

What is populist about populism?

While populism is an important and intensely debated topic, most scholarship is plagued with conceptual confluences [cf. @mudde2011voices 1]. Despite efforts to avoid such confusions, many influential scholars continue to use qualifying features of the Right to describe populism, possibly leading to severe shortcomings in their empirical analyses. To avoid similar mistakes, this chapter will first adopt Cas Mudde’s clear minimalist definition to identify those core elements that all subtypes of populism have in common (2.1.1.). Subsequently, we propose a comprehensive framework to classify European populist parties along two relevant dimensions: progressivist and traditionalist populism. (2.1.2.)

A minimalist definition: Moving away from the confusion between populism and the Right

In almost every handbook about populism, authors would eventually point out to the concept’s contested nature. As Heinisch et al. described, “[n]early as ubiquitous as articles and commentaries on populism is the assertion that it is a contested concept and difficult to define. [...] [T]here have been numerous conceptualisations, which are themselves derived from several fundamental approaches that differ [...] in their ideas on whether populism is primarily ideational, discursive, stylistic, or strategic in nature.” [Heinisch2017handbook 22]. This contending debate on how to best define populism is reflected by various empirical studies that emphasize different and sometimes even contradictory aspects of the phenomenon [cf. @gerring2001social 120]. Broadly speaking, there exist three types of definition for populism. It can be qualified as an organizational type, as a political communication style or as an ideology. Especially the latter has gained prominence in scholarly literature. [cf. @pauwels2011measuring 99]. However, the differentiation between populism as a communication style and as an ideology seems artificial at times. Both types distinguish between the people as opposed to the elite and they both allow for a combination with other (even diametrically opposed) ideologies. In our understanding these two types of populism share so many characteristics that the differentiation between them seems to be a matter of wording rather than a matter of clear defined features of populism. Most scholars agree on the “chameleonic” character of populism [cf. @taggart2000populism]. Some authors, borrowing the notion of a thin ideology from @freeden1998nationalism, assert that populism can be combined with other more “established” ideologies like liberalism, nationalism, conservatism, federalism or socialism [i.e. @mudde2016populist 1; @mudde2017populism 19; @albertazzi2007twenty 4]. As Mudde and Kaltwasser emphasize, populism can be “left-wing or right-wing, organized in top-down or bottom-up fashion, rely on strong leaders or be even leaderless” [in @mudde2013exclusionary 153]. A serious problem is therefore the confusion between populism and the Right [i.e. *Betz, 1994* in @albertazzi2007twenty 3], as Cas Mudde laments: “Until now, populism was almost exclusively linked to the radical right, leading to an incorrect conflation of populism and xenophobia.” [mudde2016populist 1] This tendency has to do with the fact that populism gained strength in Europe with the formation of populist radical right parties in the 1980s [mudde2013exclusionary 155]. Their emergence triggered the blossoming of a vast scholarly literature – although focussing almost exclusively on discussing right-wing populism [de2008pariah in @otjes2015populists 60] while neglecting the growing impact of their counterpart on the left side of the political spectrum [lucardie2012populisten in @otjes2015populists 60].

Despite the already existing thematization of this shortcoming, many scholars still make the mistake of using right-wing characteristics to define populism [mudde2007populist in @otjes2015populists 61]. For instance, Inglehart and Norris, in their analysis on the support for populism in Europe, justified their definition as follows: “Cas Mudde has been influential in the literature, suggesting that populist philosophy is a loose set of ideas that share three core features: anti-establishment, authoritarianism, and nativism.” [inglehart2016trump 6]. Considering that the publication they quoted from is called “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe” (2007), Inglehart’s and Norris’ statement seems to be remarkably negligent. In this publication, Cas Mudde unambiguously named authoritarianism and nativism as ideological features of the populist right and not of populism per se [cf. @mudde2013exclusionary 155]. We believe that it is exactly because of such a theoretical conflation that Inglehart’s and Norris’ empirical classification of European parties exhibits serious flaws, i.e. by wrongly categorising ostensibly right-wing parties such as the German National Democratic Party or the Hungarian Jobbik as populist left just because they happen to be on the left and right on the economic policy scale [cf. @inglehart2016trump 36]. As Albertazzi points out, “this

insistence on making ‘populist’ and ‘extreme right’ synonymous or lumping all populists under the ‘radical Right populist’ banner for ease of comparison [...] is detrimental to our understanding [of] [...] populism itself.” [Albertazzi2007twenty 4].

