

Seminar Paper

Rise of Populism

A Cross-National Examination of the Support for Populism in 25 European countries

Author: Fabio Votta, B.A.
Email: fabio.votta@gmail.com
Student ID: 2876533

Author: Marlon Schumacher, B.A.
Email: M.C.Schumacher@live.de
Student ID: xxxxxxxx

Author: Quynh Nga Nguyen, B.A.
Email: qynga.n@gmail.com
Student ID: 2949965

Date of Submission: 30.03.2018

Abstract

This paper seeks to investigate support for populist parties in Europe. While populism is an intensely debated topic, most scholarship is plagued with conceptual confluences between different variants of populism.

To avoid such conceptual confusions, this paper adopts a minimalist definition to identify core features that all subtypes of populism have in common, namely anti-establishment attitudes as well as their opposition to globalization.

While previous authors used economic and cultural factors to determine support for populism, we propose a theoretical model that distinguishes between *traditionalist* and *progressive populism*. This model involves two steps:

1. **Economically deprived individuals** are more likely to reject establishment parties and consequently support populist parties instead.
2. **Cultural values** determine whether these individuals support progressive or traditionalist populism:
 - a. *Traditionalist populists* draw their support from people who believe that societal change has gone too far.
 - b. *Progressive populists* draw their support from people who believe that their reactionary society is in need of progressive change.

In order to operationalize our conceptual considerations, we use the *Chapel Hill Expert Survey* dataset and combine it with *European Social Survey* data to identify respondents that vote for and/or identify with populist parties.

We estimate a multinomial logistic regression to test our hypotheses. Our models lend support for our theoretical expectations. Economically deprived individuals are more likely to support either variant of populism. Yet individuals who hold traditional values are more likely to support traditionalist populism, whereas the effect goes in the opposite direction for the support of progressive populism.

Further research might be able to build upon our conceptualization and give more attention to the different variants of populism, so as to not conflate the distinct explanatory frameworks that come along with them.

Contents

1	Introduction	4
1.1	Subcaption 1	4
1.2	Subcaption 2	4
2	Introduction	5
2.1	What is populist about populism? (5,5)	5
2.1.1	A minimalist definition: Moving away from the confusion between populism and the Right (3)	5
2.1.2	An essential distinction: Moving towards a comprehensive conceptualization of progressive and traditionalist populism (2,5)	8
3	Methods and Data Preparation	9
3.1	Data & Operationalization	9
3.1.1	Establishment - Anti-Establishment Axis	9
3.1.2	Progressivism - Traditionalism Axis	10
3.1.3	Dependent Variable: Support for Establishment/Populist Parties	16
3.1.4	Independent Variables: Cultural and Economic Explanations	16
3.2	Statistical Methodology	17
4	Analysis	19
4.1	Descriptive Statistics	19
4.2	Multinomial Logistic Regression	23
4.2.1	Results	23
4.2.2	Discussion of the Results	29
5	Conclusions	31
5.1	Limitations	31
5.2	Implications	31
6	References	32

List of Figures

1	Factor Analysis of CHES Data	12
2	Results of Gap Statistic Method	13
3	Party Alignment of European Parties	14
4	Support for Establishment/Populist Parties over Time	19
5	Support for Establishment/Populist Parties Across European Regions	20
6	Support for Establishment/Populist Parties by NUTS - Regions	21
7	Support for Establishment/Populist Parties over Time	21
8	Marginal Effects for Control Variables - Model 3	24
9	Marginal Effects for Economic Hypotheses - Model 3	25
10	Coefficient Plot: Models 1 - 5	26
11	Marginal Effects for Cultural Hypotheses - Model 3	28
12	Marginal Effects for Interaction Effect 1 - Model 4	28
13	Marginal Effects for Interaction Effect 2 - Model 4	29

List of Tables

1 Introduction

1.1 Subcaption 1

1.2 Subcaption 2

This is a great way to test whether 1233.34 really works in the way it is intended to work. This is different though because 34.876 might be better actually. Or how about 44864.

1233.34

1233.34

1233.34

The following subsection will conceptualize regime support and introduce possible explanatory frameworks that were gathered from the relevant literature (Section 2.1). In this section, the concept of deliberation is clarified (Section 2.2) and a link between deliberation and regime support is established, from which research hypotheses are subsequently derived (Section 2.3).

Some Citations

This is an example introduction. Let's cite someone here (Tibshirani et al. 2001). And in text as well: Habermas (1994) says that we can cite people in text. Or we can write the name, and then use the citation thingy to print the year: Blabla states something about something (1975). Or how about multiple citations (Habermas 1994; Habermas 1994). Or we citation with a little of text around it (cf. Habermas 1994: 92-93).

ALLE Zitierweisen von Zotero gibts HIER.

More Citations

Blah blah (cf. Easton 1965: 33–5; also Easton 1975: 2).

Blah blah (Easton 1975: 33–5, 38–9).

Blah blah (Easton 1975; Habermas 1994).

Smith says blah (1975).

Easton (1975) says blah.

Habermas (1994: 33) says blah.

2 Introduction

2.1 What is populist about populism? (5,5)

While populism is an important and intensely debated topic, most scholarship is plagued with conceptual confluences (Mudde/Kaltwasser 2011: 1). Despite existing pleas to avoid these, many influential scholars continue to use qualifying features of the Right to describe populism, possibly leading to severe shortcomings in their empirical analyses. To avoid similar conceptual confusions, this chapter will first adopt Cas Mudde's clear minimalist definition to identify those core elements that all subtypes of populism have in common (2.1.1.). Subsequently, we propose a comprehensive framework to classify European populist parties along two relevant dimensions: progressivist and traditionalist populism. (2.1.2.)

