

## The paradox of nationalism: The common denominator of radical right and radical left euroscepticism

DAPHNE HALIKIOPOULOU<sup>1</sup>, KYRIAKI NANOU<sup>2</sup> &  
SOFIA VASILOPOULOU<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>*London School of Economics and Political Science, UK;* <sup>2</sup>*University of Oxford, UK;*

<sup>3</sup>*University of York, UK*

**Abstract.** What can explain the strong euroscepticism of radical parties of both the right and the left? This article argues that the answer lies in the paradoxical role of nationalism as a central element in both party families, motivating opposition towards European integration. Conventionally, the link between nationalism and euroscepticism is understood solely as a prerogative of radical right-wing parties, whereas radical left-wing euroscepticism is associated with opposition to the neoliberal character of the European Union. This article contests this view. It argues that nationalism cuts across party lines and constitutes the common denominator of both radical right-wing and radical left-wing euroscepticism. It adopts a mixed-methods approach, combining intensive case study analysis with quantitative analysis of party manifestos. First, it traces the link between nationalism and euroscepticism in Greece and France in order to demonstrate the internal validity of the argument. It then undertakes a cross-country statistical estimation to assess the external validity of the argument and its generalisability across Europe.

**Keywords:** euroscepticism; nationalism; radical right; radical left

### Introduction

Radical right-wing and radical left-wing parties have consistently opposed the project of European integration and have succeeded not only in distinguishing themselves from mainstream parties on this dimension, but have also managed to mobilise voters in European Parliament (EP) elections and win considerable support. The aim of this article is to examine what accounts for this common eurosceptic stance presented by these two party groups across the European Union (EU) Member States despite differences between them in terms of origins.

Two approaches are commonly used to explain positive or negative party stances towards the EU. The first identifies the role played by the ideological underpinnings of political parties (Marks & Wilson 2000; Kopecky & Mudde

2002) and the second focuses on strategic considerations (Taggart 1998; Sitter 2001; Szczerbiak & Taggart 2008). Findings from studies of radical right- and left-wing parties tend to stress differences in their origins and ideology. The shared ideology of radical right-wing parties is centred on nationalism. These parties highlight the need for resistance against external threats to the nation – often expressed by an ‘ethno-centric message’ (Hainsworth 2008) and tough policies on asylum and immigration (Mudde 1996, 2007; Mair & Mudde 1998). The shared ideology of radical left-wing parties has three key elements (March & Mudde 2005): a rejection of the values of capitalism and the free market economy; the protection of collective economic and social rights in pursuit of social justice; and the idea of states working together to address shared concerns in support of internationalism. Therefore, conventionally, the defence of the nation tends to be associated with radical parties of the right whereas radical left-wing parties are associated with the promotion of internationalism.

The argument we put forward contests this idea that radical right- and left-wing parties are so dissimilar that they take positions at opposite ends of the political spectrum across a range of issues. Instead, we argue that radical parties share elements of nationalist ideology leading to a common eurosceptic stance. Radical left-wing opposition to EU integration is grounded in the very nationalist narratives to which in theory it is fundamentally opposed. Paradoxically, nationalism is the underlying feature that unites the radical right and the radical left, cross-cutting traditional alignments and mobilising support across the political spectrum. Radical parties voice common concerns distinct from their mainstream rivals, highlighting an important debate regarding different visions of the national interest.

This article adopts a mixed methods approach in order to demonstrate, first, that nationalism is the common denominator between the two party families; and second, that it is the underlying reason why these parties adopt a negative position towards the EU. It commences with case study analysis of Greece and France, both in 2009 and across time, in order to trace the link between nationalism and euroscepticism among radical parties, using the dataset from the 2009 Euromanifestos Project (EMP) and party Euromanifestos from 1994 onwards. We choose these two cases because, despite being different in many respects, they confirm the argument to a great extent. In order to test the generalisability of the argument, the article then proceeds with a cross-country quantitative analysis examining the broad policy parallels between the two radical party families.

Alongside the cross-time analysis of party manifestos demonstrating the emergence of a new cleavage between mainstream and radical parties, we mostly focus on the 2009 European elections, which ‘book-end’ a time period

when public dissatisfaction with the EU, and its policies and institutions, had been increasing – most evidently in debates over the failed ratification of the European Constitution and the protracted progress of the Lisbon Treaty. These elections were marked by a rise in the eurosceptic vote. Radical parties of both the right and the left managed to mobilise the electorate, receiving about 10 per cent of the votes on average across the Member States (*The Economist* 2009). This development raises concerns about the implications for the future of European integration because nationalism and euroscepticism have a stronger presence in an EP which, following the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, has extended powers.

This article finds that nationalism and euroscepticism are central among radical parties independently of party competition and position in the party system. European integration is seen as a threat to the autonomy, unity and identity of the nation. The radical right expresses this from a predominantly ethnic viewpoint, while the radical left adopts a predominantly civic perspective.

## **Theoretical considerations on euroscepticism and nationalism**

### *Euroscepticism and radical parties*

What explains the similar eurosceptic trajectories followed by radical right- and left-wing parties? The answer to this question is situated within the wider debate over what drives parties' positions on European integration. This debate has been structured in terms of explanations that refer to the dynamics of the national party system versus party-specific characteristics. Taggart (1998) argues that party positions depend on the dynamics of the party system, with peripheral parties more predisposed to euroscepticism. This applies to radical parties of both the right and the left to the extent that they have a protest character and occupy a marginal position in their domestic party systems (Taggart 1998: 372, 382). Given their spatial position, they have increased incentives to oppose Europe in order to differentiate themselves from mainstream parties.

Along similar lines, Sitter (2001) argues that euroscepticism has a government–opposition dynamic, where patterns of competition shape the translation of the European question into party politics. The radical right and new populist parties are 'driven largely by their opposition or protest strategy' (Sitter 2001: 27). The old hard left and new politics parties form an ideological and protest-oriented euroscepticism. Sitter (2001) also suggests that in the case where eurosceptic parties aspire to participate in a governing coalition, they

are expected to modify their euroscepticism because of its potential electoral cost. According to this approach, radical parties have strong strategic electoral incentives to oppose the EU, which points to the importance of the national context. Although party ideology can be a component in explaining opposition to European integration, it is not enough to predict it.

Focusing on ideological factors on the other hand, Marks and Wilson (2000) suggest that a party's values and beliefs drive its response to European integration. They emphasise the importance of the deeply entrenched political conflicts that have historically shaped political life in Western Europe. They argue that traditional cleavage theory accounts for a party's position on European integration and that it is a better guide than using national variations. It follows that by paying close attention to a party's historically embedded predisposition, one can predict how it will respond to a new issue such as European integration.

Hooghe et al. (2004: 125) argue that the ideological positioning of parties towards the extremes of the left–right dimension is very powerful in accounting for their negative EU positions. The radical right and left represent polar normative ideals with the former being nationalist, authoritarian and populist (Mudde 2010) and the latter being universalistic and expressing support for internationalism (March & Mudde 2005: 25; Bornschier 2010). The euroscepticism of the radical right is strongly linked to opposition to immigration and the defence of the national community and culture against foreigners. On the other hand, radical left-wing EU opposition tends to be 'rooted in the perception that European integration fundamentally threatens cherished radical left goals' (Hooghe et al. 2004: 128) as the EU is thought to favour neoliberal policies.

These two approaches are not necessarily antithetical as it is problematic to detach ideology from strategy given that parties do not operate in isolation. Hence scholars increasingly tend to examine party EU stance by carrying out spatial analysis of party positions on a cultural and a socioeconomic dimension (Kriesi et al. 2006; Bornschier 2010). This article also adopts an approach that incorporates both the ideological and strategic elements of party politics, recognising that ideology may be shaped by strategic considerations in the context of party competition. We argue, on the one hand, that nationalism constitutes the common ideological basis of both party families and, on the other, that the *type* of nationalism utilised differs depending on strategy – that is, the targeted constituencies and party politics.

