

Testing the LATE Assumptions

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Review of “Textbook” Instrumental Variables (IV) Model

Observed


- ▶ Y = Outcome (Wage)
- ▶ D = Treatment (Attend Uni)
- ▶ Z = IV (Live Nearby)

Unobserved

- ▶ U = Confounders (Ability)

Assumptions

- ▶ Model: $Y = \alpha + \beta D + U$
- ▶ Relevance: $\text{Cov}(Z, D) \neq 0$
- ▶ Exogeneity: $\text{Cov}(Z, U) = 0$



A Relevant, Exogenous Instrument Identifies β

Assumptions

$$Y = \alpha + \beta D + U, \quad \text{Cov}(Z, D) \neq 0, \quad \text{Cov}(Z, U) = 0$$

OLS

$$\beta_{\text{OLS}} = \frac{\text{Cov}(D, Y)}{\text{Var}(D)} = \frac{\beta \text{Var}(D) + \text{Cov}(D, U)}{\text{Var}(D)} = \beta + \frac{\text{Cov}(D, U)}{\text{Var}(D)} \neq \beta$$

IV

$$\beta_{\text{IV}} = \frac{\text{Cov}(Z, Y)}{\text{Cov}(Z, D)} = \frac{\beta \text{Cov}(Z, D) + \text{Cov}(Z, U)}{\text{Cov}(Z, D)} = \beta + \frac{\text{Cov}(Z, U)}{\text{Cov}(Z, D)} = \beta$$

```
library(mvtnorm)
library(tidyverse)
set.seed(587103)
n <- 1e4
sims <- rmvnorm(n, sigma = matrix(c(1, 0.5,
                                     0.5, 1), 2, 2, byrow = TRUE))

U <- sims[,1]
V <- sims[,2]
Z <- rbinom(n, size = 1, prob = 0.3)
D <- -0.5 + 0.3 * Z + V
beta <- -0.3
Y <- 1 + beta * D + U
c(OLS = cov(D, Y) / var(D), IV = cov(Z, Y) / cov(Z, D),
  truth = beta) %>% round(2)
```

```
##    OLS    IV truth
## 0.20 -0.28 -0.30
```

Which assumptions are testable in the textbook IV model?

Instrument Relevance

- ▶ Since D and Z are observed, directly estimate $\text{Cov}(D, Z)$.
- ▶ Beware of weak instruments!

Instrument Exogeneity

- ▶ Since U is unobserved, can't directly estimate $\text{Cov}(Z, U)$.
- ▶ Could we use the IV residuals?

```
library(AER) # for ivreg()
library(broom) # for tidy()
beta <- 0
Y <- 1 + beta * D - Z + U # Endogenous instrument!
iv_results <- ivreg(Y ~ D | Z)
tidy(iv_results) %>% knitr::kable(digits = 2)
```

term	estimate	std.error	statistic	p.value
(Intercept)	-0.62	0.12	-5.05	0
D	-3.30	0.29	-11.56	0

```
cov(residuals(iv_results), Z)
```

```
## [1] 1.604262e-14
```

Z Is Uncorrelated with the IV Residuals *By Construction*

- ▶ Let U be the **structural error** and V be the **IV residual**: $V \equiv Y - \alpha_{IV} - \beta_{IV}D$.

$$\beta_{IV} = \frac{\text{Cov}(Z, Y)}{\text{Cov}(Z, D)} = \beta + \frac{\text{Cov}(Z, U)}{\text{Cov}(Z, D)}, \quad \alpha_{IV} = \mathbb{E}(Y) - \beta_{IV}\mathbb{E}(D).$$

- ▶ $V = U \iff Z$ is exogenous: the only way to obtain $\beta_{IV} = \beta$ and $\alpha_{IV} = \alpha$.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Cov}(Z, V) &= \text{Cov}(Z, Y - \alpha_{IV} - \beta_{IV}D) = \text{Cov}(Z, Y) - \beta_{IV}\text{Cov}(Z, D) \\ &= \text{Cov}(Z, Y) - \frac{\text{Cov}(Z, Y)}{\text{Cov}(Z, D)}\text{Cov}(Z, D) = 0.\end{aligned}$$

