

Catholic Censorship and the Demise of Knowledge Production in Early Modern Italy

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Abstract

Censorship makes new ideas less available to others, but also reduces the share of people choosing a non-compliant activity. We propose a new method to measure the effect of censorship on knowledge growth, accounting for the endogenous selection of agents into compliant vs. non-compliant ideas. We apply our method to the Catholic Church’s censorship of books written by members of Italian universities and academies over the period 1400-1750. We highlight two new facts: once censorship was introduced, censored authors were of better quality than the non-censored authors, but this gap shrunk over time; the intensity of censorship decreased over time. These facts are used to identify the deep parameters of a novel endogenous growth model linking censorship to knowledge diffusion and occupational choice. We conclude that censorship reduced by 28% the average log publication per scholar in Italy. Interestingly, half of this drop stems from the induced reallocation of talents towards compliant activities, while the other half arises from the direct effect of censorship on book availability.

JEL Classification Numbers: J24, N33, O33, O43.

Keywords: Censorship, Upper-Tail Human Capital, Publications, Scholars, Early Modern Italy, Occupational Choice

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1 Introduction

Italy’s primacy in knowledge creation was undisputed in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. ~~Yet, it was overtaken by~~ North and Western Europe in the following two centuries, ~~during~~ which scholars and the knowledge they produced are believed to have played an essential role in the rise of the West (Mokyr 2016). The first ~~candidate to explain~~ such a reversal of fortune is the fight led by the Catholic Church against novel ideas (Landes 1999), such as heliocentrism (Gingerich 1973), infinitesimal calculus (Alexander 2014), and atomism (Beretta 2007).¹ These novel ideas were at the root of the Scientific Revolution in Europe.

~~This paper tackles~~ this issue by focusing on the role of one weapon in the Church’s arsenal, namely the power to censor books published by scholars. The list of ~~such~~ prohibited books is called *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*. ~~The question we address is~~ whether ~~such~~ censorship was key in altering the growth path of the generation of new knowledge in the Italian peninsula.

We answer the question with three contributions. First, we construct a large sample of scholars active in Italy from 1400 to 1750 and we document how the intensity of censorship and the (relative) notability of blacklisted authors changed over time. Second, we use this data to identify the deep parameters of a novel model linking censorship to knowledge diffusion and occupational choice. Third, we perform a counterfactual experiment to assess quantitatively the role of censorship ~~on~~ the decline in total publications per scholar in Italy. ~~Our strategy to~~ measure the impact of censorship ~~results in~~ a new method that explicitly accounts for agents’ endogenous selection into compliant vs. non-compliant ideas.

In the first part of the paper, we build a database of Italian scholars active in the Renaissance academies and universities from 1400 to 1750. For each scholar, we identify whether his (or her) work was subject to censorship by the Church. We also measure the “quality” of each scholar by his (or her) quantity of written output in today’s library catalogs. Using this new database, we document the drop in publications per person over the period 1400-1750. Studying the distribution of the publications per person, we highlight that, in the sixteenth century, the censored authors ~~are~~ of much better quality, on average, than the non-censored authors. Moreover, this difference shrunk over time. The intensity of censorship decreased as well, after it was first introduced in the sixteenth century. This pattern may reflect either a deliberate choice of the best authors to switch from non-compliant to compliant publications, or a change in the Church’s policy, or both.

In the second part of the paper, we design a structural model linking censorship to knowledge

¹Probably Newton would have had issues developing his particle theory of light in a country averse to atomism.

diffusion and productivity growth over the long-run. The model explicitly includes the two mechanisms described in the first part. In the model, knowledge is codified in books and can be of two types: conformist and non-conformist. Following the literature on endogenous growth and knowledge diffusion (Kremer 1993; Jones 2001; Lucas 2009; Lucas and Moll 2014; De la Croix, Doepke, and Mokyr 2018), we assume that authors randomly draw ideas from the stock of knowledge left by the previous generation, retaining the best one. We introduce a novel occupational choice made by printers between printing compliant/conformist books or revolutionary/non-conformist books. Revolutionary books are less likely to be printed if they are of lower quality or rarer than compliant books.² We show that, by censoring revolutionary books, the Church can not only reduce the share of people in the revolutionary occupation, but, more importantly, alter the development path of knowledge drastically. An initial temporary blow to the revolutionary ideas can force society to converge towards a compliant steady state. Since setting up a censorship apparatus is costly, if the Church displays patience she has the incentive to delay censorship. This rationalizes why the Church waited several decades after the rise of Protestantism before setting up an Index of forbidden books.³

In the third and last part of the paper, we use the facts highlighted in the first part to identify the deep parameters of the structural model. The most important parameter, namely the rate of censorship, is intuitively identified by the share of censored authors. The dynamics of the overall quality of authors identifies some key technological parameters. The relative productivity in the two sectors is implied by the level and dynamics of the share of censored authors. Without targeting these moments in particular, the model is to match them well, which gives credence to the model’s mechanisms. The fixed cost necessary to impose censorship is picked to match the timing of the creation of the first Index of forbidden books. Simulations show that imposing a censorship rate of 18% on the non-conformist books was sufficient to decrease the share of non-conformist authors from 51% in 1470-1550 to 25% in 1680-1750. We conclude that censorship reduced by 28% the average log publication per scholar in Italy. Interestingly, half of this drop stems from the induced reallocation of talents towards compliant activities, while the other half arises from the direct effect of censorship on book availability.⁴

The development and estimation of the structural model constitute a new methodology to measure the effect of censorship on knowledge growth. Not only we account for the effect of

²In a robustness exercise, we also consider the possibility that authors and printers self-censor because of the fear of being persecuted by the Inquisition.

³Donato (2019) notice that “As is well known, in Italy the Inquisition was reorganized relatively late (1542), in response to the ‘infection’ of Protestantism.” The first roman Index was published even later (1559), and censorship was institutionalized in 1564 by the Council of Trent.

⁴The effect of censorship is also due to the interaction between *i*) its direct effect and *ii*) the induced reallocation of talents. We reported the size of *i*) and *ii*) assuming that the effect of the interaction is shared between *i*) and *ii*) proportionally, according to their relative “pure” effects.

censorship on the availability of already written books, ~~but also~~ for its repercussions ~~on~~ the sector and ~~quality~~ of future knowledge. This is done by modeling the endogenous selection of agents into the compliant vs. non-compliant sectors, which depends on past knowledge and censorship. The introduction of censorship is also endogenized. Overall, the ~~model's structure and its estimation~~ allow us to build a counterfactual path of knowledge dynamics characterized by the absence of censorship.

Literature ~~This~~ paper relates to three strands of the literature. First, we add to the existing literature that studies the effects of censorship. Motivated by the fact that a large share of the world population is currently subject to censorship,⁵ previous research studied how autocratic governments strategically impose censorship (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013; Zhuang 2019) and its effectiveness in ~~the~~ spread of non-compliant ideas (Roberts 2014). This paper contributes to this literature by proposing a novel method to study censorship, accounting for the endogenous selection of agents into compliant vs. non-compliant knowledge. On the theory side, Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2015) propose a model where the ruler can censor media reports to avoid revolts, while citizens might update negatively about a regime when they see no news. ~~Guriev and Treisman (2020) study the trade-offs between various tools of authoritarian politics such as censorship, propaganda and repression. We contribute~~ this literature by making endogenous the creation and quality of ~~non-compliant~~ content.

Another strand of the literature explores ~~the fight of government/religious institutions against novel ideas~~ in early modern Spain (Vidal-Robert 2011), Europe (Anderson 2015), Imperial China (Koyama and Xue 2015), and the Islamic world (Iyigun 2015; Chaney 2016; Rubin 2017). ~~Relative to these works, this paper differs by distinguishing~~ the effect of censorship from that of the ~~inquisition~~. Censorship affects knowledge production by making some ideas unavailable to future generations, while the ~~inquisition~~ is the ~~armed~~ arm of the Church, responsible for punishing heretics. Censorship can be effective even if heretic authors do not risk their life. This paper is also ~~the first work~~ in economics about the effect of Catholic censorship, ~~except for~~ Becker, J. Pino, and Vidal-Robert (2021). Their work studies the effect of censorship on the number of printed books. Instead of taking books as the unit of observation, we focus on scholars, which enables us to study their choice to comply with the Church's ideology. Focusing on authors also allows to ~~weigh~~ them by quality, and to study the dynamic effects of censorship via diffusion of knowledge to future generations.

Second, our paper contributes to the literature on changes and persistence in institutions and the ruling class (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Acemoglu 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson 2008).

⁵According to the report “Freedom of the Press 2017” by Freedom House, only 13% of the world population enjoys a free press:
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/press-freedoms-dark-horizon>.

More closely related to our work, Bénabou, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2015) focus on the persistence of religiosity in a framework where belief-eroding innovations can be censored, and religious institutions can adapt the doctrine to the new knowledge. Ekelund, Hebert, and Tollison (2002, 2004) study the behavior of the Catholic Church before and after the rise of Protestantism by interpreting ~~her~~ action as an incumbent monopolistic firm. ~~Compared to this literature, we propose~~ a dynamic approach to understanding the persistence of the Catholic Church’s power, where ~~her~~ decisions to impose censorship depend on the current and future (endogenous) distribution of authors’ quality by sector. Our framework allows us to rationalize both the Church’s late reaction to the rise of Protestantism and that several books censored in the sixteenth century could circulate freely in the previous centuries.

Finally, this paper is tied to the literature ~~that studies the causes at the root~~ of the decline of Italy. The ~~hypothesis~~ regarding the demise of Italy include the excessive control by the guilds (Cipolla 1994), the inability of Italy to seize the new profitable trade routes ~~leading across the Atlantic~~ (Landes 1999; Braudel 2018), and the fight of the Catholic Church against novel ideas (Landes 1999; Gusdorf 1971). We focus on the latter argument by examining the role of the Catholic Church’s censorship on knowledge diffusion. Compared to the literature on knowledge diffusion in the Malthusian epoch (De la Croix, Doepke, and Mokyr 2018), in which knowledge is embodied into craftsmen, we model a complementary vector of idea transmissions by focusing on codified/written knowledge. We do not seek to make a direct link between censorship and economic growth, even though recent research highlights the importance of upper-tail human capital for pre-industrial Europe’s take-off (Squicciarini and Voigtländer 2015; Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014; Mokyr 2011; Mokyr 2016).

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the data sources, and we highlight two novel facts about censorship and scholars’ quality. In Section 3, we develop a model linking censorship to knowledge diffusion. In Section 4, we estimate the structural model and **present** its ~~implication~~ for the role of censorship on Italy’s accumulation of knowledge. The conclusion is in Section 5.

2 Data

2.1 Academies, Scholars, Publications, and Censorship

Our unit of observation is a scholar active in Italy, to whom we will attach publications and, possibly, censorship. The database is built in three steps. An example is shown in Figure 1.

