

# Catholic Censorship and the Demise of Knowledge Production in Early Modern Italy

Fabio Blasutto<sup>1</sup>

David de la Croix<sup>2</sup>

December 3, 2021

## Abstract

Censorship makes new ideas less available to others, but also reduces the share of people choosing a non-compliant **activity**. We propose a new method to measure the effect of censorship on knowledge growth, accounting for the endogenous selection of agents into compliant vs. non-compliant ideas. We apply our method to the Catholic Church’s censorship of books written by members of Italian universities and academies over the period 1400-1750. We highlight two new facts: once censorship was introduced, censored authors were of better quality than the non-censored authors, but this gap **shrunk** over time, and the intensity of censorship decreased over time. These facts are used to identify the deep parameters of a novel endogenous growth model linking censorship to knowledge diffusion and occupational choice. We conclude that censorship reduced by 40% the average log publication per scholar in Italy, while adverse macroeconomic processes are responsible for another 11%. Interestingly, the induced reallocation of talents towards compliant activities explains half the effect of censorship.

JEL Classification Numbers: J24, N33, O33, O43.

Keywords: Censorship, Upper-Tail Human Capital, Publications, Scholars, Early Modern Italy, Occupational Choice

---

<sup>1</sup>Department of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics. Email: fabio.blasutto@hhs.se

<sup>2</sup>IRES/LIDAM, UCLouvain & CEPR. Email: david.delacroix@uclouvain.be.

This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme, under grant agreement No 883033 “Did elite human capital trigger the rise of the West? Insights from a new database of European scholars.” Blasutto acknowledges financial support from the French speaking community of Belgium (*mandat d’aspirant* FC 23613). We thank Matthias Doepke, Fabio Mariani, Joel Mokyr, and Luca Pensieroso for their thoughts on an earlier version of the paper.

# 1 Introduction

Italy’s primacy in knowledge creation was undisputed in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. However North and Western Europe overtook Italy in the following two centuries, a period in which scholars and the knowledge they produced are believed to have played an essential role in the rise of the West (Mokyr 2016). The first explanation proposed for such a reversal of fortune is the fight led by the Catholic Church against novel ideas (Landes 1999), such as heliocentrism (Gingerich 1973), infinitesimal calculus (Alexander 2014), and atomism (Beretta 2007).<sup>1</sup> These novel ideas were at the root of the Scientific Revolution in Europe.

We tackle this issue by focusing on the role of one weapon in the Church’s arsenal, namely the power to censor books published by scholars. The list of prohibited books is called the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*. We ask whether this censorship was key in altering the growth path of the generation of new knowledge in the Italian peninsula.

We answer the question with three contributions. First, we construct a large sample of scholars active in Italy from 1400 to 1750 and we document how the intensity of censorship and the (relative) notability of blacklisted authors changed over time. Second, we use this data to identify the deep parameters of a novel model linking censorship to knowledge diffusion and occupational choice. Third, we perform a counterfactual experiment to assess quantitatively the role of censorship in the decline in total publications per scholar in Italy. To measure the impact of censorship we created a new method that explicitly accounts for agents’ endogenous selection into compliant vs. non-compliant ideas.

In the first part of the paper, we build a database of Italian scholars active in the Renaissance academies and universities from 1400 to 1750. For each scholar, we identify whether his (or her) work was subject to censorship by the Church. We also measure the “quality” of each scholar by his (or her) quantity of written output in today’s library catalogs. Using this new database, we document the drop in publications per person over the period 1400-1750. Studying the distribution of the publications per person, we highlight that, in the sixteenth century, the censored authors were of much better quality, on average, than the non-censored authors. Moreover, this difference shrunk over time. The intensity of censorship decreased as well, after it was first introduced in the sixteenth century. This pattern may reflect either a deliberate choice of the best authors to switch from non-compliant to compliant publications, or a change in the Church’s policy, or both.

In the second part of the paper, we design a structural model linking censorship to knowledge

---

<sup>1</sup>Probably Newton would have had issues developing his particle theory of light in a country averse to atomism.

diffusion and productivity growth over the long-run. The model explicitly includes the two mechanisms described in the first part. In the model, knowledge is codified in books and can be of two types: conformist and non-conformist. Following the literature on endogenous growth and knowledge diffusion (Kremer 1993; Jones 2001; Lucas 2009; Lucas and Moll 2014; De la Croix, Doepke, and Mokyr 2018), we assume that authors randomly draw ideas from the stock of knowledge left by the previous generation, retaining the best one. We introduce a novel occupational choice made by printers between printing compliant/conformist books or revolutionary/non-conformist books. Revolutionary books are less likely to be printed if they are of lower quality or rarer than compliant books.<sup>2</sup> We show that, by censoring revolutionary books, the Church can not only reduce the share of people in the revolutionary occupation, but, more importantly, can alter the development path of knowledge drastically. An initial temporary blow to revolutionary ideas can force society to converge towards a compliant steady state. Since setting up a censorship apparatus is costly, if the Church displays patience she has the incentive to delay censorship. This offers a rationale for why the Church waited several decades after the rise of Protestantism before setting up an Index of forbidden books.<sup>3</sup>

In the third and last part of the paper, we use the facts highlighted in the first part to identify the deep parameters of the structural model. The most important parameter, namely the rate of censorship, is intuitively identified by the share of censored authors. The dynamics of the overall quality of authors identify some key technological parameters. The relative productivity in the two sectors is implied by the share of censored authors. Without targeting these moments in particular, the model is to match them well, which gives credence to the model’s mechanisms. The fixed cost necessary to impose censorship is picked to match the timing of the creation of the first Index of forbidden books. Simulations show that imposing a censorship rate of 18% on the non-conformist books was sufficient to decrease the share of non-conformist authors from 51% in 1470-1550 to 26% in 1680-1750. We conclude that censorship reduced by 40% the average log publication per scholar in Italy. Interestingly, half of this drop stems from the induced reallocation of talents towards compliant activities, while the other half arises from the direct effect of censorship on book availability.<sup>4</sup>

The effect of censorship on knowledge growth can be contrasted with the impact of adverse macroeconomic shocks hitting the Italian economy over the same period. To model such shocks,

---

<sup>2</sup>In a robustness exercise, we also consider the possibility that authors and printers self-censor because of the fear of being persecuted under the Inquisition.

<sup>3</sup>Donato (2019) notes that “As is well known, in Italy the Inquisition was reorganized relatively late (1542), in response to the ‘infection’ of Protestantism.” The first Roman Index was published even later (1559), and censorship was institutionalized in 1564 by the Council of Trent.

<sup>4</sup>The effect of censorship is also due to the interaction between *i*) its direct effect and *ii*) the induced reallocation of talents. We reported the size of *i*) and *ii*) assuming that the effect of the interaction is shared between *i*) and *ii*) proportionally, according to their relative “pure” effects.

we assume that the number of books people can buy is proportional to income per capita. If real GDP per capita had remained constant after 1470 instead of dropping by about 20% (Bolt and van Zanden 2020), the average log publication per scholar would have been 11% higher. The effect of adverse macroeconomic conditions on knowledge production is one fourth of the effect of censorship.

The development and estimation of the structural model constitute a new methodology to measure the effect of censorship on knowledge growth. We account for the effect of censorship on the availability of already written books, and for its repercussions for the sector and the quality of future knowledge. This is done by modeling the endogenous selection of agents into the compliant vs. non-compliant sectors, which depends on past knowledge and censorship. The introduction of censorship is also endogenized. Overall, the structure and estimation of the model allow us to build a counterfactual path of knowledge dynamics characterized by the absence of censorship.

**Literature** Our paper relates to three strands of the literature. First, we add to the existing literature that studies the effects of censorship. Motivated by the fact that a large share of the world population is currently subject to censorship,<sup>5</sup> previous research studied how autocratic governments strategically impose censorship (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013; Zhuang 2019) and its effectiveness in stopping the spread of non-compliant ideas (Roberts 2014). This paper contributes to this literature by proposing a novel method to study censorship, accounting for the endogenous selection of agents into compliant vs. non-compliant knowledge. On the theory side, Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2015) propose a model where the ruler can censor media reports to avoid revolts, while citizens might update negatively about a regime when they see no news. Guriev and Treisman (2020) study the trade-offs between various tools of authoritarian politics such as censorship, propaganda and repression. We contribute to this literature by making endogenous the creation and quality of non-compliant content.

Another strand of the literature explores the way government and religious institutions fought against novel ideas in early modern Spain (Vidal-Robert 2011; Drelichman, Vidal-Robert, and Voth 2021), Europe (Anderson 2015), Imperial China (Koyama and Xue 2015), and the Islamic world (Iyigun 2015; Chaney 2016; Rubin 2017). Relative to these works, this paper differs by distinguishing the effect of censorship from that of the Inquisition. Censorship affects knowledge production by making some ideas unavailable to future generations, while the Inquisition is the enforcement arm of the Church, responsible for punishing heretics. Censorship can be effective even if heretic authors do not risk their life. This paper is also one of the first works in

---

<sup>5</sup>According to the report “Freedom of the Press 2017” by Freedom House, only 13% of the world population enjoys a free press:  
<https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/press-freedoms-dark-horizon>.

economics about the effect of Catholic censorship, alongside Becker, Pino, and Vidal-Robert (2021) and Comino, Galasso, and Graziano (2021). Becker, Pino, and Vidal-Robert (2021) study the effect of censorship on the number of printed books, while Comino, Galasso, and Graziano (2021) focus on the effect of censorship on publishing firms in Venice. Both unravel a causal effect of censorship on publication levels. Instead of taking books or printers as the unit of observation, we focus on scholars and on the ~~choice~~ to comply with the Church’s ideology. Focusing on authors also allows us to weight them by quality, and to study the dynamic effects of censorship via diffusion of knowledge to future generations in a structural growth model.

Second, our paper contributes to the literature on changes and persistence in institutions and the ruling class (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Acemoglu 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson 2008). More closely related to our work, Bénabou, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2021) focus on the persistence of religiosity in a framework where belief-eroding innovations can be censored, and religious institutions can adapt the doctrine to the new knowledge. Ekelund, Hebert, and Tollison (2002, 2004) study the behavior of the Catholic Church before and after the rise of Protestantism by interpreting the Church’s action as an incumbent monopolistic firm. Our is a dynamic approach to understanding the persistence of the Catholic Church’s power, where decisions to impose censorship depend on the current and future (endogenous) distribution of authors’ quality by sector. Our framework allows us to rationalize both the Church’s late reaction to the rise of Protestantism and that several books censored in the sixteenth century could circulate freely in the previous centuries.

Finally, this paper is tied to the literature on the root causes of the decline of Italy. The hypotheses regarding the demise of Italy include the excessive control by the guilds (Cipolla 1994), the inability of Italy to seize the new, profitable transatlantic trade routes (Landes 1999; Braudel 2018), and the fight of the Catholic Church against novel ideas (Landes 1999; Gusdorf 1969). We focus on the latter argument by examining the role of the Catholic Church’s censorship on knowledge diffusion. Compared to the literature on knowledge diffusion in the Malthusian epoch (De la Croix, Doepke, and Mokyr 2018), in which knowledge is embodied into craftsmen, we model a complementary vector of idea transmissions by focusing on codified/written knowledge. We do not seek to make a direct link between censorship and economic growth, even though recent research highlights the importance of upper-tail human capital for pre-industrial Europe’s take-off (Squicciarini and Voigtländer 2015; Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014; Mokyr 2011; Mokyr 2016).

