## Occupation, model tables

## April 14, 2024

Table 1: Elasticities of labor supply using different experiments

|                            | Change in net wages | Change in pension points |
|----------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|
| Elasticity of labor supply | 0.052               | 1.227                    |

Table 2: Lifecycle model: counterfactual experiments

|                    | Pension<br>gender gap | Women's labor<br>hours | Women's labor participation (%) | Women in marginal jobs (%) | Welfare gains wrt baseline (%) |
|--------------------|-----------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Baseline           | 0.212                 | 17.14                  | 67.07                           | 25.76                      | 0.0                            |
| Caregiver credits  | 0.201                 | 19.50                  | 73.43                           | 25.73                      | 0.102                          |
| Lower income taxes | 0.214                 | 21.71                  | 75.44                           | 25.75                      | 0.247                          |

Notes: The experiments in the last three rows imply the same government deficit.

Welfare gains = increase in consumption at baseline to be indifferent with the experiment under analysis.

Labor outcomes are measured while the child is 10 y.o. or younger

Reforms are in place while the child is 10 y.o. or younger

Table 3: Model parameters and fit

| Parameter                                      | Value | Target statistics              |      |       |
|--|-------|--------------------------------|------|-------|
|  |       | Name                           | Data | Model |
| Discount factor $(\beta)$                      | 0.984 | Effect of reform on hours      | 2.32 | 2.36  |
| Cost of working - mini $(q_{10})$              | 0.198 | Share mini-jobs                | 0.26 | 0.26  |
| Cost of working - part $(q_{20})$              | 0.139 | Share part-time                | 0.20 | 0.20  |
| Cost of working - full $(q_{38.5})$            | 0.440 | Share full time                | 0.20 | 0.20  |
| Fixed effect - standard deviation $(\sigma_q)$ | 0.105 | Effect of reform on employment | 0.06 | 0.06  |

Table 4: Non-targeted moments

| Effect of the reform on                          | Data                  | Model                |
|--|-----------------------|----------------------|
| Pension points Work full time Regular employment | 0.11<br>0.03<br>-0.07 | 0.13<br>0.04<br>0.06 |
| Effect of retroactive credits on                 | Data                  | Model                |
| Marginal propensity to earn (MPE)                | -0.51 to -0.12        | -0.22                |