

# FROM STATE CONTROL TO GOVERNANCE: DECENTRALIZATION AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN GUANGDONG, CHINA

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**Abstract** – In China there has been a strong trend to diversification and decentralization of education in the post-Mao period. This paper examines how the policy of decentralization has affected the governance of universities in Guangdong. More specifically, the paper focuses on reform of the financing and management structure, the merging of universities, and joint development programmes to enhance competitiveness. Despite these changes, the state's role as a regulator and overall service coordinator has been strengthened rather than weakened under the policy of decentralization. This paper not only examines the recent developments in Guangdong's higher education but also analyses such developments in light of the global trend towards decentralization in educational governance.

**Zusammenfassung** – In China hat es einen deutlichen Trend zur Diversifizierung und Dezentralisierung der Bildung in der post-Mao Ära gegeben. In diesem Artikel wird untersucht, inwieweit die Politik der Dezentralisierung die Leitung der Universitäten in Guangdong beeinflusst hat. Im einzelnen konzentriert sich der Autor auf Reformen der Finanzierungs- und Management Struktur, die Zusammenlegung von Universitäten und gemeinsame Entwicklungsprogramme zur Förderung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. Trotz dieser Veränderungen wurde die Rolle des Staates als Regulationsorgan und Gesamtdienstleistungskoordinator unter einer Dezentralisationspolitik eher gestärkt als geschwächt. Der Autor untersucht nicht nur die jüngsten Entwicklungen in der Hochschulbildung in Guangdong, sondern analysiert diese Entwicklungen angesichts eines weltweiten Trends zur Dezentralisierung in der Leitung von Bildungseinrichtungen.

**Résumé** – La Chine connaît à l'ère post-maoïste une forte tendance à la diversification et à la décentralisation de l'éducation. Cet article examine les effets de la politique de décentralisation sur l'administration des universités de Guangdong. Il se penche notamment sur la réforme des structures de financement et de gestion, le fusionnement des universités, et sur les programmes collectifs de développement destinés à accroître la compétitivité. Malgré cette évolution, la politique de décentralisation n'a pas affaibli mais au contraire étendu le rôle de l'Etat qui est celui d'un régulateur et d'un coordinateur général des services. Outre l'évolution récente au sein de l'enseignement supérieur de Guangdong, l'article analyse aussi cette orientation à la lumière de la tendance mondiale à la décentralisation de l'administration éducative.

**Resumen** – En China se ha manifestado una fuerte tendencia hacia la diversificación y descentralización de la educación en el período post-maoísta. Este artículo examina cómo la política de descentralización ha afectado al gobierno de las universidades en Guangdong. Particularmente, el trabajo se centra en la reforma de las estructuras financieras y de gestión, en la fusión de universidades y en programas de desarrollo comunes, destinados a mejorar la competitividad. Pese a estos cambios, el papel del Estado como regulador y coordinador global de los servicios ha quedado más reforzado que debilitado bajo la política de descentralización. Este papel no sólo examina los



desarrollos recientes de la educación superior en Guangdong, sino que también analiza estos desarrollos a la luz de la tendencia mundial hacia la descentralización en el gobierno educacional.

**Резюме** – В Китае наблюдалась сильная тенденция диверсификации и децентрализации образования в период пост-Мао. Данная статья изучает, как политика децентрализации повлияла на управление университетами в Гуангдонге. Особо в статье уделяется внимание реформе структур финансирования и управления, возникновению университетов и совместных программ развития для повышения конкурентоспособности. Несмотря на эти перемены роль государства как регулятора и координатора всех образовательных услуг при политике децентрализации больше укрепилась, чем ослабла. В данной статье рассматриваются не только недавние перемены в высшем образовании в Гуангдонге, но они также анализируются в свете глобальной тенденции к децентрализации в образовательном управлении.

Since the 1980s, a policy of decentralization has been used by the Communist Party of China (CCP) in the educational sphere to allow more flexibility for governments and educational practitioners at local levels to run education. This article, being set in this policy context, examines how the policy of decentralization has affected the running of higher education in Guangdong, with particular reference to strategies adopted in reforming the financing structure, instituting joint development programmes to enhance the competitive edge of higher education institutions, merging universities, and reforming the management structure of higher education institutions. With the introduction and implementation of the “Project 211”,<sup>1</sup> the CCP introduced “internal competition” in its university sector in order to bring about substantial improvements.

One very significant consequence of the change in the state’s role in higher education is that the public-good functions of education, in which the state has taken the primary role of reliable guarantor, have diminished. Nonetheless, the state’s role as a regulator and overall service coordinator has been strengthened rather than weakened under the policy of decentralization. This article examines the recent developments in Guangdong’s higher education and analyzes such developments in light of the global trend of decentralization in educational governance.

### **Changing philosophy of government: diversified modes of governance**

Over the last decade, people began to talk about the impact of globalization on economic, social, political and cultural fronts (see, for example, Giddens 1990; Sklair 1991; Held 1991; Robertson 1992). One of the major impacts of the process of globalization is related to the fundamental change in the philosophy of governance and the way public sector is managed (Flynn 1997; Hood 1991). The shift from “government” to “governance” has been widely debated both in the West, where the debate originated, and in the Asia-Pacific, where it is a strong emergent theme (Streeten 1996; Pape 1998). In the West, early work concerned on problems of government failure in the realms of regulation, welfare and development (Kooiman 1993). This developed into a focus on the increasingly complex challenges facing modern states. By the mid-1990s, bodies such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) were devoting considerable attention to issues affecting “governance in transition” (OECD 1996). At this time, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) issued its first discussion paper on governance, namely civil society, the state and the private sector (UNDP 1995). Its second discussion paper developed these themes (UNDP 1997).

In his *Understanding Governance* (1997), R. A. W. Rhodes, a leading analyst of governance and related issues among Western academics, brings together work undertaken by himself over the course of more than a decade and also synthesizes work undertaken by others. Rhodes identifies many important strands to the governance debate. At its heart is the contention that the mode of governance associated with Weber’s classic ideal type of bureaucracy is in the process of being deconstructed. In its place are emerging forms of governance that bring both state and non-state actors into the policy process, and transfer control to bodies operating either on the margins of the state or outside its boundaries altogether. Much of this change has been driven by state actors, but there is also a strong strand of unintended consequence to the debate. As policy networks become established alongside or below the structures of the central state, and as the actors in them gain power and resources, so the central state itself loses the ability to impose overall coherence on the policy process. Loss of steering capacity is a major theme of the literature on governance. Loss of accountability is a linked theme. Another is the power relationship in which managers endeavour to maintain or enhance their dominance over other stakeholders in governance partnership (Rhodes 1997).

