirical examination is that the deliberative quality of a political system increases its legitimacy (perceived by the citizens), which should manifest itself in higher levels of regime support.

At this point it has to be discussed, that (linke deliberation) legitimacy is mostly referred to within democratic contexts. What about deliberation in autocracies? Generally speaking, autocratic rulers (and one could argue, also democratic ones) have three means at their hands to maintaining their power: repression, co-optation and legitimation (cf. Gerschewski, 2013, p. 18). Repression is not always possible or successful and it might only create superficial support amongst the citizenry. Co-optation is only applicable on a certain scale, as one can't co-opt the whole citizenry, even though deliberation could be seen as an attempt to co-opt the people by giving them a voice option (cf. He & Warren, 2011, p. 281). Legitimation, however, is rooted in the people's conviction that the system is in fact legitimate (cf. Gerschewski, 2013, p. 18). As discussed before, deliberation is said to be a way to generate legitimacy and therefore, deliberative practices could legitimate the political regime without adopting electoral democratic structures. An important notion in this context is, that deliberation doesn't need to be about sensitive topics, but can be used to deliberate about issues that aren't threatening the autocratic rule, for example new community infrastructures. When decisions are made through deliberative practices, the participants might have the impression that the rulers are asking for and listening to their opinion and in turn they might perceive the regime to be more legitimate. In some cases, citizen deliberation could inform the regime about policy preferences otherwise not knowable in highly autocratic contexts and therefore enable the regime to be more responsive to the citizenry. Truex (2017) finds such effects when conducting an online survey experiment of Chinese Netizens who were exposed to the National People's Congress' online participation portals. He summarizes his findings as follows: "[...] even such limited reforms may shift attitudes toward the regime in the positive direction. [...] exposure to images [...] increases satisfaction with the regime, feelings of government responsiveness, and expressed willingness to comply with regulations, but only for citizens with low political access and low expectations for government performance" (Truex, 2017, p. 352). The results offer some evidence for the proposed relationship, even if the examined online portals aren't exactly deliberative by definition but rather participatory or consultative and Truex only studied short-time effects. The general argument, that deliberative qualities should increase the support of a political regime, even beyond individual participants of the decision making process can be applied to non-democracies as well. Deliberation between elites and a following reasoned justification of decisions with common good orientation might generate more legitimacy and support than a regime without these criteria would enjoy.

It should be noted that the strengthening of autocratic rule is just one possible long-term outcome of the introduction of deliberative practices and quality criteria in a political system. Deliberation might as well lead to the democratization of a regime, as frequent deliberation could increase the democratic capacity of citizens over the long run (cf. He & Warren, 2011, pp. 183–184; Truex, 2017, p. 352). Side-effects of deliberation, like increased knowledge or efficacy, could influence the people’s perception of their political regime and at the same time increase their preference for democracy. Following this line of thought, deliberation could lead to a loss of legitimacy for non-democratic regimes, especially in light of Truex’ findings that positive effects of consultative online portals only applied for individuals with low political access. Therefore, the theoretical predictions for the effects of deliberation in non-democracies are contradicting, indicating either higher legitimacy through deliberative qualities, or lower support due to an increase in democratic capacities of the citizens.

3 Empirical Section

The following section will first introduce the data and its sources along with the data-merging approach. Next, the operationalization of regime support is discussed, which is followed by the operationalization of deliberation through the “Deliberative Component Index” from the “Varieties of Democracy”-Dataset and subsequently a description of the used control variables is given (Section 3.1). In the following subsection we take into account potential bias with the measurement of regime support and discuss possible adaptations (Section 3.2). Following this, the statistical methodology is explained (Section 3.3) and a short examination of descriptive statistics takes place (Section 3.4). Lastly, the results of estimated multilevel regression models are reported and examined for their implications regarding the research hypotheses (Section 3.5).

3.1 Data Merging and Operationalization

needs new numbers

In order to test the hypotheses from the previous section a number of datasets will be combined. The analysis includes micro-level data from six cross-national survey projects spanning a time range from 2010 to 2015. The final dataset combines the Afrobarometer Survey Round 5 and Round 6 (data from 2011–2015), the Asian Barometer Survey Wave 3 and Wave 4 (2010–2015), the AmericasBarometer (2014), the European Social Survey Round 6 (2012), the Latinobarómetro (2015) and the World Values Survey (2010–2014). The final dataset accumulates the responses of 306,047 citizen in 113 countries across all continents and covers individual data from 58% of all independent countries that represent 86% of the world population.³ Before the variables from different surveys are merged, they are standardized to a range of 0 to 1.

³The following countries had to be excluded because of some form of political instability that made the reference point of the regime unclear: Egypt 2013 (imminent military coup), Libya in 2014 (post-revolutionary, transitional state), Mali in both 2012 and 2014 (civil war), Palestine in 2012 and 2013 (government split between Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in Westbank), as well as Yemen in 2014 (civil war) (cf. Mauk, 2017, p. 14).

Dependent Variables: Regime Support and Democratic Performance Evaluation

In line with the theoretical definition of regime support discussed previously, the main dependent variable will be constructed from self-reported trust in the following regime institutions: trust/confidence in political leadership, police, courts and parliament (Questions and wordings can be found in Appendix Table A2). A range of studies focused on institutional trust and political support have operationalized regime support in a very similar way (Chen, 2017; Mauk, 2017; Yang & Tang, 2010). We chose this specific operationalization because of two reasons: first, because it covers the three types of traditional political branches, executive (political leadership), judicial and legal system (courts and police) and legislation (parliament) and second, common availability in all used survey projects. Given that the analysis in this paper doesn't seek to predict regime support of citizens in a specific year, but is more generally interested in the average regime support in a given country, surveys done in the same country in different years are collapsed into a single case, leaving us with a more general estimation of regime support.⁴ **With the help of a confirmatory factor analysis, regime support is modeled as a latent variable, which allows for measurement error being accounted for (results in Appendix Table ??).**

KÜRZEN?

Now that the dependent variable has been introduced, a discussion of the operationalization of the independent variables follows. The question how to measure deliberation is a major challenge to empirical research. On the process level, a notable instrument is the Deliberative Quality Index (??? 53-60), which has shown to be a reliable, considerably valid and widely used measure of deliberative quality (cf. Bächtiger & Wyss, 2013, p. 165). The index is only applicable to assess and compare the quality of deliberation in actual speech acts/debates and not across whole political systems. The only available measurement of deliberation on the structural level known to the authors, that serves the purpose of quantitative cross-national comparison is the Deliberative Democracy Index or rather the Deliberative Component Index (DCI) of the "Varieties of Democracy(V-Dem)"-Project (M. Coppedge et al., 2017a). The focus of the DCI is on "the degree of deliberativeness that can be discerned across all powerful institutions in a polity (not just those explicitly designed to serve a deliberative function) and among the citizenry" (M. Coppedge et al., 2011, p. 254). The DCI is constructed with a Bayesian factor analysis "attempting to measure the extent to which political elites offer public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels [...]" (M. Coppedge et al., 2017b; M. Coppedge, Lindberg, Skaaning, & Teorell, 2016, p. 583). There are five indicators for deliberation of which the DCI is composed of, summarized in Table 1. Especially the first three indicators – Reasoned Justification, Common Good and Respect for Counter-Arguments – resemble some of the criteria of ideal deliberation and are also found in the DQI, though not all of the quality standards are captured. Beyond that, there is an assessment of respect towards counter-arguments. To assess the scope of deliberation, the DCI contains two indicators: Range of Consultation and Engaged Society. However,

⁴This is judged to appropriate, because the time distances between surveys do not exceed five years. Surveys done in the same country and in the same year from different research projects are also collapsed into the same case.