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the data sources, and we highlight two novel facts about censorship and scholar quality. In Section 3, we develop a model linking censorship to knowledge diffusion. In Section 4, we estimate the structural model

and present its implications for the role of censorship on Italy’s accumulation of knowledge. The conclusion is in Section 5.

## 2 Data

### 2.1 Academies, Scholars, Publications, and Censorship

Our unit of observation is a scholar active in Italy, to whom we will attach publications and, possibly, censorship. The database is built in three steps. An example is shown in Figure 1.

First, we collect information on all scholars who were appointed to an Italian university or were nominated to an Italian academy over the period 1450-1750. For universities, the main sources are as follows. An extensive coverage of the University of Bologna is provided by Mazzetti (1847). The University of Padova is covered by Facciolati (1757): we complete its information with the works by Casellato and Rea (2002) and Pesenti (1984). Professors at the university in Rome, Sapienza, were found in Renazzi (1803). The professors at University of Naples are covered by Origlia Paolino (1754). Pavia is another well-documented university: Raggi (1879) lists all its professors. Pisa is covered in Fabroni (1791). The smaller University of Macerata also benefits from a full coverage by Serangeli (2010). For academies, we use the database “Italian Academies 1525-1700, the first intellectual networks of early modern Europe” made available by the British Library in 2013. Among the academies covered, the Gelati and the Ricovrati are two important ones. We complete these data with Parodi (1983) for the language academy “La Crusca” and with Maggiolo (1983) for a full coverage of the biggest academy, the Ricovrati. In appendices A.1 and A.2 we discuss how representative are the university professors and academicians in our data are, and how much of the Italian university/academy population is covered.

Figure 1 shows that Tommaso Dempstero is in the list compiled by Mazzetti (1847) of professors at the University of Bologna. We also find him in the history of the University of Pisa by Fabroni (1791), under his Latin name, Thomas Dempsterus. Checking the Italian encyclopedia from the Istituto dell’Enciclopedia Italiana (1929), we corroborate the information on Bologna.

Second, we use the Worldcat search engine, which provides references to the collections of thousands of libraries around the world, to assign to each scholar all the written output he/she generated, including post mortem editions. More precisely, we count the number of “publications”, including different editions of the same work. We only record publications by the author, and exclude publications about the author, which are also available through Worldcat. WorldCat provides a good approximation of the population of known European authors. Chaney




Figure 1: Data collection: example of Thomas Dempster

(2020) compares the Universal Short Title Catalogue (USTC) of St. Andrews (2019)<sup>6</sup> to the references in the Virtual International Authority File (VIAF), on which WorldCat is based. Chaney successfully locates 81% of USTC authors in the VIAF. Figure 1 shows the Worldcat Page for Thomas Dempster, with the total count of publications (by or about). We can identify the two types of publications by scraping the page. From the graph on the webpage, we can see that all publications are by him.

In a third step, we look at the list of forbidden books from De Bujanda and Richter (2002) and De Bujanda et al. (1996). We find an entry for Thomas Dempster with a short biography and the list of books that were forbidden, with the date of the corresponding decrees.

We now show some statistics on the number of scholars and on their publications. In Table 1 the period 1400-1750 has been divided into five periods of 70 years each. The first line covers all of Europe, from the database built by De la Croix (2021), and includes both universities and academies. Columns (1) to (5) contain the number of “published” scholars per period, i.e. those having some work referenced in Worldcat. Columns (6) to (10) show the median number of publications per person. The second line covers the subset of scholars affiliated to an Italian institution.

The number of publications per person illustrates perfectly the decline of Italy. Until period 2 (1470-1540), published scholars in Italy produced an output similar to the average European scholar. Then, a gap appears in period 3 (1540-1610) and becomes really wide in period 5 (1680-1750). The appearance of the gap coincides with the formalization of censorship through the first index published by the University of Paris in 1544, and the first Roman Index, also known as the *Pauline Index*, promulgated by Pope Paul IV in 1559 (De Bujanda and Richter 2002). Note that the Catholic Church also censored scholars who never visited Italy, but the Church struggled to enforce censorship outside Italy.<sup>7</sup> A more comprehensive history of the indexes of the Catholic Church is in Becker, Pino, and Vidal-Robert (2021).

Table 1 also shows the European numbers by individual country.<sup>8</sup> For countries like France, Germany and Austria we can observe that until period 2 (1470-1540) published scholars produce a similar or lower output than Italy, while a gap appears in the following periods. Note that

---

<sup>6</sup><https://ustc.ac.uk/>

<sup>7</sup>One explicative example is the story of Copernicus’ *De revolutionibus*, which was first published in 1546 and appeared in the Index in 1616 under the list of books to be corrected. Gingerich (2004) analyzed 277 copies of the first edition and 324 of the second of *De revolutionibus*. He found that about two-thirds of the copies of *De revolutionibus* in Italy were “corrected.” Since the *De revolutionibus* could circulate for decades without any problem, two-thirds is probably a lower bound estimate of the overall rate of enforcement. One copy forgotten in a private library for decades is probably less likely to be corrected. However, virtually none of the copies outside Italy, including in Spain and France, were touched.

<sup>8</sup>We did not show the results for all European countries because some have too few observations or contained scholars coming from one University/academy only (this is the case of Belgium and the University of Louvain).



eventually these countries reach a level of output unknown to Italy. This fact refutes the possibility that Italy was overtaken because it had less room for growth and that Europe grew more solely because of the spread of knowledge to more remote areas. A similar pattern can be observed for Great Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and Sweden, with the caveat that we have very few observations for these countries in the first two periods. The case of Spain and Portugal is different, as these countries do not overtake Italy. This is not surprising given the intensity of the Spanish Inquisition (Vidal-Robert 2011).

The following lines in Table 1 disaggregate the Italian numbers by (important) institution. The decline from period 3 to period 5 is present in the universities of Bologna, Padua, Pavia, Pisa, and in the two Roman universities. The academies do better, in particular the Ricovrati, but this is not enough to compensate for the overall decline at the Italian level.

Period	Total number of published scholars					Median number of publications per person				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Europe	385	1140	2632	3569	5004	30	55	57	49	47
Italy	197	373	718	719	589	50	62	48	29	23
France	55	190	451	682	861	9	69	73	50	46
Germany & Austria	73	386	858	972	1997	6	40	61	96	67
Great Britain & Ireland	12	46	147	350	770	14	73	119	134	93
Denmark & Sweden	1	13	54	133	300	3	24	54	53	64
Spain & Portugal	17	80	216	169	151	59	60	27	17	8
Ubologna-1088	53	86	77	55	45	32	56	30	16	23
Unapoli-1224	10	20	26	19	18	94	72	17	16	41
Upadua-1222	73	126	130	72	79	49	45	37	30	11
Upavia-1361	37	70	49	17	7	45	60	32	20	3
Uroma-1303	42	60	58	44	39	193	96	77	44	61
Upisa-1343	12	38	65	59	34	22	39	23	31	7
UromaGregoriana-1556			62	55	48			116	66	19
Umacerata-1540		5	22	17	15		8	14	2	6
AcadRicovrati-1599		1	71	115	190		2	28	38	28
AcadCrusca-1583		2	38	106	116		291	29	29	42
AcadGelati-1588			21	67	15			15	26	47

Note: periods: 1:1400-69, 2:1470-1539, 3:1540-1609, 4:1610-79, 5:1680-1749

Table 1: Total number of scholars & publications by period

One can argue that the decline in knowledge production in Italy might be because the standard required to become a professional scholar declined. In fact, if published scholars are positively selected and the barriers to entry weaken, the median quality of scholars goes down. One

way to control for this problem is to look at the dynamics of top scholars, who are less affected by changes in the barriers to entry. Hence, in Table 2 in the appendix, we show that Italy still loses to Europe in terms of knowledge production if we consider only scholars whose longest Wikipedia page (across all languages) is longer than 5000 characters. Moreover, in Appendix A.3 we show that Italy is overtaken by Europe within all the scholars' fields that we are able to identify, ruling out the possibility that the this observation was driven by a composition effect across fields.

## 2.2 Two Features of Author Censorship

On May 23 1555, a new Pope was elected and Cardinal Caraffa became Paul IV. This election heralded the return of the conservatives. In 1559, Paul IV had published the first long list of prohibited books, the Index. The idea was refined further by the Council of Trent, which established in 1564 the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*. The Index comprised three parts. The first part contained the name of the heretical authors whose entire output, past and future, was condemned (opera omnia, the works). The second part contained a list of censored publications by authors who still belonged to the Church. The third part dealt with anonymous publications.

This attempt to control publications by the Catholic Church is probably the biggest experiment in the history of censorship. To read or to keep censored books could lead to excommunication and eternal damnation. It lasted four centuries, as the last version of the Index was published in 1948.

The Index was established following a change in the attitude of the Church towards novel ideas, including scientific ones. One aim was to defend Aristotelian physics against alternative views. Aristotle had to be defended, because his theory on substance and accidents is compatible with the dogma of transubstantiation according to which, during the Mass, the bread and wine are literally converted into the body and blood of Christ at the consecration. Everything that went against Aristotle's physics became suspect.

The Copernicus case best illustrates the reversal of attitude. The idea of his heliocentric system was developed around 1505, and first documented in an unpublished book intended for his friends. The Pope Clement VII learned about these ideas in 1533 and liked them. Several highly ranked clerics asked Copernicus to publish his treaty. One advantage of Copernicus's system was to provide more accurate computations for astronomical events. Then, after the conservative revolution, Copernicus's writings were blacklisted. What appeared to be a legitimate hypothesis in 1543 became in 1616 a foolish thesis, absurd in philosophy, and formally heretic. The Church took more than three centuries to accept heliocentrism and remove Copernicus's works from the Index in 1846.

The Church's fight did not spare the most notable forerunners of the varied flow of novel ideas that spread all over Italy and Europe. Galileo Galilei was condemned, and his books were censored not only for his astronomical views, but also for his support of atomism. According to atomism, the physical world comprises fundamental, indivisible components known as atoms, violating the Aristotelian view of a continuous matter. Atomism and its proponents, such as the French philosopher Descartes, were censored by the Church until at least the beginning of the eighteenth century. In a world where religion and philosophy were intertwined with natural sciences, the aversion towards atomism is likely to have affected scientific knowledge. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the particle theory of light, which relies on an atomist view of the matter, was developed by Newton and not by an Italian.

The Church's fight had some consequences for thinking about the continuum, indivisibles, and the actual infinite. The Jesuits were particularly active in these mathematical controversies, fighting against the idea that a continuous line is composed of distinct and infinitely tiny parts (Alexander 2014). In his book, Alexander (2014) considers what the world would have been like without infinitesimals. "If the Jesuits and their allies had had their way, there would be no calculus, no analysis, nor any of the scientific and technological innovations that flowed from these powerful mathematical techniques." Now, this is perhaps exaggerated, and Alexander claims more than he is able to prove. Grabiner (2014) defends the view that seventeenth-century mathematics had far too much momentum and too many demonstrable successes to be stopped by philosophical arguments about the nature of the continuum.

Another landmark of the reversal in the attitude of the Church is the censorship of all the works by, and the burning at the stake of, Giordano Bruno. Bruno had accumulated many reasons to be condemned to death, but one point of his theory that did not fit at all with the Church's view was the theoretical possibility of an infinite universe and the plurality of worlds. Bruno has become the symbol of the scientist persecuted by religious authorities. In other times authors were punished with imprisonment. For example, Galilei was sentenced to house arrest for the rest of his days.

