## accframe Results

**Table 1: Honesty Experiment: Descriptive Statistics** 

Panel A: Participant-period Level

	Neutral			Сс	ntextua	lized	Tests for Differences		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD			
% Honesty	976	0.259	0.355	976	0.606	0.387	t = 20.63	p < 0.001	
Truthful	976	0.052	0.223	976	0.199	0.399	$^{2} = 94.11$	p < 0.001	
All Slack	976	0.607	0.489	976	0.246	0.431	$^2 = 258.08$	p < 0.001	

Panel B: Participant Level

		Neutral			ntextua	lized	Tests for Differences	
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD		
Mean % Honesty	100	0.293	0.334	100	0.650	0.353	t = 7.36	p < 0.001
Always Truthful	100	0.040	0.197	100	0.150	0.359	$^{2} = 5.82$	p = 0.016
Always All Slack	100	0.400	0.492	100	0.170	0.378	$^2 = 11.88$	p < 0.001
Recalls Information Structure	100	0.980	0.141	100	0.940	0.239	$^{2} = 1.17$	p = 0.279
Recalls Optimal Strategy	100	0.970	0.171	100	0.950	0.219	$^{2} = 0.13$	p = 0.718

Table 2: Does Business Framing Affect Honesty?

	Perio	d Fixed	Effects	Intera	Interacted by Period			
	Est	S.E.	p-value	Est	S.E.	p-value		
Intercept				0.270	0.039	< 0.001		
Contextualized	0.290	0.046	< 0.001	0.252	0.048	< 0.001		
Period				-0.009	0.004	0.037		
${\rm Period} \times {\rm Contextualized}$				0.007	0.002	0.006		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.149			0.152				
Number of observations	1,707			1,707				

Table 3: Reasons

		Neutral			ntextual	ized	Tests for Differences	
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD		
Mentions Payoff	1000	0.794	0.405	1000	0.641	0.480	$^{2} = 56.99$	p < 0.001
Mentions Other	1000	0.220	0.414	1000	0.305	0.461	$^2 = 18.22$	p < 0.001
Cares About Own Payoff	1000	9.131	1.806	1000	8.269	1.729	t = -10.90	p < 0.001
Cares About Other Payoff	1000	2.030	2.008	1000	2.572	1.797	t = 6.36	p < 0.001
Cares About Honesty	1000	3.838	2.312	1000	6.157	1.818	t = 24.93	p < 0.001

Figure 1: Average Slack Claimed by True Cost and Condition




Figure 2: Average Honesty by Period and Condition




Table 4: Gift Exchange Experiment: Descriptive Statistics

Panel A: Dyad-period Level

		Neutral			ontextua	lized	Tests for Differences		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD			
Wage Paid	500	47.598	9.420	500	43.186	11.367	t = -6.68	p < 0.001	
Effort Returned	500	0.495	0.142	500	0.566	0.151	t = 7.59	p < 0.001	
Payoff Firm	500	25.844	8.749	500	31.257	7.916	t = 10.26	p < 0.001	
Payoff Manager	500	41.658	9.587	500	35.588	10.412	t = -9.59	p < 0.001	
Combined Payoff	500	67.502	7.779	500	66.845	10.914	t = -1.10	p = 0.273	

Panel B: Participant Level

		Neutral			ntextua	lized	Tests for Differences	
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	$\overline{\mathrm{SD}}$		
Passed Calculation Checks	100	0.940	0.239	100	0.660	0.476	$^2 = 22.78$	p < 0.001
Recalls Role of Multiplier	100	0.200	0.402	100	0.000	0.000	$^2 = 20.06$	p < 0.001

Panel C: Dyad Level

	Neutral			(	Contextua	lized	Tests for Differences	
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD		
Average Payoff Firm	50	258.440	78.646	50	312.568	75.727	t = 3.51	p < 0.001
Average Payoff Manager	50	416.580	82.384	50	355.880	98.557	t = -3.34	p = 0.001
Average Combined Payoff	50	337.510	36.094	50	334.224	53.516	t = -0.36	p = 0.720

Table 5: Does Contextualization Affect the Wage Paid?

