


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Seminar Paper

Deliberation Across the World

A Cross-National Examination of the Link Between Deliberation and Regime Support in 113 countries

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Abstract

This seminar paper seeks to investigate deliberation and its relationship to regime support across the world. This is accomplished by exploring the relevant literature and deriving hypotheses from it, which are subsequently tested by using survey data covering 113 countries and 306,047 individual respondents. Given that self-reported regime support is expected to be biased, a weight is applied to account for possible distortions of the data, though results are also reported for the unweighted variable due to the experimental nature of this weight. As this paper is the first known to the authors that examines the effect of deliberation on regime support in a cross-country design, the used deliberation measurement, the Deliberative Component Index from the “Varieties of Democracy”-Project, is examined in a thorough manner and analyses are conducted for its components as well. The analysis finds contradictory evidence for the proposed hypotheses. Deliberation seems to increase regime support first and foremost in democracies, the results in non-democracies and the complete sample are ambiguous and less robust. Furthermore, an exploratory mediation analysis is conducted, to test whether the macro-effect of deliberation on regime support is mediated through democratic performance evaluation on the individual level. The findings of the analysis suggest that further studies in the field should investigate the relationship between deliberation and regime support as well as democratic performance evaluation in greater detail and find possible methods to remedy bias in self-reported regime support. Moreover, more sensible ways to measure deliberation on the country level are necessary, as it is highly correlated with democracy, although some interesting deviations could be found within the subsamples as well as in regards to the individual components.

Contents

1	Introduction	4
2	Theory	5
2.1	Regime Support	5
2.2	Deliberative Theory	9
2.3	Linking Deliberation to Regime Support	11
3	Empirical Section	17
3.1	Data Merging and Operationalization	17
3.2	Possible Bias and Correction	25
3.3	Statistical Methodology	29
3.4	Descriptives	30
3.5	Multilevel Regression Analysis	34
3.6	MSEM - Mediation Analysis	46
4	Conclusion	49
5	Literature	54
6	Appendix	60
6.1	Operationalization and Descriptives	60
6.2	Multilevel Regressions: Full Model Reports	67
6.3	Model Comparisons	74
6.4	Regression Diagnostics	79

List of Figures

1	A General Conception of Political Support	7
2	Proposed Relationships between Deliberation and Regime support	16
3	Difference between Polity/FH and the DCI	23
4	Regime Support by Polity/FH	26
5	Regime Support by Freedom of Discussion	27
6	Regime Support Across the World 2010 - 2015	31
7	Deliberation Across the World 2000 - 2010	32
8	Bivariate Relationships between Deliberation Indicators and Regime Support (High Bias)	33
9	Complete Sample: Models A1.1 to F1.6	36
10	Democracy Sample: Models A2.1 to F2.2	40
11	Non-Democracy Sample: Models A3.1 to F3.6	43
12	MSEM - Mediation Analysis	48
A1	Bivariate Relationship between Polity/FH and DCI	62
A2	Distribution of DCI by Regime Type	62
A3	Correlation Matrix	64
A4	Bivariate Relationships between Deliberation Indicators and Regime Support	65
A5	Bivariate Relationships between Deliberation Indicators and Regime Support (Low Bias)	66
A6	Standardized Regression Plots: Models P1.1 to P.3.3	68
A7	Model Comparison Complete Sample: Regime Support (No Bias)	75
A8	Model Comparison Complete Sample: Regime Support (Low Bias)	75
A9	Model Comparison Complete Sample: Regime Support (High Bias)	76
A10	Model Comparison Democracy Sample: Regime Support	76
A11	Model Comparison Non-Democracy Sample: Regime Support (No Bias)	77
A12	Model Comparison Non-Democracy Sample: Regime Support (Low Bias)	77
A13	Model Comparison Non-Democracy Sample: Regime Support (High Bias)	78
A14	Individual-Level Residual (QQ-)Plot: Model A1.4	79
A15	Country-Level Residual QQ-Plot: Model A1.4	80

List of Tables

1	The Concept of Political Support according to Easton	6
2	DCI and Subcomponents	20
3	DCI and Subcomponents: Correlation with Polity/FH	21
4	Weighting of Regime Support	28
5	Summary of Results	51
A1	Data Sources	60
A2	Operationalization Regime Support	60
A3	Operationalization Democratic Performance Evaluation	61
A4	Summary Statistics	63
A5	Latent Variable Modeling: Regime Support	63
A6	Countries and Country Codes	67
A7	Polity/FH: Statistical models P1.1 to P.3.3	68
A8	Complete Sample: Statistical models A1.1 to F1.3	69
A9	Complete Sample (including Polity/FH dummies): Statistical models A1.4 to F1.6	70
A10	Democracy Sample: Statistical models A2.1 to F2.2	71
A11	Non-Democracies Sample (including Polity/FH): Statistical models A3.4 to F3.6	72
A12	Non-Democracies Sample: Statistical models A3.1 to F3.3	73
A13	Model Comparison: A1.1 to F1.6	74
A14	Model Comparison A2.1 to F2.2	74
A15	Model Comparison: A3.1 to F3.6	74

1 Introduction

Since political theory took its “deliberative turn” (Dryzek 2000) in the 1990s, empirical political science has increasingly turned towards deliberation as well. There have been numerous studies about its requirements and consequences. This paper is concerned with the latter. Deliberative theory along with empirical science has developed manifold assumptions about the effects of deliberation, including transformation of preferences, epistemic quality, consensus and accommodation, as well as side-effects on civic virtues like political trust (cf. Bächtiger and Wyss 2013: 164-165). Given the current decline of trust in governments and political institutions in many democracies across the world (cf. Foa and Mounk 2016), deliberation could be seen as a process to arrive at legitimate decisions in societies of increasing complexity (see for example: Habermas 1994: 7-8; Warren and Gastil 2015: 562). This paper seeks to investigate what can be theorized as a side-effect of deliberation: political support for the regime. This study differs from previous ones in the following terms: It is the first to examine the effects of deliberation on regime support in a cross-national framework across a large dataset of 306,047 respondents from 113 countries across all continents. Moreover, the analysis is not restricted to democratic regimes, but also includes non-democracies.¹ Therefore, a recent theoretical development, the conceptualization of deliberation outside of democratic contexts, so called *authoritarian deliberation*, is taken into account (see: He 2014; He and Warren 2011; He and Thøgersen 2010).

The main research question of this thesis states as follows: *What role does Deliberation play for regime support across the world?* The following section establishes the theoretical framework of political support and derives possible determinants of regime support. Next, the concept of deliberation is clarified and the link between deliberation and regime support is drawn, from which hypotheses are derived (Section 2). The next section presents the research design of this study and the results of the analysis (Section 3). In the end, the findings of the analysis will be summarized and the conclusion gives an answer to the research question along with a discussion of implications for further research (Section 4).

¹For the purposes of this paper we consequently refer to political systems as non-democratic in accordance with the Polity IV project classification of autocracies and anocracies.

2 Theory

The following subsection will conceptualize regime support and introduce possible explanatory frameworks that were gathered from the relevant literature (Section 2.1). In this section, the concept of deliberation is clarified (Section 2.2) and a link between deliberation and regime support is established, from which research hypotheses are subsequently derived (Section 2.3).

2.1 Regime Support

As a concept of political science, political support has been first introduced by David Easton (cf. Easton 1965; Easton 1975). He defines political support in the following way: "We can say that A supports B either when A acts on behalf of B or when he orients himself favorably toward B; it may be a goal, idea, or institution. I shall designate supportive actions as overt support and supportive attitudes or sentiments as covert support" (Easton 1965: 159). For the purposes of this paper, we will concentrate on *covert support* or "supportive attitudes", as such attitudes are the subject of most surveys and empirical research. Political support thereby relates to supportive attitudes of citizens towards the political system. What objects can be the target of such attitudes? Easton differentiates between three types of support objects, the *political community*, *political regime* and *political authorities* (cf. Easton 1965: 171-225):

1. The *political community* comprises the members of a political system and the basic values represented by it. The basis of such a community is an individual's sense of belonging and the feeling of mutual solidarity between the members of this community.
2. The *political regime* consists of the network of institutions that uphold a political system, i.e. the legislative, judicative or executive institutions.
3. Lastly, *political authorities* consist of the actual personalities that occupy the institutions (for example parliamentarians, heads of state).

Where does support for the mentioned political objects come from? According to Easton, two types of support sources, *diffuse* and *specific*, can be distinguished (cf. Easton 1975: 436-439). Specific support is sourced in the performance and outputs of a political system and its institutions. It is therefore targeted at

Table 1: The Concept of Political Support according to Easton


		Objects of Support		
		<i>political community</i>	<i>political regime</i>	<i>political authorities</i>
Sources of Support	<i>diffuse</i>	identification with the political community	regime legitimacy regime trust	legitimacy of authorities trust in authorities
	<i>specific</i>	-	-	Satisfaction with everyday output

Table based on Fuchs 1989: 18.

and often dependent on the personal assessment of the current administration. On the other hand, according to Easton, diffuse support is a commitment to specific political values and norms, as well as to the concrete political structures responsible for the implementation of that political and social order. Diffuse support is therefore more robust and a more long-term source of support than specific support.

Accordingly, the stability of a given political system, what Easton calls *persistence*, relies on a minimum amount of political support in the citizenry (cf. Easton 1965: 211). Easton further divides diffuse political support into political legitimacy and trust (cf. Easton 1975: 447-453). On the one hand, legitimacy is the degree to which political and moral principles of a political system are in line with one's own values and principles and ideas of political and social order. On the other hand, political trust is based on the subjective conviction that the political system produces positive outputs and complies with generally binding normative political rules without the need for explicit control or active participation on part of individual citizens (cf. Newton 2008: 242). Table 1 shows a summary of the Eastonian framework of political support taken from Fuchs (1989).

In reference to Dieter Fuchs, who build upon Easton's theoretical considerations in regards to democracies, political support can also be differentiated on three levels of the political system: as an agreement to the *values* of a system, as attitudes towards the regime at the *structural level* and as support for the political authorities at the *procedural level* (cf. Fuchs 2002: 37-39; Fuchs 2007: 165-166). Because Fuchs focused his considerations on democracies, we also draw from Marlene Mauk who described how to apply them more generally to all types of political systems, including non-democracies (cf. Mauk 2017: 4-5). Located at the top of the hierarchical structure of political support, Fuchs theorizes that

Figure 1: A General Conception of Political Support

Modified from Fuchs (2002), (2007) and adapted from Mauk (2017).

the normative principles of the political system are crucial for its persistence (and thereby broadly correspond to the Eastonian legitimacy concept). As such, the values embodied by a political system need to correspond to the values of the citizen (*political value orientations*) and the given overlap influences support for the institutional framework at the structural level (*regime support*) and its authorities at the procedural level (*incumbent support*), a relationship that Fuchs calls the *overflow of values*. For example, citizen who subscribe to democratic ideals should be more inclined to support a democratic regime and its leadership, while endorsement of authoritarian rule should be positively related to support for authoritarian regimes and leadership, a relationship that Mauk was able to show is specifically true for authoritarian political systems (cf. Mauk 2017: 27). However, according to Fuchs, there is also an effect that goes in the opposite direction, starting from the procedural support, i.e. the support for specific political authorities, which influences attitudes towards the political regime and ultimately the political value system as a whole. Fuchs calls this effect the *generalization of experiences*. The model suggested by Fuchs and Mauk allows a more general and comprehensive conceptualization of political support and is therefore applied in this work.

For the purposes of this paper, a focus will be set on trust and diffuse support rather than legitimacy or specific support. Regime support, as defined in this paper, is then embodied by the trust that citizens express towards the political regime and is thereby located at the structural level of political support. Figure 1 depicts the adaptations made by Fuchs (2002), (2007) and Mauk (2017).

The literature often distinguishes between two general explanations for regime support: culturalist and institutionalist explanations. Institutionalist approaches to regime support are mostly guided by rational choice models of cost-benefit analysis, whereby an individual subjectively assesses the political system and evaluates its performance in terms of its own goals (cf. Lipset 1959: 86; Lipset 1967: 445-446). Thus citizen's regime support is hypothesized to increase when they can derive a certain benefit from it, for example increased standards of living or the psychological satisfaction of seeing one's ideas represented. This link is also included in Easton's system-theoretical model for political support: The political system provides outputs that are demanded by citizens and therefore contribute to their political support (cf. Easton 1965: 32). According to Fuchs, performance of a regime can be further classified into two categories: *democratic* and *systemic performance* (cf. Fuchs 1998: 151-152). Systemic performance is associated with classical measures of material well-being, like gross domestic product and economic growth or the regime's ability to provide security to its citizens. In contrast, democratic performance relates to the regime's ability to provide ways to participate in the political system, as well as guarantee individual liberties and public accountability. As Mauk points out, democratic political systems have an inherent advantage when it comes to democratic performance, however this mustn't mean that non-democratic regimes can't produce a certain level of democratic performance as well: "[...] to the extent that they allow for at least limited multiparty competition and grant extended civil liberties, the electoral authoritarian regimes of Mozambique and Malaysia boast a higher democratic performance than the politically closed authoritarian regimes of China and Sudan." (Mauk 2017: 10). The relationship between satisfaction with democratic or systemic performance and regime support has already been demonstrated empirically in numerous analyses (see: cf. Kornberg and Clarke 1992; Mishler and Rose 2001; Newton and Norris 2000; Zmerli 2004; Ehin 2007; Listhaug et al. 2009).

While institutionalist explanatory approaches emerge from broad theories of political economy and are guided by an economic viewpoint of cost-benefit analysis on social relations, culturalist explanatory approaches are largely influenced by political culture research and the focus is on values, norms and social relations. The central idea of the concept is the so-called congruence postulate, first thought of by Almond and Verba in their seminal book about political culture (cf. Almond and Verba 1963: 31). As Patrick puts it: "the stability or instability of political systems is to a large degree dependent on the congruence or incongruence between political structure and political culture" (Patrick 1984: 290). Two such explanatory approaches fit within the culturalist framework: Putnam's social capital theory (Putnam 2001) and Inglehart's value change thesis (Inglehart 1997). The former concerns itself with the importance of social networks, while the latter is an extension of the classical modernization theory. As the focus of this work does not lie with these sets of theories, we limit our discussion about them in this paper and relegate interested readers to Zmerli and van der Meer (2017) and Welzel and Dalton (2015) for modern takes on social capital theory and value change, respectively.

2.2 Deliberative Theory

In order to draw a link between deliberation and regime support, the theoretical concept of deliberation must first be clarified. For over twenty years, deliberation has been a topic of great interest to political theory and empirical political science. One of the main contributors to deliberative theory is the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas. His classical model of deliberation is characterized by the logic of communicative action, by which the action orientations of participants are coordinated through acts of common understanding, instead of strategic calculations about their own success (cf. Habermas 1982: 385). The ideal deliberative procedure, as described by Cohen, needs to meet the following criteria (Cohen 2003: 346-347): First, ideal deliberation is *free* in that "the participants regard themselves as bound only by results of their deliberation [...] [and] suppose that they can act from the results, taking the fact that a certain decision is arrived at through their deliberation as a sufficient reason for complying with it". The second criterion for ideal deliberation is that it must be *reasoned*. Participants justify

proposals with reasons and assume that these reasons and no other factors will determine whether these proposals are accepted. The next criterion is formal and substantive *equality*: Participants “are formally equal in that the rules regulating the procedure do not single out individuals [...] [and are] substantively equal in that the existing distribution of power and resources does not shape their chances to contribute to deliberation, nor does that distribution play an authoritative role in their deliberation”. Lastly, deliberation’s ideal goal is to arrive at a rational *consensus*, which Cohen describes as finding “reasons that are persuasive to all who are committed to acting on the results of a free and reasoned assessment of alternatives by equals”. To sum up, this type of deliberation contains the process of rational consideration of arguments, in which the participants provide elaborate reasons relating to the common good to justify their positions, respect other opinions and are truthful as well as willing to yield to better arguments (cf. Bächtiger et al. 2010: 35-37).

The discussed type of ideal deliberation is quite demanding and therefore invited criticism from different directions. Bächtiger et al. (2010: 42-48) discern between the Habermasian “type I” deliberative theory and “type II” deliberation, under which they subsume criticisms and further developments. This type of deliberation contains a range of theoretical adaptations and does not represent a unified theory. Generally, the focus changed from the deliberative process to deliberative institutions and outcomes and some of the strict requirements of the classical model are loosened or dropped completely. For example, scholars pointed out that not all citizens are equally skilled in rhetoric, which can be dependent on factors like socio-economic background, gender or ethnicity (cf. Sanders 1997: 349). Thus, one branch of type II theory introduced the admissibility of other forms of speech besides rational argumentation, as for example rhetoric, emotion, humor or storytelling (cf. Dryzek 2000: 48). Moreover, Mansbridge et al. argue that self-interests can be legitimate in some forms because they don’t necessarily violate deliberative ideals and therefore should not be completely excluded from the concept of deliberation (cf. Mansbridge et al. 2010: 72-73). Other adaptations define the ideal results of deliberation in more detail and lower the threshold of admissible outcomes by focusing on meta-consensus and inter-subjective rationality instead of rationally motivated consensus (cf. Niemeyer and Dryzek 2007: 522).

Moreover, in type II deliberation the truthfulness criterion is relaxed or abandoned entirely, as it doesn't capture the possibility of multiple and complex intentions and is not necessary for argument accessibility or the willingness to cooperate and to change one's opinion (cf. Markovits 2006: 257-258; Bächtiger et al. 2010: 44).

2.3 Linking Deliberation to Regime Support

This section establishes a link between the two previously introduced concepts deliberation and regime support. In the theoretical framework of political support introduced in the previous chapter, deliberation can be located at the structural level. The degree to which a political system and its institutions are deliberative is a feature of the actual implemented institutional structure. However, one might argue that deliberation may relate to the process level as well. One can imagine examples where attitudes towards political incumbents change through deliberative processes, especially if the specific authorities provide reasoned justifications for their decisions or implement deliberatively agreed upon policies. Concerning the value level, deliberation might be also associated with regime support. Deliberation ideal-typically fulfills the function of will-formation and can transform values of participants (cf. Habermas 1994: 8-9). The relationship somewhat resembles Fuchs' "generalization of experience": deliberation influences incumbent along with regime support and therefore affects the attitudes towards the whole value system. Since this study aims at a more general macro framework of political support that allows for comparison across countries, our conceptualization places deliberation solely at the structural level.