Despite the fact that different countries may respond differently to the global forces, it is unquestionable that globalization impacts on the public administration and management of individual countries (Baltodano 1997). One major transformation caused by the global tide of managerialism is the new way in which people perceive the issue of governance. Unlike the practices of the old days, the new vision of governance today conceives modern states as “facilitators” instead of “service providers”. That is particularly true when the “welfare state” is turned into a “competitive state”. Some scholars even

speak of a “New World Order” where “much of the globalization process came to be dependent on the adoption of reduced roles for government, not only as a regulator but also a provider of public services” (Jones 1998: 1; see also, Welch 1998; Currie and Newson 1998). This “New World Order” is characterized by governments which revamp the role of a government and cut back the scope of their work; while the notion of “social good” is replaced by the rhetoric of “economic rationalism,” whereby customer choice and the three Es, namely, effectiveness, efficiency and economy, are emphasized (Welch 1996).

### **From control to governance: restructuring of the state-education relationships**

In the wider policy context as discussed above, notions such as “reinventing government” (Osborne and Gaebler 1992) and “entrepreneurial government” (Ferlie et al. 1996) have become very fashionable in managing the public sector. As Hirst and Thompson (1995) suggested when talking about a wide range of government activities in the public sector,

The tendency in common usage (is) to identify the term “government” with the institutions of the state that control and regulate the life of a territorial community. [For] Governance – that is, the control of an activity by some means such that a range of desired outcomes is attained – is, however, not just the province of the state. Rather, it is a function that can be performed by a wide variety of public and private, state and non-state, national and international, institutions and practices (p. 422).

Such a discernible trend of restructuring of the role of the state in the running of the public sector has undoubtedly affected the governance of education, and eventually led to a fundamental change in state-education relationships. Shifting from the “state control model” to “state supervision model”,<sup>2</sup> educational governance can be characterized by power decentralized from educational bureaucracies to create in their place devolved systems of schooling, entailing significant degrees of institutional autonomy and a variety of forms of school-based management and administration (Whitty 1997). Such changes are closely related to the “marketization” of education, whereby private sector principles and practices are adopted. Stressing the importance of parental choice and competition between diversified and specialized forms of provision, it is undeniable that an “education market” or “quasi-market” has emerged in education in the West (Le Grand and Bartlett 1993; Ball 1990; Bridges and McLaughlin 1994). The process of “marketization” in general and the formation of the “market place” in education in particular have unquestionably affected not only the governance of education but also the state-education relationships (Dale 1997; Hargreaves 1997).

Despite the argument that the restructuring of the state-civil society or government-public policy relationship has really weakened the role of the

government [the central state in particular] in the public sector, scholars in the education field repeatedly find that the state's role in the control of education has actually been strengthened rather than weakened (Dale 1997). Realizing the fact that modern states have to run their businesses with limited resources in the present social and economic context, different modes of governance, therefore, have emerged in the education sphere. No matter what strategies/forms of governance such as decentralization, privatization, marketization, commodification, etc. are adopted, the state does not entirely retreat from the process. Essentially, the role of the state changes from one of carrying out most of the work of education itself to determining where the work will be done and by whom.

One point which deserves attention here is that when talking about centralization and decentralization, they are processes of “-ization” rather than static situations. Generally speaking, there are two major types of “decentralization”, namely, *functional decentralization* and *territorial decentralization*. *Functional decentralization* refers to “a shift in the distribution of powers between various authorities that operate in parallel”; while *territorial decentralization* refers to “a redistribution of control among the different geographical tiers of government, such as nation, states/provinces, districts, and schools” (Bray 1999: 208–209). We must also note that the range of models for the governance of education is very wide. A better understanding of the models for governing education adopted by any countries/places must be analyzed in the context of political ideologies, historical legacies, and other factors such as linguistic plurality, geographic size, and ease of communications (Bray 1999). Most interesting of all, we may find the coexistence of trends that are both centralizing and decentralizing in the governance of education in any countries.

Thus, the discussion of the role of the state in educational governance is inevitably related to different types of governance activities, namely funding, regulation and provision/delivery. As many of the responsibilities taken by the state during the postwar period begin to be devolved to other non-state sectors, it is not surprising that coordinating institutions are diversified in modern societies. In addition to the state, various actors like the market, the community and the others are involved in educational provision or educational governance (Neave and van Vught 1994). In terms of control, we can easily discover that the state takes different roles in different governance activities, thus the extent of state intervention is found varied. Many comparative studies in education policies have reported that decentralization can be a mechanism for *tightening* central control of the periphery instead of allowing greater decision making for the lower levels of governments (see, for example, Neave and van Vught 1994; Hanson 1999; Hawkins 1999).

For instance, despite the fact that the UK has adopted the “state-supervising model” (supposedly a decentralization mode of governance) in governing its higher education, the people working in the university sector have generally agreed that the control of the state is strengthened. In setting up of a University

Funding Council (UFC) to monitor and assess performance of individual higher educational institutions, the government has indeed strengthened its control over the research output and the quality of teaching of individual higher educational institutions. Such a “territorial decentralization” in terms of establishing another independent body to supervise educational institutions in the UK has definitely empowered the state to assert its direct control over the higher education sector and achieve the objectives of “functional centralization” (see, Bray 1999; Hartley 1995).

Putting all these developments in perspective, the conventional “public-private distinction” is neither adequate nor convincing to describe the restructured state-education relationships especially when we analyze such changes in light of the dynamic and fluid nature of “decentralization” (Bray 1999; Hanson 1999; Dale 1997; Mok 2000). Notably, the discernible trend of decentralization of power and devolution of responsibilities in the education realm may not necessarily mean that a process of de-regulation has started (Whitty 1997; Currie and Newson 1998). Against this wider background, we will now examine how the policy of decentralization has affected governance of higher education in Guangdong.