2.1.1 A minimalist definition: Moving away from the confusion between populism and the Right (3)

In nearly every handbook about populism, authors would eventually point out to the concept's contested nature. As Heinisch et al. described, "[n]early as ubiquitous as articles and commentaries on populism is the assertion that it is a contested concept and difficult to define. [...] [T]here have been numerous conceptualisations, which are themselves derived from several fundamental approaches that differ [...] in their ideas on whether populism is primarily ideational, discursive, stylistic, or strategic in nature." (HB: 22) This contending debate on how to best define populism is reflected by various empirical studies that emphasize different and sometimes even contradictory aspects of the phenomenon (Gerring 2001: 120 in HB: 169). Broadly speaking, there exist three types of definition for populism. It can be qualified as an organizational type, as a political communication style or as a thin ideology (cf. Pauwels 2011: 99). Especially the latter type has gained prominence in scholarly literature (? Referenz wiederfinden) However, the differentiation between populism as a communication style and as a thin ideology seems artificial at times. Both types distinguish between the people as opposed to the elite and they both allow for a combination with other (even diametrically opposed) ideologies. In our understanding these two types of populism share so many characteristics that the differentiation between them seems to be a matter of wording rather than a matter of clear defined features of populism.

Most scholars agree on the "chameleonic" character of populism (cf. Taggart 2000 in Ot/Low 2015: 61). Some authors, borrowing Michael Freeden's (1996) notion of a thin ideology (in Ot/Low 2015:61), assert that populism can be combined with other more "established"

ideologies like liberalism, nationalism, conservatism, federalism or socialism (i.e. Mudde 2015:1, M/K 2017: 19, Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008: 4). As Mudde and Kaltwasser emphasize, populism

can be “left-wing or right-wing, organized in top-down or bottom-up fashion, rely on strong leaders or be even leaderless” (? In Mudde/Kaltwasser 2012: 153).

A serious problem is therefore the confusion between populism and the Right (ie Betz, 1994 in Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008:3), as Cas Mudde laments: “Until now, populism was almost exclusively linked to the radical right, leading to an incorrect conflation of populism and xenophobia.” (Mudde 2015: 1 in HB. 229) This tendency has to do with the fact that populism gained strength in Europe with the formation of populist radical right parties in the 1980s (Mudde/Kaltwasser 2012: 155). Their emergence triggered the blossoming of a vast scholarly literature – although focussing almost exclusively on discussing right-wing populism (De Lange, 2008, in Ot/low 2015:60) while neglecting the growing impact of their counterpart on the left side of the political spectrum (Lucardie and Voerman, 2012; March and Mudde, 2005 in Ot/Low 2015: 60).

Despite the already existing thematization of this shortcoming, many scholars still make the mistake of using right-wing characteristics to define populism (Mudde 2007 in Ot/Low 2015: 61). Inglehart and Norris, for instance, justified their definition of populism as follows: “Cas Mudde has been influential in the literature, suggesting that populist philosophy is a loose set of ideas that share three core features: anti-establishment, authoritarianism, and nativism.” (Inglehart/Norris 2016: 6). Considering that the publication they quoted from is called “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe” (2007), Inglehart’s and Norris’ statement seems to be remarkably negligent. In this publication, Mudde unambiguously named authoritarianism and nativism as ideological features of the populist right and not of populism per se (cf. Mudde 2007: 22, Mudde/Kaltwasser 2012: 155). We believe that it is exactly because of such a theoretical conflation that Inglehart’s and Norris’ empirical classification of European parties exhibits serious flaws, i.e. by wrongly indicating that the National Democratic Party of Germany belongs to the populist left party family, just to name but one. (cf. Inglehart/Norris 2016: 36). As Albertazzi points out, “this insistence on making ‘populist’ and ‘extreme right’ synonymous or lumping all populists under the ‘radical Right populist’ banner for ease of comparison [...] is detrimental to our understanding [of] [...] populism itself.” (Albertazzi et al. 2007: 4).

To avoid similar mistakes, we draw on a minimalist definition to capture those core features that all subtypes of populism have in common. Following Mudde (who is indeed “influential in the literature”), we view populism as “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus

“the corrupt elite”, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people”. (Mudde 2004: 543) / (Mudde/Kaltwasser 2017: 6). The biggest advantage about this minimalist definition is its neutrality, allowing us to analyse populism separately from the ideological situation in which it operates (Hali/Nanou 2012: 2).

Marlon: The essential point about Mudde’s definition is to make a normative distinction between the “pure” people and the “corrupt” elite (cf. Mudde 2017: 9). Generally speaking, the elite can be defined on the basis of power. Whatever specific group of elite, the corrupt elite is understood as a homogeneous group that works for their own interests instead of representing the *volonté générale* (general will of the people) (M/K 2017: 11). Therefore, the politics should be an expression of the general will (M/K 2017: 16).

Verbinden & Reformulieren/Kürzen: In essence, “Whatever their positioning on the Left/Right spectrum, the key feature of populists is their claim to be the ‘true democrats’, fighting to reclaim the people’s sovereignty from the professional political and administrative classes (be they in regional or national capitals, or at supranational level in Brussels), as well as other elite ‘enemies’ who, through the sleight of hand of representative and deliberately arcane and complex politics, have stolen and perverted democracy.” (Albertazzi & McDonnell 2008: 4) “Populists claim that, contrary to the ruling elites, they will make good on their promises.” (Ot/Low 2015: 60).

Recognizing that left-wing populism was widely neglected in the past, recent scholarship has started to study this variant of populism (i.e. Stavrakakis, 2014 or Rendueles, 2018). However, so far this literature has tended to conduct qualitative case studies that concentrate on regional singularities instead of generalizable tendencies of the phenomenon.

Reformulieren/Kürzen: “Like most political phenomena, populism is studied mostly nationally and partly regionally. The first studies of populism were focused exclusively on the United States, while later work looked at Latin America and Western Europe. Few cross-regional studies of populism exist (notably Weyland 1999), while most generic studies of populism remain fairly theoretical and empirically voluntaristic (e.g., Laclau 2005; Taggart 2000). This situation is neither unique to the topic of populism nor without compelling reasons.” (Mudde/Kaltwasser 2011: 1)

Left-wing populism is commonly perceived as geographically limited to Latin America while right-wing populism is associated to the European political context. Given the recently growing importance of left-wing populist parties in Europe (i.e. SYRIZA or Podemos), it is important to study the populist phenomenon taking into account – but without limiting it to – the regional context (comprising political, cultural and economic specificities) that it is

embedded in (? in HB: 138, 229).