Next, the causal pathway along which deliberation might influence regime support is examined in greater detail. Drawing this link can be achieved by considering some of the presumed benefits and desirable outcomes of deliberation. According to some scholars, deliberation is necessary to arrive at legitimate decisions in complex societies (see for example: Habermas 1994: 7-8; Warren and Gastil 2015: 562). As discussed before, the aim of deliberation is rational consensus or at least some form of meta-consensus. This involves the transformation of preferences, which at first refers to the attitudes towards the alternative policies considered through deliberation, ideally in a direction of more public-spirited orientations (cf. Fishkin 2009: 134). The epistemic quality of decisions is assumed to increase

when they are deliberated (cf. Bächtiger and Wyss 2013: 164). In addition, deliberation can change individual attributes of participants like civic capacities or virtues. Though not consistently, participants of deliberation have shown changes in knowledge, internal and external efficacy as well as political trust (cf. Fishkin 2009: 139; Grönlund et al. 2010: 114). Between the two alternative approaches to explain regime support, we analyze deliberation within the institutionalist framework because deliberative practices can be seen as a form of democratic performance that the regime affords to its citizen. In our view, deliberation is therefore assumed to increase regime support because more deliberative systems benefit the citizens – through reasoned decisions with high epistemic quality and common good orientation, mutual respect or a feeling of efficacy – which they evaluate and reward with increased support. For the cross-national framework of this paper, the following hypothesis is derived:

Hypothesis H1: *The more deliberative a political system is, the higher is the support for the regime.*

Since this paper aims to explain regime support across different countries, democracies and non-democracies alike, the relationship between democracy and deliberation needs to be examined. In the literature, deliberation is often discussed exclusively in democratic contexts, especially regarding models of deliberative democracy (for example Habermas 1994; Cohen 2003). In such conceptualizations, deliberation and democracy are closely linked to each other. On the other hand, critics assume an inconsistency between deliberative procedures of participation and democratic principles like equality (cf. Sanders 1997: 347-350; Lafont 2017). For the purposes of this paper deliberation and democracy are considered to be distinct phenomena, as Dryzek puts it: “Deliberative capacity does not have to be sought in any particular set of institutions (such as elections), but it can be manifested in different ways, in different systems” (Dryzek 2009: 1380). We follow the conceptual approach proposed by He and Warren: democracy concerns the inclusion of individuals in matters that affect them, whereas deliberation can be conceptualized as a “communication mode in which participants in a political process offer and respond to the substance of claims, reasons, and perspectives in ways that generate persuasion-based influence” (He and Warren 2011: 271). Especially in the context of non-democracies it seems appropriate to apply a type

II concept of deliberation, as He and Warren do. But even then, the requirements of deliberation are more likely to be met in democracies. Moreover, the concepts are somewhat theoretically overlapping, as they still share underlying principles like equality and freedom of speech. Nevertheless, deliberative procedures have been implemented not only in democracies. A prominent example is China, a rather autocratic country, where deliberative practices like opinion polls or village councils have gained popularity over the last 20 years (see: He 2014; He and Warren 2011; He and Thøgersen 2010). As an illustrative example, the case of deliberative polling in Zeguo Township in Wenling City, a local public consultation that attempted to affect policy choices over the funding of infrastructure projects, shall be examined briefly (cf. Fishkin et al. 2010: 437-439). The Zeguo Town leadership made the decisions of the deliberations effectively binding by committing to fund the highest rated projects. Response and participation rates were rather high: out of a random sample of 275, there were 257 participants in the deliberation and 235 completed the final questionnaire. Fishkin et al. conclude, that the deliberative poll was highly representative (despite a gender bias through wrong sampling at the household stage) and brought significant attitudinal change, which didn't always gravitate towards the opinion of more privileged participants, but rather focalized on public-spirited alternatives and met the criteria of being "scientific, democratic and legal" very well. Moreover, and somewhat counter-intuitively, the authoritarian context proved to have some advantages: the expectation of participation made it easier than in the usual democratic context to recruit the sample and the promise of the implementation of agreed upon results was easier to grant by the authorities (cf. Fishkin et al. 2010: 446).

But why should non-democracies adopt deliberative practices in the first place? The reasons are not so different from the ones that democracies have and are rooted in the interest of autocratic rulers in maintaining and expanding their power. As Easton puts it, for the persistence of the regime it needs a minimal level of political support from its citizens. This applies for non-democracies alike, because widespread and high dissatisfaction with the regime might lead to uprisings and even regime collapse. In order to maintain their power, autocratic rulers have three means at their hands: repression, co-optation and legitimization (cf. Gerschewski 2013: 18). Repression is not always possible or successful and

it might only create superficial support amongst the citizen. Co-optation is only applicable on a certain scale, as one can't co-opt the whole citizenry, even though deliberation could be seen as an attempt to co-opt the people by giving them a voice option (cf. He and Warren 2011: 281). Legitimation, however, is rooted in the people's conviction that the system is in fact legitimate, or in other words, it is a form of political support (cf. Gerschewski 2013: 18). As discussed before, deliberation can serve to arrive at (more) legitimate decisions and shape preferences of participants. Therefore, deliberation might be a means to create legitimacy and other forms of support without necessarily adopting electoral democratic structures. An important notion in this context is, that deliberation doesn't need to be about sensitive topics concerning the status of the regime or its actual legitimacy. It can be used to let people deliberate about issues that aren't threatening the autocratic rule, for example new infrastructures that are most needed in a community, as it happened in Zeguo. When such decisions are made through deliberative practices, the participants might have the impression that the rulers are asking for and listening to their opinion and in turn they might perceive the regime to be more democratic. In some cases, deliberation could inform the regime about policy preferences otherwise not knowable in highly autocratic contexts and therefore enable the regime to be more responsive to the citizenry. This could transform the attitudes of the population towards the regime in general and enhance its support. Truex (2017) finds such effects when conducting an online survey experiment of Chinese Netizens who were exposed to the National People's Congress' online participation portals. He summarizes his findings as follows: "[...] the data reveal that even such limited reforms may shift attitudes toward the regime in the positive direction. [...] exposure to images from the "You Propose My Opinion" website and other portals increases satisfaction with the regime, feelings of government responsiveness, and expressed willingness to comply with regulations, but only for citizens with low political access and low expectations for government performance" (Truex 2017: 352). Although it has to be mentioned that only short-term effects were measured and therefore one should be careful to suggest any implications in the long-term. Still, these results offer some evidence for the proposed relationship, even if the examined online portals aren't exactly deliberative by definition but rather participatory or consultative. It should be

noted that the strengthening of autocratic rule is just one possible long-term outcome of the introduction of deliberative practices. Deliberation might as well lead to the democratization of a regime, as frequent deliberation could increase the democratic capacity of citizens over the long run (cf. He and Warren 2011: 183-184; Truex 2017: 352). Side-effects of deliberation, like increased knowledge or efficacy, could influence the people's perception of the legitimacy of the regime and at the same time increase their preference for democracy. Following this line of thought, deliberation could lead to a decrease in support for non-democratic regimes. Since the theoretical predictions for non-democracies are contradicting, the first hypothesis is expanded to account for the difference between democracies and non-democracies:

Hypothesis H1.1: In democracies, the more deliberative a political system is, the higher is the support for the regime.


Hypothesis H1.2a: In non-democracies, the more deliberative a political system is, the higher is the support for the regime.

Hypothesis H1.2b: In non-democracies, the more deliberative a political system is, the lower is the support for the regime.

So far, we have hypothesized the effect of deliberation on regime support as a macro-micro relationship. Strictly speaking, support for the regime arises on the micro level for which the proposed relationship doesn't account yet. As already established, deliberation can be seen as a form of democratic performance that citizen reward with political support. However, as the causal link between democratic performance is directly contingent on the evaluation of democratic performance by citizens on the individual level, an indirect effect is proposed between deliberation and regime support that is mediated by democratic performance evaluation. More specifically, deliberation would then influence people's perception of how democratically they are governed, which in turn would be influencing regime support positively (drawing from Mauk 2017: 7-11). In general, we assume that democratic performance evaluation should be positively related to regime support.²

²How democratic performance evaluation affect regime support is also influenced by an individual's preference for democracy (cf. Mauk 2017: 11). When democracy is the preferred regime type, the positive impact of high democratic performance evaluation on regime support will be much higher. This relationship is not specified here, as it would go beyond the

Figure 2: Proposed Relationships between Deliberation and Regime support



Source: own illustration.

In a democratic context, democratic performance evaluation should – according to deliberative theory – be positively influenced by deliberation, whereas the predictions for non-democracies are again contradictory. On the one hand, people in non-democratic polities might indeed perceive their country to be more democratic, as they feel more included and asked for their opinion. But if frequent deliberation increases knowledge, information and efficacy, it could as well lead to a decrease in democratic performance evaluation, as individuals might intensify their reflections about principles like democracy and question the status quo of their own political system. From these theoretical assumptions, the following hypotheses are derived:

Hypothesis H2: The more deliberative a political system is, the higher are democratic performance evaluations.

Hypothesis H2.1: In democracies, the more deliberative a political system is, the higher are democratic performance evaluations.

Hypothesis H2.2a: In non-democracies, the more deliberative a political system is, the higher are democratic performance evaluations.

Hypothesis H2.2b: In non-democracies, the more deliberative a political system is, the lower are democratic performance evaluations.

Hypothesis H3: The higher the democratic performance evaluations, the higher is the support for the regime.

Hypothesis H4: The effect of deliberation on regime support is mediated through democratic performance evaluations.

scope of this study. Moreover, the preference for regime type could in turn also be influenced by deliberation, which is another assumption not to be discussed.

3 Empirical Section

The following section will first introduce the data and its sources along with the data-merging approach. Next, the operationalization of regime support as well as democratic performance evaluation is discussed, which is followed by the operationalization of deliberation through the “Deliberative Component Index” from the “Varieties of Democracy”-Dataset and subsequently a description of the used control variables is given (Section 3.1). In the following subsection we take into account potential bias with the measurement of regime support and discuss possible adaptations (Section 3.2). Following this, the statistical methodology is explained (Section 3.3) and a short examination of descriptive statistics takes place (Section 3.4). In the next subsection, the results of estimated multilevel regression models are reported and examined for their implications regarding the research hypotheses (Section 3.5). Lastly, the results of the mediation analysis done in the framework of of multilevel structural equation model are reported (Section 3.6).

3.1 Data Merging and Operationalization

In order to test the hypotheses from the previous section a number of datasets will be combined. The analysis includes micro-level data from six cross-national survey projects spanning a time range from 2010 to 2015. The final dataset combines the Afrobarometer Survey Round 5 and Round 6 (data from 2011-2015) , the Asian Barometer Survey Wave 3 and Wave 4 (2010-2012/2014-2015), the AmericasBarometer (2010/2012/2014), the European Social Survey Round 6 (2012), the Latinobarómetro (2013/2015) and the World Values Survey (2010-2014). The final dataset accumulates the responses of 306,047 citizen in 113 countries across all continents and covers individual data from 58% of all independent countries that represent 86% of the world population.³ Before the variables from different surveys are merged, they are standardized to a range of 0 to 1.

³The following countries had to be excluded because of some form of political instability that made the reference point of the regime unclear: Egypt 2013 (imminent military coup), Libya in 2014 (post-revolutionary, transitional state), Mali in both 2012 and 2014 (civil war), Palestine in 2012 and 2013 (government split between Hamas in Gaza and Fatah in Westbank), as well as Yemen in 2014 (civil war) (cf. Mauk 2017: 14).

Dependent Variables: Regime Support and Democratic Performance Evaluation

In line with the theoretical definition of regime support discussed previously, the main dependent variable will be constructed from self-reported trust in the following regime institutions: trust/confidence in political leadership, police, courts and parliament (Questions and wordings can be found in Appendix Table A2). A range of studies focused on institutional trust and political support have operationalized regime support in a very similar way (Yang and Tang 2010; Chen 2017; Mauk 2017). We chose this specific operationalization because of two reasons: first, because it covers the three types of traditional political branches, executive (political leadership), judicial and legal system (courts and police) and legislation (parliament) and second, common availability in all used survey projects. Given that the analysis in this paper doesn't seek to predict regime support of citizens in a specific year, but is more generally interested in the average regime support in a given country, surveys done in the same country in different years are collapsed into a single case, leaving us with a more general estimation of regime support.⁴ With the help of a confirmatory factor analysis, regime support is modeled as a latent variable, which allows for measurement error being accounted for (results in Appendix Table A5).⁵ As a last step, regime support is recoded to range from 0 to 100 in order to facilitate interpretation.

For the mediation hypotheses, democratic performance evaluation is operationalized by the following item: *How democratic is your country being governed today?*⁶ This measurement can be seen as a direct measurement of subjective evaluation of democratic performance, also used by Mauk in her analysis (Mauk 2017). Unfortunately, this question wasn't asked across all countries, therefore the mediation analysis will be performed with a smaller dataset including only 93 countries and 222,665 respondents in total , which should still be enough to estimate robust results.

⁴This is judged to appropriate, because the time distances between surveys do not exceed five years. Surveys done in the same country and in the same year from different research projects are also collapsed into the same case.

⁵In order to improve model fit, the latent model includes an error term correlation between trust in political leadership and trust in parliament as suggested by modification indices. Given that both political leadership and parliament relate to institutions grounded in the legislative and administrative process of a regime, it is reasonable to assume an error term correlation on theoretical grounds as well.

⁶Questions and answers across survey projects can be found in Appendix Table A3.

Independent Variable: Deliberation

Now that the dependent variables have been introduced, a discussion of the operationalization of the independent variables follows. The question how to measure deliberation is a major challenge to deliberative research. On the process level, a notable instrument is the Deliberative Quality Index (DQI) (Steiner et al. 2004: 53-60). The DQI is designed to measure deliberation based on Habermasian criteria like participation, the level and content of justification, respect toward groups, demands and counterarguments and constructive politics. The truthfulness criterion is not implemented, as it poses severe difficulties in empirical measurement. The DQI has shown to be a reliable, considerably valid and widely used measure of deliberative quality (cf. Bächtiger and Wyss 2013: 165). Unfortunately, it is only applicable to assess and compare the quality of deliberation in actual speech acts/debates and not across whole political systems. The only available measurement of deliberation on the structural level that serves the purpose of quantitative cross-national comparison is the Deliberative Democracy Index or rather the Deliberative Component Index (DCI) of the “Varieties of Democracy(V-Dem)”-Project (see Coppedge et al. 2017a). The underlying conception of deliberative democracy “focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions [...]” (Coppedge et al. 2011: 253). The authors state that “[...] there should be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion” (Coppedge et al. 2011: 253). The DCI is constructed with a Bayesian factor analysis “attempting to measure the extent to which political elites offer public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels [...]” (Coppedge et al. 2016: 583; for the aggregation method see: Coppedge et al. 2017c).

There are five indicators for deliberation of which the DCI is composed of, summarized in Table 2. Especially the first three indicators – Reasoned Justification, Common Good and Respect for Counter-Arguments – resemble some of the criteria of ideal deliberation and are also found in the DQI, though

Table 2: DCI and Subcomponents

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Question</i>
Reasoned Justification	<i>When important policy changes are being considered, i.e. before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?</i>
Common Good	<i>When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?</i>
Respect counterarguments	<i>When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?</i>
Range of consultation	<i>When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation at elite levels?</i>
Engaged society	<i>When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?</i>

(cf. Coppedge et al. 2017b: 202-207)

not all of the possible indicators are captured. As in the DQI, truthfulness is not accounted for. Beyond that, there is only an assessment of respect towards counterarguments, not towards groups or demands and no reference to constructive politics or participation. To assess the scope of deliberations, the DCI contains two indicators: range of consultation and engaged society. The focus of the DCI is on “the degree of deliberativeness that can be discerned across all powerful institutions in a polity (not just those explicitly designed to serve a deliberative function) and among the citizenry” (Coppedge et al. 2011: 254). Though it should be noted that the DCI concentrates mainly on deliberation on elite levels, as only the engaged society indicator asks for public instead of elite deliberation. Since this paper is the first known to the authors that examines the effects of deliberation on regime support on a macro-scale, the analyses are conducted for the DCI as well as its components respectively, to gain as much information as possible. The analysis in this paper should therefore be seen as exploratory in nature that is meant to inspire future research.

For the empirical analyses, the mean values over 10 years (2000-2010) are estimated for the DCI and its components, as it is assumed that regime support arises not (only) on a daily basis but over a period of time and the lagging of the variable is meant to simulate that temporal order of causality. The same treatment applies to other independent macro-variables varying over time. In the analysis, only the DCI and not the whole Deliberative Democracy Index is used, as a theoretical distinction between democracy and deliberation has been made beforehand. Nevertheless, our sample shows that the deliberation indicators are

Table 3: DCI and Subcomponents: Correlation with Polity/FH

	DCI	RJ	CG	CA	RoC	ES	Polity/FH
Complete Data (n=113)	0.82	0.72	0.40	0.78	0.75	0.77	1.00
Democracies (n=61)	0.55	0.62	0.36	0.45	0.55	0.36	1.00
Non-Democracies (n=52)	0.68	0.39	0.15	0.64	0.58	0.74	1.00

DCI = Deliberative Component Index, RJ = Reasoned Justification, CG = Common Good, CA = Counter-Arguments, RoC = Range of Consultation, ES = Engaged Society. Table shows Pearson's r. Bold numbers indicate correlations below $r = 0.5$.
Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.


highly correlated with democracy (see Table 3; a scatterplot of deliberation and democracy in Appendix A1), measured by an index that averages Freedom House and Polity2 values, which we name Polity/FH.⁷

This is not due to the choice of the democracy measurement, as the correlation persists with similar popular democracy measures. With an r value of 0.82, the DCI itself correlates the strongest with Polity/FH, the components Reasoned Justification, Counter-Arguments, Range of Consultation and Engaged Society show almost as strong correlations, with r varying from 0.72 to 0.78. Only the Common Good component seems less related to democracy ($r = 0.40$). A high correlation of democracy and deliberation measures isn't surprising, as they share underlying principles. Indeed, it would be unreasonable to assume that the range of consultation or level of public justification isn't inherently higher in democracies than in non-democracies. Nonetheless, a correlation as high as 0.82 brings up challenges for the analysis. For instance, one could call into question the validity of the DCI. More specifically, it might be proposed that the index merely captures a general perception of the minimal deliberative quality that naturally comes along with any democracy, instead of actual differences in the quality of deliberation. However, the strong empirical correlation contradicts the assumption that deliberation and democracy should be considered distinct phenomena. If this assumption is to be maintained, the effect democracy has on regime support must be separated from the effect of deliberation, which would lead to issues of collinearity / multicollinearity in a multivariate model. Within the

⁷The index is taken from the V-Dem Dataset and originally stems from Freedom House 2017. The index constructors imputed missing polity values by regressing Polity2 on the average Freedom House measure. The Variable is scaled from 0 - 10. As with deliberation, the mean values from 2000-2010 are estimated for the analysis. To apply the Polity2-classification of democracies, anocracies and autocracies, the variable was rescaled to range from -10 to +10. Polity set their cut-off values at 6 and -6 (-10 - -6 = Autocracy; -5 - 5 = Anocracy; 6-10 = Democracy). However, in the process of rescaling the variable and calculating the ten year average, values have been produced that lie between the cut-off values. Numbers were rounded to integers and the usual cut-off values of Polity2 were used to classify the countries.

subsample of democracies ($\text{Polity/FH} \geq 6$), the correlation between the DCI and Polity/FH drops to $r = 0.55$, similar patterns can be observed for the component indicators that previously showed high correlations in the whole sample. For the subsample of non-democracies ($\text{Polity/FH} < 6$), the correlations are also smaller, albeit not as much as for democracies. All deliberation indicators show smaller correlations within the respective subsamples than in the complete sample. For both subsamples, though especially in the democracy sample, we can therefore assume problems of collinearity to be less severe. Nevertheless, such problems are especially expected for the deliberation indicators strongly correlated with Polity/FH. Within democracies, besides the DCI, two of the components show correlations with r above 0.5: Reasoned Justification ($r = 0.62$) and Range of Consultation ($r = 0.55$). Within non-democracies there are four indicators that fulfill this criterion: the DCI, Counter-Arguments ($r = 0.64$), Range of Consultation ($r = 0.58$) and Engaged Society ($r = 0.74$). Accordingly, for the indicators Common Good, Counter-Arguments and Engaged Society in democracies, and Reasoned Justification along with Common Good in non-democracies, we expect tolerable levels of collinearity.

