

# COMP6843 - Topic 3

More types of Injection

# A NOTE ON ETHICS / LEGALITY

- UNSW hosting this course is an extremely important step forward.
- We expect a high standard of professionalism from you, meaning:
  - Respect the **property of others** and the university
  - Always **abide by the law** and university regulations
  - Be **considerate of others** to ensure everyone has an equal learning experience
  - Always check that you have **written permission** before performing a security test on a system

Always err on the side of caution. If you are unsure about anything **ask** one of the course staff!

# What are we going to learn today

Template Injection

CSV Injection

Play with Command Injection &  
LFI

## Understanding template injections



# What are templates?

## Server Side Templates

CSHTML

```
<p>Last week this time: @(DateTime.Now - TimeSpan.FromDays(7))</p>
```

CSHTML

```
@("<span>Hello World</span>")
```

### Warning

Using `HtmlHelper.Raw` on unsanitized user input is a security risk. User input might contain malicious JavaScript or other exploits. Sanitizing user input is difficult. Avoid using `HtmlHelper.Raw` with user input.

CSHTML



```
@Html.Raw("<span>Hello World</span>")
```

## Client Side Templates

```
<h3>Current customer: {{ currentCustomer }}</h3>
```

```
<!-- "The sum of 1 + 1 is not 4" -->  
<p>The sum of 1 + 1 is not {{1 + 1 + getVal()}}.</p>
```

```
<ul>  
  <li *ngFor="let customer of customers">{{customer.name}}</li>  
</ul>
```


# Template Injection

- Inputs from users ending up directly in templates without any validation or sanitisation.
- Could lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE), Cross Site Scripting (XSS).
- Could be classified as Server-Side and Client-Side Template Injection.

# Server-Side Template Injection

- User input reflected directly in the server-side template engines.
- Attacker might be able to compromise the server.
- Make sure secure patterns are used when user inputs are passed into templates.

## Server-Side Template Injection - DEMO



```
{% for x in ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() %}
    {% if "warning" in x.__name__ %}
        {{
            x().__module__.__builtins__['__import__']
            ('os').popen("cat /etc/passwd").read()
        }}
    {%endif%}
{% endfor %}
```




# Client-Side Template Injection

- When user input enters the template context without any validation.
- Would lead to XSS in most cases.
- DOM manipulation.

## Client-Side Template Injection - DEMO

Payload:

```
{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}
```



What is this?


- Angular expressions are evaluated against the Scope object.

```
$scope.constructor.constructor()
```

# Recommendation

- Do not use user inputs to create dynamic templates.
- Do not mix server-side templates with client-side templates.
- Input validation.
- Follow framework provided recommendations.
- Separation between user input and data.

## Understanding CSV injections




# What is CSV?

## Comma-Separated-Values

- File extension: .csv
- Flat files, defined for data only.





What data can we put in the file?



# CSV Formula Injection

- Cells beginning with = are interpreted as formulas by Excel (and other applications).



A screenshot of an Excel spreadsheet. The formula bar at the top shows '=1+1'. The spreadsheet has columns A through E and rows 1 through 2. Cell A1 contains '1', cell B1 contains '2', and cell C1 contains '3'. Cell B1 is selected, and its formula bar shows '=1+1'.

	A	B	C	D	E
1	1	2	3		
2					

# Formulas that hurt!

So why is this dangerous?

Formulas can be used for multiple kinds of malicious payloads, for example:

- Create fake hyperlinks.
- Use Excel DDE (Dynamic Data Exchange) to **execute commands** (Excel only).





=cmd|' /C notepad'!'A1'

Cell begins with =  
(indicates a  
formula to Excel)


'Filename' gets directly  
executed as

With arguments of  
(run command 'notepad')


Cell reference: forces Excel to treat  
the preceding string as a 'filename'



# What happens next?



and...



# Remediations

Application exporting CSV files must sanitise the output!  
The following characters are known to be dangerous:

= + - @

- Cells beginning with these characters should have a single quote character (') inserted at the beginning.
- This forces Excel to interpret the cell as text.
- Make sure commas are removed from data!
- Commas can be used to start a new cell, which then evades the single quote remediation above.
- If a different delimiter other than commas is used, modify the remediation accordingly.

THANKS FOR LISTENING TO US RANT!

questions? slack / email

Thanks to @sy for all the contributions