Table 1: DCI and Subcomponents

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Question</i>
Reasoned Justification	<i>When important policy changes are being considered, i.e. before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?</i>
Common Good	<i>When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?</i>
Respect counterarguments	<i>When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?</i>
Range of consultation	<i>When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at elite levels?</i>
Engaged society	<i>When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?</i>

See Coppedge et al. 2017: 202–7.

it should be noted that the DCI concentrates mainly on deliberation on elite levels, as only the engaged society indicator asks for public instead of elite deliberation. Since this paper is the first known to the authors that examines the effects of deliberation on regime support on a macro-scale, the analyses are conducted for the DCI as well as its components respectively, to gain as much information as possible. The analysis in this paper should therefore be seen as exploratory in nature that is meant to inspire future research.

For the empirical analyses, the mean values over 10 years (2000-2010) are estimated for the DCI and its components, as it is assumed that regime support arises not (only) on a daily basis but over a period of time and the lagging of the variable is meant to simulate the temporal order of causality. The same treatment applies to other independent macro-variables varying over time. In the analysis, only the DCI and not the whole Deliberative Democracy Index is used, as we have argued to theoretically distinguish between democracy and deliberation. Nevertheless, our sample shows that the deliberation indicators are highly correlated with democracy (see Table 2; a scatterplot of deliberation and democracy in Appendix ??), measured by an index that averages Freedom House and Polity2 values, which we name Polity/FH.⁵

Table 2: DCI and Subcomponents: Correlation with Polity/FH

	DCI	RJ	CG	CA	RoC	ES	Polity/FH
Complete Data (n=119)	<i>0.80</i>	<i>0.67</i>	<i>0.35</i>	<i>0.79</i>	<i>0.70</i>	<i>0.78</i>	<i>1.00</i>
Democracies (n=64)	<i>0.61</i>	<i>0.68</i>	<i>0.39</i>	<i>0.54</i>	<i>0.59</i>	<i>0.46</i>	<i>1.00</i>
Non-Democracies (n=55)	<i>0.64</i>	<i>0.28</i>	<i>0.08</i>	<i>0.65</i>	<i>0.47</i>	<i>0.72</i>	<i>1.00</i>

Table shows Pearson's r. Bold numbers indicate correlations below $r = 0.5$.
Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

NEW CORRS!


This is not due to the choice of the democracy measurement, as the correlation persists with similar

⁵The index is taken from the V-Dem Dataset and originally stems from Freedom House Freedom House (2017). The index constructors imputed missing polity values by regressing Polity2 on the average Freedom House measure. The Variable is scaled from 0 - 10. As with deliberation, the mean values from 2000-2010 are estimated for the analysis. To apply the Polity2-classification of democracies, anocracies and autocracies, the variable was rescaled to range from -10 to +10. Polity set their cut-off values at 6 and -6 (-10 - -6 = Autocracy; -5 - 5 = Anocracy; 6-10 = Democracy). However, in the process of rescaling the variable and calculating the ten year average, values have been produced that lie between the cut-off values. Numbers were rounded to integers and the usual cut-off values of Polity2 were used to classify the countries.

popular democracy measures. Table XX depicts the correlations of the DCI and its components with the previously introduced Polity/FH variable. With an r value of 0.80, the DCI itself correlates the strongest with Polity/FH, the components Reasoned Justification, Counter-Arguments, Range of Consultation and Engaged Society show almost as strong correlations, with r varying from 0.67 to 0.79. Only the Common Good component seems less related to democracy ($r = 0.35$). A high correlation of democracy and deliberation measures isn't surprising, as they share underlying principles. Indeed, it would be unintuitive to assume that the range of consultation or level of public justification isn't averagely higher in democracies than in non-democracies. Nonetheless, a correlation as high as 0.80 brings up challenges for the analysis. For instance, one could call into question the validity of the DCI. More specifically, the index might capture merely a general perception of the minimal deliberative quality that naturally comes along with any democracy, instead of actual differences in the quality of deliberation. Another challenge is that the strong empirical correlation contradicts the theoretical assumption that deliberation and democracy should be considered distinct phenomena. If this assumption is to be maintained, the effect deliberation has on regime support must be controlled for the level of democracy, which would lead to issues of collinearity / multicollinearity in a multivariate model. Within the subsample of democracies (Polity/FH > 6), the correlation between the DCI and Polity/FH drops to 0.61, similar patterns can be observed for the component indicators that previously showed high correlations in the whole sample. For the subsample of non-democracies (Polity/FH < 6), the correlations are also smaller. Almost all deliberation indicators shows smaller correlations within the respective subsamples than in the complete sample. For both subsamples, though especially in the democracy sample, we can therefore assume problems of collinearity to be less severe. Nevertheless, such problems are especially expected for the deliberation indicators strongly correlated with Polity/FH. Within democracies, besides the DCI, three of the components show correlations with r above 0.5: Reasoned Justification (0.68), Range of Consultation (0.59) and Counter-Arguments (0.54). Within non-democracies three indicators fulfill this criterion: the DCI (0.64), Counter-Arguments (0.65), and Engaged Society (0.72). Accordingly, for the indicators Common Good and Engaged Society in democracies, and Reasoned Justification, Common Good and Range of Consultation in non-democracies, we expect less severe levels of collinearity.

Even though deliberation and democracy are empirically strongly connected, a closer look at the deviations seems worthwhile. Figure 1 depicts a scatterplot of the Polity/FH and DCI variables. The blue colour resembles the democracy sample, non-democracies are coloured red. Interestingly, the previous example of deliberation in non-democracies, China, appears as one of the countries which score relatively high on the DCI, especially in comparison with the level democracy. This also applies to Vietnam and less clearly to Singapore, both countries identified by research as non-democracies with consultative institutions (cf. Jayasuriya & Rodan, 2007, p. 779). As China specifically was already theorized to be a case of a non-democracy with deliberative institutions, the empirical results indicate that there is some accuracy in the V-Dem measurement of deliberation – despite the strong relation to democracy. There are not many deviating cases, much less cases that deviate strongly, but if there are differences, the results imply that they could be meaningful. Therefore, we decide to use the DCI and its subcomponents in the analysis, with the assumption that the diverging patterns are indeed representative of two empirically distinct

Figure 1: Scatterplot between Polity/FH and the DCI



Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

phenomena.