Even though deliberation and democracy are empirically strongly connected, a closer look at the deviations seems worthwhile. Figure 3 depicts the differences between the Polity/FH and DCI scores of the countries in our sample (both rescaled to 100 for intuitive interpretation) in descending order. The cases coloured green resemble democracies, blue cases are anocracies and red cases autocracies, as classified by the PolityIV-Project. In sum, the sample contains 61 democracies, 45 anocracies and 7 autocracies. Interestingly, the previous example of deliberation in non-democracies, China, appears on the top of the list, closely followed by Vietnam and Singapore, both countries identified by research as non-democracies with consultative institutions (cf. Jayasuriya and Rodan 2007: 779). As China specifically was already theorized to be a case of a non-democracy with deliberative institutions, the empirical results indicate that there is some accuracy in the V-Dem measurement of deliberation – despite the strong relation to democracy. There are not many deviating cases, much less cases that deviate strongly, but if there are differences, the results imply that they could be meaningful. Therefore, we decide to use the DCI and its subcomponents in the analysis, with the assumption

Figure 3: Difference between Polity/FH and the DCI

Both indices are rescaled to range from 0 - 100 and are averaged over 10 years (2000-2010).
Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

that the diverging patterns are indeed representative of two empirically distinct phenomena. A second interesting finding is, that non-democracies, if they deviate, tend to score higher on the DCI than the democracy measurement, whereas it is the other way around with democracies. This might suggest that non-democracies do indeed need a higher level of deliberation in order to satisfy their population with democratic performance. However, it is more likely that democracies simply score higher on both measurements of deliberation and democracy and therefore they have less variation between them than non-democracies.

Control Variables

Lastly, a range of control variables were added, both on the individual and the country level. On the individual level, a dummy for sex is coded, whereby 1 indicates female sex and 0 male sex. Age is included as control variable as well, with respondents ranging from 15 to 108 years. Since economic performance evaluations are also related to regime support (cf. Mauk 2017: 18-19), we include socio-economic factors like financial security (measured in terms of whether there is enough financial resources to support the household), education (years of schooling and education levels) and employment status, which is captured through a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the individual is currently employed and 0 if not.⁸

The macro control variables are taken from either the V-Dem, or the “Quality of Government(QoG)”-Dataset (Teorell et al. 2017). First, the already introduced Polity/FH measure serves as a control for democracy. Furthermore, real GDP per capita in constant dollars of the year 2000 is included as control variable, as high economic development could increase economic performance evaluations and therefore regime support. The imputed variable is taken from the QoG-Dataset and originally stems from Gleditsch (2002). As all independent macro variables vary over time, the average value between 2000 and 2010 is calculated. Moreover, the variable is log-transformed because of severe skewness (as is general practice with such variables). Next, we control for ethnic fractionalization, because divided societies are assumed to imply challenges to deliberative democracy (cf. Fishkin 2009: 161-9). The variable is taken from the QoG-Dataset and originally stems from Alesina et al. (2003). The third macro control variable is the population size, taken from the V-Dem-Dataset (cf. Coppedge et al. 2017b: 396). The natural

⁸ Detailed operationalization of the individual-level control variables can be requested from the authors.

logarithm of the variable as well the mean from 2000-2010 is estimated. Lastly, all models include design dummies that account for the different surveys and are coded as 1 for all respondents that were part of a specific survey project and 0 if they were not part of it. This allows to control for possible bias between the different survey projects.⁹

3.2 Possible Bias and Correction


Given that the main variable of interest *regime support* consists of self-reported attitudes in different societies and political systems across the world, a critical examination of the data is appropriate. A very widespread problem within survey research is the so-called *social desirability bias*, which especially applies to sensible survey items that concern very personal topics associated with a social stigma, like overt racism or sexual activity (cf. Krumpal 2013). Some respondents might choose to give responses they know to be untruthful because they either want to comply with some strong social norms or they fear repercussions by their social environment and the government. Especially the fear of government repression seems to be relevant in autocratic regimes, where expressing the wrong opinions might lead to physical harm. That is why in such repressive environments, respondents in surveys tend to practice *preference falsification*, where they will express uncontroversial regime-friendly opinions in public and conceal their real convictions (cf. Kuran 1997). Tannenberg analyzed such sensible survey items relating to trust in political institutions in the context of 36 African countries and was able to show that there is considerable bias when respondents believe that the survey is administered by a government agency, which is especially prevalent in more autocratic regimes (cf. Tannenberg 2017: 21).

There is therefore strong grounds on which one might assume that the data is affected by social desirability bias, since we analyze sensible survey items relating

⁹ As it is common in cross-national studies, the analysis originally included regional dummies as controls, though the results vary strongly when including them. The varying effects within different geographical regions might need to be studied separately. As it would go beyond the scope of this study, the results including regional dummies are not reported. However, it can be said that the dataset dummies already function as regional dummies to some degree, as most of them are specific to a certain region. With that, we feel confident in reporting the results without regional dummies. Another adaptation considered, but not implemented due to the scope of the analysis, is the exclusion of specific groups of cases that could bias the results, like for example OECD or EU countries.

to regime support in environments of varying repressiveness. In order to reveal such bias, we investigate the relationship between our democracy measurement (Polity/FH) and regime support, as well as a comparison of means between democracies, anocracies and autocracies, shown in Figure 4. Judging from the bivariate relationship, one can notice that there seems to be a quadratic effect of democracy on regime support. Very autocratic regimes score high on regime support and it decreases for countries that are semi-democratic until it rises again in democratic regimes. A non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis test between autocratic regimes in regards to anocratic and democratic regimes reveals that the average regime support is significantly higher in an autocratic context $H(2) = 7.63$, $p = 0.037$ and $H(2) = 7.95$, $p = 0.025$, respectively, though it doesn't significantly differ between anocracies and democracies, $H(2) = 0.03$, $p = 0.420$.

Figure 4: Regime Support by Polity/FH




Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

In order to investigate whether high regime support in autocracies is due to some form of bias, a measurement of Freedom of Discussion is introduced (cf. Coppedge et al. 2017b: 228-229). Freedom of Discussion measures "the extent to which citizens are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces [...] without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities", which has the great advantage of not just focusing on repression of freedom of speech on behalf of the government,

but also takes into account the degree to which other citizens impose speech prohibitions. The relationship between Freedom of Discussion and regime support is examined in Figure 5, which shows a positive association between the two variables, suggesting that regime support is higher when discussion about political issues is more regulated. This might imply that revealing low support of the regime is socially undesirable and politically inconvenient in such societies and therefore citizens tend to falsify their preferences and express higher levels of regime support to avoid negative repercussions.

Figure 5: Regime Support by Freedom of Discussion



Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

This possible bias in the data poses a serious problem for the analysis. What is to be done to remedy the revealed problematic? Two such approaches might be suitable: 1.) exclude the countries that are most likely to be biased or 2.) design a weight that accounts for the possible bias. The first approach has serious problems and may severely limit the validity of the results because it is associated with a loss of information, and also systematically leaves out a certain group of countries. A designed weight seems the more appropriate adaptation, as Tannenberg recommends: "one avenue forward would be to construct reliability weights to enable the researcher to account for the biases in the analysis" (Tannenberg 2017: 21). Unfortunately, measurements of whether respondents believed the surveyors to be government representatives are not available for all surveys used in this analysis,

therefore a weight on the country-level might be an alternative. We hereby propose the Freedom of Discussion measurement to weigh regime support, which is already proven to be positively associated with the dependent variable. Given that the proposed weight is highly experimental in nature, two bias boundaries will be introduced: a lower and a higher bound, whereby regime support in societies with somewhat and weakly respected Freedom of Discussion will be penalized with 10% and 15% (low bias) or 20% and 25% (high bias), respectively. Table 4 shows a summary for all weighted country cases, which only applies to anocratic and autocratic regimes.

Table 4: Weighting of Regime Support

Country	Regime Support Original	Regime Support Low Bias (10 - 15%)	Regime Support High Bias (20 - 25%)	Freedom of Discussion (FoD)
Qatar	85.68	72.83	64.26	<i>Weakly Respected</i>
Uzbekistan	82.97	70.53	62.23	<i>Weakly Respected</i>
Singapore	68.06	57.85	51.04	<i>Weakly Respected</i>
Kuwait	66.50	56.52	49.87	<i>Weakly Respected</i>
Swaziland	59.07	50.21	44.30	<i>Weakly Respected</i>
Rwanda	57.38	48.77	43.03	<i>Weakly Respected</i>
Zimbabwe	55.08	46.82	41.31	<i>Weakly Respected</i>
Vietnam	79.98	71.98	63.99	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
China	71.28	64.15	57.02	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Burundi	68.80	61.92	55.04	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Thailand	58.17	52.36	46.54	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Azerbaijan	56.78	51.10	45.43	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Kazakhstan	52.24	47.02	41.79	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Iraq	49.90	44.91	39.92	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Guatemala	38.52	34.66	30.81	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Madagascar	36.67	33.00	29.34	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
Venezuela	34.76	31.29	27.81	<i>Somewhat Respected</i>
<i>Correlation - FoD</i>	<i>0.14</i>	<i>0.06</i>	<i>0.00</i>	-

Pearson's r reported. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

One caveat comes with this approach: as it stands, Freedom of Discussion is positively associated with democracy ($r = 0.80$ for the whole sample, and $r = 0.58$ within non-democracies) and therefore also associated with increased deliberative levels ($r = 0.67$ with DCI for the complete sample, and $r = 0.44$ for the non-democracy subsample). Thereby, weighting regime support with Freedom of Discussion inherently makes the dependent variable more similar to the independent variables. However, the usage of the weight can be well justified on theoretical grounds and it is thereby assumed that this adaptation improves the validity of measured regime support. Nevertheless, this step has to be critically evaluated, as we might over- or underestimate the bias severely. Therefore, models with unweighted regime support are always reported as well.

3.3 Statistical Methodology

Given that the dataset in this paper combines individual level data with country level data, a multilevel analysis is needed to account for hierarchical data structure, which will model a unique intercept for each country (cf. Gelman and Hill 2006: 237). This becomes necessary, because standard linear regression only produces accurate estimations of standard errors if the data points are independent of each other, which is not the case in our dataset. Furthermore, since the main independent variable is located on the country-level, it allows us to control its influence for individual-level control variables. We follow a recommendation by Enders and Tofighi to use grand-mean centered predictors, because a multilevel analysis with the focus on the influence of a level 2 predictor can then be controlled by the level 1 variables (as is our intent) (cf. Enders and Tofighi 2007: 128 - 129).


A range of multilevel models are then estimated in order to test Hypothesis H1. Given the expected high levels of multicollinearity, the influence of DCI and its subcomponents on regime support is tested separately for the Polity/FH variable, in order to control for possible distortions caused by the strong overlap between the two variables. In the interest of accounting for the slight quadratic effect in the relationship between democracy and regime support in the complete sample, the Polity/FH variable will be split into three dummies, Autocracy, Anocracy and Democracy, as recommended by Tabachnik et al. (cf. Tabachnick et al. 2013: 43-44). Moreover, in order to avoid issues of multicollinearity, the sample is further divided into democracies ($\text{Polity/FH} \geq 6$) and non-democracies ($\text{Polity/FH} < 6$), where the sub-hypotheses of H1 are tested separately. In these subsamples, the continuous Polity/FH variable can be used again, because the quadratic relationship only appears in the full sample. These divisions of the data, in addition to estimating all models for three separate dependent regime support variables (no bias, low bias, high bias) and six separate independent deliberation variables, leave us with 84 multilevel models to be estimated. In addition, we estimate seven models with Polity/FH only and none of the deliberation indicators, for the purpose of comparison, which adds up to a total of 91 estimated models. Given the exploratory nature of the analysis and the many problems with expected multicollinearity and quadratic effects, the estimation of so many models seems justified as this allows us to test for robustness of the findings. To facilitate an

intuitive communication of the results, we will only visualize the relevant effects in the main text and report the detailed results in tables in the appendix.

While Hypotheses H1 can be tested with a traditional multilevel model, the Hypotheses H2 - H4 concerning the mediation effect will be tested with a multilevel structural equation model. This has several upsides: 1.) the mediation can be estimated as a single model instead of several models, 2.) fit indices provide a general estimation of how well the model fits to the data, 3.) the dependent variable regime support is already modeled as a latent variable and can be integrated easily and 4.) mediation models within standard multilevel regression might be severely biased (cf. Preacher et al. 2010: 212). We thereby follow the recommendation by Preacher et al. and analyze our mediation hypothesis in the framework of a multilevel structural equation model. Lastly, for the sake of simplicity, the proposed mediation effect will only be estimated with the DCI and the unweighted regime support variable, without any control variables. However, the data split between democracies and non-democracies is still performed, leaving us with a total of three mediation models. The results can be seen as a first exploratory approach to validate the macro-micro mediation hypothesis, future research might focus on this specific hypothesis in more detail.

3.4 Descriptives


This section will examine some of the descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations, focusing on the relationship between deliberation and regime support, but also including levels of democracy to account for the necessity to separate democracy and deliberation. As a first overview, Figure 6 depicts a map with levels of regime support across the world. The countries were grouped in quintiles, darker shades indicate quintiles with higher support. Completely white coloring means that data for the country wasn't available. First, it comes to attention that there is no clear regional pattern of regime support in our sample, although some general trends can be observed. The countries with the highest aggregated regime support are located at quite different places of the world. Firstly, Northern Europe stands out with higher levels of support, with much of Western and especially Southern and Eastern Europe being located in lower quintiles. Then, available cases in Southern and Eastern Africa are located mostly in higher quin-

Figure 6: Regime Support Across the World 2010 - 2015

Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000).
 1st Quintile: < 38.59, 2nd Quintile: 50.98, 3rd Quintile: 53.51 4th Quintile: 57.38 >, 5th Quintile: 57.38 ≤.
 Own calculations.

tiles, whereas Western Africa shows a rather mixed pattern. Including the MENA countries, it becomes visible that Africa is a highly underrepresented continent in the sample. Turning the attention to Asia, the relatively high average regime support, especially in parts of Eastern and Southeastern Asia stand out. Across Central and South America, there is no country within the fourth or fifth quintile and not so many in the third one, indicating rather low aggregate levels of regime support within the broader region.

Figure 7 shows a world map indicating the level of deliberation (DCI) across the countries of our sample, also grouped into quintiles, with darker shades indicating higher quintiles and therefore higher levels on the DCI. Notably, the distribution of the DCI in our sample is rather skewed, which leaves us with narrow ranges for the upper quintiles. The regional patterns for the DCI differ from the ones of regime support. First, Northern as well as Western and Southern Europe are all placed within the higher quintiles. Concerning the Americas, no clear pattern is visible and mix of all levels of deliberation can be found. The same can be said for Africa, though not many countries there are found in the fourth or fifth quintile. In Asia, the pattern is rather mixed as well, though especially Southeastern Asia stands out with comparably dark shades and, therefore, higher scores on the DCI.


Figure 7: Deliberation Across the World 2000 - 2010

Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. 1st Quintile: < 0.60, 2nd Quintile: 0.82, 3rd Quintile: 0.93
4th Quintile: 0.94 >, 5th Quintile: 0.94 ≤. Own calculations.

Figure 8 shows six scatterplots that visualize the distribution of average regime support¹⁰ (weighted with the high bias boundary) per country over levels of deliberation (the DCI and its components, respectively). The dashed line shows the overall correlation. The coloring of the cases is red for autocracies, green for anocracies and blue for democracies, the respective lines show the correlation within the groups. When only observing overall correlations, it comes to attention that all the independent variables reveal a weak positive correlation with regime support, with r varying from 0.12 to 0.26. In two cases the correlation becomes significant, with p -values below 0.01: Reasoned Justification ($r = 0.26$) and Range of Consultation ($r = 0.26$). Interestingly, when grouped into regime type categories, there is a consistent pattern that shows mostly stronger or sometimes equal positive correlations within the groups compared to the overall relationship (with two exceptions for anocracies: Engaged Society and Common Good have weaker within-group correlations). In contrast to the relatively small bivariate correlation within the full dataset, the deliberation indicators seem to be consistently positively related to regime support within groups of similar levels of democracy.

¹⁰Only variables with the high bias boundary will be analyzed in this section. The bivariate relationships between the two other variants of regime support can be found in Appendix Figure A4 and A5.

Figure 8: Bivariate Relationships between Deliberation Indicators and Regime Support (High Bias)



Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Persons's r is reported. Own calculations.

So far, only results for high bias regime support were reported, therefore a short discussion of low and no bias regime support is warranted. At first, it has to be recalled that democracies are not affected by the weighting at all. The correlations and p-values within the subgroups anocracies and autocracies do not vary strongly, when weighting the dependent variable. On the other hand, the overall correlations show great increases both in p-values and effect sizes. The most remarkable increase can be observed for the Reasoned Justification indicator ($r = 0.089$, $p = 0.35$ for the unweighted regime support compared to $r = 0.26$, $p = 0.0054$).

In sum, the findings of the bivariate correlations indicate that deliberation has an effect on regime support first and foremost in democracies (strong effects within autocracies are not reliable, as this group has only seven cases). This could imply that deliberation is - in fact - a predominantly democratic concept that only works within the freedoms that come along with democratic regimes. As the results discussed here are not controlled for other variables, this should be seen as a first indication rather than an explicit finding.

3.5 Multilevel Regression Analysis

In this section, the results of the multilevel regression analyses are reported and analyzed in regard to their implications for the research hypotheses.¹¹ First, in order to assess whether multilevel modeling is warranted, a null model for each dependent variable is estimated (weighted and unweighted) with a random-intercept and no predictors (cf. Hox 2010: 300). The intraclass correlations (ICCs) for the null models show that indeed 44.45% (unweighted), 41.18% (low boundary weight) and 40.64% (high boundary weight) of the variance of regime support is bound on the country-level. The results strongly indicate that a multilevel analysis is appropriate.

Figure 9 summarizes the standardized regression coefficients, the lines indicating a 90% confidence interval for the effects of DCI and its components (estimated

¹¹Since multicollinearity was expected for many of the estimated models, it should be noted right at the beginning that none of the 91 estimated regression models in the analysis showed problematic VIF-values for any of the included variables (VIF < 5 in all estimated models). Furthermore, regression diagnostics for one of the full models involving the DCI and all control variables has been conducted and no major violation of statistical assumption are revealed (see Figures A14 and A15 in the Appendix).


separately, not included in one model) on three different dependent variables: regime support with no weighting (colored in green), weightings applied with low (blue) and high boundaries (red), respectively (the full report of all 36 estimated models can be found in appendix Table A8 and A9). In the first column, the effects are controlled for variables on the individual level (Age, Sex, Education, Financial Security, Employment) along with country level variables (logged GDP, Ethnic Fractionalization, logged Population). It has to be noted that the models reported here do not separate the effects of democracy and deliberation, which suggests that the effects might be strongly interwoven, given the high correlation between both measures.

