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Seminar Paper

Rise of Populism

A Cross-National Examination of the Support for Populism in 25
European countries

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Abstract

This paper seeks to investigate support for populist parties in Europe. While populism is
an intensely debated topic, most scholarship is plagued with conceptual conflations between
different variants of populism.

To avoid such conceptual confusions, this paper adopts a minimalist definition to identify core
features that all subtypes of populism have in common, namely anti-establishment attitudes as
well as their opposition to globalization.

While previous authors used economic and cultural factors to determine support for populism,
we propose a theoretical model that distinguishes between *traditionalist and progressive populism*.
This model involves two steps:

1. **Economically deprived individuals** are more likely to reject establishment parties
   and consequently support populist parties instead.
2. **Cultural values** determine whether these individuals support progressive or traditionalist
   populism:
   a. *Traditionalist populists* draw their support from people who believe that societal
      change has gone too far.
   b. *Progressive populists* draw their support from people who believe that their reactionary
      society is in need of progressive change.

In order to operationalize our conceptual considerations, we use the *Chapel Hill Expert Survey*
dataset and combine it with *European Social Survey* data to identify respondents that vote for
and/or identify with populist parties.

We estimate a multinomial logistic regression to test our hypotheses. Our models lend support
for our theoretical expectations. Economically deprived individuals are more likely to support
either variant of populism. Yet individuals who hold traditional values are more likely to
support traditionalist populism, whereas the effect goes in the opposite direction for the support
of progressive populism.

Further research might be able to build upon our conceptualization and give more attention to
the different variants of populism, so as to not conflate the distinct explanatory frameworks
that come along with them.

Seminar: Transformation of representative democracy

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This is a great way to test whether 1233.34 really works in the way it is intended to work. This is different though becasue 34.876 might be better actually. Or how about 44864.

1233.34

1233.34

1233.34

The following subsection will conceptualize regime support and introduce possible explanatory frameworks that were gathered from the relevant literature (Section 2.1). In this section, the concept of deliberation is clarified (Section 2.2) and a link between deliberation and regime support is established, from which research hypotheses are subsequently derived (Section 2.3).

Some Citations

This is an example introduction. Let's cite someone here (Tibshirani et al. 2001). And in text as well: Habermas (1994) says that we can cite people in text. Or we can write the name, and than use the citation thingy to print the year: Blabla states something about something (1975). Or how about multiple citations (Habermas 1994; Habermas 1994). Or we citation with a little of text around it (cf. Habermas 1994: 92-93).

ALLE Zitierweisen von Zotero gibts HIER.

More Citations

Blah blah (cf. Easton 1965: 33–5; also Easton 1975: 2).

Blah blah (Easton 1975: 33–5, 38–9).

Blah blah (Easton 1975; Habermas 1994).

Smith says blah (1975).

Easton (1975) says blah.

Habermas (1994: 33) says blah.

2 Introduction

2.1 What is populist about populism? (5,5)

While populism is an important and intensely debated topic, most scholarship is plagued with conceptual conflations (Mudde/Kaltwasser 2011: 1). Despite existing pleas to avoid these, many influential scholars continue to use qualifying features of the Right to describe populism, possibly leading to severe shortcomings in their empirical analyses. To avoid similar conceptual confusions, this chapter will first adopt Cas Mudde's clear minimalist definition to identify those core elements that all subtypes of populism have in common (2.1.1.). Subsequently, we propose a comprehensive framework to classify European populist parties along two relevant dimensions: progressivist and traditionalist populism. (2.1.2.)

2.1.1 A minimalist definition: Moving away from the confusion between populism and the Right (3)

In nearly every handbook about populism, authors would eventually point out to the concept's contested nature. As Heinisch et al. described, "[n]early as ubiquitous as articles and commentaries on populism is the assertion that it is a contested concept and difficult to define. [. . .] [T]here have been numerous conceptualisations, which are themselves derived from several fundamental approaches that differ [. . .] in their ideas on whether populism is primarily ideational, discursive, stylistic, or strategic in nature." (HB: 22) This contending debate on how to best define populism is reflected by various empirical studies that emphasize different and sometimes even contradictory aspects of the phenomenon (Gerring 2001: 120 in HB: 169). Broadly speaking, there exist three types of definition for populism. It can be qualified as an organizational type, as a political communication style or as a thin ideology (cf. Pauwels 2011: 99). Especially the latter type has gained prominence in scholarly literature (? Referenz wiederfinden) However, the differentiation between populism as a communication style and as a thin ideology seems artificial at times. Both types distinguish between the people as opposed to the elite and they both allow for a combination with other (even diametrically opposed) ideologies. In our understanding these two types of populism share so many characteristics that the differentiation between them seems to be a matter of wording rather than a matter of clear defined features of populism.