### *The nationalist Janus and the euroscepticism of radical parties*

How is nationalism associated with radical party families and their negative positions on European integration? This article proposes a causal connection

between nationalism and euroscepticism among radical parties, arguing that nationalism – as the attainment and maintenance of unity, autonomy and identity of a deemed nation (Breuilly 2005) – cuts across party lines, is central to both party families and constitutes the common denominator of both radical right- and left-wing euroscepticism. Radical parties perceive the idea of Europe as a threat to the autonomy, unity and identity of the nation. Parties of the radical right oppose the EU on predominantly ethnic grounds as they perceive it to be a threat to the nation's cultural homogeneity. Radical left-wing parties are sceptical towards the EU on predominantly civic grounds as they perceive it to be a vehicle of great power intervention and imperialism and a threat to the territorial integrity of the nation-state. This relationship is conceptualised through a process-tracing mechanism (Gerring 2006: 181) in Figure 1 below.

The core principle of nationalism is the congruence of national and political units (Gellner 1983; Freedman 1998; Mudde 2007). Although scholars may




Figure 1. Argument flow.

disagree on its origins or scope, emphasising either its political, ideological or cultural power, nationalism may be seen as one single concept in terms of its 'well defined goals of collective self-rule, territorial unification and cultural identity, and often a clear political and cultural programme for achieving these ends' (Smith 2010: 24). Aiming at enabling meaningful scholarly discussion among theorists of nationalism, including modernists, perennialists and ethno-symbolists, Breuilly (2005: 16–17) defines nationalism as 'a political movement for the attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population, some of whose members deem it to constitute an actual or potential "nation"'. In doing so he essentially accepts Smith's<sup>1</sup> definition of nationalism with an alteration – the replacement of the term 'ideological' with the term 'political'. Therefore scholars tend to agree that the prime aim of nationalist movements is the pursuit and maintenance of national self-determination (Gellner 1983; Hechter 2000; Breuilly 2005) – that is, the desire to give politico-institutional expression to the nation (Freeden 1998: 752).

The key premise of any nationalism is the right of the nation to act as independent, free and sovereign. It is a coherent ideology in as much as it refers to the pursuit of autonomy, unity and identity of a nation and provides answers to the national question. What nationalism lacks is systematic answers to key social questions such as justice and welfare (Freeden 1998: 751). This leaves it as a thin ideology, granting it the ability to attach itself to other ideologies that do provide such answers. Hall (2011) emphasises the chameleon-like nature of nationalism, describing it as sticky, attaching itself to different situations according to the political forces with which it interacts. Because of its 'sticky' or 'thin' nature, nationalism has often been described as a 'modern day Janus' (Nairn 1975) – both a progressive, inclusive force and a reactionary extremist movement (Minkenberg 1995; Hechter 2000: 6); both 'democratic and authoritarian and both left-wing and right-wing' (Haywood 1992: 136). This Janus-faced character has led to the identification of two types of nationalism: the ethnic, which is exclusive and organic, defined by a community of birth and a native culture; and the civic, which is inclusive and voluntary, emphasising historic territory, legal political community and a civic culture (Kohn 1946; Smith 1991; Zimmer 2003).

The pursuit and most importantly the maintenance of national self-determination links nationalism to both the right and the left, which represent the two faces of the nationalist Janus. Because a key element of nationalism is its ability to promote a 'sense of belonging and membership in which *sentiment* and *emotion* play an important role' (Freeden 1998: 752), nationalism has a propensity for radicalisation. This radicalisation of nationalism by parties outside of the mainstream irrespective of whether they belong to the right or the left is likely to result in equally radical views on European integration and

hence accounts for their euroscepticism. Because of the constituencies targeted, however, the two party families appropriate different components of national identity in their nationalism, reflecting 'the varying capacities of different political groups to appropriate the national idea to their particular needs' (Breuilly 2000: 220). Subsequently, the radical right predominantly emphasises the ethnic elements of nationalism while the radical left emphasises the civic elements.

### *Ethnic nationalism and radical right-wing euroscepticism*

Nationalism is often associated with the radical right and criticised as an irrational doctrine with a fanatical vision and a propensity towards violence (Kedourie 1960). It is historically linked to extreme movements of the right including Italian fascism, Nazism and Japanese militarism (Nairn 1975: 5). Scholars stress the compatibility of at least some elements of nationalism with right-wing radicalism (Kedourie 1960; Breuilly 1993; Freedman 1998; Hechter 2000). Radical right nationalism is rooted in the supremacy of the nation, which is idealised as a homogeneous and fixed entity. It seeks congruence between the nation and the state (Gellner 1983; Mudde 2007: 16), where the nation is defined as an ethnic community 'inhabited exclusively by members of the native group' (Mudde 2010: 1173). Espousing a narrow and largely *ethnically* based exclusionary representation of the nation, defined by criteria such as language, creed, race or community of birth, the radical right seeks 'to provide a sense of solidarity and belonging that binds supporters to their vision of the nation and society' (Hainsworth 2008: 67).

Radical right-wing parties portray the nation as an organic pre-modern community and defend its homogeneity by promoting difference and exclusivity. The EU is by definition a heterogeneous entity. It consists of a number of different nations and promotes labour and cultural mobility among its members. This runs counter to the mission of radical right parties whose priority is to protect the nation against foreign influences. Hence their policies are directed against immigration (Hainsworth 2008). They put forward an ethno-centric message that stresses the incompatibility of the EU with ethnic values and seeks to save 'the endangered nation and people from cosmopolitan, decadent, alien and anti-national influences' (Hainsworth 2008: 66). It is primarily the exposure to and mixing with foreign cultures that prompt radical right parties to oppose European integration in an 'effort to construct an idea of nation and national belonging by radicalising ethnic, religious, cultural and political criteria of exclusion' (Minkenberg 2002: 337).

*Civic nationalism and radical left-wing euroscepticism*

Nationalism and the left usually are treated as polar opposites and theoretically incompatible (Minkenberg 1995; Mevius 2011). The main features of the radical left include a rejection of capitalism, a call for a major redistribution of resources, 'the espousal of collective economic and social rights' (March & Mudde 2005: 25) and internationalism. Marxism (Nairn 1975: 3) and subsequent radical left-wing movements and parties perceive class as the only social cleavage while other divisions can only be understood as 'false consciousness'. However, we argue that nationalism is, paradoxically, a strong feature of the radical left.

Radical left-wing movements and/or parties find that providing a national programme (i.e., one dealing with autonomy, unity and identity) as well as answers to the problematic 'national question' are imperative for maintaining legitimacy at the domestic level. As the radical left may only pursue class interest within the territorial framework of the nation-state (Breuilly 2011), it equates nation with class, 'counter-posing quite abstract internationalism to a pragmatic support of nationalist struggles' (Nairn 1975: 22). It assumes that every national project will correspond to an essential class, bringing nationalism to the core of anti-imperialist left-wing ideology because it contains explicit support for its key premise, national self-determination, and the pursuit and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity.

The relationship between nationalism and left-wing radicalism may be traced historically as the 'product of the Enlightenment and the French revolution' (Erk 2010: 425), where there is a close link between nationalism and civic concepts such as 'popular sovereignty' (Yack 2001) and 'class' (Schwarz-mantel 1987). The combination of the national, class (Hobsbawm 1990; Mevius 2011) and popular dimensions of the French Revolution culminated in directing 'its struggle against the social elite of its own *ethnie*' (Smith 2004: 203) – in other words, in the equation of nation and people, seen from below as representing the common interest of the nation against the privileged elites (Hobsbawm 1990: 20). This explains why nationalism has been associated with early radical and labour movements of the 1830s, 1840s and 1850s (Breuilly 2011) as well as with a number of more recent radical left-wing and/or communist movements, whose trajectory can be explained by this equation of nation with class, including Stalin's Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mao's China, Nasser's Egypt, Ho Chi Minh's Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (Tonnesson 2009) and Milosevic's Serbian Communist Party (Mevius 2011: 2).