When investigating the results for the unweighted dependent variable, the findings are mixed. The components Reasoned Justification (Beta = 0.06), Common Good (Beta = 0.07) and Range of Consultation (Beta = 0.04) are positively related to regime support, whereas Counter-Arguments (Beta = -0.03) and Engaged Society (Beta = -0.04) together with the DCI (Beta = -0.02) have negative coefficients. The effect for none of the deliberation indicators reaches statistical significance. A continuous pattern catches one's attention: the weighting of the dependent variable causes the coefficients for all deliberation indicators to shift towards (stronger) positive effects. With the low boundary dependent variable none of the effects are negative anymore, and the previously positive effects reach weak statistical significance on the 90% level or higher. For the high boundary weighting, the effect sizes grow, while only Counter-Arguments and Engaged Society have p-values below 0.1.¹²

The second column of Figure 9 depicts the results for models that include individual- and country-level variables including dummies for Polity/FH (Autocracies and Democracies with Anocracies as reference category). As discussed before, we refrain from using a continuous variable because the specification of a quadratic term for Polity/FH would increase already existing problems of multicollinearity. For the interpretation of the reported results, it has therefore to be noted that the effect of democracy is controlled for in a restricted manner and with some potential loss of the controlling function.

¹²The shift towards more positive effects is (maybe just partly) an inherent consequence of the weighting, as discussed before ($r = 0.67$ for Freedom of Discussion and the DCI). Of course, the unweighted results have the problem of assumably being (more) biased, and therefore estimates should be interpreted with caution.

Figure 9: Complete Sample: Models A1.1 to F1.6



*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. Standardized regression coefficients and 90% confidence intervals are reported. Reference category for Polity/FH dummies is Autocracy. For the full models see Appendix Table A8 and A9. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations

Including the Polity/FH dummies has a striking impact on the coefficients of all six deliberation indicators. Even for the unweighted regime support, there are notable changes, all effects statistically significant at the 95% level or higher (Beta varying from 0.10 to 0.22). Contrary to the results without control for the dummies, the weighting doesn't have as much of an impact on the coefficients for the respective deliberation indicators, but rather on the coefficients for the dummy variables themselves. This is not surprising as the variable used to calculate the weightings correlates stronger with Polity/FH as with the deliberation indicators. In general, the coefficients of the Polity/FH dummies show that regime support is higher in autocracies than in anocracies and in turn lower in democracies than in anocracies. The respective differences decrease when the dependent variable is weighted with either of the boundaries, though stronger with the high bias variant. This indicates that the weighting procedure works as intended. It has to be noted though, that in most cases even the high boundary weighting doesn't diminish the positive or negative effects of the Autocracy or Democracy dummies, respectively. This could mean, that our weighting is not accurate or strong enough. One the other hand, the possibility that autocracies and anocracies actually do enjoy more or at least equal support from their citizens than democracies has to be considered. For example, citizens in democracies could be more "assertive" than "allegiant" (cf. Welzel and Dalton 2015). In light of the current "disconnect" many democracies are said to experience (cf. Foa and Mounk 2016), the assumption that regime support is not higher in democracies does not seem completely far-fetched. It has to be noted, though, that the negative and positive effects for the Democracy and Autocracy dummies, respectively, are notably weaker and for democracies insignificant, when only the dummies and control variables, but none of the deliberation indicators are included (Models P.1.1 to P1.3, see Appendix Table A6/ Figure A6).

Lastly, we compare the estimated models reported on the left and right side of Figure 9, with the help of AIC, BIC and deviance (-2 times the log-likelihood). The models are compared with the respective Polity/FH only models. The purpose of this comparison is to evaluate whether the sometimes striking effect-increase of deliberation indicators when including the Polity/FH dummies is due to the dummies alone or if deliberation indicators significantly contribute to a

better model fit. Table A13 and Figures A7 to A9 in the Appendix visualize the differences in AIC, BIC and deviance for the three dependent variables, respectively. The models A1.1 to F1.3 (including only the deliberation indicators) are shown in red, while the green bars indicate the models A2.4 to F2.6 (with Polity/FH dummies and the deliberation indicators included). Lastly, the blue bars show the models P1.1-P1.3. AIC and deviance consistently indicate that the models including deliberation indicators and Polity/FH dummies have the lowest values and therefore the best fit (with the exception of the AIC for the high bias model that only includes Common Good, Model C1.6). Although BIC shows contradictory trends, the discrepancy might not be troublesome as BIC tends to prefer models of lesser complexity. Overall, this could indicate that including Polity/FH dummies into the model causes the respective deliberation indicator to fully unfold its effect on regime support, thereby increasing model fit, a so-called suppressor effect. This might be further substantiated by the fact that deliberation indicators alone seem to fit less well than the Polity/FH dummies alone (blue bars compared to red bars). However, given the high overlap between Polity/FH dummies and most of the deliberation indicators, it might as well be that a statistical artefact has been produced.

In conclusion, for the first hypothesis, which suggests that deliberation has a positive effect on regime support, the findings are mixed. In models not controlling for Polity/FH dummies and using unweighted regime support, empirical evidence doesn't validate the hypothesis. Then again, when assuming that the data is biased and that the applied weightings actually remedy the bias, positive effects of some of the deliberation indicators can be assumed as well. As the assumption of the accuracy of the applied weighting isn't tested and the effects when including the Polity/FH dummies is suspicious due to expected multicollinearity (though it should not be as severe when including only three categories), we refer from confirming H1. Nonetheless, some evidence for predicted effect should be noted.


Figures 10 and 11 depict the same models shown in Figure 9, with the samples restricted to democracies ($\text{Polity/FH} \geq 6$) and non-democracies, respectively (the full report of the 48 estimated models can be found in appendix A10 to A12). Instead of dummy variables, as before, the continuous Polity/FH variable is included in the models reported in the right column, since the relationship between

Polity/FH and regime support is no longer quadratic within these subgroups. Moreover multicollinearity due to the correlation of Polity/FH is not as severe as for the complete sample (with the DCI its $r = 0.55$ and $r = 0.68$ for democracies and non-democracies, respectively, see Table 3 in Section 3.1). We do expect problems of multicollinearity, especially for the component indicators strongly correlated with Polity/FH.

Within democracies, three of the deliberation indicators show correlations with r above 0.5: the DCI, Reasoned Justification and Range of Consultation. Within non-democracies there are four indicators that fulfill this criterion: the DCI, Counter-Arguments, Range of Consultation and Engaged Society. Accordingly, for the indicators Common Good, Counter-Arguments and Engaged Society in democracies, and Reasoned Justification as well as Common Good in non-democracies, respectively, we expect tolerable levels of multicollinearity.

For the democracy sample, no systematic bias of regime support is assumed, as Freedom of Discussion is respected in all cases and our weighting doesn't apply. As already suggested by the bivariate correlations in Section 3.4, the multilevel models within democracies also show a positive effect on regime support for all deliberation indicators (see Figure 10, left column). The most remarkable effects are the ones of the DCI ($\text{Beta} = 0.22$) as well as its components Reasoned Justification ($\text{Beta} = 0.25$), Range of Consultation ($\text{Beta} = 0.21$) and Engaged Society ($r = 0.20$), which all are significant with $p < 0.001$. Counter-Arguments ($\text{Beta} = 0.14$) and Common Good ($\text{Beta} = 0.13$) show smaller effects, both weakly significant on the 95% and 90% level, respectively. When including Polity/FH (see Figure 10, right column), the coefficients for the respective deliberation indicators don't change much and if so, in a direction towards slightly stronger positive effects. A rather puzzling finding are the insignificant and weak, but negative effects of Polity/FH, as the bivariate correlation indicated a somewhat positive relationship within democracies. Models that do not include any deliberation indicator, but include only Polity/FH show an effect that is weakly positive but still statistically insignificant ($\text{Beta} = 0.06$; Model P2.1, see Appendix Figure A6).

Figure 10: Democracy Sample: Models A2.1 to F2.2




*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. Standardized regression coefficients and 90% confidence intervals are reported. For the full models see Appendix A10. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations

As discussed before, multicollinearity should not be as much of an issue for the components Common Good, Counter-Arguments and Engaged Society compared to the the remaining three indicators. For the three more unproblematic models, Polity/FH has a rather small negative effect ($\text{Beta} = -0.06$ in Model D2.2) up to no discernible effect at all (in model C2.2) on regime support. For the assumably more problematic indicators, the negative coefficients are slightly higher ($\text{Beta} = -0.10$ in Model E2.2; $\text{Beta} = -0.12$ in Models A2.2 and B2.2). Moreover, the effect sizes are greater and p-values smaller for the presumably problematic deliberation indicators. Coefficients for these vary between $\text{Beta} = 0.24$ (Model E2.2) and $\text{Beta} = 0.29$ (Model B2.2), while the coefficients for the unproblematic indicators range between $\text{Beta} = 0.13$ (in Model C2.2) and $\text{Beta}=20$ (in Model F2.2). This pattern could indicate that there actually are problems of multicollinearity that affect the results, even though the VIF Values are within non-problematic boundaries. Then again, the differences between the presumably unproblematic and problematic models are not as severe as they could be, which indicates a certain robustness of the results. Taking a look at the goodness of fit measures in the appendix Figure A10, it becomes visible that including the Polity/FH measure does not really lead to an increase of fit overall compared to the respective models with only the DCI or its components. It can also be safely assumed that the positive effects of the deliberation indicators are not due to the influence of the Polity/FH measure, as the model with only Polity/FH (P2.1) has the worst fit overall (the only exception being the BIC, which indicates worse fits for the Models C2.1 and D2.1 than for P2.1). The conclusion for H1.1 would be the same, even if we only considered the models expected to be unproblematic. The hypothesis states that, within democracies, the more deliberative a system, the higher the support for the regime. In light of the reviewed empirical evidence, we cautiously consider H1.1 to be preliminarily confirmed.

After the results concerning H1.1 were discussed, the empirical results for the contradicting hypotheses H1.2a and H1.2b are examined. In the left column of Figure 11, the effects of the deliberation indicators on regime support within the non-democracy subsample are reported. Rather similar to the results for the complete sample, the indicators DCI ($\text{Beta} = -0.04$), Counter-Arguments ($\text{Beta} = -0.07$), and Engaged Society ($\text{Beta} = -0.12$) have negative effects on the

unweighted dependent variable, whereas Reasoned Justification (Beta = 0.05) as well as Common Good (Beta = 0.09) show positive coefficients, and Range of Consultation has no visible effect at all. Weighted or unweighted, none of the effects reaches statistical significance, with the exception of the Engaged Society coefficient for the unweighted regime support, with a p-value below 0.5. The results follow no clear pattern when changing the weighting of the independent variable, besides the previously observed shift towards more positive or less negative effects. The indicator least affected by the weighting is Common Good, for which the coefficients remain stable and only a small decrease in the confidence intervals is observable, which can be explained with the almost non-existent relationship of Common Good and the weighting variable within non-democracies ($r = 0.04$). Recalling the previous discussion, deliberation indicators with Polity/FH correlations over $r = 0.5$ are: the DCI ($r = 0.68$), Counter-Arguments ($r = 0.64$), Range of Consultation ($r = 0.58$), and Engaged Society ($r = 0.74$). Rather unproblematic indicators are Reasoned Justification ($r = 0.39$) and Common Good ($r = 0.15$). It appears, that the effect sizes follow almost the same order as the size of the correlations, for weighted and unweighted dependent variables alike. Engaged Society, correlating the strongest with Polity/FH, has the strongest negative effect on regime support, whereas Common Good, with the weakest correlation, has the highest positive coefficient. Only Counter-Arguments differs by having a stronger negative effect than the DCI. As noted before, the results on the left side of the Figures are not controlled for Polity/FH. The bivariate as well as the multilevel regression results reveal a negative relationship between regime support and Polity/FH, especially in non-democracies, which could be an explanation for the observed pattern. It should be noted, that no such pattern can be detected for the complete sample or the democracy subsample.

Figure 11: Non-Democracy Sample: Models A3.1 to F3.6



*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. Standardized regression coefficients and 90% confidence intervals are reported. For the full models see Appendix Table A11 and A12. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

Including the Polity/FH variable in the models has a similar impact as it had for the democracy subsample and as the dummies had in the complete sample (see Figure 11, right column): the effects of the respective deliberation indicators increase and reach weak statistical significance in almost all cases (with p-values varying between below 0.1 and above 0.01). For two of the components, the same components that showed the strongest negative tendencies in the corresponding models without Polity/FH, the coefficients are not significant for any of the dependent variables: Counter-Arguments (Models D3.4-D3.6) and Engaged Society (Models F3.4-F3.6). Weighting regime support has the same impact already observed before with the dummy variables, by shifting the effects of Polity/FH towards less negative coefficients. Notably, a different pattern for the deliberation indicators can be observed, with the exception of Engaged Society. For the other five indicators, there is a rather small decrease in effect sizes for the weighted dependent variables. Interestingly, the Engaged Society indicator is the one that correlates the strongest with the Polity/FH measure within non-democracies. But overall, no systematic differences can be detected in the results of the presumably problematic and unproblematic indicators. The same can be said for the effects of the Polity/FH measure, which has consistently negative coefficients of notable size, statistically significant on the 95% level or higher (with Model F3.6 being an exception with $p < 0.1$ only). Slightly weaker but still notable negative effects of Polity/FH can be observed when excluding the deliberation indicators and including only Polity/FH (Models P3.1-P3.3, Appendix Figure A6). The Polity/FH coefficients for the assumably problematic indicators show no notable systematic differences compared to the two rather unproblematic variables Reasoned Justification and Common Good.

The empirical evidence is mixed for the two contradicting hypotheses, which assumed that, in non-democracies, the more deliberative a system, the higher (H1.2a) or lower (H1.2b) is regime support. In models not controlling for Polity/FH dummies (unweighted regime support), empirical evidence shows no clear pattern at all, with one indiscernible (Range of Consultation), two positive (Reasoned Justification, Common Good) and three negative effects (Counter-Arguments, Engaged Society, DCI), all besides one statistically insignificant. However, when including the Polity/FH variable, the results indicate a positive effect of delib-

eration, with all of the six indicators having positive coefficients, four of them with noteworthy effect sizes and being statistically weakly significant at the 90% or respective 95% level. Taking a look at the fit measurements in Figures A11 to A13 in the Appendix, one can see that the models that include Polity/FH as well as the deliberation components are amongst the best-fitting models (though the BIC shows contradictory trends in some cases). The only exception are the models with the independent variables Engaged Society and Counter-Arguments, where the best-fitting model is not the one that includes a deliberation indicator together with Polity/FH. The models including only Polity/FH (P3.1-P3.3) have the best fit in this cases, and always a better fit than the models only including the respective deliberation indicators. In general it has to be noted that the non-democracy subsample is affected by a possible bias in the self-reported regime support and that, as discussed before, the weighting measure has not been tested for its accuracy. In light of the discussed evidence we reject H1.2b, but refer from confirming H1.2a due to the mixed results and discussed restrictions. Nevertheless, some empirical indications for the effect proposed by H1.2a can be noted.

In sum, we did find evidence for an effect of deliberation on regime support, especially and least restricted by limitations within the democracy subsample. To begin with, general trends can be observed for the weighting of the dependent variable. In most cases, though not for the non-democracy subsample, the effects of the deliberation indicators shift towards more positive/less negative effects when the weighting is applied. For the Polity/FH dummies, the effects of the democracy dummies become less negative and for the autocracy dummy less positive (in reference to anocracies). Similarly, in the autocracy subsample, the effects of the continuous Polity/FH measure are less negative for the weighted dependent variables. A second trend can be observed when comparing the respective models with and without one of the Polity/FH measures. In all models, when including Polity/FH, negative effects of the deliberation indicators become positive and positive effects increase (only weakly in democracies, but rather strongly for the complete and the non-democracy sample). This applies to models both presumably problematic and unproblematic in regard to multicollinearity. The results could indicate that deliberation has a positive effect on regime support, but at the same time positively correlates with Polity/FH, which itself has a negative effect on


regime support. This could be interpreted as a suppressor effect. However, this interpretation has to be done very cautiously, due to the restrictions of our study.

3.6 MSEM - Mediation Analysis

Next, the hypotheses H2, H3 and the mediation hypothesis H4 are tested with the help of multilevel structural equation modeling, using the methodology suggested by Preacher et al. (cf. Preacher et al. 2010). Given the limited scope of this paper and the exploratory nature of the analysis, the examination of the suggested macro-micro mediation effect will only focus on three variables, the DCI, democratic performance evaluation and regime support. Given that the measurement of democratic performance evaluation wasn't available in all countries, a smaller sample will be used. There are three models to be estimated: one for the whole sample (93 countries, 231.596 respondents), one for democracies (44 countries, 113.273) and one for non-democracies (49 countries, 118.323). Figure 12 reports the results as standardized estimates, the whole sample is shown in black, while the democracy and non-democracy sample are shown in blue and red, respectively. At first, we focus on the effects on the individual level and the within-country relationships. Given that the DCI does not vary within a specific country, there is no relationship with democratic performance evaluation on the individual-level. Starting with the overall model for the whole sample, one can see a relatively well fit, with a CFI of 0.978 (suggested cut-off value for a good fit: 0.95), a RMSEA of 0.013 (cut-off value: 0.05) and a $SRMR_{within}$ of 0.011 (cut-off value: 0.8) (cf. Urban and Mayerl 2013: 94-97; cf. Hu and Bentler 1999). Looking at the democracy and non-democracy subsamples, one can observe similarly well fitting indicators with a CFI of 0.985, a RMSEA of 0.013, a $SRMR_{within}$ of 0.013 and a CFI of 0.980, a RMSEA of 0.012 and a $SRMR_{within}$ of 0.010, respectively. Standardized Betas seem to be fairly close to each other for the overall model and the subsamples at about 0.37, all of them significant on the 99% level. In total, democratic performance evaluation explains roughly 14% of the variation of regime support on the individual level for the complete sample as well as the subsamples. The results suggest a positive effect of democratic performance evaluation as hypothesized by H3, at least on the individual level. Focusing on the country-level, one can observe somewhat problematic fit indices of $SRMR_{between} = 0.104$ in the overall model

and $SRMR_{between} = 0.094$ in the democracies model, which is somewhat higher than the suggested cut-off value of 0.08. Given that the validity of cut-off values in Multilevel-SEM is still a debated matter in the literature, we interpret the results of these models on the country-level as well, though with some necessary caution (cf. Ryu 2014; Hsu et al. 2017). $SRMR_{between}$ for non-democracies is 0.058 and thereby well within acceptable limits. Next, the effect of the DCI on democratic performance evaluation is examined. As hypothesized by H2, H2.1 and H2.1a, a positive effect can be found for the overall data and both subsamples, Betas varying from 0.366 in the overall sample to 0.406 in the democracy sample and 0.272 in the non-democracy sample, here although only significant on the 95% level. In total, the DCI explains 13.4% of the variation of democratic performance evaluation in the overall sample, while it only explains 7.4% of variation in the non-democracy subsample. Given the positive effects of the DCI on democratic performance evaluation, H2.1b can be preliminarily rejected. Next, we examine the effect of democratic performance evaluation on the country-level. Highly significant effects can be found with large effect sizes of over 0.5 in the overall model and in both subsamples. On the country-level, democratic performance alone explains 32.5%, 25.6% and a striking 56.2% in the complete, democracy and non-democracy samples, respectively. These results validate Hypothesis H3 on the country level, specifically though for the non-democracy sample with the least problematic fit. As a last step, we investigate the results of the proposed indirect effect between the DCI and regime support, mediated by democratic performance evaluation. All three indirect effects are shown to be significant, if only on the 95% levels for the democracy and non-democracy subsample. With an effect size of Beta = 0.094 in the complete sample, Beta = 0.155 and Beta = 0.128 in the democracy and non-democracy sample, respectively, one can assume a non-negligible indirect effect. The results validate the mediation hypothesis H4. However, given that the $SRMR_{between}$ for the complete and democracy sample had bad model fits and the fact that the effects in this analysis are not controlled for other variables, there is a lack of empirical evidence to ultimately judge these results to be reliable. Although for the purposes of this paper, H4 can be accepted (and most reliably so for the non-democracy sample), it is suggested that future research focuses on the proposed relationship in greater detail.