Most scholars agree on the "chameleonic" character of populism (cf. Taggart 2000 in Ot/Low 2015: 61). Some authors, borrowing Michael Freeden's (1996) notion of a thin ideology (in Ot/Low 2015:61), assert that populism can be combined with other more "established"

ideologies like liberalism, nationalism, conservatism, federalism or socialism (i.e. Mudde 2015:1, M/K 2017: 19, Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008: 4). As Mudde and Kaltwasser emphasize, populism

can be "left-wing or right-wing, organized in top-down or bottom-up fashion, rely on strong leaders or be even leaderless" (? In Mudde/Kaltwasser 2012: 153).

A serious problem is therefore the confusion between populism and the Right (ie Betz, 1994 in Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008:3), as Cas Mudde laments: "Until now, populism was almost exclusively linked to the radical right, leading to an incorrect conflation of populism and xenophobia." (Mudde 2015: 1 in HB. 229) This tendency has to do with the fact that populism gained strength in Europe with the formation of populist radical right parties in the 1980s (Mudde/Kaltwasser 2012: 155). Their emergence triggered the blossoming of a vast scholarly literature – although focussing almost exclusively on discussing right-wing populism (De Lange, 2008, in Ot/low 2015:60) while neglecting the growing impact of their counterpart on the left side of the political spectrum (Lucardie and Voerman, 2012; March and Mudde, 2005 in Ot/Low 2015: 60).

Despite the already existing thematization of this shortcoming, many scholars still make the mistake of using right-wing characteristics to define populism (Mudde 2007 in Ot/Low 2015: 61). Inglehart and Norris, for instance, justified their definition of populism as follows: "Cas Mudde has been influential in the literature, suggesting that populist philosophy is a loose set of ideas that share three core features: anti-establishment, authoritarianism, and nativism." (Inglehart/Norris 2016: 6). Considering that the publication they quoted from is called "Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe" (2007), Inglehart's and Norris' statement seems to be remarkably negligent. In this publication, Mudde unambiguously named authoritarianism and nativism as ideological features of the populist right and not of populism per se (cf. Mudde 2007: 22, Mudde/Kaltwasser 2012: 155). We believe that it is exactly because of such a theoretical conflation that Inglehart's and Norris' empirical classification of European parties exhibits serious flaws, i.e. by wrongly indicating that the National Democratic Party of Germany belongs to the populist left party family, just to name but one. (cf. Inglehart/Norris 2016: 36). As Albertazzi points out, "this insistence on making 'populist' and 'extreme right' synonymous or lumping all populists under the 'radical Right populist' banner for ease of comparison [. . .] is detrimental to our understanding [of] [. . .] populism itself." (Albertazzi et al. 2007: 4).

To avoid similar mistakes, we draw on a minimalist definition to capture those core features that all subtypes of populism have in common. Following Mudde (who is indeed "influential in the literature"), we view populism as "a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus

"the corrupt elite", and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people". (Mudde 2004: 543) / (Mudde/Kaltwasser 2017: 6). The biggest advantage about this minimalist definition is its neutrality, allowing us to analyse populism separately from the ideological situation in which it operates (Hali/Nanou 2012: 2).

Marlon: The essential point about Mudde's definition is to make a normative distinction between the "pure" people and the "corrupt" elite (cf. Mudde 2017: 9). Generally speaking, the elite can be defined on the basis of power. Whatever specific group of elite, the corrupt elite is understood as a homogeneous group that works for their own interests instead of representing the volonté générale (general will of the people) (M/K 2017: 11). Therefore, the politics should be an expression of the general will (M/K 2017: 16).

Verbinden & Reformulieren/Kürzen: In essence, "Whatever their positioning on the Left/Right spectrum, the key feature of populists is their claim to be the 'true democrats', fighting to reclaim the people's sovereignty from the professional political and administrative classes (be they in regional or national capitals, or at supranational level in Brussels), as well as other elite 'enemies' who, through the sleight of hand of representative and deliberately arcane and complex politics, have stolen and perverted democracy." (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008: 4) "Populists claim that, contrary to the ruling elites, they will make good on their promises." (Ot/Low 2015: 60).

Recognizing that left-wing populism was widely neglected in the past, recent scholarship has started to study this variant of populism (i.e. Stavrakakis, 2014 or Rendueles, 2018). However, so far this literature has tended to conduct qualitative case studies that concentrate on regional singularities instead of generalizable tendencies of the phenomenon.

Reformulieren/Kürzen: "Like most political phenomena, populism is studied mostly nationally and partly regionally. The first studies of populism were focused exclusively on the United States, while later work looked at Latin America and Western Europe. Few cross-regional studies of populism exist (notably Weyland 1999), while most generic studies of populism remain fairly theoretical and empirically voluntaristic (e.g., Laclau 2005; Taggart 2000). This situation is neither unique to the topic of populism nor without compelling reasons." (Mudde/Kaltwasser 2011: 1)

Left-wing populism is commonly perceived as geographically limited to Latin America while right-wing populism is associated to the European political context. Given the recently growing importance of left-wing populist parties in Europe (i.e. SYRIZA or Podemos), it is important to study the populist phenomenon taking into account – but without limiting it to – the regional context (comprising political, cultural and economic specificities) that it is

embedded in (? in HB: 138, 229).

