

Universität Stuttgart

Bachelor Thesis

Godly Governance

A Cross-National Examination of Religious Politics in
Arab Muslim-Majority Countries

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Date of Submission: 13.04.2017

Abstract

This bachelor thesis seeks to investigate Muslim support for religious governance in Arab Muslim-Majority countries with a focus on the role that religiosity plays. It does so by exploring the relevant literature and deriving hypotheses from it, which are subsequently tested by using survey data of the Arab Barometer. The following analysis conducts hierarchical linear and logistic regression with the dependent variables of ideological support for religious governance (Islamism) and preference for a religious party (0/1). The analysis finds that religiosity indeed plays a major role in explaining support for religious governance while marginalizing other theorized predictors. However, this effect depends substantially on an individual's interpretation of their religion as well as the tendency to endorse patriarchal values. The findings of the analysis suggest that further studies in the field should account for the multidimensional impact of religiosity and avoid essentialist explanations that inextricably link Muslim religiosity to the support for religious governance.

Acknowledgements

I would first like to thank my thesis advisor Prof. André Bächtiger for providing me with helpful advice and support as well as motivating and encouraging words. I would also like to thank my friends for their feedback, patience and of course friendship. Finally, I must express my very profound gratitude to my parents and to my life partner for providing me with unfailing support and continuous encouragement throughout my years of study and through the process of researching and writing this thesis. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them. Thank you.

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1 Introduction

Ever since the upheavals following the 2011 Arab Spring revolutions and demonstrations, much has been written on Arab voting preferences and the political systems to follow dictatorships and authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Given the importance of religion in the region, some scholars asked if free and fair elections in Arab countries could indeed lead to liberal democratic outcomes or if secular-nationalist authoritarians would only be replaced by authoritarian Islamist counterparts, letting the Arab Spring become an “Islamist Winter” (Totten et al. 2012: 23). As in the case of Egypt, the first free and fair elections in 2012 after the revolution brought the Muslim Brotherhood under Mohammed Mursi into power, who subsequently was seen to undermine the gains of the revolution by installing authoritarianism under the premise of an Islamist agenda. This situation ultimately culminated in a military coup supported by popular demonstrations that ousted the Islamists from power in 2013, leading to a crackdown on Islamist parties and organizations, including massacres and mass incarceration (cf. Arafa 2015: 859-860). While some state of stability has again been established in Egypt, the question still remains whether religious authoritarianism was again replaced by a militaristic and authoritarian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Six years after the hopes of the Arab Spring the state of affairs seems meager. Syria has gone into the seventh year of civil war, while Lybia and Yemen too have devolved into conflict. Most markedly, Tunisia appears to be on the road of reconciling Islamism and democracy, with the Islamist Ennahda party making wide concessions to liberal democratic ideals (cf. Hamid 2016: 185-187). Notably, the problem of the pendulum swing between religious and secular-nationalist authoritarianism in the Arab world is not necessarily a new phenomenon. The impending threat of Islamist takeover has often served as a reason to crackdown on otherwise free elections, as happened in the Algerian civil war in 1991, which started with a military coup to prevent the democratically elected *Front Islamique du Salut* (FIS) from coming into power (cf. Hamid 2016: 92-93).

Albeit this might raise negative prospects for the future of democracy in the Arab world, many studies have found that Arab citizens, despite all the upheavals, still overwhelmingly favor democracy (cf. Robbins 2015: 82-83). In contrast to that, many claims have been made about the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

Those who have argued that Islam itself is an impediment to democratization, often invoke religious leaders and scholars that consider the notion of democracy as un-Islamic (cf. Jawad 2013: 1-2). Other religious scholars have argued for democracy, especially based on the Islamic concepts of consultation (*shurah*) and consensus (*ijma*) (cf. Nafissi 2005: 415). An interesting approach comes from Lily Zubaidah Rahim in her editorial book about Muslim secular democracy, where she promotes the idea of *wasatiyyah* (moderate, centrist, or middle path), which rejects both "assertive secularist states (France, Kemalist Turkey)" as well as "conservative Islamists and political elites who demand that the state be governed by comprehensive sharia" (Rahim 2013: 2).

In order to resolve the complex nexus between secularism and Islamism in the Arab world it is thus helpful to look at the preferences of ordinary Arab citizens and how they see the relationship between Islam and Politics. Therefore this thesis seeks to investigate the determinants of support for religious governance in Arab Muslim-Majority countries by exploring the relevant literature and deriving hypotheses from it, which are subsequently tested by using survey data of the Arab Barometer. An increasing range of scholars has already established some important research in this area. Most notably, Mark Tessler who is a leading head of the Arab Barometer research project, has written extensively on the relationship between religion and politics in the Arab world and recently published a comprehensive book where he summarized his findings of various studies conducted in the Middle East (cf. Tessler 2015).

The main research question of this thesis states as follows: *Why do Muslim Arab citizen support religious governance and what role does religiosity play?* The following sections of this chapter shortly discuss the usage of terminology (Section 1.1) and introduce a definition of Islamism (Sections 1.2). Subsequently, possible determinants of supporting religious governance are derived from a review of relevant literature (Chapter 2). The next chapter discusses the Arab Barometer data, as well as the methodology used in this bachelor thesis and ultimately presents the results of the analysis (Chapter 3). In the end, the findings of the analysis will be summarized and the conclusion gives an answer to the research question (Chapter 4).

1.1 On the Use and Misuse of the term Islamism

Throughout the analysis the term *Islamism* will be used. As Islamism, both as a concept and as an analytical subject, is contested in the literature a short discussion of the issue is warranted. The problem with terms like Islamism is that people who adhere to it generally do not self-describe as such. It's a label that is *ascribed* to certain actions, beliefs, and groups that connect the religion of Islam to a political and societal order that see themselves as following the teachings of Islam, not Islamism.¹ Some scholars seem to agree with the notion that Islam is not just a private endeavor but also inextricably linked with ideas of political and societal order. For example, as Gellner writes: "Islam is the blueprint of a social order. It holds that a set of rules exists, external and divinely ordained, and independent of the will of men, which defines the proper ordering of society" (Gellner 1983: 1). However, this view assumes that there is hardly any differentiation in Islamic thought and ultimately declares every pious Muslim to be endorsing a certain kind of political order, which does not correspond to the reality of most Muslims who in fact have very diverse views and ideas about the role that religion should play in the public and political sphere (cf. Tessler 2015: 54-55). This controversy has led some scholars to argue that the term Islamism is indeed not useful at all and should therefore not be used in public or academic discourse. They raise the argument that associating the religion of Islam with authoritarian politics and political violence might alienate Muslims and help foster prejudice against Muslims and their faith (cf. Rauf 2010: 116). In line with this argument, in February 2017 the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan urged German Chancellor Angela Merkel not to use the term "Islamist terrorism" because it associates Islam with political violence (cf. Herf 2017: n. p.). However, it could be argued that it is the Islamists in the first place who claim their actions and beliefs are informed by their religious convictions (whether they are right to do so is of course a very different debate). Of course one then might postulate that Islamists merely use Islam in their own interests, and therefore the connection between Islam and Islamism is purely instrumental. However, this line of thought does not correspond to the fundamental importance of Islam in forming

¹As a critic of the term notes: "If Islam is a way of life, how can we say that those who want to live by its principles in legal, social, political, economic, and political spheres of life are not Muslims, but Islamists and believe in Islamism, not Islam" (Jan 2006: n. p.).

the political and social identities and political visions of Islamist individuals and organizations (cf. Hamid 2016: 9-10).

The position taken in this thesis is the *Islamism compatibility of Islam* theorem coined by Armin Pfahl-Traugher, according to whom the political interpretation and application of Islam is not the only but a possible interpretation of Islam (cf. Pfahl-Traugher 2007: 63-64). In the words of current head of the counter-extremist think tank *Quilliam Foundation* and former Islamist Maaajid Nawaz: “To say this problem has nothing to do with Islam leaves nothing to be discussed within the communities. To say it has nothing to do with Islam is as incorrect as [...] saying the problem is Islam itself. The truth is in the middle: it’s got something to do with Islam – not everything, not nothing, but something” (Maaajid Nawaz, as quoted by Sunday Morning Herald 2015: n. p.). Following this line of thought, it is argued that it is indeed useful and relevant to talk about Islamism as a subject of analysis and to distinguish it from the religion of Islam, which is simply a religion with various religious texts and sources as well as differing interpretations and denominations. As Hamid notes: “It is time to ‘bring religion back,’ but with care and caution, taking into account the historical richness and diversity that have long been a staple of the Islamic tradition” (cf. Hamid 2016: 14). The following section seeks to establish a definition of Islamism and contrasts it with often used terminology.

1.2 Towards a Definition of Islamism

Political Islam or Islamism² is a term that is often employed in various contexts to describe a range of political parties, organizations and movements, from the Ayatollah regime in Iran, mainstream political parties such as the Justice and Development Party in Turkey (AKP), to the the terror militia Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Seemingly, those organizations seem to be quite different, both in substance and methodology, therefore one should be careful to ascribe a single term to all of these entities. What can be said to bind all of these groups and parties in a common nexus is the vocation of Islam as a social and political force, however broadly one might define the relevance of religion in the process. One should also be careful to not lump in pious Muslims into the nexus of Political

²Both terms will be used interchangeably.

Islam. A sincere follower of Islam could live his/her life in accordance with his or her interpretation of Islam, depending on which, religiosity may or may not have any political implication at all.

On defining Islamism, some scholars have focused on a definition based on certain actions of individuals: "[a]ll who seek to Islamize their environment, whether in relation to their lives in society, their family circumstances, or the workplace, may be described as Islamists" (Roy and Sfeir 2007: VIII). Alternatively, Denoeux notes that Islamism can be seen as "a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals, groups and organizations that pursue political objectives" with the purpose of providing "political responses to today's societal challenges by imaging a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from Islamic tradition (Denoeux 2002: 61) and Bassam Tibi simply calls it "religionized politics" (Tibi 2012: 22). Therefore, contrary to the lay use of the term Islamism often used in public discourse and media, by no means all Islamists endorse or perpetrate terrorism nor do they believe in violence to achieve their goals. Islamist organizations range from groups providing charity and health services to parliamentary parties that endorse democratic principles and to those that only use democracy in order to come into power without sharing any of its core commitments (cf. March 2015: 104). Lastly, Islamists who do endorse violence are often referred to as *Jihadists*, with the core distinction that they support and perpetrate violence as a means of achieving their often times revolutionary goals and see organizations that seek to accommodate themselves into democratic politics as sell-outs (cf. Moghadam 2012: 100).

Others have focused on the importance of traditional Islamic law or *shari'a* as a basis of legislation (cf. Soage 2009: 893), which can be referred to as shari'a law or shari'a governance when applied to politics. In such a political system the government's legitimacy is not subject to democratic sovereignty but is said to be based on divine revelation, however this may not necessarily mean that some form of elections or democratic accountability couldn't exist under an Islamist system (cf. Jawad 2013: 1-2). Although as Abootalebi notes, it does imply that possible candidates or parties can only move within the restricted framework of shari'a as interpreted by a body of Islamic scholars, also referred to as *ulama*, who are given considerable power by applying their interpretations of scriptures that

are used to be translated into law (cf. Abootalebi 1999: 15-16).

A different approach to categorize Islamism is used by Fuller, who describes it as a form of Muslim identity politics: "Political Islam seeks to create a single Islamic identity that takes precedence, at least in one's moral life, over even the national identity" (Fuller 2003: 17). According to Fuller, this entails a homogeneous and identitarian societal conception, according to which all citizen would belong to the political prescriptions of the "true faith". From the perspective of this collectivist thinking, the importance of the individual is marginalized and is only valued as part of the religious community, or *umma*.