3.2 Possible Bias and Correction

Given that the main variable of interest *regime support* consists of self-reported attitudes in different societies and political systems across the world, a critical examination of the data is appropriate. A very widespread problem within survey research is the so-called *social desirability bias*, which especially applies to sensible survey items that concern very personal topics associated with a social stigma, like overt racism or sexual activity (cf. Krumpal, 2013). Some respondents might choose to give responses they know to be untruthful because they either want to comply with some strong social norms or they fear repercussions by their social environment and the government. Especially the fear of government repression seems to be relevant in autocratic regimes, where expressing the wrong opinions might lead to physical harm. That is why in such repressive environments, respondents in surveys tend to practice *preference falsification*, where they will express uncontroversial regime-friendly opinions in public and conceal their real convictions (cf. Kuran, 1997). Tannenbergs analyzed such sensible survey items relating to trust in political institutions in the context of 36 African countries and was able to show that there is considerable bias when respondents believe that the survey is administered by a government agency, which is especially prevalent in more autocratic regimes [cf. tannenbergs2017autocratic 21].

There is therefore strong grounds on which one might assume that the data is affected by social

desirability bias, since we analyze sensible survey items relating to regime support in environments of varying repressiveness. In order to reveal such bias, we investigate the relationship between our democracy measurement (Polity/FH) and regime support, as well as a comparison of means between democracies, anocracies and autocracies, shown in Figure 2. Judging from the bivariate relationship, one can notice that there seems to be a quadratic effect of democracy on regime support. Very autocratic regimes score high on regime support and it decreases for countries that are semi-democratic until it rises again in democratic regimes. **A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test between autocratic regimes in regards to anocratic and democratic regimes reveals that the average regime support is significantly higher in an autocratic context $H(2) = 7.63$, $p = 0.037$ and $H(2) = 7.95$, $p = 0.025$, respectively, though it doesn't significantly differ between anocracies and democracies, $H(2) = 0.03$, $p = 0.420$.**

Figure 2: Regime Support by Polity/FH




Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

In order to investigate whether high regime support in autocracies is due to some form of bias, a measurement of Freedom of Discussion is introduced (cf. Coppedge Michael et al., 2017, pp. 228–229). Freedom of Discussion measures “the extent to which citizens are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces [...] without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities”, which has the great advantage of not just focusing on repression of freedom of speech on behalf of the government, but also takes into account the degree to which other citizen impose speech prohibitions on each other. The relationship between Freedom of Discussion and regime support is examined in Figure 3, which shows a positive association between the

two variables, suggesting that regime support is higher when discussion about political issues is more regulated. This might imply that revealing low support of the regime is socially undesirable and politically inconvenient in such societies and therefore citizen tend to falsify their preferences and express higher levels of regime support to avoid negative repercussions.

Figure 3: Regime Support by Freedom of Discussion



Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

This possible bias in the data poses a serious problem for the analysis. What is to be done to remedy the revealed problematic? Two such approaches might be suitable: 1.) exclude the countries that are most likely to be biased or 2.) design a weight that accounts for the possible bias. The first approach has serious problems and may severely limit the validity of the results because it is associated with a loss of information, and also systematically leaves out a certain group of countries. A designed weight seems the more appropriate adaptation, as Tannenberg recommends: “one avenue forward would be to construct reliability weights to enable the researcher to account for the biases in the analysis” (Tannenberg, 2017, p. 21). Unfortunately, variables indicating whether respondents believed the surveyors to be government representatives or similar variables are not available for all surveys used in this analysis, therefore a weight on the country-level might be an alternative. We therefore use the Freedom of Discussion measurement to weigh regime support, which is already proven to be positively associated with the dependent variable. Given that the proposed weight is highly experimental in nature, two bias boundaries will be introduced: a lower and a higher bound, whereby regime support in societies with somewhat and weakly respected Freedom of Discussion will be penalized with 10% and 15% (low bias) or 20% and 25% (high bias), respectively. Table 3 shows a summary for all weighted country cases, which only applies to anocratic

and autocratic regimes.

Table 3: Weighting of Regime Support

Country	Regime Support <i>Original</i>	Regime Support <i>Low Bias (10 - 15%)</i>	Regime Support <i>High Bias (20 - 25%)</i>	Freedom of Discussion <i>(FoD)</i>
Qatar	85.68	72.83	64.26	<i>Weakly Respected</i>
Uzbekistan	82.97	70.53	62.23	<i>Weakly Respected</i>
Singapore	68.06	57.85	51.04	<i>Weakly Respected</i>
Kuwait	66.50	56.52	49.87	<i>Weakly Respected</i>
Swaziland	59.07	50.21	44.30	<i>Weakly Respected</i>
Rwanda	57.38	48.77	43.03	<i>Weakly Respected</i>
Zimbabwe	55.08	46.82	41.31	<i>Weakly Respected</i>
Vietnam	79.98	71.98	63.99	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
China	71.28	64.15	57.02	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Burundi	68.80	61.92	55.04	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Thailand	58.17	52.36	46.54	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Azerbaijan	56.78	51.10	45.43	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Kazakhstan	52.24	47.02	41.79	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Iraq	49.90	44.91	39.92	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Guatemala	38.52	34.66	30.81	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Madagascar	36.67	33.00	29.34	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Venezuela	34.76	31.29	27.81	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
<i>Correlation - FoD</i>	<i>0.14</i>	<i>0.06</i>	<i>0.00</i>	-

Pearson's r reported. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.


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One caveat comes with this approach: as it stands, Freedom of Discussion is positively associated with democracy ($r = 0.80$ for the whole sample, and $r = 0.58$ within non-democracies) and also associated with increased deliberative levels ($r = 0.67$ with DCI for the complete sample, and $r = 0.44$ for the non-democracy subsample). Thereby, weighting regime support with Freedom of Discussion inherently makes the dependent variable more similar to the independent variables. However, the usage of the weight can be well justified on theoretical grounds and it is thereby assumed that this adaptation improves the validity of measured regime support. Nevertheless, this step has to be critically evaluated, as we might over- or underestimate the bias severely. Therefore, models with unweighted regime support are always reported as well.

3.3 Descriptives

This section will examine some of the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations, focusing on the relationship between deliberation and regime support, but also including levels of democracy to account for the necessity to separate democracy and deliberation. As a first overview, Figure 4 depicts a map with levels of regime support across the world. Grey coloring indicates that data for the country wasn't available. First, it comes to attention that there is no clear regional pattern of regime support in our sample, although some general trends can be observed. Firstly, Northern Europe stands out with higher levels of support, with much of Western and especially Southern and Eastern Europe having lower support. Then, available cases in Southern and Eastern Africa are located mostly in higher quintiles, whereas Western Africa shows a rather mixed pattern. For the MENA countries, it becomes visible that they are highly underrepresented. Turning the attention to Asia, the relatively high average regime support, especially in parts of Eastern and Southeastern Asia stand out. Across Central and South America, there

Figure 4: Regime Support & Deliberation Across the World




Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Own calculations.

is no country with above medium levels, indicating rather low aggregate levels of regime support within the broader region. Figure 4 shows a world map indicating the level on the DCI (normed to reach from 0-1) across the countries of our sample. Notably, the distribution of the DCI is rather skewed, which leaves us with few cases having low scores. The regional patterns for the DCI differ from the ones of regime support. First, Northern as well as Western and Southern Europe are all placed within the higher quintiles. Concerning the Americas, a mix of medium to high levels of deliberation can be found. The pattern for African countries is also mixed, with more countries scoring lower on the DCI. In Asia, the pattern is rather ambiguous as well, though especially Southeastern Asia stands out with comparably higher scores on the DCI.