With regard to the populist phenomenon in Europe – which is this is paper's focus of study – two common points shared by all populist parties are important to note. First, as explained above, populists reject establishment parties that they consider to represent the "corrupt elite" (M/K 2017: 12). Secondly, populists are consistently opposed to the European integration process. It is however at this point that differences between varieties of populism manifest. While populists from both sides of the political spectrum display an anti-European stance, the justification and intensity of

their euroskepticism vary depending on their ideological orientation (in Ot/Low 2015: 60, M/K 2017: 22). What, then, essentially distinguishes the operating logic of these populism subtypes?

2.1.2 An essential distinction: Moving towards a comprehensive conceptualization of progressive and traditionalist populism (2,5)

The main difference originates from the populists' conception of "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite". As Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) assert, "[e]ach populist actor emerges because of a particular set of social grievances, which influences its choice of host ideology, which in turn affects how the actor defines 'the people' and 'the elite'". (M/K 2017: 22). Populists are usually ambiguous about the "people" that they intend to represent (HB: 22). Since "the people" is an "empty signifier" (Laclau in M/K 2017: 9), its meaning varies depending on historical and regional circumstances and differs from party to party (Canovan 1981 in HB: 169). Due to this ambiguity, the dichotomy between the "pure people" and the "corrupt elite" can be understood from a political, a cultural or an economic viewpoint (Mény and Surel 2000 in HB: 169). Most populists therefore not only target the political elite, but also other types of elites like the economic, the cultural or the media elite (M/K 2017: 12).

While all populists attack political elites, left-wing populists especially target the economic elite. Right wing populists, on the other hand, are characterized by nativism and focus on "cultural antagonism" (HB:170, cf. Mudde 2007: 18 ff.). Simply put, populist parties frequently enter in a marriage of convenience with some type of "nativism" on the right and with some sort of "socialism" on the left" (Mudde 2015: 1 in HB: 229, M/K 2017: 21). Radical-right wing populists emphasize the necessity to resist "external threats" to the nation state. This ethno-centric tendency expresses

RIGHT: The shared ideology of radical right-wing parties is centred on nationalism. These parties highlight the need for resistance against external threats to the nation – often expressed by an "ethno-centric message" (Hainsworth 2008) and tough policies on asylum and immigration (Mudde 1996, 2007; Mair & Mudde 1998). (in hali/nanou 2012: 2)

LEFT: The shared ideology of radical left-wing parties has three key elements (March & Mudde 2005): a rejection of the values of capitalism and the free market economy; the protection of collective economic and social rights in pursuit of social justice; and the idea of states working together to address shared concerns in support of internationalism.Therefore, conventionally, the defence of the nation tends to be associated with radical parties of the right

There is a lively discussion within recent scholarship on how to ideally capture these two broad dimensions of the populist phenomenon. They are commonly labelled as "right-wing" and "left-wing" populism. Some authors prefer to describe them as

3   Methods and Data Preparation

The following section will introduce the data and its sources. We use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) on European party position in order to construct our dependent variable of *Support for Populist Parties* (i.e. Support for Progressive or Traditionalist Populist parties) along with individual level data from the European Social Survey (ESS) (Section 3.1). The following subsection operationalizes our hypotheses (cultural and economic explanations for populism) and subsequently a description of the used control variables is given (Section 3.2). Following this, the statistical methodology is explained (Section 3.3) and a short examination of descriptive statistics takes place (Section 3.4). Lastly, the results of estimated multinomial logistic regression models are reported and examined for their implications regarding the research hypotheses (Section 3.5).

3.1   Data & Operationalization

The CHES dataset contains information on the positions of XXX political parties in 40 European countries on european and national policy issues in the timerange between 1999 and 2014. This makes the CHES data suitable for identifying the ideological party positions that can be classified as progressive and traditionalist populism within the European context.

As a first step, we selected two variables that are in line with our minimalistic definition of populism. They will be used to construct the an Establishment - Anti-Establishment Axis.

3.1.1   Establishment - Anti-Establishment Axis

Populism, as it is conceptualized in this study, is characterized by two main features: a disdain for the established elites that supposedly exploit the *pure* and *little* people and an opposition to the effects of globalization that brings cultures and economies closer together at the expense of the (local) working class.

Anti-Elite Sentiment

Anti-Elite Sentiment is measured with the 11-point scale (0-1) variable *antielite_salience* that indicates the salience of anti-elite rhetoric within a given party. This corresponds with Mudde and Kaltwasser's concept of populism where the "corrupt elite" is pitted against the pure people (M/K 2017: 12).

- *Salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric*
    0. Not important at all
    1. Extremely important

Euroskepticism

Euroskepticism (*position*[1]) will be used as a proxy variable for anti-globalization. Populists are consistently opposed to the European integration process, albeit for different reasons.

