

Password Manager Vulnerabilities

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Time for a quick poll!

**Raise your hand if you
have ever reused a
password on multiple
websites**

**Raise your hand if you
store passwords on a
word document or notes
app**

Why is this an issue?

- If one account is compromised, then all of your account are compromised
- Your accounts contain personal and financial information that should be secure!
- Hackers are able to make money off of your compromised accounts!
- If malware is ever installed onto your computer, then hackers could gain access to your files

What is a password manager?


- Stores all of your passwords and any sensitive information on an encrypted database
- Only need to remember one master password to gain access to all of your passwords
- Some offer more specific features like a password generator, dark web scanner, password sharing, etc.

Are password managers worth it?


- YES
- If your passwords are strong enough you should not be able to remember all of your passwords by memory
- They are much safer than reusing passwords or storing passwords on plain text documents
- There is a lot of security behind password managers that make them safe to use

**How do password
managers work?**


Encryption & Decryption



Hashing Algorithm



Password Hash Salting



OFFLINE PASSWORD MANAGER


Encrypted file



Your device



ONLINE PASSWORD MANAGER



Project Goal:

Find vulnerabilities on 5 different web-based password managers: Bitwarden, Azure, Roboform, Lastpass, and Dashlane

BeEF Attack

- BeEF is a module in Kali Linux that has several different attack features on browsers
- Essentially it is able to “hook” a browser if someone just clicks on a malicious link
- Wanted to test out the iframe injection and lastpass detection features
- Browsers have updated to stop most of BeEF’s features from working so ultimately this attack was not useful



The Browser Exploitation Framework Project


Pyperclip Attack

- Most password managers have a clipboard feature that allows users to copy and paste their passwords
- This code stores everything the victim copies and pastes on a CSV file, and emails the hacker everything on the file
- This is all done automatically without the victim knowing
- This was successful on any password manager that had a copy/paste feature
- The attacker would need the victim to download the python code onto their computer

Password



Man-in-the-middle Attack



Man-in-the-middle Attack



Main Findings Using MITM Attack

Bitwarden

```
12 {  
  "email": "phoebe@hackmeinc.com",  
  "name": "Phoebe",  
  "masterPasswordHash": "m1SIfD6LD1ugsJ2Xg1HgPH1kdRbw8y5ceL0qDhvn2Xg=",  
  "key": "2.HaSfnk+uiIcBE21PjyyiRA==|losvHrH1SKA0E9yKxPu+0yjMnFw0IOo3P+8",  
  "kdf": 0,  
  "kdfIterations": 100000,  
  "referenceData": {  
    "id": "1453248666.1659041651"  
  },  
  "captchaResponse": null,  
  "masterPasswordHint": "gnbk3#",  
  "keys": {  
    "publicKey":  
      "MIIBIjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOCAQ8AMIIBCgKCAQEAYR6HTXiXDU2GSaVzj8A02L  
      0xzqQA9PBrj5a4M+e0YBCSuojs0S6pttaua0Ij6n8XMfvL8dKZ5b8eCgM1zL+758L16  
    "encryptedPrivateKey":  
      "2.00X2Xje5VvkqNA7/0qDKBqQ==|H1/2Zou9vacMx/uBjC1NQ6wpYUybppf0/y0/9pa  
      X7KD/VLTX8i0eMsZrErDORKnAPI9Ca1L0ZIKEvM5u2VwdVz1CL6mVV0aYmaLwtUxIKF
```


Bitwarden

My Account

Name

Phoebe

Email

phoebe@hackmeinc.com

Master Password Hint

greenntbk3#

Pretty

Raw

Hex



\n



```
10 Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
11 Accept: application/json
12 Sec-Ch-Ua-Mobile: ?0
13 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64
14 Sec-Ch-Ua-Platform: "Linux"
15 Origin: https://vault.bitwarden.com
16 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
17 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
18 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
19 Referer: https://vault.bitwarden.com/
20 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
21 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
22
23 {
24   "culture": "en-US",
25   "name": "Phoebe",
26   "masterPasswordHint": "greenntbk3#"
27 }
```