With regard to the populist phenomenon in Europe – which is this is paper’s focus of study – two common points shared by all populist parties are important to note. First, as explained above, populists reject establishment parties that they consider to represent the “corrupt elite” (M/K 2017: 12). Secondly, populists are consistently opposed to the European integration process. It is however at this point that differences between varieties of populism manifest. While populists from both sides of the political spectrum display an anti-European stance, the justification and intensity of

their euroskepticism vary depending on their ideological orientation (in Ot/Low 2015: 60, M/K 2017: 22). What, then, essentially distinguishes the operating logic of these populism subtypes?

2.1.2 An essential distinction: Moving towards a comprehensive conceptualization of progressive and traditionalist populism (2,5)

The main difference originates from the populists' conception of "the pure people" and "the corrupt elite". As Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) assert, "[e]ach populist actor emerges because of a particular set of social grievances, which influences its choice of host ideology, which in turn affects how the actor defines 'the people' and 'the elite'". (M/K 2017: 22). Populists are usually ambiguous about the "people" that they intend to represent (HB: 22). Since "the people" is an "empty signifier" (Laclau in M/K 2017: 9), its meaning varies depending on historical and regional circumstances and differs from party to party (Canovan 1981 in HB: 169). Due to this ambiguity, the dichotomy between the "pure people" and the "corrupt elite" can be understood from a political, a cultural or an economic viewpoint (Mény and Surel 2000 in HB: 169). Most populists therefore not only target the political elite, but also other types of elites like the economic, the cultural or the media elite (M/K 2017: 12).

While all populists attack political elites, left-wing populists especially target the economic elite. Right wing populists, on the other hand, are characterized by nativism and focus on "cultural antagonism" (HB:170, cf. Mudde 2007: 18 ff.). Simply put, populist parties frequently enter in a marriage of convenience with some type of "nativism" on the right and with some sort of "socialism" on the left" (Mudde 2015: 1 in HB: 229, M/K 2017: 21). Radical-right wing populists emphasize the necessity to resist "external threats" to the nation state. This ethno-centric tendency expresses

RIGHT: The shared ideology of radical right-wing parties is centred on nationalism. These parties highlight the need for resistance against external threats to the nation – often expressed by an "ethno-centric message" (Hainsworth 2008) and tough policies on asylum and immigration (Mudde 1996, 2007; Mair & Mudde 1998). (in hali/nanou 2012: 2)

LEFT: The shared ideology of radical left-wing parties has three key elements (March & Mudde 2005): a rejection of the values of capitalism and the free market economy; the protection of collective economic and social rights in pursuit of social justice; and the idea of states working together to address shared concerns in support of internationalism. Therefore, conventionally, the defence of the nation tends to be associated with radical parties of the right

There is a lively discussion within recent scholarship on how to ideally capture these two broad dimensions of the populist phenomenon. They are commonly labelled as "right-wing" and "left-wing" populism. Some authors prefer to describe them as

3 Methods and Data Preparation

The following section introduces the data and its sources. We use the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) on European party positions in order to construct our dependent variable of *Support for Establishment/Populist Parties* (i.e. Support for Progressive or Traditionalist Populist parties) along with individual level data from the European Social Survey (ESS) (Section 3.1). The section further operationalizes our hypotheses (cultural and economic explanations for populism) and give a description of the used control variables. Following this, the statistical methodology is explained (Section 3.2).

3.1 Data & Operationalization

The CHES dataset contains information on the positions of 365 political parties in 40 European countries on european and national policy issues in the timerange between 1999 and 2014. This makes the CHES data suitable for identifying the ideological party positions that can be classified as progressive and traditionalist populism within the European context. Since parties have changed over time, for the purposes of our analysis we only use the latest available data from 2014.

As a first step, we selected two variables that are in line with our minimalistic definition of populism. They will be used to construct the an Establishment - Anti-Establishment Axis.

3.1.1 Establishment - Anti-Establishment Axis

Populism, as it is conceptualized in this study, is characterized by two main features: a disdain for the established elites that supposedly exploit the *pure* and *little* people and an opposition to the effects of globalization that brings cultures and economies closer together at the expense of the (local) working class.

Anti-Elite Sentiment

Anti-Elite Sentiment is measured with the 11-point scale (0-1) variable *antielite_salience* that indicates the salience of anti-elite rhetoric within a given party. This corresponds with Mudde and Kaltwasser’s concept of populism where the “corrupt elite” is pitted against the pure people (M/K 2017: 12).

- *Salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite rhetoric*
 0. Not important at all
 1. Extremely important

Euroskepticism

Euroskepticism (*position*¹) will be used as a proxy variable for anti-globalization. Populists are consistently opposed to the European integration process, albeit for different reasons.

- *Overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration*
 1. Strongly opposed
 2. Strongly in favor

3.1.2 Progressivism - Traditionalism Axis

Next, we try to identify the value cleavage between progressivism and traditionalism.

This cleavage divides *progressives*, who favor progressive social values, promote liberal lifestyles and acceptance of homosexuality, civil liberties and multiculturalism from *traditionalists* who take the opposite stance on all these positions. The following variables have been selected in order to distinguish between progressive and traditionalist populism.

GAL-TAN

GAL-TAN is a new politics dimension invented by Hooghe et al. (2002). The capital letters are abbreviations for a scale that is supposed to capture the new fault lines in European politics and they stand for *Green-Alternative-Libertarian* (GAL) and *Traditional-Authoritarian-Nationalist* (TAN) respectively.