Lastly, Andrew March defines Islamism as "the range of modern political movements, ideological trends, and state-directed policies concerned with giving Islam an authoritative status in political life" (March 2015: 104). Therefore, Islamism is an umbrella term for all political views and actions which strive to influence the social and political order in the name of Islam. As March notes, the ideological origin of the Islamist movement lies with Islamic revivalist efforts in the second half of the nineteenth century, which came as an reaction to Western influence and colonization and the organizational roots can be traced back to the Muslim Brotherhood founded in Egypt in 1928 (cf. March 2015: 106-107). All later currents were and are intended to make Islam not only a binding guideline for an individual but also for social and political life. This means that beliefs and ideas pertaining to Islamism generally advocate some form of unity between state and religion (*dar-din-dawla*), which could be described as an institutionalization of religion (cf. March 2015: 112). Given the implication of the literature, Islamism is defined in the following way:

Islamism is a political ideology comprising various political movements and policies based on a political interpretation of the religion of Islam with the aim of giving Islam an institutionalized and authoritative status in social and political life, which may include the implementation of shari'a governance and/or the establishment of an Islamic state (some form of government consisting of explicitly religious individuals or parties) based on a collectivist Islamic identity.

2 Theory

The following section will introduce different theories and possible explanations for the support for religious governance that were gathered from the relevant literature.

2.1 Secularization Theory

What is secularization? Demerath understands secularization in terms of degrees on a spectrum between "[...] conditions where religion is all dominant to conditions in which religion has disappeared altogether" (Demerath III 2007: 61) and locates most existing societies somewhere in between these two extreme poles. Demerath further notes that it is important to consider the analytical levels on which secularization can occur, namely on the:

- *Macro-level*, concerning the whole society, culture and political structures,
- *Meso-level*, concerning the influence and importance of religious institutions and organizations,
- *Micro-level*, concerning individual forms of religious belief and behavior (cf. Demerath III 2007: 63).

However, as Chavez argues, secularization can be understood primarily as the decline of religious institutional power rather than a permanent decline in religious beliefs on the individual level, as exemplified by the high religiosity rates in the distinctly secular political system of the United States of America (Chavez 1994: 749-750). Therefore, secularization does not have to occur at all three levels simultaneously, nor does secularization on one level necessarily demand secularization at another level, even though of course the three levels are interrelated (cf. Casanova 2006: 8). Given the focus of this thesis on the macro and meso level of secularization, the following definition is used:

Secularization is the gradual process of institutional differentiation whereby religion is legally, normatively and/or bureaucratically segregated from the institutions of politics and societal power. This includes the decline of laws based on religious norms or scriptural justification, an increasing disapproval of religious leaders as political leaders and religious institutions and organizations influencing political decision making (cf. Demerath III 2007: 65-66; cf. Casanova 2006: 7).

How does this process of secularization come about? As Weber notes most famously, secularity is marked with a "disenchantment of the world" (Weber 2004[1917]: 30), a worldview that is based on knowledge of this world rather than concerns for the supernatural. This is connected with the idea that through the process of rationalization, scientific progress and increasing awareness of natural explanations, traditional accounts found in religious scripture would become less and less relevant and thus superfluous. Therefore, the process of secularization became interwoven with modernization³, which led many early proponents of classical secularization theory to believe that religion will become "a private affair" (Luckmann 1967: 86) and completely vanish from the public sphere (cf. Berger 1967: 133). However, after the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979, creating a modern-day theocracy, the non-wavering importance of Christian evangelicals in US politics and most recently the terror campaign by the self-declared caliphate in Iraq and Syria, the relevancy of religion and especially religious politics seems to have *increased*. After the apparent failure of secularization theory to explain this resurgence of religious politics and among many calls to do away with it altogether, the scholars Inglehart and Norris made it their goal to update the theory so that it is able to account for the cross-national variance of religiosity by postulating that "[s]ecularization is a tendency, not an iron law" (Norris and Inglehart 2011: 5). They introduce the *security axiom* to account for the variance of religious behavior and belief, which according to them is the consequence of poor living conditions and the perception of threats to personal well-being (cf. Norris and Inglehart 2011: 13-14). In a world full of insecurity and perceived loss of control, religion is a powerful tool for guidance for those seeking to mitigate the effects of vulnerability.⁴ This new framing of secularization theory suggests that attaining material resources and stable living situations, as well as increasing education (as formerly suggested by classical secularization theory) will lead individuals to feel more empowered to deal with the uncertainty and real or perceived grievances of life, which in turn would not only decrease the need for religion to counteract

³Some scholars, however have suggested that this connection might be invalid and that there are "multiple modernities", see Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah (2000): "Multiple modernities." *Daedalus* 129.1: 1-29.

⁴For a social psychologist account of this mechanism, see Hogg et al. 2011: "Religion in the face of uncertainty: An uncertainty-identity theory account of religiousness." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 14.1: 72-83.

vulnerability, but could also reduce the demand for a public and political role of religion.

Some public opinion studies conducted in the Arab world and other countries seem to support this suggested relationship. For example, using the World Value Survey, Norris found that education is positively related to supporting secularism and secular democracy (cf. Norris 2013: 131). Robbins finds that lower socio-economic indicators are positively associated with supporting Islamist parties and Political Islam in Algeria, Morocco, and the Palestinian territories (cf. Robbins 2009: 27-28). Lastly, by combining a vast amount of studies conducted in the Middle East, Tessler shows that education has an overall negative effect on supporting Political Islam, however in secular regimes this only seems to be the case for older men and women (cf. Tessler 2015: 168-169). Thus, given the implications of the literature, the first set of hypotheses can be stated as follows:

Hypothesis H1a: Increasing individual material resources and reduction of existential insecurity marginalizes support for religious governance.

Hypothesis H1b: Increasing intellectual resources marginalize support for religious governance.

2.2 Anti-Westernism, Moral Decline and Parochialism

The relationship between Western countries and the Arab world can be seen as quite volatile. On the one hand, many Arab countries are close allies of the US in the region, like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, on the other hand, many Arab citizen seem to have quite negative views of the United States and the West in general (cf. Blaydes and Linzer 2012: 228; cf. Corstange 2014: 3-6). The literature identifies several sources of Arab Anti-Westernism:

- Western (especially US) support for Israel (cf. Abdallah 2003: 63-65; cf. Dana 2017: 5-6; cf. Chiozza 2007: 125),
- a legacy of colonization and (perceived) humiliation by Western powers (cf. LeVine 2013: 9-10),
- backing authoritarian leaders and renewed Western interventionism in the Arab world as part of the so-called *War on Terror* after 9/11 (cf. Tessler and Robbins 2007: 311),

- Western hegemony creates a "siege mentality" (Mazrui 2005: 83) where Arab culture and Islam are perceived to be under attack (cf. Fuller 2002: 54-55).

The sources for Anti-Americanism are often classified by the literature in two categories: *what America does* and *what America is* (cf. Markovits 2007: 25). The former refers to opposition to American policies and interventionism (cf. Abdallah 2003: 70) while the latter describes opposition to non-native "Western values" and conjures a "war of cultures" (cf. Paz 2003: 53, 60).⁵ In line with the latter argument, Mahmood argues that Islamist movements have been successful partly due to pious activists who felt that religion and tradition was losing its appeal due to increasing westernization, which had caused immorality to become widespread (cf. Mahmood 2011: 44-47). In the terms of one of the most notable political theorists of Political Islam, Sayyid Qutb, this sense of disconnection of the moral sphere is considered to be *jahiliyya*, often translated as the "days of ignorance" and traditionally describing the condition of Arab tribes before the revelation of the Quran by the Prophet Muhammad, however used by Qutb and following theorists to frame the current status of the world to be similarly unenlightened and tainted by moral decline (cf. Toth 2013: 125). This new application of jahiliyya is not seen as a historical time period but as an on-going condition, which is said to include "both Western secularism and the local Muslim community permeated by Western influence [...]" and now often "stands for everything barbaric and evil: secularism, [...], democratic legislatures, [...] free (unrestricted) capitalist markets, usury, family disintegration [and] immorality" (Toth 2013: 125). Notably, this notion of moral decline and depravity is also linked to the idea of democratization, as some Islamists maintain that democracy is an "imported solution", which would lead believers away from divine legitimacy (cf. Tibi 2012: 96-97).

One concept that often comes up when discussing the Middle East is the term *Orientalism*, proposed by Edward Said in his book of that title. Said describes Orientalism as the tendency to portray the Arab world in an inaccurate, biased and essentialist way, that is fundamentally juxtaposed to the Western world while ignoring the complexity of Arab reality (cf. Said 1979: 1-3). The process of

⁵While Anti-Americanism and Anti-Westernism can be separated analytically, this distinction is not necessary in this thesis as it focuses on the consequences of othering and identity politics, where the West is perceived to be pitted against the Islamic/Arab world. In this context, both concepts of resentments overlap enough to be used interchangeably.

crafting this sort of "us vs. them" narrative is known in the literature as *othering* (cf. Mountz 2009: 328). Mountz describes othering as a process "wherein persons or groups are labeled as deviant or non-normative [...] through the constant repetition of characteristics about a group of people who are distinguished from the norm in some way" (Mountz 2009: 328). For example, Samuel P. Huntington's *Clash of Civilization* thesis (cf. Huntington 1993) is often described as trying to create an "us vs. them" narrative where Islam and the West are pitted against each other in a cultural clash (cf. Creutz-Kämpfi 2008: 303-304; cf. Spierings 2014: 433).

A consequence of this othering process is the tendency to polarize each side even further, pushing individuals to identify with their "own side" and overemphasize identity as a defense mechanism against (perceived) outside threats and allegations. In turn, this has been theorized to be responsible for a resurgence in Islamic identity politics, whereas Islam is seen as an indigenous and authentic bulwark against increasing globalization, westernization and erosion of culture and tradition (cf. Moghadam 2012: 131). If globalism stands for cosmopolitanism and international trade, parochialism is the opposite of that phenomena and puts the focal point on the in-group while fostering hostility towards what is perceived as out-group, where "globalization is seen as a surrender to a dominant, non-indigenous standpoint" (Rubin 2003: n. p.). Parochial individuals tend to be exposed to great psychological and social pressure if they deviate from what is deemed socially desirable and thus have an incentive to conform to peer pressure and endorse the status quo (cf. Huang 2004: 256). Islamists have since understood to popularize their political ideology using religious language and symbolism in an attempt to signalize authenticity and nativism to counteract the perceived threat towards Islamic identity (cf. Moghadam 2012: 110). Tapping into this grievance, Islamists typically advocate for reconnection "with the pre-colonial symbolic universe" (Burgat and Dowell 1993: 309) where the glorification of that symbolic universe of authenticity "becomes a means of regaining one's true cultural identity – as opposed to mimicry of the dominant West" (Munson 2003: 44). Accordingly, various researchers have identified Islamist organizations and parties at the forefront of anti-American and anti-Western agitation, for example, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan and the Shi'ite Hezbollah in Lebanon (cf. Vogt 2006: 137-138; 147-8), the Islah

Reform Party in Yemen (cf. Münzner 2006: 111-112), the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and the Justice and Development Party in Morocco (cf. Mattes 2006: 27-28; 34) as well as the National Islamic Front in Sudan (cf. Hofheinz 2006: 61).