### **Brief background of the case study and research methodology**

Guangdong is located at the southern part of mainland China and near Hong Kong and Macau. Having been the “window” of China in terms of trade and international exchanges, Guangdong is one of the most economically prosperous regions in mainland China. Since the implementation of the open door policy and the launch of economic reform in 1978, Guangdong province has been developed rapidly. In 1978, the GDP of Guangdong was 18.59 billion yuan; while in 1998, the figure increased to 791.91 billion yuan, with an average annual growth rate of 14%. Per capita GDP also jumped from 369 yuan in 1978 to 11,143 yuan in 1998. Compared with the figure in 1978, Guangdong’s share in the national GDP has also increased from 5.1% to 10.0%, with its ranking raised from the sixth to the first (*Guangdong Yearbook*, 2000).

Guangdong is the fifth most populous province in China. By the end of 1998, the number of permanent residents in the province was 71,434,300, or 5.72% of the national population. Accompanied with the rapid economic development, there is no doubt that the livelihood of Guangdong residents has improved significantly. In 1978, the per capita annual incomes of the rural and urban residents were 93 yuan and 412 yuan respectively. After carrying out economic reform for two decades, the incomes of rural and urban Guangdong residents have increased to 3,527 yuan and 8,562 yuan. The latter was also the highest in the country (*Guangdong Yearbook*, 2000).

In addition, higher education in Guangdong has seen rapid development. The number of regular institutions of higher education increased from 29 in

1978 to 43 in 1998. Compared with the year 1992, the numbers of undergraduate students and postgraduate students enrolled grew from 97,000 and 3,453 respectively to 185,000 and 8,043 by the end of the 1990s. The average capacity of the regular institutions of higher education<sup>3</sup> has also increased from 2,266 to 4,027, being ranked the first in the country. After the adoption of the policy of decentralization since 1985, provincial and local governments have been empowered and given more autonomy to run higher education institutions; while the Ministry of Education at the central level only provides macro policy framework. Hence, local and provincial governments, as well as individual higher education institutions, can exercise far more discretion to decide matters related to curricula, appointments of professors, as well as administration and management.

The present paper is based upon fieldwork and field interviews carried out by the author in Guangdong in 1998 and 1999. When selecting targets for intensive interviews, a purposive sampling method was adopted to identify the interviewees. This sampling method is particularly effective and appropriate for this type of qualitative research. By using this sampling method, the selected interviewees are knowledgeable and able to provide sufficient information to answer the research questions. The selected interviewees in this study were professors, senior administrators, university presidents or vice-presidents, who were assumed to be well informed about how the decentralization policy has affected the modes of governance of their institutions. Guangdong is not, of course, typical of the rest of China. No claim is, therefore, made that the findings are representative of situations in the mainland. But they do throw some light on how the higher education sector in this most economically prosperous region of the mainland has been going through the process of marketization in general and how it has been affected by the policy of decentralization.

### **Policy context for change: the policy of decentralization**

Under the rule of Mao Zedong, the leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from 1949–1978, China's higher education was run according to the "centralist model" (Wei 1997). This model can be characterized by five key functions held by the central government in education, namely: (1) provision of core funding; (2) setting student enrollments for each institution; (3) approving senior staff appointments; (4) authorizing all new academic programmes; and (5) managing the student assignment process (Wei 1997: 8; China National Institute of Educational Research 1995). With the rapid expansion of higher education, the central government felt that it was difficult to continue to use this model to run higher education.

Acknowledging that over-centralization and stringent rules would kill the initiatives and enthusiasm of local educational institutions, the CCP called for "resolute steps to streamline administration, devolve powers to units at lower



levels so as to extend the schools' decision-making power in the administration of school affairs" (cited in Lewin 1994: 233) and thus reducing the rigid controls over schools at all levels as stipulated in the 1985 document called the "Decision of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party on the Reform of the Educational System".

One of the major themes of the decision is related to reform in the higher education sector, devolving decision-making power from the central government to individual higher education institutions. Realizing the importance of professional knowledge and technical know-how to the success of China's modernization and admitting the state's insufficient financial resources to create adequate higher education opportunities for the citizens, the state has allowed more autonomy and flexibility to local governments and educationists in directing the course of educational development (Wei and Zhang 1995; Zhu 1994). The state, in providing a framework necessary for educational development, has deliberately devolved responsibility and power to local government, local communities and other non-state sectors to involve themselves in creating more learning opportunities.

The promulgation of the "Mission Outline of the Reform and Development of China's Education" ("The Mission Outline", hereafter) (*Zhongguo Jiaoyu Gaige he Fazhan Ganyao*) in 1993 reassured the people that the state still supported the decentralization policy and diversification of educational services. Moreover, the "Mission Outline" stated very clearly that "the national policy is to actively encourage and fully support social institutions and citizens to establish schools [including higher education institutions] according to laws and to provide right guidelines and to strengthen administration" (Chinese Communist Party Central Committee 1993), and that "Government has to change its function from direct control to managing schools [including higher education institutions] through legislation, funding, planning, advice on policies and other necessary means" (State Education Commission Policies and Law Department 1993: 6). In sum, the principles behind the new approach are to deepen reform of China's higher education system "by gradually setting up a system under which the government exercises overall management while institutions are run independently and geared to the needs of society" (Wei 1997: 9). Most important of all, the new approach has further confirmed the move to the policy of decentralization, allowing individual institutions to have more managerial autonomy in deciding matters related to student enrollment, adjustment of specialties, appointing and dismissing cadres, use of funds, evaluation of professional titles, distribution of wages and conducting international cooperation and exchanges (Cheng 1996; Min 1994).

Within this policy context, there is a significant change in the relationship between the central government and provincial/local governments. Instead of exercising a "micro control", that is, imposing a very tight control of all details of the operation of the higher education system, the central government now maintains a "macro control" over higher education by giving policy directions and issuing policy principles (Wang 1988). The Ministry of Education



[formerly State Education Commission] is held responsible for supervising the implementation of the plans and policies and still directly governs the 35 national universities; while higher educational institutions at the provincial and local levels are directly managed and run by governments at lower levels. At the same time, the central government also encourages local governments to participate in “joint-development programmes” to run the universities and colleges affiliated to the central line ministries by means of a joint-management by both the provinces and the ministries (*Gongjiang*) (State Education Commission 1993).