Figure 12: MSEM - Mediation Analysis



*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. Standardized regression coefficients are reported. Factor loadings, error variances and error variance correlation omitted for spatial reasons. Error term correlations estimated between confidence in courts and police, as well as between confidence in parliament and political leadership on Level 1 and Level 2 for all models. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Full model specifications can be requested from the authors. Own calculations

4 Conclusion

Recalling the research question, *What role does Deliberation play for regime support across the world?*, a simple answer can not be given in light of the ambiguous empirical evidence. Table 5 summarizes the findings of this paper in regard to the research hypotheses derived from the theoretical considerations in Section 2.2. To test H1 and its sub-hypotheses, multilevel regression analyses were performed. Empirical evidence is found for Hypothesis 1, which states that the more deliberative a system is, the higher is support for the regime, though the results are not unambiguous enough to confirm H1. On the other hand, the most robust evidence was found for H1.1, which restricts H1 to democracies. Within the democracy subsample, we find clear evidence of a positive effect of the used deliberation measurement and regime support and, therefore preliminarily confirm H1.1. Concerning the contradicting sub-hypotheses H1.2a and H1.2b, we can rather confidently refer from confirming the latter one. The results, especially after controlling for Polity/FH, tend towards positive effects of the deliberation indicators and regime support within non-democracies, therefore indicating the effect proposed by H1.2a. Next, the implications for hypothesis H2, H3 and H4 are evaluated. Since the reported results of the multilevel structural equation model weren't controlled for other variables, they should be viewed as rather exploratory. With this limitation in mind, the evaluation of the results suggests a validation of the proposed relationships, specifically, deliberation positively influencing democratic performance evaluation in general (H2), in democracies (H2.1) and in non-democracies (H2.2a), while the results show no negative influence, as proposed by H2.2b. However, it must be noted that the models for the complete sample and the democracy subsample indicated poor fit on the country-level ($SRMR_{between}$ above 0.8). Therefore we refrain from accepting H2 and H2.1, even though some evidence is noted. Concerning just non-democracies, H2.b can be accepted, again keeping the exploratory nature of the analysis in mind. Hypothesis H3 suggested, that democratic performance evaluation would increase regime support, and the empirical findings did indeed provide some evidence for this relationship, both on the country- and individual-level. Still, as before, the results on the country-level cannot be safely assumed to be valid and therefore H3 is rejected, although the found evidence is put on record. Our results further

indicate that the effect deliberation has on regime support might be mediated through democratic performance evaluations, as suggested by H4. However, these results are problematic again in regards to the complete sample as well as the democracy subsample and therefore H4 cannot be safely accepted, although the validation of the proposed relationship in non-democracies should be noted . It is suggested that further research investigates this relationship more thoroughly.

The general conclusion and central finding of this study is, that deliberation seems to have a positive effect on regime support, foremostly within democracies, for which the empirical evidence was the most unambiguous and robust. The results for the complete sample and non-democracy subsample bear the problem to be potentially affected by biased regime support data, or to be weighted with a rather unexplored procedure, which might undermine the reliability of the results. Moreover, the findings are more ambiguous and less robust than within the democracy subsample, though tendencies towards a positive effect of deliberation predominate.

Since there are quite some restrictions and limitations of our study, they shall be briefly discussed in regard to implications for further research. First, the self-reported regime support data are presumed to be biased, since regime support in non-democracies is investigated as well. The applied weighting to account for the bias has arbitrary cut-off values and is not tested for accuracy or validity. We therefore join Tannenberg (2017) and encourage further research to take possible bias into account and find possible remedies, as for example specific survey items or refined statistical methods. Another limitation of the empirical analysis is the lack of meaningful control variables on the macro level, as the ones that were included (GDP logged, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Population, logged) in the analysis didn't gain statistical significance or improve the model fit (Polity/FH and the Dataset-Dummies did, though). Research building upon this analysis should make an effort to find country-level control variables stronger related to regime support. Moreover, one could consider to employ regional dummies or exclude specific sets of cases, like OECD or Western countries. The analysis is moreover limited in that it primarily focuses on between-country effects and does not appropriately account for effects within countries or capture changes within a country over time. Instead of a cross-sectional analysis, one would have to conduct a cross-sectional

Table 5: Summary of Results

Hypothesis	Confirmed	Indications/ Tendencies	Restrictions
H1: The more deliberative a political system is, the higher is the support for the regime.	No	+	Only controlled for Polity/FH dummies Without control for dummies: positive effects only for Low and High Bias DV
			Presumed Data-Bias
H1.1: In democracies, the more deliberative a political system is, the higher is the support for the regime.	Yes	+	Potential multicollinearity problems with some of the indicators (3/6) and Polity/FH
H1.2a: In non-democracies, the more deliberative a political system is, the higher is the support for the regime.	No	+	Potential multicollinearity problems with some of the indicators (4/6) and Polity/FH Positive effects only when controlling for Polity/FH
			Presumed Data-Bias
H1.2b: In non-democracies, the more deliberative a political system is, the lower is the support for the regime.	No	-	Potential multicollinearity problems with some of the indicators (4/6) and Polity/FH Presumed Data-Bias
H2: The more deliberative a political system is, the higher are democratic performance evaluations.	No	+	Not controlled for other variables Presumed Data-Bias Bad Model Fit on Country-Level
H2.1: In democracies, the more deliberative a political system is, the higher are democratic performance evaluations.	No	+	Not controlled for other variables Bad Model Fit on Country-Level
H2.2a: In non-democracies, the more deliberative a political system is, the higher are democratic performance evaluations.	Yes, with restrictions	+	Not controlled for other variables Presumed Data-Bias
H2.2b: In non-democracies, the more deliberative a political system is, the lower are democratic performance evaluations	No	-	Not controlled for other variables Presumed Data-Bias Bad Model Fit on Country-Level
H3: The higher the democratic performance evaluations, the higher is the support for the regime.	No	+	Not controlled for other variables Presumed Data-Bias for complete sample and non-democracy subsample Bad Model Fit on Country-Level
H4: The effect of deliberation on regime support is mediated through democratic performance evaluations.	No	+	Not controlled for other variables Presumed Data-Bias for complete sample and non-democracy subsample Bad Model Fit on Country-Level

A "+" sign indicates at least some empirical evidence in favor of the hypothesis and a "-" sign stands for contradictory empirical evidence.

time-series analysis. As data on regime support is only very shortly available for a decently high amount of countries and the data isn't always collected on a regular basis (though the WVS is a great achievement in this regard), such an analysis is hard to conduct. Especially concerning the Hypothesis 1.2a and H1.2b, an analysis of long-time effects of increases or declines in deliberation within countries would be highly informative. Last but not least, our study might be limited in our measurement of deliberation through V-Dems DCI and its subcomponents. The validity of the measurement could be called into question, as it highly correlates with the index for democracy, Polity/FH. High correlations were expected and explainable to some degree, but a correlation of $r = 0.82$ (DCI with Polity/FH, complete sample) has to be evaluated critically. We suggest that scholars should, therefore, make an effort to improve the measurement of deliberation on the country-level to make it more precise and sensible, for example through including more components than just five, which every other V-Dem component index does (especially since the DCI components showed some interesting differences in their correlations with Polity/FH when investigated more thoroughly and within subgroups). Then again, we found some good news for the DCI and its components. Some of the deviations in the measures of deliberation and democracy appeared to be meaningful, with the three examples of China, Vietnam and Singapore appearing in our sample as well as in the literature as rather consultative or deliberative authoritarian polities. Moreover, expected multicollinearity wasn't as present (or at least not directly detectable) as assumed. In this context, it seems moreover relevant for the findings, that the correlations of the DCI and its components with the Polity/FH measure vary between the overall correlations and the ones found in the subgroups of democracies and non-democracies, sometimes strongly. To recall two examples: Engaged Society has correlations of $r = 0.77$, $r = 0.36$ and $r = 0.74$, Reasoned Justification of $r = 0.72$, $r = 0.62$ and $r = 0.39$ in the complete, democracy and non-democracy sample, respectively. As the examination of such variations is beyond the scope of this study, we recommend further research to investigate the detected differences more thoroughly. It could be especially interesting to explore whether these findings are due to the time-period of this study, due to the facts that the 10 year means for the variables were estimated or maybe due to the chosen democracy measurement and the classification of

democracies and non-democracies. It should therefore be investigated, whether the deviations between democracy and deliberation found in this study can be reproduced in a more general context. Another suggestion would be to estimate macro-micro interactions, as the results of Truex (2017) indicate that positive effects of participatory processes in autocratic contexts might be restricted to the less educated and to the ones expecting less of the regime. In light of the discussed implications, we conclude that further research on relation of deliberation and regime support as well as the measurement of deliberation on the country level seems to be necessary as well as promising.

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6 Appendix

6.1 Operationalization and Descriptives

Table A1: Data Sources

Individual-Level Data
Afrobarometer Round 5/6 (2011-2015)
AmericasBarometer (2010/2012/2014)
Asian Barometer Wave 3/4 (2010-2012/2014-2015)
European Social Survey Round 6 (2012)
Latinobarómetro (2013/2015)
World Values Survey Wave 6 (2010-2014)

Country-Level Data
Quality of Government - Data (Teorell et al. 2017)
Varieties of Democracy - Data (Coppedge et al. 2017a)

Table A2: Operationalization Regime Support


Survey and Questions	Support Object	Answers	Item Code
Afrobarometer Round 5/6			
How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say:	... the President/Prime Minister ... Parliament ... the Police ... courts of law	not at all (0) just a little (1) somewhat (2) a lot (3)	Q59A/Q52A Q59B/Q52B Q59H/Q52H Q59J/Q52J
AmericasBarometer			
To what extent do you trust...	... the President/Prime Minister? ... the National Congress? ... the National Police? ... the justice system?	not at all (1) - a lot (7)	B21A B13 B18 B10A
Asian Barometer Wave 3/4			
I'm going to name a number of institutions. For each one, please tell me how much trust do you have in them?	... the National Government ... Parliament ... the Police ... the courts	a great deal (1) quite a lot (2) not very much (3) none at all (4)	q9 q11 q14 q8
European Social Survey Round 6			
Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you, personally trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust. Firstly...	... politicians? ... [country]'s parliament? ... the police? ... the legal system?	No trust at all (0) - Complete trust (10)	trstplt trstprl trstplc trstlg
Latinobarómetro 2013/2015			
Please look at this card and tell me how much trust you have in each of the following groups/institutions.	... the National Government ... National Congress/Parliament ... Police ... Judiciary	a lot (1) some (2) a little(3) none (4)	P26STGBS.B/P16ST.G P26STGBS.C/P16ST.F Q28STGBS.B/P16TGB.B P26STGBS.E/P16ST.H
World Values Survey Wave 6			
I'm going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them:	... the Government [in capital] ... Parliament ... the Police ... the Courts	a great deal (1) quite a lot (2) not very much (3) none at all (4)	V115 V117 V113 V114

Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix.


Table A3: Operationalization Democratic Performance Evaluation

Survey and Questions	Scale	Item Code
Afrobarometer Round 5/6 On a scale between 0 and 10, where 0 means completely undemocratic and 10 means completely democratic, where would you place [our country today], or haven't you heard enough to say? / In your opinion how much of a democracy is [ENTER COUNTRY] today?	11-point scale/ 4-point scale	Q46A/ Q40
AmericasBarometer To what extent would you say the current administration promotes and protects democratic principles?	7-point scale	N3
Asian Barometer Wave 3/4 Here is a scale. 1 means completely undemocratic and 10 means completely democratic. Where would you place our country under the present government?	10-point scale	q91/ q94
European Social Survey Round 6 How democratic do you think [country] is overall? Choose your answer from this card where 0 is not at all democratic and 10 is completely democratic	11-point scale	dmcntov
Latinobarómetro 2013/2015 Here is a scale: 1 means completely undemocratic and 10 means completely democratic. Where would you place our country under the present government?	10-point scale	P50TGB.A/ P17STGBS
World Values Survey Wave 6 And how democratically is this country being governed today? Again using a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means "not at all democratic" and 10 means "completely democratic", what position would you choose?	10-point scale	V141

Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix.

Figure A1: Bivariate Relationship between Polity/FH and DCI

Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own Calculations.

Figure A2: Distribution of DCI by Regime Type

Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own Calculations.

Table A4: Summary Statistics


	N	Mean	SD	Median	Min	Max	Skew	Kurtosis
Individual-Level Variables								
<i>Financial Security</i>	306047	0.47	0.29	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.05	-0.83
<i>Education</i>	306047	0.49	0.28	0.50	0.00	1.00	0.06	-0.84
<i>Age</i>	306047	41.39	16.63	39.00	15	108	0.56	-0.53
<i>Employment (0/1)</i>	306047	0.50	0.50	1.00	0.00	1.00	-0.01	-2.00
<i>Sex (Male/Female)</i>	306047	0.51	0.50	1.00	0.00	1.00	-0.06	-2.00
<i>Democratic Performance Evaluation</i>	247921	0.56	0.28	0.56	0.00	1.00	-0.24	-0.63
<i>Regime Support</i>	306047	49.28	27.08	50.00	0.00	100.00	-0.02	-0.77
<i>Regime Support (Low Bias)</i>	306047	48.42	26.47	49.59	0.00	100.00	-0.03	-0.75
<i>Regime Support (High Bias)</i>	306047	47.71	26.17	49.05	0.00	100.00	-0.00	-0.71
Country-Level Variables								
<i>DCI</i>	113	0.74	0.21	0.79	0.00	1.00	-1.13	1.07
<i>Reasoned Justification</i>	113	0.56	0.19	0.56	0.00	1.00	-0.06	-0.24
<i>Common Good</i>	113	0.62	0.21	0.65	0.00	1.00	-0.55	-0.06
<i>Counter-Arguments</i>	113	0.61	0.20	0.63	0.00	1.00	-0.60	0.01
<i>Range of Consultation</i>	113	0.50	0.17	0.51	0.00	1.00	-0.18	0.20
<i>Engaged Society</i>	113	0.57	0.18	0.59	0.00	1.00	-0.53	0.32
<i>Polity/FH</i>	113	4.90	4.69	6.27	-7.75	10.00	-0.93	-0.12
<i>Ethnic Fractionalization</i>	113	0.48	0.27	0.51	0.00	1.00	-0.02	-1.15
<i>logged Population</i>	113	16.53	1.53	16.38	13.07	20.98	0.26	0.23
<i>logged GDP per Capita</i>	113	8.59	1.22	8.68	5.77	11.40	-0.20	-0.67
<i>Democracy dummy</i>	113	0.57	0.50	1.00	0.00	1.00	-0.27	-1.93
<i>Anocracy dummy</i>	113	0.39	0.49	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.45	-1.80
<i>Autocracy dummy</i>	113	0.04	0.20	0.00	0.00	1.00	4.56	18.83

Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

Table A5: Latent Variable Modeling: Regime Support


	Unstandardized	SE	Standardized
factor loadings:			
<i>Confidence in Political Leadership</i>	1.00	-	0.61
<i>Confidence in Parliament</i>	1.02	0.00	0.65
<i>Confidence in Police</i>	1.10	0.00	0.70
<i>Confidence in Courts/Justice System</i>	1.31	0.01	0.84
error term correlation:			
<i>Confidence in Political Leadership/Parliament</i>	0.03	0.00	0.43
Model Fit			
<i>(df) scaled chi-square</i>	<i>RMSEA</i>	<i>CFI</i>	<i>SRMR</i>
(1) 0.018	0.000 [0.000 - 0.000]	1.000	0.000

Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

Figure A3: Correlation Matrix


Pearson's r reported. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

Figure A4: Bivariate Relationships between Deliberation Indicators and Regime Support



Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

Figure A5: Bivariate Relationships between Deliberation Indicators and Regime Support (Low Bias)




Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations

Table A6: Countries and Country Codes

Nr.	Country Name	Country Code	Nr.	Country Name	Country Code	Nr.	Country Name	Country Code
1	Albania	ALB	45	Iraq	IRQ	89	Sierra Leone	SIE
2	Algeria	ALG	46	Ireland	IRE	90	Singapore	SIN
3	Argentina	ARG	47	Israel	ISR	91	Slovakia	SLO
4	Armenia	ARM	48	Italy	ITA	92	Slovenia	SLV
5	Australia	AUL	49	Jamaica	JAM	93	South Africa	SAF
6	Azerbaijan	AZE	50	Japan	JPN	94	Spain	SPN
7	Belarus	BLR	51	Jordan	JOR	95	Swaziland	SWA
8	Belgium	BEL	52	Kazakhstan	KZK	96	Sweden	SWD
9	Benin	BEN	53	Kenya	KEN	97	Switzerland	SWZ
10	Bolivia	BOL	54	Kuwait	KUW	98	Thailand	THI
11	Botswana	BOT	55	Kyrgyzstan	KYR	99	Togo	TOG
12	Brazil	BRA	56	Lebanon	LEB	100	Trinidad and Tobago	TRI
13	Bulgaria	BUL	57	Lesotho	LES	101	Tunisia	TUN
14	Burkina Faso	BFO	58	Liberia	LBR	102	Turkey	TUR
15	Burundi	BUI	59	Lithuania	LIT	103	Uganda	UGA
16	Cabo Verde	CAP	60	Madagascar	MAG	104	Ukraine	UKR
17	Cambodia	CAM	61	Malawi	MAW	105	United Kingdom	UKG
18	Cameroon	CAO	62	Malaysia	MAL	106	Tanzania	TAZ
19	Canada	CAN	63	Mauritius	MAS	107	United States of America	USA
20	Chile	CHL	64	Mexico	MEX	108	Uruguay	URU
21	China	CHN	65	Mongolia	MON	109	Uzbekistan	UZB
22	Colombia	COL	66	Morocco	MOR	110	Venezuela	VEN
23	Costa Rica	COS	67	Mozambique	MZM	111	Viet Nam	VIE
24	Cyprus	CYP	68	Myanmar	MYA	112	Zambia	ZAM
25	Czech Republic	CZR	69	Namibia	NAM	113	Zimbabwe	ZIM
26	Denmark	DEN	70	Netherlands	NTH			
27	Dominican Republic	DOM	71	New Zealand	NEW			
28	Ecuador	ECU	72	Nicaragua	NIC			
29	El Salvador	SAL	73	Niger	NIR			
30	Estonia	EST	74	Nigeria	NIG			
31	Finland	FIN	75	Norway	NOR			
32	France	FRN	76	Pakistan	PAK			
33	Gabon	GAB	77	Panama	PAN			
34	Georgia	GRG	78	Paraguay	PAR			
35	Germany	GMY	79	Peru	PER			
36	Ghana	GHA	80	Philippines	PHI			
37	Guatemala	GUA	81	Poland	POL			
38	Guinea	GUI	82	Portugal	POR			
39	Guyana	GUY	83	Qatar	QAT			
40	Haiti	HAI	84	Republic of Korea	ROK			
41	Honduras	HON	85	Romania	RUM			
42	Hungary	HUN	86	Russian Federation	RUS			
43	India	IND	87	Rwanda	RWA			
44	Indonesia	INS	88	Senegal	SEN			