Looking at the data in the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, one should admit that censorship does not necessarily imply that the author risks his life. While sometimes, as for Bruno and Galilei, censorship went together with severe consequences for the author; in other cases, the consequences were mild. For example, the poet John Barclay, whose works contained satirical descriptions of the Jesuit school, was listed in the Index in 1608. At the invitation of the Pope himself, he went to Rome in 1616 and resided there until he died in 1621. Moving to Rome was a way to signal that he was a good Catholic and avoid further consequences. Not all of his writings were blacklisted, and he was able to publish again after he was first censored. In other

cases, there were no consequences for the author simply because the heresy was identified after her/his death. This is the case of Bernardino Ciaffoni, who used to be the rector of Rome’s college San Bonaventura. He died in 1684 but was censored in 1701 because his works contained insulting claims against the Jesuits. Scholars developed different strategies to avoid negative repercussions from their writings. Many authors used pseudonyms to protect themselves. This is the case of Copernicus, who first revealed his theories anonymously in the *Commentariolus*. Only after he realized that his work was well-received, did he reveal his identity by writing his theory under his real name (Rosen 1977). In sum, censorship did not always bring negative consequences for the authors, while posterity indeed paid a premium for complicated access to the revolutionaries’ wisdom, at least that embodied in forbidden books.

Being a clergyman did not confer protection against censorship. One particularly striking case is Serry Jacobus Hyacinthus. A Professor in Padova, he contributed to the Dominicans-Jesuits controversy on grace, and several of his works appeared in the Index. Not only he was a Dominican, but also he was a member of the *Congregation of the Index*, the body responsible for the creation and management of the Index. Censorship did not spare even the members of the company of Jesus, who had a primary role in the Counter-Reformation and who were the “*soldiers of God [...]* for the *defense* and propagation of the faith.”<sup>9</sup> In our database, 10 out of 173 published scholars belonging to the Jesuit university Gregoriana were censored. Among them, Achille Gagliardi was censored in 1703 for his writings about the annihilation of the will during mystical states. These ideas were found to be incompatible with free will, which is a cornerstone of Catholic theology.

We now describe the impact of censorship quantitatively. Figure 2 shows how authors belonging to our dataset are distributed according to the number of their publications. We mark authors who were censored at least once in red, and non-censored authors in green. We provide five histograms, one for each period. Censorship started at the end of the second period, but also affected works that were published in the past. From these five histograms, it is clear that censorship was concentrated on top scholars for the first two to three periods, and then became more uniformly distributed over the quality of scholars. Or, as we wrote earlier, once censorship was introduced, censored authors were of better quality than the non-censored authors, but this gap shrank over time. For an alternative visualization of the changing gap in quality between censored and non-censored authors, see Figure 3 in Appendix A.5.

This shift in the identity of who was impacted by censorship reflects behavioral changes. The top scholars who had the potential to publish non-compliant ideas and become famous (as in the first three periods) decided to be more compliant, and published conventional material instead.

---

<sup>9</sup>This is a translation of the words of the *Exposcit Debitum* Papal bull, that gave rise to the foundation of the order in 1550.

Bruno, Copernicus and Galilei were at the top of the distribution and were all censored, and sometimes burned. Their similarly talented successors in the last two periods might have been published as mediocre poets.

Moment description	Period				
	1400-69	1470-1539	1540-1609	1610-79	1680-1749
Number of published scholars (all)	197	373	718	719	589
% censored scholars	7.11	10.99	8.22	6.68	4.92
Log publications per scholar (all), median (1)	4.34	4.52	4.29	3.74	3.37
Log publications per scholar (censored), median (2)	7.70	7.06	7.00	5.66	5.91
Gap in median publications (2)-(1)	3.36	2.54	2.71	1.92	2.54
Log publications per scholar (all), 75 <sup>th</sup> percentile	5.84	5.89	5.58	5.14	5.19
Log publications per scholar (censored), 75 <sup>th</sup> perc.	7.85	7.84	8.14	7.23	6.74

Table 2: Moments per period

We show in Table 2 the key moments of these distributions. It confirms what we expected from the figures: the gap in median publications between censored authors and all authors shrank from about 3.4 to 2.5 (the numbers should be interpreted as log of number of publications). The table shows two additional features. First, after the second period, the percentage of censored authors is shrinking over time. Second, overall quality, measured by median publications per person, is declining over time as well. This also holds for the top of the distribution, as the 75th percentile also diminishes over the last four periods. Those two trends are very much compatible with the idea of the top innovators' books becoming progressively compliant and mediocre over time.

Our data also reveals possible geographical patterns in censorship. Figure 3 shows the place of birth of the scholars in the database, distinguishing the censored (red) from the not censored (green) ones. Geographical coordinates have been slightly randomized, so that people born in cities still appear distinctly. From the map of Italy, we can observe that our data cover the whole peninsula and its islands. Moreover, censorship seems to affect all regions rather uniformly.

Some members of Italian universities and academies were born outside Italy (as with Thomas Dempster in our example above). Hence the interest in having a map of Europe. Figure 4 in Appendix 4 provides a European view of the places of birth of our scholars. Some of them are foreign members (or corresponding members) of some academies, such as the Ricovrati. They might have never come to Italy, so we use a specific robustness test that excludes those




Figure 2: Distribution of published authors by quality. Red: censored. Green: non-censored.




Figure 3: Place of birth of censored (red) and non censored (green) members of Italian universities & academies – Italy.

foreigners.

### 3 Occupational Choice and Knowledge Diffusion

In this section, we develop a theory of accumulation of knowledge and occupational choice. We build on recent approaches in the theory of economic growth that model explicitly the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge through the combination of ideas (Kortum 1997, Lucas 2009, Lucas and Moll 2014). We include in this class of models a new trade-off through occupational choice.

Authors, building on the knowledge created by the previous generation, write books that can be compliant with the Catholic Church’s ideology or revolutionary (in the sense of the Humanistic and Scientific Revolutions). Printers decide whether to be active in the revolutionary or compliant sector. They make this choice according to the quality of the books of each type that they encounter. Therefore, if revolutionary knowledge grows faster than compliant knowledge, the share of revolutionary books will also increase. The Catholic Church dislikes revolutionary ideas and might decide to censor them, which would decrease their share but also alter the accumulation of the total stock of knowledge in the economy.

### 3.1 Knowledge Diffusion

Time is discrete. At each date  $t$  one generation of  $S$  persons is alive. Knowledge is embodied in books and is transmitted between the successive generations through them. At the beginning of each period, the individuals first learn from  $\mu_t$  books.  $\mu_t$  is a parameter representing the number of books one can buy during her life. We let it depend on time to allow changes in  $\mu_t$ , for example when income or length of life changes. Books include more or less relevant content to produce goods and services. A book  $i$  has a characteristic  $h_i$  drawn from an exponential distribution.  $h_i$  should be seen as a negative feature, for example the irrelevance of the book. The quality of a book is a decreasing function of its irrelevance, with elasticity  $\theta$ :

$$q_i = h_i^{-\theta}, \quad \theta \in (0, 1). \quad (1)$$

Books are of two types, which define different distributions from which their relevance is drawn. *Compliant* books, indicated by the superscript  $C$ , embody the type of knowledge that is compliant with the ideology of the Catholic Church.<sup>10</sup> *Revolutionary* books, denoted by the superscript  $R$ , contain knowledge that is considered heretical by the Catholic Church. Taking examples from Alexander (2014), geometry books would be compliant while books using infinitesimal calculus would be revolutionary. Both of them are of variable quality, which we call relevance.

At the beginning of time  $t$ , the irrelevance of book  $i$  of type  $j$  follows an exponential distribution

$$h_i^j \sim \exp(k_t^j), \quad \text{with } j \in \{C, R\}. \quad (2)$$

---

<sup>10</sup>Note that being compliant does not necessarily mean to produce work using the official Catholic Church doctrine as an input: this is true just for the production of religious books or religious services in general. Instead, it just means that the knowledge should not contradict the Catholic Church doctrine.



Note that the scale parameter  $k_t^j$  depends on the book type. As

$$\mathbb{E}[h_i^j] = \frac{1}{k_t^j},$$

$k_t^j$  measures the average usefulness of knowledge in sector  $j$ .

Using the words of Kortum (1997), the distribution of book quality represents the technology frontier. Since the irrelevance of books is exponentially distributed and given Equation (1), the distribution of book quality follows a Fréchet distribution, see Appendix C.1. This allows us to write the average book quality  $q^j$  by sector as:

$$E(q_i^j) = \Gamma(1 - \theta) (k^j)^\theta \text{ with } j \in \{C, R\}, \quad (3)$$

where  $\Gamma(\cdot)$  is the Euler gamma function.

The number of revolutionary books that each agent will read in  $t + 1$  depends on their availability in bookshops. The share of printers that produced revolutionary books in the previous generation is denoted by  $m_t$ . Therefore, a individual will read  $\lfloor \mu_{t+1} m_t \rfloor$  revolutionary books and  $\lfloor \mu_{t+1} (1 - m_t) \rfloor$  compliant books, drawn from their respective distribution. Each individual  $s$  retains the best book coming from each one of the two distributions. Formally, the process of retaining the best books by sector is described as

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{h}_s^C &= \min\{h_1^C, \dots, h_{\lfloor (1-m_t)\mu_{t+1} \rfloor}^C\}, \\ \hat{h}_s^R &= \min\{h_1^R, \dots, h_{\lfloor m_t\mu_{t+1} \rfloor}^R\}. \end{aligned}$$

For the sake of simplicity, from now on we will approximate  $\lfloor (1 - m_t)\mu_{t+1} \rfloor$  and  $\lfloor m_t\mu_{t+1} \rfloor$  to respectively  $(1 - m_t)\mu_{t+1}$  and  $m_t\mu_{t+1}$ , so that we will be able to proceed with our analysis treating the number of books read as a continuous variable.

Note that the exponential distribution satisfies the minimum stability postulate: if  $x$  and  $y$  are mutually independent random variables, exponentially distributed with parameter  $\lambda$ , then  $\min(x, y)$  is exponentially distributed with parameter  $2\lambda$ . Hence, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \min\{h_1^C, \dots, h_{(1-m_t)\mu_{t+1}}^C\} &\sim \exp(k_t^C (1 - m_t)\mu_{t+1}), \quad \text{and} \\ \min\{h_1^R, \dots, h_{m_t\mu_{t+1}}^R\} &\sim \exp(k_t^R m_t\mu_{t+1}). \end{aligned}$$

We can now deduce that the distribution of actual relevance of the best book read by person  $s$  follows

$$\hat{h}_s^j \sim \exp(b_{t+1}^j), \quad \text{with } j \in \{C, R\}, \quad (4)$$

where  $b_{t+1}^C$  and  $b_{t+1}^R$  are defined as

$$\begin{aligned} b_{t+1}^C &= k_t^C(1 - m_t)\mu_{t+1}, \\ b_{t+1}^R &= k_t^R m_t \mu_{t+1}. \end{aligned}$$

Later in life, the generation  $t + 1$  writes new books, combining their inherited knowledge with a new idea. This new idea is drawn from a distribution whose scale parameter depends on the average quality of the books they have read:

$$h_{sN}^j \sim \exp(\nu b_{t+1}^j), \quad \text{with } j \in \{C, R\}.$$

Taking the best of their acquired and new knowledge leads to a book with irrelevance distributed as:

$$\tilde{h}_s^j = \min(h_{sN}^j, \hat{h}_s^j) \sim \exp((1 + \nu)b_{t+1}^j). \quad (5)$$