In August 1998, the promulgation of the “Higher Education Law” (the “Law”, hereafter) again stipulated that the development of higher education must be catering for emerging social needs. Once more, the “Law” reconfirms the general principles behind the policy of decentralization, further calling for more diversified modes of educational services and allowing far more flexibility for local and provincial governments to run higher education (Central Committee of Communist Party of China 1998). Openly recognizing that the state alone can never satisfy the pressing needs for higher education, Jiang Zemin, the General Secretary of the CCP, repeatedly called for the joint efforts of every sector in society to engage in creating more educational opportunities. More importantly, he even openly endorsed the role of *minban* (people-run) higher educational institutions and urged further development in *minban* institutions of higher learning to train people for China’s modernization (*Guangming Daily*, 16 June 1999, p. 1). Conceptualizing the processes of decentralization in China’s higher education, we may argue that China is now experiencing both *functional decentralization* and *territorial decentralization*, the developments of which should have affected the modes of governance of education and the state-education relationships.

### **The “211 Project” and “internal competition” in the higher education sector**

Despite the fact that the government adopted a policy of decentralization in running the higher education, the CCP has never withdrawn entirely from the higher education domain. Instead of being the sole direct provider of educational services, the central government now acts as policy facilitator and regulator of higher education. Even though the central government has delegated its authorities to local/provincial governments and individual higher education institutions to take charge of their operational matters, the central government has introduced “internal competition” and “review exercises” to regulate the higher education sector. Drawing comparative insights from leading universities in other countries, the CCP has begun to realize the importance of bringing about substantial improvements in its university education. Early in the 1993 Mission Outline, the State Education Commission (SEC) [now Ministry of Education] initiated a concrete plan to bring resources

together to operate 100 universities and selected academic disciplines to meet world standards. The Mission Outline states clearly that:

In order to meet the challenges coming from the globe's technological revolution, both central and local authorities should concentrate resources and powers on operating around 100 main point universities and a group of main point professions and disciplines. It aims at enhancing the quality of teaching, scientific research and institutional management in selected higher education institutions as well as their academic disciplines to a recognized world standards during the twenty-first century" (Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party 1993, Part II, para. 9).

Based upon the framework of the "Mission Outline", the SEC issued a document to introduce a "211 Project" in July 1993, five months after the promulgation of the Mission Outline (Cheng 1996; Wei 1997). Pursuing to the goal of reforming and restructuring China's higher education systems, central to the "211 Project" is the training of high quality professionals for future economic modernization and to construct a solid base for scientific, technological and social development. In addition, the "211 Project" is meant to be a plan to promote "quality education" in both scientific research and management to a certain recognized international standard.

In order to select the top 100 higher education institutions to be included in the "211 Project", the SEC set out a stringent set of regulations. In brief, the criteria for being selected to be a member institution of the project depend on the institutions' performance in teaching and research as well as their ability to build up a status of leadership in both the national and international academic arenas. Therefore, universities are assessed by quantifiable, objective criteria on staffing, buildings, libraries, laboratories, research, funds, etc. to determine whether they are "qualified" to be included as top higher educational institutions (Christiansen 1996; Mok and Wat 1998). Moreover, the "211 Project" also calls for high-quality institutional management by its repeated emphasis on managerial reforms within higher education institutions along the line of the 3Es.

Between 1994 and 1996, 30 higher education institutions had submitted their applications with detailed review reports. Thereafter the SEC assessed these higher education institutions with great care, and the first stage of assessment of the project was passed in 1996 (Beijing Normal University Editorial Committee 1996). Up to 1998 the progress of the "211 Project" was marked by the setting up of 100 national main point laboratories and 25 research centres for national engineering and technology. Two hundred fifty universities have been included in the China Educational Scientific Research Computing Network (*Zhongguo Jiaoyu Keyan Jisun Jiwan*). Meanwhile, nearly 100 higher education institutions have submitted their applications to be included in the project and they were assessed by the then SEC and the "211 Project" Office (Zhu 1998).

## **Responses to changes: higher education in Guangdong**

### *Diversified sources in financing of higher education*

Under the policy of decentralization, one of the major transformations in China's higher education sector is related to the financing system. In order to alleviate the pressure on the government's finances and to strengthen the institutions' capacity for self-reliance, sources of financing in higher education have been increasingly diversified. In spite of the fact that the public expenditure on education has grown by about 6.19 times from 22.80 billion yuan in 1985 to 141.16 billion yuan in 1995 and its percentage of the total government expenditure also grew in the same period from 12.35% to 16.05%, it is nearly impossible to meet people's pressing needs for higher education if we only depend on the state's limited financing abilities (Wei 1997).

The fact is that, with only limited financial resources, the central government alone can never satisfy people's pressing demands for education. In order to diversify the sources for educational financing, educational institutions look to surcharges in both urban and rural areas, tuition and fees, profits from school-run enterprises and voluntary, tax allowable contributions from businesses and individuals, and other channels as alternative sources of funding (Rosen 1997; Mok 1997).<sup>4</sup> As part of the overall economic reform to allow provinces to retain a higher portion of their revenues, the central government has allowed provincial governments more flexibility to exercise their financial autonomy. In Guangdong, the provincial government has allocated additional financial resources to develop its higher education on top of the legally stipulated educational surcharges. For instance, the provincial government of Guangdong has invested massively in higher education by raising teachers' wages and improving the learning environment of higher education institutions. Another way to upgrade the higher education institutions in Guangdong is by matching the allocation from the central government to universities under the Ministry of Education and higher education institutions located within the province (Wei 1997).

Another major structural change in financing higher education is the introduction of a "fee-paying" principle. Early in the 1980s, the plan for charging students a fee was regarded as an "ultra-plan", implying that the in-take of these "self-supporting" students was beyond the state plan (Cheng 1996). But after the endorsement of a socialist market economy in the CCP's Fourteenth Congress, in 1992 the SEC officially approved higher education institutions admitting up to 25% of their students in the "commissioned training" or "fee-paying" categories. In 1993, 30 higher education institutions were selected for a pilot study for a scheme known as "merging the rails," whereby students were admitted either because of public examination scores or because they were willing and able to pay a fee though their scores were lower than what was required. In 1994, more institutions entered the scheme and the fee-charging principle was thus legitimized (Cheng 1996).