To avoid similar mistakes, we propose a new classification system, drawing on a minimalist definition to capture core features that all subtypes of populism have in common. Following Mudde (who is indeed “influential in the literature”), we view populism as “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people”. [Mudde2004populist 543; Mudde2017populism 6]. A big advantage of this minimalist definition is its neutrality, allowing us to analyse populism independently from the ideological environment in which it operates [Halikiopoulou2012paradox 2]. The particularity of Mudde’s definition is the normative distinction made between the “pure” people and the “corrupt” elite [cf. Mudde2017populism 9]. According to populists, democracy has been perverted by the corrupt elite who act in their own interests instead of respecting the *volonté générale* (general will of the people) [Mudde2017populism 16]. Populists proclaim their commitment to fight these corrupt elites as well as other alien enemies in possession of power in order to give back the sovereignty to the people [Otjes2015populists 60]. Studies of populism was initially studied in a narrow national or regional context, first concentrating on the United States and later expanding to also include Latin America and Europe. [cf. Mudde2011voices 1] Recognizing that left-wing populism was widely neglected in the past, recent scholarship has started to study this variant of populism [i.e. Stavrakakis2014return or Rendueles2018rise]. However, so far this literature tends to conduct qualitative case studies that concentrate on regional singularities instead of generalizable tendencies of the phenomenon. [Mudde2011voices 1] Left-wing populism is commonly perceived as geographically limited to Latin America while right-wing populism is associated to the European political context. [Hawkins2017populism 267] Given the recently growing importance of left-wing populist parties also in Europe (i.e. SYRIZA or Podemos), it is important to study the populist phenomenon taking into account – but without limiting it to – the regional context (comprising political, cultural and economic specificities) that it is embedded in [cf. Sorensen2017com 138; Lanzzone2017com 229].

With regard to the populist phenomenon in Europe – which is this paper’s focus of study – two common points shared by all populist parties regardless of their ideological backgrounds are important to note. First, as explained above, populists reject establishment parties that they consider to represent the “corrupt elite” acting against the interests of the “pure people” [Mudde2017populism 12]. Secondly, populists are consistently opposed to globalization, most notably represented by the European integration process [cf. Halikiopoulou2012paradox; Harmsen 2010; Mudde2007populist in Hawkins2017populism 390, Hooghe2002does in Van2016united 1184]. However, while anti-establishment attitudes and euroscepticism constitute common denominators of populists from all sides of the political spectrum, the justification and intensity for these attitudes vary starkly depending on the ideological orientation of the populist parties in question [Conti and Memoli 2012 93 in Van2016united 1184; *? in* Otjes2015populists 60, Mudde2017populism 22]. This begs another important question: what, then, distinguishes the operating logic of different variants of populist parties?

An essential distinction: Moving towards a comprehensive conceptualization of progressive and traditionalist populism

The main difference originates from the populists’ definition of “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite”. [Mudde2013exclusionary 148] The term populism in itself is derived from the Latin word *populus* - literally meaning “the people”. Populists are however very ambiguous about ‘the people’ that they intend to represent [Heinisch2017handbook 22]. Since ‘the people’ is an “empty signifier” (Laclau in Mudde2017populism 9), its signification varies depending on historical and regional circumstances and its interpretation differs from party to party [Akkerman2017parties 169]. As Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) assert, “[e]ach populist actor emerges because of a particular set of social grievances, which influences its choice of host ideology, which in turn affects how the actor defines ‘the people’ and ‘the elite’”. [Mudde2017populism 22]. Due to this ambiguity, the dichotomy between the “pure people” and the “corrupt elite” can be understood