Radical left-wing parties oppose European integration by equating class with national exploitation. Unlike the radical right, the radical left does not



emphasise the homogeneity of the nation but rather seeks emancipation and independence from great powers which are seen as exploitative of the popular classes. It focuses on territory and presents itself as more inclusive and *civic*. In the radical left we may discern a nationalism characterised by a fervent opposition to imperialism and domination, support for a strongly anti-Western foreign policy and a critique of domestic collaborationists (Breuilly 1993: 156–166). This corresponds to radical left-wing party positions on the EU which they view as an imperialist power contradicting the basic principles of autonomy and national self-determination. They perceive the EU as a vehicle for elite and great power domination at the expense of the popular classes. They tend to support an anti-Western foreign policy that equates EU foreign policy with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and condemn all military involvement as Western imperialism. They provide a strong critique of all other parties which they describe as led by corrupt and privileged elites collaborating with the dominant imperialist powers of the EU. Emphasising the defence of popular classes, territory and the equation of nation with class, the euroscepticism of radical left-wing parties is predominantly associated with civic nationalist ideals.

Therefore radical party euroscepticism may be understood in terms of a clash between nationalists rather than a clash between nationalists and non-nationalists. Largely due to their ethnocentric ideology and ‘fear of the other’, radical right-wing parties interpret the maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity as the right of the nation to be homogeneous, and support the allocation of welfare based on ethnicity and culture as the criterion for national membership. Since class interest may only be pursued through the territorial framework of the nation-state (Breuilly 2011), the radical left also develops the need to annex nationalism. Parties of the radical left equate nation with class and express their nationalism in terms of the right to emancipation from great powers and opposition to capitalism and imperialism. Since the radical left focuses on class exploitation, when it annexes nationalism it radicalises it with strong class, anti-imperial, anti-capitalist and anti-establishment arguments. The idea of Europe is seen as undermining the autonomy, unity and identity of the nation whether that is seen through a predominantly ethnic (radical right) or predominantly civic (radical left) prism. Parties of the radical right oppose European integration, which they perceive as a threat to the nation’s cultural homogeneity; they espouse the civic components of nationalism but justify them on ethnic terms. On the other hand, radical left-wing parties are sceptical towards the EU as they perceive it to be a vehicle of great power intervention and imperialism and a threat to the territorial integrity of the nation-state. They espouse civic nationalism but tend to steer away from the ethnic components of nationalism.

## Research design

In order to ground this argument empirically, this article carries out analysis on two levels, adopting a mixed-methods approach. We commence with case study analysis both on a single time point (2009 EP elections) and across time (1994 onwards). We have chosen two cases –Greece and France– as, although they are different in many respects, we observe that in both the relationship between nationalism and euroscepticism among radical right- and left-wing parties corresponds with the argument outlined above. We then proceed to carry out large-N analysis in order to test the external validity of the argument and the extent to which it can be generalised. By conducting cross-country quantitative analysis the article displays the ‘big picture’ and identifies a correlation between euroscepticism and nationalism in the European radical right and radical left in the 2009 EP elections. The rationale behind this research design is to first show the applicability of our argument by examining a small sample and then to assess the extent to which it may apply across a larger universe of cases.

Both levels of analysis use identical measurements of the dependent variable, *Euroscepticism*, and the principal independent variable of interest, *Nationalism*, which are operationalised as follows.

### *Euroscepticism*

‘Euroscepticism’ may be broadly defined as a sentiment of disapproval towards European integration. For the purposes of this article, we draw upon Vasilopoulou (2011) that focuses on a number of aspects of cooperation at the EU level. Based on this approach, we have identified the following four variables as composing the European integration dimension: *economic integration*, *enlargement*, *cultural integration* and *future deepening*. The first three variables refer to the policy practice of the EU, while the last one is broader and refers to Member States’ willingness for an ever closer union:

- *Economic integration*: Opposition to policies such as economic and monetary union (EMU) and the Single Market.
- *Enlargement*: Denial of entry to new EU members.
- *Cultural integration*: Support for the preservation of national cultures in Europe.
- *Future deepening*: Opposition to the creation of an ever closer union operationalised by looking at general support for the EU and the transfer of powers and competences.

## Nationalism

Having defined ‘nationalism’ as the attainment and maintenance of the unity, autonomy and identity of the nation, it follows that in order to operationalise this variable first we need to define and measure the components of the nation itself. This article takes Breuilly’s reformulation of Smith’s definition of the nation as ‘a named human population occupying an historic territory and sharing common myths and memories, a public culture, and common laws and customs for all members’ (Breuilly 2005: 16). As the definition implies, nations are constituted by a number of different components including: religion (Hastings 1997); language (Gellner 1983); common culture, myths, memories, historical experiences (Smith 1991, 2010); state institutions (Breuilly 1993) and voluntary membership – that is, a common will to belong (Renan 1882 [1996]). We can broadly categorise these into four main constitutive groups: the *ethnic*, *cultural*, *territorial* and *economic*. The first two refer to the ethnic origins of the nation – that is, the ascriptive, such as creed and language; the second two refer to the civic origins of the nation – that is, the voluntary, including the economy, the education system and the law. Smith (1991) provides a typology in which he groups and systematises these ethnic and civic elements that together constitute the nation. Drawing on his typology, we operationalise the nationalism dimension on the basis of four variables:

- *Ethnic*: The criteria for inclusion within a nation. A nation defined by characteristics such as language, creed or descent is by default exclusive. We measure the ethnic nationalism variable in terms of degree of openness and, more specifically, party positions on policies including multiculturalism, immigration, citizenship and tolerance of outsiders (such as opposition to foreign labour).
- *Cultural*: The reproduction of the pattern of values that constitutes a nation, measured in terms of support for traditional values and a willingness to preserve the national way of life, including support for morality, religion, tradition and patriotism.
- *Territorial*: The right to national self-determination within a specific and predefined territory measured in terms of support for territorial integrity, including the right to sovereignty, an independent foreign policy and support for strategic isolationism.
- *Economic*: A common economy measured in terms of support for the national currency, protectionism, the maintenance of tariffs and restrictions on trade, and the maintenance of traditional means of production.

## **The nationalist determinants of euroscepticism in Greece and France**

Greece and France have different relationships to European integration in terms of the timing and purpose of their joining the EU and in terms of their status and position, with the latter being a core state and motor of EU integration and the former a peripheral state and laggard within the EU. The fact that these two countries are dissimilar in terms of their relationship to European integration but still exhibit a close link between nationalism and euroscepticism among radical right and radical left party families provides a good starting point for a potentially generalisable argument which we will test in the quantitative section of this article. In this section we carry out spatial analysis of party positions on the above dimensions (European integration and nationalism) during the 2009 EP elections. Furthermore we code party Euromanifestos on each individual component of the nationalism and EU dimensions for each EP election from 1994 onwards. In doing so, we trace the link between nationalism and euroscepticism in Greece and France in order to demonstrate the internal validity of the argument.

### *Party spatial representation during the 2009 European Parliament elections*

#### *Data and method*

The analysis below employs specific data on Greece and France from the European Manifesto Project (EMP) component of the European Election Study (EES) project (Braun et al. 2010). The EMP group coded policy commitments in party manifestos for the 2009 EP elections into nine domains and several other categories, ranging from external relations to mentions of particular social groups. Each policy statement in a manifesto is considered to be a coding unit and assigned to one of the pre-defined issue categories. After coding each document, the EMP estimates the frequency of the policy statements in each issue category, calculated as a percentage of the total number of statements. The coding scheme employed by the EMP explicitly measures party policy alternatives by classifying policy sentences into issue categories for which a different code is assigned for positive and negative references (Wüst & Volkens 2003; Braun et al. 2010: 34–46). For instance, a party manifesto might include statements supporting the need for maintenance or even extension of tariffs to provide protection against the single market, which would be coded in the category ‘protectionism: positive’. Conversely, another party might support less state involvement and support free trade, which would be coded as ‘protectionism: negative’.

