

Lecture notes for Multics retrospective

- Multics overview
 - Time-sharing OS 1964-2000
 - MIT w/ GE/Honeywell & Bell Labs
 - Extremely influential to CS
 - Hierarchical file system, arbitrary length filenames, symlinks
 - ACLs on files
 - Dynamic linking (even to other executables...)
 - Hot swapping of CPUs, RAM, disks
 - Engineered from the start for security
 - Ring protection
 - Per-process per-ring stacks in kernel
 - 36 bit words (in 1964!)
 - Bell Labs left in 1969, developed UNICS (later UNIX)
 - [Compare to DOS of the 1980s and early 1990s... not even a concept of a user or of protection]
 - So what happened?
 - [Shift from time-sharing mainframes to single-user systems; people believed single-user systems required no security]
- Multics required all customers to design around its security
 - All apps must work with Multics' controls
 - [Compare to Windows & Vista user accounts control]
- PL/I [pee el one / programming language one]
 - Possible to program buffer overflow, but takes work
 - [Compare to C: possible to program non-overflow, but takes work]
 - Design choices: the easy thing to do should be the secure thing
- Backdoors / malicious developers
 - Testing is poor way to discover backdoors... unlikely to test critical values
 - Experimental backdoors discovered only with manual code audit
 - Backdoors put in programs since (sendmail debug mode, Excel flight simulator)

- Boot sector viruses
 - Virtual machine based rootkit
- Ring protections
 - Multics had 9 rings
 - x86 processors have 4
 - 0: hypervisor, 1: kernel, 2: unused, 3: apps
- Compiler backdoor inserter
 - Malicious compiler on system (as an executable binary)
 - Inserts a backdoor into every program it compiles
 - Source-code review of apps will **not** find the backdoor
 - Source-code review of compiler will not find the backdoor inserter
 - Recompile compiler?
 - But recompile with the malicious compiler
 - Detects own recompilation, inserts the backdoor inserter into output (or simply copies itself over to the final output)
- “Software without pedigree”
 - Military use of COTS
 - E-voting systems