Occupation, model tables

October 16, 2024

Table 1: Elasticities of labor supply using different experiments

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	Change in net wages	Change in pension points
Elasticity of labor supply	0.052	1.227

Table 2: Lifecycle model: counterfactual experiments

	Pension gender gap	Women's labor hours	Women's labor participation (%)	Average age at retirement	Welfare gains wrt baseline (%)
Baseline	0.508	16.28	68.73	66.72	0.0
Caregiver credits	0.482	16.81	70.08	66.52	0.156
Caregiver credits, no threshold	0.452	17.07	70.43	66.40	0.367
Lower income taxes	0.495	17.24	70.86	66.57	0.487

Notes: The experiments in the last three rows imply the same government deficit. Welfare gains = increase in consumption at baseline to be indifferent with the experiment under analysis. Reforms are in place while the child is 10 y.o. or younger.

Table 3: Model parameters and fit

Parameter	Value	Target statistics		
		Name	Data	Model
Cost of working - mini (q_{10})	0.068	Share mini-jobs	0.26	0.256
Cost of working - part (q_{20})	0.137	Share part-time	0.20	0.198
Cost of working - full $(q_{38.5})$	0.396	Share full time	0.20	0.198
Fixed effects distribution (q_{LIM})	0.643	Effect of the reform on pension points	0.153	0.153

Table 4: Non-targeted moments

Effect of the reform on	Data	Model	
Behavioral pension points	0.10	0.057	
Work full time	0.05	-0.004	
Marginal employment	-0.12	-0.133	
Non-marginal employment earnings (€)	2809	1583	
Employed	0.10	0.084	
Other moments	Data	Model	
Marginal propensity to earn (MPE)	-0.51 to -0.12	-0.33	

NOTES: The numbers related to the effect of the reform in the data are the DiD coefficients reported in Tables ?? and ??. The model counterparts are obtained by running the same DiD models as in the empirical section, but using simulated data.