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C634 MDMP EXAM

Army Nurse Corp

19 February 2016

# Running Estimate

The area of interest is movement and logistics of troops and equipment. It is very critical to the success of our mission to the Ranger base camp at Calasiao in the Lingayen Gulf. This area of operation is characterized by sharp terrain that will slow down movement of troops, hills and mountains dominate both the eastern and western flanks. Apart from the poor condition weather, it will also be difficult to resist the Japanese landing even with the help of Philippine Defense Forces because in bad weather and rugged terrain, Air support is needed to deliver supplies, surveillance and movement of troops.

According to information from different sources, Japanese forces have already landed at five key points in the Northern and Southern Luzon as well as Mindanao (King, 1985, p. 7). They have established seaplane bases and seized airfields. Their target is Lingayen Gulf with proximity to Manila, which is the capital city. Therefore, this is the most logical site for a large invasion force to land. We anticipate that the landing will take place at the Southern end of the Gulf where the friendly forces store their artillery batteries. We need the full assistance of the submarines and coastal artillery to shoot down the Japanese seaplanes (King, 1985, p. 8). We have to develop an accurate, comprehensive movement estimate to define appropriately where we should land, when and how to land. We should also identify techniques on how to mass combat power and ways of minimizing opposition to our landings as long as we can. With our significant variable here being time, our estimates should focus on not only time but also other factors such as the Japanese Army (enemy) Courses of Action, terrain and also the resources that we have at our disposal. We must understand that there are limitations in supplies, and any decisions made should be focused on reducing wastage. Every Soldier is required to be mission capable, ready as a whole force, and with an understanding of the kind of equipment available at our disposal. The Battalion Engineer will need to analyze the situation, develop a plan of action to reduce obstacles and tasks, and furthermore evaluate the quick movement and action. The entire force is required to understand the planning factors within a critical event. Without a full understanding of this, the staff will not provide the detail necessary for plan synchronization. Moreover, all the beachheads and shores around us should be secured. Land, sea, and, if need be, airborne forces should prevent the Japanese from coming closer to the camp.

Time and precision are of the utmost essence to the success of this mission. If we delay our mission, or if we falter and allow the Japanese any time to react, then the entire mission will be compromised. The POW camp lies behind enemy lines, and along the mainstream of Japanese enemy movements. Consequently, stealth and impeccability in timing are fundamental. All through the mission, secrecy is essential until the very last minute. At any moment that the Japanese forces discover that we are homing in on them, they will immediately react by killing the POWs. Our execution should therefore take the shortest time possible, but the planning and preparation should be relatively more meticulous. Our attack will take place in the next 48 hours. The first forty will be spent on planning and preparation, while the last 8 are committed to the execution of the mission. During planning and preparation, the soldiers will familiarize themselves with the terrain and plan of action. Reconnaissance operations will be ongoing to determine patterns in movement and processes by the Japanese, in order to identify loopholes that may be exploited. The forty-hour preparation period and the 8-hour execution period will be interspersed, occurring concurrently. In particular, reconnaissance operations and intelligence gathering will take place even in between mission execution.

The nature of the terrain presents a tricky situation in our quest to maintain secrecy. The area separating our territory from enemy territory is occupied by open grasslands and rice paddies. This will significantly slow-down movement, since stealth will be an essential substitute to cover. There are heavy contingencies of the Japanese army in the area, since they are in transit. Consequently, it will be more prudent to move slower and especially at night, where darkness will provide the required cover lacking due to the absence of vegetation. Daytime activities should be confined to movement through Philipino villages, or to scouting, reconnaissance and preparation as well as rest activities. Using time this way will improve the efficacy of time expenditure and enhance the chances of completing the mission as soon as possible.

Before deploying the mission, it will be prudent to allow sufficient time for the Japanese contingencies going through the area to have moved out. Once the Japanese forces available within a one-hour radius of the camp has been diminished, the mission objectives can then be deployed. The positioning of army platoons and friendly guerilla fighters at strategic entry and exit points will be useful in further inhibiting the capacity of these forces in providing backup once the mission execution has begun. The strategic locations in this case include the highways and along the bridge.