- ▶ $\text{Cov}(Z, V) = 0$ *by construction* even when $\text{Cov}(Z, U) \neq 0$

Multiple Instruments and Over-identification

Assumptions

- ▶ $Y = \alpha + \beta D + U$
- ▶ $\text{Cov}(Z_1, D) \neq 0, \text{Cov}(Z_2, D) \neq 0$
- ▶ $\text{Cov}(Z_1, U) = \text{Cov}(Z_2, U) = 0$

$$\beta_{IV}^{(1)} \equiv \frac{\text{Cov}(Z_1, Y)}{\text{Cov}(Z_1, D)} = \beta + \frac{\text{Cov}(Z_1, U)}{\text{Cov}(Z_1, D)}$$

$$\beta_{IV}^{(2)} \equiv \frac{\text{Cov}(Z_2, Y)}{\text{Cov}(Z_2, D)} = \beta + \frac{\text{Cov}(Z_2, U)}{\text{Cov}(Z_2, D)}$$

Implications

- ▶ Both IVs identify *same* effect: β
- ▶ If not, **at least one is endogenous**

$$\beta_{IV}^{(1)} - \beta_{IV}^{(2)} = \frac{\text{Cov}(Z_1, U)}{\text{Cov}(Z_1, D)} - \frac{\text{Cov}(Z_2, U)}{\text{Cov}(Z_2, D)}$$

Over-identifying Restrictions Test

- ▶ Test of null that all MCs identify same parameters.

Beyond the Textbook IV Model

Heterogenous Treatment Effects

- ▶ $Y = \alpha + \beta D + U$ implies that everyone has the same treatment effect: β .
- ▶ In reality, treatment effects differ across people.

Overidentifying restrictions?

- ▶ Out the window! Different instruments may identify different causal parameters.

Local Average Treatment Effects (LATE) Model

- ▶ What does IV tell us when treatment effects are heterogeneous?

Review of the LATE Model

- ▶ Suppose that both D and Z are binary

$$\beta_{IV} \equiv \frac{\text{Cov}(Z, Y)}{\text{Cov}(Z, D)} = \frac{\frac{\text{Cov}(Y, Z)}{\text{Var}(Z)}}{\frac{\text{Cov}(D, Z)}{\text{Var}(Z)}} = \frac{\mathbb{E}[Y|Z=1] - \mathbb{E}[Y|Z=0]}{\mathbb{E}[D|Z=1] - \mathbb{E}[D|Z=0]} \equiv \text{Wald Estimand}$$

Intent-to-treat Effect: $\mathbb{E}[Y|Z=1] - \mathbb{E}[Y|Z=0]$ (ITT)

- ▶ E.g. randomized experiment with treatment **offer** Z and treatment **take-up** D
- ▶ **Non-compliance** / randomized encouragement design: D may not equal Z
- ▶ In this setting the ITT is the ATE of *offering* treatment.

The Wald Estimand

- ▶ ITT is “diluted” by people who are offered ($Z=1$) but do not take up ($D=0$)
- ▶ Divide ATE of offer on outcome $Z \rightarrow Y$ by that of offer on take-up $Z \rightarrow D$.
- ▶ **Under what assumptions does this give us a meaningful causal quantity?**

Decomposing the ITT Effect

- ▶ Example: moving to opportunity (MTO) experiment randomly offered housing vouchers to encourage families to move to a more affluent neighborhood.
- ▶ 50% of offered families ($Z = 1$) moved; 20% of non-offered families ($Z = 0$) moved

$$Y = (1 - D)Y_0 + DY_1, \quad p_z \equiv \mathbb{P}(D = 1|Z = z)$$

- ▶ $\mathbb{E}[Y|Z = 1]$ is a *mixture* of Y_0 and Y_1 for different types of families:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|Z = 1] = \underbrace{(1 - p_1)}_{\approx 0.5} \mathbb{E}[Y_0|Z = 1, D = 0] + \underbrace{p_1}_{\approx 0.5} \mathbb{E}[Y_1|Z = 1, D = 1]$$

- ▶ $\mathbb{E}[Y|Z = 0]$ is a *mixture* of Y_0 and Y_1 for different types of families:

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|Z = 0] = \underbrace{(1 - p_0)}_{\approx 0.8} \mathbb{E}[Y_0|Z = 0, D = 0] + \underbrace{p_0}_{\approx 0.2} \mathbb{E}[Y_1|Z = 0, D = 1]$$

Compliance “Types” in the LATE Model

- Catalogue all possible treatment take-up “decision rules”

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Never-taker: } T = n &\iff D(Z) = 0 \\ \text{Always-taker: } T = a &\iff D(Z) = 1 \\ \text{Complier: } T = c &\iff D(Z) = Z \\ \text{Defier: } T = d &\iff D(Z) = (1 - Z).\end{aligned}$$