We constructed our own measures of party positions by creating new issue scales from the coded items included in the EMP dataset on the *European*

*integration* and *Nationalism* dimensions following the method employed by the Manifesto Research Group/Comparative Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP) (Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006). Our measure of *European integration* is constructed by subtracting eurosceptic mentions from those in support of the EU on four aspects of European integration: economic integration; enlargement; cultural integration; and future deepening. This gives an overall ‘net’ score for each party. A positive score indicates a favourable EU stance, whereas a negative score indicates a eurosceptic position. The measure of *Nationalism* is constructed from mentions reflecting higher to lower degrees of ethnocentrism. Positive scores of the variable indicate an ethnocentric position, whereas negative scores reveal a less ethnocentric position. Examples of references revealing more support for nationalism include negative mentions of immigration and multiculturalism and positive appeals to patriotism. The composite *Nationalism* scale is further divided into four individual components – ethnic, cultural, territorial and economic – consistent with our classification scheme above (Smith 1991).<sup>2</sup> In order to verify that these components of *Nationalism* address distinctive concerns, in Table 1 we present the correlation between pairs of components.

The individual components of *Nationalism* are all associated, however in varying degrees. The overall measure of *Nationalism*, as expected, is highly correlated with its components. The correlation between the four individual components is also significant with two exceptions: the *economic and ethnic*, and the *economic and cultural* aspects of nationalism. Overall, the strength of the associations of the individual components shows that although they are not

Table 1. Association between measures of nationalism

	Nationalism overall	Nationalism ethnic	Nationalism cultural	Nationalism territorial	Nationalism economic
Nationalism overall	1				
Nationalism ethnic	0.6206*	1			
Nationalism cultural	0.6452*	0.2978*	1		
Nationalism territorial	0.7231*	0.2341*	0.2150*	1	
Nationalism economic	0.5451*	0.1033	0.0869	0.2907*	1

Notes: Reported coefficients of pairwise correlations; \* significant at 5% level ( $p \leq 0.05$ ).

completely independent from each other, they tap into different elements of the ideology of nationalism.

*Findings and discussion*

The left–right cleavage tends to be perceived as the main dividing line in most European political systems. Equally in Greece and France, left–right alignment appears to be enduring as social class and the economy remain important determinants of voting behaviour (Lyrintzis 2005: 244; Kriesi et al. 2006: 937; Hale Williams 2009).<sup>3</sup> Figure 2 situates Greek parties in 2009 on the left–right axis, ranging from the most left-wing Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)<sup>4</sup> to the most right-wing New Democracy (ND). Figure 3 paints an interesting picture of French politics where the distribution of party positions is skewed towards the left on the left–right axis. The centrists, the socialists, the Gaullists and (to a lesser extent) the communists seem to have colluded *vis-à-vis* the extremist Front National (FN).

In both countries, however, we discern increasing polarisation on aspects independent of the left–right dimension, including issues of cultural identity and European integration. In Greece, this emerging polarisation mostly represents a division between social forces promoting the ‘modernisation’ of Greece and those that seek to obstruct it (Featherstone 2005). In France, we observe a clear division on European issues, which in combination with party positions on the nationalism dimension may be seen as representing a wider




Figure 2. Left–right dimension, Greece (range: –100 [left] to +100 [right]).




Figure 3. Left–right dimension, France (range: –100 [left] to +100 [right]).

cleavage between ‘integration and demarcation’ (Bornschieer 2008; Bornschieer & Lachat 2009) or ‘winners and losers from globalisation’ (Kriesi et al. 2008). This new societal division arguably has been accentuated by Jean Marie Le Pen (Perrineau 1997: 64), who ‘has actively sought to weaken the impact of economic issues by declaring that the socio-economic cleavage has lost any relevance, and has been replaced by opposition between the proponents of a cosmopolitan and those of a national identity’ (Bornschieer 2008: 89).

Figures 4 and 5 present our results on the nationalism dimension. Figure 4 shows that the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and ND exhibit a propensity towards internationalism, whereas SYRIZA, the Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS) and the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) are situated very close to each other, advocating instead nationalist values. Measuring Greek party attitudes to issues including ‘nationalism, immigration, ethical issues, and civil liberties’, Gemenis and Dinas (2010: 189) find similar evidence of polarisation between Greek parties and the emergence of a new cleavage ‘over the nature and character of value priorities’. The radical left-wing KKE links its nationalism to civic ideals including anti-Westernism and anti-imperialism (Kalyvas & Marantzidis 2002). The latter was heightened by the party’s view of the Cyprus issue in 1974 as a ‘proof that the country had been wronged by the United States and NATO’ (Kalyvas & Marantzidis 2002: 678–679). The nationalism of radical right-wing LAOS is predominantly associated with ethnic values (Georgiadou 2008; Sotiropoulos 2010). Its policy




Figure 4. Nationalism dimension, Greece (range: –1 [internationalist] to +1 [nationalist]).




Figure 5. Nationalism dimension, France (range: –1 [internationalist] to +1 [nationalist]).

positions represent the logic of ‘patriotic interference’ – namely the party puts the ‘nation’ first in every policy decision (Karatzafelis 2009).

Figure 5 shows a similar picture. The Union for a Popular Movement (UMP) and the Democratic Movement (MODEM) are the most internationalist parties in the French system, whereas FN is clearly the most nationalistic.<sup>5</sup> The Communist Party of France (PCF)<sup>6</sup> is situated to the right of the axis, closer to FN than any other French party. PCF’s ideological stance has been somewhat ambivalent as historically it sought to combine revolutionary internationalism with defence of French national interests (Minkenberg 1995: 6). Like KKE, its nationalism is inextricably linked to anti-Western and anti-imperialist feelings, since the party presents itself as the guarantor of French national independence from external powers (Lazar 1995: 20). The themes of nation and identity are central to FN’s ideology (Davies 1999: 65). This ethnic, identity-centred starting point is inextricably linked to the doctrine of national preference, which advocates the defence of French culture and identity (McCulloch 2006: 167) and can be summarised by the party’s well-known slogan ‘*La France d’abord*’.

The parties of the radical right and radical left do not have identical positions on the nationalism axis. However, the facts that in both countries, the radical left-wing parties are situated to the right of the middle point of the axis; they are the most nationalistic after the radical right LAOS/FN respectively; and they are situated considerably apart from the nearest mainstream party (ND/UMP) are significant findings in themselves and point towards the emergence of a new cleavage in both societies.

Alongside the above observations, Figures 6 and 7 display a clear pro-anti EU division in both countries. Figure 6 shows that SYRIZA, KKE and LAOS are all clustered near the extreme eurosceptic end of the spectrum *vis-à-vis* the europhile PASOK and ND. Similarly Figure 7 shows that FN and PCF oppose European integration in contrast to UMP, MODEM and PS, which are fervent supporters of the project.

It is obvious from Figures 4 and 6 that SYRIZA, KKE and LAOS side together on the axis measuring opposition to/support of European integration




Figure 6. European dimension, Greece (range: -1 [against] to +1 [for]).






Figure 7. European dimension, France (range: -1 [against] to +1 [for]).

as well as the dimension measuring levels of nationalism. We discern a picture whereby SYRIZA, LAOS and KKE have a nationalist anti-EU agenda, whereas ND and PASOK are pro-European and also exhibit lower levels of nationalism. This confirms our expectation that both radical left- and right-wing parties are situated on the same end of the axis *vis-à-vis* the more internationalist mainstream parties. A very similar picture is displayed in Figures 5 and 7 where radical parties are both nationalist and eurosceptic *vis-à-vis* the mainstream parties which are both internationalist and pro-EU.