A very different approach to explain the connection between supporting religious governance and the relation to modernization processes is proposed by Ayubi, who states that Islamists are not fundamentally opposed to ideas that globalization has brought to the Arab world, but their opposition to it arises because modernization had failed *them* as "they desired it so strongly and yet could not get it. Theirs is the proverbial case of 'sour grapes': they hate modernity because they cannot get it!" (Ayubi 1993: 134). This notion of Islamists as "sour grapes" is also found by LeVine, who states that many Arab societies cling to religious identities "in the face of an imposed neoliberal globalization which has yet to prove it can bring either democracy or freedom" (LeVine 2013: 55). Globalization, the increasing global interconnectivity in economic and cultural affairs, has been argued to produce various counter-movements that seek to remedy negative effects on the poor and working class (economic globalization) and a dislocation of traditional values and indigenous cultures (cultural globalization) (cf. Haidt 2016: 46-47). The prevalence of such negative attitudes towards globalization have been proposed to be instrumental in the rise of various populist political figures of both the left and right such as the late President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez (cf. Foer 2006: 104-105) and most recently US President Donald Trump (cf. Bartels et al. 2016: 192). The effects of globalization can be witnessed everywhere where processes of internationalization have taken hold and not last in the Arab world where it is often directly associated with westernization and a continuation of Western imperialism under a new guise, from the economic encroachments of the Internal Monetary Fund (IMF) to the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, which is sometimes referred to as neo-colonialism (cf. Spierings 2014: 432-433).

While Western interventionism has indeed caused legitimate grievances in the Arab world, not all of the criticism that is directed at the United States and the West is always rooted in factual discourse. Most notably, wild conspiracy theories that paint the West as the source of all possible negative outcomes are quite widespread in the Arab world (cf. Gray 2010: 155). As a result, some scholars have suggested to term the misrepresentation of the Western world as *Occidentalism*

(cf. Buruma and Margalit 2005: 5). As Gray notes: "Occidentalism (al-istighrab) may provide a lens by which the West is viewed in a conspiracist manner, by acting as a fortification for the 'self' against a conspirator 'other'" (Gray 2010: 11). Thus it is proposed that Orientalism and Occidentalism are reciprocal processes of othering, whereby Arab citizens who foster anti-American and anti-Western attitudes are more likely to endorse religious governance in order to emphasize what they see as their native and authentic culture against what is framed by Islamists as an attack on Islamic identity. The hypotheses for this section are as follows:

Hypothesis H2a: Anti-Western sentiments increase support for religious governance.

Hypothesis H2b: Parochial viewpoints increase support for religious governance.

Hypothesis H2c: Individuals that expect Moral Decline in democracies are more likely to support religious governance.

2.3 Patriarchal Values

Many studies have been conducted that look at the relationship between Islam and gender equality. Some scholars have suggested that the Islamic religion provides some special hindrances to women's empowerment in the social, political and economic realm. Angrist identifies three main directions of such arguments: "[...] the substance of Islamic (shari'a) law, which treats men and women differently, [...] the ways in which politicians defer to conservative interpretations of shari'a law in order to build and/or consolidate their legitimacy" and the "contemporary regimes' need to appease (or at least not inflame) important Islamist constituencies who favor a subordinate role for women" (Angrist 2012: 51). Using empirical data to test this relationship, Rahman conducts a study where she finds that it is mostly the implementation of strict shari'a family law that hinders women's sociopolitical empowerment in Muslim-Majority countries (cf. Rahman 2012: 360). Furthermore, in line with the argumentation that Anti-Westernism increases support for religious governance from the previous section, Moghadam argues that gender relations have become a political issue where Islamists "seek to recuperate traditional patterns, including patriarchal gender relations, in reaction to

the ‘westernizing’ trends of globalization” (Moghadam 2012: 49) and have made their case “incumbent on women’s behavior, dress, and appearance” (Moghadam 2012: 110-111). Indeed Fourati et al. show that more conservative attitudes towards women and the preference for modest clothing increase the likelihood to vote for the Islamist party in Tunisia (Ennahda) (cf. Fourati et al. 2016: 62). On the other hand, some scholars have suggested that given the importance of religion in the region, women’s empowerment can be more successfully achieved through a feminist interpretation of Islam, coining the term *Muslim feminism* which describes “the simultaneous support for women’s equality, but a rejection of purely secular interpretation of gender roles and relations” (Fox et al. 2016: 43). However, as Alexander and Welzel quite impressively show in a cross-national study including Muslim respondents all across the world, traditional gender roles and patriarchal values are very widespread with Muslims (cf. Alexander and Welzel 2011: 271). Given that Islamists often endorse such traditional gender roles, it is then hypothesized that they might be able to tap into the widespread support for patriarchal values and turn it into support for religious governance in order to enforce such beliefs (cf. Tessler 2015: 134). Thus the hypotheses are stated as follows:

Hypothesis H3a: Patriarchal Values increase the support for religious governance.

Hypothesis H3b: Anti-Westernism increases the impact that Patriarchal Values have on the support for religious governance.

2.4 The Role of Religiosity

A commonly proposed explanation for the support for Political Islam is that devout Muslims simply support religious governance out of their religious convictions. However, this explanation lacks scientific value as it cannot account for the subgroup of religious Muslims who do not support Political Islam and at times openly oppose the intermingling of religion with the state. This proposed relationship also falls in danger to become tautological and essentialist in nature, leading to explanations that Muslims support Political Islam *because they are Muslims*. Tessler describes the problematic nature of such arguments as this “mistakenly assume[s] that there are clear and uncontested definitions of what constitute [...] “Muslim” orientations” and “[...] ignores the significant differences

that exist between Arab and Muslim countries, as well as the equally important individual-level variation that exists within countries [...] associated with age, education, class, gender, ethnicity, and residence” (cf. Tessler 2015: 54-55). For example, Bratton finds that the support for shari’a governance in Nigeria is highest among the least devout and only half of religious Muslims share this preference (cf. Bratton 2003: 500). Furthermore, prominent Islamic scholars like Abdullahi An-Naim have proposed that the state has to be neutral and secular in order to guarantee voluntary practice of Islam (cf. An-Naim 2008: 1-2) and Esposito and Mogahed note that the Gallup Poll survey ”indicate[s] that wanting Shari’a does not automatically translate into wanting theocracy” (Esposito and Mogahed 2007: 50) as many who want religiously legitimated laws also endorse democratic principles. Therefore, it is important not to conflate personal religiosity, which entails prayer, mosque attendance, and fasting, with the desire of a specific political system on the grounds of religious convictions.

Nevertheless, one should also not make the mistake and assume no relationship between religiosity and support for a religious system. As Shadi Hamid comments after having interviewed several members of the Muslim Brotherhood, many Muslims have joined the Islamist movement because they want to become better Muslims and see the political application of their faith as a fulfillment of this desire (cf. Hamid 2016: 9-10). The key differentiation in this thesis is that Political Islam is just one of many ways how one might express religiosity and that one should not mistakingly assume that there isn’t any significant variation of religious peoples’ political preferences in the Arab and Muslim world. It is thus reasonable to theorize that religiosity leads to support for religious governance, however this should not imply that it necessarily has to. Most importantly, within Muslim discourse there is a vibrant dialog on Islamic thought and liberal secular interpretations of Islam exist, which challenge the conservative and theocratic Islam that often dominates the Islamist discourse (El Fadl 2014; Khorchide and Hartmann 2014; An-Naim 2008; Kurzman 1998; Hashemi 2009; Sachedina 2001). For example, Khorchide emphasizes Islamic humanism (cf. Khorchide and Hartmann 2014: 139-142), El Fadl has made the case for reviving rationalist interpretations of Islam (cf. El Fadl 2014: 51-52) and Hashemi seeks to reconcile liberal secular democracy with Islamic religiosity (cf. Hashemi 2009: 171-177). Such liberal and humanist viewpoints

are often at odds with Islamist interpretations of Islam, as Islamism necessitates a certain interpretation to become part of law and thus demands that religious beliefs be enforced through "coercion by the state" (An-Naim 2008: 2). Given the implications of this literature, it can be assumed that liberal interpretations of Islam are likely to reduce the support for religious governance.

In line with the previous discussion about patriarchal values (Section 2.3), it is further theorized that religiosity might significantly interact with attitudes towards women. Accordingly, it could be argued that religious individuals with patriarchal sentiments are more likely to support religious governance than their more gender egalitarian counterparts who do not support traditional gender roles. Lastly, more liberal interpretations of Islam are assumed to have a diminished or even reversed effect on the impact of religiosity. The following Hypothesis are thus formulated:

Hypothesis H4a: Religiosity increases the support for religious governance.

Hypothesis H4b: Liberal interpretations of Islam decrease the support for religious governance.

Hypothesis H4c: If an individual endorses liberal interpretations of Islam, religiosity has a diminished or even reversed effect on the support for religious governance.

Hypothesis H4d: If an individual endorses patriarchal values, religiosity has a stronger effect on the support for religious governance than an individual who endorses more gender egalitarian views.

3 Empirical Section

This section will introduce the research design and methods that are used to test the hypotheses. The analysis in this thesis is based on the *Arab Barometer Wave 3* dataset, which is freely available online.⁶ Only Muslim respondents will be analyzed which leaves the data with 14207 cases throughout 12 Arab countries.⁷ The analysis seeks to find predictors for the ideological support for religious governance (*Support for Islamism*) and preference of religious parties (*Support for Religious Parties*) in Arab Muslim-Majority countries. First, a Hierarchical Factor Analysis is conducted to construct a dependent variable that measures the support for Islamism. Then a dichotomous variable is coded to gage the support for religious parties. Finally, the statistical methodology for the main analysis will be introduced. The subject of interest in this thesis is the individual, however since the individual respondents are not independent of each other but clustered into 12 Arab countries, a multilevel analysis is appropriate to test the adequacy of the hypotheses.⁸

3.1 Data and Methods

As sample sizes vary between countries, all analysis' in the following sections have been done with the provided weight, which weighs each sample to a nationally representative sample.

3.1.1 Ideological Support for Religious Governance

In order to measure the support for Islamism, one first needs to find variables that can be combined into one theoretical construct. Thus, some method of index construction has to be chosen. According to Welzel, it can be differentiated between dimensional and compository logic of index construction (cf. Welzel 2013: 60). With dimensional logic, the focus lies on internal consistency and reducing the error variance when combining items. Compository logic, on the other hand, is more focused on external validity and the way that the combination of the items

⁶<http://www.arabbarometer.org/instruments-and-data-files0>

⁷Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen


⁸Throughout thesis, the terms multilevel analysis and hierarchical regression will be used interchangeably.

makes theoretical sense. Welzel and Inglehart point out how sometimes even low correlated variables and constructs can be summarized into one index, as under compository logic they are assumed to be complimentary to each other (cf. Welzel and Inglehart 2016: 1075). Thus the compository approach is more suited for this analysis since the focus lies on the theoretical construct of Islamism rather than the coherency of the variables used to construct it. As Welzel and Dalton note: "[t]he proof of their usefulness lies in *predictiveness* rather than internal coherence" (cf. Welzel and Dalton 2016: 5; italics in original). One way to test the external validity of the constructed index for Islamism would then be to assess whether it accurately predicts the support for religious parties. Therefore, a last hypothesis is added:

Hypothesis H5: Increasing ideological support for religious governance increases the likelihood of preferring a religious party.

As a first step, the Arab Barometer was screened under the theoretical definition of Islamism, selecting relevant variables that suggest a connection between religion and politics. Seven such variables have been judged to be relevant. The first set of items is meant to measure the degree to which Islamic law should be the basis of legislation. The survey question reads: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following principles in the enactment of your country's laws and regulations?" allowing for a four-point response with the possible answers of: "Strongly Agree", "Somewhat Agree", "Somewhat Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree". The statements read as follows: "The government and parliament should enact personal status laws (marriage, divorce) in accordance with Islamic law" (q6055), "The government and parliament should enact inheritance laws in accordance with Islamic law" (q6056) and "The government and parliament should enact penal laws in accordance with Islamic law" (q6054).