First, we collect information on all scholars who were appointed to an Italian university or were




Figure 1: Data collection: example of Thomas Dempster

nominated to an Italian academy over the period 1450-1750. For universities, the main sources are as follows. An extensive coverage of the university of Bologna is provided by Mazzetti (1847). The university of Padova is covered by Facciolati (1757): we complete its information with the works by Casellato and Rea (2002) and Pesenti (1984). Professors at the university in Rome (Sapienza) were found in Renazzi (1803). The professors at university of Naples are covered by Origlia Paolino (1754). Pavia is another well-documented university: Raggi (1879) listing all its professors. Pisa is covered in Fabroni (1791). The smaller university of Macerata also benefits from a full coverage by Serangeli (2010). For academies, we use the database “Italian Academies 1525-1700, the first intellectual networks of early modern Europe” made available by the British Library in 2013. Among the academies covered, the Gelati and the Ricovrati are two important ones. We complete these data with Parodi (1983) for the language academy “La Crusca” and with Maggiolo (1983) for a full coverage of the biggest Academy, the Ricovrati. In appendices A.1 and A.2 we discuss how representative are university professors and academicians in our data and how much of the Italian university/academy population is covered.

Figure 1 shows that Tommaso Dempstero is in the list compiled by Mazzetti (1847) of professors at the university of Bologna. We also find him in the history of the university of Pisa by Fabroni (1791), under his Latin name, Thomas Dempsterus. Checking the Italian encyclopedia from the Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana (1929), we corroborate the information on Bologna.

Second, ~~for each scholar,~~ we use the Worldcat search engine, which provides references to the collections of thousands of libraries around the world, to assign to each ~~person,~~ all the written output he/she generated, including post mortem editions. More precisely, we count the number of “publications”, including different editions of the same work. We only record publications by the author, ~~excluding~~ publications about the author, which are also available through Worldcat. WorldCat provides a good approximation ~~to~~ the population of known European authors. Chaney (2020) compares the Universal Short Title Catalogue (USTC) of St. Andrews (2019)⁶ to the references in the Virtual International Authority File (VIAF), on which WorldCat is based. Chaney successfully locates 81% of USTC authors in the VIAF. Figure 1 shows the Worldcat Page for Thomas Dempster, with the total count of publications (by or about). We can identify the two types of publications by **scrapping** the page. From the graph on the webpage, we can see that all publications are by him.

In a third step, we look at the list of forbidden books ~~provided by~~ De Bujanda and Richter (2002) and De Bujanda et al. (1996). We find an entry for Thomas Dempster, with a short biography, and the list of books that were forbidden, with the date of the corresponding decrees.

⁶<https://ustc.ac.uk/>

We now show some statistics on the number of scholars and on their publications. In Table 1 the period 1400-1750 has been divided into five periods of 70 years each. The first line covers all of Europe, from the database built by De la Croix (2021), and includes both universities and academies. Columns (1) to (5) contain the number of “published” scholars per period, i.e. those having some work referenced in Worldcat. Columns (6) to (10) show the average number of publications per person. The second line covers the subset of scholars affiliated to an Italian institution.

The number of publications per person illustrates perfectly the decline of Italy. Until period 2 (1470-1540), published scholars in Italy produced an output similar to the average European scholar. Then, a gap appears in period 3 (1540-1610) and becomes really wide in period 5 (1680-1750). The appearance of the gap coincides with the formalization of censorship through the first index published by the university of Paris in 1544, and the first Roman Index, also known as *Pauline Index*, promulgated by Pope Paul IV in 1559 (De Bujanda and Richter 2002). Note that the Catholic Church also censored scholars who never visited Italy, but the Church struggled to enforce censorship outside Italy.⁷ A more comprehensive history of the indexes of the Catholic Church is in Becker, J. Pino, and Vidal-Robert (2021).

Table 1 also shows the European numbers by individual country.⁸ For countries like France, Germany and Austria we can observe that until period 2 (1470-1540) published scholars produce a similar or lower output than Italy, while a gap appears in the following periods. Note that these countries reach a level of output unknown to Italy. This fact goes against the possibility that Italy was overtaken because it had less room for growth and that Europe grew more just because of the spreading of knowledge in more remote areas. A similar pattern can be observed for Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and Sweden, with the caveat that we have very few observations for these countries in the first two periods. The case of Spain and Portugal is different, as these countries do not overtake Italy. This is not surprising given the intensity of the Spanish Inquisition (Vidal-Robert 2011).

The following lines in Table 1 disaggregate the Italian numbers by (important) institution. The decline from period 3 to period 5 is present in the universities of Bologna, Padua, Pavia, Pisa, and in the two Roman universities. The university of Naples escapes decline in period 5 thanks

⁷One explicative example is the story of Copernicus’ *De revolutionibus*, which was first published in 1546 and appeared in the Index in 1616 under the list of books to be corrected. Gingerich (2004) analyzed 277 copies of the first edition and 324 of the second of *De revolutionibus*. He found that about two-thirds of the copies of *De revolutionibus* in Italy were “corrected.” Since the *De revolutionibus* could circulate for decades without any problem, two-thirds is probably a lower bound estimate of the overall rate of enforcement. One copy forgotten in a private library for decades is probably less likely to be corrected. However, virtually none of the copies outside Italy, among which Spain and France, were touched.

⁸We did not show the results for all European countries because some have too few observations or contained scholars coming from one University/academy only (this is the case of Belgium and the University of Louvain).

to one person, Gianbattista Vico (a renowned political philosopher and historian of the Age of Enlightenment). The academies do better, in particular the Ricovrati, but this is not enough to compensate for the overall decline at the Italian level.

One can argue that the decline in knowledge production in Italy might be ~~due to a weakening of the barriers to entry into the scholar profession~~. In fact, if published scholars are positively selected and the barriers to entry weaken, the average quality of scholars goes down. One way to control for this problem is to look at the dynamics of top scholars, who are less affected by changes in the ~~barrier~~ to entry. Hence, in Table 6 in the appendix, we show that Italy ~~loses~~ to Europe in terms of knowledge production ~~also~~ if we consider only scholars whose longest Wikipedia page (across all languages) is longer than 5000 characters. Moreover, in Appendix A.3 we show that Italy is overtaken by Europe within all the scholars' fields that we are able to identify, ruling out the possibility that this observation was driven by a composition effect across fields.

Period	Number of published scholars					Average publications per person				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Europe	525	1274	3186	4435	5862	159	279	318	232	236
France	64	144	493	796	871	256	214	337	263	343
Germany & Austria	77	335	892	1059	2127	138	256	398	277	250
Great Britain & Ireland	14	46	158	328	753	25	697	248	393	382
Denmark & Sweden			45	119	215			228	150	231
Spain & Portugal	13	66	271	243	172	415	161	166	105	70
Italy	297	531	969	1167	766	161	272	238	160	111
Ubolgna-1088	53	81	74	64	41	74	184	225	84	46
Unapoli-1224	4	20	31	14	19	632	123	57	39	245
Upadua-1222	59	116	146	85	75	75	179	175	140	63
Upavia-1361	35	68	59	22	8	113	170	159	63	46
Uroma-1303	32	67	53	47	39	518	420	490	164	91
Upisa-1343		43	55	65	37		92	123	79	63
UromaGregoriana-1556			40	62	49			416	253	62
Umacerata-1540			25	18	14			26	15	29
AcadRicovrati-1599			39	107	188			51	162	183
AcadCrusca-1583			14	98	100			136	126	153
AcadGelati-1588			8	71	27			193	116	57

Note: periods: 1:1400-70, 2:1470-1540, 3:1540-1610, 4:1610-80, 5:1680-1750

Table 1: Total number of scholars & publications by period

2.2 Two Features of Authors' Censorship

On May 23 1555, a new Pope was elected. Cardinal Caraffa became Paul IV. This election witnessed the return of the conservatives. In 1559, Paul IV had published the first long list of prohibited books, the Index. The idea was refined further by the Council of Trent, which established in 1564 the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*. The Index comprised three parts. The first part contained the name of the heretical authors whose entire output, past and future, was condemned (*opera omnia*, the works). The second part contained a list of censored publications by authors who still belonged to the Church. The third part dealt with anonymous publications.

This attempt to control publications by the Catholic Church is probably the biggest experiment in the whole history of censorship. To read or to keep censored books could lead to excommunication and eternal damnation. It lasted four centuries, as the last version of the Index was published in 1948, still affecting the second authors' grandparents.

The establishment of the Index follows from a change of attitude of the Church concerning novel ideas, including scientific ones. One aim was to defend Aristotelian physics against alternative views. Aristotle had to be defended, because his theory on substance and accidents is compatible with the dogma of transubstantiation according to which, during the Mass, the bread and wine are literally converted into the body and blood of Christ at the consecration. Everything that goes against Aristotle's physics became suspect.

The Copernicus case best illustrates the reversal of attitude. The idea of his heliocentric system was developed around 1505, and first written in an unpublished book intended for his friends. The Pope Clement VII learned about these ideas in 1533 and liked them. Several highly ranked clerics asked Copernicus to publish his treaty. One advantage of Copernicus' system was to provide more accurate computations for astronomical events. Then, after the conservative revolution, Copernicus' writings were blacklisted. What appeared to be a legitimate hypothesis in 1543 became in 1616 a foolish thesis, absurd in philosophy, and formally heretic. The Church took more than three centuries to accept heliocentrism and remove Copernicus' works from the Index in 1846.

The Church's fight did not spare the most notable forerunners of the varied flow of novel ideas that spread all over Italy and Europe. Galileo Galilei was condemned, and his books were censored not only for his astronomical views, but also for his support of atomism. According to atomism, the physical world comprises fundamental, indivisible components known as atoms, violating the Aristotelian view of a continuous matter. Atomism and its proponents, such as the French philosopher Descartes, were censored by the Church until at least the beginning of the eighteenth century. In a world where religion and philosophy were intertwined with natural

sciences, the aversion towards atomism is likely to have affected scientific knowledge. Perhaps it is **not a case** that the particle theory of light, which relies on an atomist view of the matter, was developed by Newton and not by an Italian.

The Church's fight had some ~~consequence on how to think~~ about the continuum, indivisibles, and the actual infinite. The Jesuits were particularly active in these mathematical controversies, fighting against the idea that a continuous line is composed of distinct and infinitely tiny parts (Alexander 2014). In his book, Alexander (2014) considers what the world would have been like without infinitesimals. "If the Jesuits and their allies had had their way, there would be no calculus, no analysis, nor any of the scientific and technological innovations that flowed from these powerful mathematical techniques." Now, this is perhaps exaggerated, and Alexander claims more than he is able to prove. Grabiner (2014) defends the view that seventeenth-century mathematics had far too much momentum and too many demonstrable successes to be stopped by philosophical arguments about the nature of the continuum.

Another landmark of the reversal in the attitude of the Church is the censorship of all the works by ~~and~~ the burning at the stake of ~~Giordano~~ Bruno. Bruno had accumulated many reasons to be condemned to death, but one point of his theory that did not fit at all with the Church's view was the theoretical possibility of an infinite universe and the plurality of worlds. Bruno has become the symbol of the scientist persecuted by religious authorities. ~~Other~~ times authors were punished with imprisonment. For example, Galilei was sentenced to house arrest for the rest of his days.