We can now summarize the dynamics of the two types of knowledge by the dynamics of the scale of their distribution:

$$k_{t+1}^C = (1 + \nu)k_t^C(1 - m_t)\mu_{t+1}, \quad (6)$$

$$k_{t+1}^R = (1 + \nu)k_t^R m_t \mu_{t+1}. \quad (7)$$

## 3.2 Occupational Choice

To finish describing the dynamics, we need to define how the share of printers producing revolutionary books evolves over time. We suppose that printers meet authors randomly, but have to decide whether to be active in the compliant sector or in the revolutionary sector at the beginning of their activity. Once they have chosen a sector,<sup>11</sup> they would print any author they meet randomly. They will thus determine their sector of activity based on the first author  $s$  they meet. This author has written two book projects of relevance  $\tilde{h}_s^C$  and  $\tilde{h}_s^R$ . Only one of these two book projects will be printed: the printed book will have quality  $q_i^C$  or  $q_i^R$ , according to which book project was chosen. There are  $2S$  book projects, which reduces to  $S$  books actually printed. Printers decide their sector taking into account the relative relevance of the two books. Printers also take into account that customers of the bookshop might value

---

<sup>11</sup>Assuming that printers have to choose a sector is consistent with Dittmar and Seabold (2015). In Germany, the official city printers were not advocates of the Reformation because they “did not want to endanger official work orders or antagonize city governments.” Moreover, according to Grendler (1975), printers in Venice faced the risk of having their bookshops in Rome [sized](#) by the Vatican if they printed revolutionary content, which implies that they had to choose a sector.

differently two books with the same quality that belong to two different sectors. This might happen because of consumer preferences or for how book quality translates into consumption goods.<sup>12</sup> We summarize these two effects assuming that the relative price at which revolutionary books are sold is represented by  $p$ . The probability that the revolutionary book is best is:

$$\text{Prob}\{q_i^C < pq_i^R\} = \text{Prob}\{\tilde{h}_s^C > p^{-1/\theta} \tilde{h}_s^R\} = \frac{b_t^R}{b_t^R + b_t^C p^{-1/\theta}} = m_t. \quad (8)$$

Using the law of large numbers, this probability also defines the share of printers active in the revolutionary sector  $m_t$ . From now on we will refer to  $\hat{p}$  as  $\hat{p} = p^{-1/\theta}$ .

The dynamics of knowledge quality (6) and (7), together with the occupation choice

$$m_t = \frac{k_t^R}{k_t^R + \hat{p}k_t^C} \quad (9)$$

and initial conditions  $k_1^C$  and  $k_1^R$ , determine  $m_1$  and the equilibrium path  $\{m_t, k_t^C, k_t^R\}_{t \geq 1}$ .

### 3.3 Censorship

So far, the Church did not play any role in the model. As we discussed in the introduction, there is historical evidence that the Catholic Church tried to limit the spread of revolutionary books issuing the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*. We model this behavior of the Church, assuming that she can interfere with the process of occupational choice imposing a rate of censorship on revolutionary books. More precisely, she can limit the number of revolutionary titles that an author can read, making unavailable a fraction  $\beta$  of the volumes that she would have read without censorship. Formally, the process of censorship limits the number of revolutionary books that individuals in  $t+1$  encounter during their life to  $\mu_{t+1}m_t(1-\beta)$  and therefore alters the process of accumulation of revolutionary knowledge, which now follows

$$k_{t+1}^R = (1+\nu)(1-\beta)k_t^R m_t \mu_{t+1}, \quad \text{with } \beta \in [0, 1]. \quad (10)$$

Note that in this way, the Church can directly decrease the share of revolutionary books  $m$  and will also make it less likely that revolutionary works will be written in the future. This is because the process of accumulation of revolutionary knowledge slows down. The law of motion of  $k_{t+1}^C$  (see Equation (7)) does not change when the Church imposes a rate of censorship on

---

<sup>12</sup>Books can be used to produce consumption goods, and books belonging to different sectors can have different productivity in this respect. For example, the production of consumption goods through books can be represented as  $c = \alpha \sum^{N_R} q_i^R + \sum^{N_C} q_i^C$ , where  $\alpha$  would be the relative productivity of revolutionary books' quality, while  $N_R$  and  $N_C$  are respectively the number of revolutionary and compliant books owed by the customer.

revolutionary books.

The Church could also limit the spread of revolutionary books by persecuting authors and printers accused of heresy. This fact matters for the accumulation of knowledge as authors and printers might decide to self-censor their works to avoid risk to their life. While we do not model self-censorship in the main baseline version of the model, this feature is included in a robustness check in Subsection 4.5.

### 3.4 The Dynamics under an Exogenous Church's Behavior

So far we mentioned that the Church can limit the share of revolutionary books through censorship, but we did not mention how the Church is choosing  $\beta$ . Clearly, the choice of  $\beta$  over time will depend on the behavior of agents described in the previous section and on the objective of the Catholic Church. On the one hand, the Church wanted to have the smallest possible number of heretical books circulating, to maintain its power. On the other hand, we do not know what prevented the Church from imposing the highest level of censorship in any period. The Church was probably trading off censorship with other motivations. It could have been because the Church was directing attention elsewhere, or because overly harsh censorship could create damage to the Church itself,<sup>13</sup> or something else.

Here we treat  $\beta$  as if it was exogenous, and we study the dynamics under this assumption. We start defining  $z = k^R/k^C$ : note that the share of revolutionary ideas  $m$  can assume one and only one value given  $z$ , which means that once we know the dynamics of one of the two variables, we also know the dynamics of the other. From equation (9) we get

$$m_t = \frac{z_t}{\hat{p} + z_t}. \quad (11)$$

We decided to make  $m_t$  rather than  $z_t$  our main variable for describing the model dynamics because its domain is a bounded set. The dynamics of  $m$  are defined formally below.

**Definition 1** *Given a censorship rate  $\beta$ , an exogenous process  $\{\mu_t\}_{t \geq 1}$ , and initial conditions on knowledge quality in the compliant and revolutionary sectors  $k_1^C$  and  $k_1^R$ , an equilibrium path is a sequence  $\{m_t, k_t^C, k_t^R\}_{t \geq 1}$ , describing the share of revolutionary books and knowledge quality*

---

<sup>13</sup>As an example, we can think that if the censorship is overly harsh, the Catholic Church might lose in terms of competition with the Protestant Church. This reasoning is plausible if devotees dislike censorship that is too harsh. While rulers had the final say about the religion of their territory, their decision was not completely independent from the common people's beliefs. Protestantism could spread thanks to the invention of the printing press, which aroused popular support by distributing pamphlets (Eisenstein 1980; Rubin 2014). Probably it would not be the best choice for a ruler to impose Catholicism if a large majority of the population already had converted to Protestantism.

in both sectors over time. *It is such that:*

- Each author of generations  $t > 1$  writes book projects whose quality and type is defined by combining acquired and new knowledge according to (5).
- Each printer of generations  $t \geq 1$  chooses her sector according to the most productive book presented by the first randomly met author, i.e. following (8). Each printer of each generation, once she chooses her sector, prints all the authors she meets randomly.
- For all  $t \geq 1$ , the probability of being exposed to revolutionary book in  $t + 1$  depends on the share of revolutionary titles written in  $t$ . The books printed in  $t$  embody the stock of compliant and revolutionary knowledge available to generation  $t + 1$ . Knowledge quality in the compliant and revolutionary sectors evolves according to (6)-(7).

The equilibrium we defined depends on the whole theory that we described in the previous subsection, but we are able to summarize in a single equation the law that governs the dynamics of  $m$ . Dividing Equation (7) by (6) side by side, and substituting the resulting  $z_{t+1}$  in (11) at time  $t + 1$ , we get the equation that governs the equilibrium dynamics of  $m$ :

$$m_{t+1} = \frac{(1 - \beta)m_t^2}{1 - m_t((\beta - 2)m_t + 2)} = f(m_t). \quad (12)$$

Equation (12) and an initial  $m_1$ , allow us to determine the equilibrium path  $\{m_t\}_{t \geq 1}$ . The initial  $m_1$  depends on the initial conditions we have imposed and on parameter  $\hat{p}$  through:

$$m_1 = \frac{k_1^R}{k_1^R + \hat{p}k_1^C}$$

The equilibrium path  $\{m_t\}_{t \geq 1}$  satisfies:

**Proposition 1** *Given the initial  $m_1 \in [0, 1)$ , the long run share of revolutionary authors,  $m \equiv \lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} m_t$ , is given by*

- i)  $m = 0$  if  $m_1 < 1/(2 - \beta)$  (Compliant steady state),
- ii)  $m = 1$  if  $m_1 > 1/(2 - \beta)$  (Revolutionary steady state),
- iii)  $m = m_1$  if  $m_1 = 1/(2 - \beta)$  (Unstable steady state).

**Proof.** See Appendix C.2 ■

Notice finally that the path of  $m_t$  does not depend on the process  $\mu_t$ , but quality levels  $k_t^R$  and  $k_t^C$  do.

### 3.5 The Dynamics under an Optimizing Church's Behavior

In the previous subsection, we described the dynamics under a constant rate of censorship  $\beta_t$ . A simple way to go beyond this approach would be to assume a rule of thumb behavior of the type: the Church chooses the lowest rate of censorship that allows convergence to a world with no revolutionary ideas. We analyzed this case in Appendix C.3. This approach has two main shortcomings. Firstly, it is stringent in defining how the Church trades off the prevalence of revolutionary books and censorship. Secondly, it leaves unexplained the discontinuity over time in censorship and its delay with respect to the rise of Protestantism. Here we propose a model that can address this additional fact and also explain the two features of authors' censorship that we illustrated in Section 2.2. We assume that setting up an apparatus capable of creating a list of forbidden books and enforcing its application represented a large fixed cost for the Church. The Church cannot enforce any censorship before having paid a fixed cost  $\psi$ . After having paid  $\psi$ , she can impose a rate of censorship up to  $\bar{\beta}$ . The Church cares about the share of compliant books in the economy: its utility function is given by  $u()$ , which is differentiable, bounded, and strictly increasing in  $1 - m_t$ , while  $\delta < 1$  is the discount factor. We can now define the value function of the Church recursively. In the case that the Church had not yet established a censorship structure, the value function is

$$V(m_t) = \max[V^N(m_t), V^C(m_t) - \psi],$$

where  $V^N$  is the value of not imposing censorship and equals

$$\begin{aligned} V^N(m_t) &= u(1 - m_t) + \delta V(m_{t+1}) \\ \text{s.t. } m_{t+1} &= f(m_t, 0) = \frac{m_t^2}{1 - m_t(-2m_t + 2)}, \end{aligned}$$

while  $V^C$  is the value of having a censorship apparatus set up and equals

$$\begin{aligned} V^C(m_t) &= \max_{0 \leq \beta_t \leq \bar{\beta}} u(1 - m_t) + \delta V^C(m_{t+1}), \\ \text{s.t. } m_{t+1} &= f(m_t, \beta_t) = \frac{(1 - \beta)m_t^2}{1 - m_t((\beta - 2)m_t + 2)}. \end{aligned}$$

We can write the last value function in this way since  $V^N(m_t)$  equals  $V^C(m_t)$  if  $\beta = 0$  is chosen. Moreover, it is straightforward to see that, once  $\psi$  has been paid, the Church will always set  $\beta_t$  to its maximum level.<sup>14</sup> In this model, the Church has to choose between paying a fixed cost today for enjoying a lower share of revolutionary books in the future and postponing such

---

<sup>14</sup>This holds because  $\partial f(m_t, \beta_t)/\partial \beta_t \leq 0$  and  $\partial u(1 - m_t)/\partial m_t < 0$ , which implies  $\partial V^C(m_t)/\partial \beta_t \geq 0$ .