- *Position of the party [...] in terms of their views on democratic freedoms and rights. “Libertarian” or “postmaterialist” parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, access to abortion, active euthanasia, same-sex marriage, or greater democratic participation. “Traditional” or “authoritarian” parties often reject these ideas; they value order, tradition, and stability, and believe that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues (galtan).*
 0. Libertarian/Postmaterialist
 1. Center
 2. Traditional/Authoritarian

Social Lifestyle

The acceptance of different lifestyle is a phenomena that consistently splits traditionalists from progressives. While progressives push for the acceptance of non-traditional social lifestyles traditionalists see this push as undermining very fabric of society.

- *Position on social lifestyle (e.g. homosexuality) (sociallifestyle).*
 0. Strongly supports liberal policies

¹The Euroskepticism variable has been recoded so that higher values indicate higher opposition to European integration.

1. Strongly opposes liberal policies

Civil Liberties

While progressives favor civil liberties and rehabilitation of criminals into society, traditionalists favor tough measures can serve as a deterrence, even at the expense of civil liberty.

- *Position on civil liberties vs. law and order (civlib_laworder).*
 0. Strongly promotes civil liberties
 1. Strongly supports tough measures to fight crime

Multiculturalism

Traditionalists usually see a looming threat from immigrants from different countries, especially when they come from non-European countries, so they favor their complete assimilation into the host country. Progressives on the other hand understand diversity as strength and favor multicultural society without assimilation.

- *Position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation) (multiculturalism).*
 0. Strongly favors multiculturalism
 1. Strongly favors assimilation

Left-Right Scale

Lastly, a general left-right scale is added to this dimension. While our definition of the Progressive-Traditionalist Axis is mostly based on value differences, it's not *just* that. Party affiliation with a set of ideas matters as well and therefore we also include a measure of ideology through this scale.


- *Position of the party [...] in terms of its overall ideological stance (lrgen).*
 0. Extreme left
 1. Center
 2. Extreme right

Having selected the variables, a maximum likelihood factor analysis with varimax rotation is conducted in order to estimate whether our proposed dimensions are being measured by the relevant variables.

Based on the Kaiser-Criterion, two distinct dimensions are extracted explaining a total variance of 0.78%. The extracted scales are then summed into two scales *Establishment vs. Anti-Establishment* and *Progressive vs. Traditionalism*, each standardized from 0 to 100 points to facilitate easy interpretation.

As a next step, we want to extract our traditionalist and progressive populist parties. This will be done with the help of *k-means clustering*. K-Means clustering is a very popular form of unsupervised

Figure 1: Factor Analysis of CHES Data



machine learning that helps with classification problems. The algorithm produces a k number of clusters (classification groups), where k is specified by the researcher. K-Means clustering estimates a centroid (i.e. a center) for each group that has the highest *intra-class similarity* within a given cluster (i.e. smallest distance from the centroid) and the lowest *inter-class similarity* with other specified cluster (i.e. maximized distance from other cluster centroids). The resulting clusters have minimal *within cluster variation* and a maximum of *between cluster variation* (cf. Friedman et al. 2001: 509 ff.).

The classical algorithm for k-means clustering is the Hartigan-Wong algorithm (1979), where the total within-cluster variation is defined as the sum of squared (Euclidean) distances between data points and the corresponding centroid:

$$W(C_k) = \sum_{x_i \in C_k} (x_i - \mu_k)^2$$

Where x_i is a data point belonging to the cluster C_k and μ_k is the mean of values that are classified as cluster C_k (centroid).

Each data point x_i is classified as a specific cluster so that the sum of squares euclidian distance of the observation to their assigned cluster centroid μ_k is minimized.

$$Within - SS = \sum_{k=1}^k W(C_k) = \sum_{k=1}^k \sum_{x_i \in C_k} (x_i - \mu_k)^2$$

Finally, the total within-cluster sum of square (Within-SS) measures the appropriateness of the

clustering based on how much it can be minimized.

Now the algorithm can come into use. As a first step, the algorithm randomly selects k points from the given data that will be used as centroids. Next, two steps will be repeated iteratively until convergence is achieved:

1. Cluster Assignment Step

Using Euclidean distance, the distances to the centroid are calculated and the data points are classified to be part of a cluster.


2. Centroid Update Step

In this step, a new centroid is calculated based on the estimated clusters. These centroids serve as new starting point and all data points are reassigned.

The algorithm converges when the clusters do not change in the next iteration (the last two iteration produce the same clusters with the same data points within them).

Finally, the two scales *Establishment vs. Anti-Establishment* and *Progressive vs. Traditionalism* are handed over to the K-means clustering algorithm. Based on the *Gap Statistic* method (cf. Tibshirani et al. 2001), four clusters are suggested as the optimal number of clusters.² Figure 2 shows the results of the gap statistic that clearly indicate four clusters.

Figure 2: Results of Gap Statistic Method




The four clusters that are estimated with the help of the k-means algorithm can be named as traditionalist and progressive populist parties as well as their two establishment counterparts (establishment progressives and traditionalists). Together with the clustering method, the two dimensions

²Elbow and average silhouette method also suggest four clusters as optimal.

can be used to visualize the ideological position of each European party and its classification, which is illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3: Party Alignment of European Parties



Source: CHES Data 1999 - 2014

In order to validate the clusters, let's pick some examples and see whether the classified parties fit our theoretical expectations.

The *top-left quadrant* shows progressive populists such as:

Syriza

After winning the parliamentary elections in January 2015, SYRIZA (*Coalition of the Radical Left*) attempted to carry out the difficult balancing act between extreme left-wing positions, opposition to EU imposed austerity and yet supposedly pro-European commitments. In social policy, Syriza is particularly committed to the socially disadvantaged in society with policies such as guaranteeing that unemployed, homeless and low-income people should be allowed to use the health facilities free of charge or that family reunification should be made easier for individuals with a migration background.