Looking at the data in the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, one should admit that censorship does not necessarily imply that the author risks his life. While sometimes, as for Bruno and Galilei, censorship went together with severe consequences for the author, ~~in~~ other cases, the consequences were mild. For example, the poet John Barclay's ~~name~~, whose works contained satirical descriptions of the Jesuit school, ~~appeared~~ in the Index in 1608. ~~Upon~~ invitation by the Pope himself, he went to Rome in 1616 and resided there until he died in 1621. Moving to Rome was a way to **testify** that he was a good Catholic and avoid further consequences. Not all ~~his~~ writings were blacklisted, and he was able to publish again after he was first censored. In other cases, there were no consequences for the author simply because the heresy was identified after her/his death. This is the case of Bernardino Ciaffoni, who used to be the rector of Rome's college San Bonaventura. He died in 1684 but was censored in 1701 because his works contained insulting claims against the Jesuits. Scholars developed different strategies to avoid **consequences because of** their writings. Many authors used pseudonyms to protect themselves. This is the case of Copernicus, who first ~~exposed~~ his theories anonymously in the *Commentariolus*. Only ~~once~~ he realized that his work was well-received, ~~he revealed~~ his identity

by writing his theory under his real name (Rosen 1977). In sum, censorship did not always bear consequences for the authors, while posterity indeed paid for more complicated access to the revolutionary’s wisdom, at least that embodied in forbidden books.

Being a clergyman was not a safe antidote towards censorship. One particularly striking case is Serry Jacobus Hyacinthus. Professor in Padova, he contributed to the Dominicans-Jesuits controversy on grace, and several of his works appeared on the index. Not only he was a Dominican, but also he was a member of the *Congregation of the Index*, the organ responsible for the creation and management of the Index. Censorship did not spare even the members of the company of Jesus, who had a primary role in the Counter-reformation and who were the “soldiers of God [...] for the defense and propagation of the faith.”⁹ In our database, 10 out of 173 published scholars belonging to the Jesuit university Gregoriana were censored. Among them, Achille Gagliardi was censored in 1703 for his writings about the annihilation of the will during mystical states. These ideas were found not compatible with free will, which is a cornerstone of Catholic theology.

We now describe the impact of censorship quantitatively. Figure 2 shows how authors belonging to our dataset are distributed according to the number of their publications. In red, we mark authors who were censored at least once, and in green non-censored authors. We provide five histograms, one for each period. Censorship started at the end of the second period, but also hit works that were published in the past. From these five histograms, it is clear that censorship was concentrated on top scholars for the first two to three periods, and then becomes more uniformly distributed over the quality of scholars. Or, as we wrote earlier, once censorship was introduced, censored authors were of better quality than the non-censored authors, but this gap shrunk over time.

This shift in the identity of who is hit by censorship reflects behavioral changes. The top scholars who had the potential to publish non-compliant ideas and become famous (as in the first three periods) decided to be more compliant, and published conventional material instead. Bruno, Copernicus and Galilei were at the top of the distribution and were all censored, and sometimes burned. Their reincarnation in the last two periods might have preferred to be mediocre poets.

We show in Table 2 the key moments of these distributions. It confirms what we expected from the figures: the gap in median publications between censored authors and all authors shrunk from about 3.1 to 2.4 (the numbers should be interpreted as log of number of publications). The Table shows two additional features. First, the percentage of censored authors is shrinking

⁹This is a translation of the words of the *Exposcit Debitum* Papal bull, that gave to the foundation of the order in 1550.




Figure 2: Distribution of published authors by quality. Red: censored. Green: non-censored.

Moment description	Period				
	1400-70	1470-1540	1540-1610	1610-80	1680-1750
Number of published scholars (all)	192	376	745	755	634
% censored scholars	7.29	11.17	7.25	6.49	4.26
Log publications per scholar (all), median (1)	4.55	4.54	4.13	3.53	3.48
Log publications per scholar (censored), median (2)	7.64	7.07	6.64	5.62	5.89
Gap in median publications (2)-(1)	3.09	2.53	2.51	2.09	2.41
Log publications per scholar (all), 75 th percentile	5.93	6.04	5.44	5.1	4.98
Log publications per scholar (censored), 75 th perc.	7.80	7.86	8.02	7.14	6.67

Table 2: Moments per period

over time. Second, overall quality, measured by median publications per person, is declining over time as well. This also holds for the top of the distribution, as the 75th percentile also diminishes. Those two trends are very much compatible with the idea of ~~top innovative people~~ becoming progressively compliant and mediocre over time.

Our data also ~~allows looking at~~ possible geographical patterns in censorship. Figure 3 shows the place of birth of the scholars in the database, distinguishing the censored (red) from the not censored (green) ones. Geographical coordinates have been slightly randomized, so that people born in cities still appear distinctly. **From Italy’s map, we retain that our data cover the whole peninsula and its islands, without obvious bias.** Moreover, censorship seems to affect all regions.

Some members of Italian universities and academies were born outside Italy (as ~~Thomas Dempster~~ in our example above). Hence the interest in having a map of Europe. Figure 4 provides a European view of the places of birth of our scholars. Some of them are foreign members (or corresponding members) of some academies, such as the Ricovrati. They might have never come to Italy, ~~requiring us to have a specific robustness exercise excluding~~ those foreigners.

3 Occupational Choice and Knowledge Diffusion

In this section, we develop a theory of accumulation of knowledge and occupational choice. We build on recent approaches in the theory of economic growth that ~~models~~ explicitly the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge through the combination of ideas (Kortum 1997, Lucas 2009, Lucas and Moll 2014). We include ~~is~~ this class of models a new trade-off through occupational choice.




Figure 3: Place for birth of censored (red) and non censored (green) members of Italian universities & academies – Italy.




Figure 4: Place for birth of censored (red) and non censored (green) members of Italian universities & academies – Europe.

Authors, building on the knowledge left by the previous generation, write books that can be compliant to the Roman Church's ideology or revolutionary (in the sense of the Humanistic and Scientific Revolutions). Printers decide whether to be active in the revolutionary or compliant sector. They make this choice according to the quality of the books of each type that they encounter. Therefore, if the revolutionary knowledge grows faster than the compliant one, revolutionary books' share will also increase. The Roman Church dislikes revolutionary ideas and might decide to censor them, which would decrease their share but also alter the accumulation of the total stock of knowledge in the economy.

3.1 Knowledge Diffusion

Time is discrete. At each date t one generation is alive. Knowledge is embodied in books and is transmitted between the successive generations through them. At the beginning of each

period, the individuals first learn from μ books. μ is a parameter representing the number of books one can read during her life. Books include more or less relevant content to produce goods and services. A book read by person i has a characteristic h_i drawn from an exponential distribution. h_i should be seen as a negative feature, for example the irrelevance of the book. The quality of a book is a decreasing function of its irrelevance, with elasticity θ :

$$q_i = h_i^{-\theta}, \quad \theta \in (0, 1). \quad (1)$$

Books are of two types, which define different distributions from which their relevance is drawn. *Compliant* books, indicated by the superscript C , ~~embodies~~ the type of knowledge ~~which~~ is ~~acquiescent~~ with the ideology of the Roman Church.¹⁰ *Revolutionary* books, denoted by the superscript R , ~~indicates that the~~ knowledge is considered ~~to be~~ heretical by the Roman Church. Taking examples from Alexander (2014), geometry books would be compliant while books using infinitesimal calculus would be revolutionary. Both of them are of variable quality, ~~what~~ we call relevance.

At the beginning of time t , the irrelevance of book i of type j follows an exponential distribution

$$h_i^j \sim \exp(k_t^j), \quad \text{with } j \in \{C, R\} \text{ and } i \in \{1, \dots, N\}. \quad (2)$$

Note that the scale parameter k_t^j depends on the book type. As

$$E[h_i^j] = \frac{1}{k_t^j},$$

k_t^j measures the average usefulness of knowledge in sector j .

Using the words of Kortum (1997), the distribution of book quality represents the technology frontier. Since the irrelevance of books is exponentially distributed and given Equation (1), the distribution of book quality follows a Fréchet distribution, see Appendix C.1. This allows us to write the average book quality q^j by sector as:

$$E(q_i^j) = \text{cst}(k^j)^\theta \text{ with } j \in \{C, R\} \text{ and } i \in \{1, \dots, N\}. \quad (3)$$

The number of revolutionary books that each agent will read in t depends on their availability in bookshops. The share of printers that produced revolutionary books in the previous generation

¹⁰Note that being compliant does not necessarily mean to produce ~~using~~ the official Roman Church doctrine as an input: this is true just for the production of religious books or religious services in general. Instead, it just means that the knowledge should not contradict the Roman Church doctrine.

is denoted by m_t . Therefore, a individual will read $\lfloor \mu m_t \rfloor$ revolutionary books and $\lfloor \mu(1 - m_t) \rfloor$ compliant books, draw from their respective distribution. Each individual retains the best book coming from each one of the two distributions.¹¹ Formally, the process of retaining the best books by sector is described as

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{h}_i^C &= \min\{h_1^C, \dots, h_{\lfloor (1-m_t)\mu \rfloor}^C\}, \\ \hat{h}_i^R &= \min\{h_1^R, \dots, h_{\lfloor m_t\mu \rfloor}^R\}.\end{aligned}$$

For the sake of simplicity, from now on we will approximate $\lfloor (1 - m_t)\mu \rfloor$ and $\lfloor m_t\mu \rfloor$ to respectively $(1 - m_t)\mu$ and $m_t\mu$, so that we will be able to proceed our analysis treating the number of books read as a continuous variable.

Note that the exponential distribution satisfies the minimum stability postulate: if x and y are mutually independent random variables, exponentially distributed with parameter λ , then $\min(x, y)$ is exponentially distributed with parameter 2λ . Hence, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}\min\{h_1^C, \dots, h_{(1-m_t)\mu}^C\} &\sim \exp(k_t^C(1 - m_t)\mu), \quad \text{and} \\ \min\{h_1^R, \dots, h_{m_t\mu}^R\} &\sim \exp(k_t^R m_t\mu).\end{aligned}$$

We can now deduce that the distribution of actual relevance of the best book read by person i follows

$$\hat{h}_i^j \sim \exp(b_t^j), \quad \text{with } j \in \{C, R\}, \quad (4)$$

where b_{t+1}^C and b_{t+1}^R are defined as

$$\begin{aligned}b_{t+1}^C &= k_t^C(1 - m_t)\mu, \\ b_{t+1}^R &= k_t^R m_t\mu.\end{aligned}$$

Later in life, the generation t writes new books, combining their inherited knowledge with a new idea. This new idea is drawn from a distribution whose scale parameter depends on the average quality of the books they have read:

$$h_N^j \sim \exp(\nu b_t^j), \quad \text{with } j \in \{C, R\}.$$

Taking the best of their acquired and new knowledge leads to a book with irrelevance distributed

¹¹It is reasonable to think that better books have more readership. This possibility can be embodied in our model by reinterpreting parameter μ . Assume that readers visit a number B of bookshops and buy the best among $\hat{\mu}$ books for each bookshop. Then, readers retain the best book among all the books they bought. This situation is equivalent to our model if $B\hat{\mu} = \mu$ and high-quality books will have relatively more readership.

as:

$$\tilde{h}^j = \min(h_N^j, \hat{h}^j) \sim \exp((1 + \nu)b_t^j).$$

We can now summarize the dynamics of the two types of knowledge by the dynamics of the scale of their distribution:

$$k_{t+1}^C = (1 + \nu)k_t^C(1 - m_t)\mu, \quad (5)$$

$$k_{t+1}^R = (1 + \nu)k_t^R m_t \mu. \quad (6)$$

3.2 Occupational Choice

To finish describing the dynamics, we need to define how the share of printers producing revolutionary books evolves over time. We suppose that printers meet authors randomly, but have to decide ~~where~~ to be active in the compliant sector or in the revolutionary sector at the beginning of their activity. Once they have chosen a sector,¹² they would print any author they meet randomly. They will thus determine their sector of activity based on the first author they meet. This author has written books of relevance \tilde{h}^C and \tilde{h}^R . Printers decide their sector taking into account ~~both~~ the relative relevance of the two books. Printers also take into account that customers of the bookshop might value differently two books with the same quality that belong to two different sectors. This might happen because of consumer preferences or for how book quality translates into consumption goods¹³. We summarize these two effects assuming that the relative price at which revolutionary books are sold is represented by p . The probability that the revolutionary book is best is:

$$\text{Prob}\{q^C < pq^R\} = \text{Prob}\{\tilde{h}^C > p^{-1/\theta}\tilde{h}^R\} = \frac{b_t^R}{b_t^R + b_t^C p^{-1/\theta}} = m_t. \quad (7)$$

Using the law of large numbers, this probability also defines the share of printers active in the revolutionary sector m_t . From now on we will refer to \hat{p} as $\hat{p} = p^{-1/\theta}$.