From 1997 onwards, all higher education institutions in the mainland have begun to charge all students tuition fees (Mok 2000). Because higher educational institutions have to recover costs (about 25 percent from the total expenditures) due to the increase in operation expenditures and reduction in state subsidy, university tuition fees in Guangdong increased by 20 to 30 percent in 1999/20 academic year (*Yangcheng Wanbao*, 17 September 1999).

During field visits to Guangdong, the author was told by Prof. Cai He, Head of Department of Sociology, Zhongshan University that all students should pay their tuition fees. Beginning in 1995, Zhongshan University started to “merge the tracks”, implying that there are no longer any differences between “publicly-funded students”, “self-paying students” and “commissioned students”. Prof. Cai He and Prof. Zhang Minqiang, Director of the Institute of Higher Education of Zhongshan University, told me that students had begun to accept the self-paying principle. In the 1998/99 academic year, the range of tuition fees varied among courses, with students paying from 2,500 to 3,500 yuan. Despite the fact that some students still have difficulties in accepting the notion of paying tuition fees in higher education, most students are relatively sympathetic. Mr. Wu Yechun, Deputy Director of the Office of Administration, South China University of Technology, said that students had far more incentive to study hard after the adoption of a “fee-charging” principle in the university sector. He said:

In the past, university education was entirely supported by the state and students seemed to take higher education for granted and thus their motivation was low once they were admitted. But this situation has changed since the adoption of “self-paying” principle in the university sector. Students are strongly motivated to study because they have to pay for the courses, and they are eager to learn a wider range of subjects to broaden their knowledge base. Despite the fact that some students, particularly those who are from poor families, may have difficulties in paying tuition fees, many of them are able to secure financial support to obtain higher education. More fundamentally, people are generally supportive of the “fee-paying” principle in higher education because they believe that higher education is an investment. With higher qualifications university graduates would find it easier to get jobs in the open labour market. “Value” is thus added to the students after university training (Field Interview in Guangdong, April 1998).

In addition to allowing higher education institutions to charge students tuition fees, the central government also encourages higher education institutions to generate their own revenue through research and consultancy, commissioned training programmes, school-run enterprises and other services to industries and communities. Higher education institutions are also encouraged to receive private donations and overseas contributions (Hu 1997; Kwong 1996; Mok 1999). From Prof. Wu Fuguang, Institute of Higher Education of Zhongshan University, I learned that it has become increasingly popular for faculty members and departments to venture into the commercial and business fields to generate additional revenues. In the face of limited financial resources from the state, the university authorities have to diversify their sources of financing. Obviously, those departments with skills and knowledge which fit

the market would have formed their own enterprises or collaborated with the private sector to generate more income. University-run enterprises are not unique to Zhongshan University. Jinan University also has set up a special office for coordinating work related university-run enterprises. Economic and Technology Development Company Limited, one of the subsidiary companies of Jinan University, has established a close partnership with the industrial field in order to promote its products developed in research projects. In addition, paid consultation services are offered in the fields of law and accounting (Field Interview in Guangdong, April 1998).

Similarly, a variety of ways has been employed by different higher education institutions in Guangdong to attract additional funding. For instance, South China Normal University (SCNU) has tried to generate additional income by leasing out some of its university-owned property. Prof. Wang Guojian, Vice-President of South China Normal University, shared with me the following:

Revenue generation in universities is increasingly popular. Without adequate funding for educational development, we should search for our own ways to get additional income. I think what has been done in revenue generation in this university is not sufficient, and we must work hard in this endeavour. In the midst of a market economy, there should be a fundamental transformation of the way that a university is managed and operated. Obviously, enhanced economic position would enable the university to develop new frontiers and other related activities (Field Interview in Guangdong, April 1998).

In spite of the fact that SCNU has only limited financial means, the university has successfully established a new Kangda School in collaboration with, and funded by, a local enterprise in Guangzhou. Affiliated with SCNU, Kangda School has attracted students, and therefore the university can get additional income from this collaborative project. All in all, different strategies have been adopted by higher education institutions in Guangdong to gain additional funds to finance educational developments in the region. As the policy of decentralization has actually delegated the financial authority from the central government to local/provincial governments and even to individual higher education institutions, the financial capacity of higher education institutions now depends entirely upon whether individual higher education institutions can attract sufficient income to finance their institutions. Since one of the performance indicators is closely related to the financial conditions of individual higher education institutions, it is therefore not surprising to see that different higher education institutions have eagerly diversified their channels for educational financing in Guangdong (Field Visits in Guangdong, February 1999).

Moreover, five higher educational institutions in Guangdong have announced plans to establish their own open colleges (schools of continuing education). The launch of these colleges will create more learning opportunities for working adults. Compared to formal universities, these colleges will adopt a far more flexible mode in management and curriculum design.

Moreover, it is also hoped that the opening of these educational institutions can generate more revenues for the universities concerned (*Yangcheng Wanbao*, 12 August 1999).

*Joint development programme to enhance competitive edge of higher education institutions*

In order to further develop higher education institutions in Guangdong, the Provincial Government of Guangdong and the State Education Commission [now Ministry of Education] have decided to pull resources together to strengthen the academic standards of higher education institutions in Guangdong. For instance, South China University of Technology (SCUT) is one of the higher education institutions in Guangdong selected as a university to enjoy “joint development” by both the central authorities and the local government. It is reported that such a reform initiative has greatly improved the research and learning environments of SCUT. Under the reform directives, the School of Communications and the School of Electric Power have been developed jointly by the university and the relevant departments of the provincial Government of Guangdong. Other examples include the Automobile and Engine Research Centre, the Chemical Engineering Science and Technical Research Centre, and the Ultrasonic Electronic and Information Equipment Engineering Research Centre which have been jointly developed by the university and relevant local organizations and industrial conglomerates. In addition, joint development projects also include those between the SCUT and other institutions of higher learning and research institutes in Guangdong (*South China University of Technology Leaflet* 1998: 1).

By making use of the joint development programmes, SCUT had succeeded in being selected as one of the top 100 universities in 1995. According to its mission statement, SCUT is committed to become:

A university of science and technology that stands in the front ranks of the key universities of China with respect to its comprehensive strength and overall standards. By that time its academic standards will have approached those of the first-rate universities in the world and some disciplines will have reached advanced world standards, making it an important base for the training of highly-qualified students for Guangdong and the nation as a whole and also an important base for scientific research and technical development (*South China University of Technology Leaflet* 1998: 1).