The final stages of the attack are the most crucial. To enhance further, the secrecy of the mission as the soldiers fall into place, an appropriate distraction will be essential. The need for a distraction arises because the area leading up to the camp is an open area that is well secured. There are three watch towers, each 12-foot high. There is also a pillbox occupied by heavily armed men. There are three barbed wire fences, four feet apart, cordoning off the stockade. Consequently, it is easier for the Japanese forces to note any parties attempting to make their way into the camp, signal the alarm, start firing, and possibly kill the prisoners of war, before we can subdue them. A distraction will keep them preoccupied and forestall the above-described outcomes. Flying a plane above the camp will suffice as a distraction, since the men tend to look upward whenever a plane flies overhead.

# The Problem

There is a danger of overextension in the face of a continual threat of counterattack by the Japanese forces against the Sixth Army, which is the leading factor that has prevented the XIV Corps from moving southwards. There are also logistics problems that are delaying the progress of XIV Corps as well as slowing down the operation of I Corps from securing the left side of the gulf. Another problem is that the US and the Filipino forces are poorly equipped and ill prepared. Shipment of cargo depends on the US Army vessels with limited cargo capacity. There are also problems resulting from miniscule budget, shortage of weapons, communication equipment, transportation, and uniform for the soldiers.

To sustain ground forces and succeed in the entire operation, we must be adequately positioned to defeat the Japanese counter attacks, we must use deception, interdiction, and counter nobility. The logistics mechanism should be able to facilitate faster movement of soldiers and men to the beach and the shores faster than the Japanese forces. They should have the necessary ammunition for dealing with counterattacks. Apart from getting the men and equipment to the ground with speed, the logistics mechanism should facilitate reinforcement movement forward and casualties to safe places we must find all other logistics ashore. It will be crucial to facilitate the movement of supplies to the forces rather than putting more soldiers in the front.

# The Mission

These are military actions of a state and non-state actors as they try to respond to a situation that is developing. A mission plan is required to put such a case on hold. Operations can be of non-combat or combat nature. A military mission statement may incorporate three different and particular words which are: Liberate, Raid, and Secure. To liberate is to set free from bondage or incarceration (Ancker & Burke, 2003, p. 18). In our case here it reflects on freeing Philippine as a nation from control by Japanese that is a foreign and oppressive government. On the other hand, a raid is a sudden attack on enemy troops, air crafts or an armed force in an attack or warfare. Secure, on the contrary, refers to something that is protected from danger, or rather to protect from danger or attack. Regarding our case, it means guarding so that the no one, Japanese included, can enter or leave without permission.

The one word that should be involved in this military mission statement is Raid. The raid also refers to depression or a tactic in the warfare mission that has no intention of capturing or holding terrain but finishes with a strong raiding force and retreats as fast as possible to the defending position to be able to a counter attack (Ancker & Burke, 2003, p. 20). The interest of this mission is in securing and freeing the prisoners of war from imminent death. The Japanese will not hesitate to execute the prisoners at the slightest provocation. Thus, a sharp, quick, and high-impact action is needed to achieve the mission objectives. The choice of raid is further informed by the fact that there is a moderately heavy presence of Japanese war contingents in the area. Therefore, once the subjects have been secured, a defensive retreat is essential.

# Purpose and Task

**The Filipino Guerillas**- there was an unrestricted Philippine resistance movement during the Japanese occupation of the island during World War II. This movement opposed the Japanese. They were involved in underground and guerilla activities. Studies indicate that there were more than 260,000 people organized into guerillas (King, 1985, p. 13). These were underground anti-Japanese movement’s organizations, and their effectiveness was realized after the end of Second World War when Japan controlled only 12 provinces out of the 42 provinces.