#### *Party positions over time*

The above picture of party positions during the 2009 EP elections can also be observed over time. Having coded Euromanifestos based on our operationalisation of the nationalism and European integration dimensions, we examine both radical and mainstream parties in order to show their contrasting positions on the two dimensions. Our sample comprised of all the available manifestos of the Greek and French parties included in Appendix 1. We looked at a total of 34 manifestos – 15 Greek and 19 French – for all the EP elections from 1994 to 2009. Our analysis includes predecessor parties (see note to Table 2). We read through the manifestos in order to identify statements related to our components of both the ‘European integration’ and ‘nationalism’ dimensions. Where there was no relevant statement or mention, we coded it as ‘0’; in this case the party does not appear in Table 2.

We discern two important findings. First, mainstream parties are neither nationalistic nor eurosceptic. In Greece, both mainstream PASOK and ND are in favour of European integration. ND has always been pro-EU and was the main driver of Greek accession to the then European Community at the beginning of the 1980s (Verney 1994). PASOK had initially adopted an anti-European and somewhat erratic policy, which, however, changed as part of its programmatic modernisation from the end of the 1980s onwards, placing Greece at the forefront of European integration (Spourdalakis & Tassis 2006:

Table 2. Nationalism and Euroscepticism in Greek and French manifestos 1994–2009

Euroscepticism	Country	1994		1999		2004		2009	
		YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
<i>Economic integration</i>	<i>Greece</i>	ND PASOK	KKE	ND PASOK	KKE	ND PASOK SYRIZA	KKE LAOS	ND PASOK	KKE SYRIZA
	<i>France</i>	RPR/UDF PS	FN PCF	MODEM RPR PS	FN PCF	MODEM PS UMP	FN PCF	MODEM PS UMP	FN FG/PCF
	<i>Greece</i>				KKE	ND PASOK	KKE SYRIZA	ND PASOK	KKE LAOS
<i>Enlargement</i>	<i>France</i>	RPR/UMP PS	PCF	RPR PS		PS UMP	MODEM	UMP	FN
	<i>Greece</i>	PASOK	KKE			ND PASOK SYRIZA	LAOS	ND PASOK	LAOS
<i>Cultural integration</i>	<i>France</i>	RPR/UDF PS	FN PCF	MODEM PS RPR	FN	MODEM PCF PS UMP	FN	MODEM UMP	FN
	<i>Greece</i>	PASOK	KKE	ND PASOK	KKE	ND PASOK SYRIZA	KKE SYRIZA	ND PASOK	KKE SYRIZA
<i>Future deepening</i>	<i>France</i>	RPR/UDF PS	FN PCF	MODEM PS RPR	FN PCF	MODEM PS UMP	FN PCF	MODEM PS UMP	FN FG/PCF
	<i>Greece</i>	PASOK	KKE	ND PASOK	KKE	ND PASOK SYRIZA	KKE SYRIZA	ND PASOK	KKE SYRIZA

Nationalism	Country	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO
Nationalism ethnic	Greece		PASOK			LAOS	PASOK SYRIZA	LAOS	KKE ND PASOK SYRIZA MODEM FG/PCF
	France	FN		FN	PCF PS	FN	MODEM PCF PS	FN	
	Greece	KKE	PASOK	KKE		KKE LAOS ND	PASOK	KKE LAOS ND	PASOK
Nationalism cultural	France	FN PCF RPR/UDF		FN PCF RPR	MODEM PS	FN PCF UMP	MODEM PS	FN	MODEM FG/PCF UMP
	Greece	KKE		KKE		KKE LAOS SYRIZA	ND PASOK	KKE LAOS SYRIZA	ND PASOK
Nationalism territorial	France	FN PCF		FN PCF RPR	MODEM PS	FN PCF	MODEM PS UMP	FN FG/PCF	MODEM UMP
	Greece	KKE	PASOK	KKE		KKE LAOS	ND PASOK SYRIZA	KKE LAOS SYRIZA	ND PASOK
Nationalism economic	France	FN PCF PS		FN PCF PS	MODEM PS RPR	FN PCF	MODEM PS UMP	FN FG/PCF	MODEM UMP

Note: (1) absence of party means no reference to the variable; (2) there are certain cases for which we do not have manifestos: ND 1994; LAOS and SYRIZA 1994/1999 (parties established in 2000 and 2004 respectively); (3) PCF ran as part of a coalition of Left parties in 2009 and for that year it is referred to as PCF/FdG; (4) The French centre-right has run as RPR/UDF in 1994; RPR in 1999 and UMP in 2004 & 2009; (5) We coded MODEM for 2009 and UDF for 2004 and 1999. In 1994 UDF ran with RPR.

498, 501). This finding is consistent with the observation that in Greece, modernisation, development, progress and reform have been equated with Westernisation and a belief that Greece should remain at the core of the EU (Economides 2005; Featherstone 2005). Thus, whereas mainstream parties have supported the deepening of European integration and Greek involvement in the process over time<sup>7</sup> as part of the country's modernisation, SYRIZA, LAOS and KKE have opposed the project as they equate this modernisation with a violation of their nationalist principles.

Similarly, our findings depict a France divided on the issue of European integration in the past two decades. FN and the Communists are the main anti-European French forces whereas MODEM, PS and UMP are clearly in favour of European integration.<sup>8</sup> Similarly to PASOK, the European policy of PS varied in the period preceding the 1980s but became consistently pro-European since then, as part of the party's modernisation (Featherstone 1988). Despite the Gaullists' old anxieties over European integration until the end of the 1980s (Shields 1996), UMP has adopted a very pro-European stance similar to the centrist MODEM. For all these parties, Europe is seen as a vehicle of French empowerment at the global level. PS and MODEM argue that Member States may only recover from any occurring crises through European cooperation. UMP puts forward a similar European message, also arguing that Europeans should defend their own values.

Second, there is a trend where radical parties whether right or left are consistently nationalist and eurosceptic. Both party families seek to preserve the unity, autonomy and identity of the nation whether emphasising the ethnic or the civic elements of nationalism. The radical right LAOS and FN equate the nation with a homogenous ethnic group that has the right to self-rule and sovereignty (FN 2004; LAOS 2009). Like other radical right-wing parties across Europe (Mudde 2007), they utilise the elements of 'chosenness' (Smith 2003)<sup>9</sup> and superiority of national identity, placing an emphasis on the ethnic and cultural elements of nationalism. They seek to defend the Greek and French nations, respectively by protecting them from 'non-native elements' epitomised by, among others, the EU (FN 1999, 2009: 1). They thus justify their euroscepticism on the basis of ethnicity. They both portray the EU as destructive of national identities, with LAOS justifying its position on the basis of maintaining the historical, cultural and ethnic roots of the Greek nation (LAOS 2004: 2) and FN seeking to protect French values and traditions from European erosion (FN 1994: 4, 2004: 7, 2009: 2). The European model has assumed power over policies that have traditionally been thought to belong to the realm of the 'national' rather than that of the 'international'.

For the radical left KKE and PCF, the EU is a product of imperialism. It represents a competition between capitalist powers for wealth, which these

parties equate with the injustice, inequality and exploitation of nations (PCF 1994: 7, 1999; KKE 1994: 9, 2009: 1). The EU is thus associated with a Western imperial project (PCF 1999: 10; KKE 2004: 4) and is opposed in an attempt to protect the nation, which is equated with class (KKE 1999: 5), its territory and its sovereignty (KKE 1994: 1; PCF 1994: 6) from external imperialists. In particular in its older manifestos, PCF makes specific reference to Germany as a great and exploitative power (PCF 1994: 7). Both parties criticise the Treaty of Maastricht as reinforcing EU imperialism by institutionalising its ability to interfere not only at the economic, but also at the political and defence/security, levels. Both KKE and PCF oppose European integration on the basis that it is every peoples' undisputed right to choose their own struggle, fate and future and their socioeconomic and political system (PCF 1999: 4; KKE 2009: 1, 12). KKE (1999: 10, 2004: 8) dismisses the other political parties in Greece as internal collaborators aiding the imperialist project of the EU, pledges to end the political control of the state by foreign capital, and supports the establishment of social justice based on the nationalisation of the economy. Its anti-EU agenda, which is legitimised on nationalistic grounds, places the Greek communists within 'a national-populism of the left' (Featherstone 2005: 233). PCF (PCF/FG 2009: 1) associates the EU with an economic model alien to France's own social and economic traditions, linking the recent economic crisis to a neoliberal free-market Europe. The party prioritises the autonomy and unity of the nation as '*domaine régalien*' seeking to safeguard the 'rights' of nations, and the 'identity' and the 'fundamental interests' of each EU Member State (PCF 2004).

