John, Richard and the Evolution of Influence Networks



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A sociological investigation of CDS at 20

On their birthdays, two incredible scientists and yet ...so uniquely different






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
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




John is adored by his students:



Richard implements perfect plans:



What are the consequences of these social structures?

The dynamics of opinions

DeGroot opinion dynamics model

$$y(t+1) = W y(t)$$

- Opinions $y \in \mathbb{R}^n$
- Influence network = row-stochastic W
- by P-F: $\lim_{t\to\infty} y(t) = (w^T y(0))\mathbb{1}_n$ where w is dominant left eigenvector of W
- Self-weights $W_{ii} =: x_i$
- Interpersonal accorded weights W_i
- Relative interpersonal accorded weights C_{ij} , where $W_{ij} = (1 x_i)C_{ij}$





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$$W(x) = \operatorname{diag}(x)I_n + \operatorname{diag}(\mathbb{1}_n - x)C$$



The dynamics of social power and self-confidence

Reflected appraisal hypothesis by Cooley, 1902:

individual' self-appraisal (e.g., self-confidence, self-esteem, self-worth) is influenced by the appraisal held by others of her


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 $self-appraisal = self-weights \leftarrow$

relative control = social power


The closed-loop system

- DeGroot dynamics about an issue: y(t+1) = W(x)y(t)
- Influence network $W(x) = \operatorname{diag}(x)I_n + \operatorname{diag}(\mathbb{1}_n x)C$
- Reflected appraisal across issues: x(k+1) = w(x(k)) =: F(x(k))

x(k+1) = F(x(k))

$$F(x) = \begin{cases} \mathbb{e}_i, \\ \left(\frac{c_1}{1-x_1}, \dots, \frac{c_n}{1-x_n}\right) / \sum_{i=1}^n \frac{c_i}{1-x_i}, \end{cases}$$

if $x = e_i$ for all $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ otherwise



c is the dominant left eigenvector of C


In Theory ...

Theorem (General "relative interpersonal accorded weights" C)

• convergence = forgetting initial conditions for all non-trivial initial conditions,

$$\lim_{k\to\infty} x(k) = \lim_{k\to\infty} w(x(k)) = x^*$$

- 2 accumulation of social power and self-appraisal
 - fixed point $x^* > 0$ has same ordering of c
 - social power threshold T such that: $x_i^* \ge c_i \ge T$ or $x_i^* \le c_i \le T$



Doubly-stochastic *C*: emergency of democracy


Lemma (Convergence to democracy)

Iff C is doubly-stochastic:

- the non-trivial fixed point of F is $\frac{\mathbb{1}_n}{n}$,
- ② for all non-trivial initial conditions, $\lim_{k\to\infty} x(k) = \lim_{k\to\infty} w(x(k)) = \frac{\mathbb{I}_n}{n}$.




- Uniform social power
- No power accumulation









Star topology: emergency of autocracy


Lemma (Convergence to autocracy)

Iff graph has star topology with center j:

- there are no non-trivial fixed points of F
- ② for all initial non-trivial conditions, $\lim_{k\to\infty} x(k) = \lim_{s\to\infty} w(x(k)) = e_j$.




- Autocrat appears in center of star topology
- Extreme power accumulation!









Conclusions

Sociological investigation of CDS at 20

- John: self-confident and influential
- Richard: great manager and collaborator
- ... inexorable consequences of their surrounding interpersonal nets!

Coworkers: Peng Jia (Mech Eng, UCSB), Ana MirTabatabaei (Bosch), Noah Friedkin (Sociology, UCSB)

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