In the MTO Example

- Never-takers: families that refuse to move with or without a voucher
- Always-takers: families that will move with or without a voucher
- Compliers are families that will **only move if given a voucher**
- Defiers are families that will only move if **not** given a voucher

Assumption 1 - Unconfounded Type

For all compliance types $t \in \{a, c, n, d\}$

$$\mathbb{P}(T = t) = \mathbb{P}(T = t|Z = 0) = \mathbb{P}(T = t|Z = 1).$$

Assumption 2 - No Defiers: $\mathbb{P}(T = d) = 0$

Assumption 3 - Mean Exclusion Restriction

For all compliance types $t \in \{a, c, n, d\}$

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbb{E}[Y_0|Z = 0, T = t] &= \mathbb{E}[Y_0|Z = 1, T = t] = \mathbb{E}[Y_0|T = t] \\ \mathbb{E}[Y_1|Z = 0, T = t] &= \mathbb{E}[Y_1|Z = 1, T = t] = \mathbb{E}[Y_0|T = t]\end{aligned}$$

Assumption 4 - Existence of Compliers: $\mathbb{P}(T = c) > 0$

Lemma 1: Assumptions 1–2 \implies

$$\mathbb{P}(D = 1|Z = 1) = \mathbb{P}(T = a) + \mathbb{P}(T = c)$$

$$\mathbb{P}(D = 0|Z = 1) = \mathbb{P}(T = n)$$

$$\mathbb{P}(D = 1|Z = 0) = \mathbb{P}(T = a)$$

$$\mathbb{P}(D = 0|Z = 0) = \mathbb{P}(T = c) + \mathbb{P}(T = n)$$

Lemma 2: Assumptions 1–3 \implies

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|D = 1, Z = 1] = \frac{\mathbb{P}(T = a)\mathbb{E}[Y_1|T = a] + \mathbb{P}(T = c)\mathbb{E}[Y_1|T = c]}{\mathbb{P}(T = a) + \mathbb{P}(T = c)}$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|D = 0, Z = 1] = \mathbb{E}[Y_0|T = n]$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|D = 1, Z = 0] = \mathbb{E}[Y_1|T = a]$$

$$\mathbb{E}[Y|D = 0, Z = 0] = \frac{\mathbb{P}(T = n)\mathbb{E}[Y_0|T = n] + \mathbb{P}(T = c)\mathbb{E}[Y_0|T = c]}{\mathbb{P}(T = n) + \mathbb{P}(T = c)}$$

The LATE Theorem: Wald = ATE for Compliers

Theorem: Assumptions 1–4 \implies

$$\frac{\mathbb{E}(Y|Z=1) - \mathbb{E}(Y|Z=0)}{\mathbb{E}(D|Z=1) - \mathbb{E}(D|Z=0)} = \mathbb{E}[Y_1 - Y_0 | T = c]$$

Proof

- ▶ Algebra and of Iterated Expectations, using the two lemmas. (See lecture notes)

MTO Example

- ▶ ITT is the average treatment effect of *offering* a housing voucher.
- ▶ Wald = LATE is the average treatment effect of *moving to opportunity* for families who can be induced to move by a housing voucher.
- ▶ Different IV \implies different compliers \implies different LATE. It's a **local** effect!

Are the LATE Assumptions Testable?

LATE Assumptions

1. Unconfounded Type
2. No Defiers
3. Mean Exclusion Restriction
4. Existence of Compliers

At Least One is Testable!

- ▶ Assumptions 1–3 $\implies \mathbb{P}(T = c) = \mathbb{E}[D|Z = 1] - \mathbb{E}[D|Z = 0]$
- ▶ Thus, Assumption 4 is just **instrument relevance**, hence testable.
- ▶ What about the others?

Even Nobel Laureates Make Mistakes

Angrist & Imbens (1994)

Part (i) is similar to an exclusion restriction in a regression model. It is not testable and has to be considered on a case by case basis.

Pearl (1995)

exogeneity ... can be given an empirical test. The test is not guaranteed to detect all violations of exogeneity, but it can, in certain circumstances, screen out very bad would-be instruments.

