

Quantum Cryptography


LWE- Learning
With Errors

COMP3601 21T3

Cryptography vs. Quantum Computers


- Cryptography uses complex/ hard to reverse calculations to encrypt/ make data secure

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
ECC- Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Disk Encryption – Microsoft BitLocker



AES- Advanced Encryption Standard



Data Encryption – WiFi



AES- Advanced Encryption Standard


- Quantum computers can process calculations simultaneously or differently than how current computers calculate
- So where do they meet

Symmetric Key Vs. Asymmetric Key Cryptography



One example: break AES

- Brute force 128-bit key = $2^{128} = 3.4028 \times 10^{38}$
- If you assume there are 8 billion people on Earth
- Each person has 10 devices (computers, mobile phones, gaming consoles, smart watches, ...)
- Each device can test 1 billion keys per second
- After trying 50% of possibilities, we will find the correct key
- Whole world can crack a single 128-bit in **67.439 billion years**
- Age of the Earth = **4.543 billion years**
- Age of the universe = **13.77 billion years**





Quantum computers may crack AES-128 in 6 months

Break RSA - 1024

- RSA depends on prime numbers [[link](#)]
- Brute force RSA 1024 needs 1.88×10^{302} calculations copied from [[link](#)]
- AES-128 brute force = 3.4028×10^{38}

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Quantum computers can crack RSA
1024 in 3.58 hours ¹


RSA 2048 in 28.6 hours ¹

Quantum computers can crack ECC 256
in 10.5 hours ¹

¹ <https://www.nap.edu/read/25196/chapter/6#98>


Current Cryptographic Algorithms vs. Quantum Computers

Symmetric Key Cryptography



Grover's algorithm showed the brute force attack time to its square root. AES-128 the attack time becomes reduced to 2^{64} (not highly secure)

Asymmetric Key Cryptography



Quantum Secure Algorithms – Postquantum cryptography



- National Institute of Standard and Testing (NIST) started finding quantum secure algorithms
- <https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography>
- Started in 2016
- Currently in round 3
- Expected to publish draft standards in 2023–2025

LWE- Learning with Errors

- Proposed in 2005 by Regev [[link](#)]
- Considered as quantum secure
- New implementations/ proposals
- We often project LWE as a Lattice Problem [[link](#)]
- We will use a simple implementation for your project

Example – given **blue** matrices, can you deduce **red** matrix (column vector)?

Diagram illustrating matrix multiplication:

$$Z_{19}^{4 \times 5} \times Z_{19}^{5 \times 1} = Z_{19}^{4 \times 1}$$

The first matrix (4x5) contains the values:

3	5	8	17	1
2	8	6	9	13
16	15	11	8	5
14	6	18	13	10

The second matrix (5x1) is a column of red squares.

The result matrix (4x1) contains the values:

9
1
13
16

Example -

$$\begin{matrix} & Z_{19}^{4 \times 5} \\ \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 5 & 8 & 17 & 1 \\ 2 & 8 & 6 & 9 & 13 \\ 16 & 15 & 11 & 8 & 5 \\ 14 & 6 & 18 & 13 & 10 \end{bmatrix} & \times & \begin{bmatrix} 16 \\ 9 \\ 1 \\ 5 \\ 13 \end{bmatrix} & = & \begin{bmatrix} 9 \\ 1 \\ 13 \\ 16 \end{bmatrix} \\ & & Z_{19}^{5 \times 1} & & Z_{19}^{4 \times 1} \end{matrix}$$

**Gaussian
Elimination**

Example – add errors

This brings us Search LWE problem:
Given **blue** matrices find **red** matrix

Noise/ Error

$$A = Z_{19}^{4 \times 5} \quad S = Z_{19}^{5 \times 1} \quad e = Z_{19}^{4 \times 1} \quad B = Z_{19}^{4 \times 1}$$

3	5	8	17	1
2	8	6	9	13
16	15	11	8	5
14	6	18	13	10

 \times

16
9
1
5
13

 $=$

$3 \times 16 + 5 \times 9 + 8 \times 1 + 17 \times 5$ $1 \times 13 = 199 \bmod 19 = 9$
$2 \times 16 + 8 \times 9 + 6 \times 1 + 9 \times 5$ $13 \times 13 = 324 \bmod 19 = 1$
$16 \times 16 + 15 \times 9 + 11 \times 1 + 8 \times 5$ $5 \times 13 = 507 \bmod 19 = 13$
$14 \times 16 + 6 \times 9 + 18 \times 1 + 13 \times 5$ $10 \times 13 = 491 \bmod 19 = 16$

 $+$

1
0
-1
0

 $=$

10
1
12
16

Considered as
Quantum safe/ hard

Known algorithms
require $2^{O(n)}$ time

LWE Search Problem

- Pick a vector $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ from the uniform distribution over $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$,
q is poly(n) – we choose a prime number

- Pick e from the distribution ϕ


We assume distribution ϕ is Gaussian, mean = 0

$\sqrt{n} \leq \text{Std. deviation} \ll q$, 'rate'- $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}$ (only cover alpha fraction of \mathbb{Z}_q^n)

- Evaluate $B = \langle A, S \rangle / q + e$,
- Output pairs (A_i, B_i) ; $i=1, \dots, n$

LWE Search problem: Find $S \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, given many (A_i, B_i)

$$B \approx \langle A, S \rangle$$



LWE Decision Problem

- Given a set of (A, B) parameters/ pairs, can you guess uniform random pairs over \mathbb{Z}_q vs. pairs generated by $B = \langle A, S \rangle / q + e$?