**Alamo Scouts** were a Special Reconnaissance Unit of the US 6th Army in the World War 2 Pacific Theatre Operations (Department of the Army Washington, DC, 2012, pp. 1-4). The scouts organized themselves on Ferguson Island and also New Guinea. Their main purpose was undertaking raids and reconnaissance from the southwest Pacific. Their operations were deeply behind Japanese lines, and they were commanded personally by Lieutenant General Krueger, who was also US Sixth Army Commanding General. This unit was formed by General Krueger to provide timely vital intelligence on enemy troops especially the Japanese. They were to estimate the troop numbers, types of units and location of the troops to the Sixth Army. This group is famous for the liberation of American prisoners of war (POW) from the Cabanatuan POW camp that was controlled by the Japanese in January 1945 in the Philippines.

**Civilians**- World War 2 saw American attitude towards Filipinos change because of the assistance they offered the American troops against the Japanese, which involved the mobilization efforts during the war against Japanese.

**The 6th US Army**- this is a United States Field Army. This Army served extensively in the Pacific during World War 2 including the fight against Japanese in the Philippine Islands.

**The Radio Team in Guimba**- the radio was the only mode of communication during the rescue of American and Allied prisoners of war from Japanese POW compound in Cabanatuan in the Philippines. This operation was done jointly by 6th Rangers, Alamo Scouts, and Filipino Guerillas.

# Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)

We lost so many soldiers to the Japanese during the Battle of Bataan suffering at the Cabanatuan Prison and many transferred to unknown destinations. The remaining soldiers are approximaately slightly over 500. The US command has become concerned that there is an intention to kill the prisoners of war. We have already been alerted of several killings that have taken place. We have to arrange a raid to rescue the remaining soldiers and allied prisoners of war.

We have the support of Filipino Guerillas and the civilians. If we have a concrete plan, and we have the Aid of Alamo Scouts, then we can rescue the prisoners of war. An arrangement was made for the attack to take place on January 30th and kept secret. Many factors will facilitate our victory on the 30th day of January. We have to act fast and free the prisoners from the number of casualties’ increases. I believe that the combination that we have in place, the Filipino guerillas, Alamo Scouts and the sixth ranger battalion can carry out a successful raid. The guerillas already based in the area, and the local fighters have guided the Alamo scouts into the area. The reconnaissance of the camp has provided us with enough information that has helped us in finalizing the final raid plans.

# Commander’s Judgement

According to the commander, the combat is going to be a raiding patrol whose mission is to attack the POW base for liberating personnel. The key to this raid is an element of surprise, firepower, and violent action. The initial plan was to execute actions on the objective on 29th Jan. Mucci, however, received information of large numbers of Japanese soldiers within the vicinity of Pangatian. There were reports that large numbers of withdrawing Japanese forces had travelled the highway adjacent to the camp in the preceding 24 hours. Additionally, at Cabu Creek, just a mile north, there were two to three hundred enemies bivouacked. Moreover, four miles south, at Cabanatuan City, there was a Japanese division. The 24 hour delay facilitated counter-offensive planning. During this delay, a number of strategies were executed. Villagers were asked to leave the vicinity of the objectives. Moreover, guerillas positioned in the area detained outsiders entering the area.

On 30 January, the conditions were more favorable for the raid. The force that had been at the camp had left and traffic on the highway was much lighter. Activity at the camp was generally normal. The nearest enemy force was at Cabu, which was further off. At this time, Mucci and his team had also gained more elaborate information on the camp, such as the various security installations within its peripheries. In addition,

# COA Analysis, Comparison & Recommendation

The central aim of this mission is the rescue of all POW held captive by the Japanese. Thus, the success of the mission is measurable through the number of POWs freed. It is therefore essential to identify the most feasible course of action that will immediately follow after the POWs have successfully been secured. The following are the relevant facts and assumptions pertaining to the mission. The first fact is that at the end, the enemy forces within the camp will have completely been neutralized. As such, the camp area will be safe save for external threats. A second closely related fact is that there are men cordoning off the camp thereby keeping enemy fighters away from the camp. A third fact pertains to the prisoners of war. A large majority of them are severely incapacitated and disoriented. They, therefore, do not have the strength, both physical and mental, to guide themselves out of the camp and to Gumba. Even if they did have the strength, their disorientation, and trauma of their experience will further inhibit their self-guiding capability.