Figure 5 shows scatterplots that visualize the distribution of average regime support (all three variants) per country over levels of deliberation (the DCI and its components, respectively). The dashed line shows the overall correlation. The coloring of the cases is red for non-democracies and blue for democracies. When only observing overall correlations, it comes to attention that all the independent variables reveal a weak positive correlation with regime support, with r varying from 0.12 to 0.26. In two cases the correlation becomes significant, with p -values below 0.01: Reasoned Justification ($r = 0.26$) and Range of Consultation ($r = 0.26$). Interestingly, when grouped into regime type categories, there is a consistent pattern that shows mostly stronger or sometimes equal positive correlations within the groups compared to the overall relationship (with two exceptions for anocracies: Engaged Society and Common Good have weaker within-group correlations). In contrast to the relatively small bivariate correlation within the full dataset, the deliberation indicators seem to be consistently positively related to regime support within groups of similar levels of democracy.

So far, only results for high bias regime support were reported, therefore a short discussion of low and no bias regime support is warranted. At first, it has to be recalled that democracies are not affected by the weighting at all. The correlations and p -values within the subgroups anocracies and autocracies do not vary strongly, when weighing the dependent variable. On the other hand, the overall correlations show great increases both in p -values and effect sizes. The most remarkable increase can be observed for the Reasoned Justification indicator ($r = 0.089$, $p = 0.35$ for the unweighted regime support compared to $r = 0.26$, $p = 0.0054$).

Figure 5: Bivariate Relationships between Deliberation Indicators and Regime Support (High Bias)



Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Persons's r is reported. Own calculations.

In sum, the findings of the bivariate correlations indicate that deliberation and regime support are related first and foremost in democracies. This could imply that deliberation is - in fact - a predominantly democratic concept that only works within the freedoms that come along with democratic regimes. As the results discussed here are not controlled for other variables, this should be seen as a first indication rather than an explicit finding.

3.4 Multilevel Regression Analysis

A range of multilevel models are then estimated in order to test the assumptions derived in the theoretical part.⁶ First, in order to assess whether multilevel modeling is warranted, a null model for each dependent variable is estimated (weighted and unweighted) with a random-intercept and no predictors (cf. Hox, 2010, p. 300). The intraclass correlations (ICCs) for the null models show that indeed 44.45% (unweighted), 41.18% (low boundary weight) and 40.64% (high boundary weight) of the variance of regime support is bound on the country-level. The results strongly indicate that a multilevel analysis is appropriate. Given the expected high levels of multicollinearity, the influence of DCI and its subcomponents on regime support is tested separately for the Polity/FH variable, in order to control for possible distortions caused by the strong overlap between the two variables. In the interest of accounting for the slight quadratic effect in the relationship between democracy and regime support in the complete sample, the Polity/FH variable will be split into three dummies, Autocracy, Anocracy and Democracy, as recommended by Tabachnick, Fidell, & Osterlind (2013, pp. 43–44). Moreover, in order to avoid issues of multicollinearity, the sample is further divided into democracies ($\text{Polity/FH} \geq 6$) and non-democracies ($\text{Polity/FH} < 6$). In these subsamples, the continuous Polity/FH variable can be used again, because the quadratic relationship only appears in the full sample. These divisions of the sample, in addition to estimating all models for three separate dependent regime support variables (no bias, low bias, high bias), six separate independent deliberation variables, as well as with and without Polity/FH, leaves us with 84 multilevel models to be estimated. In addition, we estimate seven models with Polity/FH only and none of the deliberation indicators, for the purpose of comparison, which adds up to a total of 91 estimated models. Given the exploratory nature of the analysis and the many problems with expected multicollinearity and quadratic effects, the estimation of so many models seems justified as this allows us to test for robustness of the findings. To facilitate an intuitive communication of the results, we will only visualize the relevant effects in the main text and report the detailed results in tables in the online appendix.⁷


⁶Given that the dataset in this paper combines individual level data with country level data, a multilevel analysis is needed to account for hierarchical data structure, which will model a unique intercept for each country (cf. Gelman & Hill, 2006, p. 237). This becomes necessary, because standard linear regression only produces accurate estimations of standard errors if the data points are independent of each other, which is not the case in our dataset. Furthermore, since the main independent variable is located on the country-level, it allows us to control its influence for individual-level control variables. We follow a recommendation by Enders and Torighi to use grand-mean centered predictors, because a multilevel analysis with the focus on the influence of a level 2 predictor can then be controlled by the individual level variables (as is our intent) (cf. Enders & Tofighi, 2007, p. 128 - 129).

⁷Since multicollinearity was expected for many of the estimated models, it should be noted right at the beginning that none of the 91 estimated regression models in the analysis showed problematic VIF-values for any of the included variables ($\text{VIF} < 5$ in all estimated models). Furthermore, regression diagnostics for one of the full models involving the DCI and all control variables has been conducted and no major violation of statistical assumption are revealed (see Figures ?? and ?? in the Appendix).

Figure 6 summarizes the standardized regression coefficients, the bold lines indicating a 95% confidence interval, the thin lines a 90% interval for the effects of DCI and its components (estimated separately, not included in one model) on three different dependent variables: regime support with no weighting (colored in blue), weightings applied with low (red) and high boundaries (yellow), respectively (the full report of all 36 estimated models can be found in the online appendix Table ?? and ??). The Graph on the left side of the Figure depicts the effects are controlled for variables on the individual level (Age, Sex, Education, Financial Security, Employment) along with country level variables (logged GDP, Ethnic Fractionalization, logged Population). It has to be noted that the models reported here do not separate the effects of democracy and deliberation, which suggests that the effects might be strongly interwoven, given the high correlation between both measures. When investigating the results for, the findings are mixed. For the unweighted dependent variable, all components have negative effects on regime support, with the DCI and Counter-Arguments having the largest effect sizes (Beta = -0.12). A continuous pattern catches one's attention: the weighting of the dependent variable causes the coefficients for all deliberation indicators to shift towards positive effects. For the high boundary weighting, none of the coefficients is negative anymore, although the effect sizes are marginal.⁸

⁸The shift towards more positive effects is (maybe just partly) an inherent consequence of the weighting, as discussed before ($r = 0.67$ for Freedom of Discussion and the DCI). Of course, the unweighted results have the problem of assumably being (more) biased, and therefore estimates should be interpreted with caution.