Following this, the second set of items relates to the degree to which a respondent wishes for the government to be Islamist in nature. The battery question reads as follows: "I will mention some of the political systems currently in place in various Middle Eastern and North African countries. I would like to know to what extent you think these systems would be appropriate for your country" with the following four-point response options: "Very Appropriate", "Appropriate", "Somewhat Appropriate" and "Absolutely inappropriate". The statements read:

Figure 1: Overview of Variables Used for Index Construction

"A parliamentary system in which only Islamist parties compete in parliamentary elections" (q518a2), "A parliamentary system based on Islamic law in which only Islamist parties compete in elections" (q518b2)⁹, "A system governed by Islamic law without elections or political parties" (q5184).

Lastly, the next set of items concern themselves with the role that religious leaders should play in politics. The question reads: "To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?" allowing for a four-point response with the possible answers of: "Strongly Agree", "Somewhat Agree", "Somewhat Disagree" and "Strongly Disagree". The corresponding statements read: "Your country is better off if religious people hold public positions in the state" (q6062) and "Religious leaders (imams, preachers, priests) should have influence over government decisions" (q6063). An overview of the variables used to construct the index can be found in Figure 1.¹⁰

All variables have been recoded in such a way that higher values indicate support for religious governance (Islamic law as the basis of legislation, the

⁹Items have been split, where half of the respondents were given q518a2 (Form A) and the other half answered q518b2 (Form B). However for the purposes of this analysis, this split is unimportant, and the items have been recombined.

¹⁰Percentages not adding up to hundred percent is due to rounding. This applies for all following figures too.

Table 1: Hierarchical Factor Analysis

Single Items	L1 Loadings	Level 1 Constructs	L2 Loadings	Level 2 Construct
Islamic Personal Status Law	0.945	Shari'a Governance	0.386	ISLAMISM
Islamic Inheritance Laws	0.807			
Islamic Penal Laws	0.608	Islamist Government	0.872	
Only Islamist Parties	0.644			
Islamist Government (no elections)	0.699			
Religious Leaders hold office	0.711	Religious Leadership	0.717	
Religious Leaders influence decisions	0.743			
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure	0.72		0.58	N = 11508 Missing = 2699 (19.0%)
Cronbachs α	0.74		0.55	
Explained Variance	55.9%		47.5%	

Results are based on a Higher Order Factor Analysis using oblique rotation ("promax") at the first level and no rotation at the second. All variables standardized from 0 to 1. Data weighted to nationally representative samples.

government consisting of Islamists and desiring religious leadership) and lower values for those that do not support religious governance. Subsequently, a factor analysis was conducted (results are shown in Table 1), yielding highly discriminant factor loadings above 0.6 and forming three subcategories:

Shari'a Governance: Measures to which degree respondents favor (personal status, inheritance and penal) laws that are in accordance with Islamic law.

Islamist Government: Measures how much a respondent favors a government that exclusively consists of Islamists (whether they are elected or not).

Religious Leadership: Measures the desire for religious leaders to influence political decisions and/or hold office.

A reliability analysis shows that Cronbach's α ($=0.74$) and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure ($=0.72$) give good indicators on the first level, however these measurements of dimensionality are only to be seen as supplementary information because, as Welzel points out, under combinatory logic, "there is no requirement for single dimensionality" (Welzel 2013: 69). The second order factor analysis of the three subcategories then gives the dependent variable *Support for Islamism*. The resulting index shows a very fine-grained single-peaked distribution of values (for a visualization per country, see Section 3.2.1).

Table 1 shows that the concepts of *Religious Leadership* and *Islamist Government* fall together quite well (factor loadings of 0.717 and 0.872, respectively),

however the importance of *Shari'a Governance* on the second level is marginalized compared to the subindices above. This is due to the one-sided support that shari'a governance has in most Arab countries (as shown in Figure 1), as many citizens prefer laws that are at least religiously legitimized while not necessarily disagreeing with notions of democracy and individual rights as well as disagreeing about how shari'a law should be enforced or by whom (cf. Ciftci 2013: 783-784; cf. Esposito and Mogahed 2007: 783-784; cf. Hamid 2016: 13). Given these confounding factors and the lack of differentiation in the concept of shari'a governance, its importance to measure Islamism is naturally marginalized. According to the hierarchical factor analysis then, preferring religious leadership and an Islamist government are the most important components of Islamism, although it was also decided to retain the index measuring shari'a governance as it allows to capture at least some of its relevant variance. Given that the items are combined under compository logic, low factors loadings are also not very problematic as the constructs are seen as complimentary to each other. As a last step, the final index was recoded on a scale from 0 to 100. It is also relevant to note that the number of missing values is quite high (19% of all cases are missing). Section 3.1.4 discusses the nature of missing values in the dataset.

3.1.2 Support for a Religious Party

The second part of the analysis will test whether the hypotheses that predict the ideological support for religious governance also hold up for supporting a religious party. In order to code the dependent variable for this analysis, the following 5-point item from the Arab Barometer has been used:

- q605a Which of the following is the closest to your point of view?
 - 1st: I prefer a religious political party over a non-religious political party.
 - 2nd: I prefer a non-religious political party over a religious political party.

Whereby respondents who (strongly) preferred a religious party over a non-religious party were coded as 1 and those that (strongly) preferred a non-religious party over a religious party or preferred neither were coded as 0. This yields a

dichotomous variable that measures the preference for a religious party compared to the preference of a non-religious party (or indifference towards both).

3.1.3 Operationalization of Hypotheses

The following section gives a short overview over the items that were selected to operationalize the hypotheses from the theoretical section.

Personal Piety

Religiosity has many aspects. In order to capture the multidimensionality of religiosity, the following variables have been used to combine them into one summary index:

- q6101 Do you pray daily? (5-Point Scale)
- q6105 Do you attend Friday prayer? (5-Point Scale)
- q6106 Do you listen to or read the Quran? (5-Point Scale)

Answers range from 1 = Always to 5 = Never. The final index named *Personal Piety* is a 13-point response scale and has been recoded from 0 to 1 (with 0 indicating the irreligious and 1 the most religious).

Socio-Economic Factors for Secularization Theory

The selected socio-economic factors comprise the following variables:

- q1016 I will read you some statements related to your household income. Which of these statements comes closest to describing your household income?
 - Our household income covers our expenses well and we are able to save.
 - Our household income covers our expenses without notable difficulties.
 - Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face some difficulties in meeting our needs.
 - Our household income does not cover our expenses and we face significant difficulties in meeting our needs.
- q1004 Do you work? (0/1)
- q1003 Level of education

Given that the numeric (household) income items from the Arab Barometer have many missing values (which is not unusual for survey questions related to income), it was decided to use the 4-scale variable that measures *Financial Security*. The question about the current employment status is coded into a dummy variable named *Employment*, where 1 denotes being employed and 0 being unemployed. Unfortunately, the survey questions for *Education* were slightly different in Yemen and Tunisia (having 8 and 6 categories respectively, compared to the 7 categories for all other countries), therefore this variable has been recoded to have five categories in order to ensure comparability.¹¹ Finally, each variable has been standardized on a range from 0 to 1.

Patriarchal Values

The index of *Patriarchal Values* consists of the following three variables asking about women's status in society:

- I will read a set of statements that relate to the status of women in our society to you in order to gauge the extent of your agreement or disagreement with each statement. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
 - q6012 A married woman can work outside the home. (4-Point scale)
 - q6013 In general, men are better at political leadership than women. (4-Point scale)
 - q6014 University education for males is more important than university education for females. (4-Point scale)

All of the items were combined using compository logic and coded in such a way that they endorse more patriarchal attitudes (disapproval of married women working outside the home, women being worse political leaders than men and endorsing sex segregation in universities). As Welzel and Inglehart note, there are two quality criteria for combinatory constructs: "Theoretically, the combination must make sense such that the components meaningfully complement each other under an overarching idea. Empirically, the combination must make a difference in that it maps closer on its expected antecedents or consequences than does each of its components." (cf. Welzel and Inglehart 2016: 1076). Both of the criteria

¹¹Education has now the following levels: Illiterate/No formal education, Elementary, Preparatory/Basic/Pre-High School, Secondary/Mid-level diploma (professional or technical), Bachelor and above.

are fulfilled, as each of the variables has less predictive power than when they are combined and endorsing a marginalized and/or segregated role for women in society can be combined theoretically under the concept of Patriarchal Values. The final index was standardized from 0 to 1 and is measured on a ten-point scale.

Anti-Westernism, Parochialism and Moral Decline

A summary index was formed to measure *Anti-Westernism*, using the following items:

- q700.1 Do you prefer that future economic relations between your country and the United States ... ?
- q700a.1 Do you prefer that future security relations between your country and the United States ... ?
 - Become stronger than they were in previous years
 - Remain the same as they were in previous years
 - Become weaker than they were in previous years
- q701.1 Do you think the influence of the United States on the development of democracy in your country has been ... ?
- q701.2 Do you think the influence of the European Union on the development of democracy in your country has been ... ?
 - 1 = Very Positive
 - 5 = Very Negative

A Cronbach's α of 0.73 shows good inter-item reliability and an exploratory factor analysis yielded congruent loadings, indicating good dimensionality and thus justifying the creation of the index. All variables have been recoded in such a direction that higher values reflect more negative views towards the West (wanting less economic and security relations with the US, as well as ascribing a negative influence to the United States and the European Union on the development of democracy in the respondent's country). Given the different measurement scales, before the items are summarized they are first dichotomized so that they indicate 0 for positive or indifferent relations with the United States and the EU and 1 for most negative attitudes. The final index has been recoded from 0 to 1 and is measured on a 5 point scale.

The following item has been chosen to measure the degree of *Parochialism*:

- q701b People differ whether the increase in the global connectivity is a good thing. Do you think that the increase in global connectivity is a good or a bad thing for the society?
 - 1 = Very good
 - 5 = Very Bad

Lastly, *Moral Decline* under democracies is measured with the following item:

- q5167 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement? Democracy negatively affects social and ethical values in your country.
 - 1 = Strongly Agree
 - 4 = Strongly Disagree

Again, the last two variables have been recoded on a 0 to 1 scale in the direction expected by the hypotheses (agreement with the statement that democracy negatively affects social and ethical values).

Liberal Islam

Liberal Islam is coded by using the following items from the Arab Barometer:

- The opinions of Islamic jurists and religious scholars differ and I want to ask to what extent you agree or disagree with some of these issues?
 - Democracy is a system that contradicts the teachings of Islam. (q6071)
 - In a Muslim country, non-Muslims should enjoy less political rights than Muslims. (q6072)
 - Gender-mixed education should be allowed in universities. (q6074)
 - Women should wear modest clothes without needing to wear hijab. (q6076)

Recalling Welzel and Englehart's criteria for compository indices, a good index requires 1) Strong theoretical justification and 2) external validity. Both of these criteria are fulfilled with this index. There are strong theoretical reasons on which to combine these variables, as they all ask about endorsements of specific interpretations of Islam and they can be coded in a certain direction that implies a more liberal and progressive interpretation (endorsing democracy, equal rights

between Muslims and Non-Muslims, gender mixed education and women not needing to veil). For the second criteria, an analysis was conducted with the single variables as well as the compository index. While all predictors were significant and effectual individually, together they yielded an even stronger result, justifying the combination under compository logic.

Control Variables

Lastly, two control variables were added. A dummy for sex is coded as *Male*, whereby 1 indicates male sex and 0 female sex. *Age* is included as control variable as well, with respondents ranging from 18 to 89 years. Table 7 in the Appendix shows summary statistics for all independent and dependent variables used in this analysis.