6.2 Multilevel Regressions: Full Model Reports

Figure A6: Standardized Regression Plots: Models P1.1 to P.3.3

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. Standardized regression coefficients and 90% confidence intervals are reported. Reference category for Polity/FH dummies is Anocracy. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

Table A7: Polity/FH: Statistical models P1.1 to P.3.3

	Complete Sample			Democracy Sample		Non-Democracy Sample		
	Model P1.1	Model P1.2	Model P1.3	Model P2.1		Model P3.1	Model P3.2	Model P3.3
(Intercept)	48.04** (14.69)	46.97*** (14.14)	46.72*** (14.11)	47.91* (18.64)	32.47 (25.60)	35.83 (23.11)	40.71† (22.52)	
Individual-Level Control Variables								
Financial Security	2.61*** (0.05)	2.59*** (0.05)	2.58*** (0.05)	2.36*** (0.06)	2.82*** (0.08)	2.79*** (0.08)	2.76*** (0.07)	
Education	-0.96*** (0.05)	-0.93*** (0.05)	-0.91*** (0.05)	0.24*** (0.06)	-2.50*** (0.06)	-2.44*** (0.09)	-2.38*** (0.08)	
Employment (0/1)	-0.84*** (0.10)	-0.84*** (0.09)	-0.83*** (0.09)	-0.85*** (0.12)	-1.01*** (0.16)	-0.99*** (0.15)	-0.97*** (0.15)	
Age	0.55*** (0.05)	0.54*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.05)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.78*** (0.08)	0.75*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)	
Sex (Male/Female)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.25† (0.14)	0.26† (0.14)	0.26† (0.14)	
Country-Level Control Variables								
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.48 (1.25)	0.50 (1.20)	0.60 (1.20)	-0.34 (1.79)	1.95 (1.78)	2.08 (1.61)	2.31 (1.56)	
logged Population	-0.43 (0.73)	-0.22 (0.71)	-0.15 (0.70)	-0.20 (0.90)	0.01 (1.27)	0.27 (1.14)	0.25 (1.11)	
logged GDP per capita	1.01 (1.03)	0.52 (0.99)	0.22 (0.99)	0.19 (2.11)	0.48 (1.52)	-0.47 (1.37)	-1.09 (1.33)	
Dataset dummies								
Afrobarometer dummy	-1.29*** (0.37)	-1.35*** (0.37)	-1.39*** (0.36)	-0.78 (0.62)	-1.35** (0.49)	-1.45** (0.47)	-1.51** (0.46)	
Latinobarometro dummy	-2.20** (0.41)	-2.18*** (0.40)	-2.15*** (0.39)	-3.11*** (0.44)	0.30 (0.84)	0.37 (0.81)	0.48 (0.79)	
Americasbarometer dummy	6.21*** (0.41)	6.16*** (0.40)	6.13*** (0.40)	4.85*** (0.44)	10.03*** (0.86)	9.82*** (0.83)	9.64*** (0.81)	
Asianbarometer dummy	-5.22** (0.36)	-5.28*** (0.36)	-5.34*** (0.35)	-11.57*** (0.50)	-0.18 (0.53)	-0.28 (0.51)	-0.39 (0.50)	
ESS dummy	-6.57*** (0.30)	-6.54*** (0.30)	-6.52*** (0.29)	-4.91*** (0.31)	-10.20*** (0.71)	-10.19*** (0.69)	-10.17*** (0.67)	
Polity/FH variables								
Autocracy dummy	17.61*** (4.81)	12.66** (4.63)	8.99† (4.62)					
Democracy dummy	-2.05 (2.65)	0.36 (2.55)	2.26 (2.55)					
Polity/FH				4.50 (7.29)	-7.07*** (2.11)	-5.15** (1.90)	-3.76* (1.85)	
AIC	2862799.61	2852375.60	2844282.62	1573451.80	1283719.65	1274857.84	1267781.68	
BIC	2862990.98	2852566.97	2844473.98	1573622.62	1283886.50	1275024.69	1267948.54	
Log Likelihood	-1431381.80	-1426169.80	-1422123.31	-786708.90	-641842.82	-637411.92	-633873.84	
Num. obs.	306047	306047	306047	170784	135263	135263	135263	
Num. groups: cntry	113	113	113	61	52	52	52	
Var: cntry (Intercept)	132.26	122.57	121.99	116.88	143.26	116.50	110.61	
Var: Residual	186.87	180.61	175.90	157.59	222.22	208.14	197.53	

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. Reference category for Polity/FH dummies is Anocracy. Reference category for dataset dummies is World Value Survey. Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix.

Table A8: Complete Sample: Statistical models A1.1 to F1.3

	DCI		Reasoned Justification				Common Good				Counter-Arguments				Range of Consultation				Engaged Society			
	Model A1.1 (No Bias)	Model A1.2 (Low Bias)	Model A1.3 (High Bias)	Model B1.1 (No Bias)	Model B1.2 (Low Bias)	Model B1.3 (High Bias)	Model C1.1 (No Bias)	Model C1.2 (Low Bias)	Model C1.3 (High Bias)	Model D1.1 (No Bias)	Model D1.2 (Low Bias)	Model D1.3 (High Bias)	Model E1.1 (No Bias)	Model E1.2 (Low Bias)	Model E1.3 (High Bias)	Model F1.1 (No Bias)	Model F1.2 (Low Bias)	Model F1.3 (High Bias)				
(Intercept)	39.08* (16.66)	43.48** (15.40)	47.28** (14.89)	48.33** (16.90)	52.86*** (15.33)	56.66*** (14.64)	50.80** (17.29)	51.69** (15.92)	53.18*** (15.50)	39.30* (16.32)	41.49** (15.14)	43.68** (14.70)	44.14** (16.44)	46.80** (14.98)	49.30*** (14.35)	37.21* (16.58)	41.51** (15.42)	45.26** (14.98)				
Individual-Level Control Variables																						
Financial Security	8.98*** (0.17)	8.92*** (0.17)	8.88*** (0.16)	8.98*** (0.17)	8.92*** (0.16)	8.88*** (0.17)	8.92*** (0.17)	8.88*** (0.16)	8.98*** (0.17)	8.92*** (0.17)	8.88*** (0.17)	8.98*** (0.16)	8.92*** (0.17)	8.88*** (0.16)	8.98*** (0.17)	8.92*** (0.17)	8.88*** (0.16)	8.92*** (0.17)	8.88*** (0.16)			
Education	-0.96*** (0.05)	-0.93*** (0.05)	-0.91*** (0.05)	-0.96*** (0.05)	-0.93*** (0.05)	-0.91*** (0.05)	-0.96*** (0.05)	-0.93*** (0.05)	-0.91*** (0.05)	-0.96*** (0.05)	-0.93*** (0.05)	-0.91*** (0.05)	-0.96*** (0.05)	-0.93*** (0.05)	-0.91*** (0.05)	-0.96*** (0.05)	-0.93*** (0.05)	-0.91*** (0.05)	-0.96*** (0.05)	-0.91*** (0.05)		
Employment (0/1)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)	-0.42*** (0.05)		
Age	0.55*** (0.05)	0.54*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.05)	0.55*** (0.05)	0.54*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.05)	0.55*** (0.05)	0.54*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.05)	0.55*** (0.05)	0.54*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.05)	0.55*** (0.05)	0.54*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.05)	0.55*** (0.05)	0.54*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.05)	0.55*** (0.05)	0.54*** (0.05)		
Sex (Male/Female)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)		
Country-Level Control Variables																						
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.29 (1.35)	0.12 (1.25)	0.06 (1.21)	0.16 (1.34)	0.05 (1.21)	0.04 (1.16)	0.03 (1.34)	-0.06 (1.24)	-0.06 (1.20)	0.30 (1.35)	0.16 (1.25)	0.12 (1.21)	0.25 (1.35)	0.22 (1.23)	0.27 (1.17)	0.33 (1.35)	0.17 (1.25)	0.12 (1.22)				
logged Population	-0.09 (0.80)	-0.11 (0.74)	-0.21 (0.72)	-0.19 (0.80)	-0.18 (0.72)	-0.26 (0.69)	-0.37 (0.81)	-0.36 (0.75)	-0.45 (0.73)	-0.11 (0.80)	-0.07 (0.74)	-0.12 (0.72)	-0.14 (0.80)	-0.10 (0.73)	-0.16 (0.70)	-0.06 (0.80)	-0.08 (0.74)	-0.18 (0.72)				
logged GDP per capita	0.82 (1.11)	0.26 (1.02)	-0.07 (0.99)	-0.04 (1.16)	-0.67 (1.05)	-1.05 (1.01)	0.02 (1.12)	-0.21 (1.03)	-0.31 (1.01)	0.83 (1.08)	0.40 (1.00)	0.16 (0.97)	0.35 (1.10)	-0.13 (0.96)	-0.40 (1.00)	0.98 (0.96)	0.42 (1.02)	0.09 (0.99)	0.42 (1.02)			
Dataset Control dummies																						
Afrobarometer dummy	-1.31*** (0.37)	-1.37*** (0.37)	-1.42*** (0.36)	-1.33*** (0.37)	-1.38*** (0.36)	-1.43*** (0.37)	-1.33*** (0.36)	-1.38*** (0.37)	-1.42*** (0.37)	-1.32*** (0.37)	-1.37*** (0.37)	-1.41*** (0.37)	-1.33*** (0.36)	-1.38*** (0.37)	-1.43*** (0.37)	-1.32*** (0.37)	-1.37*** (0.37)	-1.41*** (0.36)				
Latinobarometro dummy	-2.19*** (0.41)	-2.18*** (0.40)	-2.15*** (0.39)	-2.19*** (0.41)	-2.18*** (0.40)	-2.16*** (0.39)	-2.19*** (0.41)	-2.17*** (0.40)	-2.13*** (0.39)	-2.19*** (0.41)	-2.17*** (0.40)	-2.14*** (0.39)	-2.19*** (0.41)	-2.18*** (0.40)	-2.16*** (0.39)	-2.18*** (0.41)	-2.17*** (0.40)	-2.14*** (0.39)				
Americasbarometer dummy	6.23*** (0.41)	6.17*** (0.40)	6.13*** (0.40)	6.23*** (0.41)	6.16*** (0.40)	6.12*** (0.40)	6.23*** (0.40)	6.18*** (0.40)	6.15*** (0.40)	6.23*** (0.40)	6.18*** (0.40)	6.14*** (0.40)	6.23*** (0.40)	6.16*** (0.40)	6.12*** (0.40)	6.24*** (0.40)	6.18*** (0.40)	6.14*** (0.40)				
Asianbarometer dummy	-5.20*** (0.36)	-5.26*** (0.36)	-5.33*** (0.35)	-5.20*** (0.36)	-5.26*** (0.35)	-5.33*** (0.36)	-5.20*** (0.36)	-5.26*** (0.35)	-5.32*** (0.36)	-5.20*** (0.35)	-5.27*** (0.36)	-5.32*** (0.36)	-5.20*** (0.35)	-5.26*** (0.36)	-5.32*** (0.35)	-5.20*** (0.36)	-5.26*** (0.35)	-5.33*** (0.36)				
ESS dummy	-6.59*** (0.30)	-6.56*** (0.29)	-6.53*** (0.30)	-6.60*** (0.29)	-6.57*** (0.30)	-6.54*** (0.29)	-6.60*** (0.30)	-6.56*** (0.29)	-6.53*** (0.30)	-6.59*** (0.29)	-6.56*** (0.30)	-6.53*** (0.29)	-6.60*** (0.30)	-6.57*** (0.29)	-6.54*** (0.30)	-6.59*** (0.29)	-6.56*** (0.30)	-6.53*** (0.29)				
DCI & Subcomponents																						
DCI	-0.56 (1.11)	0.85 (1.02)	1.89† (0.99)																			
Reasoned Justification				1.63 (1.24)	2.88* (1.13)	3.80*** (1.07)																
Common Good							1.87 (1.29)	2.24† (1.19)	2.57* (1.16)													
Counter-Arguments										-0.82 (1.17)	0.54 (1.08)	1.57 (1.05)										
Range of Consultation													0.95 (1.12)	2.13* (1.02)	3.01** (0.97)							
Engaged Society																	-1.10 (1.13)	0.35 (1.05)	1.44 (1.02)			
AIC	2862823.76	2852391.65	2844292.11	2862822.07	2852385.71	2844283.63	2862821.61	2852388.52	2844290.55	2862823.42	2852391.97	2844293.41	2862823.28	2852388.00	2844286.52	2862823.02	2852392.17	2844293.69				
BIC	2863004.50	2852572.38	2844472.85	2863002.81	2852566.45	2844464.36	2863002.35	2852569.25	2844471.29	2863004.15	2852572.71	2844474.15	2863004.01	2852568.74	2844467.26	2863003.76	2852572.91	2844474.43				
Log Likelihood	-1431394.88	-1426178.82	-1422129.06	-1431394.04	-1426175.86	-1422124.81	-1431393.81	-1426177.26	-1422128.28	-1431394.71	-1426178.99	-1422129.71	-1431394.64	-1426177.00	-1422126.26	-1431394.51	-1426179.09	-1422129.85				
Num. obs.	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047				
Num. groups: entry	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113			
Var: entry (Intercept)	160.28	136.84	127.79	158.15	129.79	118.37	157.62	133.36	126.41	159.92	137.40	129.48	159.58	132.29	121.32	159.27	137.57	129.72				
Var: Residual	186.87	180.62	175.90	186.87	180.62	175.90	186.87	180.62	175.90	186.87	180.62	175.90	186.87	180.62	175.90	186.87	180.62	175.90				

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. Models show unstandardized b-coefficients and all predictors are grand-mean centered and z-standardized. Reference category for dataset dummies is World Value Survey. Models estimated with Restricted Maximum Likelihood. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations

Table A9: Complete Sample (including Polity/FH dummies): Statistical models A1.4 to F1.6