¹²Assuming that printers have to choose a sector is consistent with Dittmar and Seabold (2015). In Germany, the official city printers were not advocates of the Reformation because they “did not want to endanger official work orders or antagonize city governments.” Moreover, according to Grendler (1975), printers in Venice faced the risk of having their bookshops in Rome sized by the Vatican if they printed revolutionary content, which implies that they had to choose a sector.

¹³Books can be used to produce consumption goods, and books belonging to different sectors can have different productivity in this respect. For example, the production of consumption goods through books can be represented as $c = \alpha \sum^{N_R} q_i^R + \sum^{N_C} q_i^C$, where α would be the relative productivity of revolutionary ~~books~~ quality, while N_R and N_C are respectively the number of revolutionary and compliant books owed by the customer.

The dynamics of knowledge quality (5) and (6), together with the occupation choice

$$m_t = \frac{k_t^R}{k_t^R + \hat{p}k_t^C} \quad (8)$$

and initial conditions k_0^C and k_0^R , determine m_0 and the equilibrium path $\{m_t, k_t^C, k_t^R\}_{t \geq 0}$.

3.3 Censorship

So far, the Church did not play any role in the model. As we discussed in the introduction, there is historical evidence that the Roman Church tried to limit the spread of revolutionary books issuing the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*. We model this behavior of the Church, assuming that she can interfere with the process of occupational choice imposing a rate of censorship on revolutionary books. More precisely, she can limit the number of revolutionary titles that an author can read, making unavailable a fraction β of the volumes that she would have read without censorship. Formally, the process of censorship limits the number of revolutionary books that individuals encounter during their life to $\mu m(1 - \beta)$ and therefore alters the process of accumulation of revolutionary knowledge, which now follows

$$k_{t+1}^R = (1 + \nu)(1 - \beta)k_t^R m_t \mu, \quad \text{with } \beta \in [0, 1]. \quad (9)$$

Note that in this way, the Church can directly decrease the share of revolutionary books m and will also make it less likely that revolutionary works will be written in the future. This is because the process of accumulation of revolutionary knowledge slows down.

The Church could limit the spread of revolutionary books ~~also~~ by persecuting authors and printers accused of heresy. This fact matters for the accumulation of knowledge as authors and ~~printer~~ might decide to self-censor their works to avoid ~~risking~~ their life. While we do not model self-censorship in the main baseline version of the model, this feature is included in a robustness check in Subsection 4.4.

3.4 The Dynamics under an Exogenous Church's Behavior

So far we mentioned that the Church can limit the share of revolutionary books through censorship, but we did not mention how the Church is choosing β . Clearly, the choice of β over time will depend on the behavior of agents described in the previous section and on the objective of the Roman Church. On the one hand, the Church wanted to have the smallest possible number of heretical books circulating to maintain ~~her~~ power. On the other hand, we do not know what prevented ~~her~~ from imposing the highest level of censorship in any period. The Church was

probably trading off censorship with other reasons. These reasons could be time spent in other activities of her interest, or the fact that an overly harsh censorship could create damage to the Church herself,¹⁴ or something else.

Here we treat β as if it was exogenous, and we study the dynamics under this assumption. We start defining $z = k^R/k^C$: note that the share of revolutionary ideas m can assume one and only one value given z , which means that once we know the dynamics of one of the two variables, we also know the dynamics of the other. From equation (8) we get

$$m_t = \frac{z_t}{\hat{p} + z_t}. \quad (10)$$

We decided to make m_t rather than z_t our main variable for describing the model dynamics because its domain is a bounded set. The dynamics of m are defined formally below.

Definition 1 *Given β , an equilibrium path is a sequence $\{m_t\}_{t \geq 0}$, describing the share of revolutionary books over time. It is such that:*

- *Each author of each generation write books whose quality and type is defined by the current state of knowledge.*
- *Each printer of each generation chooses her sector according to the most productive book presented by the first randomly met author.*
- *Each printer of each generation, once she chose her sector, prints all the authors she meets randomly.*
- *The probability of being exposed to revolutionary book in $t + 1$ depends on the share of revolutionary titles written in t .*
- *The books printed in t embody the stock of compliant and revolutionary knowledge available to generation $t + 1$.*

The equilibrium described in definition 1 depends on the whole theory that we described in the previous subsection, but we are able to summarize in a single equation the law that governs

¹⁴As an example, we can think that if the censorship is overly harsh, the Roman Church might lose in terms of competition with the Protestant Church. This reasoning is plausible if devotees dislike a too harsh censorship. While rulers had the final say about the religion of their territory, their decision was not completely independent from the common people's believes. Protestantism could spread thanks to the invention of the printing press, which aroused popular support by distributing pamphlets (Eisenstein 1980; Rubin 2014). Probably it would not be the best choice for a ruler to impose Catholicism if a large majority of its population already converted to Protestantism.

the dynamics of m . Dividing Equation (6) by (5) side by side, and substituting the resulting z_{t+1} in (10) at time $t + 1$, we get the equation that governs the equilibrium dynamics of m :

$$m_{t+1} = \frac{(1 - \beta)m_t^2}{1 - m_t((\beta - 2)m_t + 2)} = f(m_t). \quad (11)$$

Equation (11) together with an initial condition m_0 , allow us to determine the equilibrium path $\{m_t\}_{t \geq 0}$. The equilibrium path $\{m_t\}_{t \geq 0}$ satisfies:

Proposition 1 *Given the initial condition $m_0 \in [0, 1)$, the long run share of revolutionary authors, $m \equiv \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} m_t = 0$, is given by*

- i) $m = 0$ if $m_0 < 1/(2 - \beta)$ (Compliant steady state),
- ii) $m = 1$ if $m_0 > 1/(2 - \beta)$ (Revolutionary steady state),
- iii) $m = m_0$ if $m_0 = 1/(2 - \beta)$ (Unstable steady state).

Proof. See Appendix C.2 ■

3.5 The Dynamics under an Optimizing Church's Behavior

In the previous subsection, we described the dynamics under a constant rate of censorship β_t . A simple way to go beyond this approach would be to assume a rule of thumb behavior of the type: the Church chooses the lowest rate of censorship that allows converging to a world with no revolutionary ideas. We analyzed this case in Appendix C.3. This approach has two main shortcomings. Firstly, it is stringent in defining how the Church trades-off the prevalence of revolutionary books and censorship. Secondly, it leaves unexplained the discontinuity over time in censorship and its delay with respect to the rise of Protestantism. Here we propose a model that can address this additional fact and also explain the two features of authors' censorship that we illustrated in Section 2.2. We assume that setting up an apparatus able to create a list of forbidden books and enforce its application represented a large fixed cost to bear for the Church. The Church cannot enforce any censorship before having paid a fixed cost ψ . After having paid ψ , she can impose a rate of censorship up to $\bar{\beta}$. The Church cares about the share of compliant books in the economy: her utility function is given by $u()$, which is differentiable, bounded, and strictly increasing in $1 - m_t$, while $\delta < 1$ is the discount factor. We can now define the value function of the Church recursively. In the case she still did not establish a censorship structure yet, her value function is

$$V(m_t) = \max[V^N(m_t), V^C(m_t) - \psi],$$

where V^N is the value of not imposing censorship and equals

$$\begin{aligned} V^N(m_t) &= u(1 - m_t) + \delta V(m_{t+1}) \\ \text{s.t. } m_{t+1} &= f(m_t, 0) = \frac{m_t^2}{1 - m_t(-2m_t + 2)}, \end{aligned}$$

while V^C is the value of having a censorship apparatus set up and equals

$$\begin{aligned} V^C(m_t) &= \max_{0 \leq \beta_t \leq \bar{\beta}} u(1 - m_t) + \delta V^C(m_{t+1}), \\ \text{s.t. } m_{t+1} &= f(m_t, \beta_t) = \frac{(1 - \beta)m_t^2}{1 - m_t((\beta - 2)m_t + 2)}. \end{aligned}$$

We can write this last value function like that since $V^N(m_t)$ equals $V^C(m_t)$ if $\beta = 0$ is chosen. Moreover, it is straightforward to see that, once ψ has been paid, the Church will always set β_t to its maximum level¹⁵. In this model, the Church has to choose between paying a fixed cost today for enjoying a lower share of revolutionary books in the future and postponing such payment. Postponing censorship would be less costly because of discounting, but it would also imply a higher share of revolutionary books in the future. This trade-off implies that the Church would be more prone to implement censorship immediately when the fixed cost ψ is low and when the effectiveness of censorship $\bar{\beta}$ is high. Moreover, she is less likely to start censoring the more she is impatient. When $\delta = 0$, the Church cares only about what happens in 0, and therefore she will never pay a cost ψ that affects only the future share of revolutionary books. The Church's decision to start censoring also depends on the initial level of revolutionary books m_0 . In fact, m_0 influences the dynamics with and without censorship. To understand why the initial condition matters, consider the extreme case $m_0 = 0$. Proposition 1 states that in this case, m stays constant over time, regardless of the value of $\bar{\beta}$, which makes censorship useless. Proposition 2 allow us to understand better when it is not optimal for the Church to censor:

Proposition 2 *If $\psi > 0$, then there exist $\tilde{m} > 0$ and $1 > \check{m} > 0$ such that*

- i) If $m_0 < \min(1/2, \tilde{m})$ then $\beta_t = 0$ for each $t \geq 0$ (No need to censor),*
- ii) If $m_0 > \max(1/2, \check{m})$ then $\beta_t = 0$ for each $t \geq 0$ (Too late to censor).*

Proof. See Appendix C.4. ■

Proposition 2 makes the point that for some m_0 it can be optimal for the Church to never impose Censorship, which can be due to opposite reasons. In fact, for a low enough m_0 , the

¹⁵This holds because $\partial f(m_t, \beta_t)/\partial \beta_t \leq 0$ and $\partial u(1 - m_t)/\partial m_t < 0$, which implies $\partial V^C(m_t)/\partial \beta_t \geq 0$.