With very good connections with the business and industrial sectors, SCUT should have few problems in attracting additional funds from them. Mr. Wu, Deputy Director of Office of Administration, SCUT, told me that the university had engaged in projects funded by enterprises in Guangzhou.

Under the concept of “Gongjiang” (joint effort of the SEC and Guangdong Provincial Government to run universities), SCUT has a very clear mission to train people for the modernization project in Guangdong. Therefore, we have



extended our contacts and established a very close relationship with local enterprises. We are sensitive and responsive to the needs of the enterprises. In order to capitalize on the knowledge and skills possessed by our faculty members, it is extremely important for the university to develop a partnership with industries and enterprises in the Guangdong area (Field Interview in Guangdong, April 1998).

Similar experiences can be found in Zhongshan University in Guangdong to jointly develop the institution in collaboration with the central authorities, local governments and other local non-state sectors. During intensive interviews with Prof. Cai He, Head of Department of Sociology and Prof. Zhang Minqiang, Director of Institute of Higher Education of Zhongshan University, the author learned that the university was allocated about 108 million yuan from both the central government and provincial government. Even though Zhongshan University has enjoyed the privilege of the “joint development programme”, we can easily find that merely depending upon state and provincial support has never satisfied the development goals of the university. Like other universities in Guangdong, Zhongshan University has to look for other income to meet its own ends (Field Interview in Guangdong, April 1998).

*Merging universities and the establishment of a “university city”*

As the CCP seeks to recruit its best 100 institutions of higher learning into “Project 211”, the state is going to attach a new financial and strategic importance to about 100 universities and some subject areas in order to try to ensure that these identified 100 universities will become “world-class universities” in the early 21st century. Central to the scheme is the introduction of “competition” among universities, rewarding the top 100 higher educational institutions which are comparable to international benchmarks (Mok and Wat 1998).

In 1997, the SEC issued a new direction for higher education in the mainland in which universities are encouraged “to share resources and facilities among universities; to merge universities to enhance research and teaching quality; to consolidate and strengthen the existing good work, and to establish new universities in collaboration with local governments” (Wu 1997). Under such a policy direction, different local universities in Guangzhou have attempted to merge with others to enhance their common strengths, hoping that such an undertaking may enable them to be selected into the “top 100”. In order to upgrade the Guangzhou city-run higher educational institutions, the present Guangzhou Normal University, together with Guangzhou Institute of Education and Guangzhou Teacher College will merge to form a new Guangzhou Normal University. At the same time, Guangzhou Medical College, South China Construction College and Guangzhou University are committed to the improvement of their research and teaching, while establishing closer links with local industries and businesses in order to make their courses more attractive and competitive in the market (Wu 1997).

Another growth area will be the establishment of a “University City” in Guangzhou. Realizing the limitations faced by the Guangzhou city-run higher educational institutions (particularly in terms of small student population size, limited space for school buildings, and inadequate resources and faculty members), it is proposed that a University City could be developed, composed of various local institutions of higher learning such as Jiaotong College, Vocational College, Industrial and Business College, College of Arts and Law, and College of Finance. The proposed “merger” will draw resources and strengths together. Coupled with the existing 100 college-run research centres and enterprises, students would very much benefit from sharing more resources, better facilities, well-qualified faculty members and enhanced research and teaching in the future University City (Wu 1997; Field Visits in Guangdong, February 1999).

Like these locally-run higher educational institutions, the publicly-run institutions of higher learning have already started a similar process by allowing students to enroll in courses offered by other sister universities. For instance, Prof. Wu Yunfeng, Deputy Registrar of Jinan University, told us that Jinan University has an agreement with six nearby universities, such as South China Polytechnic University and South China Normal University, to allow their students to enroll in courses outside of their universities by the transfer of credits. In addition, libraries and other facilities are also commonly shared among these universities. It is hoped that this scheme will not only encourage students to broaden their scope of knowledge but also pull more resources together to facilitate quality education (Field Interview in Guangdong, February 1999). Similar experiences are easily found in South China University of Technology and South China Normal University where the university authorities identify outstanding students and allow them to enroll in “double degree” programmes. With a broader knowledge base and speciality, graduates would find themselves more “competitive” in the labour market” (Field Interview in Guangdong, February 1999). More importantly, it is also the hope that merging universities would bring strengths together to improve their competitive edge in the selection process of the “211 Project”.

#### *Reforms of management structure of higher education institutions*

As discussed earlier, the policy of decentralization has delegated authority to individual higher education institutions to control the management of their own affairs. Various reforms of the management structure of individual higher education institutions have been introduced and implemented gradually and incrementally (Wei 1997). One of the reforms is to empower the university presidents to take charge of the overall affairs of their institutions. Under the leadership of the Party Committee of the higher education institutions, the presidents of individual higher education institutions are held responsible for the development and operation of the institutions. Like other minban higher education institutions which are run by a new management system of

“Presidential Responsibility” under the supervision of a Board of Advisors (Mok 1997; Min 1994), some public universities have attempted to establish similar management structures by forming their Boards of Trustees to develop closer links with the industrial and business sectors, as well as cultivating fruitful relationship with other sectors in the society. According to Wei:

There was no common expectation from creation of the Boards. Most institutions used the Boards to give them access to a wide range of enterprises and to mobilize funds. Some of them stressed the involvement of the related officials, while only a few actively involved the Boards in their management, expecting the Boards to review the universities’ development plan and to provide suggestions to the authorities of the universities (Wei 1997: 19).

In my field visits to various higher education institutions in Guangdong, I also learned that similar bodies are in formation. As the state encourages the establishment of Boards of Trustees at the universities and colleges, we would therefore expect that the system of trustees will play a role in the internal management of the institutions of higher learning in the future (Field Visits in Guangdong, February 1999).

In addition to the reform in the management structure by allowing the presidents of the higher education institutions more flexibility to run their institutions, another major reform area is related to the restructuring of academic organizations. To transform the conventional “two-level-model” of university and academic departments, some universities in Guangdong have taken the initiatives in establishing a “three-level-model”, whereby the relationship between the university, colleges and departments is made clearer. With the intention to reduce the overall workload of university presidents and to streamline administration of higher education institutions, the restructuring process has allowed the college and departmental levels far more autonomy to run their business. Being the central governance body in the university, university presidents are therefore held responsible for the formulation of policies and the development of long-term development plans and objectives. While the colleges now become the management entities which enjoy considerable powers to deal with their teaching and research matters, the management of personnel, and resource allocation (Field Interview in Guangdong, April 1998).