payment. Postponing censorship would be less costly because of discounting, but it would also imply a higher share of revolutionary books in the future. This trade-off implies that the Church would be more prone to implement censorship immediately when the fixed cost  $\psi$  is low and when the effectiveness of censorship  $\bar{\beta}$  is high. Moreover, the Church is less likely to start censoring the more impatient it is. When  $\delta = 0$ , the Church cares only about what happens in 0, and therefore it will never pay a cost  $\psi$  that affects only the future share of revolutionary books. The Church's decision to start censoring also depends on the initial level of revolutionary books  $m_1$ . In fact,  $m_1$  influences the dynamics with and without censorship. To understand why the initial condition matters, consider the extreme case  $m_1 = 0$ . Proposition 1 states that in this case,  $m$  stays constant over time, regardless of the value of  $\bar{\beta}$ , which makes censorship useless. Proposition 2 allow us to understand better when it is not optimal for the Church to censor:

**Proposition 2** *If  $\psi > 0$ , then there exist  $\tilde{m} > 0$  and  $1 > \check{m} > 0$  such that*

- i) If  $m_1 < \min(1/2, \tilde{m})$  then  $\beta_t = 0$  for each  $t \geq 1$  (No need to censor),*
- ii) If  $m_1 > \max(1/2, \check{m})$  then  $\beta_t = 0$  for each  $t \geq 1$  (Too late to censor).*

**Proof.** See Appendix C.4. ■

Proposition 2 makes the point that for some  $m_1$  it can be optimal for the Church to never impose censorship, which can be for opposite reasons. In fact, for a low enough  $m_1$ , the Church knows that revolutionary ideas would naturally disappear. Therefore, there is no need to censor. Symmetrically, when  $m_1$  is large enough, the Church knows that even imposing censorship, she would converge fast to the revolutionary steady state. In this case, it is too late to censor. Proposition 3 improves further our understanding of the Church's censoring behavior.

**Proposition 3** *There exists  $\bar{\psi}$  such that for each  $\psi < \bar{\psi}$ , there also exists  $\bar{m}, \hat{m}$  such that for  $\hat{m} > m_1 > \bar{m}$ ,  $\beta_1 = \bar{\beta}$  holds (window of censorship).*

**Proof.** See Appendix C.5. ■

Proposition 3 tell us that the areas under which the Church is willing to censor are not isolated points, but form *windows* of the domain of  $m$ . This result is intuitive if we think that two conditions should hold to make the Church willing to censor. First, censorship should be able to alter the time path of revolutionary books significantly. Second, the Church should lose the opportunity to change the equilibrium path dramatically if it waits for one additional period.

Censorship decisions are taken when  $m$  belongs to a certain interval  $(\bar{m}, \hat{m})$ , where points have a very similar value of postponing censorship and of altering the dynamics of  $m$ .

Note that we could not characterize a closed form of the equilibrium time path  $\{m_t\}_{t \geq 1}$ . Censorship *windows* can be placed anywhere in  $[0, 1]$  unless some strict assumptions are made. The model leaves open the possibility that revolutionary ideas were growing or declining before the Church implemented censorship. In order to be consistent with the historical fact that the Protestant Reformation started before the first issue of the Index, one would like to find in the estimated model that revolutionary ideas were growing before censorship.

### 3.6 Discussion of Model Assumptions

Our model of censorship introduction under an optimizing Church's behavior relies on a set of assumptions to make it tractable. In this subsection, we discuss our assumptions, and we compare them with some alternative modeling choices.

**One shot fixed-cost of censorship** A different modeling choice that we could have taken is to assume that there is no one-shot fixed cost  $\psi$  to set up censorship, but rather a convex cost that depends on the size of the chosen rate of censorship  $\beta_t$ .<sup>15</sup> A model based on this alternative assumption would have a hard time fitting the data for two reasons. First, it would predict a gradual increase or decrease in the share of forbidden books, while in the data there is a discontinuous increase in censored books given by the creation of the Index. Second, it would generate a faster reaction to the diffusion of Protestantism than the one observed in the data. This is because revolutionary authors' dynamics display inertia, which makes acting early with a low rate of censorship a good idea. Finally, the one-shot nature of the cost  $\psi$  helps to rationalize why the Church kept updating the Index until the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The Church would have removed censorship much sooner if it had to pay  $\psi$  each period. In fact, once censorship can shift dynamics towards the compliant steady state, the gains of censorship decrease rapidly.

**Maximal level of censorship** A point that is worth discussing is why the Church is bounded above by  $\bar{\beta}$  in the level of censorship that it can impose. We assume this for two main reasons. First, the process leading to censorship was largely bottom-up and grounded on external denounce.<sup>16</sup> If the arrival rate (frictions) of new books to be checked is low enough, then the Church can not have the opportunity to censor all revolutionary books. This mechanism explains why many books were censored decades after being first published. It also hints at

---

<sup>15</sup>If the cost was concave enough, the model would behave similarly to the fixed cost model.

<sup>16</sup>By external denunciations, we mean that the Congregation of the Index did not initiate the process most of the time. Wolf (2006) enumerates members of the clergy, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie as the categories of people who were bringing suspicious books to Rome to denounce them.



why some books might have never been censored. Further, it justifies our assumption that the Church censor a *share* and not a *number* of censored authors. The latter would make sense if the Church’s bottleneck was too high a number of books to be checked, which is unlikely to be the case.<sup>17</sup> Second, dissimulation to avoid censorship was far from uncommon (Spruit 2019). Heretic authors could cloak their dissident beliefs either by pretending to comply with the Church (*simulatio*) or by hiding their heterodox views to authorities (*dissimulatio*). Decartes’ quote “Like an actor wearing a mask, I come forward, masked, on the stage of the world,” means that he was conscious of the risks ahead of him and found in dissimulation a valuable tool to overcome them (Snyder 2012). Since books’ revolutionary content was seldom hidden, it is reasonable to think that the Church could identify only a share of the heretic books.

**Censorship enforcement** One additional assumption we made is that the Roman Inquisition (the police) was able to enforce the application of the Index outside the Papal State at a constant rate over time. The primary weapon of the Church for enforcing the application of the Index was a dense peripheral organization of censorship. It was constituted by 41 inquisitorial tribunals, primarily distributed in northern Italy, and by bishops in the center-south (Balsamo and Fragnito 2001).<sup>18</sup> The Church had an additional economic weapon for enforcing censorship: in Venice, the Church enforced compliance by threatening to seize the stores of printers within the Papal State (Grendler 1975). The Church could enforce censorship throughout the XVIII century, even though carrying out this task became increasingly more complicated (Prosperi, Lavenia, and Tedeschi 2010). In fact, under the papacy of Pope Benedict XIV, which started in 1740, some inquisitorial tribunals were closed. Therefore, we can claim that our assumption about censorship enforcement is valid until the first half of the XVIII century.

We will provide several robustness checks regarding the Church’s ability to enforce censorship over time and space. The sensitivity checks results, summarized in Table 6, indicate that our assumptions are not crucial for our baseline results.

## 4 Quantitative Results

### 4.1 Identification Strategy

In this section, we estimate the parameters of the model of knowledge diffusion under the optimizing Church’s behavior described in Section 3, using the data and stylized facts described

---

<sup>17</sup>The Congregation of the Index was formed of eight cardinals only in 1587, while it previously had five members. Moreover, Wolf (2006) observes that between 1571 and 1596, the number of yearly meetings of the Congregation oscillated between 0 and 34. The Church could have easily increased these numbers if needed.

<sup>18</sup>In the south and the highlands the Inquisition was carried on by the Spanish, except for Naples, where the archbishop was responsible for censorship (Prosperi, Lavenia, and Tedeschi 2010).

in Section 2. We follow a three-step estimation strategy. The first step is to set one parameter following the literature. The second step is to estimate six parameters using a minimum distance estimation procedure, under the assumption that censorship kicks in mid 16<sup>th</sup> century as in the data. The last step is to set one last parameter such that it rationalizes the timing of the introduction of censorship.

$t$	years	rate of censorship $\beta$	share of censored authors	$\mu_t$
1	1400-1469	0	0	1.000
2	1470-1539	0	$m_2\bar{\beta}$	0.878
3	1540-1609	$\bar{\beta}$	$m_3\bar{\beta}$	0.787
4	1610-1679	$\bar{\beta}$	$m_4\bar{\beta}$	0.828
5	1680-1749	$\bar{\beta}$	$m_5\bar{\beta}$	0.851

Table 3: Model Periods

Before going into the estimation details, we specify the relationship between model periods and their empirical counterpart, see Table 3. We consider five model periods that correspond to 1400-1469, 1470-1539, 1540-1609, 1610-1679, and 1680-1749. We made this choice following four criteria. First, we want each period to correspond to an equal number of years. Second, we want to stop in 1750 because the Church might have lost the capacity to censor after this date. Third, we want a year close to 1544 (first edition of the Index) to be the threshold between two consecutive model periods. In this way, we can claim that censorship started in the second of these two periods. Finally, we don't want each period to be too short. If this was the case, the number of authors per period would be small, causing the moments' standard errors to be large.

Table 3 shows in parallel the censorship rate and the share of censored authors to stress that censorship in period 3 affects books written in period 2. The process for  $\mu$  is taken from the annual GDP per capita series offered by Bolt and van Zanden (2020).  $\mu_t$  is obtained by averaging GDP per capita over the 70 calendar years corresponding to each model period  $t$ . Values are the normalized to have  $\mu_1 = 1$ .

**Preset Parameter.** We set the discount factor  $\delta$  to 0.06, which corresponds to a quarterly discount factor of 0.99:  $0.06 \approx 0.99^{280}$ . This parameter's role is minimal: conditionally on censorship starting on  $t = 3$  (which depends on the fixed cost of censorship  $\psi$ ), it does not affect dynamics.

**Minimum Distance Estimation.** We estimate the array of six parameters

$$\vartheta = [k_1^C, k_1^R, \theta, \bar{\beta}, \nu, p]$$

using a minimum distance estimation procedure. The parameters are identified by minimizing the distance between 14 empirical and theoretical moments, implying thus 8 (=14-6) **over-identifying** restrictions. The first moments are based on the distribution of the quality of all authors,  $q_{it}$ , obtained by drawing with probability  $m_t$  from the distribution of  $q_t^R$  (i.e. a Fréchet( $(k_t^R)^\theta, 1/\theta$ )) and with probability  $(1 - m_t)$  from the distribution of  $q_t^C$ . Five moments are the median<sup>19</sup> of the quality of all authors, and five other moments are their 75<sup>th</sup> percentile. The last four moments are the share of censored authors  $m_t\bar{\beta}$  for  $t = 2, 3, 4, 5$ .

The above estimation problem belongs to the family of the Simulated Method of Moments (McFadden 1989), a structural estimation technique to be applied when the theoretical moments obtain from simulating the model. Remark that we refrain from targeting separately moments based on censored vs. non-censored authors. These moments will rather be used to evaluate the quality of our estimation.

Our six parameters are expected to influence all moments (except  $\nu$  which does not affect  $m_t\bar{\beta}$ ). But we can still think that some moments are more important than others for identifying specific parameters. Parameters  $k_1^C, k_1^R$  are identified by moment  $m_2\bar{\beta}$  (which depends on  $m_1\bar{\beta}$  through Equation (12)) and by the median of the distribution of  $q_{i1}$ . Parameter  $\nu$  is identified by the growth rate of overall quality. Parameter  $p$  is identified by the average share of censored authors  $m_t\bar{\beta}$  over time (see Equation (11)). Parameter  $\bar{\beta}$  influences the speed at which  $m_t$  converges (Equation (12)), and is thus identified by the dynamics of the share of censored authors. Parameter  $\theta$  governs the shape of the Fréchet distribution of knowledge quality and is identified by the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of the quality distribution.