	DCI		Reasoned Justification						Common Good			Counter-Arguments			Range of Consultation			Engaged Society		
	Model A1.4 (No Bias)	Model A1.5 (Low Bias)	Model A1.6 (High Bias)	Model B1.4 (No Bias)	Model B1.5 (Low Bias)	Model B1.6 (High Bias)	Model C1.4 (No Bias)	Model C1.5 (Low Bias)	Model C1.6 (High Bias)	Model D1.4 (No Bias)	Model D1.5 (Low Bias)	Model D1.6 (High Bias)	Model E1.4 (No Bias)	Model E1.5 (Low Bias)	Model E1.6 (High Bias)	Model F1.4 (No Bias)	Model F1.5 (Low Bias)	Model F1.6 (High Bias)		
(Intercept)	64.38*** (15.53)	64.81*** (14.77)	65.51*** (14.64)	73.04*** (15.08)	73.11*** (14.28)	73.43*** (14.17)	61.03*** (16.10)	59.81** (15.49)	59.73*** (15.44)	55.00*** (15.20)	54.62*** (14.55)	54.82*** (14.46)	63.86*** (14.51)	63.40*** (13.78)	63.50*** (13.68)	59.43*** (15.74)	60.09*** (15.01)	61.05*** (14.87)		
Individual-Level Control Variables																				
Financial Security	2.61*** (0.05)	2.59*** (0.05)	2.58*** (0.05)																	
Education	-0.96*** (0.05)	-0.93*** (0.05)	-0.91*** (0.05)																	
Employment (0/1)	-0.84*** (0.10)	-0.84*** (0.09)	-0.83*** (0.09)	-0.84*** (0.10)	-0.84*** (0.09)	-0.83*** (0.09)	-0.84*** (0.10)	-0.83*** (0.09)	-0.84*** (0.09)	-0.83*** (0.10)	-0.84*** (0.09)	-0.83*** (0.10)	-0.84*** (0.09)	-0.83*** (0.10)	-0.84*** (0.09)	-0.83*** (0.10)	-0.84*** (0.09)	-0.83*** (0.09)		
Age	0.55*** (0.05)	0.54*** (0.05)	0.53*** (0.05)																	
Sex (Male/Female)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)	0.42*** (0.09)																	
Country-Level Control Variables																				
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.17 (1.26)	-0.21 (1.20)	-0.15 (1.19)	-0.20 (1.20)	-0.21 (1.13)	-0.12 (1.13)	0.06 (1.28)	0.08 (1.23)	0.03 (1.23)	0.01 (1.28)	0.07 (1.23)	0.24 (1.22)	0.25 (1.20)	0.34 (1.13)	0.11 (1.28)	0.07 (1.22)	0.13 (1.21)			
logged Population	-0.96 (0.75)	-0.81 (0.71)	-0.76 (0.71)	-0.96 (0.67)	-0.78 (0.66)	-0.72 (0.77)	-0.83 (0.74)	-0.62 (0.75)	-0.55 (0.72)	-0.65 (0.71)	-0.47 (0.67)	-0.41 (0.67)	-0.82 (0.71)	-0.63 (0.67)	-0.56 (0.76)	-0.78 (0.72)	-0.63 (0.72)			
logged GDP per capita	0.49 (1.04)	-0.05 (0.99)	-0.37 (0.98)	-0.46 (1.04)	-1.02 (0.98)	-1.35 (0.97)	0.39 (1.08)	-0.10 (1.04)	-0.40 (1.04)	0.89 (1.04)	0.39 (1.04)	0.08 (1.00)	0.33 (0.99)	-0.19 (1.00)	-0.50 (0.95)	0.56 (0.94)	-0.00 (1.01)	-0.35 (1.00)		
Autocracy dummy	24.75*** (5.32)	20.45*** (5.06)	17.20*** (5.01)	22.46*** (4.70)	17.73*** (4.45)	14.17*** (4.41)	17.26*** (4.87)	12.31** (4.68)	8.64† (5.17)	21.37*** (4.67)	16.79*** (4.94)	13.36*** (4.91)	24.53*** (4.87)	19.84*** (4.62)	16.33*** (4.59)	23.32*** (5.52)	19.24*** (5.26)	16.17*** (5.21)		
Democracy dummy	-7.70* (3.23)	-5.81† (3.07)	-4.23 (3.04)	-8.57** (2.77)	-6.45* (2.75)	-4.70† (2.75)	-3.65 (2.79)	-1.22 (2.68)	0.66 (3.32)	-6.25† (3.32)	-4.25 (3.18)	-2.62 (3.16)	-8.25** (2.92)	-6.07* (2.77)	-4.31 (2.75)	-5.39† (3.09)	-3.49 (2.94)	-1.94 (2.92)		
Dataset dummies																				
Afrobarometer dummy	-1.31*** (0.37)	-1.37*** (0.37)	-1.42*** (0.36)	-1.33*** (0.37)	-1.39*** (0.36)	-1.43*** (0.37)	-1.31*** (0.37)	-1.37*** (0.37)	-1.42*** (0.36)	-1.30*** (0.37)	-1.36*** (0.37)	-1.41*** (0.37)	-1.33*** (0.37)	-1.39*** (0.37)	-1.43*** (0.37)	-1.30*** (0.37)	-1.36*** (0.36)	-1.40*** (0.36)		
Latinobarometro dummy	-2.19*** (0.41)	-2.18*** (0.40)	-2.14*** (0.39)	-2.19*** (0.41)	-2.17*** (0.40)	-2.14*** (0.39)	-2.16*** (0.41)	-2.13*** (0.40)	-2.19*** (0.39)	-2.17*** (0.40)	-2.14*** (0.39)	-2.20*** (0.40)	-2.18*** (0.40)	-2.15*** (0.40)	-2.20*** (0.39)	-2.18*** (0.41)	-2.15*** (0.40)	-2.15*** (0.39)		
Americasbarometer dummy	6.23*** (0.41)	6.17*** (0.40)	6.14*** (0.40)	6.23*** (0.41)	6.18*** (0.40)	6.14*** (0.41)	6.24*** (0.40)	6.19*** (0.41)	6.16*** (0.41)	6.23*** (0.40)	6.18*** (0.41)	6.15*** (0.40)	6.22*** (0.41)	6.16*** (0.41)	6.13*** (0.40)	6.22*** (0.41)	6.17*** (0.40)	6.13*** (0.40)		
Asianbarometer dummy	-5.23*** (0.36)	-5.29*** (0.36)	-5.35*** (0.35)	-5.24*** (0.36)	-5.30*** (0.36)	-5.36*** (0.35)	-5.22*** (0.36)	-5.28*** (0.36)	-5.34*** (0.35)	-5.23*** (0.36)	-5.30*** (0.36)	-5.36*** (0.36)	-5.23*** (0.36)	-5.29*** (0.36)	-5.35*** (0.36)	-5.23*** (0.36)	-5.29*** (0.36)	-5.35*** (0.36)		
ESS dummy	-6.58*** (0.30)	-6.55*** (0.30)	-6.52*** (0.29)	-6.59*** (0.30)	-6.55*** (0.29)	-6.53*** (0.30)	-6.58*** (0.30)	-6.54*** (0.29)	-6.52*** (0.30)	-6.58*** (0.30)	-6.55*** (0.30)	-6.52*** (0.29)	-6.59*** (0.30)	-6.55*** (0.30)	-6.53*** (0.30)	-6.58*** (0.30)	-6.54*** (0.30)	-6.52*** (0.29)		
DCI & Subcomponents																				
DCI	4.38** (1.45)	4.78*** (1.38)	5.04*** (1.37)																	
Reasoned Justification				5.94*** (1.35)	6.21*** (1.28)	6.34*** (1.27)														
Common Good							2.62* (1.25)	2.59* (1.20)	2.62* (1.19)											
Counter-Arguments								3.21* (1.50)	3.53* (1.43)	3.73** (1.42)										
Range of Consultation											5.34*** (1.25)	5.54*** (1.19)	5.66*** (1.18)							
Engaged Society														3.15* (1.45)	3.63** (1.38)	3.96** (1.37)				
AIC	2862794.90	2852369.11	2844275.04	2862785.91	2852359.24	2844265.40	2862799.67	2852376.29	2844283.47	2862799.14	2852374.61	2844281.15	2862787.09	2852360.96	2844267.22	2862799.07	2852373.86	2844279.80		
BIC	2862996.90	2852571.11	2844477.04	2862987.91	2852561.24	2844467.39	2863001.67	2852578.29	2844485.46	2863001.14	2852567.61	2844483.15	2862989.09	2852562.96	2844469.21	2863001.07	2852575.86	2844481.79		
Log Likelihood	-1431378.45	-1426165.56	-1422118.52	-1431373.96	-1426160.62	-1422113.70	-1431380.84	-1426169.15	-1422112.73	-1431380.57	-1426168.30	-1422121.58	-1431374.55	-1426161.48	-1422114.61	-1431380.54	-1426167.93	-1422120.90		
Num. obs.	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047	306047		
Num. groups: entry	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113	113		
Var: entry (Intercept)	129.98	117.48	115.39	119.39	107.00	105.33	135.56	125.36	124.60	135.31	123.76	122.28	120.49	108.53	106.94	135.07	122.73	120.54		
Var: Residual	186.87	180.62	175.90	186.87	180.62	175.90	186.87	180.62	175.90	186.87	180.62	175.90	186.87	180.62	175.90	186.87	180.62	175.90		

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, † $p < 0.1$. Models show unstandardized b-coefficients and all predictors are grand-mean centered and z-standardized. Reference category for Polity/FH dummies is Autocracy. Reference category for dataset dummies is World Value Survey. Models estimated with Restricted Maximum Likelihood. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations

Table A10: Democracy Sample: Statistical models A2.1 to F2.2

	DCI <i>Model A2.1</i>	Reasoned Justification <i>Model A2.2 (Polity/FH)</i>	Common Good <i>Model B2.1</i>	Counter-Arguments <i>Model B2.2 (Polity/FH)</i>	Range of Consultation <i>Model C2.1</i>	Engaged Society <i>Model C2.2 (Polity/FH)</i>	Model D2.1	Model D2.2 <i>(Polity/FH)</i>	Model E2.1	Model E2.2 <i>(Polity/FH)</i>	Model F2.1	Model F2.2 <i>(Polity/FH)</i>
(Intercept)	67.40*** (18.48)	65.10*** (18.47)	68.49*** (17.80)	65.50*** (17.83)	54.97** (19.74)	54.92** (20.19)	53.87** (18.58)	51.82** (18.98)	60.15*** (17.30)	56.52** (17.60)	60.55*** (17.58)	59.65** (18.20)
Individual-Level Control Variables												
Financial Security	8.14*** (0.21)	8.14*** (0.21)	8.14*** (0.21)	8.14*** (0.21)	8.14*** (0.21)	8.14*** (0.21)	8.14*** (0.21)	8.14*** (0.21)	8.14*** (0.21)	8.13*** (0.21)	8.14*** (0.21)	8.14*** (0.21)
Education	0.24*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)	0.24*** (0.06)
Employment (0/1)	-0.43*** (0.06)	-0.43*** (0.06)	-0.43*** (0.06)	-0.43*** (0.06)	-0.43*** (0.06)	-0.43*** (0.06)	-0.43*** (0.06)	-0.43*** (0.06)	-0.43*** (0.06)	-0.43*** (0.06)	-0.43*** (0.06)	-0.43*** (0.06)
Age	0.40*** (0.06)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.40*** (0.06)	0.40*** (0.06)
Sex (Male/Female)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.11)	0.41*** (0.11)
Country-Level Control Variables												
Ethnic Fractionalization	-1.70 (1.69)	-2.36 (1.76)	-0.96 (1.62)	-1.46 (1.65)	-1.00 (1.80)	-1.01 (1.87)	-0.79 (1.75)	-1.05 (1.81)	-0.99 (1.63)	-1.40 (1.67)	-1.74 (1.68)	-1.82 (1.74)
logged Population	-0.88 (0.84)	-1.27 (0.89)	-0.56 (0.81)	-0.88 (0.84)	-0.79 (0.92)	-0.79 (0.98)	-0.81 (0.89)	-1.02 (0.96)	-0.43 (0.81)	-0.67 (0.84)	-0.68 (0.83)	-0.73 (0.86)
logged GDP per capita	-1.52 (1.53)	0.08 (1.99)	-2.04 (1.52)	-0.45 (1.94)	0.20 (1.53)	0.22 (2.17)	0.13 (1.47)	1.08 (2.15)	-1.30 (1.46)	0.11 (1.96)	-0.93 (1.44)	-0.63 (2.01)
Polity/FH	-9.83 (7.84)	-9.75 (7.44)	-9.75 (7.44)	-0.13 (7.92)	-5.07 (8.27)	-5.07 (8.27)	-7.98 (7.43)	-7.98 (7.43)	-1.55 (7.09)	-1.55 (7.09)	-1.55 (7.09)	-1.55 (7.09)
Dataset dummies												
Afrobarometer dummy	-0.80 (0.62)	-0.80 (0.62)	-0.78 (0.62)	-0.77 (0.62)	-0.82 (0.62)	-0.83 (0.62)	-0.79 (0.62)	-0.79 (0.62)	-0.80 (0.62)	-0.80 (0.62)	-0.75 (0.62)	-0.76 (0.62)
Latinobarometro dummy	-3.09*** (0.44)	-3.10*** (0.44)	-3.11*** (0.44)	-3.12*** (0.44)	-3.08*** (0.44)	-3.08*** (0.44)	-3.10*** (0.44)	-3.10*** (0.44)	-3.11*** (0.44)	-3.12*** (0.44)	-3.13*** (0.44)	-3.12*** (0.44)
Americasbarometer dummy	4.86*** (0.44)	4.86*** (0.44)	4.84*** (0.44)	4.84*** (0.44)	4.87*** (0.44)	4.88*** (0.44)	4.86*** (0.44)	4.86*** (0.44)	4.84*** (0.44)	4.84*** (0.44)	4.83*** (0.44)	4.83*** (0.44)
Asianbarometer dummy	-11.61*** (0.50)	-11.62*** (0.50)	-11.59*** (0.50)	-11.60*** (0.50)	-11.59*** (0.50)	-11.59*** (0.50)	-11.61*** (0.50)	-11.62*** (0.50)	-11.57*** (0.50)	-11.58*** (0.50)	-11.61*** (0.50)	-11.61*** (0.50)
ESS dummy	-4.91*** (0.31)	-4.90** (0.31)	-4.91*** (0.31)	-4.91*** (0.31)	-4.91*** (0.31)	-4.91*** (0.31)	-4.91*** (0.31)	-4.91*** (0.31)	-4.91*** (0.31)	-4.91*** (0.31)	-4.90*** (0.31)	-4.90*** (0.31)
DCI & Subcomponents												
DCI	9.50*** (2.64)	11.33*** (3.01)										
Reasoned Justification			7.63*** (1.87)	8.85*** (2.07)								
Common Good					3.60[†] (1.89)	3.61[†] (2.02)						
Counter-Arguments							5.42* (2.20)	6.14* (2.50)				
Range of Consultation									6.72*** (1.71)	7.57*** (1.88)		
Engaged										6.99*** (1.88)	7.09*** (1.95)	
AIC	1573442.43	1573436.90	1573440.06	1573434.49	1573451.37	1573447.41	1573448.75	1573444.32	1573441.27	1573436.27	1573442.36	1573438.57
BIC	1573613.24	1573617.77	1573610.87	1573615.36	1573622.19	1573628.27	1573619.57	1573625.19	1573612.09	1573617.14	1573613.18	1573619.43
Log Likelihood	-786704.21	-786700.45	-786703.03	-786699.25	-786708.69	-786705.70	-786707.38	-786704.16	-786703.64	-786700.13	-786704.18	-786701.28
Num. obs.	170784	170784	170784	170784	170784	170784	170784	170784	170784	170784	170784	170784
Num. groups: entry	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61	61
Var: entry (Intercept)	104.28	103.20	98.66	97.37	120.72	122.95	115.73	117.03	100.54	100.24	102.60	104.41
Var: Residual	157.60	157.60	157.60	157.60	157.60	157.60	157.60	157.60	157.60	157.60	157.60	157.60

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $^{\dagger}p < 0.1$. Models show unstandardized b-coefficients and all predictors are grand-mean centered and z-standardized. Reference category for dataset dummies is World Value Survey. Models estimated with Restricted Maximum Likelihood. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations.

Table A11: Non-Democracies Sample (including Polity/FH): Statistical models A3.4 to F3.6

	DCI		Reasoned Justification				Common Good		Counter-Arguments				Range of Consultation				Engaged Society		
	Model A3.4 (No Bias)	Model A3.5 (Low Bias)	Model A3.6 (High Bias)	Model B3.4 (No Bias)	Model B3.5 (Low Bias)	Model B3.6 (High Bias)	Model C3.4 (No Bias)	Model C3.5 (Low Bias)	Model C3.6 (High Bias)	Model D3.4 (No Bias)	Model D3.5 (Low Bias)	Model D3.6 (High Bias)	Model E3.4 (No Bias)	Model E3.5 (Low Bias)	Model E3.6 (High Bias)	Model F3.4 (No Bias)	Model F3.5 (Low Bias)	Model F3.6 (High Bias)	
(Intercept)	35.05 (26.75)	38.13 (24.06)	42.73[†] (23.47)	41.58 (26.96)	44.45[†] (24.19)	48.66[*] (23.63)	47.11[†] (27.45)	47.79[†] (24.90)	51.25[*] (24.39)	22.89 (27.37)	26.90 (24.74)	32.46 (24.16)	29.92 (26.04)	33.09 (23.50)	37.81 (23.02)	27.92 (27.65)	31.93 (24.94)	37.33 (24.28)	
Individual-Level Control Variables																			
Financial Security	9.72*** (0.27)	9.59*** (0.26)	9.49*** (0.26)	9.72*** (0.27)	9.59*** (0.26)	9.49*** (0.26)	9.72*** (0.27)	9.59*** (0.26)	9.49*** (0.27)	9.72*** (0.26)	9.59*** (0.26)	9.49*** (0.27)	9.72*** (0.26)	9.59*** (0.27)	9.49*** (0.26)	9.72*** (0.26)	9.59*** (0.26)		
Education	-2.50*** (0.09)	-2.44*** (0.08)	-2.38*** (0.08)	-2.50*** (0.09)	-2.44*** (0.08)	-2.38*** (0.08)	-2.50*** (0.09)	-2.44*** (0.08)	-2.38*** (0.08)	-2.50*** (0.09)	-2.44*** (0.08)	-2.38*** (0.08)	-2.50*** (0.09)	-2.44*** (0.08)	-2.38*** (0.08)	-2.50*** (0.09)	-2.44*** (0.08)		
Employment (0/1)	-0.50*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.07)	-0.50*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.07)	-0.50*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.07)	-0.49*** (0.08)	-0.50*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.07)	-0.49*** (0.08)	-0.50*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.07)	-0.50*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.07)	-0.50*** (0.08)		
Age	0.78*** (0.08)	0.75*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)	0.78*** (0.08)	0.75*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)	0.77*** (0.08)	0.75*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)	0.78*** (0.08)	0.75*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)	0.78*** (0.08)	0.75*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)	0.75*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)		
Sex (Male/Female)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)		
Country-Level Control Variables																			
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.29 (1.87)	1.46 (1.68)	1.71 (1.64)	1.04 (1.86)	1.21 (1.67)	1.48 (1.63)	1.41 (1.82)	1.62 (1.65)	1.89 (1.61)	1.43 (1.96)	1.63 (1.77)	1.94 (1.73)	1.69 (1.81)	1.85 (1.63)	2.10 (1.60)	1.92 (1.90)	2.03 (1.72)	2.24 (1.67)	
logged Population	-0.47 (1.34)	-0.20 (1.20)	-0.19 (1.17)	-0.53 (1.32)	-0.25 (1.18)	-0.24 (1.15)	-0.69 (1.32)	-0.34 (1.20)	-0.30 (1.17)	0.14 (1.34)	0.38 (1.21)	0.34 (1.19)	-0.29 (1.30)	-0.01 (1.17)	0.00 (1.14)	-0.04 (1.38)	0.19 (1.24)	0.14 (1.21)	
logged GDP per capita	0.51 (1.56)	-0.44 (1.41)	-1.06 (1.37)	0.07 (1.56)	-0.87 (1.40)	-1.46 (1.36)	-0.46 (1.59)	-1.28 (1.44)	-1.83 (1.42)	0.81 (1.64)	-0.19 (1.48)	-0.86 (1.45)	0.87 (1.55)	-0.11 (1.40)	-0.76 (1.37)	0.46 (1.62)	-0.50 (1.46)	-1.12 (1.42)	
Polity/FH	-10.27*** (2.84)	-8.21** (2.55)	-6.69** (2.49)	-8.71*** (2.29)	-6.74** (2.05)	-5.26** (2.00)	-7.95*** (2.17)	-5.91** (1.97)	-4.45* (1.93)	-8.50** (2.72)	-6.38** (2.45)	-4.77* (2.45)	-9.91*** (2.53)	-7.73*** (2.28)	-6.13** (2.40)	-7.45* (2.38)	-5.80* (2.38)	-4.63[†] (2.79)	
Dataset dummies																			
Afrobarometer dummy	-1.38** (0.49)	-1.47** (0.47)	-1.54*** (0.46)	-1.39** (0.49)	-1.48** (0.47)	-1.55*** (0.46)	-1.38** (0.49)	-1.47** (0.47)	-1.54*** (0.46)	-1.36** (0.49)	-1.45** (0.47)	-1.52*** (0.46)	-1.39** (0.49)	-1.48** (0.47)	-1.54*** (0.46)	-1.36** (0.49)	-1.45** (0.47)	-1.52*** (0.46)	
Latinobarometro dummy	0.35 (0.84)	0.42 (0.82)	0.53 (0.79)	0.36 (0.84)	0.43 (0.82)	0.54 (0.79)	0.34 (0.84)	0.42 (0.82)	0.53 (0.79)	0.33 (0.84)	0.41 (0.82)	0.52 (0.79)	0.35 (0.84)	0.42 (0.82)	0.53 (0.79)	0.33 (0.84)	0.41 (0.82)	0.52 (0.79)	
Americasbarometer dummy	10.07*** (0.86)	9.86*** (0.83)	9.69*** (0.81)	10.09*** (0.86)	9.88*** (0.83)	9.70*** (0.83)	10.08*** (0.86)	9.86*** (0.83)	9.69*** (0.81)	10.06*** (0.86)	9.85*** (0.84)	10.07*** (0.82)	9.86*** (0.84)	9.69*** (0.83)	10.06*** (0.81)	9.86*** (0.82)	9.68*** (0.81)		
Asianbarometer dummy	-0.19 (0.53)	-0.29 (0.51)	-0.40 (0.50)	-0.20 (0.53)	-0.31 (0.51)	-0.41 (0.50)	-0.16 (0.53)	-0.27 (0.51)	-0.37 (0.50)	-0.19 (0.53)	-0.30 (0.50)	-0.40 (0.51)	-0.19 (0.53)	-0.30 (0.51)	-0.40 (0.50)	-0.18 (0.53)	-0.29 (0.51)	-0.39 (0.50)	
ESS dummy	-10.20*** (0.71)	-10.18*** (0.69)	-10.16*** (0.67)	-10.20*** (0.69)	-10.18*** (0.67)	-10.16*** (0.69)	-10.21*** (0.71)	-10.19*** (0.69)	-10.17** (0.67)	-10.20*** (0.71)	-10.18*** (0.69)	-10.20*** (0.67)	-10.19*** (0.71)	-10.17*** (0.69)	-10.15*** (0.67)	-10.20*** (0.71)	-10.16*** (0.69)		
Deliberation & Subcomponents																			
DCI	3.88[†] (2.21)	3.71[†] (1.99)	3.55[†] (1.94)		4.72[*] (2.27)	4.54[*] (2.04)	4.31[*] (1.99)		3.72[*] (1.69)	3.21[*] (1.53)	2.94[†] (1.50)		2.45 (2.69)	2.10 (2.43)	1.73 (2.37)		4.77[*] (2.26)	4.32[*] (2.04)	3.98[*] (1.99)
Reasoned Justification																			
Common Good																			
Counter-Arguments																			
Range of Consultation																			
Engaged Society																			
AIC	1283709.28	1274848.98	1267773.78	1283708.04	1274847.54	1267772.47	1283708.15	1274848.65	1267773.84	1283711.09	1274851.25	1267776.15	1283707.92	1274847.97	1267773.13	1283711.96	1274851.97	1267776.56	
BIC	1283885.95	1275025.65	1267950.45	1283884.71	1275024.21	1267949.14	1283884.82	1275025.32	1267950.51	1283887.76	1275027.92	1267952.82	1283884.59	1275024.63	1267949.80	1283886.63	1275028.64	1267953.23	
Log Likelihood	-641836.64	-637406.49	-633868.89	-641836.02	-637405.77	-633868.24	-641836.08	-637406.33	-633868.92	-641837.54	-637407.63	-633870.07	-641835.96	-637405.98	-633868.57	-641837.98	-637407.99	-633870.28	
Num. obs.	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	
Num. groups: entry	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	
Var: entry (Intercept)	152.06	122.70	116.79	148.32	119.15	113.76	146.74	120.45	115.65	159.32	129.84	123.85	147.88	120.20	115.35	162.09	131.66	124.76	
Var: Residual	222.24	208.16	197.55	222.24	208.16	197.55	222.24	208.16	197.55	222.24	208.16	197.55	222.24	208.16	197.55	222.24	208.16	197.55	