16	15	11	8	5	12
----	----	----	---	---	----

Random?

5	1	9	3	13	2
---	---	---	---	----	---

Random?

3	10	6	7	17	8
---	----	---	---	----	---

Random?

14	6	18	13	10	16
----	---	----	----	----	----

Random?

3	5	8	17	1	X	16	+	1	=	10
2	8	6	9	13		9		0		1
16	15	11	8	5		1		-1		12
14	6	18	13	10		5		0		16
						13				


LWE Public Cryptography

- How to use LWE problem to implement a simple public key crypto algorithm
- 3 Components
 - Key generation
 - Encryption
 - Decryption
- Used to encrypt 1-bit(1,0), for L-bits repeat encryption L times
- There may be errors in decryption[one of the tasks you evaluate]

Key Generation




- Bob generates public keys (A, B) and sends to Alice
- S is only known by Bob (private key)
- q is assumed to be known by Alice and Bob



Encryption/ Encode



- Alice generates the message (let's say one bit) $M=\{0,1\}$
- Generates u and v



$$\mathbf{u} = \left(\sum \mathbf{A}_{\text{sample}} \right) \bmod q$$

$$\mathbf{v} = \left(\sum \mathbf{B}_{\text{sample}} - M \cdot \frac{q}{2} \right) \bmod q$$

If S is a scalar

u is a scalar

If S is a column vector

u is a row vector

Encrypted/ encoded values are (\mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v})

Randomly sample; typical value $\approx n/4$

Decryption/ Decode



- Bob receives **u** and **v**
- Bob calculates **D**, $D = (v - u.s) \bmod q$

If **D** is less than $q/2$, the message (**M**) is 0. If
D is greater than $q/2$, the message(**M**) is 1.

If **D** is between $-q/4$ and $q/4$, the message (**M**) is 0.
else the message(**M**) is 1.

Example

- Lets assume $n=12$, $m=4$, $q=23$, $S=\{4\ 7\ 5\ 5\}$



A					S				e		B
18	4	16	20		4		280		4		3
8	11	12	12		7		229		22		1
1	11	17	9		5		211		4		4
13	22	22	12		5		376		8		8
20	19	22	16				403		12		10
4	22	12	0	X		=	230	mod q	0	+	2
9	15	22	18				341		19		19
17	9	2	3				156		18		20
0	21	1	11				207		0		1
21	11	7	5				221		14		13
17	5	13	8				208		1		3
12	9	12	15				246		16		17

Example

- Lets assume $n=12$, $m=4$, $q=23$
- $M = 1$
- A , B and q known



A				B
18	4	16	20	3
8	11	12	12	1
1	11	17	9	4
13	22	22	12	8
20	19	22	16	10
4	22	12	0	2
9	15	22	18	19
17	9	2	3	20
0	21	1	11	1
21	11	7	5	13
17	5	13	8	3
12	9	3	15	17

$$\begin{aligned}
 u &= (\sum A_{\text{sample}} \bmod q) \\
 &= [8 \ 11 \ 12 \ 12] + [20 \ 19 \ 22 \ 16] + [9 \ 15 \ 22 \ 18] \\
 &\quad + [17 \ 5 \ 13 \ 8] \\
 &= [54 \ 50 \ 69 \ 54] \bmod 23 \\
 &= [8 \ 4 \ 0 \ 8]
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 v &= (\sum B_{\text{sample}} - M \cdot \frac{q}{2}) \bmod q \\
 &= (1 + 10 + 19 + 3) - 1 \times 11.5 \\
 &= (33) - 1 \times 11.0 \leftarrow \text{floor} \\
 &= 22 \bmod 23 \\
 &= 22
 \end{aligned}$$