- *Overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration*
    1. Strongly opposed
    2. Strongly in favor

3.1.2   Progressivism - Traditionalism Axis

Next, we try to identify the value cleavage between progressivism and traditionalism.

This value cleavage depicted divides *progressives*, who favor progressive social values, promote liberal lifestyles and acceptance of homosexuality, civil liberties and multiculturalism from *traditionalists* who take the opposite stance on of all these positions. The following Variables have been selected in order to distinguish between progressive and traditionalist populism.

GAL-TAN

GAL-TAN is a new politics dimension invented by Hooghe et al. (2002). The capital letters are abbrevations for a scale that is supposed to capture the new fault lines in European politics and they stand for *Green-Alternative-Libertarian* (GAL) and *Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist* (TAN) respectively.

- *Position of the party [. . .] in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. "Libertarian" or "postmaterialist" parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. "Traditional" or "authoritarian" parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues (galtan).*
    0. Libertarian/Postmaterialist
    1. Center
    2. Traditional/Authoritarian

Social Lifestyle

The acceptance of different lifestyle is a phenomena that consistently splits traditionalists from progressives. While progressives push for the acceptance of non-traditional social lifestyles traditionalists see this push as undermining very fabric of society.

- *Position on social lifestyle (e.g. homosexuality) (sociallifestyle).*
    0. Strongly supports liberal policies

---

[1]The Euroskepticism variable has been recoded so that higher values indicate higher opposition to European integration.

1. Strongly opposes liberal policies

Civil Liberties

While progressives favor civil liberties and rehabilitation of criminals into society, traditionalists favor tough measures can serve as a deterrence, even at the expense of civil liberty.

- *Position on civil liberties vs. law and order (civlib_laworder).*
    0. Strongly promotes civil liberties
    1. Strongly supports tough measures to fight crime

Multiculturalism

Traditionalists usually see a looming threat from immigrants from different countries, especially when they come from non-European countries, so they favor their complete assimilation into the host country. Progressives on the other hand understand diversity as strength and favor multicultural society without assimilation.

- *Position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation) (multiculturalism).*
    0. Strongly favors multiculturalism
    1. Strongly favors assimilation

Left-Right Scale

Lastly, a general left-right scale is added to this dimension. While our definition of the Progressive-Traditionalist Axis is mostly based on value differences, it's not *just* that. Party affilliation with a set of ideas matters as well and therefore we also include a measure of ideology through this scale.

- *Position of the party [. . .] in terms of its overall ideological stance (lrgen).*
    0. Extreme left
    1. Center
    2. Extreme right

Having selected the variables, a maximum likelihood factor analysis with varimax rotation is conducted in order to estimate whether our proposed dimensions are being measured by the relevant variables.

Based on the Kaiser-Criterion, two distinct dimensions are extracted explaining a total variance of 0.78%. The extracted scales are then summed into two scales *Establishment vs. Anti-Establishment* and *Progressive vs. Traditionalism*, each standardized from 0 to 100 points to facilitate easy interpretation.

As a next step, we want to extract our traditionalist and progressive populist parties. This will be done with the help of *k-means clustering.* K-Means clustering is a very popular form of unsupervised

Figure 1: Factor Analysis of CHES Data

Source: CHES Data 2014; N: 218

machine learning that helps with classification problems. The algorithm producess a *k* number of clusters (classification groups), where k is specified by the researcher. K-Means clustering estimates a centroid (i.e. a center) for each group that has the highest *intra-class similarity* within a given cluster (i.e. smallest distance from the centroid) and the lowest *inter-class similarity* with other specified cluster (i.e. maximized distance from other cluster centroids). The resulting clusters have minimal *within cluster variation* and a maximum of *between cluster variation.*

The classical algorithm for k-means clustering is the Hartigan-Wong algorithm (1979), where the the total within-cluster variation is defined as the sum of squared (Euclidean) distances between data points and the corresponding centroid:

$$W(C_k) = \sum_{x_i \in C_k} (x_i - \mu_k)^2$$

Where x_i is a data point belonging to the cluster C_k and μ_k is the mean of values that are classified as cluster C_k (centroid).

Each data point x_i is classified as a specific cluster so that the sum of squares euclidian distance of the observation to their assigned cluster centroid μ_k is minimized.

$$Within - SS = \sum_{k=1}^{k} W(C_k) = \sum_{k=1}^{k} \sum_{x_i \in C_k} (x_i - \mu_k)^2$$

Finally, the total within-cluster sum of square (Within-SS) measures the appropriateness of the clustering based on how much it can be be minimized.

Now the algorithm can come into use. As a first step, the algorithm randomly selects k points from the given data that will be used as centroids. Next, two steps will be repeted iteratively until convergence is achieved:

1. *Cluster Assignment Step*

    Using Euclidean distance, the distances to the centroid are calculated and the data points are classified to be part of a cluster.