Podemos

In the general elections held on December 20, 2015, the left-wing political party Podemos that emerged from a protest movement obtained 20.68% of the votes and 69 deputies in the whole of the State. The Spanish “Indignados”, the “indignants” of the Podemos movement, practice critique of globalization and capitalism often symbolized in the overarching EU bureaucracy. Among other measures, they defend abortion, want to stop house evictions, suppress church privileges, promote renewable energies and are in favor of curbing nuclear energy. With regard to political parties, they propose to stop gauging, reduce subsidies and expand restrictions on connections between politicians and companies.

Red-Green Alliance (Denmark)

The Red-Green Alliance (Enhedslisten) was formed as a collaboration between the Left Socialists (VS), the Danish Communist Party (DKP) and the Socialist Labor Party (SAP) in 1989. During the last parliamentary elections in 2015, the Red-Green Alliance gained 7,8% of the popular vote. Enhedslisten does not stand in European elections, but supports Folkebevægelsen mod EU (*Popular Movement against the EU*), a heavily anti-EU political party that only competes for the European elections. The party attaches great importance to combating social inequality and poverty, as well as advocating strengthening and expanding the welfare state. Politically, the party is in favor of more space for all forms of diversity, including gender, sexuality, disability and ethnic background.

The *top-right quadrant* shows traditionalist populists such as:

AfD

The alternative for Germany (AfD) is a political party founded in 2013 in Germany. As of 2014, it gradually moved into 14 state parliaments and in the 2017 general election, the AfD received 12.6% of the vote and thus became the third strongest force and the strongest opposition party in the German Bundestag. Regarding the EU, they have been in favor of renationalization of policies that are currently situated in the EU. The AfD represents conservative-antifeminist positions in gender politics and rejects gender equality policies and relies thereby on Christian fundamentalist and nationalist ideas. According to the AfD, Islam does not belong to Germany. In particular, the party calls for a ban on minarets and the face veiling.

Front National

UKIP

The *bottom-left and bottom-right quadrants* show progressive and traditionalist establishment parties:

German SPD and CDU, Labour Party and Conservatives UK, SOME FRENCHIES

Given that the distinction between kinds of establishment parties is not of greater interest to us, we will merge progressive and traditionalist establishment parties into a single establishment party group.

A full list of used parties as well as their respective affiliations can be found in the appendix.

3.1.3 Dependent Variable: Support for Establishment/Populist Parties

TODO:

After the successful classification, we combine the clusters from the CHES data with the *European Social Survey* (ESS) Round 5 – 8. We decided to use only this timerange, because in this way we capture the years after the European financial crisis (2008-09). Two variables will be used to measure our dependent variable *Support for Establishment/Populist Parties*:

1. *What party did you vote for in the last national election?*
2. *Which party is closest to your views?*

A respondent that either voted for or indicated that they feel closest to a specific party, will be classified as either supporting a progressive or traditionalist populist or an establishment party, based on the clusters generated by the k-means algorithm. If it is the case that a person voted for a party but felt close to a different party, we decided to classify said person as a supporter of the party that it felt most close to (thus ranking their vote as less indicative of their support). This is based on the assumption that many voters have an incentive to vote strategically and they might end up voting for an establishment party even though they actually support a populist party.

After merging of the datasets is completed, we are initially left with 130155 respondents from 22 European countries. However, given that there are many missing values for respondents who gave no indication on whether they support a political party (32.99%), we are ultimately left with 87238 cases for the purposes of our descriptive analysis and 68403 for the multinomial logistic regression analysis (where all missing values were deleted listwise).³

3.1.4 Independent Variables: Cultural and Economic Explanations

Next, the hypotheses will be operationalized with corresponding ESS variables. *Economic deprivation* will be captured with two variables: *Economic Insecurity* (4-point scale) and the dummy variables *Unemployment*, and *Welfare*. The *cultural value hypothesis* will be measured with an index for *Anti-Immigration Sentiment* and four *Schwartz Human Value* dimensions, all ranging from 0 to 10: *Openness*, *Self-Transcendence*, *Self-Enhancement* and *Conservation*, where the former two are associated with liberal values and the latter two are associated with conservative values (cf. Schwartz 1994; Schwartz 2005). The models further include common socio-demographic control variables, for example, *Age*, *Education* and *Sex* but also includes a *Left-Right Scale*, *Religiosity*, *Government*

³Note that is certainly a high amount of missing values. Imputation could be considered in this case, however, this would be beyond the scope of this seminar paper.

Satisfaction, Ethnic Minority Status, Trust in Global Governance and the dummy variable *Rural vs. Urban*. Lastly, regional dummies (East, West, North and Southern Europe) and time dummies for each year will be included in the model as controls (2010, 2012, 2014 and 2016).

A more detailed description of the used variables can be requested from the authors.

3.2 Statistical Methodology

Multinomial logistic regression expands upon binary logistic regression, so that it is possible to predict three or more outcomes of a variable. Each category of the variable of interest is compared to the *reference category*, which is specified by the researcher, with the consequence that estimated parameters (logits and/or odds ratios) are interpreted in reference to that category (cf. Hosmer Jr et al. 2013: 269).

For this example, we assume that the multinomial model is run over a categorical response category Y , coded as 0, 1, or 2, where 0 is used as reference category. Similar to the logistic regression model, where the logit is understood as $Y = 1$ versus $Y = 0$, a multinomial logistic regression compares the outcomes $Y = 2$ and $Y = 1$ to $Y = 0$. Therefore, two distinct logit functions are estimated:

$$g_1(x) = \ln \left[\frac{Pr(Y=1|x)}{Pr(Y=0|x)} \right]$$

$$g_2(x) = \ln \left[\frac{Pr(Y=2|x)}{Pr(Y=0|x)} \right]$$

This model is almost analogous to a logistic regression model, except that the multinomial logit equations contrast each of response category Y with reference category $Y = 0$. When Y has a binary outcome the multinomial logit model reduces to the usual logistic regression model.