Church knows that revolutionary ideas would naturally disappear. Therefore, there is no need to censor. Symmetrically, when m_0 is large enough, the Church knows that even imposing censorship, she would converge fast to the revolutionary steady state. In this case, it is too late to censor. Proposition 3 improves further our understanding of the Church's censoring behavior.

Proposition 3 *There exists $\bar{\psi}$ such that for each $\psi < \bar{\psi}$, there also exists \bar{m}, \hat{m} such that for $\hat{m} > m_0 > \bar{m}$, $\beta_0 = \bar{\beta}$ holds (*Window of censorship*).*

Proof. See Appendix C.5. ■

Proposition 3 tell us that the areas under which the Church is willing to censor are not isolated points, but form *windows* of the domain of m . This result is intuitive if we think that two conditions should hold to make the Church willing to censor. First, censorship should be able to alter the time path of revolutionary books significantly. Second, the Church should lose the opportunity to change the equilibrium path dramatically if ~~she~~ waits for one additional period. Censorship decisions are taken when m belongs to a certain interval (\bar{m}, \hat{m}) , where points have a very similar value of postponing censorship and of altering the dynamics of m .

Note that we could not characterize a closed form of the equilibrium time path $\{m_t\}_{t \geq 0}$. Censorship *windows* can be placed anywhere in $[0, 1]$ unless some strict assumptions are made. The model leaves open the possibility that revolutionary ideas were growing or declining before the Church implemented censorship. In order to be consistent with the historical fact that the Protestant ~~reformation~~ started before the first issue of the Index, one would like to find in the estimated model ~~d~~ that revolutionary ideas were growing before censorship.

3.6 Discussion of Model Assumptions

Our model of censorship introduction under an optimizing Church's behavior relies on a set of assumptions ~~that allows us~~ to make it tractable. In this subsection, we discuss ~~such~~ assumptions, and we compare them with some alternative modeling choices ~~that we could have taken~~.

One shot fixed-cost of censorship A different modeling choice that we could have taken is to assume that there is no one-shot fixed cost ψ to set up censorship, but rather a convex cost that depends on the size of the chosen rate of censorship β_t .¹⁶ A model based on this alternative assumption would have a hard time fitting the data for two reasons. First, it would predict a gradual increase or decrease in the share of forbidden books, while in the data there

¹⁶If the cost was concave enough, the model would behave similarly ~~than with~~ the fixed cost.

is a discontinuous increase in censored books given by the creation of the Index. Second, it would generate a faster reaction to the diffusion of Protestantism than the one observed in the data. This is because revolutionary authors' dynamics display inertia, which makes acting soon with a low rate of censorship a good idea. Finally, the one-shot nature of the cost ψ helps to rationalize why the Church kept updating the index until the 20th century. The Church would have removed censorship much sooner if she had to pay ψ each period. In fact, once censorship can shift dynamics towards the compliant steady state, the gains of censorship decrease rapidly.

Maximal level of censorship A point that is worth discussing is why the Church is bounded above by $\bar{\beta}$ concerning the level of censorship that she can impose. We assume this for two main reasons. First, the process leading to censorship was largely bottom-up and grounded on external denounce.¹⁷ If the arrival rate (frictions) of new books to be checked is low enough, then the Church can not have the opportunity to censor all revolutionary books. This mechanism explains why many books were censored decades after being first published. It also hints at why some books might have never been censored. Also, it justifies why we assume that the Church censor a *share* and not a *number* of censored authors. The latter would make sense if the Church's bottleneck was a too large number of books to be checked, which is unlikely to be the case.¹⁸ Second, dissimulation to avoid censorship was far from uncommon (Spruit 2019). Heretic authors could cloak their dissident beliefs either by pretending to comply with the Church (*simulatio*) or by hiding their heterodox views to authorities (*dissimulatio*). Decartes' quote "Like an actor wearing a mask, I come forward, masked, on the stage of the world," means that he was conscious of the risks ahead of him and found in dissimulation a valuable tool to overcome them (Snyder 2012). Since books' revolutionary content was seldom hidden, it is reasonable to think that the Church could identify only a share of the heretic books.

Censorship enforcement One additional assumption we made is that the Roman Inquisition (the police) was able to enforce the application of the Index outside the Papal State at a constant rate over time. The primary weapon of the Church for enforcing the application of the Index was a dense peripheral organization of censorship. It was constituted by 41 inquisitorial tribunals, primarily distributed in northern Italy, and by bishops in the center-south (Balsamo and Fragnito 2001).¹⁹ The Church had an additional economic weapon for enforcing censorship: in Venice, the Church enforced compliance threatening printers to seize their stores within the

¹⁷By external denounce, we mean that the Congregation of the Index did not initiate the process most of the time. Wolf (2006) enumerate members of the clerics, aristocrats, and bourgeoisie as the categories of people who were bringing suspicious books to Rome to denounce them.

¹⁸The Congregation of the Index was formed of eight cardinals only in 1587, while it previously had five members. Moreover, Wolf (2006) observes that between 1571 and 1596, the number of yearly meetings of the Congregation oscillated between 0 and 34. The Church could have easily increased these numbers if needed.

¹⁹In the south and the highlands the Inquisition was carried on by the Spanish, except for Naples, where the archbishop was responsible for censorship (Prosperi, Lavenia, and Tedeschi 2010).

Papal State (Grendler 1975). The Church could enforce censorship throughout the XVIII century, even though carrying out this task became increasingly more complicated (Prosperi, Lavenia, and Tedeschi 2010). In fact, under the papacy of Pope Benedict XIV, which started in 1740, some inquisitorial tribunals were closed. Therefore, we can claim that our assumption about censorship enforcement is valid until the first half of the XVIII century.

We will provide several robustness checks regarding the Church’s ability to enforce censorship over time and space. The sensitivity checks results, summarized in Table 4, indicate that our assumptions are not crucial for our baseline results.

4 Quantitative Results

4.1 Identification Strategy

In this section, we estimate the parameters of the model of knowledge diffusion under the optimizing Church’s behavior described in Section 3, using the data and stylized facts described in Section 2. We follow a three-step estimation strategy. The first step is to set one parameter following the literature. The second step is to estimate six parameters using a minimum distance estimation procedure, under the assumption that censorship kicks in mid 16th century as in the data. The last step is to set one last parameter such that it rationalizes the timing of the introduction of censorship.

Before going into the estimation details, we specify the relationship between model periods and their empirical counterpart. We consider 5 model periods that correspond to 1400-1470, 1470-1540, 1540-1610, 1610-1680, and 1680-1750. We made this choice following four criteria. First, we want each period to correspond to an equal number of years. Second, we want to stop in 1750 because the Church might have lost the capacity to censor after this date. Third, we want a year close to 1544 (first edition of the Index) to be the threshold between two consecutive model periods. In this way, we can claim that censorship started in the second of these two periods. Finally, we don’t want each period to be too short. If this was the case, the number of authors per period would be small, causing the moments’ standard errors to be large.

Preset Parameter. We set the discount factor δ to 0.06, which corresponds to a quarterly discount factor of 0.99: $0.06 \approx 0.99^{280}$. This parameter’s role is minimal: conditionally on censorship starting on $t = 3$ (which depends on the fixed cost of censorship ψ), it does not affect dynamics.

Minimum Distance Estimation. We estimate the array of six parameters

$$\vartheta = [k_1^C, k_1^R, \theta, \bar{\beta}, (1 + \nu)\mu, p]$$

using a minimum distance estimation procedure.²⁰ The parameters are identified by minimizing the distance between 14 empirical and theoretical moments, implying thus 8 (=14-6) overidentifying restrictions. These moments are the median and the 75th percentile of the distribution of quality of all authors and the share of censored ideas.²¹ We consider these variables for each period $t = \{2, ..5\}$, and we also included the overall knowledge quality in $t = 1$.²² The above estimation problem belongs to the family of the Simulated Method of Moments (McFadden 1989), a structural estimation technique to be applied when the theoretical moments obtain from simulating the model.

The identification comes from the initial share of censored authors, initial authors' quality (which identifies parameters k_1^C, k_1^R), and their dynamics. Specifically, $(1 + \nu)\mu$ is identified by the growth rate of overall quality. Parameter $\bar{\beta}$ is intuitively identified by the share of censored authors. Parameter p is identified by the dynamics of the shared of censored authors and scholars' quality. Parameter θ governs the shape of the Frechet distribution of knowledge quality and is identified by the 75th percentile of the quality distribution.

The objective function $\Omega(\vartheta)$ to minimize is given by

$$\Omega(\vartheta) = (\mathbf{m} - \mathbf{m}_\vartheta)' \mathbf{W} (\mathbf{m} - \mathbf{m}_\vartheta), \quad (12)$$

where ϑ is a vector of parameters, \mathbf{m} is the vector of data moments, and \mathbf{m}_ϑ is the vector of moments obtained simulating the model with parameters ϑ . \mathbf{W} is a diagonal matrix with $1/\mathbf{m}^2$ as elements. The objective function is minimized using the genetic algorithm package in R developed by Scrucca et al. (2013), which allows for global optimization. We computed bootstrapped standard errors of the parameters by drawing 500 random samples with replacement from the original data. For each bootstrap sample, we computed the 14 moments and estimate the corresponding parameters. We then use these boot-strapped estimates to compute the standard errors. The model's simulation is straightforward since there is no uncertainty, and the parameters define both the initial conditions and govern model dynamics. Note that we run simulations assuming that censorship starts in $t = 3$. The timing of censorship depends

²⁰These are actually 7 parameters, but we cannot distinctly identify the number books read by authors, μ , and the parameter governing the relative productivity of new ideas, ν . They both matter only for growth in quality, which is governed by $(1 + \nu)\mu$.

²¹We target the median instead of the mean because it is less sensitive to outliers.

²²We do not consider the share of censored authors in $t = 1$ as in the model censorship in t affects books written in $t - 1$, and censorship starts in $t = 3$.

on the fixed cost of censorship ψ , whose estimation is discussed below.

Parameter set a posteriori. We are left with parameter ψ , namely the fixed cost to set up the censorship apparatus. We set it to rationalize that censorship starts in $t = 3$, given the value of all the other parameters. This parameter is *set identified*: there is a range of values that can rationalize the timing of censorship. The bounds of ψ , namely ψ_L and ψ_R , are set as follows. The lower bound ψ_L is the limit value of ψ for which starting censorship in $t = 3$ gives a larger utility for the Church than starting it in $t = 2$. The higher bound ψ_R is the limit value of ψ for which starting censorship in $t = 3$ gives a larger utility for the Church than waiting and starting it in $t = 4$.²³ Note that we set ψ assuming a linear time utility function $u(1 - m)$. If we chose a different shape that respects the assumptions about $u()$, the value of ψ would have changed, but the timing of censorship and the dynamics would have stayed the same. Note that in Table 3 we report a scaled value of the fixed cost, defined as $\hat{\psi} = \psi/[V^C(1/(2 - \bar{\beta})) - V^N(1/(2 - \bar{\beta}))]$.