2. *Centroid Update Step*

    In this step, a new centroid is calculated based on the estimated clusters. These centroids serve as new starting point and all data points are reassigned.

The algorithm converges when the clusters do not change in the next iteration (the last two iteration produce the same clusters with the same data points within them).

Finally, the two scales *Establishment vs. Anti-Establishment* and *Progressive vs. Traditionalism* are handed over to the K-means clustering algorithm. Based on the Gap Statistic method (cf. Tibshirani et al. 2001), four clusters are suggested as the optimal number of clusters.[2] Figure shows the results of the gap statistic that clearly indicate four clusters.

Figure 2: Results of Gap Statistic Method

The four clusters that are estimated with the help of the k-means algorithm can be named as traditionalist and progressive populist parties as well as their two establishment counterparts (establishment progressives and traditionalists). Together with the clustering method, the two dimensions can be used to visualize the ideological position of each Euopean party and its classification, which is illustrated in Figure .

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[2]Elbow and average silhouette method also suggest four clusters as optimal.

Figure 3: Party Alignment of European Parties

Source: CHES Data 1999 - 2014

In order to validate the clusters, let's take a look at them in greater detail and see whether the classified parties fit our theoretical expectations.

TODO:

Top Left shows progressive populists such as:

Syriza

After winning the parliamentary elections in January 2015, SYRIZA (*Coalition of the Radical Left*) attempted to carry out the difficult balancing act between extreme left-wing positions, opposition to EU imposed austerity and yet supposedly pro-European commitments. In social policy, Syriza is particularly committed to the socially disadvantaged in society with policies such as guaranteeing that unemployed, homeless and low-income people should be allowed to use the health facilities free of charge or that family reunification should be made easier for individuals with a migration background.

Podemos

In the general elections held on December 20, 2015, the left-wing political party Podemos that

emerged from a protest movement obtained 20.68% of the votes and 69 deputies in the whole of the State. The Spanish "Indignados", the "indignants" of the Podemos movement, practice critique of globalization and capitalism often symbolized in the overarching EU bureacracy. Among other measures, they defend abortion, want to stop house evictions, suppress church privileges, promote renewable energies and are in favor of curbing nuclear energy. With regard to political parties, they propose to stop gauging, reduce subsidies and expand restrictions on connections between politicians and companies.

Red–Green Alliance (Denmark)

The Red–Green Alliance (Enhedslisten) was formed as a collaboration between the Left Socialists (VS), the Danish Communist Party (DKP) and the Socialist Labor Party (SAP) in 1989. During the last parliamentary elections in 2015, the Red–Green Alliance gained 7,8% of the popular vote. Enhedslisten does not stand in European elections, but supports Folkebevægelsen mod EU (*Popular Movement against the EU*), a heavily anti-EU political party that only competes for the European elections. The party attaches great importance to combating social inequality and poverty, as well as advocating strengthening and expanding the welfare state. Politically, the party is in favor of more space for all forms of diversity, including gender, sexuality, disability and ethnic background.

DESCRIBE THEM

Top Right shows traditionalist populists such as:

AfD

The alternative for Germany (AfD) is a political party founded in 2013 in Germany. As of 2014, it gradually moved into 14 state parliaments and in the 2017 general election, the AfD received 12.6% of the vote and thus became the third strongest force and the strongest opposition party in the German Bundestag. Regarding the EU, they have been in favor of renationalization of policies that are currently situated in the EU. The AfD represents conservative-antifeminist positions in gender politics and rejects gender equality policies and relies thereby on Christian fundamentalist and nationalist ideas. According to the AfD, Islam does not belong to Germany. In particular, the party calls for a ban on minarets and the face veiling.

Front National

UKIP

DESCRIBE THEM

Bottom left and bottom right shows progressive and traditionalist establishment parties:

German SPD and CDU, Labour Party and Conservatives UK, SOME FRENCHIES

DESCRIBE THEM

Given that the distinction between kinds of establishment parties is not of greater interest to us, we will merge progressive and traditionalsit establishment parties into a single establishment party group.

Our measure of populism correlates well with different similar classification methods.

(TODO:) CORRELATION WITH OTHER MEASURES

(TODO:) ONLY INCLUDE PARTIES THAT ARE USED LATER ON

A full list of used parties as well as their respective affiliations can be found in the appendix.

(TODO: TABLE that shows the individuals scores)

3.1.3   Dependent Variable: Support for Populist Parties

TODO:

(TODO:) INCLUDE ALL ESS ROUNDS

The European Social Survey data is such and such.

- from when to when
- which countries
- how many parties
- actual operationaliztion

After the successful classification, we combine the clusters from the CHES data with the *European Social Survey* (ESS) Round $5 - 8$. We decided to use only these dates, as we expect the years after the European financial crisis (2008-09) to be more homoegenous in terms of populism. Two variables will be used to measure our dependent variable *Support for Populist Parties*:

1. What party did you vote for in the last national election?

2. Which party is closest to your views?

A respondent that either voted for or indicated that they feel closest to a specific party, will be classified as either supporting a progressive or traditionalist populist or an establishment party, based on the clusters generated by the K-means alghorithm. If it is the case that a person voted for a party but felt close to a different party, we decided to classify said person as a supporter of the party that it felt most close to (thus ranking their vote as less indicative of their support). This is based on the assumption that many voters have an incentive to vote strategically and they might end up voting for an establishment party even though they actually support a populist party (TODO: **CITATION**).