The probabilities for each Y-Category is calculated as follows:

$$Pr(Y = 0|x) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{g_1(x)} + e^{g_2(x)}}$$

$$Pr(Y = 1|x) = \frac{e^{g_1(x)}}{1 + e^{g_1(x)} + e^{g_2(x)}}$$

$$Pr(Y = 2|x) = \frac{e^{g_2(x)}}{1 + e^{g_1(x)} + e^{g_2(x)}}$$

Theoretically a multilevel model would have been needed to estimate the model properly, but given that there are some countries with almost none or no populist supporters in our data, this would lead to problems. In order to still account for the hierarchical order of our data, we decided to use regional variables of Europe, based on the four classifications: Eastern, Western, Southern and Northern Europe.


4 Analysis

In this section, a short examination of descriptive statistics takes place (Section 4.1) followed by a report on the results of estimated multinomial logistic regression models which are further examined for their implications regarding the research hypotheses (Section 4.2).

4.1 Descriptive Statistics


This section will introduce some basic descriptive statistics of the used variables. More specifically, we examine the support for populism over time, its geographical distribution and how it differs among different socio-demographic groups.

Figure 4: Support for Establishment/Populist Parties over Time



Source: ESS Data Round 5 - 8; N = 87238.

Figure 5: Support for Establishment/Populist Parties Across European Regions



Source: ESS Data Round 5 - 8; N = 87238.


Figure 4 shows the support for populist and establishment parties over the timerange that is present in our dataset (2010 - 2016). As can be observed in the figure, support for populist parties has increased in recent years and support for the establishment has fallen. Support for established parties has dropped from 86.17% in 2010 to 81.45% in 2016, reaching the lowest point in 2014 with 80.44%. The opposite trend can be observed for the support of populist parties: support for progressive populists has risen from 5.83% in 2010 to 8.3% in 2016. In regards to traditionalist populism, there was an increase from 8% in 2010 to 10.25% support in 2016. Support for progressive and traditionalist populist parties peaked with 9.2% and 10.36% respectively in 2014 and has remained relatively constant for 2016.

Figure 5 visualizes the support of populist parties for European regions as defined by the UN⁴. It can be observed that Eastern Europe stands out in regard to the support for established parties, where it is significantly lower than in other regions: only 65.89% support established parties in Eastern Europe, whereas in any other region support is well above 80%. Most notably, the support for non-establishment parties in Eastern Europe is primarily due to traditional populists (23.27%). Regarding the support of progressive populists, the East does not stand out clearly anymore.

Southern Europe, like Northern and Western Europe, shows more than 80% support for established parties, but the south clearly stands out in regard to their support for progressive populists (15.24%). In regard to traditionalist populists, a very different picture emerges for Southern Europe, where

⁴Standard country or area codes for statistical use (M49). See: <https://unstats.un.org/unsd/methodology/m49/>

Figure 6: Support for Establishment/Populist Parties by NUTS - Regions




Source: ESS Data Round 5 - 8; N = 87238.

support is just over 1% and thus hardly worth mentioning. Such low support for populists cannot be observed in any other region, where the minimum is at least 6%.

Additionally, Figure 6 shows three maps and the distribution of support for establishment, traditionalist and progressive populist parties in Europe. One can clearly observe the difference of establishment party support between Eastern and Western Europe which goes right through Germany. The prevalence of traditionalist populist in Eastern Europe becomes rather clear to see, specifically in Hungary where the Fidesz dominates the political landscape. In regards to progressive populists, one can observe that East Germany and the Czech Republic, as well as Southern Europe seem to be the hotspots of support.

Figure 7: Support for Establishment/Populist Parties over Time



Number in boxplots show the arithmetic mean. Source: ESS Data Round 5 - 8; N = 87238.

Figure 7 seeks to visualize the socio-demographic characteristics of establishment and populist party supporters. The chart uses violinplots paired with boxplots, inside which the arithmetic mean is shown. The dotted line shows the overall mean. In addition, on the right hand side of each plot the results of a t-test are reported.

A clear picture emerges regarding self-placement on the left-right scale in upper left part of Figure 7. Those who support progressive populists generally locate themselves on the political left (Mean = 3.22; SD = 2.21). On the other hand, the supporters of traditional populists tend to place themselves on the right-wing spectrum (Mean = 6.48; SD = 2.16). One can also observe that the average supporter for establishment parties places themselves right in the middle of the left-right spectrum (Mean = 5.2; SD = 2.2). T-tests between each pair further shows that the p-values are below 0.001, indicating that all differences are statistically significant. At first, this seems like a trivial finding, however these results once again confirm our operationalization and validate the idea that we accurately captured traditionalist and progressive populists in their respective categories.

With regard to age in the upper right part of Figure 7, it becomes clear that supporters of established parties are older than those who support populist parties. The average supporter populist parties is 48.42, in regards to progressive populists and 49.05, whereas the average establishment supporter is 51.03 years old. As the t-tests show, the differences between the group of supporters for established parties over the other two groups are statistically significant. However, there seems to be no statistically significant difference between the supporters of traditional and progressive populists in regards to age.

The bottom-left graph of Figure 7 shows the distribution of education. One can clearly observe that supporters for traditional populists stand out with lower education levels (Mean = 3.59; SD = 1.6) than the supporters of established parties (Mean = 4.18; SD = 1.87) or progressive populists (Mean = 4.08; SD = 1.84) and these differences are statistically significant. The educational attainment differences between supporters of progressive populists and supporters of established parties is also statistically significant but only marginally lower for the latter.

Lastly, the bottom-right graphic of Figure 7 shows the degree of religiosity by party support. Focusing on the the graph, supporters of progressive populists stand out clearly with a low average level of religiosity (Mean = 3.23; SD = 3.04). Supporters of traditional (Mean = 4.75; SD = 3.1)and established parties (Mean = 4.58; SD = 2.98) both share a similar degree of religiosity, with the former exhibiting higher levels of religiosity. As the results of the p-values show, all differences between groups are highly statistically significant.

