

**Academic Positions:**

**Assistant Professor**, Business School, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, 2022-  
**Postdoctoral Researcher**, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, 2021-2022

**Education:**

**Ph.D. in Economics**, Brown University, 2021  
Ph.D. Advisors: Jesse Shapiro, Rafael La Porta, Neil Thakral

**Master of Sciences**, Economics and Finance, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, 2014

**Bachelor of Arts**, Social Sciences, Amsterdam University College (with distinction), 2013

**Teaching and Research Fields:**

Industrial organization, Development Economics, Political Economy

**Teaching Experience:**

Main Instructor

|             |   |
|-------------|---|
| Summer 2019 | Behavioral Game Theory, Brown University, Pre-college courses       |
| Summer 2018 | Principles of Microeconomics, Brown University, Pre-college courses |

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| Fall 2020   | Theory of Behavioral Economics, Brown University, Prof. Geoffroy De Clippel    |
| Spring 2015 | Topics in Microeconomics, University College London, Dr. Elodie Douarin        |
| Spring 2015 | Microeconomics I, Queen Mary University of London, Dr. Asen Ivanov             |
| Spring 2015 | Labour Economics, Queen Mary University of London, Barbara Masi                |
| Fall 2014   | Applied Game Theory, University College London, Dr. Randolph Bruno             |
| Fall 2014   | Health Economics, Queen Mary University of London, Dr. Georgios Kavetsos       |
| Fall 2014   | Development Economics, Queen Mary University of London, Dr. JM Albala-Bertrand |
| Fall 2014   | Macroeconomics II, Queen Mary University of London, Dr. JM Albala-Bertrand     |
| Spring 2014 | Industrial Organization, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Dr. Christian Michel        |
| Fall 2013   | Macroeconomics I, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Dr. Davide Debortoli               |

**Research Experience and Other Employment:**

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| Summer 2020   | Bank of Spain, PhD Summer Intern   |
| Summer 2019   | Amazon Inc., Economist Intern  |
| May-June 2019 | World Bank, Short-term Consultant  |
| 2017-2018     | Brown University, RA for Prof. Joaquin Blaum                                 |
| 2015-2016     | Institute for Fiscal Studies, RA for Dr. Britta Augsborg and Dr. Bet Caeyers |
| Summer 2014   | Universitat Pompeu Fabra, RA for Dr. Maria Petrova                           |
| Spring 2014   | Universitat Pompeu Fabra, RA for Prof. Fabrizio Germano                      |

**Conferences and Seminars (scheduled\*, by co-author<sup>+</sup>)**

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| 2021 | Northwestern Development Rookiefest*; STEG Theme 5 Workshop*; EEA-ESEM; 7th Workshop on Relational Contracts; ThReD Conference; Midwest International Economic Development Conference; ITAM (Business); Nera; Insper; Boston University; CUNEF; Harvard Business School (Strategy); Charles River Associates; UC Berkeley (Haas); ECARES; Católica-Lisbon; NEUDC; IGC-Stanford Conference on Firms, Trade and Development; Brown University |
| 2020 | NEUDC; Young Economist Symposium <sup>+</sup> ; DEVPEC <sup>+</sup> ; Brown University; FLACSO Ecuador  |
| 2019 | PEDL/IGC Conference <sup>+</sup> ; Econometric Society Winter Meeting <sup>+</sup> ; Corporación Andina de Fomento; Brown University; Universidad San Francisco de Quito  |
| 2018 | Watson Institute of Public Affairs  |

**Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:**

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| 2020- 2021 | Dissertation Completion Proposal Award, Brown University |
| 2018- 2020 | Graduate Studies Fellowship, Bank of Spain               |
| 2018       | Corporación Andina de Fomento Grant \$15,000 with J      |
| 2018       | Brugués and S Giambra                                    |
|            | Global Mobility Fellowship, Brown University             |
| 2017-2018  | Hazeltine Fellowship for Graduate Research, Brown        |
| 2017       | University   |
| 2017       | Honors in Field Examinations, Brown University           |
| 2017       | Graduate Program in Development Summer Research Award,   |
| 2015-2017  | Brown University   |
| 2013-2014  | Student Grant, Brown Arts Initiative                     |
|            | Social Sciences Scholarship, Fundación Ramón Areces      |
|            | Tuition Waiver and Teaching Assistantship, Barcelona     |
|            | Graduate School of Economics                             |

**Research Papers:*****“Take the Goods and Run: Contracting Frictions and Market Power in Supply Chains”***

Firms in developing countries often face concentrated input markets and contracting frictions. This paper studies the efficiency of self-sustained long-term relationships between buyers and sellers, a common solution to contracting frictions, when sellers have significant market power and trade-credit contracts cannot be enforced through courts. Using new transaction-level data from the Ecuadorian manufacturing supply chain, I document trade patterns consistent with these frictions. As a relationship ages, quantities

rise, and prices fall more than can be explained by quantity discounts. Based on these facts, I develop and estimate a dynamic non-linear contracting model with limited enforcement in which buyers can default on their trade-credit debt without legal penalties. In the estimated model, sellers withhold trade in early periods of a relationship, and encourage trade in later periods, in order to give buyers an incentive to pay debts. My key finding is that bilateral trade is estimated to be inefficiently low in early periods of the relationship, but converges toward efficiency as relationships age, despite sellers' market power. Counterfactual simulations imply that both seller market power and limited enforcement contribute to inefficiencies in trade, as addressing either friction alone leads to welfare losses, and that relaxing both frictions can lead to significant efficiency gains.

***“Political Connections and the Misallocation of Procurement Contracts: Evidence from Ecuador”*** (with Javier Brugués and Samuele Giambra)

We use new administrative data from Ecuador to study the welfare effects of the misallocation of procurement contracts caused by political connections. We show that firms that form links with the bureaucracy through their shareholders experience an increased probability of being awarded a government contract. We develop a novel sufficient statistic—the average gap in revenue productivity and capital share of revenue—to measure the efficiency gains or losses of political connections. Our framework allows for heterogeneity in quality and quantity, and non-constant marginal costs. We estimate political connections create welfare losses of up to 6% of the procurement budget.

***“Liquidity Spillovers through Ownership Networks”***

This paper studies the diffusion of liquidity shocks through ownership networks. Using novel administrative data from Ecuador for 2007-2016, I find that investment, employment, and cash flows increase as a response to liquidity shocks to related firms when the firm is financially constrained. Evidence suggests that i) these spillovers work mainly through the collateral channel, rather than the internal capital market or the internal trade channels, and that ii) flows may be inefficient as resources are not targeted towards firms with the highest return to capital or labor nor the most productive.