The objective function  $\Omega(\vartheta)$  to minimize is given by

$$\Omega(\vartheta) = (\mathbf{m} - \mathbf{m}_\vartheta)' \mathbf{W} (\mathbf{m} - \mathbf{m}_\vartheta), \quad (13)$$

where  $\vartheta$  is the vector of parameters,  $\mathbf{m}$  is the vector of data moments, and  $\mathbf{m}_\vartheta$  is the vector of moments obtained simulating the model with parameters  $\vartheta$ .  $\mathbf{W}$  is a diagonal matrix with  $1/\mathbf{m}^2$  as elements. The objective function is minimized using the genetic algorithm package in R developed by Scrucca et al. (2013), which allows for global optimization. We computed bootstrapped standard errors of the parameters by drawing 500 random samples with replacement from the original data. For each bootstrap sample, we computed the 14 moments and estimated the corresponding parameters. We then used these boot-strapped estimates to compute the standard errors. The model's simulation is straightforward since there is no uncertainty, and the parameters define both the initial conditions and govern model dynamics. Note that we run simulations assuming that censorship starts in  $t = 3$ . The timing of censorship depends

---

<sup>19</sup>We target the median instead of the mean because it is less sensitive to outliers.

on the fixed cost of censorship  $\psi$ , the estimation of which is discussed below.

**Parameter set a posteriori.** We are left with parameter  $\psi$ , namely the fixed cost to set up the censorship apparatus. We set it to rationalize that censorship starts in  $t = 3$ , given the value of all the other parameters. This parameter is *set identified*: there is a range of values that can rationalize the timing of censorship. The bounds of  $\psi$ , namely  $\psi_L$  and  $\psi_R$ , are set as follows. The lower bound  $\psi_L$  is the limit value of  $\psi$  for which starting censorship in  $t = 3$  gives a larger utility for the Church than starting it in  $t = 2$ . The higher bound  $\psi_R$  is the limit value of  $\psi$  for which starting censorship in  $t = 3$  gives a larger utility for the Church than waiting and starting it in  $t = 4$ .<sup>20</sup> Note that we set  $\psi$  assuming a linear time utility function  $u(1 - m)$ . If we chose a different shape that respects the assumptions about  $u()$ , the value of  $\psi$  would have changed, but the timing of censorship and the dynamics would have stayed the same. Note that in Table 4 we report a scaled value of the fixed cost, defined as  $\hat{\psi} = \psi/[V^C(1/(2 - \bar{\beta})) - V^N(1/(2 - \bar{\beta}))]$ .

## 4.2 Estimation Results

We list the identified parameters and their standard errors in Table 4. The estimation delivers  $k_1^R > k_1^C$ : this implies that the quality of censored authors is higher than non-censored authors, which is consistent with data even if the relative quality by sector is not among the targeted moments. The productivity of books  $\theta$  equals 0.34: this is slightly lower than the value (0.5) used by Lucas (2009). Our estimate is lower because the dispersion in log publications is lower than the one in earnings observed in modern U.S. data, which is the target of Lucas (2009).<sup>21</sup> The relative price of revolutionary books  $p$  equals 0.49. This insures that the initial share of revolutionary authors is not too large, even if they have a much higher quality than compliant scholars. For example, if  $p$  was equal to 1, the share of revolutionary authors would converge to 1 very fast: as a result, the share of censored authors would converge to  $\bar{\beta}$  and stay constant, unlike in the data. Parameter  $\nu$  insures that knowledge quality would have kept growing if censorship was never introduced. The most interesting parameter is the rate of censorship  $\bar{\beta}$  that the Church imposes, which equals 18%.

The model fit is reported in Figure 4, upper panels. The simulated variables rarely lie outside the 95% confidence interval of the data moments.<sup>22</sup> An exception is the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of the overall knowledge quality. This reflects that the underlying empirical distribution does not follow exactly a Fréchet distribution like in the model.

---

<sup>20</sup>Starting censorship in previous periods (2,1,0,-1..) would have given the Church a lower utility than waiting for  $t = 3$ .

<sup>21</sup>The Gini index of log publications is 0.34.

<sup>22</sup>The confidence intervals are computed drawing 500 random samples with replacement and then using the 2.5<sup>th</sup> and 97.5<sup>th</sup> percentile from the distribution of the variable of interest.

Table 4: Identification of Parameters


Calibrated Parameters		Value	Standard Errors	Target
Discount Factor	$\delta$	0.06	-	RBC literature
Fixed Cost of Censorship	$\hat{\psi}$	(1.031 - 1.032)	-	Index set-up
Estimated Parameters		Value	Standard Errors	Target
Compliant knowledge in 1	$k_1^C$	15.1	1.17	$\Omega(\vartheta)$
Rev. knowledge in 1	$k_1^R$	128.9	10.77	$\Omega(\vartheta)$
Productivity of books	$\theta$	0.34	0.017	$\Omega(\vartheta)$
Max Censorship	$\bar{\beta}$	0.18	0.016	$\Omega(\vartheta)$
Knowledge Growth	$\nu$	1.44	0.076	$\Omega(\vartheta)$
Price of rev. books	$p$	0.49	0.02	$\Omega(\vartheta)$

As a test of the theory, we compare our results to empirical observations that were not used to identify the parameters. Looking at the dynamics of censored and non-censored authors (Figure 4, lower panels) is particularly interesting as it allows us to test whether printers choose their sector according to its (relative) quality. This mechanism is summarized by Equation 11: the share of revolutionary authors can assume one and only one variable given the ratio of the quality in the two sectors. This ratio can be proxied by the ratio of censored to non-censored authors' quality, which we can measure in the data. Since the model fit well the dynamics of censored and non-censored authors, we can assert that Equation 11 is likely to hold in the data too. The model also predicts that the share of revolutionary ideas was increasing before  $t = 3$ . This is consistent with the fact that the share of censored books was larger in the period 1470-1539 than 1400-1469. Moreover, the average difference in quality between censored and non-censored authors decreases over time. It is 3.71 in 1470-1539, and it drops to 1.66 in 1680-1749.

### 4.3 The Role of Censorship in Knowledge Formation


What is the role of the Catholic Church in the demise in knowledge production in early modern Italy? How much of this effect is driven by selection into the revolutionary/compliant sectors? In this section we answer these questions by comparing model simulations with and without censorship. This is done by using the parameters identified in Section 4, with the exception of the rate of censorship  $\bar{\beta}$ , which is set to 0 in the no-censorship scenario. Figure 5 illustrates the outcomes of the experiments.

Without censorship, the share of revolutionary authors  $m_t$  would have kept increasing. It would have reached 59% in  $t = 5$ , instead of decreasing to 26% in  $t = 5$ . This fact demonstrates the effectiveness of censorship, which can change the dynamics of revolutionary ideas drastically.



NOTES. periods: 1:1400-69, 2:1470-1539, 3:1540-1609, 4:1610-79, 5:1680-1749.

Figure 4: Model fit (upper panels), over-identification checks (lower panels).  
 Data (solid) and simulations (dashed).



NOTES. periods: 1:1400-69, 2:1470-1539, 3:1540-1609, 4:1610-79, 5:1680-1749.

Figure 5: Baseline simulations (solid), simulations without censorship (dashed)

Moreover, censorship has the unintended effect of reducing the overall quality of scholars, which is 40% lower under the baseline than in the  $\bar{\beta} = 0$  scenario.

Becker, Pino, and Vidal-Robert (2021) analyze the effect of censorship on knowledge growth by establishing an empirical correlation between the number of famous people born in, or migrating into, a city and the number of indexed books printed in that city. Here we look at another, complementary, dimension by considering the actual publications of the scholars. Our structural approach also allows to quantify the effects, and to propose an interpretation of these effects, through the lens of our theory. Of course, in doing so, we impose more restrictions on the data than the reduced form approach of Becker, Pino, and Vidal-Robert (2021) does.

The loss in the overall quality is ~~both~~ driven by a reduction in the stock of knowledge *within each sector* and by self-selection *across sectors*. This result comes from the following decomposition:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \underbrace{q_5 - \hat{q}_5}_{=-1.68 \text{ (100\%)}} &= \underbrace{\hat{m}_5[q_5^R - \hat{q}_5^R] + (1 - \hat{m}_5)[q_5^C - \hat{q}_5^C]}_{=-1.13 \text{ (67\%); (a)}} + \\
 &\quad \underbrace{[m_5 - \hat{m}_5]\hat{q}_5^R + [(1 - m_5) - (1 - \hat{m}_5)]\hat{q}_5^C}_{=-1.43 \text{ (85\%); (b)}} \\
 &\quad + \underbrace{(m_5 - \hat{m}_5)[(q_5^R - q_5^C) - (\hat{q}_5^R - \hat{q}_5^C)]}_{=0.88 \text{ (-52\%); (c)}}.
 \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

Variables  $q_5, q_5^C, q_5^R$  indicate the average quality of all authors, compliant authors and revolutionary authors under the baseline scenario. The variables with a hat relate to the experiment

where  $\bar{\beta} = 0$ . Equation (14) shows that the self-selection effect exists only if there is a quality gap between the two sectors. Indeed, if  $\hat{q}_5^R = \hat{q}_5^C$ , the second line is equal to zero, and the fact that printers shift their activity towards the compliant sector does not matter as the compliant sector delivers the same quality as the revolutionary one.

The effect of censorship due to changes in quality within sectors (the direct effect) is captured by (a) in Equation (14) and accounts for 67% of the overall drop. The self-selection effect (b) accounts for 85% of the overall drop. This shows that censorship is important as it pushes printers to select compliant knowledge, which has a lower quality. Finally, (c) captures the interaction between effects (a) and (b) and accounts for  $-52\%$  of the total effect.

To sum up, the effect of censorship on knowledge accumulation is not entirely due to the decline in quality within sectors. The drop in the revolutionary sector is partially compensated by the increased quality within the compliant sector. Half of the effect of censorship on knowledge growth is due to its ability to make compliant ideas relatively more available. Not only are compliant ideas lower quality than revolutionary ones, but they would have displayed no growth in quality if there was no censorship.


#### 4.4 The Role of Macroeconomic Shocks in Knowledge Formation

In this section we evaluate the role played by macroeconomic factors besides censorship itself in shaping the observed decline in publications. The Italian economy declined substantially over the period under study, ~~as witnessed by~~ the drop in GDP per capita reported in Table 3. The enormous literature on Italy's relative decline and failure to lead the transition to modern growth highlights adverse macroeconomic processes that would almost certainly show up in the key measure of productivity we use.

To contrast the effect of censorship on knowledge growth with the impact of adverse macroeconomic shocks hitting the Italian economy over the same period, we run a counterfactual simulation under the assumption that the process for  $\mu_t$  was constant over time. Hence, instead of dropping by 20%, the number of books read (bought) by households stays constant in this counterfactual. This helps knowledge to grow as authors acquire ideas from more books. The results are shown in Figure 6.

Shutting down the source of adverse macroeconomic shocks translates into moderately higher average quality as early as ~~in~~ period 2. The gains ~~culminate~~ at 14% in period 4, and equal 11% in period 5 (there was indeed a small recovery in  $\mu_t$  from period 4 to 5). Those effects are relatively important in the first three periods, but appear small compared to the gains obtained under no censorship in periods 4 and 5. Overall, the effect of censorship on knowledge





NOTES. periods: 1:1400-69, 2:1470-1539, 3:1540-1609, 4:1610-79, 5:1680-1749.