	Perio	d Fixed	Effects	Intera	Interacted by Period			
	Est	S.E.	p-value	Est	S.E.	p-value		
Intercept				46.831	1.129	< 0.001		
Contextualized	-4.412	1.887	0.044	-4.359	1.609	0.024		
Period				0.140	0.066	0.063		
${\rm Period} \times {\rm Contextualized}$				-0.010	0.099	0.924		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.036			0.041				
Number of observations	1,000			1,000				

Table 6: Does Contextualization Affect the Effort Returned?

	Perio	d Fixed	Effects	Intera	Interacted by Period			
	Est	S.E.	p-value	Est	S.E.	p-value		
Intercept				0.510	0.016	< 0.001		
Contextualized	0.070	0.028	0.033	0.049	0.024	0.075		
Period				-0.003	0.001	0.018		
${\rm Period} \times {\rm Contextualized}$				0.004	0.002	0.029		
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.046			0.053				
Number of observations	1,000			1,000				

Table 7: Does Contextualization Affect the Wage Sensitivity of Effort?

		(1)	
	Est	S.E.	p-value
Contextualized	-0.164	0.136	0.257
Wage	0.001	0.002	0.582
Wage $\times$ Contextualized	0.006	0.003	0.077
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.184		
Number of observations	1,000		

Table 8: Does Contextualization Affect the Participant's Payoffs?

		(1)	
	Est	S.E.	p-value
Intercept	416.580	11.680	< 0.001
Firm	-158.140	20.415	< 0.001
Contextualized	-60.700	18.212	0.001
$\operatorname{Firm} \times \operatorname{Contextualized}$	114.828	28.417	< 0.001
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup> Number of observations	0.315 200		

Table 9: Reasons

Panel A: Reasons for Wage Decision

		Neutral			ntextua	lized	Tests for Differences	
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD		
Mentions Payoff	500	0.694	0.461	500	0.902	0.298	$^{2} = 65.81$	p < 0.001
Mentions Other	500	0.916	0.278	500	0.972	0.165	$^2 = 13.79$	p < 0.001
Cares About Own Payoff	500	6.866	1.322	500	7.112	1.122	t = 3.17	p = 0.002
Cares About Other Payoff	500	5.728	1.289	500	5.592	1.375	t = -1.61	p = 0.107
Cares About Fairness	500	7.156	1.481	500	6.584	1.483	t = -6.10	p < 0.001
Cares About Reciprocity	500	6.089	1.657	500	6.046	1.590	t = -0.42	p = 0.673

Panel B: Reasons for Effort Decision

	Neutral			Co	ntextua	lized	Tests for Differences	
	N	Mean	$\overline{\mathrm{SD}}$	N	Mean	SD		
Mentions Payoff	500	0.934	0.249	500	0.968	0.176	$^{2} = 5.49$	p = 0.019
Mentions Other	500	0.880	0.325	500	0.854	0.353	$^{2} = 1.25$	p = 0.264
Cares About Own Payoff	500	6.940	1.242	500	7.522	1.073	t = 7.93	p < 0.001
Cares About Other Payoff	500	5.442	1.540	500	5.224	1.797	t = -2.06	p = 0.040
Cares About Fairness	500	7.136	1.574	500	6.516	1.909	t = -5.60	p < 0.001
Cares About Reciprocity	500	4.242	1.793	500	4.080	1.711	t = -1.46	p = 0.144

Figure 3: Wage by Period and Condition




Figure 4: Effort by Period and Condition




Figure 5: Wage Sensitivity of Effort by Condition




Table 10: Trust Experiment: Descriptive Statistics

Panel A: Dyad-period Level

		Neutral			Contextual	ized	Tests for Differences		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD			
Investment	500	53.920	10.755	500	57.890	14.921	t = 4.83	p < 0.001	
Dividend	500	73.876	21.264	500	78.772	27.461	t = 3.15	p = 0.002	
% Returned	500	0.455	0.081	500	0.451	0.094	t = -0.60	p = 0.548	
Payoff Investor	500	119.956	14.041	500	120.882	17.851	t = 0.91	p = 0.362	
Payoff Manager	500	87.884	19.521	500	94.898	27.993	t = 4.60	p < 0.001	
Combined Payoff	500	207.840	21.510	500	215.780	29.842	t = 4.83	p < 0.001	