The recent reforms of the management and academic organization of higher education institutions in Guangdong are timely and appropriate methods of adapting to the new context of the market economy. No doubt, such reform strategies have empowered the college and department levels to hold responsibility for their own operational matters. But it is also true that the delegation of power implies that these entities have to struggle for their survival. Similar to their Western counterparts, academic departments in Chinese universities nowadays are managed with a one-line budget, thus suggesting individual departments have to search for their own ways to sustain their own departments. It is therefore easy to imagine that those academic departments or colleges which possess the skills and knowledge to cater for the market

needs would have no problem in surviving; while others without the same level of survival skills would be the losers in the market. Hence, all academic departments and colleges have been trying hard to venture themselves in the “strong tide of marketization”. In order to survive, higher education institutions have sought either to make their courses more “market-friendly” to attract more “students (customers)” or to engage in various kinds of activities to generate additional income (Kwong 1996; Lin 1996; Mok 1998).

### **Challenges from other regions in the mainland**

Under the policy of decentralization and diversification, students are now granted far more freedom to select the institutions and disciplines for which they wish to apply providing that they can perform well in the national higher education institutions entrance examination. It is not surprising to see that students with high academic achievements would choose those institutions with high academic prestige and achievement like Beijing University, Tsinghua University in Beijing and Fudan University in Shanghai, the top universities in the mainland. This is particularly true when all Chinese universities are required to collect students’ tuition fees. It is not difficult to imagine that when students have become the “users” and “customers” of the educational services, they would choose universities and courses they consider to be “value for money”. In order to attract students of higher quality, universities have to enhance their teaching and research as a means of maintaining their prestige and academic achievements. Obviously, whether the academic standards and research performance of individual higher education institutions can be enhanced and advanced depends upon whether they can obtain sufficient grants and funds (Field Interviews in Shanghai, January 1999).

There is no doubt that the most prestigious universities such as Beijing University, Tsinghua University and Fudan University will have no problem in recruiting top students because these top universities should have no difficulty in securing funds from both the central government and other non-state sectors (including the market) to improve their teaching and research environments. Nonetheless, the second-tier universities or, even worse, the universities located in local areas may have encountered problems in admitting students. No one can deny that the “211 project” can act as a catalyst to arouse higher education institutions’ motivation to enhance their quality so as to earn a qualification for being included in the top “100”. But what is also true is that those second-tier and locally run universities may find themselves in disadvantageous positions when competing with the top universities (Field Interviews in Shanghai, January 1999).

For instance, Shanghai City Architecture College and Shanghai Architecture College, with a total staff of 2000 and students of 6000 have merged with Tongji University. After merging with Tongji University, these three higher education institutions can pull resources together to strengthen their teaching

and research profiles. Similarly, Sichuan Lianhe University also merged with different local higher education institutions to strength its application for the inclusion in the “211 Project”. The strategy of merging has proved effective enough to improve the operations of Tongji University and Sichuan Lianhe University. Both of them have successfully passed the first stage of “211 project” assessment after the “merging” (Wu 1996; *Gaojiao Wenzhai*, October 1994: 6–7).

More recently, the Ministry of Education (MOE) has announced a new scheme to strategically develop only two universities, namely Beijing University and Tsinghua University, as the top universities in mainland China by allocating additional funds to establish these two higher education institutions as internationally recognized “Top Class” universities. Meanwhile, the MOE has also called for all provincial and local governments to identify one or two universities for strategic development. In response to the call from the SOE, the Shanghai Municipal Government has identified Fudan University as the target for strategic development (Field Interviews in Shanghai, June 1999). Undoubtedly, with such “preferential treatment”, these selected institutions would have no big problem to become world class universities. But what is also true is that there will be disparity and inequality of development within the university sector in the mainland.

Putting such new developments in perspective, we are pleased to hear the success story of these universities on the one hand; but on the other hand we are sorry for those local universities or colleges in Guangdong, for they have already been caught in the difficulties of recruiting students. How these second-tier universities and local colleges can secure sufficient financial resources to improve their teaching and research in order to compete with the strengthened and properly restructured universities as mentioned above has been the tough question for them. Unquestionably, the new policy of identifying a few universities for “strategic development” by the MOE may probably weaken the position of those universities without the same “preferential treatments”. One can easily imagine that one of the great challenges which higher education institutions in Guangdong would encounter is how to improve their “competitive edge” in the emerging “internal market” within the university sector in mainland China. The central government seems to be very intent on developing Beijing and Shanghai as the leading centres of cultural and academic exchange in the mainland. Whether the higher education institutions in Guangdong can be established into the “centres of excellence” in academic and research endeavour would be the most challenging tasks ahead. No doubt, the introduction of “internal market” in China’s higher education has inevitably raised the issues of inequality in terms of resource allocation and the issue of disparity in education.

### **Discussion: decentralization or re-centralization in higher education in China**

Our above discussion has suggested that the role of the state in higher education has changed substantially during the past two decades. What really has happened in mainland China, even when education has become more marketized and privatized (Mok 1997, 1997a, 1999), is a transformation of the state's role as a sole provider or a reliable guarantor of educational services to a regulator or service purchaser. China has moved in a direction similar to that of some Western countries where their policies "amount to a 'hollowing out' of the state (Jessop 1993: 7–39) with the loss of some activities 'upwards' to supranational bodies and the loss of others 'downwards' to sub-national or non-state bodies" (Dale 1997: 274).

The shift from a direct state control to governance has caused fundamental changes to the state's role in education. Like the establishment of differentiated markets in the welfare sector, and similarly, a move towards a post-Fordist mode of economy which "places a lower value on mass individual and collective consumption and creates pressures for a more differentiated production and distribution of health, education, transport and housing" (Whitty 1997: 300) in the West, this study presents us with the fact that central state in mainland China has gradually retreated from governance activities of funding, provision and delivery. At the same time, different coordinating institutions [i.e. the market and the community] other than the state have taken a far more active role in education governance. Nonetheless, although the state has realized that its own capacity to provide people with sufficient higher educational opportunities is severely limited in the present social and economic context, it is wrong to say that the CCP has entirely withdrawn from the educational arena. Very broadly speaking, the nature of the work it does has changed from directly coordinating and administering education itself to determining where the work will be done and by whom. More interestingly, the strong tide of "marketization" affecting China's education does suggest the mode of governance in education has changed from the "state control model" to the "state supervision model".