Figure 6: Gains in Average quality (in %) with respect to baseline. Blue: no censorship ( $\beta = 0$ ). Red: no macroeconomic decline ( $\mu_t = 1 \forall t$ )

production is four times the effect of adverse macroeconomic conditions.

In the above estimation we modelled the process for  $\mu_t$  as an income process, following the path of GDP per capita. Higher income allows to buy more books. An alternative interpretation of  $\mu_t$  is in terms of time available to read books. The total number of books one can read during one's life should be proportional to the length of life. To consider this hypothesis, we compute the mean age at death of our scholars by period. We assume that the time available for reading is proportional to the mean age at death minus eighteen (assuming that one does not read scholarly books before the age of eighteen). Table 5 shows the values for the mean age at death and compares the new process for  $\mu_t$  to the baseline one. The mean age at death has a similar U-shaped pattern than GDP per capita. However, the shock appears weaker when one considers life expectancy than when one considers GDP per capita.

$t$	years	mean age at death	$\mu_t$ (GDP per capita)	$\mu_t$ (mean age at death -18)
1	1400-1469	68.18	1.000	1.000
2	1470-1539	63.95	0.878	0.916
3	1540-1609	65.36	0.787	0.943
4	1610-1679	64.73	0.828	0.931
5	1680-1749	69.73	0.851	1.031

Table 5: Different processes for  $\mu_t$

Taking as baseline a simulation where  $\mu_t$  takes the values in the last column, we find that the gains of keeping life expectancy constant culminate at 5% in period 4 and are negligible in

period 5. We conclude that the effect of censorship on knowledge production is ~~quite~~ stronger than the effect of adverse longevity conditions.

## 4.5 Robustness

We now consider the robustness of the simulation results to using alternative samples and/or different theoretical assumptions. The results are reported in Table 6.

**Only Italian born scholars.** Some scholars might have spent only a period of their time in Italy. Living outside Italy could have allowed them to access forbidden books without consequences. To limit this problem, we estimate the model using a sample of Italian born scholars only. Table 6 shows that the results of this sensitivity check differ only slightly with respect to baseline results.

**Only Southern/Northern Italian born scholars.** The model used for the baseline estimation assumes that the rate of censorship that the Church can enforce does not depend on scholars' location in Italy. This assumption is problematic if the actual rate of censorship differed drastically across Italian regions. To understand whether this is the case, we estimate the model separately for Italian scholars born in northern and southern Italy. A scholar is defined as northern Italian if he is born in a city whose latitude is larger than 43.8, which corresponds to cities north of Florence. The results reported in Table 6 indicate that the effect of censorship on knowledge growth is for northern and southern Italian scholars. The effect is slightly stronger for southern Italians because the rate of censorship there is slightly higher. This result is consistent with the Church having a stronger capacity in the Papal state.

**Only  $t \leq 4$ .** In the baseline model, we assume that the Church could enforce censorship until 1750, the end of period  $t = 5$ . In this sensitivity check, we re-estimate the model assuming that the Church can enforce censorship until the end of  $t = 4$  only, or 1680. In the last period  $t = 5$ , the Church keeps censoring authors, but anyone can read revolutionary books. The Church's ability to enforce censorship likely decreased over time. It is also likely that its ability to censor did not disappear completely. Hence, we think that this robustness provides a lower bound to the effect of censorship on knowledge growth. Despite the conservative assumption, the results in Table 6 show that the effect of censorship is still large, even though slightly lower than in the baseline case. This is because once the decline of revolutionary ideas started, its decline became unstoppable because of inertia.

**No weak links.** In our baseline sample, we included scholars who have a weak link to a university or academy. These include foreign and corresponding members of academies. One example is Leonhard Euler at Accademia Ricovrati. While all of these scholars decided to do

some work with the institution, they might not have been there physically. Scholars with weak links might be less constrained by the Church’s censorship, for example, because they lived elsewhere in Europe. Hence, we propose a sensitivity check where we exclude them from the sample and then re-estimate the model. Table 6 reports the results, which differ only slightly from the baseline estimation. One reason why excluding weak links has a slight effect on the results is that they represent less than 2% of the original sample.

**All publications.** In the baseline sample, we measure the author’s quality by the number of publications written *by* them. It is possible to argue that quality is better measured if publications *about* the author are also included. These capture the impact that these authors had on future generations. Table 6 reports the results where quality is measured by considering publication both *by* and *about* the author. The role of knowledge accumulation is very similar to the baseline, which indicates that results are robust to different quality measures.

**Length of Wikipedia pages.** One problem with our measure of authors’ quality is that it may be biased because older works have more editions. To limit this problem, we consider a different measure of author quality, based on the number of characters of the author’s longest Wikipedia page. Table 6 shows that our results are robust to this different measure of quality. Note that for building this measure of author quality we followed De la Croix et al. (2020) by assuming that having no Wikipedia page is similar to having one page with a length of 60 characters.

**Imperfect censorship.** In the model, we assumed that no one could access the knowledge embodied in forbidden books. As historians (Grendler 1975) documented the smuggling of forbidden books, this assumption is not always met. This sensibility check consists of assuming that the Church was able to enforce censorship only in  $\chi\%$  of total cases. Hence, even if  $m_t\bar{\beta}$  authors have been censored, only  $m_t\bar{\beta}\chi$  are not available to the next generation. One important question is how to set the value of  $\chi$ . Our strategy is the following: we set  $\chi$  the lowest possible, such that, after re-estimating of the model given  $\chi$ , we can rationalize the timing of censorship (introduced in  $t = 3$ ) for at least one value of  $\psi$ .<sup>23</sup> In this way, we maximize the odds that this sensibility check will undermine the baseline results. We find  $\chi = 0.80$ . When  $\chi$  is too small, the estimate from the model implies that the share of revolutionary ideas would be declining already in  $t = 1$ .<sup>24</sup> When this happens, censorship is set immediately, and the timing of censorship cannot be rationalized. Also, low levels of  $\chi$  implying  $m_1 < m_2$  are at odds with the fact that the share of revolutionary authors is larger in 1470-1540 than in 1400-1470. The

---

<sup>23</sup>The procedure to set  $\psi$  is the one described in section 4. In particular, the timing of censorship by the Church can be identified if  $\psi_L \neq \psi_R$ .

<sup>24</sup>When censorship is not effective, the decrease in quality can be matched only when this happens naturally, without any intervention by the Church.

results reported in table 6 indicate that imperfect censorship has only an effect on the baseline results, but this is relatively small. In particular, the impact of censorship on knowledge growth stays large and negative.

**Model with self-censorship.** History tells us that censoring books was not the only tactic the Church used to limit the spread of revolutionary books. In fact, in the second half of the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the Catholic Church developed a system of tribunals, called the *Roman Inquisition*, aimed at persecuting both authors and printers accused of heresy. This institution affected the work of scientists and thinkers. One notable example is the experience of Galileo Galilei, who was tried by the Inquisition in 1633. The Inquisition matters for our analysis because it can slow down the accumulation of revolutionary knowledge through self-censorship: even if one author writes a high-quality revolutionary book, she still might prefer not to submit it to the printer for fear of being processed by the Inquisition. Others might have migrated elsewhere in Europe, where the Church could not reach them.<sup>25</sup> Similarly, even if the best books are revolutionary, printers might still prefer to be compliant for the same reason. This mechanism can be easily incorporated in our framework, assuming that the Inquisition makes publishing and writing revolutionary books less desirable. Individuals take this into account discounting  $q^R$  by a factor  $\gamma \in [0, 1]$ . We can also interpret  $\gamma$  as the probability that authors decide not to write revolutionary books or that printers do not publish them for fear of being punished. Under this new mechanism, the probability that a printer chooses the revolutionary sector is:

$$\text{Prob}\{q^C < \gamma p q^R\} = \text{Prob}\{\tilde{h}^C > (\gamma p)^{-1/\theta} \tilde{h}^R\} = m_t. \quad (15)$$

We re-estimate the model enriched by this feature. Parameter  $\gamma$  is mostly identify by  $\bar{\beta}m_2$ , which is too low in the simulations when the baseline model is used. Note that self-censorship is introduced starting  $t = 3$ , which allows us to separately identify  $\gamma$  and  $p$ . Parameter  $\gamma$  helps to speed the demise of revolutionary ideas, thus allowing for an initial larger level of revolutionary ideas. The estimation implies that  $\gamma=0.92$  and  $\bar{\beta}=0.18$ , which is very close to the baseline. Then, we assess the role of direct censorship by comparing simulations with the estimated  $\bar{\beta}$  and setting  $\bar{\beta} = 0$ , where  $\gamma$  is always set to its estimated value. If the baseline model was misspecified, the version with self censorship should give a different effect of direct censorship on knowledge growth. This is not the case: Table 6 shows that the results differ only slightly from the baseline. To understand the joint role of direct and self censorship, we perform a counterfactual simulation where  $\bar{\beta} = 0$  and  $\gamma = 1$ . The joint effect implies that knowledge quality would have been 78% higher than in the baseline. Since the effect of direct censorship was 50%, this means that self-censorship also has an effect on knowledge quality,

---

<sup>25</sup>De la Croix et al. (2020) show that a European academic market existed in early modern times.

even if including it in the model does not alter the baseline results about the effects of direct censorship.

**Universities only** In the baseline estimation we consider both university professors and members of academies. In Appendix A.2 we show that while the coverage of university professors is very good, we probably miss many members of academies. Hence, we provide a robustness check where we exclude those scholars who were not professors. Table 6 shows that the result of the baseline and this alternative estimation: censorship reduced log publications by 40% in the first case and 31% in the second case. This result reflects the larger share of censored authors among members of the academies.

<i>Symbol</i>	The role of censorship in:		Rate of censorship $\bar{\beta}$	% heretic scholars $m_5$
	scholars' quality $(q_5 - \hat{q}_5)/q_5$	% heretic scholars $(m_5 - \hat{m}_5)/m_5$		
Benchmark	-40%	-125%	18%	26%
Only Italian born scholars	-39%	-113%	18%	28%
Only southern Italian scholars	-53%	-102%	19%	34%
Only northern Italian scholars	-27%	-118%	16%	23%
Only $t \leq 4$	-23%	-144%	20%	20%
No weak links to institution	-37%	-114%	17%	27%
All publications	-39%	-121%	18%	27%
Length Wikipedia page	-52%	-124%	18%	27%
Imperfect censorship	-26%	-113%	20%	24%
Self censorship	-50%	-121%	18%	27%
Universities only	-31%	-100%	15%	26%

Notes: variables denoted by the hat relate to simulations under a no-censorship scenario, while all the other variables relate to simulations with censorship. Subscript 5 corresponds to the period 1680 - 1749.

Table 6: Sensibility checks

## 5 Conclusion

Censorship has a direct effect on knowledge accumulation by making censored material less available to scholars. It also discourages writers from engaging in non-compliant work, and hence modifies the allocation of talents across different types of activities. In this paper, we developed a new method that considers these two channels. Then, we applied it to the Catholic Church's censorship from the Counter-Reformation until the Enlightenment. We investigated whether censorship was responsible for the demise of Italian science and evaluated the relative importance of the direct channel vs. the activity choice channel.

Our analysis had three steps. First, we collected data on members of universities and academies,

identifying the scholars whose books were either allowed to be printed and sold, or put in the *Index Librorum Prohibitorum*, i.e. censored. Second, we built a theoretical model of knowledge accumulation through book production and censorship, distinguishing non-compliant knowledge (susceptible to being censored) from compliant knowledge. Third, we estimated the structural parameters of the model using facts collected from the dataset. We used the quantitative model to answer our questions by simulating a counterfactual path of knowledge dynamics characterized by the absence of censorship.