Figure 6: Complete Sample: Models A1.1 to F1.6



*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Standardized regression coefficients and 90% confidence intervals are reported. Reference category for Polity/FH dummies is Anocracy. For the full models see Appendix Table ?? and ??. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations

The second column of Figure 6 depicts the results for models that include individual- and country-level variables including dummies for Polity/FH (Autocracies and Democracies with Anocracies as reference category). As discussed before, we refrain from using a continuous variable because the specification of a quadratic term for Polity/FH, to capture the nonlinear effect more adequately, would increase already existing problems of multicollinearity. For the interpretation of the reported results, it has therefore to be noted that the effect of democracy is controlled for in a restricted manner. Including the Polity/FH dummies has a striking impact on the coefficients of all six deliberation indicators. Contrary to the results without control for the dummies, the weighting of the independent variable doesn't have as much of an impact on the coefficients for the respective deliberation indicators, but rather on the coefficients for the dummy variables themselves. This is not surprising as the variable used to calculate the weightings correlates stronger with Polity/FH as with the deliberation indicators. In general, the coefficients of the Polity/FH dummies show that regime support is higher in autocracies than in anocracies and in turn lower in democracies than in anocracies. It has to be noted though, that even the for high boundary weighting, there are positive and negative effects of the Autocracy and Democracy dummies, respectively. This could mean, that our weighting is not accurate or strong enough. On the other hand, the possibility that autocracies and to a lesser degree anocracies actually do enjoy more or at least equal support from their citizens than democracies has to be considered. For example, citizens in democracies could be more "assertive" than "allegiant" (cf. Welzel & Dalton, 2015). In light of the current "disconnect" many democracies are said to experience (cf. Foa & Mounk, 2016), the assumption that regime support is not higher in democracies does not seem completely far-fetched. It has to be noted, though, that the effects of both dummies are notably weaker when only the dummies and control variables, but none of the deliberation indicators are included (Models P.1.1 to P1.3, see Appendix Table A4/ Figure ??).


Lastly, we compare the estimated models reported on the left and right side of Figure 6, with the help of the deviance (-2 times the log-likelihood). The models are compared with the respective Polity/FH only models as well. The purpose of this comparison is to evaluate whether the deliberation indicators contribute to a better model fit, especially in comparison with models including only the Polity/FH dummies. Table ?? ?? to ?? in the Appendix show the differences in deviance for the three dependent variables, respectively. The models A2.4 to F2.6 (with Polity/FH dummies and the deliberation indicators included) fit consistently better than the models A1.1 to F1.3 (including only the deliberation indicators). In comparison to the models including only the dummy variables (P1.1 to P1.3), only the models also including Reasoned Justification (B1.4-1.6) and Range of Consultation (E1.4-1.6) fit consistently better than their respective counterparts. For the DCI and Engaged society, a better fit can only be observed for the High and Low Bias dependent variables.

In conclusion, for the assumption that deliberation has a positive effect on regime support, the findings are mixed. In models not controlling for Polity/FH dummies and using unweighted regime support, there is no evidence for the proposed relationship, as all indicators have negative effects. Then again, when assuming that the data is biased and that the applied weightings actually remedy the bias, and when including dummies for democracy and democracy, one could conclude that deliberation actually has

positive effects. As the assumption of the accuracy of the applied weighting isn't tested, and the effects when including the Polity/FH dummies is suspicious due to expected multicollinearity (though it should not be as severe when including only three categories), there is no general conclusion to if, and in which way, deliberation is related to regime support.

Figures 7 and 8 depict the same models shown in Figure 6, with the samples restricted to democracies ($\text{Polity}/\text{FH} \geq 6$) and non-democracies, respectively (the full report of the 48 estimated models can be found in appendix ?? to A5). Instead of dummy variables, as before, the continuous Polity/FH variable is included in the models reported in the right column, since the relationship between Polity/FH and regime support is no longer as nonlinear within these subgroups. Moreover multicollinearity due to the correlation of Polity/FH is not as severe as for the complete sample (with the DCI it's 0.61 and 0.64 for democracies and non-democracies, respectively, see Table 2 in Section 3.1). Nevertheless, we do expect problems of multicollinearity, especially for the component indicators strongly correlated with Polity/FH. For the democracy sample, no systematic bias of regime support is assumed, as Freedom of Discussion is respected in all cases and our weighting doesn't apply. As already suggested by the bivariate correlations in Section 3.4, the multilevel models also show a positive effect on regime support for all deliberation indicators (see Figure 7, left column). The strongest, though in absolute terms still rather weak, effects are the ones of Reasoned Justification ($b = 0.25$), Range of Consultation ($b = 0.21$) and Engaged Society ($b = 0.20$). Almost no effect can be observed for the Common Good indicator ($b = 0.02$). When including Polity/FH (see Figure 7, right column), the coefficients for the respective deliberation indicators change in a direction towards slightly stronger positive effects. A rather puzzling finding are the negative effects of Polity/FH, as the bivariate correlation indicated a somewhat positive relationship within democracies. Models that do not include any deliberation indicator, but include only Polity/FH show an effect that is weakly negative as well ($b = -0.10$; Model P2.1, see Appendix Figure ??).

Figure 7: Democracy Sample: Models A2.1 to F2.2




*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Standardized regression coefficients and 90% confidence intervals are reported. Reference category for Polity/FH dummies is Anocracy. For the full models see Appendix Table ?? and ??. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations

As discussed before, multicollinearity should not be as much of an issue for the components Common Good and Engaged Society compared to the remaining indicators. For the more unproblematic models, Polity/FH has a rather small negative effect ($b = -0.11$ in Model D2.2; $b = -0.10$ in model C2.2) on regime support. For the assumably more problematic indicators, the negative coefficients are slightly higher. In reverse, the positive effect sizes are greater for the presumably problematic deliberation indicators, while the Common Good indicator has almost no effect at all ($b = 0.04$). Nevertheless, the Engaged Society indicator has an effect size more similar to the other indicators ($b = 0.14$). This pattern could indicate that there actually are problems of multicollinearity that affect the results, even though the VIF Values are within non-problematic boundaries. Then again, the differences between the presumably unproblematic Engaged Society model and the more problematic ones is not as severe as they could be, which indicates a certain robustness of the results. Taking a look at the deviance comparison in the appendix Figure ??, it becomes visible that the models including Polity/FH as well as the respective deliberation indicators fit consistently better than their counterparts including only the deliberation indicators. With the exception of the Common Good model, this applies as well for the comparison with the models including only Polity/FH. Overall, this could indicate that including Polity/FH dummies into the model causes the respective deliberation indicator to fully unfold its effect on regime support, thereby increasing model fit, a so-called suppressor effect. However, given the high overlap between Polity/FH dummies and most of the deliberation indicators, it might as well be that a statistical artefact has been produced. The implication derived from theory is that, especially within democracies, deliberative qualities should increase regime support. The findings are not as robust as one wishes, but some empirical evidence for the presumed relationship can be noted.

After the results for democracies are examined, in the left column of Figure 8, the effects of the deliberation indicators on regime support within the non-democracy subsample are reported. Rather similar to the results for the complete sample, the indicators mostly have weak negative effects on the unweighted dependent variable. The results follow no clear pattern for the weighted dependent variables, besides the previously observed shift towards more positive or less negative effects. Recalling the previous discussion, deliberation indicators with Polity/FH correlations below $r = 0.5$ are: Range of Consultation, Reasoned Justification and Common Good. It appears that the effect sizes follow almost the same order as the size of the correlations, for weighted and unweighted dependent variables alike. Engaged Society, correlating the strongest with Polity/FH, has the strongest negative effect on regime support, whereas Common Good, with the weakest correlation, has no observable effect at all. Only Counter-Arguments differs by having a stronger negative effect than the DCI. As noted before, the results on the left side of the Figures are not controlled for Polity/FH. The bivariate as well as the multilevel regression results reveal a negative relationship between regime support and Polity/FH in non-democracies, which could be an explanation for the observed pattern. Including the Polity/FH variable in the models has a similar impact as it had for the democracy subsample and as the dummies had in the complete sample (see Figure 8, right column): the effects of the respective deliberation indicators have positive, but small coefficients in almost all cases (with the exception of Engaged Society). Weighting regime support has the same impact already observed before with the dummy variables, by shifting the effects of Polity/FH towards less

negative coefficients. Overall, no systematic differences can be detected in the results of the presumably problematic and unproblematic indicators. The same can be said for the effects of the Polity/FH measure, which has consistently negative coefficients of notable size.