After the merging is completed we are left with XXX respondents from 24 European countries.

TODO: **Descriptives?**

3.1.4   Independent Variables: Cultural and Economic Explanations

TODO: **Description of INDEPENDENT VARIABLES?**

Next, the hypotheses will be operationalized with corresponding ESS variables. *Economic deprivation* will be captured with two variables: Economic Insecurity and Unemployment (0/1). The *cultural value hypothesis* will be measured with an index for anti-immigration sentiment and four Schwartz Human Value dimensions (Openness to Experience, Conservation, Self-Enhancement and Self-Transendence). The models further include common socio-demographic control variables, for example, age, education and sex but also includes a Left-Right Scale, Religiosity, Government Satisfaction, Minority Status, Trust in the EU & UN and Rural vs. Urban. Lastly, regional dummies (East, West, North and South Europe) and time dummies for each year will be included in the model as controls.

A more detailed description of the used variables as well as general statistics of all the used variables can be found in the Appendix.

TODO: How many point scales?

CHECK THIS All models were checked by tolerance tests to be free of problems of multicollinearity..

3.2   Statistical Methodology

Here comes a description of the multinomial model (might need to change the name of the title)

Multinomial logistic regression is an extension of binary logistic regression, which makes it possible to predict three or more outcomes of a variable. In this case, each category of the variable of interest will be compared to the *reference category* that is specified by the researcher with the consequence that estimated parameters (logits and/or odds ratios) are interpreted in reference to that category.

In the multinomial logit model we assume that the log-odds of each response follow a linear model

$$\eta_{ij} = \log \frac{\pi_{ij}}{\pi_{iJ}} = \alpha_j + \boldsymbol{x}_i' \boldsymbol{\beta}_j$$

where α_j is a constant and β_j is a vector of regression coefficients, for $j = 1, 2, \ldots, J - 1$. Note that we have written the constant explicitly, so we will assume henceforth that the model matrix $\boldsymbol{X}$ does not include a column of ones.

This model is analogous to a logistic regression model, except that the probability distribution of the response is multinomial instead of binomial and we have $J-1$ equations instead of one. The $J-1$ multinomial logit equations contrast each of categories $j = 1, 2, \ldots, J-1$ with category J, whereas the single logistic regression equation is a contrast between successes and failures. If $J = 2$ the multinomial logit model reduces to the usual logistic regression model.

Note that we need only $J-1$ equations to describe a variable with J response categories and that it really makes no difference which category we pick as the reference cell, because we can always convert from one formulation to another.

Theoretically a multilevel model would have been needed to estimate the model properly, but given that there are some countries with almost none or no populist supporters in our data, this would lead to problems. In order to still account for the hierarchical order of our data, we decided to use regional variables of Europe, based on the four classifications by the UN: Eastern, Western, Southern and Northern Europe.

4   Analysis

4.1   Descriptive Statistics

TODO - Populist Parties by Country (map) - Plots: *descriptives* Regional Plot (how many populists per region) Boxplot: age + educ + sex + lrscale+ religion + rural Populist Parties by Country (map) *analysis* Coefficent Plots (one big motherfucker) Probability Plots for the main hypotheses

This section will introduce some basic descriptive statistics of the used variables. More specifically, we examine the support for populism over time, its geographical distribution and how it differs among different socio-demographic groups.

Figure 4: Support for Establishment/Populist Parties over Time

Source: ESS Data Round 5 - 8; N = 87238.

Figure 5: Support for Establishment/Populist Parties Across European Regions

Source: ESS Data Round 5 - 8; N = 87238.

Figure 4 shows the support for populist and establishment parties over the timerange that is present in our dataset (2010 - 2016). As can be observed in the figure, support for populist parties has increased in recent years and support for the establishment has fallen. Support for established parties has dropped from 86.17% in 2010 to 81.45% in 2016, reaching the lowest point in 2014 with 80.44%. The opposite trend can be observed for the support of populist parties: support for progressive populists has risen from 5.83% in 2010 to 8.3% in 2016. In regards to traditionalist populism, there was an increase from 8% in 2010 to 10.25% support in 2016. Support for progressive and traditionalist populist parties peaked with 9.2% and 10.36% respectively in 2014 and has remained relatively constant for 2016.

Figure 5 visualizes the support of populist parties for European regions as defined by the UN[3]. It can be observed that Eastern Europe stands out in regard to the support for established parties, where it is significantly lower than in other regions: only 65.89% support established parties in Eastern Europe, whereas in any other region support is well above 80%. Most notably, the support for non-establishment parties in Eastern Europe is primarily due to traditional populists (23.27%). Regarding the support of progressive populists, the East does not stands out clearly anymore.