4.2 Estimation Results

We list the identified parameters and their standard errors in table 3. The estimation delivers $k_1^R > k_1^C$: this implies that the quality of censored authors is larger than non-censored authors, which is consistent with data even if the relative quality by sector is not among the targeted moments. The productivity of books θ equals 0.36: this is slightly lower than the value (0.5) used by Lucas (2009). Our estimate is lower because the dispersion in log publications is lower than the one in earnings observed in modern U.S. data, which is the target of Lucas (2009).²⁴ The relative price of revolutionary books p equals 0.49. This assures that the initial share of revolutionary authors is not too large, even if they have a much larger quality than compliant scholars. For example, if p was equal to 1, the share of revolutionary authors would converge to 1 very fast: as a result, the share of censored authors would converge to $\bar{\beta}$ and stay constant, unlike in the data. The combinations of parameters $(1 + \nu)\mu$ assure that knowledge quality would have kept growing if censorship was never introduced. The most interesting parameter is the rate of censorship $\bar{\beta}$ that the Church imposes, which equals 18%.

The model fit is reported in Figure 5, panels a and b. The simulated variables rarely lie outside the 95% confidence interval of the data moments.²⁵ An exception is the 75th percentile of the overall knowledge quality. This reflects that the underlying empirical distribution does not follow exactly a Fréchet distribution like in the model.

²³Starting censorship in previous periods (2,1,0,-1..) would have given the Church a lower utility than waiting for $t = 3$.

²⁴The gini index of log publications is 0.34.

²⁵The confidence intervals are computed drawing 500 random samples with replacement and then using the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile from the distribution of the variable of interest.

Table 3: Identification of Parameters


Calibrated Parameters		Value	Standard Errors	Target
Discount Factor	δ	0.06	-	RBC literature
Fixed Cost of Censorship	$\hat{\psi}$	(1.029 - 1.031)	-	Index set-up
Estimated Parameters		Value	Standard Errors	Target
Compl. knowledge $t = 1$	k_1^C	13.7	0.93	$\Omega(\vartheta)$
Rev. knowledge in $t = 1$	k_1^R	106.7	9.46	$\Omega(\vartheta)$
Productivity of books	θ	0.36	0.016	$\Omega(\vartheta)$
Max Censorship	$\bar{\beta}$	0.18	0.018	$\Omega(\vartheta)$
Knowledge Growth	$(1 + \nu)\mu$	2	0.07	$\Omega(\vartheta)$
Price of rev. books	p	0.49	0.017	$\Omega(\vartheta)$

As a test of the theory, we compare our results to empirical observations that were not used to identify the parameters. Looking at the dynamics of censored and non-censored authors (Figure 5, panels c and d) is particularly interesting as it allows us to test whether printers choose their sector according to its (relative) quality. This mechanism is summarized by Equation 10: the share of revolutionary authors can assume one and only one variable given the ratio of the quality in the two sectors. This ratio can be proxied by the ratio of censored to non-censored authors' quality, which we can measure in the data. Since the model fit well the dynamics of censored and non-censored authors, we can ~~claim~~ that Equation 10 is likely to hold in the data too. The model also predicts that the share of revolutionary ideas was increasing before $t = 3$. This is consistent with the fact that the share of censored books was larger in the period 1470-1540 than 1400-1470. Moreover, the average difference in quality between censored and non-censored authors decreases over time. It is 3.83 in 1470-1540, and it drops to 1.57 in 1680-1750.

4.3 The Role of Censorship for Knowledge Formation


What is the role of the Catholic Church for the demise in knowledge production in early modern Italy? How much of this effect is driven by selection into the revolutionary/compliant sectors? In this section we answer these questions by comparing model simulations with and without censorship. This is done by using the parameters identified in Section 4, with the exception of the rate of censorship $\bar{\beta}$, which is set to 0 in the no-censorship scenario. Figure 6 illustrates the outcomes of the experiments.

Without censorship, the share of revolutionary authors m_t would have kept increasing. It would have reached 55% in $t = 5$, instead of decreasing to 25% in $t = 5$. This fact demonstrates the effectiveness of censorship, which can change the dynamics of revolutionary ideas drastically.



NOTES. periods: 1:1400-70, 2:1470-1540, 3:1540-1610, 4:1610-80, 5:1680-1750.

Figure 5: Model fit (panels a,b), over-identification checks (panels c,d).
 Data (solid) and simulations (dashed).



NOTES. periods: 1:1400-70, 2:1470-1540, 3:1540-1610, 4:1610-80, 5:1680-1750.

Figure 6: Baseline simulations (solid), simulations without censorship (dashed)

Moreover, censorship has the unintended effect of reducing the overall quality of scholars, which would have been 28% lower under the baseline than in the $\bar{\beta} = 0$ scenario.

Becker, J. Pino, and Vidal-Robert (2021) analyze the effect of censorship on knowledge growth by establishing an empirical correlation between the number of famous people born in, or migrating into, a city and the number of indexed books printed in that city. Here we look at another, complementary, dimension by considering the actual publications of the scholars. Our structural approach also allows to quantify the effects, and to propose an interpretation of these effects, through the lens of our theory. Of course, in doing so, we impose more restrictions on the data than the reduced form approach of Becker, J. Pino, and Vidal-Robert (2021) does.

The loss in the overall quality is both driven by a reduction of the stock of knowledge *within each sector* and by self-selection *across sectors*. This results come from the following decomposition, where all the variables with a hat relate to the experiment where $\bar{\beta} = 0$:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \underbrace{q_5 - \hat{q}_5}_{=-1.62 \text{ (100\%)}} &= \underbrace{\hat{m}_5[q_5^R - \hat{q}_5^R] + (1 - \hat{m}_5)[q_5^C - \hat{q}_5^C]}_{=-1.39 \text{ (69\%); (a)}} + \\
 &\quad \underbrace{[m_5 - \hat{m}_5]\hat{q}_5^R + [(1 - m_5) - (1 - \hat{m}_5)]\hat{q}_5^C}_{=-1.12 \text{ (85\%); (b)}} \\
 &\quad + \underbrace{(m_5 - \hat{m}_5)[(q_5^R - q_5^C) - (\hat{q}_5^R - \hat{q}_5^C)]}_{=0.88 \text{ (-54\%); (c)}}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{13}$$

The effect of censorship due to changes in quality within sectors is captured by (a) in Equation

13 and accounts for 69% of the overall drop. The self-selection effect (*b*) accounts for 85% of the overall drop. This shows that censorship is important as it pushes printers to select compliant knowledge, which has a lower quality. Finally, (*c*) captures the interaction between effects (*a*) and (*b*) and accounts for -54% of the total effect.

To sum up, the effect of censorship on knowledge accumulation is not entirely due to the ~~decrease~~ in quality within sectors. The drop in the revolutionary sector is partially compensated by the increased quality within the compliant sector. Half of the effect of censorship on knowledge growth is due to its ability to make compliant ideas relatively more available. Not only compliant ideas ~~have a~~ lower quality than revolutionary ones, but they would have displayed no growth in quality if there was no censorship.

4.4 Robustness

We now consider the robustness of the simulation results to using alternative samples and/or different theoretical assumptions. The results are reported in Table 4.

Only Italian born scholars. Some scholars might have spent only a period of their time in Italy. Living outside Italy could have allowed them to access forbidden books without consequences. To limit this problem, we estimate the model using a sample of Italian born scholars only. Table 4 shows that ~~this sensitivity check's results~~ differ only slightly with respect to baseline results.

Only Southern/Northern Italian born scholars. The model used for the baseline estimation assumes that the rate of censorship that the Church can enforce does not depend on scholars' location in Italy. This assumption is problematic if the actual rate of censorship differed drastically across Italian regions. To understand whether this is the case, we estimate the model separately for Italian scholars born in northern and southern Italy. A scholar is defined as northern Italian if he is born in a city whose latitude is larger than 43.8, which corresponds to cities ~~northern than~~ Florence. The results reported in ~~table 4~~ indicate that the effect of censorship on knowledge growth is very similar for northern and southern Italian scholars. The effect is slightly stronger for southern Italians because the rate of censorship there is slightly ~~larger~~. This result is consistent with the ~~stronger capacity that the Church had~~ in the Papal state.

Only $t \leq 4$. In the baseline model, we assume that the Church could enforce censorship until 1750, the end of period $t = 5$. In this sensitivity check, we re-estimate the model assuming that the Church can enforce censorship until the end of $t = 4$ only, or 1680. In the last period $t = 5$, the Church keeps censoring authors, but anyone can read revolutionary books. The Church's

ability to enforce censorship likely decreased over time. It is also likely that ~~her~~ ability to censor did not disappear completely. Hence, we think that this robustness provides a lower bound to the effect of censorship on knowledge growth. Despite the conservative assumption, the results in Table 4 show that the effect of censorship is still large, even though slightly lower than in the baseline case. This is because once the decline of revolutionary ideas started, its decline ~~becomes~~ unstoppable because of inertia.

No weak links. In our baseline sample, we included scholars who have a weak link to a university or academy. These include foreign and corresponding members ~~to~~ academies. One example is Leonhard Euler at Accademia Ricovrati. While all ~~these~~ scholars decided to do some work with the institution, they might not have been there physically. Scholars with weak links might be less constrained by the Church’s censorship; ~~for example~~, because they lived elsewhere in Europe. Hence, we propose a sensitivity check where we exclude them from the sample and then re-estimate the model. Table 4 reports the results, ~~that~~ differ only slightly from the baseline estimation. One reason why excluding weak links ~~have~~ a ~~low~~ effect on the results is that they represent less than 2% of the original sample.

All publications. In the baseline sample, we measure the author’s quality by the number of publications written *by* them. It is possible to argue that quality is better measured if ~~also~~ publications *about* the author are ~~included~~. These capture the impact that these authors had on future generations. Table 4 reports the results where quality is measured by considering ~~both~~ publication *by* and *about* the author. The role of knowledge accumulation is very similar to the baseline, which indicates that results are robust to different quality measures.

~~Length~~ **Wikipedia pages.** One problem with our measure of authors’ quality is that it may be biased because older works have more editions. To limit this problem, we consider a different measure of author’s quality, based on the number of characters of the author’s longest Wikipedia page. Table 4 shows that our results are robust to this different measure of quality. Note that for building this measure of authors’ quality we followed De la Croix et al. (2020) by assuming that having no Wikipedia page is similar to having one page with a length of 60 characters.

Imperfect censorship. In the model, we assumed that ~~none~~ could access the knowledge embodied in forbidden books. As historians (Grendler 1975) documented the smuggling of forbidden books, this assumption is not always met. This sensibility check consists in ~~in~~ assuming that the Church was able to enforce censorship only in $\chi\%$ of total cases. Hence, even if $m_t\bar{\beta}$ authors have been censored, only $m_t\bar{\beta}\chi$ are not available to the next generation. One important question is how to set the value of χ . Our strategy is the following: we set χ the lowest possible, under the constraint that, after the re-estimation of the model given χ , it exists one value of

ψ rationalizing the timing of censorship (introduced in $t = 3$).²⁶ In this way, we give the best shot to this sensibility check to undermine the baseline results. We find $\chi = 0.91$. When χ is too small, the model's estimation implies that the share of revolutionary ideas would be declining already in $t = 1$.²⁷ When this happens, censorship is set immediately, and the timing of censorship cannot be rationalized. Also, low levels of χ implying $m_1 < m_2$ are at odds with the fact that the share of revolutionary authors is larger in 1470-1540 than in 1400-1470. The results reported in table 4 indicate that imperfect censorship has only a minor effect on the baseline results. In particular, the impact of censorship on knowledge growth stays large and negative.