We thus discern an emerging cleavage during the last decades between mainstream and radical parties in both Greece and France. In Greece, the ideological divide between the two mainstream parties has substantially decreased (Featherstone 2005; Gemenis & Dinas 2010) as they have developed a managerial attitude towards politics (Lyrantzis 2005). On the other hand, SYRIZA, LAOS and KKE seek to provide a clear but not necessarily 'orthodox' alternative to the other parties in the Greek political landscape (Gemenis & Dinas 2010). In a way, these two blocs represent two political cultures – namely the 'modernising' and the 'underdog' (Diamandouros 1993). The modernising culture views Greece as a modern entity open to influences from the west (Sotiropoulos 2010: 317), including European integration. The 'underdog' culture, on the other hand (Diamandouros 1993: 4; see also Mouzelis 1995), is essentially ethno-centric and premodern, viewing Greeks as 'either victims of foreign conspirators or wag[ing] battles to resist superior forces, . . . which includes popular resistance against domestic elites in favour of foreign imported reforms' (Sotiropoulos 2010: 317).

Equally in France, the distance between the mainstream centre-right and centre-left parties has decreased substantially, over time moving in the same direction as the median voter (Hale Williams 2009: 603). With regard to the issue of Europe, we can distinguish two opposing arguments. Centrist parties promote active participation in the European project as the only way to guarantee prosperity in France, whereas the PCF and FN view European integration as a type of regional globalisation with unpleasant implications for the nation-state. Our findings conform with previous research that supports a general transformation of politics in France and argues that since the 1980s/1990s, 'cultural conflicts related to the different conceptions of norms that should be binding in society, of the way community is conceived, and of the balance of power between the nation-state and the European Union have emerged' (Bornschier 2008: 77).

### Nationalism and euroscepticism across Europe

Having examined the link between nationalism and euroscepticism in Greece and France, we proceed by testing the applicability of the argument across Europe. The source of our party policy position measures is the EMP component of the EES project (Braun et al. 2010) which we also used in our spatial analysis above. The party policy position data includes the policy platforms of 189 political parties in the 27 EU Member States that competed in the 2009 EP elections. The unit of analysis is the issue-specific position of each party within an EU Member State at the time of the 2009 EP election.

We include a classification of parties into family groupings, which is the one followed by the EMP and is based on similarities of parties' historical origins. In the EMP, parties are grouped into ten party families: green; (post-) communist; social democrat; liberal; Christian democrat; conservative; agrarian; nationalist; ethnic and regional; and a final group comprising special interest parties (Klingemann et al. 2006: 75; Braun et al. 2010: 47). The classification of party families relies on the EMP groupings with one exception. Although our radical left category corresponds to the (post-)communist group, the parties belonging to our radical right group were selected independently. Nevertheless, this group corresponds closely to the nationalist party family included in the EMP classification (with three exceptions<sup>10</sup>). The main expectation is that parties at both edges of the political systems in Europe agree on euroscepticism – not *despite* but *because* of their common fear regarding the erosion of national sovereignty. This fear is incorporated into a common nationalism among both party groups – with the radical right emphasising the

ethnic aspects and the radical left focusing on the civic-territorial components. There is a common underlying cause of euroscepticism rooted in the idea of protection of national sovereignty.

We first want to examine how far parties of the radical right and radical left are positioned from each other on European integration and nationalism, including on their different components. In this part of the analysis we focus on the party positions of 19 radical right and 23 radical left parties. We computed party group means for radical right and radical left parties and calculated the distances between the two party groups. We also estimated standard deviations of the positions of parties within each group to measure the degree of differentiation of party positions on European integration and nationalism within the two groups. Table 3 presents the results.<sup>11</sup>

The distance measures indicate a low level of divergence on nationalism among the radical right- and left-wing party groups on the territorial and economic components, but more divergence on the cultural and ethnic components. Parties of the radical right and left across Europe presented a similar picture on economic and territorial nationalism, but differentiated themselves on ethnic and cultural nationalism. This is consistent with our expectation that radical right-wing parties express nationalism by emphasising ethnic and cultural characteristics. Interestingly, although we expected less agreement in the territorial and economic components emphasised by the radical left-wing

*Table 3.* Distance between the positions of radical left and radical right parties on nationalism and European integration

	Mean radical left	Mean radical right	Distance	Divergence radical left	Divergence radical right
Nationalism					
Ethnic	-0.64	0.56	1.21	0.57	0.64
Cultural	-0.002	0.88	0.89	0.96	0.47
Territorial	-0.34	-0.04	0.30	0.61	0.86
Economic	0.36	0.55	0.19	0.84	0.76
Overall	-0.17	0.60	0.78	0.51	0.45
European integration					
Future deepening	-0.39	-0.57	0.18	0.71	0.76
Economic	0.05	0.03	0.02	0.98	1.01
Enlargement	0.08	-0.50	0.58	1.03	0.84
Cultural	-0.50	-1.00	0.50	0.92	0.00
Overall	-0.24	-0.56	0.32	0.77	0.72

parties, our findings indicate that radical right-wing parties adopted a similar stance on these components. The overall measures of nationalism signify agreement among the radical right and left in Europe. The standard deviations within groups indicate that radical right-wing parties disagree more on the territorial component and radical left-wing parties disagree more on the cultural component. Within the party groupings there is divergence on nationalism.

Parties of the radical right and radical left adopt similar positions on all aspects of European integration. This agreement is more pronounced than in the case of nationalism. Both types of parties present their most eurosceptic position on the issue of cultural integration. This is an indication that concerns over retaining the national way of life and national cultures in Europe is a primarily unifying concern for radical parties' euroscepticism. This confirms our theoretical claim that European integration is seen as a force eroding national identities and cultures (Carey 2002; McLaren 2002; Bruter 2005; Hooghe & Marks 2005).

Radical right and left parties also express their euroscepticism over the issue of future deepening of the EU. The process of future deepening is a highly politicised issue since it not only entails extending the range and number of policy decisions that are agreed at the EU level but also at this stage of the integration process involves a decision about moving away from a purely economic union to a more political entity. Future deepening in the 2009 EP elections after the failed Constitution and the difficulties in the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty thus not only entails restrictions on national autonomy over policy making, but most importantly is perceived as posing an even greater threat to political sovereignty.

In terms of contestation over aspects of European integration within the radical party groups, the standard deviations indicate significant disagreement over economic integration, showing that there are both radical right and left parties that completely reject policies such as the Single Market or the EMU and radical parties that adopt more moderate positions on such policies.

Although the link between positions on European integration and nationalism is more prominent in the positions of the radical parties of the right and left, in this section we explore whether this relationship cuts across party family lines by employing OLS regression analysis. The composite measure of party position on European integration is the dependent variable in models 1 and 2. In models 3 and 4, in order to identify the effect of our independent variables on future integration, the dependent variable is one component of the European integration measure on future deepening.