4.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression

This section will present the results of multinomial logistic regression used to estimate the support for progressive and traditionalist populism followed by a short summary and discussion of the findings in regards to our hypotheses.

4.2.1 Results

Five models will be estimated in total: *Model 1* only includes the results of the control variables. *Model 2* tests the economic hypothesis and *Model 3* tests the cultural hypothesis. Lastly, *Model 4* estimates variables of both hypotheses together and *Model 5* shows additional interaction effects between them.⁵ Instead of a table, it was decided to use a coefficient plot in order to visualize the results, shown in Figure 10. The big advantage of reporting the results in this way is that in addition to estimates and p-values, the relation and differences between coefficients can be intuitively read, as negative relationships are found to the left and positive relationships are found to the right of an Odds Ratio of 1.

The results found in the descriptive part are further corroborated in *Model 1*. In terms of *age*, the chance of supporting both progressive and traditionalist populism is 1.01 times lower for each year that a person ages compared to the chance of supporting an establishment party. In regard to *education*, similar results can be observed: supporters of traditionalist populism have a significantly lower education and the chance to support traditional populists compared to support of established parties per educational attainment score is 1.23 lower (OR = 0.81; 95% CI [0.79 - 0.82]; $p < 0.001$). With respect to the *left-right spectrum*, the previously identified trend also emerges clearly: the chance to support progressive populists compared to support for established parties is 1.45 times lower (OR = 0.69; 95% CI [0.68 - 0.70]; $p < 0.001$), whereas the chance for support of progressive populists is 1.45 higher (OR = 1.45; 95% CI [1.43 - 1.47]; $p < 0.001$). Not surprising are the effects of *government satisfaction* and *trust in global governance*. Government satisfaction seems to decrease the chance of supporting both progressive (OR = 0.85; 95% CI [0.83 - 0.86]; $p < 0.001$) and traditionalist populist parties (OR = 0.90; 95% CI [0.88 - 0.91]; $p < 0.001$). The same trend emerges for trust in global governance: for each point on the scale, the chance to support a traditionalist populist party decreases by 1.06 (OR = 0.94; 95% CI [0.92 - 0.95]; $p < 0.001$) and the chance to support a progressive populist party decreases by 1.05 (OR = 0.95; 95% CI [0.93 - 0.96]; $p < 0.001$) compared to support for establishment parties.

Next, the economic hypothesis will be examined in *Model 2*. Here it can be seen that the chance for support of progressive populists compared to support of established parties increases by 1.08 per point on the *economic insecurity* scale (OR = 1.08; 95% CI [1.04 - 1.13]; $p < 0.001$). Similarly, the

⁵All models were checked by tolerance tests to be free of problems of multicollinearity.

Figure 8: Marginal Effects for Control Variables - Model 3




Source: ESS Data Round 5 - 8; N = 87238.

chance of supporting traditionalist populism also increases by 1.18 with higher perceived economic insecurity, OR = 1.18; 95% CI [1.13 - 1.23]; $p < 0.001$.

Similar effects can be observed with *unemployment*, where being unemployed increases the chance by 1.21 to support progressive populists (OR = 1.21; 95% CI [1.13 - 1.28]; $p < 0.001$) and by 1.20 to support traditionalist populists compared to supporting establishment parties (OR = 1.20; 95% CI [1.13 - 1.28]; $p < 0.001$). In regard to *welfare*, a different picture emerges. While there is a 1.17 times greater chance to support progressive populists when on welfare compared to support established parties, *it should be noted that the effect is only slightly significant MIGHT NOT BE CORRECT* (OR = 1.17; 95% CI [1.03 - 1.32]; $p < 0.05$). The same does not seem to be the case for traditionalist populists, where being on welfare increases the chance of supporting traditionalist populists by 1.17, OR = 1.02; 95% CI [0.89 - 1.17]; $p = 0.79$. **MIGHT NOT BE CORRECT**


In terms of the economic dimension, it can be seen that as economic deprivation increases, the chance of support for populists is higher compared to support from established parties. However, the effect of dependence on social benefits/welfare varies. Furthermore, almost all effects are significant in the model, and McFadden's R^2 increases from 0.20 to 0.21 in Model 1 compared to the control model and a likelihood ratio test shows a statistically significant better fit than the control model, ($\chi^2 = 490.08$; $p\text{-value} < 0.001$).

Figure 9: Marginal Effects for Economic Hypotheses - Model 3



Source: ESS Data Round 5 - 8; N = 87238.

Figure 10: Coefficient Plot: Models 1 - 5



Next, we examine the results in regards to the *cultural thesis* and focus on *Model 2*. Here one can observe that *Anti-Immigration sentiment* increases the chance of support for traditionalist populist parties by 1.34 compared to support for established parties (OR = 1.34; 95% CI [1.32 - 1.36]; $p < 0.001$). As expected, *Anti-Immigration sentiment* pulls in the opposite direction for progressive populism: for each point on the anti-immigration scale, the chance to support progressive populists decreases by 1.04 (OR = 0.96; 95% CI [0.95 - 0.98]; $p < 0.001$).

There are also similar patterns regarding *conservative attitudes*: the chance of supporting traditionalist populists is 1.05 times higher compared to support for established parties (OR = 1.05; 95% CI [1.02 - 1.07]; $p < 0.001$), whereas the chance of supporting progressive populists is 1.03 times lower compared to support for established parties (OR = 0.97; 95% CI [0.95 - 0.99]; $p < 0.01$).

A similar pattern can also be noted in terms of *openness*: the chance of supporting traditionalist populists is 1.05 times higher compared to support for established parties (OR = 0.95; 95% CI [0.93 - 0.97]; $p < 0.001$), whereas the chance of supporting progressive populists is 1.01 times lower compared to support for established parties (OR = 1.01; 95% CI [0.99 - 1.03]; $p = 0.38$).


