AXIOMATIC AND SEMANTIC APPROACHES TO TRUTH

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Axiomatic and semantic approaches can be found already in Tarski's seminal work on formal theories of truth. Syntactic or axiomatic principles have been used in order to evaluate, motivate, and justify semantic definitions of truth; conversely, semantic constructions and analyses have been used for similar purposes with respect to axiomatic approaches.

In the talk I will try to analyze the interplay between axiomatic and semantic theories of truth. In particular, I'll will argue that Tarski's rejection of axiomatic theories of truth is incoherent with his own theory of truth.

Since Donald Davidson's work on truth and meaning, it has often been claimed that certain semantic theories of truth can be captured by or rephrased in an axiomatic theory. I will try to analyze what this could mean, not only for classical typed theories such as Tarski's but also for type-free theories such as Kripke's.