Euroscepticism is thought to derive from two types of concerns that stem from an assessment of the effects of European integration and particular EU



policies to the domestic policy goals of parties as represented by their ideology (Hooghe et al. 2004; Marks et al. 2006). The first type of concerns relates to the socioeconomic nature of EU policies linked with party positions across the left–right dimension, and the second type of concerns is focused on threats to state autonomy and on national cultural identity linked to positions on nationalism (Kriesi et al. 2006; Bornschier 2010). Though these two types of concerns are not completely independent of each other (Hooghe et al. 2004; Marks et al. 2006), we argue that they tap into different parts of party ideology and have different implications for the future of the integration process.

We examine across models how party positions on European integration are influenced by positions on the left–right dimension of contestation and by positions on nationalism. We employ the measure of left–right positions as coded by the EMP (Braun et al. 2010). Higher values indicate a more right-wing position. Our measures of nationalism vary across models. In models 1 and 3 we include our composite measure of nationalism, whereas in models 2 and 4 we include its four individual components: ethnic, cultural, territorial and economic.

We also account for each of the party family groupings by including a set of dummy variables in the models using the classification of the EMP with the changes we made to the radical right grouping (Braun et al. 2010). To account for differences in levels of euroscepticism between the ‘old’ EU-15 and ‘new’ EU-12 Member States we include a dummy variable that distinguishes the party positions of the Member States into the two groups. This variable captures differences in the domestic economic and political contexts between Eastern and Western Member States as well as the differences in the perceptions and experience of EU participation between ‘old’ and ‘new’ ones (Marks et al. 2006).

Domestic factors specific to each country during the election could influence party positions and introduce bias into our results. To control for country-specific effects we include individual country dummies in our estimations. An additional concern in our estimations is the presence of heteroskedasticity, which in OLS causes standard error bias (Gujarati 2003: 387). To account for this we use the Huber-White robust treatment of errors, which relaxes the OLS assumptions that errors are both independent and identically distributed and produces results that tend to be more reliable (Wooldridge 2002: 405–407).

As shown in Table 4, the results largely confirm the expectation that parties with higher levels of nationalism have eurosceptic positions. In model 1 an increase in nationalism is associated with a decrease in support for European integration ( $p \leq 0.01$ ). This relationship also exists in model 2 for the ethnic and territorial components, as indicated by the negatively signed coefficients of ‘Nationalism ethnic’ and ‘Nationalism territorial’ ( $p \leq 0.05$ ). This result

Table 4. Party position on European integration and future deepening, robust OLS estimators with country dummies

	<i>European integration</i>		<i>Future deepening</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
<i>Right Left position</i>	0.004 0.047 (0.007)	0.015 0.162 (0.007)*	0.014 0.056 (0.018)	0.036 0.138 (0.019)+
<i>Nationalism overall</i>	-0.624 -0.328 (0.207)**		-1.381 -0.259 (0.554)*	
<i>Nationalism ethnic</i>		-0.533 -0.240 (0.263)*		-0.758 -0.122 (0.625)
<i>Nationalism cultural</i>		-0.108 -0.140 (0.081)		-0.229 -0.105 (0.187)
<i>Nationalism territorial</i>		-0.187 -0.265 (0.063)**		-0.533 -0.270 (0.212)*
<i>Nationalism economic</i>		0.108 0.118 (0.081)		0.210 0.082 (0.213)
<i>Green/ecology parties</i>	-0.215 -0.036 (0.266)	-0.346 -0.058 (0.256)	0.449 0.027 (0.763)	0.290 0.017 (0.729)
<i>Radical left parties</i>	-0.811 -0.036 (0.309)**	-0.730 -0.157 (0.299)*	-2.102 -0.161 (0.842)*	-1.842 -0.141 (0.831)*
<i>Social Democratic parties</i>	0.061 0.015 (0.260)	-0.057 -0.014 (0.255)	0.879 0.078 (0.755)	0.597 0.053 (0.747)
<i>Christian Democratic parties</i>	0.108 0.023 (0.290)	-0.112 -0.024 (0.332)	1.213 0.095 (0.794)	0.697 0.054 (0.903)
<i>Conservative parties</i>	0.025 0.004 (0.391)	0.068 0.012 (0.386)	1.210 0.080 (1.042)	1.263 0.084 (1.044)
<i>Radical Right parties</i>	-1.631 -0.322 (0.689)*	-1.471 -0.290 (0.668)*	-3.401 -0.239 (1.756)+	-3.243 -0.228 (1.786)+
<i>Agrarian parties</i>	0.005 0.0004 (0.567)	-0.053 -0.004 (0.578)	0.849 0.025 (1.851)	0.990 0.029 (1.825)
<i>Ethnic and Regional parties</i>	0.266 0.042 (0.338)	0.149 0.023 (0.317)	2.461 0.138 (1.053)*	2.479 0.139 (1.042)*
<i>Special Interest parties</i>	-1.249 -0.252 (0.449)**	-1.460 -0.295 (0.462)**	-2.399 -0.173 (1.311)+	-2.802 -0.202 (1.378)*
<i>EU15</i>	-0.544 -0.175 (0.503)	-1.765 -0.568 (1.043)	-3.311 -0.380 (1.436)*	-7.633 -0.876 (4.908)
Constant	0.564 (0.356)	1.928 (0.986)	2.001 (0.867)*	6.436 (4.766)
Observations	189	189	189	189
Adjusted R-squared	0.36	0.40	0.33	0.35

Standardised coefficients reported on the second line; robust standard errors in parentheses; + significant at 10% level ( $p \leq .1$ ); \* significant at 5% level ( $p \leq .05$ ); \*\* significant at 1% level ( $p \leq .01$ ). The individual country dummy estimates are not reported in the table but are available upon request. Reference categories are Liberals for party family and Sweden for the member states.

indicates that parties' ideology embedded in the assertion of national independence and protection from outsiders (ethnic component), combined with a defence of territorial integrity (territorial component), structures their positions on European integration. This eurosceptic stance for parties that express greater nationalism in their 2009 EP election manifestos is rooted in what the EU represents: an external force that erodes national identity and state sovereignty.

We argue that such parties are likely to belong to either the radical right or radical left party grouping, but we are also open to the possibility that nationalism may not be restricted to these two groupings since the effect is present even accounting for party family groupings. The estimation parameters presented in models 3 and 4 indicate that nationalism contributes to the rejection of the idea of further deepening in the EU. In model 4 it is evident that it is the territorial component of nationalism that drives this effect, as indicated by the negatively signed and significant coefficient ( $p \leq 0.05$ ). This result suggests that parties that express territorial nationalism are resistant to future integration since they possibly perceive it as a threat to national sovereignty.

The effect of left–right position on euroscepticism varies across models. This variable is only significant in models 2 (at  $p \leq 0.05$ ) and 4 (at  $p \leq 0.1$ ) indicating that right-wing parties adopt favourable positions in relation to the overall process of European integration and on future deepening. However, concerns over issues relating to the left–right dimension determine support or opposition to European integration in the 2009 EP elections but not to the same extent that concerns over nationalism do as indicated by the standardised coefficients of the variables. This does not mean that left–right ideology has *no* impact on EU stance, but that socioeconomic concerns follow those regarding state autonomy and issues of national identity and culture, controlling for nationalism and party family.<sup>12</sup>

The parameter estimates for the effect of party family on positions on European integration indicate across models that radical parties of both the right and the left express eurosceptic views compared to those of liberal parties (the reference category). Special interest parties also express greater euroscepticism compared to the liberal parties. This is not surprising since parties in the special interest group are likely to be single-issue parties competing on an anti-integration platform in the 2009 EP elections. Although this group is heterogeneous, in some of these cases nationalism is also found – for example, the United Kingdom Independence Party. However other special interest parties which are nationalist, such as ethnic and regional parties, strongly support future deepening of the integration process compared to the liberals. This points to potential limitations of the model, although it may be that such parties are nationalist but not eurosceptic because they see the EU

as a vehicle towards independence from the nation-state. The rest of the party families are closer to the liberals. Radical parties of the right and left also express more disagreement with future deepening of the EU compared to the liberals, as is indicated by the negative and significant coefficients of these variables ( $p \leq 0.05$  and  $p \leq 0.1$ , respectively).