LastPass

Confirm Master Password

••••••••••••••••



Reminder (Optional)

MasterPassword



By completing this form, I agree to the [Terms](#) and [Privacy](#)

```
12 Origin: https://lastpass.com
13 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
14 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
15 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
16 Referer: https://lastpass.com/
17 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
18 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
19
20 email=fakeemailaccount%40gmail.com&masterpassword=
%E2%80%A2%E2%80%A2%E2%80%A2%E2%80%A2%E2%80%A2%E2%80%A2%E2%80%A2%E2%80%A2%E2%80%A2%E2%80%A2%E2%80%A2%E2%80%A2&passwordreminder=MasterPassword&login=1&ref=0&product=premium&token=MTY1OTY0MjQxOC44MDAxLVDzS1&language2=en-US&json=1&website=1&hash=24328d77160fd5c9100100&method=web&browser=cr
```



Search...

Azure

Microsoft Azure Upgrade

Home > Key vaults > phoebesvault | Secrets > secret >

Create a secret

Upload options

Manual

Name ⓘ

secret

Value * ⓘ

.....

Content type (optional)

Set activation date ⓘ

☐

Set expiration date ⓘ

☐

Enabled

Yes No

intercept HTTP history websockets history Options

Request to https://phoebesvault.vault.azure.net:443 [20.62.134.229]

Forward Drop Intercept is on Action Open Browser

Pretty Raw Hex

```
1 PUT /secrets/secret?api-version=7.0 HTTP/2
2 Host: phoebesvault.vault.azure.net
3 Content-Length: 114
4 X-MS-Client-Session-Id: db0a1d8120b44153b37334ebb6737106
5 Accept-Language: en
6 Authorization: Bearer
  eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsIngldCI6IjJaUXBKM1VwYmpBWVhZR2F
  ldCIsImIzcyI6Imh0dHBzOi8vc3RzLndpbmRvd3MubmV0LzBjNWNRiYTlVLTgwMTItNC
  iOiIxIiwiaWVlIjoiIjoiQVRROXkvOFRBQUFBUl1XaDBWSDBoRmRwS2U3e3FNTFpRdkgvVS
  kOGEtYjYk2Ny02MmY5OGVjNDFlZmUiLCJhcHBpZGFjciI6IjIiLCJmYWVlbnBhbmFtZS
  icnV6emVzZSI6Im9pZCI6IjZmOGM1Y2ZjLWVhNmItNGE5Ni05ZjEyLTBlOWVhY2I2MT
  3TDU2UUpNcEFLYy4iLCJzY3AiOiJlc2VyX2ltcGVyc29uYXRpb24iLCJzdWIiOiJHOE
  3MM1YWQxIiwidW5pcXVlX25hbWUiOiJwaG9lYmVaaGFja21lYW5jLmNvbSIsInVwbi
  xDTckkLY-HALKCsTDraxtH1ISHWXS10H6TLGVYfngWAD0DubGapv-SFGTZZPNVQCKZM
  2B4g_eRpv4nAWnEelmGIYXQWoo8g7tE6pRDhMsqcJGFRDMdJfo7xb5rLQdLCZigGRKq
7 X-MS-Effective-Locale: en.en-us
8 Content-Type: application/json
9 Accept: */*
10 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/5
11 X-MS-Client-Request-Id: 01aa2518-12ce-4092-b20b-1d2192a35012
12 Origin: https://portal.azure.com
13 Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site
14 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
15 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
16 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
17
18 {
  "value": "here is another scret",
  "contentType": null,
  "attributes": {
    "enabled": true,
    "exp": null,
    "nbf": null
  }
}
```

Conclusion

- Browser and app updates are important!
- Be cautious with the clipboard feature
- More personal information should be encrypted on password managers
- Password managers, despite a few exceptions, are pretty safe and should be more widely used

Questions?