Southern Europe, like Northern and Western Europe, shows more than 80% support for established parties, but the south clearly stands out in regard to their support for progressive populists (15.24%). In regard to traditionalist populists, a very different picture emerges for Southern Europe, where

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[3]Standard country or area codes for statistical use (M49). See: https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/

support is just over 1% and thus hardly worth mentioning. Such low support for populists cannot be observed in any other region, where the mininum is at least 6%.

potentielle Begr??ndungen k??nnen in dem zusammenfassenden Absatz des Kapitels???oder man k??nnte auch weitere Plots machen, aber muss ja ned sein

Figure 6: Support for Establishment/Populist Parties over Time

Number in boxplots show the arithmetic mean. Source: ESS Data Round 5 - 8; N = 87238.

Figure 6 seeks to visualize the socio-demographic characteristics of establishment and populist party supporters. The chart uses violinplots paired with boxplots inside which the arithmetic mean is shown. The dotted line shows the overall mean. In addition, on the right hand side of each plot the results of a t-test are reported.

A clear picture emerges regarding self-placement on the left-right scale. Those who support progressive populists generally locate themselves on the political left (Mean = 3.22; SD = 2.21). On the other hand, the supporters of traditional populists tend to place themselves on the right-wing spectrum (Mean = 6.48; SD = 2.16). Once can also observe that the average supporter for establishment parties places themselves right in the middle of the left-right spectrum (Mean = 5.2; SD = 2.2). T-tests between each pair further shows p-values < 0.001, indicating that all differences are statistically significant. At first, this seems like a trivial finding, however these results once again confirm our operationalization and validate the idea that we accurately captured traditionalist and progressive populists in their respective categories.

With regard to age, it becomes clear that supporters for established parties are older than those who support populist parties. Also, the differences between the group of supporters for established

parties over the other two groups are significant. There is no significant difference between the groups "supporters for traditional populists" and "supporters for progressive populists" regarding age.

In education, supporters for traditional populists stand out. These have a much lower education than the supporters of established parties or progressive populists. Although there are no visually identifiable differences between supporters of progressive populists and supporters of established parties, but an averaging comparison is significant.

In terms of religiousness, especially the supporters of the progressive populists stand out with a lower average level of religiosity. Supporters of traditional and established parties both share similar religiosity, but, as mentioned on education before, a significant difference between the two groups can be identified by comparing the mean.

IMPORTANT: mean einbauen, entweder in den Text oder aber in den Plot???damit sich die Signifikanzen f??r den Leser noch mal besser erkl??ren // statistische Kennwerte in den Text einbauen => t-Werte..

4.2   logistic Analysis

This section will present the results of multinomial logistic regression used to estimate the support for progressive and traditionalist populism.

4.3   Results

control: The results found in the descriptive part are confirmed in the control model. In terms of age, the chance of support for both progressive and traditional populists of higher age is 1.01 lower than for support of established parties. In education, it is once again clear that supporters of traditional populists have a significantly lower education. Thus, the chance to support traditional populists compared to support of established parties per education point is 1.28 lower, OR = 0.78; 95% CI (0.77-0.79); p < 0.001. Even with respect to the left-right spectrum, the previously descriptive identified characteristics can be found clearly: the opportunity for support of progressive populists compared to support for established parties is lower by 1.45, whereas the chance for support of progressive populists by 1.43 higher, OR = 0.69; 95% CI (0.68-0.70); p < 0.001 and OR = 1.43; 95% CI (1.41-1.45); p < 0.001.

model1: First, the economic hypothesis will be examined. Here it can be seen that the chance for support of progressive populists compared to support of established parties increases by 1.20 per scale point in the economic insecurity. Similarly, support for traditional populists is similar. Here is the chance of this 1.34 higher. Similar effects can be observed in unemployment, OR = 1.19; 95%

CI (1.11-1.26); p < 0.001 and OR = 1.34; 95% CI (1.26-1.42); p < 0.001. With regard to welfare, another picture is emerging. While there is a greater chance for progressive populists to support 1.26 compared to support from established parties, it should be noted that the effect is only slightly significant. However, this does not seem to have any significant effect on the support of traditional populists, OR = 0.94; 95% CI (0.81-1.09); p = 0.40. In terms of the economic dimension, it can be seen that as economic deprivation increases, the chance of support for populists is higher compared to support from established parties. However, the dependency on social benefits/welfare varies. In addition, almost all effects are significant in the model, and McFadden's R?? increases from 0.2 to 0.21 in Model 1 compared to the control model. In addition, the fit of the model is significantly better than the control model.