3.1.4 Missing Values

The following section explains how this thesis has dealt with the missing values in the dataset. Combining the relevant variables into various indices has produced a series of missing values, thus imputation of nonresponse-items became desirable. First, the missing values need to be classified. According to Rubin, there are three mechanisms of missing values: *missing completely at random* (MCAR), *missing at random* (MAR) and *missing not at random* (MNAR) (cf. Rubin 1976: 582; cf. Little and Rubin 2014: 11-12). Under the MCAR assumption, the observed missing value pattern is independent of the observed data D_{obs} as well as the unobserved data D_{mis} . This is the most unproblematic, yet unlikely case which assumes that the data is not biased in any way. The formula for MCAR looks as follows:

$$p(M|D) = P(M) \quad (1)$$

whereby M denotes a missing value matrix with $m_{ij} = 1$ in case of unobserved data D_{mis} and $m_{ij} = 0$ if data is observed. MAR can be assumed when the missing values are independent of the unobserved data D_{mis} but depend on the observed data D_{obs} , which biases the dataset but is less problematic since the dependencies of the missing value pattern are known. MAR yields following equation:

$$p(M|D) = p(M|D_{obs}) \quad (2)$$

If the latter two assumptions apply, the missing values can be seen as *ignorable*. Lastly, the MNAR assumption specifies the missing values as dependent on some unobserved data D_{mis} which systematically skews the data and leads to missing values that must be treated as *non-ignorable*.

$$p(M|D) = p(M|\phi) \quad (3)$$

, where ϕ denotes some unobserved values that are not part of the data. Analyzing the data at hand with the help of a *shadow matrix* (cf. Kabacoff 2015: 360-361), some missing value patterns emerge that could be interpreted as MNAR. For example the religiosity variables, as well as the variables that link religion and politics and those that measure Anti-Westernism seem to be missing together without any observed data that accounts for their missingness, suggesting that they might depend on some unobserved data. One possible explanation for this non-random missing value pattern could be that questions of religion and politics asked in countries that have a history of persecuting Islamists (for example Algeria) might discourage some to voice their opinions about religion in fear of repercussions. Similarly, respondents with very high anti-Western attitudes might be reluctant to give an answer to interviewers whom they might see as working for a Western agency or study. Given the fact that these variables are central to this study, it was decided to ignore the possible MNAR patterns and go on with the analysis without imputation, assuming that the missing values are MAR.¹² Lastly, it is important to note that it ultimately cannot be determined whether data really is MAR or MNAR from the observed data alone (cf. Resseguier et al. 2011: 282-283).

3.1.5 Statistical Methodology

Given that the data used in this thesis is hierarchical in nature, meaning that individuals are nested into countries, the application of a multilevel analysis becomes suitable (cf. Gelman and Hill 2006: 237). Since OLS regression assumes that individual data points are independent of each other, standard errors tend to

¹²Note that this is not a recommendable procedure at this point and the possible MNAR patterns would need to be explored further. It is possible to deal with MNAR patterns by imputation, but they require special modeling techniques specifying priors (see Resseguier et al. 2011). However, such procedures are beyond the scope of this thesis. Therefore the results of the analysis found in this thesis should be interpreted with caution and the prospect that feature analysis will deal with those patterns more properly.

be underestimated if contextual relationships between individuals are not taken into account. The great advantage of conducting a multilevel analysis is that it can remedy the distortions of standard errors that would occur when using OLS regression on hierarchical data (cf. Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 7). When using multilevel models, the question of centering predictors arises. Two such methods are commonly practiced: grand-mean centering (centering the predictors around their overall mean across countries) and group-mean centering (centering the predictors around the average for each individual country). Enders and Torighi, for example, recommend that multilevel analysis which focuses on the individual level (as in this thesis) should be group-mean centered because it erases all between-country variation, yielding a clean "estimate of the pooled within-cluster (i.e., Level 1) regression coefficient" (cf. Enders and Tofighi 2007: 128). However, more recent scholarship has been skeptical of the group-mean centering procedure and found it to introduce significant bias without providing the suggested benefits and even recommends to abandon the practice (cf. Kelley et al. 2017: 280-281). In order to assess the viability of centering in the following analysis, the results of using grand-mean centered predictors and group-mean centered predictors were compared and it was found that group-mean centering did not alter the results in a significant way. Given that there was no considerable change, it was decided to use grand-mean centered and z-standardized predictors as a non-controversial transformation, which also avoids multicollinearity issues for the interaction effects. This changes the interpretation of the coefficients, where a one-unit change in the unstandardized coefficient now signifies a difference of one standard deviation in the dependent variable.

The following equations are estimated for the models. The first equation for the hierarchical linear model is given as:

$$\begin{aligned}
 ISLAMISM_{ij} = & \alpha_{0j} + \beta_{1,2j} \cdot X_{ij} + \\
 & \beta_{3j} \cdot income_{ij} + \beta_{4j} \cdot employment_{ij} + \\
 & \beta_{5j} \cdot education_{ij} + \beta_{6j} \cdot antiwesternism_{ij} + \\
 & \beta_{7j} \cdot parochialism_{ij} + \beta_{8j} \cdot moraldecline_{ij} + \\
 & \beta_{9j} \cdot patriarchal_{ij} + \beta_{10j} \cdot piety_{ij} + \\
 & \beta_{11j} \cdot liberalislam_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij}
 \end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

with i th individual observations clustered into j countries and a varying intercept per country $\alpha_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + u_{0j}$, where γ_{00} denotes the grand mean and u_{0j} defines its normally distributed error variance $u_{0j} \sim N(0, \sigma_u^2)$. The regression coefficients are denoted as β_{kj} , and ε_{ij} defines an error term. Lastly, X_{ij} denotes a vector of control variables (Age and Sex).

The equation for the hierarchical logistic regression is estimated with a logit-link function: $\text{logit}(\text{RELIGPARTY}_{ij}) = \log\left(\frac{p_{ij}}{1-p_{ij}}\right)$, where p_{ij} is denoted as the probability of the i th individual to prefer a religious party in the j th country. Therefore the equation for the hierarchical logistic model is given as follows:¹³

$$\begin{aligned} \text{logit}(\text{RELIGPARTY}_{ij}) = & \alpha_{0j} + \beta_{1,2j} \cdot X_{ij} + \\ & \beta_{3j} \cdot \text{income}_{ij} + \beta_{4j} \cdot \text{employment}_{ij} + \\ & \beta_{5j} \cdot \text{education}_{ij} + \beta_{6j} \cdot \text{antiwesternism}_{ij} + \\ & \beta_{7j} \cdot \text{parochialism}_{ij} + \beta_{8j} \cdot \text{moraldecline}_{ij} + \\ & \beta_{9j} \cdot \text{patriarchal}_{ij} + \beta_{10j} \cdot \text{piety}_{ij} + \\ & \beta_{11j} \cdot \text{liberalislam}_{ij} + \beta_{12j} \cdot \text{islamism}_{ij} + \varepsilon_{ij} \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$


3.2 Descriptive and Multilevel Analysis

The following section explores the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. First, a descriptive analysis is conducted, outlining some general patterns. Subsequently, a hierarchical linear regression tests the hypotheses and the following hierarchical logistic regression seeks to test the proposed hypotheses and validate the index construction of Islamism.

3.2.1 Descriptive Analysis

First, both of the dependent variables are examined. The dependent variable *Support for Islamism* forms a single-peaked distribution closely related to a normal distribution (Skewness = 0.13, Kurtosis = -0.01) with a grand mean of $\bar{x}_{GrandMean} = 47.71$ and a standard deviation of $\sigma = 19.55$. Figure 2 shows the distribution of support for Islamism by country, as well as their corresponding

¹³The same annotation definitions of the hierarchical linear model also apply for the hierarchical logistic regression.

Figure 2: Support for Islamism by Countries

country mean. For most countries, the distribution follows an almost normally distributed single peaked pattern. However, the most notable exception is Lebanon where two peaks emerge and the distribution is strongly skewed to the left.

Lebanon is also an outlier in a different way, as it is the country with the least average support for Islamism ($\bar{x}_{Lebanon} = 21.42$), with the next country average being a total of 16.69 points further to the right, namely Tunisia ($\bar{x}_{Tunisia} = 38.01$), however both are located well below the grand mean. Egypt as well is somewhat noticeable below the grand mean ($\bar{x}_{Egypt} = 40.02$), while the remaining countries are clustered close to the grand mean. Noticeably above average support for Islamism is found in Jordan ($\bar{x}_{Jordan} = 55.53$) and Sudan with the highest value ($\bar{x}_{Sudan} = 57.5$).

Taking a look at Figure 3, Sudan also stands out when it comes to respondents who prefer a religious party over a non-religious party, with a total of 78.4% preferring a religious party. Considering the complete data, a slight majority of 53.7% of respondents say they would prefer a religious party, while 46.3% prefer a non-religious party or neither. Some notable differences emerge when comparing the preference for a religious party and the average ideological support for Islamism in the countries of Sudan, Palestine (68.2%), Tunisia (59.2%) and Algeria (30.7%).



Figure 3: Support for a Religious Party per Country

Figure 4 seeks to explore this further. The first three mentioned countries seem to have considerable more support for religious parties than what the average support for Islamism would suggest. Algeria, on the other hand, has less support for a religious party but has a notably higher average support for Islamism. In Algeria, this discrepancy might be partly explained through the historical marginalization of Islamic parties ever since the Algerian civil war of 1991, however the political discrimination does not seem to have dampened the average ideological support for Islamism. Sudan and the Gaza Strip in Palestine both have Islamist parties in power that provide a considerable amount of health and social services, which might partly explain why respondents generally support religious parties but share less of the ideological undercurrents. Except for the mentioned exception, the comparison in Figure 4 shows that average support for Islamism, as measured in this thesis, seems to map quite well with the preference for a religious party, which can be seen as an indication that the index measures what it is supposed to measure, namely support for religious governance.

As a means of comparison, the percentage of current seats belonging to Islamic parties in legislative bodies is taken from the *Kurzman and Turkoglu Islamic Political Parties Dataset* (cf. Kurzman and Türkoğlu 2015) for the given country

and the closest date available before the survey was conducted. Looking at the share of Islamic parties in legislative bodies, one can see that except for Sudan, Palestine, Egypt and Tunisia, Islamic parties are not well represented in many countries where average support for Islamism and support for religious parties is high. Interestingly, Egypt and Lebanon seem to have much higher shares of Islamic parties in their legislative bodies than the average support for Islamism and support for religious parties in their countries would suggest.

Figure 4: Religious Governance in Arab Muslim-Majority Countries




In Egypt, this discrepancy might be explained by the fact that the survey was conducted in a time where many people feared that the Justice and Development Party (Muslim Brotherhood) might ruin the gains of the revolution by creating a religious authoritarian state and were therefore less supportive of Islamism and religious parties when surveyed. In Lebanon, the high share of Islamic parties is explained through the importance of Hezbollah, which similarly to the Hamas, is not just a religious political party but also provides many social and health services, which may lead individuals to vote for the party without sharing the ideology.

Next, the relationship between support for religious governance and religiosity is explored in Figure 5. In order to make visualization more intuitively interpretable, the Personal Piety index has been split in four parts, from 0 to .24, 0.25 to 0.49, 0.50 to .74 and 0.75 to 100 and the support for Islamism index is split in half.

Focusing on the total numbers first, it is interesting to note that the majority of respondents are located in the upper two categories, which is in line with the generally high rates of religiosity in the Arab world. Noticeably, both illustrations indicate an increase of support for religious governance with higher religiosity. This is in accordance with what was expected from Hypothesis H4a. While religiosity is associated with higher support for religious governance, there also seems to be a considerable share of highly religious individuals who do not support religious governance. For example, 51.0% of the most pious and 61.9% of the more pious are found to have lower support for Islamism (< 50) while preferring a religious party is slightly more distinctly split with only 39.7% of the most pious and 48.4% of the more pious not preferring a religious party (or being indifferent towards both). This first assessment of the relationship between religiosity and support for religious governance indicates that it is indeed important to account for the variability of religious belief. The following multilevel models will shine more light on the explored relationships.