Model with self-censorship. History tells us that book's censorship was not the only way the Church used to limit the spread of revolutionary books. In fact, in the second half of the 16th century, the Roman Church developed a system of tribunals, called *Roman Inquisition*, aimed at persecuting both authors and printers accused of heresy. This institution affected the work of scientists and thinkers. One notable example is the process of Galileo Galilei, who was tried by the Inquisition in 1633. The Inquisition matters for our analysis because it can slow down the accumulation of revolutionary knowledge through self-censorship: even if one author writes a high-quality revolutionary book, she still might prefer not to hand it in to the printer for fear of being processed by the Inquisition. Others might have migrated elsewhere in Europe, where the Church could not reach them.²⁸ Similarly, even if the best books are revolutionary, printers might still prefer to be compliant for the same reason. This mechanism can be easily incorporated in our framework, assuming that the Inquisition makes publishing and writing revolutionary books less desirable. Individuals take this into account discounting q^R by a factor $\gamma \in [0, 1]$. We can also interpret γ as the probability that authors decide not to write revolutionary books or that printers do not publish them for fear of receiving punishment. Under this new mechanism, the probability that a printer chooses the revolutionary sector is:

$$\text{Prob}\{q^C < \gamma p q^R\} = \text{Prob}\{\tilde{h}^C > (\gamma p)^{-1/\theta} \tilde{h}^R\} = m_t. \quad (14)$$

We re-estimate the model enriched by this feature. Parameter γ is mostly identified by $\bar{\beta}m_2$, which is too low in the simulations when the baseline model is used. Parameter γ helps to make the demise of revolutionary ideas faster, thus allowing for an initial larger level of revolutionary ideas. The estimation implies that $\gamma=0.95$ and $\bar{\beta}=0.16$, which is very close to the baseline.

²⁶The procedure to set ψ is the one described in section 4. In particular, the timing of Censorship by the Church can be identified if $\psi_L \neq \psi_R$.

²⁷When censorship is not effective, the decrease in quality can be matched only when this happens naturally, without any intervention by the Church.

²⁸De la Croix et al. (2020) show that an European academic market existed in early modern times.

Then, we assess the role of direct censorship by comparing simulations with the estimated $\bar{\beta}$ and setting $\bar{\beta} = 0$, where γ is always set to its estimated value. If the baseline model was misspecified, the version with self censorship should give a different effect of direct censorship on knowledge growth. This is not the case: Table 4 shows that the results differ only slightly from the baseline. To understand the joint role of direct and self censorship, we perform a counterfactual simulations where $\bar{\beta} = 0$ and $\gamma = 1$. The joint effect reduces knowledge quality by 41%. Since the effect of direct censorship was 28%, this means that also self-censorship has an effect on knowledge quality, even if including it in the model do not alter the baseline results about the effects of direct censorship.

Universities only In the baseline estimation we consider both University professors and members of academies. In Appendix A.2 we show that while the coverage of University professor is very good, we probably miss many member of academies. Hence, we provide a robustness check where we exclude those scholars who were not professors. Table 4 shows that the result of the baseline and this alternative estimation are very similar: censorship reduced log publications by 26% in the first case and 24% in the second case.

<i>Symbol</i>	Impact of censorship on:		Rate of censorship $\bar{\beta}$	% heretic scholars m_5
	scholars' quality $(q_5 - \hat{q}_5)/\hat{q}_5$	% heretic scholars $(m_5 - \hat{m}_5)/\hat{m}_5$		
Benchmark	-28%	-56%	18%	26%
Only Italian born scholars	-29%	-54%	17%	27%
Only southern Italian scholars	-34%	-53%	19%	32%
Only northern Italian scholars	-23%	-50%	15%	26%
Only $t \leq 4$	-16%	-60%	19%	17%
No weak links to institution	-28%	-54%	17%	26%
All Publications	-29%	-56%	18%	25%
Length wikipedia page	-34%	-56%	18%	25%
Imperfect censorship	-24%	-56%	18%	23%
Self censorship	-26%	-51%	16%	27%
Universities only	-28%	-56%	18%	26%

Notes: variables denoted by the hat relate to simulations under a no-censorship scenario, while all the other variables relate to simulations with censorship. Subscript 5 correspond to the period 1680 - 1750.

Table 4: Sensibility checks

5 Conclusion

Censorship has a direct effect on knowledge accumulation by making censored material less available to scholars. It also discourages writers from engaging in non-compliant work, and

hence modifies the allocation of talents across different types of activities. In this paper, we developed a new method that considers these two channels. Then, we applied it to the Catholic Church’s censorship from the Counter-Reformation until the ~~age of~~ Enlightenment. We investigated whether censorship was responsible for the demise of Italian science and evaluated the relative importance of the direct channel vs. the activity choice channel.

~~The~~ analysis ~~proceeded in~~ three steps. First, we collected data on members of universities and academies, identifying the scholars whose books were either **free** to be printed and sold, or put in the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, i.e. censored. Second, we built a theoretical model of knowledge accumulation through book production and censorship, distinguishing non-compliant knowledge (susceptible ~~of~~ being censored) from compliant knowledge. Third, we estimated the structural parameters of the model using facts collected from the dataset. We used the quantitative model to answer our questions by simulating a counterfactual path of knowledge dynamics characterized by the absence of censorship.

We concluded that censorship reduced by 28% the average log publication per scholar in Italy from 1470-1550 to 1680-1750. Renaissance Italy has been regarded as the cradle of culture and science. Yet, Italy found itself in a scientific backwater during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, being overtaken by non-Catholic countries such as Great Britain and ~~The~~ Netherlands. The sizeable effect that we estimated ~~allows claiming~~ that Church’s censorship ~~is~~ one of the main drivers of Italy’s decline.

Half of this drop stems from the induced reallocation of talents towards compliant activities, while the other half arises from the direct effect of censorship on book availability. This result stresses the importance of selection effects when analyzing the impact of censorship on output. The top scholars at the time of the Counter-Reformation were all censored (Bruno, Galilei, Copernicus), and their successors might have decided to become mediocre poets or theologians rather than dangerous mathematicians.

Finally, one may wonder whether the Church’s censorship also had a role in the *economic* decline of Italy. This ~~possibility does not seem~~ implausible, given that recent research highlighted the role of upper-tail human capital production for pre-industrial Europe’s take-off (Squicciarini and Voigtländer 2015; Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014; Mokyr 2011; Mokyr 2016). Our analysis sets the stage for future research on this topic by directly linking the Church’s censorship to upper-tail human capital production.

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A Additional Data

A.1 How representative are university professors and academicians?

The paper is based on publications by university professors and members of academies. One may wonder how representative are those publications of the total production of knowledge in early modern times. To answer that question, one needs to define a new universe of persons from which we can extract the sample of university professors and compute their share. Looking at scientific domains, let us consider the scientists who have given their name to a crater on the moon. Those names were given by the Commission on Lunar Nomenclature of the International Astronomical Union from 1935 onward (Richardson 1945). Among these persons there are 54 Italians born before 1770. Figure 7 represents their occupation breakdown. A large majority of them were either university professor or member of an academy or both. This comforts the idea that our sample of scholars is a good representation of people working in sciences.




Figure 7: Occupations of Italians having given their name to a crater on the moon

A.2 How much of the Italian University/Academy population is covered?

Another question is how much of the Italian University/Academy population is covered. For universities, we can provide a precise answer. We believe we have a comprehensive coverage for the following universities: Ubologna-1088, Umacerata-1540, Umodena-1175, Upadua-1222, Upavia-1361, Upisa-1343, UromaGregoriana-1556. Thanks to very detailed secondary sources, we almost have all professors having taught there.

We have a broad coverage for the following universities StudFlorence-1321, Ucagliari-1606, Ucatania-1444, Umantua-1625, Umessina-1548, Unapoli-1224, Upalermo-1578, Uperugia-1308, Uroma-1303, Usalerno-1231, Usassari-1617. Thanks to detailed secondary sources, we have a large number of the professors having taught there, and we probably have all those who published something, which is the relevant dimension for this paper.

For the following list, we have only a partial coverage. Many of those universities are quite small, or specialized, or detached from bigger universities (Milano & Venice). We will be able to complete Ferrara and Parma soon. Ualtamura-1748, Uancona-1562, Ucamerino-1727, Ufermo-1585, Uferrara-1391, Ugenoa-1773, Ulucca-1369, Umilano-1556, Umondovi-1560, Uparma-1412, Upau-1722, Usiena-1246, Utorino-1404, Uurbino-1671, Uvenice-1470, Uvicenza-1204.

For academies, assessing our coverage is more complicated, as the number of academies is potentially very large. Each city had one or more small academies, sometimes very temporarily, gathering the curious minds of the moment. As we explained in the text, our more important source comes from the data compiled by the British library based on all the books in their possession related in one way or in another to an Italian academy. To this list, we added important academies for which there is a complete coverage based on a biographical dictionary of their members: the Crusca, the Ricovrati, and the Gelati.

A.3 How is the distribution of the scholars' fields changing over time?

Europe overtook Italy in terms of scholars quality. In principle, this could be driven by the mere fact that a field with low average publications became relatively more common in Italy than in Europe. To answer this question, in table 5 we show the dynamics of scholars quality in Italy and Europe by field.²⁹ We observe that Europe overtakes Italy in each field at the time

²⁹In case the scholar is associated with more than one field, we expand the observation according to the number of her/his fields. Details about each discipline can be found below Table 5.

censorship was introduced. Moreover, the share of publications in science and medicine rises much faster in Europe than in Italy. This analysis is consistent with the effect of censorship in the model, according to which the Index *i*) decreases quality within sectors/fields; *ii*) affect the occupational choice of scholars.

Period	Distribution (%) of the scholars' fields for each period					Average publications per person				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Italy										
Theology	7	7	9	8	11	329	254	406	187	215
Law	41	27	20	14	16	206	220	167	114	70
Humanities	27	40	44	47	35	641	608	452	293	207
Medicine	13	13	14	11	11	119	360	248	143	135
Sciences	11	10	8	13	16	72	456	724	238	88
Others	1	3	5	8	11	6	3539*	79	40	180
Europe (excluding Italy)										
Theology	34	26	26	27	22	173	595	945	350	278
Law	25	18	19	16	13	173	123	252	261	379
Humanities	30	41	35	33	32	313	346	470	442	496
Medicine	6	8	12	11	14	62	196	322	208	291
Sciences	3	5	8	11	14	62	254	417	313	384
Others	2	1	1	2	6	22	48	1012	364	736

Note: periods: 1:1400-70, 2:1470-1540, 3:1540-1610, 4:1610-80, 5:1680-1750.

*: Number driven by Niccoló Machiavelli

Table 5: Distribution & publications by period and field

- **Theology:** Theology, scriptures
- **Law:** Canonic law, Roman law, French law, *juriconsulte*
- **Humanities:** History, Literature, Philosophy, Ethics, Rethoric, Greek, Poetry
- **Medicine:** Medicine, Anatomy, Surgery, Veterinary, Pharmacy, Botany
- **Sciences:** Mathematics, Logic, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, Astronomy, Earth Science, Geography
- **Others:** Applied Sciences (Engineering, Architecture, Agronomy), Social Sciences (Economics, Political Science)

A.4 Additional Figures and Tables




Figure 8: Distribution of the fields of scholars. Red: censored. Green: non-censored.