model2: Now we come to the cultural thesis. It clearly shows that anti immigration has increased the chance for support from traditional populists by 1.29 compared to support from established parties, OR = 1.29; 95% CI (1.27-1.31); p < 0.001. There are also differences regarding conservative attitudes. Thus, the chance of supporting traditional populists is slightly higher compared to support from established parties, whereas the chance of supporting progressive populists is slightly lower. A similar difference can also be noted in terms of openness. The effects on the self-enhancement scale and the self-transcendence scale are in line with expectations. For each scale point on the self-transcendence scale, the chance of support for traditional populists is 1.08 lower than that for established party support. Regarding the support for progressive populists, the chance are slightly larger. With regard to the self-enhancement scale, the exact opposite is the case with similar effect sizes. Not surprising are the effects on government satisfaction and globalization. Globalization, which has been measured by trust in the EU and the UN, as well as satisfaction with the government, in comparison to the chance to support established parties, less chance of supporting populist parties, OR = 0.92; 95% CI (0.91-0.94); p < 0.001; OR = 0.93; 95% CI (0.92-0.95); p < 0.001; OR = 0.89; 95% CI (0.88-0.91); p < 0.001; OR = 0.88; 95% CI (0.86-0.89); p < 0.001. The McFadden's R?? increases from 0.21 to 0.24 compared to model 2, and the fit of the model is significantly better compared to model 2. In contrast to the economic dimension, the effects on the cultural dimension went in different directions. It has thus become clear that the cultural dimension ultimately contributes explanatory power when it comes to the question of which form of populism is supported. However, it should also be emphasized that the effect sizes found here are rather weak.

Model 3: Model 3 now includes the economic as well as the cultural dimensions. This confirms the previously found effects again. In terms of the economic dimension, however, there are slight reductions in the effects. But despite a slight weakening of the effect sizes, significances remain untouched. Moreover, the McFadden's R?? increases from 0.24 to 0.25 compared to model 2 and the fit of the model is significantly better compared to the previous model.

Abschluss: Finally, with regard to our multinomial models, it can be said that our hypotheses were

able to confirm. Let's start with the economic hypothesis:

H1: The less economically fortunate (economic dissatisfaction, unemployment, economic insecurity, living on welfare), the higher the probability of supporting anti-establishment parties.

This hypothesis was clearly confirmed by the models. Unemployment, economic insecurity and also the life on welfare increase the chance to support populists compared to support of established parties. The impact of living on welfare seems not to be as great as the other two factors mentioned and does not even have a significant effect in supporting traditional populists. In addition, in Model 3, where the cultural dimension has been added, there is a slight weakening of the effects. But despite the weakening, all significances remain stable.

Concerning our two established culture hypotheses, confirmatory results could also be found here. H2: The more culturally inclusive (values), the higher the probability of supporting progressive populist parties.

H3: The more culturally exclusive, the higher the probability of supporting a traditionalist populist party.

Inclusive values (high values for self-transcendence and openness and a low value for anti-immigration) increases the probability of support for progressive populists, but openness has no significant effect here. Also, when there are exclusive values (low values for self-transcendence and openness and a high value for anti-immigration), the probability of supporting traditional populists increases. Anti-immigration in particular seems very important here and stands out clearly from the other effects. In addition, the effect of openness on supporting traditional populist parties is highly significant. Even in Model 3, all these effects remain stable. The effects also show our previously suspected differentiation. The economic dimension generally provides for an increase in the likelihood of supporting populist parties. The cultural dimension, on the other hand, shows that it has an opposite effect on the support of traditional and progressive populists.

It should also be stressed that while all the effects found are significant, they are rather weak. In addition, almost all effects of the control variables remain significant in all models. In literature, supporters of populist parties often associate features such as a higher age and lower education. But there were slight surprises here. The strong difference between supporting progressive and traditional populists in education stands out. Supporters of traditional populists may have low education but not supporters of progressive populists. When it comes to age, it even shows that supporters of progressive populists as well as supporters of traditional populists have a slightly lower age.

Let's first evaluate the results of the *economic deprivation hypothesis*. Looking at *Welfare*, the chance of supporting a traditionalist populist party compared to supporting an Establishment party seems to not have a significant effect, OR = 1.05; 95% CI (0.90-1.23); p = 0.53. However, the

expected effect of welfare emerges elsewhere: the chance of supporting a progressive party compared to an establishment party is 1.29 higher when an individual is on welfare, OR = 1.29; 95% CI (1.14-1.47); p < 0.001.

Let's next evaulate the effects for the *cultural thesis*. Looking at *Conservation*, the chance of supporting a traditionalist populist party compared to supporting an Establishment party seems to increase by 1.05 per conservation unit scale, OR = 1.05; 95% CI (1.03-1.08); p < 0.001. The expected effect of *Conservation* also emerges when looking at progressive populism: the chance of supporting a progressive party compared to an establishment party is 1.03 lower when an individual fully endorses conservation values, OR = 0.97; 95% CI (0.95-1.00); p < 0.05.

Figure 7: Functional Decomposed Data Structure

5   Conclusions

5.1   Limitations

5.2   Implications

6   References

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