Figure 5: Religiosity and Support for Religious Governance



3.2.2 Hierarchical Linear Regression

First, a null model is conducted with a random-intercept only¹⁴ to assess whether multilevel modeling is warranted (cf. Hox 2010: 300). The intraclass correlation (ICC) for the null model shows that indeed 22.81% of the variance of Islamism is bound on the country-level. The results strongly indicate that a multilevel analysis is appropriate for the analysis. The results of the main model (Model

¹⁴Not shown.

A1) including the interactions effects (Model A2, A3, and A4) are shown in Table 4. The main model was selected by using a sequential approach, which is demonstrated in Table 5 in the Appendix. Focusing first on the measures of fit for Model A1, one can note that 15.74% of the variance is explained by the fixed factors and 29.16% of the variance is explained by both the fixed and random parts (Marginal $R^2 = 0.1574$, Conditional $R^2 = 0.2916$). The between-country variance is estimated to be $\tau_{00} = 47.88$ and the within-country between-individual variance is estimated as $\sigma^2 = 252.87$, showing that there is meaningful variance both across countries and across individuals within countries. Lastly, no severe violations of residual assumptions can be found (see Figures in the Appendix).

The following interpretations are based on Model A1. Recalling the first set of hypotheses pertaining to the *Secularization Theory*, it was theorized that increasing an individual's material resources and reducing existential insecurity would marginalize support for religious governance (Hypothesis H1a). Looking at the coefficients for Financial Security and Employment in Model A1, mixed evidence can be found for Hypothesis H1a. As hypothesized, being employed is found to have a significant negative effect on supporting Islamism ($b = -1.51$, $SE = 0.39$, $p < 0.001$). The coefficient for Financial Security on the other hand shows a significant (although only at a 95% confidence level) and positive effect on the support for Islamism, indicating the *opposite* relationship from what was expected ($b = 0.41$, $SE = 0.19$, $p < 0.05$). Thus, Hypothesis H1a has to be rejected for Financial Security, however being employed shows the expected negative effect on the support for Islamism and gives some evidence for Hypothesis H1a. As expected by classical secularization theory, Education is found to negatively influence the support for Islamism, however the relationship is only significant at a 95% confidence level ($b = -0.48$, $SE = 0.21$, $p < 0.05$). Nonetheless, Hypothesis H1b can be accepted so far.

Recalling the second set of hypotheses, Anti-Westernism was expected to have a positive effect on the support for religious governance (Hypothesis H2a). No clear empirical evidence can be found for this hypothesis in Model A1.¹⁵ However, the coefficient seems to suggest the expected positive direction even if the relationship is insignificant ($b = 0.28$, $SE = 0.18$, $p > 0.1$). Thus Hypothesis H2a has to be

¹⁵This seems to be due to the effect of adding variables pertaining to religiosity, as the coefficient of Anti-Westernism is significant in Model C3 in Table 5 of the Appendix.

Table 2: Hierarchical Linear Regression - Results


	Model A1	Model A2	Model A3	Model A4
(Intercept)	48.94 (2.02)***	48.90 (2.01)***	48.81 (2.04)***	48.93 (2.04)***
Individual-Level				
Male (0/1)	− 1.74 (0.39)***	− 1.74 (0.39)***	− 1.75 (0.39)***	− 1.87 (0.39)***
Age	− 0.89 (0.19)***	− 0.88 (0.19)***	− 0.90 (0.19)***	− 0.91 (0.19)***
Financial Security	0.41 (0.19)*	0.41 (0.19)*	0.36 (0.19) [†]	0.41 (0.19)*
Education	− 0.48 (0.21)*	− 0.47 (0.21)*	− 0.47 (0.21)*	− 0.46 (0.21)*
Employment (0/1)	− 1.51 (0.39)***	− 1.47 (0.39)***	− 1.49 (0.39)***	− 1.56 (0.39)***
Anti-Westernism	0.28 (0.18)	0.25 (0.18)	0.25 (0.18)	0.22 (0.18)
Parochialism	1.05 (0.19)***	1.01 (0.19)***	1.05 (0.19)***	1.10 (0.19)***
Moral Decline	1.87 (0.18)***	1.88 (0.18)***	1.91 (0.18)***	1.85 (0.18)***
Patriarchal Values	2.16 (0.19)***	2.15 (0.19)***	2.19 (0.19)***	2.16 (0.19)***
Personal Piety	3.38 (0.18)***	3.37 (0.18)***	3.44 (0.18)***	3.53 (0.18)***
Liberal Islam	− 4.25 (0.20)***	− 4.23 (0.20)***	− 4.19 (0.20)***	− 4.21 (0.20)***
Individual-Level Interactions				
Patriarchal Values × Anti-Westernism		0.67 (0.17)***		
Personal Piety × Patriarchal Values			1.22 (0.16)***	
Personal Piety × Liberal Islam				− 1.14 (0.16)***
AIC (vs. Model A1)	75296	[−14]	[−55]	[−47]
BIC (vs. Model A1)	75395	[−7]	[−48]	[−40]
Marginal R^2	0.1574	0.1594	0.1609	0.1608
Conditional R^2	0.2916	0.2924	0.2981	0.2975
LRT (vs. Model A1)	−	16.15***	56.57***	49.11***
Observations / Countries	8781 / 12	8781 / 12	8781 / 12	8781 / 12
Variance (Intercept) τ_{00}	47.88 (6.92)	47.44 (6.89)	49.10 (7.01)	48.91 (6.99)
Variance Residual σ^2	252.87	252.43	251.26	251.47

Annotation: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Model coefficients estimated with Restricted Maximum Likelihood. Aikake Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) are fitted with Full Maximum Likelihood to ensure comparability (Change in AIC and BIC in regards to Model A1 indicated in square brackets). Marginal R^2 is interpreted as the variance explained by fixed factors and Conditional R^2 represents the variance explained by both fixed and random factors (or the entire model) as suggested by Nakagawa and Schielzeth and extended upon by Johnson (cf. Nakagawa and Schielzeth 2013; cf. Johnson 2014). Models show unstandardized b-coefficients, but all predictors are grand-mean centered and z-standardized. Data weighted to nationally representative samples.

considered rejected so far. Furthermore, Hypothesis H2b expected Parochialism to be associated with higher support for Islamism and indeed Model A1 shows a significant and positive relationship as suggested ($b = 1.05$, $SE = 0.19$, $p < 0.001$). A positive relationship between expecting Moral Decline under democracies and the support for religious governance was suggested by Hypothesis H2c and indeed a significant positive effect was found ($b = 1.87$, $SE = 0.18$, $p < 0.001$), leading to the conclusion that Hypothesis H2b and H2c can be accepted.

The next hypothesis suggested that endorsement of Patriarchal Values would increase the support for religious governance (Hypothesis H3a). As theorized, the coefficient for Patriarchal Values is indeed significant and shows a positive influence on support for Islamism ($b = 2.16$, $SE = 0.19$, $p < 0.001$). Therefore, Hypothesis H3a can be accepted.

Lastly, religiosity was expected to have a positive influence on the support for religious governance (Hypothesis H4a) while liberal interpretations of Islam were theorized to have a negative effect (Hypothesis H4b). The empirical evidence in Model A1 seems to support this relationship. Personal Piety has a significant positive effect on the support for Islamism ($b = 3.38$, $SE = 0.18$, $p < 0.001$) while


Figure 6: Standardized Coefficients Based on Model A1

liberal interpretations of Islam are strongly negatively associated with the support for Islamism ($b = -4.25$, $SE = 0.20$, $p \leq 0.001$). Thus, Hypothesis H4a and H4b can be accepted.

Figure 6 shows the standardized coefficients for Model A1. The standardized coefficients allow for a direct comparison of influence on the dependent variable. It can be seen that the strongest predictor for the support for Islamism is the endorsement of illiberal interpretations of Islam ($beta = -0.22^{***}$), followed by increased religiosity ($beta = 0.17^{***}$), patriarchal attitudes ($beta = 0.11^{***}$) and the perception that democracy undermines moral values ($beta = 0.09^{***}$). This gives substantial evidence for the importance of religion and its interpretation when it comes to predicting the support for Islamism.


As an interesting side note, the control variables suggest that women and younger cohorts are significantly associated with supporting Islamism ($b_{Male} = -1.74$, $SE = 0.39$, $p < 0.001$ and $b_{Age} = -0.89$, $SE = 0.19$, $p < 0.001$, respectively).

As a next step, the results of the moderation effects in Models A2, A3 and A4 in Table 2 are examined. As can be seen by the likelihood ratio tests, all interaction effects show significant better fits with respect to Model A1. Accord-

Figure 7: Interaction Patriarchal Values X Anti-Westernism

ingly, all interaction effects are found to be significant.¹⁶ Model A2 estimates an interaction between Patriarchal Values and Anti-Westernism, seeking to test the relationship suggested by Hypothesis H3b, which theorized that Anti-Westernism would increase the impact that Patriarchal Values have on the support for religious governance. The interaction between the two variables is found to be significant in the expected positive direction ($b = 0.67$, $SE = 0.17$, $p < 0.001$). Figure 7 visualizes this interaction by using the minimum and maximum values of each interaction variable. As can be seen by Illustration A on the left-hand side of Figure 7, increasing Anti-Westernism has a positive effect on Islamism for the most patriarchal individuals while *Anti-Westernism has a slight negative effect on Islamism for the least patriarchal individuals*, which is somewhat surprising and unexpected. This effect going in both directions might shade some light on why the overall coefficient for Anti-Westernism is insignificant in Model A1, as the effect of Anti-Westernism seems to depend heavily on contingent factors. Next, Illustration B on the right-hand side of Figure 7 shows that the impact of Patriarchal Values is steeper for those individuals who are most anti-Western compared to those who are least anti-Western. It can also be noted that patriarchal values increase the support for Islamism for both the least anti-Western as well as the most anti-Western individuals. Thus, Hypothesis H3b is backed by the empirical evidence.

¹⁶Interaction models showed no problems with multicollinearity yielding variance inflation factors (VIF) below 5.

Figure 8: Individual Level Interactions

Model A3 estimates an interaction between Personal Piety and Patriarchal Values, as suggested by Hypothesis H4d. The interaction is indeed significant in the expected direction, indicating that higher patriarchal values increase the effect that religiosity has on the support for Islamism ($b = 1.22$, $SE = 0.16$, $p < 0.001$). As shown in the upper two illustrations of Figure 8, an increase of Patriarchal Values boosts the support for Islamism for the most religious individuals, although somewhat interestingly, for the least religious the effect of Patriarchal Values is working in the opposite direction. Complimentary to that, the upper right illustration of Figure 8 shows that Personal Piety increases the support for Islamism for those strongly endorsing Patriarchal Values, while religiosity has almost no effect on the support for Islamism for individuals with more gender egalitarian values. Accordingly, it can be said that Hypothesis H4d is supported by the empirical evidence.

Lastly, Model A4 seeks to test Hypothesis H4c, theorizing that liberal interpretations of Islam have a moderating effect on religiosity. As suggested, a significant

negative interaction effect was found ($b = -1.14$, $SE = 0.16$, $p < 0.001$). The lower two illustrations of Figure 8 shed more light on this interaction: Illustration A on the bottom left shows that increasing liberal interpretations of Islam have the strongest negative effect for the most religious, strongly indicating that Hypothesis H4c is correct. Illustration B on lower right shows that endorsing illiberal interpretations of Islam increases the effect of religiosity while liberal interpretations of Islam completely marginalize the effect that high religiosity has on the support for Islamism. Thus, Hypothesis H4c can be considered to be accepted.