from a political, a cultural or an economic viewpoint [@meny2000populismo in @akkerman2017parties 169]. Most populists therefore not only target the political elite, but also other types of elites like the economic, the cultural or the media elite [@mudde2017populism 12]. As suggested in the previous section, the two most discussed variants are commonly labelled “left-wing” and “right-wing” populism. In recent scholarly literature however, there exist many different notions to capture these two manifestations of the populist phenomenon. Alexander and Wenzel, for instance, propose to associate left-wing populism to “disaffected liberalism” and right-wing populism to “disaffected illiberalism” [@alexander2017myth 8]. Kaltwasser and Mudde, on the other hand, identify a juxtaposition between “inclusionary populism” and “exclusionary populism” [@mudde2011voices 2, @mudde2013exclusionary 158]. Whereas inclusive populism operates on a socioeconomic dimension (inclusion of the underprivileged), exclusive populism operates primarily on a sociocultural dimension (exclusion of the ‘others’). [@mudde2013exclusionary 167] In this sense, inclusive populism is considered to exhibit left-wing and exclusive populism right-wing characteristics. Halikiopoulou et al. (2012), for their part, consider nationalism to be the source of populism. Which variant of populism then emerges depends on whether a civic (left-wing) or an ethnic (right-wing) form of nationalism is at play [@halikiopoulou2012paradox 3]. These are but some of the many existing conceptualizations of populism – reflecting a certain difficulty to do justice to the diversity of this phenomenon.

We, for our part, seek to distance ourselves from the left-right labels and suggest to classify European populist parties along a values continuum on which *progressive populists* and *traditionalist populists* are opposing one another. There are two main reasons for as why we chose to categorize variants of populism along this value dimension and using these notions. The first reason has to do with the politically correct [appropriate] naming of public actors. We wish to avoid imposing a label that the actors in question would not employ to describe themselves. Populists do not necessarily agree to be pigeonholed as belonging to the “left” or to the “right” (and especially not to the “radical-left” or “radical-right”). Furthermore, it has been noted that the positions of some populist parties on political and economic issues are too incoherent to be consistently categorized as left or right [cf. @huber2017distinct]. As for the suggestion to categorize populists as being “liberal” or “illiberal”, it is important to note that liberalism is a highly ambiguous concept in itself [@paton2010seeking 9]. On the one hand, the “classic” or “Lockean” version of liberalism insists on individual freedom associated to private property rights, hence rejecting any form of state intervention. On the other hand, the “social” or “Millian” version of liberalism rejects market inequality in favour of individual agency, hence encouraging state intervention, economic regulation and resources redistribution by a welfare state. [@stephens2017pop 58; @skorupski1999ethical 215] In this respect, both the political right and the left can be qualified as “liberal”, depending on the interpretation of the concept. Furthermore, the term “liberal” has an inextricable political and normative connotation when used within the setting of liberal democracies. No populist party – regardless of their ideological affiliation – would accept being described as “illiberal”. Conversely, those populists who feel close to socialist ideals would shy away from being called “liberals”. Our second reason to classify populism along a “progressivist-traditionalist” axis is of conceptual considerations. The notion of *progressivism*, defined by the Oxford dictionary as “support for or advocacy of social reform.” [@ox2017prog], refers initially to the Progressive Movement that developed in United States in the late 19th century. It emerged as a reaction to social problems that resulted from the rapid industrialisation, urbanisation, agrarian depression and financial recession at the time. Progressivism’s main assumption is that laissez-faire capitalism and excessive individualism has led to social ills, such as extreme poverty, the formation of slums, increased prostitution and the exploitation of workers. Progressives hence support state induced social reforms to help the weak and underprivileged (especially workers, women and children). The government, responsible for protecting the “public interest” against self-interest, [@prono2008prog 258; @nugent2009progressivism 4] is expected to control finance and industry to make these more accountable to citizens – and to fight social injustice in the process. [cf. @prono2008prog 257] The key value of progressivism is thus “openness to change” [@nugent2009progressivism 3], and the central belief of progressives is that “society could be changed into a better place.” (ibid: 5).

When speaking about progressivism since the late 20th century, it is notably associated with the “silent revolution” that describes a value change of the post-war generation towards post-materialism [cf. @inglehart1977silent]. Post-materialists endorse progressive social values and new lifestyles, champion self-expression and civil liberties [cf. @inglehart1997modernization 131] including cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism, and a greater tolerance for sexual, ethnic and religious diversity (cf. ibid: 23). This value shift brought new issues

on the political agenda such as environmental protection, human rights, legalisation of abortion, acceptance of homosexuality, and gender equity, resulting in rising support for left-libertarian parties (i.e. the Greens) and progressive movements. [cf. @ignazi1992silent; @inglehart1977silent in @mudde2013exclusionary 167; @inglehart1997modernization 4f., 23, 240f. in @inglehart2016trump 3].