Period	Number of published scholars					Average publications per person				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Europe	107	270	599	577	698	536	936	1048	736	915
France	15	27	116	124	169	946	599	894	947	1231
Germany & Austria	12	67	110	37	152	602	913	1933	965	862
Great Britain & Ireland	5	17	43	89	184	14	1845	616	960	1055
Denmark & Sweden		2	9	16	31		1084	553	495	829
Spain & Portugal	6	25	58	25	11	755	371	454	514	571
Italy	60	105	174	215	85	485	875	773	462	510
Ubologna-1088	4	16	13	14	5	139	360	546	140	150
Unapoli-1224	1	5	2	1	2	1840	116	105	96	2142
Upadua-1222	9	16	24	9	10	140	683	622	716	141
Upavia-1361	6	10	6			410	520	701		
Uroma-1303	17	16	13	9	4	888	1032	1535	428	234
Upisa-1343		6	6	11	4		232	313	285	152
UromaGregoriana-1556			7	6				1211	557	
Umacerata-1540			1		1			34		218
AcadRicoverti-1599			2	15	25			171	518	706
AcadCrusca-1583			4	23	10			397	331	1052
AcadGelati-1588			1	11	3			887	328	150

Note: periods: 1:1400-70, 2:1470-1540, 3:1540-1610, 4:1610-80, 5:1680-1750

Note: Famous scholars: scholars having a Wikipedia page longer than 5000 characters

Table 6: Total number of famous scholars & publications by period

B Bibliographies

John Barclay (Pont-à-Mousson 1582 - Roma 1621, censored in 1608) was born from a Scottish-born father. In 1605 John Barclay presented the first part of his *Euphormionis Lusinini Satyricon*. This humanist novel is a very original piece of work (Correard 2017), including a satirical description of the Jesuit schools (~~in which~~ he was raised). This book was put on the Index on 13 December 1608 (De Bujanda and Richter 2002). Upon invitation by the Pope himself, he went to Rome in 1616 and resided there until he died in 1621. Moving to Rome was a way to testify that he was a good Catholic. John Barclay was a member of several Italian academies, including the Accademia degli Umoristi and the Accademia dei Lincei.

Giordano Bruno (Nola 1548 - Roma 1600, censored in 1600) was an Italian friar, member of the Dominicans. His contributions span from philosophy to mathematics and cosmology. He is best known for being persecuted by the Catholic Church and was later regarded as a martyr for science. The Inquisition found him guilty of heresy for several of his views, among which his positions on cosmology: he theorized an infinite universe and a plurality of worlds. All his works entered the Index of forbidden books, and he was burned at stake in Rome's square Campo de' Fiori.

Bernardino Ciaffoni (Porto Sant'Elpidio 1615/1620 - Marches 1684, censored in 1701) was a theologian and belonged to the order of the Franciscans. He also used to be a rector of the well-known college San Bonaventura, located in Rome. His *Apologia*, published posthumously, defends the rigorist doctrine and fights the probabilism, supported by Jesuits. This piece of work was introduced in the Index because of its insulting claims against Jesuits.

Nicolaus Copernicus (Thorn 1474 - Frauenburg 1543, censored in 1616) was a Prussian mathematician and astronomer. In his book *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium*, he theorized the cosmos as having the Sun at the center of the solar system, where the Earth rotated around it. This theory is in deep contrast with the Ptolemaic model, where the Earth is stationary at the center of the universe. Several other scientists, among which Galilei, contributed to his theory by bringing evidence in its support. While his theories were welcomed positively by the Church at first, his *De revolutionibus* was censored in 1616, after that the Church's conservative revolution.

Achille Gagliardi (Padova 1537 – Modena 1607, censored in 1703) was a Jesuit theologian and spiritual writer. He taught philosophy at the Roman College, then theology in Padua and Milan. He was a collaborator of the Archbishop of Milan Carlo Borromeo, who requested him to write a handbook of religion, the popular *Catechismo della fede cattolica*. His *Breve compendio* was censored because of his thoughts about the annihilation of the will during mystical states.

These ideas are not compatible with free will, which is a cornerstone of catholic theology.

Galileo Galilei (Pisa 1564 - Arcetri 1642, censored in 1634) was an Italian astronomer and physicist. Also Professor in Padova and member of the prestigious Accademia dei Lincei, arguably he was the most notable and influential scientist of his times. He is also known as the father of modern science because of his work on the scientific method. His books were censored because of ~~its support to~~ atomism, heliocentrism, and Copernicanism. The Inquisition condemned him, and he was forced to abjure his thesis and spent the last part of his life under house arrest.

Serry Jacobus Hyacinthus (Toulon 1659 – Padua 1738, censored in 1722) was a theologian and belonged to the order of the Dominicans. Also consultor of the Congregation of the Index, he taught theology at the university of Padua from 1698. His *Historiae*, written under the pseudonym Augustinus Leblanc, deals with the Jesuit-Dominican controversy on grace and was prohibited by the Inquisition.

C Proofs of Propositions

C.1 The Fréchet Cheat Sheet

Since the irrelevance of books of type j is exponentially distributed with scale parameter k_t^j and given Equation (1), the distribution of book quality follows a Fréchet distribution with scale parameter $k^{j\theta}$ and shape parameter $1/\theta$. This allows us to write the average book quality q^j by sector as:

$$E(q_i^j) = \int_0^\infty h_i^{-\theta} (k^j e^{-k^j h_i}) dh_i \quad \text{with } j \in \{C, R\} \text{ and } i \in \{1, \dots, N\},$$

Now we can multiply the RHS by $(k^j)^{1+\theta}/(k^j)^{1+\theta}$ to obtain:

$$E(q_i^j) = (k^j)^{1+\theta} \int_0^\infty (k^j h_i)^{-\theta} (e^{-k^j h_i}) dh_i.$$

Now, using a change of variable $y = k^j h_i$ we have that

$$E(q_i^j) = (k^j)^{1+\theta} \int_0^\infty (y)^{-\theta} (e^{-y}) (1/k^j) dy.$$

We can finally show that

$$E(q_i^j) = (k^j)^\theta \Gamma(1 - \theta) \quad \text{with } j \in \{C, R\} \text{ and } i \in \{1, \dots, N\},$$

where $\Gamma(x) = \int_0^\infty s^{x-1} e^{-s} ds$ is the Euler gamma function.

C.2 Proof of Proposition 1

Using the variable z_t , Equation (11) can be rewritten as

$$z_{t+1} = \frac{1 - \beta}{\hat{p}} (z_t)^2.$$

This recurrence Equation admits an explicit solution:

$$z_t = \frac{\hat{p}}{1 - \beta} \left(\frac{z_0(1 - \beta)}{\hat{p}} \right)^{2^t}. \quad (15)$$

Equation (10) implies that once we know the dynamics of z_t , we also know the dynamics of m_t . Given this change of variable, we use Equation (15) to study the limit of z_t and obtain

- a) $z_0 < \hat{p}/(1 - \beta) \Rightarrow \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} z_t = 0$. Note also that $m_0 < 1/(2 - \beta) \Leftrightarrow z_0 < \hat{p}/(1 - \beta)$.
- b) $z_0 > \hat{p}/(1 - \beta) \Rightarrow \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} m_t = 1$. Note also that $m_0 < 1/(2 - \beta) \Leftrightarrow z_0 < \hat{p}/(1 - \beta)$.
- c) $z_0 = \hat{p}/(1 - \beta) \Rightarrow z_t = \hat{p}/(1 - \beta) \forall t$. Note $m_t = 1/(2 - \beta) \forall t \Leftrightarrow z_t = \hat{p}/(1 - \beta) \forall t$

From a) and Equation 10, i) follows. From b) and Equation 10, ii) follows. From c) and Equation 10, iii) follows.

Note that we excluded $m_0 = 1$ from the proposition. In that case, no compliant books are left in the economy and imposing $\beta = 1$ would shut down the whole production of knowledge.

C.3 The Dynamics under a Rule of Thumb Church's Behavior

In Section 3.4 we described the dynamics under a constant rate of censorship β_t . Here we endogenize the introduction of censorship by assuming that the Church chooses the lowest censorship rate that allows to converge to a world with no revolutionary ideas. This is equivalent to assume that the Church has lexicographic preferences, caring firstly to have $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} m_t = 0$, and secondly to minimize β_t . Given our assumptions, we can describe the dynamics of the share of revolutionary ideas in Proposition 4.

Proposition 4 *For a given share of revolutionary ideas $m_t \in [0, 1)$, the Church will choose a level of censorship β_t such that $\beta_t = \max\{2 - 1/m_t + \epsilon, 0\}$, where ϵ is arbitrarily small.*

Proof. Notice that Proposition 1 states that $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} m_t = 0$ when $m_t < 1/(2 - \beta_t)$, from which it trivially follows that $\beta_t = \max\{2 - 1/m_t + \epsilon, 0\}$. ■

Note that for any initial $m_0 \in [0, 1)$, we will have $\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} m_t = 0$, but the convergence will be slow due to the fact that in any period m_t would be set very close to the unstable steady state $1/(2 - \beta_t)$. It is worth noting that Proposition 4 implies that the Church will impose no censorship if $m_t < 1/2$.

C.4 Proof of Proposition 2

Note that imposing censorship when $m = 0$ is not convenient:

$$\frac{u(0)}{1 - \delta} = V^N(0) > V^C(0) - \psi = \frac{u(0)}{1 - \delta} - \psi.$$

Note also that imposing censorship when $m = 1$ is not convenient.

$$\frac{u(1)}{1 - \delta} = V^N(1) > V^C(1) - \psi = \frac{u(1)}{1 - \delta} - \psi.$$

Note also that $V^M(m)$ and $V^C(m)$ are continuous functions in $m \in [0, 1]$: see Norets (2010) for a formal proof of continuity of discrete choice dynamic value functions under a set of [assumption](#) that are satisfied in our case.

Then, it follows that there exists \tilde{m} and \check{m} , respectively in a neighborhood of 0 and 1, such that for each $m \in [0, \tilde{m}]$ and also for each $m \in [\check{m}, 1]$, $V^N(m) > V^C(m) - \psi$ holds. According to proposition 1, if censorship is not imposed, \tilde{m} converges to 0, while \check{m} will converge to 1. Since censorship [do](#) not happen [for](#) each $m \in [0, \tilde{m}]$ and for each $m \in [\check{m}, 1]$, proposition 2 is proved.

C.5 Proof of Proposition 3

We take $\bar{\psi}$ such that for some m^* we have $V^C(m^*) - \bar{\psi} > V^N(m^*)$, then for each $\psi < \bar{\psi}$ it holds $V^C(m^*) - \psi > V^N(m^*)$. Now define $\mathcal{D}(m) = V^C(m) - \psi - V^N(m)$: since this function is continuous, for an arbitrarily small ϵ we have that $\mathcal{D}(m^* - \epsilon) > 0$ and $\mathcal{D}(m^* + \epsilon) > 0$. Using again continuity we can claim that $\mathcal{D}(m) > 0$ for each $m \in [m^* - \epsilon, m^* + \epsilon]$, which implies that the Church will immediately impose censorship if m_0 belongs to this set.