3.2.3 Hierarchical Logistic Regression

As a last step, a hierarchical logistic regression with the dichotomous dependent variable *Support for a Religious Party* was estimated, in order to test whether the hypotheses for supporting Islamism also translate into supporting a religious party. Furthermore, it can be tested whether ideological support for religious governance predicts the preference for a religious party. It was decided to not estimate interaction effects for the hierarchical logistic regression, as too complex models lead to non-convergence and severe bias of the estimators.

Before the main analysis, again a null model is estimated with a random effect on the country-level, allowing the intercept to vary by country.¹⁷ The ICC for the null model indicates that 10.98% variance of the dependent variable is bound at the country-level, making a multilevel model necessary. The results of the hierarchical logistic regression are shown in Table 3, where Model B1 estimates the effect of all predictors that were used in the hierarchical linear model and Model B2 includes the support for Islamism predictor, recoded 0 to 1. Given that the predictors in both models are coded 0 for the lowest value and 1 for the highest value, the odds ratios (shown in Figure 9) can intuitively be interpreted as the chance to prefer a religious party in regards to the minimum and maximum value of a predictor. Focusing on the measures of fit first, shrinking AIC and BIC values as well as the likelihood ratio test indicate that adding Islamism as a predictor increases the fit of the model substantially and the change from 10.01% to 22.51% explained variance due to fixed factors (Marginal R^2) and from 18.79%

¹⁷Not shown.


Table 3: Hierarchical Logistic Regression - Results

	Model B1	Model B2
(Intercept)	0.03 (0.25)	− 1.63 (0.25) ^{***}
Male (0/1)	− 0.29 (0.05) ^{***}	− 0.23 (0.06) ^{***}
Age	− 0.80 (0.14) ^{***}	− 0.70 (0.14) ^{***}
Financial Security	0.08 (0.08)	0.03 (0.08)
Employment	−0.02 (0.05)	0.04 (0.06)
Education	− 0.44 (0.09) ^{***}	− 0.43 (0.09) ^{***}
Anti-Westernism	0.34 (0.07) ^{***}	0.34 (0.08) ^{***}
Parochialism	0.13 (0.10)	0.01 (0.11)
Moral Decline	0.26 (0.08) ^{**}	0.04 (0.09)
Patriarchal Values	0.52 (0.12) ^{***}	0.16 (0.13)
Personal Piety	1.86 (0.13) ^{***}	1.32 (0.14) ^{***}
Liberal Islam	− 1.98 (0.15) ^{***}	− 1.24 (0.16) ^{***}
Islamism		3.94 (0.17) ^{***}
AIC	10480	[−624]
BIC	10571	[−617]
Marginal R^2	0.1001	0.2251
Conditional R^2	0.1879	0.2923
LRT (Compared to Model B1)	−	625.82 ^{***}
Observations / Countries	8525 / 12	8525 / 12
Variance (Intercept) τ_{00}	0.36 (0.60)	0.31 (0.56)

Annotation: ^{***} $p < 0.001$, ^{**} $p < 0.01$, ^{*} $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Variables are not centered in any way and predictors are standardized on a 0 to 1 scale in order to allow for intuitive interpretation of odds ratios. Change in AIC and BIC in regards to Model B1 indicated in square brackets. Marginal R^2 is interpreted as the variance explained by fixed factors and Conditional R^2 represents the variance explained by both fixed and random factors (or the entire model) as suggested by Nakagawa and Schielzeth and extended upon by Johnson (cf. Nakagawa and Schielzeth 2013; cf. Johnson 2014). Models show unstandardized b-coefficients as log-odds. Data weighted to nationally representative samples.

to 29.23% total explained variance (Conditional R^2) also show a considerable increase in explanatory power. VIF scores below five also showed no apparent issues with multicollinearity and no severe violations of the residual assumptions can be found (see Figures in the Appendix). The between country-variance for Model B2 is estimated relatively low as $\tau_{00} = 0.31$. As for the Hypothesis, some notable differences to the previous models emerge while some similarities persist.

The following interpretations are based on Model B2, which is found to be the best fitting model. The first set of hypotheses suggested that there might be a link between socio-economic factors and support for religious governance. The empirical evidence in Model B2 shows that only the coefficient for Education is found to have a significant and expected negative effect on supporting a religious party ($b = -0.43$, $SE = 0.09$, $p < 0.001$). Interpreting the odds ratios from Figure 9, it can be said that a high educated individual (Bachelor and above) has a 1.54

Figure 9: Odds Ratios Based on Model B2

Annotation: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$.

*times lower chance*¹⁸ to prefer a religious over a non-religious party than a low educated individual (illiterate or no formal education) (*OddsRatios* = 0.65***). Given the lack of significant predictors, Hypothesis H1a has to be rejected for Financial Security and Employment, however Education showed the expected effect and gives evidence for classical secularization theory and Hypothesis H1b.

The second set of hypotheses theorized that Anti-Westernism would have a positive effect on supporting religious governance. Indeed a positive and significant effect can be found ($b = 0.34$, $SE = 0.08$, $p < 0.001$). The interpretation of odds ratios from Figure 9 suggests that the most anti-Western individuals have a *1.40 times higher chance* to prefer a religious over a non-religious party than an individual who is not anti-Western (*OddsRatios* = 1.40***). Thus, Hypothesis H2a can be accepted in the case of the hierarchical logistic regression. However, Hypothesis H2b and H2c have to be rejected as Parochialism nor Moral Decline seem to have any significant effect on the preference for a religious party, after controlling for the influence of Islamism.

Similarly, the positive effect of Patriarchal Values is also found to lose significance in Model B3, once it has been controlled for Islamism. Therefore, Hypothesis H3a can be rejected.

¹⁸A different interpretation would be: A highly educated individual has a 0.64 higher chance to prefer a religious over a non-religious party than a low educated individual. However, odds ratios below 1 are not intuitively understandable. A solution is to use the inverse value of the odds ratios, in this case $1 : 0.65 = 1.54$. In the following interpretations, all odds ratios below one are also calculated in this way.

Subsequently, religiosity and liberal interpretations of Islam seem to have held their expected relationship. Personal Piety has a significant effect on the support for a religious party ($b = 1.32$, $SE = 0.14$, $p < 0.001$) and the interpretation of odds ratios from Figure 9 suggests that very pious individuals have a *3.73 times higher chance* to prefer a religious over a non-religious party than an irreligious individual ($OddsRatios = 3.73^{***}$). On the other hand, liberal interpretations of Islam are strongly negatively associated with the preference of a religious party ($b = -1.24$, $SE = 0.16$, $p < 0.001$) and the interpretation of odds ratios from Figure 9 suggests that individuals with a very liberal interpretation of Islam have a *3.45 times lower chance* to prefer a religious over a non-religious party than an individual with illiberal interpretations of Islam ($OddsRatios = 0.29^{***}$). Both results yield strong evidence that Hypothesis 4a and 4b can be accepted.

Lastly, Hypothesis H5 suggested that supporting Islamism would also lead to preferring a religious party. Indeed a very strong positive and significant relationship can be found ($b = 3.94$, $SE = 0.17$, $p < 0.001$), indicating that someone who is fully supportive of Islamism has a *51.40 higher chance* to prefer a religious party over a non-religious party than someone who is not supportive of Islamism at all ($OddsRatios = 51.40^{***}$).¹⁹ Additionally to the very strong effect, it can also be noted that support for Islamism marginalizes the influence of several other predictors, suggesting that the ideological support for religious governance is a crucial factor in explaining the preference for a religious party.

Again, the control variables suggest a similar relation to the the hierarchical linear model. Women and younger cohorts are significantly associated with preferring a religious party ($b_{Male} = -0.23$, $SE = 0.06$, $p < 0.001$ and $b_{Age} = -0.70$, $SE = 0.14$, $p < 0.001$, respectively). The interpretations of odds ratios suggest that men have a *1.25 times lower chance* to prefer a religious over a non-religious party than women ($OddsRatios = 0.80^{***}$) while 89 year olds have a *2.0 times lower chance* to prefer a religious over a non-religious party than 18-year olds ($OddsRatio = 0.50^{***}$).

¹⁹This very high effect might raise suspicions, however no apparent issues have been found. A correlation below 0.4 indicate no issues of multicollinearity and an inspection of the variables did not show severe separation of values.

4 Limitations and Conclusion

The thesis is concluded with first discussing some limitations that had to be made, followed by a discussion of the results and final remarks about future research.

4.1 Limitations

The thesis constructed various indices in order to estimate the support for religious governance. Doing so, left a lot of missing values in the dataset used for the analysis. While there were more than enough cases left for the estimation (8781 and 8525 out of 14207 cases for the hierarchical linear and logistic regression, respectively), it should be seen very critically to lose so many cases in the process of modeling and index construction. This is especially the case for the data in this thesis, as some of the missing value patterns are possibly not missing at random and might depend on some unobserved contingent factors. This might have affected the generalizability and biased the estimators of the estimated models, therefore the analysis and conclusions drawn from it should be read with caution until future research might be able to remedy this problem through imputation techniques for non-missing at random patterns, as suggested by Resseguier and his colleagues (cf. Resseguier et al. 2011: 282-283). Furthermore, after considering the relevant literature, it was decided that country-level variables would only skew the estimators and confidence intervals in the multilevel analysis (cf. Stegmueller 2013: 758). Future research seeking to include country-level variables might be able to estimate Bayesian models that are less vulnerable to violations of small sample sizes and have a more accurate plausibility test than the frequentist p-value approach. (cf. Stegmueller 2013: 758-759). Given the many indices used in this analysis, another possible estimation could be based on structural equation modeling, which makes it possible to include all variables used for index construction in the same model. Lastly, for the sake of brevity it was also decided not to use random slopes in the multilevel models, however it is strongly recommended that future research also accounts for slope differences between countries, as it can be expected that the hypotheses in the thesis vary between countries. The focus of this thesis was therefore on overall effects averaged over countries.

4.2 Conclusion and Future Research

The goal of this bachelor thesis was to estimate predictors that would explain the preference for religious governance in Arab Muslim-Majority countries. The guiding research question that led throughout the thesis was: *Why do Muslim Arab citizen support religious governance and what role does religiosity play?* In order to answer the research question, possible explanations were derived from the literature and two dependent variables were used to gauge the support for religious governance: ideological support for religious governance (*Support for Islamism*) and preference of religious parties (*Support for Religious Parties*). To estimate the former, hierarchical linear regressions were modeled while the latter necessitated hierarchical logistic regressions because of the dichotomous dependent variable, which in both cases allowed for possible variance between countries.

The results of hierarchical linear and logistic regression yield some evidence for the hypotheses. Table 5 gives an overview of the results. First, secularization theory does not seem to apply in the theorized way. Very mixed evidence can be found for Hypothesis H1a and Financial Security even indicated the *opposite* relationship from what was expected. Secularization theory, as proposed by Inglehart and Norris, is not able to explain this discrepancy. Some more evidence and studies need to be evaluated in order to explain this relationship, but given the overall small coefficients, there also might be a different mechanism at work from what was expected by secularization theory. On the other hand, higher education is negatively associated with support for religious governance in general, as the proposed relationship was found in both models that sought to estimate ideological support for religious governance and preference for a religious party, a relationship that other studies have also found (cf. Robbins 2009: 27-28; cf. Tessler 2015: 168-169). Therefore, it can be concluded that rationalization processes through education seem to generally decrease the support for religious governance, as would be expected by classical secularization theory.