Progressive populists, in our understanding, are people who challenge establishment institutions on the grounds of social justice and internationalist solidarity. They believe that “neoliberal” transnational elites (represented by institutions like multinational banks and firms) undermine the people’s will by safeguarding a deeply reactionary society that is in dire need of radical change. [cf. @van20176 390] While being essentially tolerant towards cultural, religious and sexual diversity, progressive populists believe that the current economic system of free markets is fundamentally defective – insofar as to benefit the elites to the detriment of the underprivileged, ordinary people [march2005s 25, @bornschier2010new in @halikiopoulou2012paradox 2]. Examples that progressive populists frequently use to criticize the dysfunctionality of the status quo are the financial crisis of 2008 or the European debt crisis. Neoliberal policies pursued by financial elites are perceived as widening the gap between rich and poor and as a danger to welfare state commitments [van2016united 1184] *Progressive populists* reject globalisation for fear of capital flight and depreciation of labour [frieden1996impact; @hawkins2017populism 389]. They therefore oppose the EU – an institution considered as a means of action for these global neoliberal elites (i.e. “Goldman Sachs’ revolving doors in Brussels”) [cf. @hooghe2004does 128 in @halikiopoulou2012paradox 2, @march2015out in @van2016united 1184].

The antithesis to *progressivism* is *traditionalism*. Tradition, in its broadest sense, is “anything which is typical of the past, customary, or part of a cultural identity.” [allison2009trad 537]. Traditionalism is the “propensity to revive or defend traditions against non-traditional beliefs and values” (ibid), and traditionalists are people who highly value traditions. In its initial meaning, traditionalism refers to the idea that established institutions and order, most notably represented by the church and the monarchy, should be protected against radical revolutions. [cf. @allison2009trad 537] In a wider sense, traditionalism’s object of protection can include diverse items ranging from religious orientation, sporting customs, linguistic practices to dietary habits” [allison2009trad]. The key value of traditionalism is the preservation of stability, and the central belief of traditionalists is that society must defend the customs they hold dear against chaotic change. [cf. @allison2009trad 537] Examples for progressive doctrines that oppose political traditionalism are Marxism or liberal capitalism, which – in their rationalism – are inherently intolerant towards traditional values and practices. These doctrines were however unable to provide people’s lives with cultural or spiritual meaning, which is important to give them the sense of security, stability and achievement. This contributes to the appeal of traditionalism, often manifesting through divers forms of nationalist or religious renaissance [cf. ibid]. Traditionalism of the late 20th century refers to counterrevolutionary reactions to the “silent revolution”. Supporters consist primarily of white men, elders and those left behind by globalisation, who fear that the rise of progressive demands will endanger their material status, benefits and privileges. They also see the strengthening of post-materialist values as a threat to once prevailing cultural norms that they cherish. Traditionalists value tradition and stability over change, believing that the government should apply strict measures to protect their social and cultural identity against morally corrupt influences. For them, security and order has priority over universal liberal norms. [cf. @inglehart2016trump 7, 13] *Traditionalist populists*, in our understanding, are people who challenge establishment institutions to protect their sociocultural identity. They draw their support from people who believe that cosmopolitan liberal elites undermine national unity and that societal change has gone too far. They usually endorse nationalist and authoritarian values [mudde2010ideology, @mudde2013exclusionary 155], emphasizing the necessity to have strong leaders repelling “external threats” to the nation state. This tendency manifests itself most notably in “ethno-centric” discourses [hainsworth2008extreme] and calls for harsh policies concerning asylum and immigration issues [mudde2007populist; @mair1998party in @halikiopoulou2012paradox 2]. *Traditionalist populists* reject globalisation, which they see as a danger for national and local identities. [van20176 390 in @hawkins2017populism] This logic translate into their euroscepticism in defence of national sovereignty and cultural homogeneity against alien influences [in @van2016united 1184; @halikiopoulou2012paradox 2].