We concluded that censorship reduced by 40% the average log publication per scholar in Italy from 1470-1549 to 1680-1749. Renaissance Italy has been regarded as the cradle of culture and science. Yet, Italy found itself in a scientific backwater during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, being overtaken by non-Catholic countries such as Great Britain and the Netherlands. The sizeable effect that we estimated supports a claim that the Church’s censorship was one of the main drivers of Italy’s decline.

Half of this drop stems from the induced reallocation of talents towards compliant activities, while the other half arises from the direct effect of censorship on book availability. This result stresses the importance of selection effects when analyzing the impact of censorship on output. The top scholars at the time of the Counter-Reformation were all censored (Bruno, Galilei, Copernicus), and their successors might have been published as mediocre poets or theologians rather than as dangerous mathematicians.

Finally, one may wonder whether the Church’s censorship also had a role in the *economic* decline of Italy. This is not implausible, given that recent research highlighted the role of upper-tail human capital production for pre-industrial Europe’s take-off (Squicciarini and Voigtländer 2015; Cantoni and Yuchtman 2014; Mokyr 2011; Mokyr 2016). Our analysis sets the stage for future research on this topic by directly linking the Church’s censorship to upper-tail human capital production.

## References

- Acemoglu, Daron. 2008. “Oligarchic versus democratic societies.” *Journal of the European Economic Association* 6 (1): 1–44.
- Acemoglu, Daron, and James A Robinson. 2001. “A theory of political transitions.” *American Economic Review* 91 (4): 938–963.
- . 2008. “Persistence of power, elites, and institutions.” *American Economic Review* 98 (1): 267–93.

- Alexander, Amir. 2014. *Infinitesimal: How a dangerous mathematical theory shaped the modern world*. Macmillan.
- Anderson, R Warren. 2015. “Inquisitions and Scholarship.” *Social Science History* 39 (4): 677–702.
- Balsamo, Luigi, and Gigliola Fragnito. 2001. *Church, Censorship and Culture in Early Modern Italy*. Cambridge University Press.
- Becker, Sascha, Francisco J. Pino, and Jordi Vidal-Robert. 2021. “Freedom of the Press? Catholic Censorship during the Counter-Reformation.” CEPR Working Paper 16092.
- Beretta, Francesco. 2007. “Inquisición romana y atomismo desde el caso Galileo hasta comienzos del siglo XVIII: ¿Que ortodoxia?” *Ciencia y religión en la Edad Moderna*, pp. 35–68.
- Bénabou, Roland, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. 2021. “Forbidden Fruits: The Political Economy of Science, Religion, and Growth.” *The Review of Economic Studies*, 10. Forthcoming.
- Bolt, Jutta, and Jan Luiten van Zanden. 2020. “Maddison style estimates of the evolution of the world economy. A new 2020 update.” Maddison-Project Working Paper WP-15, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands.
- Braudel, Fernand. 2018. *Le modèle italien*. Flammarion.
- Cantoni, Davide, and Noam Yuchtman. 2014. “Medieval universities, legal institutions, and the commercial revolution.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 129 (2): 823–887.
- Casellato, Sandra, and Luciana Sitran Rea. 2002. *Professori e scienziati a Padova nel Settecento*. Padua: Antilia.
- Chaney, Eric. 2016. “Religion and the rise and fall of Islamic science.” Harvard University.
- . 2020. “Modern Library Holdings and Historic City Growth.” University of Oxford.
- Cipolla, Carlo M. 1994. *Before the industrial revolution: European society and economy, 1000-1700*. WW Norton & Company.
- Comino, Stefano, Alberto Galasso, and Clara Graziano. 2021. “Censorship, industry structure, and creativity: evidence from the Catholic inquisition in Renaissance Venice.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16028.
- De la Croix, David. 2021. “Scholars and Literati in European Academia before 1800.” *Reperitorium Eruditorum Totius Europae* 5:35–41.
- De Bujanda, Jesús Martínez, René Davignon, Ela Stanek, and Marcella Richter. 1996. *Thesaurus de la littérature interdite au XVIe siècle: auteurs, ouvrages, éditions avec addenda et corrigenda*. Volume 10. Librairie Droz.

- De Bujanda, Jésus Martínez, and Marcella Richter. 2002. *Index des livres interdits: Index Librorum Prohibitorum 1600-1966*. Volume 11. Montréal: Médiaspaul.
- De la Croix, David, Frédéric Docquier, Alice Fabre, and Robert Stelter. 2020. “The Academic Market and the Rise of Universities in Medieval and Early Modern Europe (1000-1800).” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14509.
- De la Croix, David, Matthias Doepke, and Joel Mokyr. 2018. “Clans, guilds, and markets: Apprenticeship institutions and growth in the preindustrial economy.” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 133 (1): 1–70.
- Dittmar, Jeremiah E, and Skipper Seabold. 2015. “Media, Markets, and Radical Ideas: Evidence from the Protestant Reformation.” Working Paper.
- Donato, Maria Pia. 2019. “Medicine and the Inquisition in the Early Modern World: Introduction.” In *Medicine and the Inquisition in the Early Modern World*, 1–13. Brill.
- Drelichman, Mauricio, Jordi Vidal-Robert, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2021. “The Long Run Effects of Religious Persecution: Evidence from the Spanish Inquisition.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP16030.
- Eisenstein, Elizabeth L. 1980. *The printing press as an agent of change*. Cambridge University Press.
- Ekelund, Robert B, Robert F Hébert, and Robert D Tollison. 2002. “An economic analysis of the Protestant Reformation.” *Journal of Political Economy* 110 (3): 646–671.
- . 2004. “The economics of the counter-reformation: incumbent-firm reaction to market entry.” *Economic Inquiry* 42 (4): 690–705.
- Fabroni, Angelo. 1791. *Historiae academiae pisanae*. Bologna: Forni.
- Facciolati, Jacopo. 1757. *Fasti Gymnasii Patavini*. Padua: typis Seminarii.
- Gingerich, Owen. 1973. “From Copernicus to Kepler: Heliocentrism as model and as reality.” *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 117 (6): 513–522.
- . 2004. *The book nobody read: chasing the revolutions of Nicolaus Copernicus*. Bloomsbury Publishing USA.
- Grabiner, Judith V. 2014. “Review of Infinitesimal: How a Dangerous Mathematical Theory Shaped the Modern World.” <https://www.maa.org/press/maa-reviews>.
- Grendler, Paul F. 1975. “The Roman Inquisition and the Venetian Press, 1540-1605.” *The Journal of Modern History* 47 (1): 48–65.
- Guriey, Sergei, and Daniel Treisman. 2020. “A theory of informational autocracy.” *Journal of Public Economics* 186:104–158.



- Gusdorf, Georges. 1969. *La Révolution Galiléenne*. Paris: Payot.
- Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. 1929. *Treccani. Enciclopedia Italiana di scienze, lettere ed arti*. Roma: Istituto dell'Enciclopedia Italiana. Also available at <https://www.treccani.it/>.
- Iyigun, Murat. 2015. *War, peace, and prosperity in the name of God: The Ottoman role in Europe's socioeconomic evolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Jones, Charles I. 2001. "Was an industrial revolution inevitable? Economic growth over the very long run." *Advances in macroeconomics* 1, no. 2.
- King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E Roberts. 2013. "How censorship in China allows government criticism but silences collective expression." *American Political Science Review*, pp. 326–343.
- Kortum, Samuel S. 1997. "Research, patenting, and technological change." *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, pp. 1389–1419.
- Koyama, Mark, and Melanie Meng Xue. 2015. "The Literary Inquisition: The Persecution of Intellectuals and Human Capital Accumulation in China." Working Paper.
- Kremer, Michael. 1993. "Population growth and technological change: One million BC to 1990." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 108 (3): 681–716.
- Landes, David S. 1999. *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor*. WW Norton & Company.
- Lucas, Robert E. 2009. "Ideas and growth." *Economica* 76 (301): 1–19.
- Lucas, Robert E, and Benjamin Moll. 2014. "Knowledge growth and the allocation of time." *Journal of Political Economy* 122 (1): 1–51.
- Maggiolo, Attilio. 1983. *I soci dell'accademia patavina dalla sua fondazione (1599) Attilio Maggiolo*. Accademia Patavia di Scienze Lettere ed Arti.
- Mazzetti, Serafino. 1847. *Repertorio di tutti i Professori antichi e moderni della famosa Università, e del celebre Istituto delle Scienze di Bologna*. Bologna: tipografia di San Tommaso d'Aquino.
- McFadden, Daniel. 1989. "A method of simulated moments for estimation of discrete response models without numerical integration." *Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society*, pp. 995–1026.
- Mokyr, Joel. 2011. *The gifts of Athena*. Princeton University Press.
- . 2016. *A culture of growth*. Princeton University Press.

- Origlia Paolino, Giovanni Giuseppe. 1754. *Istoria dello studio di Napoli*. Torino: nella stamperia di Giovanni di Simone.
- Parodi, Severina. 1983. *Catalogo degli accademici dalla fondazione*. Accademia della Crusca.
- Pesenti, Tiziana. 1984. *Professori e promotori di medicina nello studio di Padova dal 1405 al 1509*. Trieste: Lint.
- Prosperi, Adriano, Vincenzo Lavenia, and John Alfred Tedeschi. 2010. *Dizionario storico dell'Inquisizione*. Volume 2. Edizioni della Normale Pisa.
- Raggi, A. 1879. Memorie e documenti per la storia dell'Università di Pavia e degli uomini piu illustri che vi insegnarono.
- Renazzi, Filippo Maria. 1803. *Storia dell'Università degli studi di Roma: detta comunemente la sapienza, che contiene anche un saggio storico della letteratura romana, dal principio del secolo XIII sino al declinare del secolo XVIII*. Stamperia Pagliarini.
- Roberts, Margaret E. 2014. "Fear or friction? How censorship slows the spread of information in the digital age." Working Paper.
- Rosen, Edward. 1977. "When Did Copernicus Write the Revolutions'?" *Sudhoffs Archiv*, pp. 144–155.
- Rubin, Jared. 2014. "Printing and Protestants: an empirical test of the role of printing in the Reformation." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 96 (2): 270–286.
- . 2017. *Rulers, religion, and riches: Why the West got rich and the Middle East did not*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Scrucca, Luca, et al. 2013. "GA: a package for genetic algorithms in R." *Journal of Statistical Software* 53 (4): 1–37.
- Serangeli, Sandro. 2010. *I docenti dell'antica Università di Macerata:(1540-1824)*. G. Giapichelli.
- Shadmehr, Mehdi, and Dan Bernhardt. 2015. "State censorship." *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics* 7 (2): 280–307.
- Snyder, Jon R. 2012. *Dissimulation and the culture of secrecy in early modern Europe*. Univ of California Press.
- Spruit, Leen. 2019. Pages 1–6 in *Censorship, Self-Censorship, and Dissimulation*, edited by Dana Jalobeanu and Charles T. Wolfe. Cham: Springer International Publishing.
- Squicciarini, Mara P, and Nico Voigtländer. 2015. "Human capital and industrialization: Evidence from the age of enlightenment." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 130 (4): 1825–1883.

- Vidal-Robert, Jordi. 2011. “An economic analysis of the Spanish Inquisition’s motivations and consequences.” Working Paper.
- Wolf, Hubert. 2006. *Storia dell’Indice: il Vaticano ei libri proibiti*. Donzelli.
- Zhuang, Maiting. 2019. “Intergovernmental conflict and censorship: Evidence from China’s anti-corruption campaign.” Working Paper.