This Lecture

- ▶ Testable implications LATE assumptions from above: [Huber & Mellace \(2015\)](#)

Closely-related Work

- ▶ [Kitagawa \(2015\)](#)
- ▶ [Mourifié & Wan \(2017\)](#)

Huber & Mellace (2015) – The Big Picture

- ▶ Assumptions 1–3 imply four inequalities: $\theta_1 \leq 0$, $\theta_2 \leq 0$, $\theta_3 \leq 0$, $\theta_4 \leq 0$
- ▶ $\theta \equiv (\theta_1, \theta_2, \theta_3, \theta_4)$ depend only on (Y, D, Z) ; we'll define them shortly.
- ▶ If any element of θ is *positive* at least one of Assumptions 1–3 must be false.
- ▶ In practice: compare estimate $\hat{\theta}$ to appropriate standard errors.
- ▶ Not all violations of the LATE assumptions lead to a positive value for θ
- ▶ **Necessary but not sufficient** for validity of LATE assumptions.
- ▶ The four inequalities come in *pairs*. We'll look at each pair in turn.

First Pair of Inequalities

Define: $F_{11}(y) \equiv \mathbb{P}(Y \leq y | D = 1, Z = 1)$ and

$$y_q \equiv F_{11}^{-1}(q), \quad y_{1-q} \equiv F_{11}^{-1}(1 - q), \quad q \equiv \frac{\mathbb{P}(D = 1 | Z = 0)}{\mathbb{P}(D = 1 | Z = 1)}$$

Under Assumptions 1–3:

$$\mathbb{E}(Y | D = 1, Z = 1, Y \leq y_q) \leq \mathbb{E}(Y | D = 1, Z = 0) \leq \mathbb{E}(Y | D = 1, Z = 1, Y \geq y_{1-q})$$

Key Points

- ▶ Lemma 1 $\implies \mathbb{E}(Y | D = 1, Z = 0) = \mathbb{E}(Y_1 | T = a)$ so now we have two *partial identification bounds* as well.
- ▶ Why care? **Overidentifying Restrictions**
- ▶ At most one of the pair can be violated.

Second Pair of Inequalities

Define $F_{00}(y) \equiv \mathbb{P}(Y \leq y | D = 0, Z = 0)$ and

$$y_r \equiv F_{00}^{-1}(r), \quad y_{1-r} \equiv F_{00}^{-1}(1-r), \quad r \equiv \frac{\mathbb{P}(D = 0 | Z = 1)}{\mathbb{P}(D = 0 | Z = 0)}.$$

Under Assumptions 1–3:

$$\mathbb{E}(Y | D = 0, Z = 0, Y \leq y_r) \leq \mathbb{E}(Y | D = 0, Z = 1) \leq \mathbb{E}(Y | D = 0, Z = 0, Y \geq y_{1-r})$$

Key Points

- ▶ Lemma 1 $\implies \mathbb{E}(Y | D = 0, Z = 1) = \mathbb{E}(Y_1 | T = n)$ so now we have two *partial identification bounds* as well.
- ▶ Why care? **Overidentifying Restrictions**
- ▶ At most one of the pair can be violated.

Theorem: Assumptions 1-3 \implies

$$\begin{bmatrix} \theta_1 \\ \theta_2 \\ \theta_3 \\ \theta_4 \end{bmatrix} \equiv \begin{bmatrix} \mathbb{E}(Y|D=1, Z=1, Y \leq y_q) - \mathbb{E}(Y|D=1, Z=0) \\ \mathbb{E}(Y|D=1, Z=0) - \mathbb{E}(Y|D=1, Z=1, Y \geq y_{1-q}) \\ \mathbb{E}(Y|D=0, Z=0, Y \leq y_r) - \mathbb{E}(Y|D=0, Z=1) \\ \mathbb{E}(Y|D=0, Z=1) - \mathbb{E}(Y|D=0, Z=0, Y \geq y_{1-r}) \end{bmatrix} \leq \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$

Where: $F_{11}(y) \equiv \mathbb{P}(Y \leq y|D=1, Z=1)$, $F_{00}(y) \equiv \mathbb{P}(Y \leq y|D=0, Z=0)$, and

$$y_q \equiv F_{11}^{-1}(q), \quad y_{1-q} \equiv F_{11}^{-1}(1-q), \quad q \equiv \frac{\mathbb{P}(D=1|Z=0)}{\mathbb{P}(D=1|Z=1)}$$

$$y_r \equiv F_{00}^{-1}(r), \quad y_{1-r} \equiv F_{00}^{-1}(1-r), \quad r \equiv \frac{\mathbb{P}(D=0|Z=1)}{\mathbb{P}(D=0|Z=0)}.$$