The above discussion on Guangdong's higher education in particular and higher education in the mainland in general has shown that "internal competition" is institutionalized among universities in the mainland. Seemingly, "internal markets" have gradually evolved, whereby the state becomes the "purchaser" while universities are becoming "providers" of educational services. Although the split between purchaser and provider is still not as clear as it is in many other countries, recent developments in China's higher education sector in moving from the state's role as sole provider or coordinator of educational services to that of a regulator and monitor are very important for China's future (Mok 1999). Despite the fact that the decentralization policy has allowed university administrators and presidents, as well as local governments to have more autonomy and flexibility to decide matters regarding



their institutions' developments, the central educational authorities in mainland China do still keep close watch on curriculum, qualifications, appointments of senior faculty members and university presidents (Hayhoe 1999; Agelasto and Adamson 1998). Fearing loss of control over the university sector, the Ministry of Education has set up special committees to monitor individual institutions by launching the "211 Project".

What really happens to the higher education sector in Guangdong in particular and in the mainland in general is the process of decentralization which fits the general definition of a transfer of authority (particularly financial) and decision-making from higher to lower levels as Hanson (1998) and Bray (1999) proposed. Hawkins has rightly pointed out that "China, unlike other socialist states in transition, has moved cautiously in all of its efforts to disengage the state from various aspects of Chinese society and as a result has avoided some of the catastrophic problems other nations have faced" (p. 7). Such observations draw us to note that we must not overstate the degree of autonomy of the university sector, arguing that there already exists a "civil society" or a "public sphere", by which we mean a binary opposition between state and society. When analyzing how the decentralization policy has affected the modes of governance of China's higher education, we must be aware that the relationship between the authoritarian state and the more autonomous university sector is an interactive one (Mok 2000). As the centre still keeps close watch on developments and changes that take place in the university sector, it is less likely that a genuine devolution of authority can take place in mainland China especially under a single dominant party retaining Maoist and Leninist traditions (Hawkins 1999). Seen in this light, it is wrong to argue that once the decentralization policy is implemented in the education sector, the role of the control of the state will automatically diminish. In contrast, decentralization may be a mechanism for tightening control of the periphery instead of a genuine devolution or delegation of state powers.

## Conclusion

Clearly commercial influences, establishment of tuition fees and a limited role for private provision in the PRC suggest a reduced state role in educational provision and financing, but this process does not constitute a total withdrawal from state control/shaping. Despite the fact that the state has tried to "roll back" from the direct provider role, the CCP has adopted different forms of state intervention. As a result of the move from direct control to governance, other actors and non-state sectors have emerged to engage in educational provision. Such developments are not the unique experiences of mainland China but, instead, we can easily find similar situations in some Western countries and in some East Asian societies. For instance, in the UK, the devolution of responsibilities and decentralization of authority to allow schools to have more autonomy to run their businesses do not necessarily mean deregulation.

Instead, deregulating some major aspects of education has indeed increased a limited number of state powers and, in turn, strengthened the state's capacity to foster particular interests while appearing to stand outside the frame (see, for example, Yong and Whitty 1997; Whitty 1994, 1997a; Moe 1994). Similarly, the call for decentralization in higher education in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore's higher education has indeed strengthened the state's control and monitoring over the university sector by means of stronger management and the implementation of quality assurance exercises (see, for example, Tan 1999; Mok 2000a, b, c; *China Development Briefing*, No. 13, 1998).

All these developments suggest that "not only have changes in the nature of the state influenced the reforms of education, but the reforms in education are themselves beginning to change the way we think about the role of the state and what we expect of it" (Whitty 1997: 302). As Dale rightly put it: as far as coordinating institutions is concerned in relation to different governance activities in education like funding, regulation and provision/delivery, the role of the state, market and community would normally be identified. However, as far as the processes of "marketization" and "decentralization" in China's higher education sector are concerned, "the state has never done all these things alone, the market and especially the community have been indispensable to the operation of the educational systems" (Dale 1997: 275).

The present paper raises a critically important issue in the governance of education, particularly related to the control of the state under the policy framework of decentralization. The case study of Guangdong has suggested both the *functional decentralization* and *territorial decentralization* have changed the central state from a provider state to a facilitator state and regulator state. It is obvious that the roles of the central state has changed substantially but what is less obvious is whether such changes really reduce the extent of state control over education. It is tricky at the best of times for us to measure state power/control. What makes the case more complicated is how do we measure change when we are seeing a shift from one type of role (provider) to another (regulator). Furthermore, we can never reach any specific conclusions as what has really worked and what has not worked in the current trend of decentralization since China is too huge and disparate a country. We may probably encounter the reality that decentralization does work very well in some parts of the mainland and not in others. Like other parts of the globe, we may find the coexistence of trends that are both centralizing and decentralizing in educational governance. In conclusion, the discussion of governance issues in education is related to redefine the nature of the state and to work out the new state-civil society relations in general and to formalize and contract the areas of their involvement in China in particular.

## Notes

1. "211 Project" refers to the selection scheme of top 100 universities in mainland China, universities being selected as the top 100 will be allocated with additional resources for development. For details, see discussion in the following part.
2. The "state control model" is traditionally found in the higher education systems of the European continent and this model is a combination of the authority of state bureaucracy and faculty guilds; while the "state supervision model" has its root both in the U.S. higher education and the old British higher education system. Such a model shows far less governmental influence on higher education than the "state control model" (see, Clark 1993).
3. "Regular institutions of higher education" refer to those higher education institutions formally recognized either by the Ministry of Education or education bureau of Guangdong Provincial Government.
4. Starting from 1985, the central government has adopted a decentralization policy in education, allowing local governments to have more autonomy to finance and develop schools. It is under such a policy background that provinces and regions at the coastal area can afford to provide better education; while people living in the inner parts of mainland China have to face problems related to education disparity.

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