Panel B: Participant Level

	Neutral			Contextualized			Tests for	Differences
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	$\overline{\mathrm{SD}}$		
Understood Role of Multiplier	100	0.970	0.171	100	1.000	0.000	$^{2} = 1.35$	p = 0.245
Recalls Role	100	0.990	0.100	100	1.000	0.000	$^{2} = 0.00$	p = 1.000

Panel C: Dyad Level

	Neutral				Contextua	lized	Tests for	Differences
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD		
Average Payoff Investor	50	1199.560	139.516	50	1208.820	176.375	t = 0.29	p = 0.772
Average Payoff Manager	50	878.840	180.717	50	948.980	253.283	t = 1.59	p = 0.114
Average Combined Payoff	50	1039.200	95.780	50	1078.900	129.934	t = 1.74	p = 0.085

Table 11: Does Contextualization Affect the Amount Sent by the Sender?

	Perio	d Fixed	Effects	Interacted by Period			
	Est	S.E.	p-value	Est	S.E.	p-value	
Intercept				50.847	0.637	< 0.001	
Contextualized	3.970	2.300	0.118	0.853	0.416	0.070	
Period				0.559	0.242	0.047	
${\rm Period} \times {\rm Contextualized}$				0.567	0.403	0.193	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.054			0.058			
Number of observations	1,000			1,000			

Table 12: Does Contextualization Affect the Percentage Returned by the Receiver?

	Perio	d Fixed	Effects	Interacted by Period			
	Est	S.E.	p-value	Est	S.E.	p-value	
Intercept				0.455	0.009	< 0.001	
Contextualized	-0.003	0.018	0.853	-0.003	0.014	0.828	
Period				0.000	0.001	0.998	
${\rm Period} \times {\rm Contextualized}$				0.000	0.002	0.973	
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	-0.010			-0.003			
Number of observations	1,000			1,000			

Table 13: Does Contextualization Affect the Participants' Payoffs?

		(1)	
	Est	S.E.	p-value
Intercept	878.840	25.622	< 0.001
Investor	320.720	36.849	< 0.001
Contextualized	70.140	44.113	0.115
Investor $\times$ Contextualized	-60.880	61.887	0.328
Adjusted R2 Number of observations	$0.366 \\ 200$		

Table 14: Reasons

Panel A: Reasons for Investment Decision

	Neutral			Сс	ntextua	lized	Tests for Differences	
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD		
Mentions Payoff	500	0.232	0.423	500	0.282	0.450	$^{2} = 3.02$	p = 0.082
Mentions Other	500	0.756	0.430	500	0.696	0.460	$^{2} = 4.23$	p = 0.040
Cares About Own Payoff	500	7.130	1.735	500	8.006	1.114	t = 9.50	p < 0.001
Cares About Other Payoff	500	5.398	1.693	500	4.316	2.083	t = -9.02	p < 0.001
Cares About Fairness	500	7.060	1.999	500	5.718	2.121	t = -10.30	p < 0.001
Cares About Trust	500	7.500	1.353	500	6.776	1.867	t = -7.02	p < 0.001

Panel B: Reasons for Dividend Decision

	Neutral			Co	ntextua	lized	Tests for Differences		
	N	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD			
Mentions Payoff	500	0.112	0.316	500	0.218	0.413	$^2 = 19.63$	p < 0.001	
Mentions Other	500	0.578	0.494	500	0.766	0.424	$^{2} = 39.24$	p < 0.001	
Cares About Own Payoff	500	4.792	1.596	500	5.164	1.551	t = 3.74	p < 0.001	
Cares About Other Payoff	500	5.640	1.372	500	5.718	1.229	t = 0.95	p = 0.344	
Cares About Fairness	500	8.982	1.002	500	8.480	1.222	t = -7.10	p < 0.001	
Cares About Trust	500	7.880	1.081	500	8.346	1.074	t = 6.84	p < 0.001	

Figure 6: Amount Sent by Period and Condition




Figure 7: Share Returned by Period and Condition