The results across models also indicate that parties in the EU-15 'old' Member States express a higher degree of euroscepticism than parties in the newest Member States,<sup>13</sup> but the results are not significant, with the exception of model 3. The parameter estimates indicate that there is increasing resistance to future deepening expressed by parties in the 'old' EU Member States compared to parties in the 'new' ones ( $p \leq 0.05$ ).

Overall, the results confirm that nationalism is strongly associated with euroscepticism<sup>14</sup> in the 2009 EP elections. Euroscepticism is driven by radical parties of both the right and left. This finding is consistent with the results from previous research regarding a strong association between party family and position on European integration (Marks et al. 2002).

## Conclusion

Existing literature tends to associate nationalism with right-wing parties. Scholars often stress that although narratives of the right tend to be nationalist in character, parties of the left tend to be internationalist. Also, comparative studies of party politics conduct research primarily *within* rather than *between* party families. Research has tended to analyse radical right-wing and radical left-wing parties in isolation. This article has bridged the gap between and within the two literatures by focusing on the paradoxical role of nationalism as part of both radical right- and left-wing euroscepticism.

This study adopts an integrated approach to answering this puzzle and improving the prospect of making valid inferences in both case study and cross-national research. The analysis of Greece and France revealed the presence of an increasing party polarisation on aspects independent of the left-right dimension, including issues of cultural identity and European integration. Radical right- and left-wing parties side together on the axis measuring opposition to/support of European integration as well as on the dimension measuring levels of nationalism, whereas the distance between mainstream parties has substantially decreased. There are clear commonalities across the radical parties' stances in both countries. These were evident for the components of nationalism and for the parties' position towards the EU, which was one of scepticism based upon the right to self-rule and national self-determination.

The empirical findings largely confirm the main expectation that parties with higher levels of nationalism tend to adopt a eurosceptic position. First, the comparative analysis of party manifestos showed that radical right- and left-wing parties adopt a similar stance on economic and territorial nationalism, but exhibit divergence in their ethnic and cultural nationalism. This important finding supported the prior expectation that radical right-wing parties express nationalism by stressing its ethnic and cultural elements. Second, the regression analysis showed that, across model estimations, parties with higher levels of nationalism take more eurosceptic positions. Specifically, parties whose ideological basis rests on the assertion of national independence and protection from external ‘others’ (the ethnic component) combined with a robust stance on territorial integrity (the territorial component) are hostile to the EU. Radical parties of both the right and left hold the most nationalist and eurosceptic positions.

Overall, the finding that party-based euroscepticism of the radical right and left is rooted in nationalism is interesting in the context of De Vries and Edwards’ (2009) findings that radical right- and left-wing parties can effectively sway citizens’ opinions against European integration. However, it is difficult to determine whether these parties reshape their positions in response to citizens’ pre-existing fears regarding the erosion of sovereignty and national identity, or, instead, whether their nationalistic – and eurosceptic – positions play a key role in shaping popular concerns. Based upon the findings obtained here, future research could examine other EU Member States in greater detail, looking at the relationship between the nationalism and euroscepticism of radical right- and left-wing parties. Research could also examine whether mainstream parties are increasingly using elements of nationalism in their platforms (and the relative prominence of each component) and whether this influences their stance towards the EU.

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## Appendix 1. Percentage of votes cast and seats gained in the 2009 European Parliament elections

<i>France</i>	<i>Percentage of vote</i>	<i>Seats</i>
The Left Front (Left Party + French Communist Party) (FG/PCF)	6.48	5
Socialist Party (PS)	16.48	14
Democratic Movement (MODEM)	8.46	6
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)	27.88	29
National Front (FN)	6.34	3

<i>Greece</i>	<i>Percentage of vote</i>	<i>Seats</i>
Communist Party of Greece (KKE)	8.35	2
Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)	4.70	1
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)	36.64	8
New Democracy (ND)	32.29	8
Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)	7.15	2

## Appendix 2. Party establishment

### France

<i>Party</i>	<i>Year of establishment</i>
The Left Front (FG/PCF), composed of the Left Party and the French Communist Party <sup>a</sup>	2009
Socialist Party (PS)	1969
Democratic Movement (MODEM), successor of the Union for French Democracy (UDF)	2007
Union for a Popular Movement (UMP), merger of several centre-right parties	2002
National Front (FN)	1972

Note: <sup>a</sup> PCF was established in 1921.

## Appendix 2. Continued.

### Greece

Party	Year of establishment
Communist Party of Greece (KKE)	1918
Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA)	2004
Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK)	1974
New Democracy (ND)	1974
Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)	2000

## Notes

1. According to Smith's (2010: 9) definition, nationalism is 'an ideological movement for attaining and maintaining autonomy, unity and identity for a population which some of its members deem to constitute an actual or potential "nation"'.
2. Details of the correspondence between individual issue categories and the *European integration* and *Nationalism* measures are available upon request from the authors.
3. For information on the electoral performance and party establishment dates, see Appendix 1 and 2.
4. SYRIZA is a complicated case as it is a recent coalition of different forces of the left that has been changing from the end of 1980s onwards. We have included it in our spatial analysis because it has consistently run for European elections. However, because of its constantly changing structure and membership, its ideological position has not been consistent and thus we do not examine it in detail.
5. The French Socialist Party (PS) does not appear in Figure 5 as the EMP project has not coded any of the aspects of nationalism which compose the nationalism dimension in our analysis. This is also confirmed in our coding where there was no reference to any of the nationalism components. Giving it a value of '0' would produce misleading results because it entails a central position.
6. In 2009, PCF ran with the Left Party (Front de Gauche).
7. Note that we observe territorial nationalism in the 1999 ND and PASOK Euromanifestos, which does not correlate with the parties' EU position at the time. Rather this is an isolated phenomenon related to the war in the neighbouring former Yugoslavia.
8. UMP favours EU enlargement but opposes Turkish accession. MODEM favours a common European ethnic, cultural, territorial and economic model among EU members, but defines more narrowly who should be an EU member. Their policy on enlargement is inconsistent in general terms. They seem to exclude those countries which, according to them, do not share 'European' values, including democratic and Christian traditions – for example Turkey.
9. Here we refer to Smith's (2003: 44–45) parallel between nationalism and religion in terms of their collective, ritual and symbolic character. The idea is that each nation perceives itself as the only authentic and 'true' nation – that is, the 'chosen' one.

10. We added the Flemish Bloc in Belgium and the Austrian Freedom Party because they both belong to the radical right party family (Mudde 2007: 8) but were not included in the EMP. We also excluded the Greek Ecologist Greens as they do not belong to the radical right party family.
11. To allow comparison across issues in Table 3, the scales have been standardised by dividing the net score by the additive score of all mentions on an issue (before calculating the measures of distance and variation) (Laver & Garry 2000; Volkens 2006). The range is two.
12. This does not mean that left–right ideology has *no* impact on their EU stance. Robustness checks showed that right–left position has a stronger impact on party position on European integration when we drop the party family dummies from the models, indicating that party family captures the effect of the left–right ideology.
13. Szczerbiak (2008: 240) discusses the issues involved in trying to locate meaningful statements that can reveal attitudes towards the EU in new Member States. In our composite measures of European integration and future deepening we have a small number of such cases in both groups of countries. The results remain robust when we employ our standardised measures of position that exclude these cases from the model estimations.
14. The results hold when we use the standardised measures of position. The most significant difference in the estimations using standardised positions is that the coefficient for social democratic parties is positive and significant ( $p \leq 0.05$ ), indicating a more europhile stance compared to liberal parties.

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*Address for correspondence:* Daphne Halikiopoulou, Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK. Tel.: +44 (0)20 7955 7805; E-mail: d.halikiopoulou@lse.ac.uk