Figure 8: Complete Sample: Models A1.1 to F1.6



*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Standardized regression coefficients and 90% confidence intervals are reported. Reference category for Polity/FH dummies is Anocracy. For the full models see Appendix Table ?? and ??. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations

In general, as the theoretical expectation, the empirical evidence for the effects of deliberation in non-democracies is mixed. Only when including the Polity/FH variable, the results indicate a weak positive effect of deliberation, without controlling for the level of democracy, the effects have negative coefficients. Taking a look at the fit measurement in Figures ?? to ?? in the Appendix, one can see that the models that include Polity/FH as well as the deliberation components do in general not have a notably higher deviance than the model including only Polity/FH, indicating that the deliberation indicators do not contribute to a better model fit for any of the models (applying all three dependent variables). In regard to the models including only the deliberation indicators, the models including both have a better fit, though this only applies for the dependent unweighted regime support and in no case for the Engaged Society models. In general it has again to be noted that the non-democracy subsample is affected by a possible bias in the self-reported regime support and that, as discussed before, the weighting measure has not been tested for its accuracy.

In sum, we did find evidence for an effect of deliberation on regime support, especially and least restricted by limitations within the democracy subsample. To begin with, general trends can be observed for the weighting of the dependent variable. In most cases, though not for the non-democracy subsample, the coefficients of the deliberation indicators become more positive/less negative when the weighting is applied. The effects democracy variables become are less negative for the weighted dependent variables. A second trend can be observed when comparing the respective models with and without one of the Polity/FH measures. In all models, when including Polity/FH, negative effects of the deliberation indicators become positive and positive effects increase. This applies to models both presumably problematic and unproblematic in regard to multicollinearity. The results could indicate that deliberation has a positive effect on regime support, but at the same time positively correlates with Polity/FH, which itself has a negative effect on regime support. This could be interpreted as a suppressor effect. However, this interpretation has to be done very cautiously, due to the restrictions of our study.

4 Conclusions

Recalling the research question, *What role does Deliberation play for regime support across the world?*, a simple answer can not be given in light of the ambiguous empirical evidence. To test implications derived from deliberative theory, multilevel regression analyses were performed. Empirical evidence is found for Annahme generell, Annahme demokratischen, Annahme nondemokratischen The general conclusion and central finding of this study is, that deliberation seems to have a positive effect on regime support, foremostly within democracies, for which the empirical evidence was the most unambiguous and robust. The results for the complete sample and non-democracy subsample bear the problem to be potentially affected by biased regime support data, or to be weighted with a rather unexplored procedure, which might undermine the reliability of the results. Moreover, the findings are more ambiguous than within the democracy subsample, and rather mixed concerning the direction of effects, though tendencies towards a positive effect of deliberation predominate slightly.

Since there are quite some restrictions and limitations of our study, they shall be briefly discussed in regard to implications for further research. First, the self-reported regime support data are presumed to be biased, since regime support in non-democracies is investigated as well. The applied weighting to account for the bias has arbitrary cut-off values and is not tested for accuracy or validity. We therefore join Tannenberg (2017) and encourage further research to take possible bias into account and find possible remedies, as for example specific survey items and refined statistical methods. Another limitation of the empirical analysis is the lack of meaningful control variables on the macro level, as the ones that were included (GDP logged, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Population, logged) in the analysis didn't gain statistical significance or improve the model fit (Polity/FH and the Dataset-Dummies did, though). Research building upon this analysis should make an effort to find country-level control variables stronger related to regime support. Moreover, one could consider to employ regional dummies or exclude specific sets of cases, like OECD or Western countries. The analysis is moreover limited in that it primarily focuses on between-country effects and does not appropriately account for effects within countries or capture changes within a country over time. Instead of a cross-sectional analysis, one would have to conduct a cross-sectional time-series analysis. As data on regime support is only very shortly available for a decently high amount of countries and the data isn't always collected on a regular basis (though the WVS is a great achievement in this regard), such an analysis is hard to conduct. Especially concerning the Hypothesis 1.2a and H1.2b, an analysis of long-time effects of increases or declines in deliberation within countries would be highly informative. Last but not least, our study might be limited in our measurement of deliberation through V-Dems DCI and its subcomponents. The validity of the measurement could be called into question, as it highly correlates with the index for democracy, Polity/FH. High correlations were expected and explainable to some degree, but a correlation of (0.80) (DCI with Polity/FH, complete sample) has to be evaluated critically. We suggest that scholars should, therefore, make an effort to improve the measurement of deliberation on the country-level to make it more precise and sensible, for example through including more components than just five, which every other V-Dem component index does. Then again, we found some good news for the DCI and its components. Some of the deviations in the measures of deliberation and democracy appeared to be meaningful, with the three examples of China, Vietnam and Singapore appearing in our sample as well as in the literature as rather consultative or deliberative authoritarian polities. Moreover, expected multicollinearity wasn't as present as assumed (or at least not directly detectable). In this context, it seems moreover relevant for the findings, that the correlations of the DCI and its components with the Polity/FH measure vary between the overall correlations and the ones found in the subgroups of democracies and non-democracies, sometimes strongly. To recall two examples: Engaged Society has correlations of (0.78), (0.46) and (0.72), Reasoned Justification of (0.67), (0.68) and (0.28) in the complete, democracy and non-democracy sample, respectively. As the examination of such variations is beyond the scope of this study, we recommend further research to investigate the detected differences more thoroughly. It could be especially interesting to explore whether these findings are due to the time-period of this study, due to the facts that the 10 year means for the variables were estimated or maybe due to the chosen democracy measurement and the classification of democracies and non-democracies. It should therefore be investigated, whether the

deviations between democracy and deliberation found in this study can be reproduced in a more general context. Another suggestion would be to estimate macro-micro interactions, as the results of Truex (2017) indicate that positive effects of participatory processes in autocratic contexts might be restricted to the less educated and to the ones expecting less of the regime. Moreover, the effects of deliberation on regime support could be intervened by variables like democratic performance evaluations, which Mauk (2017) has found to be relevant for regime support. In light of the discussed implications, we conclude that further research on relation of deliberation and regime support as well as the measurement of deliberation on the country level seems to be necessary as well as promising.