Next, it was theorized by Hypothesis H2 that Anti-Westernism, Parochialism and a sense of Moral Decline under democracies might have a positive effect on the support for religious governance. In fact, Anti-Westernism is not found to have a significant effect on supporting Islamism, but it does so for preferring a religious party. This might suggest that individuals with anti-Western tendencies are more

Table 4: Summary of Results

	Hypotheses	Multilevel Linear Model	Multilevel Logistic Model
H1: Secularization Theory	H1a: Increasing individual material resources and reduction of existential insecurity marginalizes support for religious governance.	Mixed Evidence	Mixed Evidence
	H1b: Increasing intellectual resources marginalizes support for religious governance.	✓	✓
H2: Anti-Westernism, Moral Decline and Parochialism	H2a: Anti-Western sentiments increase support for religious governance.	Mixed Evidence	✓
	H2b: Parochial viewpoints increase support for religious governance.	✓	X
	H2c: Individuals who expect Moral Decline in democracies are more likely to support religious governance.	✓	Mixed Evidence
H3: Patriarchal Values	H3a: Patriarchal Values increase the support for religious governance.	✓	Mixed Evidence
	H3b: Anti-Westernism increases the impact that Patriarchal Values have on the support for religious governance.	✓	-
H4: The Role of Religion and Liberal Interpretations of Islam	H4a: Religiosity increases the support for religious governance.	✓	✓
	H4b: Liberal interpretations of Islam decrease the support for religious governance.	✓	✓
	H4c: If an individual endorses liberal interpretations of Islam, religiosity has a diminished or even reversed effect on the support for religious governance.	✓	-
	H4d: If an individual endorses patriarchal values, religiosity has a stronger effect on the support for religious governance than an individual who endorses more gender egalitarian views.	✓	-
H5: Ideological Support for Islamism	H5: Increasing ideological support for Islamism increases the likelihood of preferring religious parties.	-	✓

likely to endorse a religious party to counteract a sense of Western hegemony even if they are not necessarily more inclined to support the ideological undercurrents. However, the interaction effect with Patriarchal Values has shown that Anti-Westernism has a positive effect with individuals who are most patriarchal, suggesting that there would be a significant effect under certain circumstances. Parochialism, on the other hand, seems to increase the support for Islamism but has no effect on the preference for a religious party. Furthermore, believing that democracies cause Moral Decline is positively associated with the support for Islamism and preference for a religious party, although the latter effect vanishes when controlled for support for Islamism. As a conclusion, it can be said that there is mixed evidence for this set of hypotheses, as it varies between supporting religious governance ideologically and preferring a religious party.²⁰

A similar picture for Hypothesis H3a concerning the role of Patriarchal Values emerges. Endorsing traditional gender roles seems to increase the support for religious governance entirely, however the effect vanishes for the preference for

²⁰Coefficients that lose significance after controlling for a variable are also judged to yield "Mixed Evidence" as further studies might be able to further specify the relationship.

a religious party when controlling for support for Islamism. The interaction effect between Anti-Westernism and Patriarchal Values suggest that the effect of endorsing patriarchal gender roles is strongest for individuals who are most anti-Western, giving credence to the notion that gender roles become a factor of cultural differentiation from the West. Therefore Hypothesis H3a yields mixed evidence, while Hypothesis H3b can be accepted.

One of the main focus of this thesis was to assess the role of religiosity in supporting religious governance and to avoid essentialist and tautological explanations while doing so. The analysis was able to find that *religion matters* and it matters *a great deal* when it comes to explaining the support for religious governance in Arab Muslim-Majority countries. As theorized by Hypothesis H4a, religiosity robustly predicted the support for religious governance, both ideologically as well as in the support for a religious party. However, as the analysis was able to show, it is not any kind of religiosity that increases the support for religious governance, as this effect seems to depend on the individual understanding of religion. Liberal interpretations of Islam are found to decrease the support for religious governance, both ideologically as well as the support for religious parties, leading to the conclusion that Hypothesis H4b can be fully accepted. Now, this might be said to be mostly due to lesser religious individuals who have a more liberal interpretation of their religion, yet the visualization of the interaction effects tell a different story. The moderating effect of liberal interpretations of Islam and less patriarchal views is *strongest for the most religious individuals* while it does not change much of the support for Islamism for irreligious individuals, or only slightly so. This strongly validates the idea that religiosity does not necessarily mean an increase in supporting religious governance, as it strongly depends on contingent factors of differing interpretations and patriarchal tendencies. The findings of the analysis suggest that essentialist explanations, which inextricably link Muslim religiosity to the support of religious governance, are inappropriate and further studies in the field should account for the very diverse interpretations and multidimensionality of religion and religiosity in that context. The implication of this leads to an acceptance of Hypothesis H4c and H4d.

Lastly, a robustness check between the two dependent variables has been estimated and it found that the support for Islamism indeed also strongly predicts the likelihood to endorse a religious party. Thus, Hypothesis H5 can be accepted. This result also shows that Arab citizens prefer religious parties when they also support Islamism ideologically, meaning that many individuals are in fact aware of why they support a religious party (and not do so only because of charity work by faith-based organizations).

Future research could focus on the differences of supporting religious governance ideologically and preferring or voting for an Islamist or religious party. The analysis in this thesis did show that these are related concepts, however some determinants seem to be more important than others in predicting the support for religious governance as measured by both concepts. A different approach would be to use some of the subsets of indices that were used to build the main index. Especially the concept of Shari'a Governance is more ambivalent and complex than the other concepts, which could warrant an analysis of its own. As shown by the descriptive analysis, much variation has been found between countries as well. Future research could pick out individual cases or subsets of the data and seek to explain more qualitatively what accounts for support for religious governance in the specific context of an individual country.

5 Literature

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
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6 Appendix


Table 5: Hierarchical Linear Regression - Model Selection

	Model C1	Model C2	Model C3	Model A1
(Intercept)	47.65*** (2.73)	48.80*** (2.49)	48.76*** (2.48)	48.94*** (2.02)
Male (0/1)	0.41 (0.41)	-1.70*** (0.42)	-1.51*** (0.41)	-1.74*** (0.39)
Age	-0.29 (0.20)	-0.22 (0.20)	-0.23 (0.19)	-0.89*** (0.19)
Financial Security	0.25 (0.20)	0.31 (0.20)	0.42* (0.20)	0.41* (0.19)
Education	-0.81*** (0.23)	-0.48* (0.22)	-0.36 (0.22)	-0.48* (0.21)
Employment (0/1)	-1.93*** (0.42)	-1.78*** (0.41)	-1.66*** (0.41)	-1.51*** (0.39)
Patriarchal Values		3.96*** (0.20)	3.35*** (0.20)	2.16*** (0.19)
Anti-Westernism			0.51** (0.19)	0.28 (0.18)
Parochialism			1.60*** (0.20)	1.05*** (0.19)
Moral Decline			2.46*** (0.19)	1.87*** (0.18)
Personal Piety				3.38*** (0.18)
Liberal Islam				-4.25*** (0.20)
AIC	76786	[-399]	[-269]	[-822]
BIC	76842	[-391]	[-248]	[-808]
Marginal R^2	0.0044	0.0435	0.0680	0.1574
Conditional R^2	0.2316	0.2383	0.2617	0.2916
LRT	-	400.73***	274.75***	826.40***
Observations / Countries	8781 / 12	8781 / 12	8781 / 12	8781 / 12
Variance (Intercept) τ_{00}	88.60 (9.41)	73.24 (8.55)	72.84 (8.53)	47.88 (6.92)
Variance Residual σ^2	299.65	286.37	277.63	252.87


Annotation: *** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. Model coefficients estimated with Restricted Maximum Likelihood. Aikake Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) are fitted with Full Maximum Likelihood to ensure comparability (Change in AIC and BIC indicated in square brackets). Marginal R^2 is interpreted as the variance explained by fixed factors and Conditional R^2 represents the variance explained by both fixed and random factors (or the entire model) as suggested by Nakagawa and Schielzeth and extended upon by Johnson (cf. Nakagawa and Schielzeth 2013; cf. Johnson 2014). Models show unstandardized b-coefficients, but all predictors are grand-mean centered and z-standardized. Data weighted to nationally representative samples.

Figure 10: Diagnostic Plots for Hierarchical Linear Model


Diagnostic Plots based on Model A1. No severe heteroscedasticity can be found although some values on the left hand are somewhat more sparsely distributed. Residuals and fitted values do not correlate and linearity can be assumed. Residuals are almost normally distributed with some minor deviations at the tails. Overall, the diagnostic assumptions seem to be met quite well.

Figure 11: Diagnostic Plots for Hierarchical Logistic Regression

Based on Model B2. Residuals and fitted values do not correlate and linearity can be assumed. Residuals are pretty much perfectly normally distributed. Overall the diagnostic assumptions seem to hold.

Figure 12: QQ-Plot Random Intercept for Hierarchical Logistic Regression

Based on Model B2. The random effect for the varying intercepts fits well with a normal distribution, indicating no violation of the diagnostic assumption.

Figure 13: QQ-Plot Random Intercept for Hierarchical Linear Regression

Based on Model A1. The random effect for the varying intercepts fits somewhat well with a normal distribution, however some small deviations can be found which might indicate a violation of the diagnostic assumption. Although the possible violation does not seem to be severe.

Table 6: Seat Share of Islamic parties in %

	Countries	Seat Share of Islamic parties in %
1	Algeria	12.34 (2012)
2	Egypt	69.48 (2011)
3	Iraq	25.23 (2010)
4	Jordan	5.45 (2007)
5	Kuwait	14.00 (2012)
6	Lebanon	48.15 (2009)
7	Libya	8.50 (2012)
8	Morocco	27.23 (2011)
9	Palestine	56.06 (2006)
10	Sudan	73.34 (2010)
11	Tunisia	41.01 (2011)
12	Yemen	15.28 (2003)

Taken from the *Kurzman and Turkoglu Islamic Political Parties Dataset* for the given country and the closest date available before the survey was conducted. Number in brackets indicates corresponding election year.

Table 7: Summary Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables

	N	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	Range	Skew	Kurtosis	Missing in %
Support for Islamism	11,508	47.706	19.553	46.751	0	100	100	0.132	-0.014	19.00
Religious Party (0/1)	13,162	—	—	53.71 ^a	0	1	1	—	—	7.36
Male (0/1)	14,207	—	—	50.02 ^a	0	1	1	—	—	0.00
Age	14,201	37.484	13.706	35	18	89	71	0.661	-0.198	0.04
Personal Piety	13,636	0.783	0.199	0.833	0	1	1	-0.918	0.669	4.02
Income	13,837	0.424	0.316	0.333	0	1	1	0.184	-0.925	2.60
Education	14,182	0.554	0.329	0.500	0	1	1	-0.326	-1.057	0.18
Employment (0/1)	14,201	—	—	44.10 ^a	0	1	1	—	—	0.04
Patriarchal Values	13,815	0.404	0.218	0.444	0	1	1	0.220	-0.027	2.76
Anti-Westernism	11,686	0.321	0.346	0.250	0	1	1	0.657	-0.872	17.74
Parochialism	13,436	0.245	0.252	0.250	0	1	1	1.050	0.692	5.43
Moral Decline	12,810	0.420	0.301	0.333	0	1	1	0.337	-0.633	9.83
Liberal Islam	12,279	0.603	0.180	0.583	0	1	1	0.017	0.135	13.57

^a For dummy variables, percentage of respondents in "1" category is given instead of the median.

Eigenständigkeitserklärung

Hiermit versichere ich, dass ich die vorliegende Bachelor Thesis selbständig und nur mit den angegebenen Hilfsmitteln verfasst habe. Alle Passagen, die ich wörtlich als auch sinngemäß aus der Literatur oder aus anderen Quellen wie z. B. Internetseiten entnommen habe, sind deutlich als Zitat mit Angabe der Quelle kenntlich gemacht.

Stuttgart, 13.04.2017