Example

- Lets assume $n=12$, $q=23$, $s=\{4\ 7\ 5\ 5\}$
- $M=?$



Bob receives (u,v)

$$u = [8\ 4\ 0\ 8]$$

$$v = 22$$

$$D = (v - u.s) \bmod q$$

$$= (22 - [8\ 4\ 0\ 8] * \begin{matrix} 4 \\ 7 \\ 5 \\ 5 \end{matrix}) \bmod 23$$

$$= (22 - 100) \bmod 23$$

$$= -78 \bmod 23 = 23 - (78 \bmod 23)$$

$$= 14$$

D is greater than $q/2$, the message (M) is 1

$$v = \sum B_{\text{sample}} - M \cdot \frac{q}{2}$$

$$= (1 + 10 + 19 + 3) - 0 \times 11.5$$

$$= (33) - 0 \times 11.0$$

$$= 33 \bmod 23$$

$$= 10$$

Assume $M=0$

$$u = [8\ 4\ 0\ 8]$$

$$v = 10$$

$$D = (v - u.s) \bmod q$$

$$= (10 - [8\ 4\ 0\ 8] * \begin{matrix} 4 \\ 7 \\ 5 \\ 5 \end{matrix}) \bmod 23$$

$$= (10 - 100) \bmod 23$$

$$= 2$$

D is less than $q/2$, the message (M) is 0

When there is no error (e=0)



18	4	16	20	4	280	4
8	11	12	12	7	229	22
1	11	17	9	5	211	4
13	22	22	12	5	376	8
20	19	22	16		403	12
4	22	12	0		230	0
9	15	22	18		341	19
17	9	2	3		156	18
0	21	1	11		207	0
21	11	7	5		221	14
17	5	13	8		208	1
12	9	12	15		246	16

$\mathbf{X} = \text{mod } q$

Example

- Lets assume $n=12$, $m=4$, $q=23$
- $M = 1$



A				B
18	4	16	20	4
8	11	12	12	22
1	11	17	9	4
13	22	22	12	8
20	19	22	16	12
4	22	12	0	0
9	15	22	18	19
17	9	2	3	18
0	21	1	11	0
21	11	7	5	14
17	5	13	8	1
12	9	3	15	16

$$\begin{aligned}
 u &= (\sum A_{\text{sample}}) \bmod q \\
 &= [8 \ 11 \ 12 \ 12] + [20 \ 19 \ 22 \ 16] + [9 \ 15 \ 22 \ 18] \\
 &\quad + [17 \ 5 \ 13 \ 8] \\
 &= [54 \ 50 \ 69 \ 54] \bmod 23 \\
 &= [8 \ 4 \ 0 \ 8] \\
 \mathbf{u} &= \mathbf{[8 \ 4 \ 0 \ 8]}
 \end{aligned}$$

If there is no error, D is either $q/2$ or 0;

$$u = [8 \ 4 \ 0 \ 8]$$

$$\begin{aligned} v &= \left(\sum B_{\text{sample}} - M \cdot \frac{q}{2} \right) \bmod q \\ &= (22 + 12 + 19 + 1) - 1 \times 11.5 \\ &= (54) - 1 \times 11.0 \\ &= 43 \bmod 23 \end{aligned}$$

$$v = 20$$

$$\begin{aligned} D &= (v - u.s) \bmod q \\ &= (20 - [8 \ 4 \ 0 \ 8] * \begin{matrix} 4 \\ 7 \\ 5 \\ 5 \end{matrix}) \bmod 23 \\ &= (20 - 100) \bmod 23 \\ &= 12 \end{aligned}$$

D is $q/2$
(difference due to rounding)

$$\begin{aligned} v &= \left(\sum B_{\text{sample}} - M \cdot \frac{q}{2} \right) \bmod q \\ &= (22 + 12 + 19 + 1) - 0 \times 11.5 \\ &= (54) - 0 \times 11.0 \\ &= 54 \bmod 23 \end{aligned}$$


$$v = 8$$

$$\begin{aligned} D &= (v - u.s) \bmod q \\ &= (8 - [8 \ 4 \ 0 \ 8] * \begin{matrix} 4 \\ 7 \\ 5 \\ 5 \end{matrix}) \bmod 23 \\ &= (8 - 100) \bmod 23 \\ &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

D is 0

Extra – Ring LWE & Homomorphic Computing

- Crypto systems often use Ring LWE
 - Why? inefficient!!!
 - You need to store A which consumes significant memory and matrix multiplications
 $m=2048, n=64, q = 65099$
 $\text{Size}_A = 2048 \times 64 \times 16\text{bit} = 256\text{KB}$
- What if we use a Polynomial X
- Multiplication in a polynomial ring,
 $\mathbb{Z}_q[X] / (X^n + 1)$
- We only need to send X ,
can use FFT to speed up
- LWE 200-400KB public key
Ring LWE 1-2KB public key



Extra – Ring LWE & Homomorphic Computing



- Can we perform operations on encrypted data?
- Typically, $\text{ENC}(X_1) + \text{ENC}(X_2) \neq \text{ENC}(X_1 + X_2)$
- What is the advantage?
- Homomorphic computing involves performing **operations** (**+**, **-**, **x**, **/**, **...**) on encrypted data
- Not easy as you may think, ENC makes data nonlinear, applies avalanche effects.
- We can expand LWE problem into homomorphic computing
- Fun to explore LWE problems → Final year thesis