The effects of the *self-enhancement scale* and the *self-transcendence scale* are also in line with expectations and pull in opposite directions for progressive and traditionalist populism. For each scale point on the self-enhancement scale, the chance of support for traditionalist populists is 1.08 higher compared to establishment party support, OR = 1.08; 95% CI [1.06 - 1.10]; $p < 0.001$. Regarding the support for progressive populists, the chance of support for progressive populists is 1.02 lower compared to establishment party support, OR = 0.98; 95% CI [0.96 - 0.99]; $p < 0.01$.

For each scale point on the self-transcendence scale, the chance of support for traditionalist populists is 1.11 lower compared to establishment party support, OR = 0.90; 95% CI [0.87 - 0.92]; $p < 0.001$. Regarding the support for progressive populists, the chance of support for progressive populists is 1.08 higher compared to establishment party support, OR = 1.08; 95% CI [1.05 - 1.11]; $p < 0.001$.

The McFadden's R^2 increases from 0.21 to 0.24 and the fit of the model is significantly better compared to Model 1, ($\chi^2 = 490.08$; $p - value < 0.001$). **NEEDS ACTUAL VALUES** As expected by our theoretical considerations, the effects on the cultural dimension went in opposite directions: culturally inclusive values seem to increase the support for progressive populists and decrease the support for traditionalist populists whereas exclusiveness seems to increase the support and inclusiveness decreases the support for the latter. It can thus be noted that the cultural dimension on its own is a meaningful differentiation between which form of populism is supported. However, it should also be emphasized that the effect sizes found here are rather weak.


Model 3 now includes the economic as well as the cultural dimensions. This further confirms the previously found effects. In terms of the economic dimension reduced effects can be observed. However, despite a slight weakening of the effect sizes, significances remain untouched and the

Figure 11: Marginal Effects for Cultural Hypotheses - Model 3



Source: ESS Data Round 5 - 8; N = 87238.

Figure 12: Marginal Effects for Interaction Effect 1 - Model 4




Source: ESS Data Round 5 - 8; N = 87238.

estimates continue to show the expected direction. Moreover, the McFadden's R^2 increases from 0.24 to 0.25 and the fit of the model is significantly better compared to Model 3, ($\chi^2 = 490.08; p\text{-value} < 0.001$). **NEEDS ACTUAL VALUES**

Model 4 shows the interaction effects.

Figure 13: Marginal Effects for Interaction Effect 2 - Model 4



4.2.2 Discussion of the Results

Finally, with regard to our multinomial logistic models, it can be said that our hypotheses were able to be mainly *confirmed*. Let's start with the economic hypothesis:

H1: The less economically fortunate (economic dissatisfaction, unemployment, economic insecurity, living on welfare), the higher the probability of supporting anti-establishment parties.

This hypothesis was clearly confirmed by the models. Unemployment, economic insecurity and also the life on welfare increase the chance to support populists compared to support of established parties. Although, the impact of living on welfare seems not to be as great as the other two factors mentioned and does not have a significant effect in supporting traditional populists. In addition, in Model 3, where the cultural dimension has been added, there is a slight reduction of the effects. Despite this, all significances remain stable and the estimates continue to show the expected effect.

Concerning the cultural dimension, the results of the multinomial logistic regression also support our hypotheses that were stated as follows:

H2: The more culturally inclusive (values), the higher the probability of supporting progressive populist parties.

H3: The more culturally exclusive, the higher the probability of supporting a traditionalist populist party.

Inclusive values (high values for self-transcendence and openness and lower anti-immigration sentiment) increases the probability of support for progressive populists, but openness has no significant effect here. In addition, exclusive values (low values for self-transcendence and openness

and a high value for anti-immigration), increase the probability of supporting traditionalist populism. Anti-immigration in particular seems very important here and stands out clearly from the other effects. **In addition, the effect of openness on supporting traditional populist parties is highly significant.** Even in Model 4 that combines all variables, all these effects remain stable. The effects also show our previously suspected differentiation. The economic dimension increases the likelihood of supporting populist parties in general. The cultural dimension, on the other hand, shows that it has diametrically opposed effects on the support of traditionalist and progressive populists.

It should also be stressed that while all the effects found are significant, they are rather weak, especially when it comes to the cultural dimension. In addition, almost all effects of the control variables remain significant in all models. In the academic literature, supporters of populist parties are often associated with features such as a older age and lower education. Some minor surprises were found here: in terms of education stands, more education decreases the support for traditional populists, whereas the same isn't true for supporters of progressive populists where higher education levels are associated with higher support. Further, when it comes to age, the models suggest that younger age is associated with higher support for progressive as well as traditional populists.

5 Conclusions

5.1 Limitations

5.2 Implications

6 References

- Easton, David 1975:** A re-assessment of the concept of political support, *British journal of political science* 5, pp. 435–57.
- Easton, David 1965:** *A systems analysis of political life*. New York: John Wiley.
- Friedman, Jerome, Hastie, Trevor & Tibshirani, Robert 2001:** *The elements of statistical learning*. Springer series in statistics New York.
- Habermas, Jürgen 1994:** Three normative models of democracy, *Constellations* 1, pp. 1–10.
- Hartigan, John A & Wong, Manchek A 1979:** Algorithm as 136: A k-means clustering algorithm, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series C (Applied Statistics)* 28, pp. 100–8.
- Hooghe, Liesbet, Marks, Gary & Wilson, Carole J 2002:** Does left/right structure party positions on european integration?, *Comparative political studies* 35, pp. 965–89.
- Hosmer Jr, David W, Lemeshow, Stanley & Sturdivant, Rodney X 2013:** *Applied logistic regression*. John Wiley & Sons.
- Schwartz, Shalom H 1994:** Are there universal aspects in the structure and contents of human values?, *Journal of Social Issues* 50, pp. 19–45.
- Schwartz, Shalom H. 2005:** Human values. european social survey edunet,
- Tibshirani, Robert, Walther, Guenther & Hastie, Trevor 2001:** Estimating the number of clusters in a data set via the gap statistic, *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B (Statistical Methodology)* 63, pp. 411–23.