Apart from these facts, there are a number of important assumptions. The first is that our forces will not suffer significant casualties and will thus be in a position to provide sustained combat support, or assistance to the prisoners of war. Here, it is assumed that the raid will be so successful, that we will only lose at most one of our men in the raid. A second assumption is that there are no significant levels of enemy fighters in the area around the camp. A third assumption is that word of the raid did not get out and as such, there are no enemy forces travelling to the camp. Another assumption pertains to the prisoners of war. It is assumed that the prisoners of war are in no position whatsoever to guide themselves out of the camp. Fifthly, it is also assumed that the guerilla fighters positioned at designated strategic points within critical access points to the camp will be able to repulse any incoming enemy forces and to prevent them from reaching camp. Other significant assumptions include that the enemy forces are actively and aggressively pursuing the rescue party for purposes of retaliatory attacks, or to complete their mission of killing the POWs.

The success of this mission will primarily be based on the number of POWs who will successfully be liberated. Liberation here refers to total liberation, which will only occur if the prisoners of war are successfully taken to Guimba. Thus, not only should the POWs be successfully freed from their captors at the camp, they should also successfully be protected from the prospect of an ambush or a similar assault while they are on transit to Guimba. Another important evaluative criteria is that whatever course of action is chosen should minimize the casualties of war. The best course of action will enable the protection of the maximum number of POWs, coupled with the lowest number of deaths of soldiers. Thus, the best course of action is the one, which ensures that overall, the fewest number of lives, is lost.

We can continue moving towards Guimba, in full knowledge that movement will be slow. The large number of prisoners of war and the inadequacy of carts means that movement will significantly be slow. This will place the entire contingent at risk of an ambush by enemy forces. During this period, we will also require food and other supplies such as medicine to sustain the POWs. Since movement will be slow, it is likely that enemy forces, who are assumed to be in aggressive pursuit, will catch up with us in one of the villages.

This type of combat is a raid which is a sudden attack on enemy troops, air crafts or an Armed Forces in an attack or warfare. As discussed above. The raid also refers to depression or a tactic in the warfare mission that has no intention of capturing or holding terrain but finishes with a strong raiding force and retreat as fast as possible to the defending position to be able to a counter attack. However, this is a liberation raid (Cone, 2013, p. 5). Therefore, this means that moving outside the camp after the invasion would help. Moving fast to a location that is concealed and establishing a defensive parameter would be the best option. It will make us prepared for any counter attack in case the enemy troops regroup or receive reinforcement from another camp. If we continue moving towards Guimba, we will run the risk of a counter-attack by the enemy troops who will be seeking revenge. Staying in the camp is also not a good idea since the enemy could send reinforcement from other camps.

The solution is raiding, liberating and retreating to a safer ground that is concealed to establish a defensive parameter (Cone, 2013, p. 5). Raiding is the most lethal and common form of warfare to the situation at hand. We will attack at break of dawn with the aim of finding the enemy still sleeping, unsuspecting and disorganized. We have to maintain a high degree of secrecy about our intended action. We will rely heavily on skills and surprise instead of mass because our goal is to liberate the POW. The plan will include a short, precise and violent force, clandestine approach to the POW base and exfiltration as soon as we have completed our objective. It will allow our troops to exit the scene as fast and possible. The Filipino guerillas having established some clandestine communications with the prisoners now have some information on how the camp was designed.

This raid operation is considerably large as it involves liberation of many POW against an area dominated by the stronger and more powerful Japanese Army. The guerillas will be joined by the reconnaissance platoon so they can clear the way forward by marking landing and drop zones. The paratroopers will the be next to jump to the marked areas and link up with the guerillas. Their work is to secure the prisoners after killing the guards. The other battalion will move to the camp on land tractors to transport the prisoners on vehicles. Another part of the plan is to safeguard the escape using heavy artillery to divert the remaining Japanese force.

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