Summing up, while all populists attack political elites, progressive populists especially target the economic elite. By contrast, traditionalist populists are characterized by nativism and focus on arguments around

cultural antagonism [akkerman2017parties 170, cf. @mudde2007populist 18 ff.]. Simply put, progressivists frequently enter in a marriage of convenience with some type of ‘socialism’ while traditionalists do the same with some type of ‘nativism’ [mudde2016populist 1, @mudde2017populism 21]. Having established a hierarchical framework to categorize European populist parties along a populist-establishment and a progressive-traditionalist dimension, we now proceed to explain the growing support for European populist parties.

What explain’s Populist’s Populism

Literature on the electoral success of populist parties is dominated by two broad strand of causal theorizing: (1) the Durkheimian sociological, “mass society” thesis that focusses on feelings of cultural identity loss and (2) the Downsian rational-choice, “economic” approach that builds upon materialist conceptions of representative politics. Despite significant differences within both strands with regard to the independent variables that they use (i.e. modernization, globalization or electoral rules), the causal mechanisms behind their arguments are similar [hawkins2017populism 268 f.]. Within the latter group of Downsian rationalist accounts, Hawkins et al. narrow interpretations of populist electoral success down to either (a) a medium-term inability of establishment parties to immediately address socioeconomic change as demanded by the electorate, or (b) a long-term response of citizens to a fundamentally corrupt governance system (both are “demand-side” accounts), or (c) the strategic exploitation of electoral rules by parties resorting to populist techniques (a “supply-side” account) [hawkins2017populism 270 f.]. As Hawkins et al. notice, scholarship so far has “given little attention to the causes of populism at the individual level”, with “research say[ing] little about the mentality of populist voters or the cognitive processes that lead people to join populist forces.” [hawkins2017populism 267] To explain individuals’ support for certain populist parties, this study will focus on the “medium-term structural change” account, which interprets populism as the result of citizens’ normative attitudes and material situation when faced with socioeconomic change [hawkins2017populism 270 f.]. Populism is not a new, but a rather recurring phenomenon. Support for populist parties grow especially during periods of major structural transitions because formerly established institutions and order are thrown into a maelstrom of uncertainty, a sort of crisis situation. [cf. @kelly2017pop 511] As the primary catalyst for socioeconomic change, industrial modernization serve as the explanatory factor for the rise of anti-establishment forces during the late 19th and early 20th century. Industrialisation and urbanization restructured the division of labour, and in the process they also alter the relationship between the state and the individual. Society becomes more atomized, moving away from familiar vehicles of social integration, like the church or the family, towards more bureaucratic and anonymous institutions. Individuals feeling socially disintegrated in this modernization process turn to populist parties who promise to bring back the good old days [hawkins2017populism 269]. In the post-industrial era of the late 20th and early 21st century, globalization as the new trigger for structural change accounts for the strong uptrend of contemporary populism. This argument, now commonly known as the globalization losers thesis, was first proposed by Betz (1994), who reasons that globalization reorganized the economy and society to the benefit of some, but also to the detriment of others [betz1994radical in @hawkins2017populism 271]. Globalization essentially depicts a disconnection between social and spatial relations. [scholte2005globalization in @hawkins2017populism 389]. In a figurative manner, it is described as “the process of world shrinkage, of distances getting shorter, things moving closer [...], pertain[ing] to the increasing ease with which somebody on one side of the world can interact, to mutual benefit, with somebody on the other side of the world.” [cf. @larsson2001race 9]. From an economic perspective, it is understood as a process of “markets and people around the world [...] becoming more integrated over time” [sen2001if n.p.]. In this sense, factors of production are becoming increasingly mobile, with especially four aspects concerned: goods (trade), money (capital), people (labour), and ideas (knowledge) [IMF2000global n.p.]. As globalization brings about new cultural, social and economic inputs, it triggers fear and hostility for several, distinct reasons. While the accelerating movement of goods and money worry especially individuals who depend heavily on socioeconomic stability, the increased mobility of people and ideas worry primarily those who want to safeguard a homogenous, culturally inclusive society. Both the socioeconomic and the sociocultural aspect of globalization play therefore distinctive roles in the strengthening of support for populist parties. While economic grievances contributes to the general electoral success of populist parties (2.2.1.), differing values and attitudes internalized by individuals will determine

which type of populist party they are likely to support. (2.2.2.)