By Lemma 1, Assumptions 1–2 \implies

$$q \equiv \frac{\mathbb{P}(D = 1|Z = 0)}{\mathbb{P}(D = 1|Z = 1)} = \frac{\mathbb{P}(T = a)}{\mathbb{P}(T = a) + \mathbb{P}(T = c)}.$$

- ▶ q = share of always-takers, $(1 - q)$ = share of compliers *among* $(D = 1, Z = 1)$

Re-write Expression for $\mathbb{E}(Y|D = 1, Z = 1)$ from Lemma 2

$$\mathbb{E}(Y|D = 1, Z = 1) = (1 - q)\mathbb{E}(Y_1|T = c) + q\mathbb{E}(Y_1|T = a).$$

- ▶ **Mixture** of Y_1 for compliers and always-takers
- ▶ LHS conditions on Z but RHS doesn't: mean exclusion assumption.

Infeasible Test of Mean Exclusion

- ▶ Suppose that we knew *who* was an always-taker among those with $(D = 1, Z = 1)$
- ▶ Compare $\mathbb{E}(Y|Z = 0, D = 1) = \mathbb{E}(Y_1|Z = 0, T = a)$ to $\mathbb{E}(Y_1|Z = 1, T = a)$.

We don't know who is an always-taker among $(D = 1, Z = 1)$.

What do we know?

- ▶ $q \times 100\%$ of those with $(D = 1, Z = 1)$ are always-takers.
- ▶ $(1 - q) \times 100\%$ of those with $(D = 1, Z = 1)$ are compliers.
- ▶ This turns out to be enough to obtain bounds.

Shorthand

$$F(y) \equiv \mathbb{P}(Y \leq y | D = 1, Z = 1) = \mathbb{P}(Y_1 \leq y | T \in \{a, c\}, Z = 1)$$

$$G(y) \equiv \mathbb{P}(Y_1 \leq y | T = c, Z = 1)$$

$$H(y) \equiv \mathbb{P}(Y_1 \leq y | T = a, Z = 1).$$

An Abstract Probability Puzzle

(Law of Total Probability + Assumptions 1–2) \implies

$$\begin{aligned} F(y) &= \mathbb{P}(T = c | T \in \{a, c\}, Z = 1)G(y) + \mathbb{P}(T = a | T \in \{a, c\}, Z = 1)H(y) \\ &= \mathbb{P}(T = a | T \in \{a, c\})G(y) + \mathbb{P}(T = c | T \in \{a, c\})H(y) \\ &= \frac{\mathbb{P}(T = c)}{\mathbb{P}(T \in \{a, c\})}G(y) + \frac{\mathbb{P}(T = a)}{\mathbb{P}(T \in \{a, c\})}H(y) \end{aligned}$$

Using our expression for q from two slides back

$$F(y) = (1 - q)G(y) + qH(y)$$

- ▶ We know q , $(1 - q)$ and F .
- ▶ Don't know G or H but mean of H equals $\mathbb{E}(Y_1 | T = a)$ under mean exclusion.
- ▶ What all possible values for the mean of H given knowledge of F and q ?

Bound the mean of H given $F = (1 - q)G + qH$ with q and F known.

Step 1 - Solve for H

$$H(y) = \left(\frac{1}{q}\right) F(y) - \left(\frac{1-q}{q}\right) G(y).$$

Step 2 - Bound H

- ▶ We know nothing about G , but it must lie between 0 and 1 to be a valid CDF.
- ▶ Substitute $G(y) = 0$ and $G(y) = 1$ into the expression for H

$$\frac{F(y)}{q} - \frac{1-q}{q} \leq H(y) \leq \frac{F(y)}{q}.$$

- ▶ But H is a CDF too! Make sure that it lies between 0 and 1

$$\max \left\{ 0, \frac{F(y)}{q} - \frac{1-q}{q} \right\} \leq H(y) \leq \min \left\{ 1, \frac{F(y)}{q} \right\}$$

More Shorthand

$$\overline{H}(y) \equiv \max \left\{ 0, \frac{F(y)}{q} - \frac{1-q}{q} \right\} \leq H(y) \leq \min \left\{ 1, \frac{F(y)}{q} \right\} \equiv \underline{H}(y)$$

Both \overline{H} and \underline{H} are CDFs

- ▶ Non-decreasing since $F(y)$ is non-decreasing.
- ▶ Bounded between 0 and 1
- ▶ Approach 0 as $y \rightarrow -\infty$
- ▶ Approach 1 as $y \rightarrow +\infty$

First-order Stochastic Dominance

- ▶ F_1 **stochastically dominates** $F_2 \iff F_1(y) \leq F_2(y) \iff F_1^{-1}(y) \geq F_2^{-1}(y) \forall y$
- ▶ \overline{H} stochastically dominates H and H stochastically dominates \underline{H} .