5 References

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6 Appendix

Table A1: Data Sources

Individual-Level Data
Afrobarometer Round 5/6 (2011-2015)
AmericasBarometer (2010/2012/2014)
Asian Barometer Wave 3/4 (2010-2012/2014-2015)
European Social Survey Round 6 (2012)
Latinobarómetro (2013/2015)
World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014)
Country-Level Data
Quality of Government - Data (Teorell et al.2017)
Varieties of Democracy - Data (Coppedge et al.2017a)

Table A2: Operationalization Regime Support

Survey and Questions	Support Object	Answers	Item Code
<i>Afrobarometer Round 5/6</i>			
How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say:	... the President/Prime Minister	not at all (0)	Q59A/Q52A
	... Parliament	just a little (1)	Q59B/Q52B
	... the Police	somewhat (2)	Q59H/Q52H
	... courts of law	a lot (3)	Q59J/Q52J
<i>AmericasBarometer</i>			
To what extent do you trust...	... the President/Prime Minister?	not at all (1)	B21A
	... the National Congress?	-	B13
	... the National Police?	a lot (7)	B18
	... the justice system?		B10A
<i>Asian Barometer Wave 3/4</i>			
I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them?	... the National Government	a great deal (1)	q9
	... Parliament	quite a lot (2)	q11
	... the Police	not very much (3)	q14
	... the courts	none at all (4)	q8
<i>European Social Survey Round 6</i>			
Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you, personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust, an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly...	... politicians?	No trust at all (0)	trstplt
	... [country]'s parliament?	-	trstprl
	... the police?	Complete trust (10)	trstplc
	... the legal system?		trstlgl
<i>Latinobarómetro 2013/2015</i>			
Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions.	... the National Government	a lot (1)	P26STGBS.B/P16ST.G
	... National Congress/Parliament	some (2)	P26STGBS.C/P16ST.F
	... Police	a little(3)	Q28STGBS.B/P16TGB.B
	... Judiciary	none (4)	P26STGBS.E/P16ST.H
<i>World Values Survey Wave 6</i>			
I'm going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them:	... the Government [in capital]	a great deal (1)	V115
	... Parliament	quite a lot (2)	V117
	... the Police	not very much (3)	V113
	... the Courts	none at all (4)	V114

Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix.

Table A3: Operationalization Democratic Performance Evaluation

Survey and Questions	Scale	Item Code
<i>Afrobarometer Round 5/6</i> On a scale between 0 and 10, where 0 means completely undemocratic and 10 means completely democratic, where would you place [our country today], or haven't you heard enough to say? / In your opinion how much of a democracy is [ENTER COUNTRY] today?	11-point scale/ 4-point scale	Q46A/ Q40
<i>AmericasBarometer</i> To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles?	7-point scale	N3
<i>Asian Barometer Wave 3/4</i> Here is a scale. 1 means completely undemocratic and 10 means completely democratic. Where would you place our country under the present government?	10-point scale	q91/ q94
<i>European Social Survey Round 6</i> How democratic do you think [country] is overall? Choose your answer from this card where 0 is not at all democratic and 10 is completely democratic	11-point scale	dmcentov
<i>Latinobarómetro 2013/2015</i> Here is a scale: 1 means completely undemocratic and 10 means completely democratic. Where would you place our country under the present government?	10-point scale	P50TGB.A/ P17STGBS
<i>World Values Survey Wave 6</i> And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means "not at all democratic" and 10 means "completely democratic", what position would you choose?	10-point scale	V141

Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix.

Table A4: Countries and Country Codes

Nr.	Country Name	Country Code	Nr.	Country Name	Country Code	Nr.	Country Name	Country Code
1	Albania	ALB	45	Iraq	IRQ	89	Sierra Leone	SIE
2	Algeria	ALG	46	Ireland	IRE	90	Singapore	SIN
3	Argentina	ARG	47	Israel	ISR	91	Slovakia	SLO
4	Armenia	ARM	48	Italy	ITA	92	Slovenia	SLV
5	Australia	AUL	49	Jamaica	JAM	93	South Africa	SAF
6	Azerbaijan	AZE	50	Japan	JPN	94	Spain	SPN
7	Belarus	BLR	51	Jordan	JOR	95	Swaziland	SWA
8	Belgium	BEL	52	Kazakhstan	KZK	96	Sweden	SWD
9	Benin	BEN	53	Kenya	KEN	97	Switzerland	SWZ
10	Bolivia	BOL	54	Kuwait	KUW	98	Thailand	THI
11	Botswana	BOT	55	Kyrgyzstan	KYR	99	Togo	TOG
12	Brazil	BRA	56	Lebanon	LEB	100	Trinidad and Tobago	TRI
13	Bulgaria	BUL	57	Lesotho	LES	101	Tunisia	TUN
14	Burkina Faso	BFO	58	Liberia	LBR	102	Turkey	TUR
15	Burundi	BUI	59	Lithuania	LIT	103	Uganda	UGA
16	Cabo Verde	CAP	60	Madagascar	MAG	104	Ukraine	UKR
17	Cambodia	CAM	61	Malawi	MAW	105	United Kingdom	UKG
18	Cameroon	CAO	62	Malaysia	MAL	106	Tanzania	TAZ
19	Canada	CAN	63	Mauritius	MAS	107	United States of America	USA
20	Chile	CHL	64	Mexico	MEX	108	Uruguay	URU
21	China	CHN	65	Mongolia	MON	109	Uzbekistan	UZB
22	Colombia	COL	66	Morocco	MOR	110	Venezuela	VEN
23	Costa Rica	COS	67	Mozambique	MZM	111	Viet Nam	VIE
24	Cyprus	CYP	68	Myanmar	MYA	112	Zambia	ZAM
25	Czech Republic	CZR	69	Namibia	NAM	113	Zimbabwe	ZIM
26	Denmark	DEN	70	Netherlands	NTH			
27	Dominican Republic	DOM	71	New Zealand	NEW			
28	Ecuador	ECU	72	Nicaragua	NIC			
29	El Salvador	SAL	73	Niger	NIR			
30	Estonia	EST	74	Nigeria	NIG			
31	Finland	FIN	75	Norway	NOR			
32	France	FRN	76	Pakistan	PAK			
33	Gabon	GAB	77	Panama	PAN			
34	Georgia	GRG	78	Paraguay	PAR			
35	Germany	GMY	79	Peru	PER			
36	Ghana	GHA	80	Philippines	PHI			
37	Guatemala	GUA	81	Poland	POL			
38	Guinea	GUI	82	Portugal	POR			
39	Guyana	GUY	83	Qatar	QAT			
40	Haiti	HAI	84	Republic of Korea	ROK			
41	Honduras	HON	85	Romania	RUM			
42	Hungary	HUN	86	Russian Federation	RUS			
43	India	IND	87	Rwanda	RWA			
44	Indonesia	INS	88	Senegal	SEN			