The Socio-Economic Aspect of Globalization

Today's post-industrial age, characterized by a drop in industrial activities and by a growing demand of services, gives new opportunities to the "winners" of globalization who stand out as being "flexible, professional, and entrepreneurial". Those who do not meet these criteria – often "the unemployed, the underemployed, the unskilled, and those whose jobs are threatened by advancing technology" – are the "losers" of globalization. [Betts 1994 in Hawkins 2017: 271]. Globalization in the economic and financial sphere gives some producers, investors and workers better conditions to make profit while making it more precarious for others in terms of incomes, jobs security and welfare benefits (Frieden and Rogowski 1996 in Verbeek and Zaslove 2017: 390). Because these "losers" feel abandoned by mainstream parties, which have consistently supported pro-market policies associated to globalization, they turn to populist parties for democratic representation [Betts 1994 in Hawkins 2017: 271]. As measured by the KOP Globalization Index, the movement of goods, people, capital and knowledge has steadily increased since the 1970s (cp. KOF Swiss Economic Institute). As a result, patterns of economic competition have changed, which in turn creates an increasing number of people unable to offer the sought-after skills and know-how for rewarding jobs. Well-paid work for hardworking, but less qualified workers gradually disappeared, especially in developed countries. This tendency frustrates especially those having difficulties to be mobile (i.e. older people or low-skilled people facing language barriers). Their fear of losing their jobs if exposed to fierce competition in the global labour market is therefore particularly great [cf. Spruyt 2016: 337]. As summed up by Rodrik: "Globalization drove multiple, partially overlapping wedges in society: between capital and labor, skilled and unskilled workers, employers and employees, globally mobile professionals and local producers, industries/regions with comparative advantage and those without, cities and the countryside, cosmopolitans versus communitarians, elites and ordinary people. It left many countries ravaged by financial crises and their aftermath of austerity." [Rodrik 2018: 12] Especially events like the financial crisis of 2007-2008 serve for some as proof for the degeneration of excessive globalization. According to the OECD, such crises are more likely to occur when the degree of uncontrolled capital flows is high [cf. OECD 2011: 49]. The EU, an institution embodying cultural and economic integration [cf. EU 2018], is seen as a vehicle for globalization and hence as a danger to the status and wellbeing by many people. Above all, EU institutions are especially disliked because they deny member states the freedom to adopt their own economic policies. [Hawkins 2017: 271] Despite awareness for these public concerns, "the economic anxiety, discontent, loss of legitimacy, fairness concerns that are generated as a byproduct of globalization rarely come with obvious solutions or policy perspectives" [cf. Rodrik 2018: 12]. Whether the hypothesis that globalization causes economic misery is objectively true does not matter in this case. As establishment parties fail to fix the problem, people who perceive themselves as "globalization losers" see in anti-establishment and anti-globalization parties the only solution to address their fears. On the other hand, it has been questioned by some authors whether a higher degree of globalization really leads to major social problems. As Agénor and Florian argues, globalization can induce higher net income inequality, higher rates of unemployment and poverty, but mainly in the beginning of the process. In the long run, a higher level of globalization results in the decline of poverty and income inequality [cf. Agénor 2004; Dorn 2018]. However, "[i]n the long run we are all dead", as John Maynard Keynes cleverly points out, "[e]conomists set themselves too easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the storm is long past the ocean is flat again." [Keynes 1923: 80] Since especially those in an economically precarious situation depend on their jobs for daily survival, they are not in a position to wait for the long-term positive impact of globalization to manifest. It is therefore plausible to assume the following: H1: The more precarious the economic situation of an individual, the higher the probability of that individual supporting populist parties. While globalization is an "economic or technical phenomenon", it is also "a cultural evolution" at the same time. This is why its sociocultural aspect also influence the perception that citizens have of populist parties.