First-Order Stochastic Dominance \implies Inequality for Means

- ▶ \bar{H} stochastically dominates H and H stochastically dominates \underline{H} .

$$\underbrace{\int_{\mathbb{R}} y \underline{H}(dy)}_{\underline{\mu}} \leq \underbrace{\int_{\mathbb{R}} y H(dy)}_{\mu} \leq \underbrace{\int_{\mathbb{R}} y \bar{H}(dy)}_{\bar{\mu}}.$$

- ▶ The mean μ of H , a distribution we don't know, must lie between the means $\underline{\mu}$ and $\bar{\mu}$ of \underline{H} and \bar{H} , two distributions we know!
- ▶ Given our definitions of \underline{H} , H and \bar{H} , the preceding is *identical* to

$$\mathbb{E}(Y|D=1, Z=1, Y \leq y_q) \leq \mathbb{E}(Y_1|T=z) \leq \mathbb{E}(Y|D=1, Z=1, Y \geq y_{1-q})$$

- ▶ Simplify slightly: suppose F is continuous, strictly increasing with density f
- ▶ Next slide: work out the densities \underline{h} and \bar{h} that correspond to \underline{H} and \bar{H} .

Deriving $\bar{h}(y)$

- ▶ $\bar{H} \equiv \max \left\{ 0, \frac{F(y) - (1 - q)}{q} \right\}$ equals zero until $F(y) > (1 - q)$
- ▶ Solving: \bar{H} is strictly increasing for $y > F^{-1}(1 - q)$
- ▶ Differentiating: $\frac{d}{dy}[F(y) - (1 - q)]/q = f(y)/q$ and therefore

$$\bar{h}(y) = 1 \left\{ y > F^{-1}(1 - q) \right\} \frac{f(y)}{q}$$

Deriving $\underline{h}(y)$

- ▶ $\underline{H} \equiv \min \left\{ 1, \frac{F(y)}{q} \right\}$ equals $F(y)/q$ until $F(y) = q$




$$\underline{h}(y) = 1 \left\{ y < F^{-1}(q) \right\} \frac{f(y)}{q}.$$

\bar{h} and \underline{h} are Truncated versions of f

- ▶ $\bar{h}(y) = 1 \{y > F^{-1}(1 - q)\} \frac{f(y)}{q}$ is the **top** $q \times 100\%$ of f rescaled
- ▶ $\underline{h}(y) = 1 \{y < F^{-1}(q)\} \frac{f(y)}{q}$ is the **bottom** $q \times 100\%$ of f , rescaled

$$\underline{\mu} \equiv \int_{-\infty}^{F^{-1}(q)} \frac{y}{q} f(y) dy \leq \mu \leq \int_{F^{-1}(1-q)}^{\infty} \frac{y}{q} f(y) dy \equiv \bar{\mu}$$

- ▶ Next slide: example where $q = 0.4$ and f is a mixture of normals.



What does this have to do with always-takers and compliers?

$$\underline{\mu} \equiv \int_{-\infty}^{F^{-1}(q)} \frac{y}{q} f(y) dy \leq \mu \leq \int_{F^{-1}(1-q)}^{\infty} \frac{y}{q} f(y) dy \equiv \bar{\mu}$$

$$\mathbb{E}(Y|D=1, Z=1, Y \leq y_q) \leq \mathbb{E}(Y_1|T=a) \leq \mathbb{E}(Y|D=1, Z=1, Y \geq y_{1-q})$$

- ▶ f is the density of $Y|D=1, Z=1$, a mixture of compliers and always-takers
- ▶ $q = 0.4 \implies$ then 40% always-takers, but we don't know who they are
- ▶ Consider the two most extreme possibilities: pack them all in the **bottom** or **top** 40% of the distribution of $Y|D=1, Z=1$.
- ▶ Resulting bounds for $\mathbb{E}(Y_1|T=a)$ are sharp; **tightest** when few compliers (q large)