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, $\dagger p < 0.1$. Models show unstandardized b-coefficients and all predictors are grand-mean centered and z-standardized. Reference category for dataset dummies is World Value Survey. Models estimated with Restricted Maximum Likelihood. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations

Table A12: Non-Democracies Sample: Statistical models A3.1 to F3.3

	DCI		Reasoned Justification				Common Good		Counter-Arguments				Range of Consultation			Engaged Society		
	Model A3.1 (No Bias)	Model A3.2 (Low Bias)	Model A3.3 (High Bias)	Model B3.1 (No Bias)	Model B3.2 (Low Bias)	Model B3.3 (High Bias)	Model C3.1 (No Bias)	Model C3.2 (Low Bias)	Model C3.3 (High Bias)	Model D3.1 (No Bias)	Model D3.2 (Low Bias)	Model D3.3 (High Bias)	Model E3.1 (No Bias)	Model E3.2 (Low Bias)	Model E3.3 (High Bias)	Model F3.1 (No Bias)	Model F3.2 (Low Bias)	Model F3.3 (High Bias)
(Intercept)	27.72 (29.85)	32.28 (26.22)	37.99 (24.86)	36.50 (30.48)	40.55 (26.49)	45.64[†] (24.99)	45.08 (30.79)	46.32[†] (26.88)	50.16[*] (25.45)	34.23 (29.51)	35.45 (25.93)	38.86 (24.65)	30.93 (29.68)	33.90 (25.93)	38.47 (24.52)	21.78 (28.78)	27.16 (25.61)	33.54 (24.60)
Individual-Level Control Variables																		
Financial Security	9.72*** (0.27)	9.59*** (0.26)	9.49*** (0.26)	9.72*** (0.27)	9.59*** (0.26)	9.49*** (0.26)	9.72*** (0.27)	9.59*** (0.26)	9.49*** (0.27)	9.72*** (0.26)	9.59*** (0.26)	9.49*** (0.27)	9.72*** (0.26)	9.59*** (0.27)	9.49*** (0.26)	9.72*** (0.26)	9.59*** (0.26)	
Education	-2.50*** (0.09)	-2.44*** (0.08)	-2.38*** (0.08)	-2.50*** (0.09)	-2.44*** (0.08)	-2.38*** (0.08)	-2.50*** (0.09)	-2.44*** (0.08)	-2.38*** (0.08)	-2.50*** (0.09)	-2.44*** (0.08)	-2.38*** (0.08)	-2.50*** (0.09)	-2.44*** (0.08)	-2.38*** (0.08)	-2.50*** (0.09)	-2.44*** (0.08)	
Employment (0/1)	-0.50*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.07)	-0.50*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.08)	-0.50*** (0.07)	-0.49*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.07)	-0.49*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.07)	-0.49*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.07)	-0.49*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.07)	-0.49*** (0.08)	-0.50*** (0.08)	-0.49*** (0.07)	
Age	0.77*** (0.08)	0.75*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)	0.77*** (0.08)	0.75*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)	0.77*** (0.08)	0.75*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)	0.77*** (0.08)	0.75*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)	0.77*** (0.08)	0.75*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)	0.77*** (0.08)	0.73*** (0.08)	
Sex (Male/Female)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	0.25[†] (0.14)	0.26[†] (0.14)	
Country-Level Control Variables																		
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.07 (2.10)	1.28 (1.84)	1.56 (1.74)	0.22 (2.10)	0.57 (1.82)	0.98 (2.01)	0.17 (1.75)	0.70 (1.65)	1.19 (2.14)	1.43 (1.88)	1.64 (1.78)	1.94 (2.05)	0.65 (1.78)	1.04 (1.69)	1.45 (1.98)	1.57 (1.76)	1.76 (1.69)	
logged Population	0.01 (1.49)	0.19 (1.31)	0.12 (1.24)	-0.39 (1.49)	-0.15 (1.29)	-0.16 (1.49)	-0.68 (1.30)	-0.34 (1.23)	-0.30 (1.46)	-0.27 (1.28)	0.07 (1.22)	-0.18 (1.48)	0.12 (1.29)	0.08 (1.22)	0.07 (1.43)	0.33 (1.27)	0.47 (1.22)	
logged GDP per capita	1.28 (1.73)	0.18 (1.52)	-0.55 (1.44)	1.37 (1.72)	0.14 (1.49)	-0.68 (1.41)	0.88 (1.74)	-0.29 (1.52)	-1.08 (1.44)	0.93 (1.79)	-0.10 (1.57)	-0.79 (1.49)	1.45 (1.76)	0.34 (1.54)	-0.40 (1.46)	1.09 (1.67)	-0.01 (1.48)	
Dataset dummies																		
Afrobarometer dummy	-1.35** (0.49)	-1.44** (0.47)	-1.51** (0.46)	-1.36** (0.49)	-1.46** (0.47)	-1.52*** (0.46)	-1.36** (0.49)	-1.46** (0.47)	-1.52*** (0.46)	-1.35** (0.47)	-1.44** (0.47)	-1.51** (0.46)	-1.35** (0.47)	-1.45** (0.46)	-1.52** (0.47)	-1.35** (0.47)	-1.44** (0.46)	
Latinobarometro dummy	0.25 (0.84)	0.33 (0.82)	0.44 (0.79)	0.24 (0.84)	0.32 (0.81)	0.44 (0.81)	0.24 (0.81)	0.32 (0.81)	0.26 (0.81)	0.34 (0.81)	0.24 (0.82)	0.34 (0.82)	0.24 (0.81)	0.32 (0.81)	0.44 (0.81)	0.27 (0.81)	0.35 (0.81)	0.46 (0.81)
Americasbarometer dummy	9.98*** (0.86)	9.77*** (0.83)	9.61*** (0.81)	9.97*** (0.86)	9.77*** (0.83)	9.60*** (0.86)	9.97*** (0.86)	9.76*** (0.86)	9.60*** (0.86)	9.99*** (0.86)	9.78*** (0.86)	9.62*** (0.86)	9.97*** (0.86)	9.76*** (0.86)	9.60*** (0.86)	10.00*** (0.86)	9.79*** (0.86)	9.63*** (0.86)
Asianbarometer dummy	-0.17 (0.53)	-0.28 (0.51)	-0.38 (0.50)	-0.18 (0.53)	-0.28 (0.51)	-0.39 (0.50)	-0.16 (0.53)	-0.26 (0.51)	-0.37 (0.51)	-0.17 (0.51)	-0.27 (0.51)	-0.38 (0.51)	-0.17 (0.51)	-0.28 (0.51)	-0.38 (0.51)	-0.18 (0.51)	-0.29 (0.51)	-0.39 (0.51)
ESS dummy	-10.21*** (0.71)	-10.20*** (0.69)	-10.18*** (0.67)	-10.22*** (0.71)	-10.20*** (0.69)	-10.18*** (0.67)	-10.22*** (0.71)	-10.18*** (0.69)	-10.22*** (0.67)	-10.18*** (0.71)	-10.22*** (0.69)	-10.20*** (0.67)	-10.17*** (0.71)	-10.22*** (0.69)	-10.20*** (0.67)	-10.18*** (0.71)	-10.21*** (0.69)	-10.19*** (0.67)
DCI & Subcomponents																		
DCI	-1.27 (1.90)	-0.41 (1.67)	0.20 (1.58)															
Reasoned Justification				1.73 (2.42)	2.23 (2.10)	2.50 (1.98)												
Common Good							2.58 (1.87)	2.36 (1.63)	2.30 (1.54)									
Counter-Arguments										-2.38 (2.40)	-1.52 (2.10)	-0.98 (2.00)						
Range of Consultation													0.06 (2.18)	0.66 (1.90)	1.07 (1.80)			
Engaged Society																-3.90* (1.93)	-2.62 (1.71)	-1.68 (1.65)
AIC	1283723.00	1274860.27	1267782.30	1283722.44	1274858.73	1267780.26	1283721.57	1274858.27	1267780.15	1283721.99	1274859.33	1267781.61	1283723.17	1274859.94	1267781.70	1283719.41	1274857.93	1267781.18
BIC	1283889.85	1275027.12	1267949.16	1283889.30	1275025.58	1267947.12	1283888.42	1275025.12	1267947.00	1283888.84	1275026.18	1267948.46	1283890.02	1275026.79	1267948.55	1283886.27	1275024.78	1267948.04
Log Likelihood	-641844.50	-637413.13	-633874.15	-641844.22	-637412.36	-633873.13	-641843.78	-637412.13	-633873.07	-641843.99	-637412.66	-633873.80	-641844.58	-637412.97	-633873.85	-641842.71	-637411.96	-633873.59
Num. obs.	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263	135263
Num. groups: entry	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52	52
Var: entry (Intercept)	191.01	146.95	132.04	190.73	143.68	127.74	185.22	140.76	126.07	188.88	145.53	131.45	192.80	146.74	131.08	177.44	140.19	129.27
Var: Residual	222.24	208.16	197.55	222.24	208.16	197.55	222.24	208.16	197.55	222.24	208.16	197.55	222.24	208.16	197.55	222.24	208.16	197.55

*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$, [†] $p < 0.1$. Models show unstandardized b-coefficients and all predictors are grand-mean centered and z-standardized. Reference category for dataset dummies is World Value Survey. Models estimated with Restricted Maximum Likelihood. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Data Source: see Table A1 in the Appendix. Own calculations

6.3 Model Comparisons

Table A13: Model Comparison: A1.1 to F1.6

Model Comparison	AIC		BIC		Deviance	
	models w.o. Polity/FH dummies	models with Polity/FH dummies	models w.o. Polity/FH dummies	models with Polity/FH dummies	models w.o. Polity/FH dummies	models with Polity/FH dummies
Model A1.1/A1.4	2862814.02	-21.76	2862994.75	-0.50	2862780.02	-25.76
Model A1.2/A1.5	2852380.77	-15.35	2852561.51	5.92	2852346.77	-19.35
Model A1.3/A1.6	2844280.62	-9.67	2844461.36	11.60	2844246.62	-13.67
Model B1.1/B1.4	2862812.51	-29.89	2862993.24	-8.62	2862778.51	-33.89
Model B1.2/B1.5	2852374.81	-19.97	2852555.54	1.29	2852340.81	-23.97
Model B1.3/B1.6	2844272.00	-11.38	2844452.73	9.88	2844238.00	-15.38
Model C1.1/C1.4	2862812.11	-15.12	2862992.84	6.14	2862778.11	-19.12
Model C1.2/C1.5	2852377.83	-5.12	2852558.57	16.15	2852343.83	-9.12
Model C1.3/C1.6	2844279.34	0.25	2844460.07	21.51	2844245.34	-3.75
Model D1.1/D1.4	2862813.77	-16.96	2862994.50	4.30	2862779.77	-20.96
Model D1.2/D1.5	2852381.22	-9.91	2852561.96	11.35	2852347.22	-13.91
Model D1.3/D1.6	2844282.10	-4.59	2844462.83	16.67	2844248.10	-8.59
Model E1.1/E1.4	2862813.53	-29.82	2862994.26	-8.56	2862779.53	-33.82
Model E1.2/E1.5	2852376.97	-20.48	2852557.71	0.78	2852342.97	-24.48
Model E1.3/E1.6	2844274.79	-12.41	2844455.53	8.85	2844240.79	-16.41
Model F1.1/F1.4	2862813.30	-16.64	2862994.03	4.63	2862779.30	-20.64
Model F1.2/F1.5	2852381.37	-10.93	2852562.10	10.33	2852347.37	-14.93
Model F1.3/F1.6	2844282.33	-6.35	2844463.06	14.92	2844248.33	-10.35

Model improvement above 5 are printed in bold. Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and deviance are fitted with Full Maximum Likelihood to ensure comparability. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Own calculations.

Table A14: Model Comparison A2.1 to F2.2


Model Comparison	AIC		BIC		Deviance	
	models w.o. Polity/FH	models with Polity/FH	models w.o. Polity/FH	models with Polity/FH	models w.o. Polity/FH	models with Polity/FH
Model A2.1/A2.2	1573439.49	0.27	1573610.31	10.32	1573405.49	-1.73
Model B2.1/B2.2	1573436.20	0.12	1573607.02	10.17	1573402.20	-1.88
Model C2.1/C2.2	1573448.37	2.00	1573619.18	12.05	1573414.37	-0.00
Model D2.1/D2.2	1573445.87	1.58	1573616.69	11.63	1573411.87	-0.42
Model E2.1/E2.2	1573437.32	0.73	1573608.14	10.78	1573403.32	-1.27
Model F2.1/F2.2	1573438.68	1.95	1573609.50	11.99	1573404.68	-0.05

Model improvement above 5 are printed in bold. Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and deviance are fitted with Full Maximum Likelihood to ensure comparability. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Own calculations.


Table A15: Model Comparison: A3.1 to F3.6

Model Comparison	AIC		BIC		Deviance	
	models w.o. Polity/FH	models with Polity/FH	models w.o. Polity/FH	models with Polity/FH	models w.o. Polity/FH	models with Polity/FH
Model A3.1/A1.4	1283729.34	-11.06	1283896.20	-1.25	1283695.34	-13.06
Model A3.2/A1.5	1274864.64	-8.60	1275031.50	1.22	1274830.64	-10.60
Model A3.3/A1.6	1267785.62	-5.60	1267952.47	4.21	1267751.62	-7.60
Model B3.1/B1.4	1283729.27	-12.29	1283896.12	-2.48	1283695.27	-14.29
Model B3.2/B1.5	1274863.47	-8.97	1275030.33	0.84	1274829.47	-10.97
Model B3.3/B1.6	1267783.90	-5.26	1267950.75	4.56	1267749.90	-7.26
Model C3.1/C1.4	1283727.76	-11.31	1283894.61	-1.50	1283693.76	-13.31
Model C3.2/C1.5	1274862.42	-7.33	1275029.28	2.49	1274828.42	-9.33
Model C3.3/C1.6	1267783.22	-3.70	1267950.08	6.11	1267749.22	-5.70
Model D3.1/D1.4	1283728.76	-8.04	1283895.61	1.78	1283694.76	-10.04
Model D3.2/D1.5	1274864.13	-5.14	1275030.99	4.68	1274830.13	-7.14
Model D3.3/D1.6	1267785.38	-2.29	1267952.23	7.52	1267751.38	-4.29
Model E3.1/E1.4	1283729.83	-13.00	1283896.69	-3.19	1283695.83	-15.00
Model E3.2/E1.5	1274864.58	-9.61	1275031.43	0.21	1274830.58	-11.61
Model E3.3/E1.6	1267785.25	-5.88	1267952.10	3.94	1267751.25	-7.88
Model F3.1/F1.4	1283725.49	-3.88	1283892.35	5.94	1283691.49	-5.88
Model F3.2/F1.5	1274862.17	-2.45	1275029.03	7.36	1274828.17	-4.45
Model F3.3/F1.6	1267784.50	-1.03	1267951.35	8.79	1267750.50	-3.03

Model improvement above 5 are printed in bold. Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) and deviance are fitted with Full Maximum Likelihood to ensure comparability. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000). Own calculations.


Figure A7: Model Comparison Complete Sample: Regime Support (No Bias)

Aikake Information Criterium (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterium (BIC) and deviance are fitted with Full Maximum Likelihood to ensure comparability. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000).

Figure A8: Model Comparison Complete Sample: Regime Support (Low Bias)


Aikake Information Criterium (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterium (BIC) and deviance are fitted with Full Maximum Likelihood to ensure comparability. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000).

Figure A9: Model Comparison Complete Sample: Regime Support (High Bias)




Aikake Information Criterium (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterium (BIC) and deviance are fitted with Full Maximum Likelihood to ensure comparability. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000).

Figure A10: Model Comparison Democracy Sample: Regime Support




Aikake Information Criterium (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterium (BIC) and deviance are fitted with Full Maximum Likelihood to ensure comparability. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000).

Figure A11: Model Comparison Non-Democracy Sample: Regime Support (No Bias)




Aikake Information Criterium (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterium (BIC) and deviance are fitted with Full Maximum Likelihood to ensure comparability. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000).

Figure A12: Model Comparison Non-Democracy Sample: Regime Support (Low Bias)



Aikake Information Criterium (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterium (BIC) and Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) are fitted with Full Maximum Likelihood to ensure comparability. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000).

Figure A13: Model Comparison Non-Democracy Sample: Regime Support (High Bias)



Aikake Information Criterium (AIC), Bayesian Information Criterium (BIC) and deviance are fitted with Full Maximum Likelihood to ensure comparability. Data weighted to same sample size (=1000).

6.4 Regression Diagnostics

Figure A14: Individual-Level Residual (QQ-)Plot: Model A1.4





Figure A15: Country-Level Residual QQ-Plot: Model A1.4

Eigenständigkeitserklärung

Hiermit versichern wir, dass wir die vorliegende Hausarbeit selbstständig und nur mit den angegebenen Hilfsmitteln verfasst haben. Alle Passagen, die wir wörtlich als auch sinngemäß aus der Literatur oder aus anderen Quellen wie z. B. Internetseiten entnommen haben, sind deutlich als Zitat mit Angabe der Quelle kenntlich gemacht.

Stuttgart, 02.10.2017