The Socio-Cultural Aspect of Globalization

Individuals dissatisfied with current establishment elites and resenting the ills of globalization are more likely to seek anti-status quo alternatives by supporting populist parties. However, rational citizens do not remain indifferent about whom they entrust the task of dethroning the ‘corrupt elite’ from the party political power stronghold. Given a choice, these individuals will obviously slant towards the populist party that they feel ideologically closer to. Whether citizens support the progressive or traditionalist variant of populism depends on sociocultural values, norms and practices that they have internalized. Culture, in the first place, is constituted by collective values and norms and therefore plays an important role for social coherence. It is part of a “collective consciousness”, responsible for “form[ing] a moral glue that results in social integration.” The feeling of disintegration and normlessness, also called anomie by Durkheim, occurs especially during periods of transitions like the 19th century’s industrial modernization and today’s resurgence of globalization. [Hawkins2017populism 269] Culture, according to Kroeber and Kluckhohn, “consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (I.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other, as conditioning elements of future action.” [Kroeber1952culture 181]. Cultural norms and practices are important as they provide people’s lives with a sense of security, stability and achievement [cf. Allison2009trad 537]. Traditionally understood, it is bound to a specific territorial boundary. However, an increased level of globalization also means that cultural practices and experiences become gradually deterritorialized [cf. Tomlinson2012cultural 2 ff.]. As a consequent, certain aspects of the local culture may be “diluted” or even disappear while particularities become stronger. This constitute a worrying development especially for individuals who cherish traditional ways [Nijman1999cultural 150].

Furthermore, cultural globalization goes hand in hand with an active promotion of a cosmopolitan identity [cf. Spruyt2016supports 337]. Cosmopolitanism is part of a progressive mentality, which is rejected by those who fear a loss of values and traditions. Images of an invasion by foreigners, who pose a threat to cultural norms and therefore to social cohesion, often serve as a strong stimulus for anti-immigration sentiments [cf. Mudde1999single 188 ff.]. This is why identity has gained an important place in the political agenda, especially of those who endorse traditional-conservative and materialist values [Hawkins2017populism 390]. It is therefore plausible to assume the following: H2: The more culturally exclusive the values of an individual, the higher the probability of that individual supporting traditionalist populist parties.

Opposing these culturally exclusive individuals are those whose cultural norms and values are fundamentally cosmopolitan. These individuals mainly belong to the post-war generation, which grew up endorsing post-material, universal ideal about human rights, rule of law, tolerance and individual freedom from traditional constraints [Jansen2011populist 2011 297; Hawkins2017populism 390]. As Calhoun explains, “cosmopolitanism has become an enormously popular rhetorical vehicle for claiming at once to be already global and to have the highest ethical aspirations for what globalization can offer.” [Calhoun2008cosmopolitanism 209] A cosmopolite, which derives from the word kosmos (world, universe) and polis (citizen), describes a person who is culturally inclusive. Ingram, citing emancipatory struggles such as the 1848 “Springtime of Nations” or the Communist Manifesto’s call to international solidarity amongst workers, argues that populism can have a universalistic, cosmopolitan and inclusive character. Populism is thus not always territorially or ethnically exclusive. This is why he criticizes the conception that populism is always xenophobic and cosmopolitanism is always elitist (Ingram 2013 in Hawkins2017populism 654 f.). It is therefore plausible to assume the following: H2: The more culturally inclusive the values of an individual, the higher the probability of that individual supporting progressive populist parties. It is however important to note that the socioeconomic and sociocultural dimensions of globalization are not completely independent from one another. Economic and sociocultural factors may interact in a way that intensifies support for populist parties. For instance, the new labour structure induced by contemporary globalization has produced “a splintered and atomized workforce; without powerful unions to reinforce a new sense of class identity, individuals find themselves powerless to mobilize.” [Hawkins2017populism 269]. As a result, feelings of identity loss, alienation and helplessness develop amongst those who are unable to cope with these changes [cf. Hawkins2017popcau 269]. In this case, economic globalization has also contributed to the widening of

sociocultural cleavages. It is also well-established that especially individuals who are in a precarious economic situation resent immigrants, whom they might lose their jobs to, or whom they see as a cost to welfare benefits. In this case, economic insecurity reinforces anti-immigrant feelings. [decleen2017pop 349] It is therefore plausible to assume the following: H4: Economic insecurity and cultural values interact in a way that increases the probability of an individual supporting populist parties