

TryHackMe — Rogue Poller

TryHackMe Task 22 — Rogue Poller

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Scenario

An intruder on the OT network is polling Modbus registers via TCP/502. Your job is to **analyze the network capture** and determine what data was accessed.

1. TShark Modbus Traffic Filtering

The first step in my attack chain was to isolate Modbus traffic. Using TShark (the CLI version of Wireshark), I filtered out all non-Modbus traffic in the provided PCAP file ([rogue-poller-1750969333044.pcapng](#)). The command I used was:

```
tshark -r rogue-poller-1750969333044.pcapng -Y "tcp.port == 502" -T fields -e ip.src -e ip.dst -e modbus.func_code -e modbus.reference_num
```

This gave me the source and destination IPs, function codes, and reference numbers, allowing me to pinpoint the exact Modbus interactions between the attacker and the PLC.


```
(fc0d3x_guest@kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ tshark -r rogue-poller-1750969333044.pcapng -Y "tcp.port == 502" -T fields -e ip.src -e ip.dst -e modbus.func_code -e modbus.reference_num
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165
10.10.75.165 10.10.145.25
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165 3 0
10.10.75.165 10.10.145.25
10.10.75.165 10.10.145.25 3
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165 3 2
10.10.75.165 10.10.145.25 3
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165 3 4
10.10.75.165 10.10.145.25 3
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165 3 6
10.10.75.165 10.10.145.25 3
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165 3 8
10.10.145.25 10.10.145.25 3
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165 3 10
10.10.75.165 10.10.145.25 3
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165 3 12
10.10.75.165 10.10.145.25 3
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165
10.10.145.25 10.10.75.165 3 14
```

2. Extract Response Register Values

I then focused on the response packets, as they contained the actual data. Using the following command to filter by Modbus and source IP, I was able to extract register values:

```
tshark -r rogue-poller-1750969333044.pcapng -Y "modbus && ip.src == 10.10.75.165" -V | grep -i "Register Value"
```

From here, I identified several non-zero values from the Modbus response that stood out among the mostly zeroed registers.



```
(fc0d3x_guest@kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ tshark -r rogue-poller-1750969333044.pcapng -Y "modbus && ip.src == 10.10.75.165" -V | grep -i "Register Value"
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 0
Register Value (UINT16): 21576
Register Value (UINT16): 19835
Register Value (UINT16): 12654
Register Value (UINT16): 17525
Register Value (UINT16): 13684
Register Value (UINT16): 29233
Register Value (UINT16): 13388
Register Value (UINT16): 24434
Register Value (UINT16): 13159
Register Value (UINT16): 12659
Register Value (UINT16): 29747
Register Value (UINT16): 29299
Register Value (UINT16): 32000
```

3. Identifying Interesting Non-Zero Register Values

The non-zero register values were my next target. These values likely contained important data or the flag. The response I obtained looked like this:

Register Value (UINT16): 21576
Register Value (UINT16): 19835
Register Value (UINT16): 12654
Register Value (UINT16): 17525
Register Value (UINT16): 13684
Register Value (UINT16): 29233
Register Value (UINT16): 13388
Register Value (UINT16): 24434

Register Value (UINT16): 13159

Register Value (UINT16): 12659

Register Value (UINT16): 29747

Register Value (UINT16): 29299

Register Value (UINT16): 32000

These values were clearly significant, so I wrote a quick bash script to decode them.

4. Decoding the Flag with a Bash Script


I created a simple bash script to convert these UINT16 values into hexadecimal, concatenate them, and then decode them into ASCII. Here is the script I used:

```
#!/bin/bash

values= 21576 19835 12654 17525 13684 29233 13388 24434 13159 12659 29747
29299 32000

hex=""
for val in "$ values[@] " do
h=$( printf "%04x" $val )
hex+=$h
done


echo "[+] Combined Hex: $hex"
echo -n "[+] ASCII Guess: "
echo "$hex" | xxd -r -p
```



```
fc0d3x_guest@kali: ~  
GNU nano 8.3 decode.sh  
#!/bin/bash  
  
# List of interesting non-zero values  
values=(21576 19835 12654 17525 13684 29233 13388 24434 13159 12659 29747 29299 32000)  
  
# Convert each to hex, combine, and decode  
hex=""  
for val in "${values[@]"; do  
    h=$(printf "%04x" $val)  
    hex+=$h  
done  
  
echo "[+] Combined Hex: $hex"  
echo -n "[+] ASCII Guess: "  
echo "$hex" | xxd -r -p
```

After running the script, the flag revealed itself as:

THM Industrial_registers



```
(fc0d3x_guest@kali)-[~]  
$ nano decode.sh  
  
(fc0d3x_guest@kali)-[~]  
$ chmod +x decode.sh  
  
(fc0d3x_guest@kali)-[~]  
$ ./decode.sh  
[+] Combined Hex: 54484d7b316e447535747231344c5f7233673173743372737d00  
[+] ASCII Guess: THM Industrial_registers  
  
(fc0d3x_guest@kali)-[~]  
$
```

5. Conclusion

What I learned:

Modbus Vulnerabilities: Modbus lacks encryption or authentication by default, which is a huge security risk when exposed on the network, especially in unsegmented environments.

TShark: It proved to be an extremely powerful tool for packet forensics, enabling me to automate the extraction of meaningful data from the traffic.

Memory Access: Even seemingly innocuous Modbus read requests can expose sensitive data such as flags, configuration secrets, and more when decoded correctly.

In this red team exercise, I successfully used my knowledge of industrial protocols to extract and decode sensitive information hidden within Modbus traffic. This highlights the importance of securing industrial control systems (ICS) against such attacks.