Table A5: Non-Democracies Sample: Statistical models A3.1 to F3.3

	DCI			Reasoned Justification			Common Good			Counter-Arguments			Range of Consultation			Engaged Society		
	Model A3.1 (No Bias)	Model A3.2 (Low Bias)	Model A3.3 (High Bias)	Model B3.1 (No Bias)	Model B3.2 (Low Bias)	Model B3.3 (High Bias)	Model C3.1 (No Bias)	Model C3.2 (Low Bias)	Model C3.3 (High Bias)	Model D3.1 (No Bias)	Model D3.2 (Low Bias)	Model D3.3 (High Bias)	Model E3.1 (No Bias)	Model E3.2 (Low Bias)	Model E3.3 (High Bias)	Model F3.1 (No Bias)	Model F3.2 (Low Bias)	Model F3.3 (High Bias)
Intercept	.76*** (.11)	.67*** (.10)	.62*** (.10)	.75*** (.11)	.67*** (.10)	.61*** (.10)	.73*** (.11)	.65*** (.11)	.61*** (.11)	.77*** (.11)	.69*** (.11)	.64*** (.11)	.74*** (.11)	.66*** (.11)	.60*** (.11)	.79*** (.10)	.71*** (.10)	.65*** (.10)
Individual-Level Control Variables																		
Financial Security	.13*** (.00)	.13*** (.00)	.12*** (.00)	.13*** (.00)	.13*** (.00)	.12*** (.00)	.13*** (.00)	.13*** (.00)	.12*** (.00)	.13*** (.00)	.13*** (.00)	.12*** (.00)	.13*** (.00)	.13*** (.00)	.12*** (.00)	.13*** (.00)	.13*** (.00)	.12*** (.00)
Education	-.10*** (.00)	-.09*** (.00)	-.09*** (.00)	-.10*** (.00)	-.09*** (.00)	-.09*** (.00)	-.10*** (.00)	-.09*** (.00)	-.09*** (.00)	-.10*** (.00)	-.09*** (.00)	-.09*** (.00)	-.10*** (.00)	-.09*** (.00)	-.09*** (.00)	-.10*** (.00)	-.09*** (.00)	-.09*** (.00)
Employment (0/1)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)	-.01*** (.00)
Age	.06*** (.00)	.06*** (.00)	.05*** (.00)	.06*** (.00)	.06*** (.00)	.05*** (.00)	.06*** (.00)	.06*** (.00)	.05*** (.00)	.06*** (.00)	.06*** (.00)	.05*** (.00)	.06*** (.00)	.06*** (.00)	.05*** (.00)	.06*** (.00)	.06*** (.00)	.05*** (.00)
Sex (Male/Female)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
Country-Level Control Variables																		
Life Expectancy	.20 (.18)	.14 (.17)	.07 (.17)	.18 (.18)	.13 (.17)	.07 (.17)	.16 (.18)	.13 (.17)	.07 (.17)	.23 (.17)	.19 (.16)	.13 (.16)	.19 (.18)	.14 (.17)	.08 (.17)	.24 (.17)	.19 (.16)	.13 (.17)
Corruption	.32 (.20)	.20 (.19)	.13 (.19)	.30 (.20)	.18 (.19)	.10 (.19)	.31 (.20)	.19 (.19)	.12 (.19)	.32 (.20)	.20 (.19)	.13 (.19)	.32 (.20)	.21 (.19)	.13 (.19)	.31 (.20)	.20 (.19)	.13 (.19)
Urban Pop. Ratio	-.17* (.07)	-.14* (.07)	-.14* (.07)	-.17* (.07)	-.15* (.07)	-.14* (.07)	-.16* (.07)	-.15* (.07)	-.14* (.07)	-.17* (.08)	-.15* (.07)	-.14* (.07)	-.16* (.07)	-.14* (.07)	-.13* (.07)	-.17* (.07)	-.15* (.07)	-.15* (.07)
Polity/FH	-.18 [†] (.10)	-.14 (.09)	-.13 (.09)	-.18 [†] (.10)	-.15 (.09)	-.13 (.09)	-.16 (.10)	-.13 (.10)	-.12 (.10)	-.19 [†] (.10)	-.15 (.09)	-.14 (.09)	-.17 (.10)	-.13 (.10)	-.11 (.10)	-.19 [†] (.10)	-.16 [†] (.09)	-.14 (.09)
Afrobarometer (0/1)	-.03 (.12)	-.06 (.11)	-.07 (.11)	-.03 (.12)	-.06 (.11)	-.08 (.11)	-.03 (.12)	-.07 (.11)	-.09 (.11)	-.04 (.12)	-.07 (.11)	-.09 (.11)	-.03 (.12)	-.07 (.11)	-.08 (.11)	-.05 (.12)	-.08 (.12)	-.09 (.12)
Dataset Control Dummies																		
logged GDP per capita	-.16* (.08)	-.13 [†] (.07)	-.11 (.07)	-.15* (.06)	-.11 [†] (.06)	-.08 (.06)	-.15** (.06)	-.10 [†] (.05)	-.07 (.05)	-.14 [†] (.07)	-.10 (.07)	-.07 (.07)	-.17* (.07)	-.13 [†] (.07)	-.09 (.08)	-.11 (.08)	-.08 (.08)	-.06 (.08)
Latinobarometro (0/1)	.01 (.00)	.01 [†] (.00)	.01 (.00)	.01 [†] (.00)	.01 [†] (.00)	.01 (.00)	.01 [†] (.00)	.01 [†] (.00)	.01 (.00)	.01 [†] (.00)	.01 (.00)	.01 (.00)	.01 [†] (.00)	.01 [†] (.00)	.01 (.00)	.01 [†] (.00)	.01 (.00)	.01 (.00)
Americasbarometer (0/1)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.01)
Asianbarometer (0/1)	.11*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.10*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.10*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.10*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.10*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.10*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.11*** (.01)	.10*** (.01)
ESS (0/1)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
DCI & Subcomponents																		
DCI	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)	-.11*** (.01)
logged Population	.04 (.09)	.07 (.09)	.09 (.09)		.08 (.08)	.09 (.08)			.07 (.08)									
Reasoned Justification				.06 (.08)	.08 (.08)	.09 (.08)			.07 (.07)									
Common Good							.07 (.08)	.07 (.07)	.07 (.07)									
Counter-Arguments										.01 (.09)	.03 (.09)	.04 (.09)						
Range of Consultation													.07 (.09)	.08 (.09)	.09 (.09)			
Engaged Society																-.04 (.10)	-.01 (.09)	.02 (.09)
AIC	30796.82	21513.39	14100.79	30796.69	21513.20	14100.75	30796.60	21513.62	14101.40	30797.03	21513.98	14101.75	30796.49	21513.16	14100.80	30796.74	21513.98	14101.80
BIC	30993.86	21710.43	14297.83	30993.73	21710.24	14297.79	30993.65	21710.66	14298.45	30994.07	21711.03	14298.79	30993.53	21710.21	14297.84	30993.78	21711.03	14298.84
Log Likelihood	-15378.41	-10736.69	-7030.39	-15378.34	-10736.60	-7030.37	-15378.30	-10736.81	-7030.70	-15378.51	-10736.99	-7030.87	-15378.24	-10736.58	-7030.40	-15378.37	-10736.99	-7030.90
Num. obs.	140386	140386	140386	140386	140386	140386	140386	140386	140386	140386	140386	140386	140386	140386	140386	140386	140386	140386
Num. groups: cntry	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55	55
Var: cntry (Intercept)	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01	.01
Var: Residual	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Models show unstandardized b-coefficients and all predictors are grand-mean centered and z-standardized. Reference category for dataset dummies is World Value Survey. Models estimated with Restricted Maximum Likelihood. Data weighted to same sample size ($n=1000$). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations