Truth, Conditionals, and Paradox

Leon Horsten University of Bristol

Numbers and Truth Götheborg, October 2012 Truth, Conditionals, and Paradox

> Leon Horsten University of Bristol

Field's conditional

abio s propos

A tresh start

Loncluding houghts

Concluding

Overview

- 1. Field's conditional
- 2. Yablo's proposal
- 3. A fresh start
- 4. Concluding thoughts
- 5. References

Truth. Conditionals, and Paradox

> Leon Horsten University of Bristol

Concluding thoughts

Concluding thoughts

- 1. a real conditional (\mapsto) that validates:
 - the unrestricted Tarski-biconditionals (with the Tarski-biconditionals spelled out in terms of the "real conditional")
 - most of the principles that we want for conditionals
- 2. the *semantical deficiency* of paradoxical sentences must be validly expressible in the object language.

A fresh start

Concluding thoughts

Concluding thoughts

- 1. a real conditional (\mapsto) that validates:
 - the unrestricted Tarski-biconditionals (with the Tarski-biconditionals spelled out in terms of the "real conditional")
 - most of the principles that we want for conditionals
- 2. the *semantical deficiency* of paradoxical sentences must be validly expressible in the object language.

Fact: The material implication of Kripke's theory of truth does not satisfy these requirements.

Field defines a semantics for a primitive conditional operator \mapsto by interleaving the Kripke jump and a revision operator

- Start with an arbitrary extension of → and build a Kripkean least fixed point for T keeping the interpretation of → fixed
- ▶ Set $\langle \phi, \psi \rangle$ in the extension of \mapsto if $V(\phi) \leq V(\psi)$; put $\langle \phi, \psi \rangle$ in the anti-extension of \mapsto otherwise
- Build a Kripkean least fixed point for the truth predicate
- **>** ...
- ▶ For limit ordinals, take the *liminf* rule for defining extension and anti-extension of the truth predicate. Set $\langle \phi, \psi \rangle$ in the extension of \mapsto if $V(\phi) \leq V(\psi)$ cofinally before; similarly for anti-extention

Field's conditional 2

Truth,
Conditionals, and
Paradox

Leon Horsten University of Bristol

Field's conditional

'ablo's proposal

A fresh start

Concluding thoughts

Concluding

Definition

Proposition

The *ultimate truth value* of ϕ is the co-final value of ϕ in this hierarchy of stages.

Field's hierarchy of models does not reach a fixed point.

Concluding thoughts

Concluding thoughts

- the Field-conditional satisfies the unrestricted Tarski-biconditionals
- the Field-conditional has certain "nice" conditional-like logical properties (such as modus ponens)
- ► The Field-conditional can be used to define a hierarchy of semantic deficiency predicates:

$$D(\phi) \equiv \phi \land (\top \mapsto \phi)$$

- the Field-conditional is complicated
- the Field-conditional has certain "unpleasant" un-conditional-like logical properties
 - $\blacktriangleright \not\models [\phi \land (\phi \mapsto \psi)] \mapsto \psi$
 - ► The theory is not closed under the semantic deduction rule

$$\frac{\phi \models y}{\phi \mapsto y}$$

- the Field-conditional does not have a pure theoretical motivation
 - interleaving of Kripkean and revision theoretic conditions

Let sk be the Strong Kleene valuation scheme.

The Kripke jump operator I:

- for λ limit: $\phi \in \mathcal{I}_{\lambda}(T,+) \equiv \phi \in \bigcup_{\alpha < \lambda} (\mathcal{I}_{\alpha}(T,+))$
- ▶ for λ limit: $\phi \in \mathcal{I}_{\lambda}(T, -) \equiv \phi \in \bigcup_{\alpha < \lambda} (\mathcal{I}_{\alpha}(T, -))$
- ▶ $\mathcal{I}_{\alpha}(\mapsto,+)$ and $\mathcal{I}_{\alpha}(\mapsto,+)$ are never revised by the operator I

(From now on we will drop the subscript "sk")

Kripke fixed points

Truth. Conditionals, and Paradox

Leon Horsten University of Bristol

Yablo's proposal

Lemma

The Kripke jump operator is monotone.

Corollary

The Kripke jump has a least fixed point \mathcal{I}_{lf} .

Corollary

For every $\phi \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{T}}$:

$$\mathcal{I}_{\mathit{If}} \models \phi \Leftrightarrow \phi \in \mathcal{I}_{\mathit{If}}(\mathit{T}, +)$$

- $\phi \in Y_{\alpha+1}(T,+) \equiv$ $\phi \in$ the extension of T of the least I –
 fixed point extending Y_{α}
- ▶ $\phi \in Y_{\alpha+1}(T, -) \equiv$ $\phi \in$ the anti-extension of T of the least I –
 fixed point extending Y_{α}
- $\langle \phi, \psi \rangle \in Y_{\alpha+1}(\mapsto, +) \equiv$ for every $\Psi \supseteq Y_{\alpha}$ and for all I fixed points $\Theta \supseteq \Psi$:

$$\Theta(\phi) \leq \Theta(\psi)$$

▶ $\langle \phi, \psi \rangle \in Y_{\alpha+1}(\mapsto, -) \equiv$ for every $\Psi \supseteq Y_{\alpha}$ and for all I – fixed points $\Theta \supseteq \Psi$:

$$\Theta(\phi) > \Theta(\psi)$$

▶ at limit stages, take unions

Yablo's construction is monotone and Kripkean ("theoretically pure")

Theorem

The operator Y as a least fixed point Y_{if} .

▶ In Y_{If} the Field-conditional behaves to some extent like a real conditional

Proposition

$$Y_{lf}$$
 validates Modus Ponens for \mapsto , $\frac{(A \mapsto B) \land (B \mapsto C)}{A \mapsto C}$, $A \mapsto A$...

Vices

The account does terribly on conditionals that have other conditionals embedded within them.

Truth,
Conditionals, and
Paradox

Leon Horsten University of Bristol

Field's conditional

Yablo's proposal

A fresh start

Concluding thoughts

Concluding

The account does terribly on conditionals that have other conditionals embedded within them.

Proposition (Field)

The formula $(A \mapsto C) \mapsto ((A \vee A) \mapsto C)$ is not valid in Y_{If} .

Proof.

Take A, C such that $A \mapsto C$ is gappy in Y_{if} . Then Y_{if} can be consistently extended with $A \mapsto C$ only and extended to an I-fixed point Y^+ . In Y^+ , $A \mapsto C$ will get the truth value 1, whilst $((A \lor A) \mapsto C)$ will be assigned the truth value $\frac{1}{2}$.

Yablo iteration?

One natural suggestion ... would be to iterate Yablo's construction, so that the extensions of Y_{lf} are themselves Yablo fixed points.

Truth,
Conditionals, and
Paradox

Leon Horsten University of Bristol

Field's conditional

Yablo's proposal

A tresh start

Concluding houghts

Concluding houghts

Yablo iteration?

One natural suggestion ... would be to iterate Yablo's construction, so that the extensions of Y_{lf} are themselves Yablo fixed points.

Define Y^+ in terms of Y:

Definition

Let the operator Y^+ be defined exactly like the operator Y, except that "I-fixed point" is replaced everywhere by "Y-fixed point".

Truth,
Conditionals, and
Paradox

Leon Horsten University of Bristol

Field's conditional

Yablo's proposal

tresn start

thoughts

oncluding

Iteration blocked

Such hopes are dashed: the iterated version breaks down right from the start.

Truth,
Conditionals, and
Paradox

Leon Horsten University of Bristol

Field's conditional

Yablo's proposal

A fresh start

Concluding houghts:

Concluding houghts

Such hopes are dashed: the iterated version breaks down right from the start.

Proof [Field]: use a Curry paradox argument.

Definition (Curry sentence)

$$K \Leftrightarrow T(K) \mapsto \bot$$

The Curry sentence K will have value $\frac{1}{2}$ in the stages of Y. So it will have value 0 in the first stage of Y^+ . Thus we have that the least fixed point of Y_1^+ , if there is one, is not even an Y-fixed point.

Pessimism

I take these to be clear deficiencies in Yablo's account as it now stands; there may conceivably be ways to fix the problems without altering its spirit, though my efforts in this regard haven't been successful.

Truth,
Conditionals, and
Paradox

Leon Horsten University of Bristol

Field's conditional

Yablo's prop

A fresh start

concluding houghts

Concluding thoughts

A fresh start

Concluding thoughts

Concluding thoughts

- $\qquad \qquad \phi \in \Phi^0_{\alpha+1}(\mathcal{T},-) \equiv \phi \in (\mathit{I}_{\mathit{lf}}(\Phi^0_{\alpha}))(\mathcal{T},-)$
- $\langle \phi, \psi \rangle \in \Phi^0_{\alpha+1}(\mapsto, +) \equiv$ for all *I*-fixed points $\Theta \supseteq \Phi^0_{\alpha} : \Theta \models \phi \Rightarrow \Theta \models \psi$
- $ightharpoonup \langle \phi, \psi \rangle \in \Phi^0_{\alpha+1}(\mapsto, -) \equiv$

for all *I*-fixed points $\Theta \supseteq \Phi^0_\alpha : \Theta \models \phi \land \neg \psi$

▶ at limit stages take unions

Theorem

 Φ^0 has a least fixed point.

For each such fixed point Φ_f^0 of the inductive operator Φ^0 :

for all I – fixed points $\Theta \supseteq \Phi_f^0 : \Theta \models \phi \Rightarrow \Theta \models \psi$

 $\blacktriangleright \langle \phi, \psi \rangle \in \Phi_f^0(\mapsto, -) \Leftrightarrow$

for all I – fixed points $\Theta \supseteq \Phi_f^0 : \Theta \models \phi \land \neg \psi$

Definition

The least fixed point of the operator Φ^0 when started on a structure S is denoted as $\Phi^0_{If}(S)$.

For each n > 0, the inductive operator Φ^n is defined as follows:

- $\phi \in \Phi_{\alpha+1}^n(T,+) \equiv \phi \in (\Phi_{\ell}^{n-1}(\Phi_{\alpha}^n))(T,+)$
- $\phi \in \Phi_{\alpha+1}^n(T,-) \equiv \phi \in (\Phi_{\ell}^{n-1}(\Phi_{\alpha}^n))(T,-)$
- $\triangleright \langle \phi, \psi \rangle \in \Phi_{\alpha+1}^n(\mapsto, +) \equiv$ for all Φ^{n-1} -fixed points $\Theta \supset \Phi_{\alpha}^{n}$:

$$\Theta \models \phi \Rightarrow \Theta \models \psi$$

 $\blacktriangleright \langle \phi, \psi \rangle \in \Phi_{\alpha+1}^n(\mapsto, -) \equiv$ for all Φ^{n-1} -fixed points $\Theta \supseteq \Phi_{\alpha}^{n} : \Theta \models \phi \land \neg \psi$

at limit stages take unions

Properties

Definition

The least fixed point of the operator Φ^n when started on a structure S is denoted as $\Phi^n_{lf}(S)$.

Theorem

Every Φ^n has a least fixed point.

Proposition

Every Φ^{n+1} fixed point is a Φ^n fixed point.

Truth,
Conditionals, and
Paradox

Leon Horsten University of Bristol

Field's conditional

Yablo's propo

A fresh start

Concluding :houghts

Concluding

A fresh start

thoughts

Concluding thoughts

Observation: The formula $(A \mapsto C) \mapsto ((A \lor A) \mapsto C)$ is in Φ^1_{lf} .

Thesis

 Φ^n fixed points assign reasonable truth conditions to sentences with conditional nestings of depth at most $\leq n+1$.

 $\Phi^{\omega}(S) \equiv \bigcup \Phi_{lf}^{n}(S)$

Proposition

- 1. Φ^{ω} has a least fixed point Φ^{ω}_{if}
- 2. Φ^{ω}_{if} is a fixed point of Φ^{n} for every n.

Thesis

 Φ^{ω}_{lf} assigns reasonable truth conditions to all sentences of ${\cal L}$ that have finite conditional nesting depth.

We can express indeterminacy in \mathcal{L} :

Definition

$$ID(\phi) \equiv (\phi \mapsto \bot) \land (\neg \phi \mapsto \bot)$$

- When $ID(\phi)$ is judged to be true by Φ_{lf}^0 , then ϕ meets an indeterminacy standard (Strong Kleene fixed point).
- ▶ If it judged to be true by Φ_{lf}^n for some n > 0, then it meets a stricter indeterminacy condition.
- ▶ In a way that is familiar from the work of Field, we can diagonalise out of this indeterminacy predicate and thus generate a hierarchy of increasingly strong determinacy predicates.

Definition

 $INT(\phi) \equiv \neg ID(\phi) \wedge [(\phi \vee \neg \phi) \mapsto \phi]$

Proposition

 $INT(\phi)$ holds in Φ^0_{if} if and only if ϕ is intrinsically true.

- ▶ There are better notions of intrinsic-ness that can be defined in terms of Φ_{if}^n for n > 0.
- Since the collection of intrinsic truths is complicated, this means that the collection of Φ_{If}^n -truths must already be complicated.

Concluding thoughts

- ▶ Yablo's aspiration for a more "Kripkean" conditional is attractive.
- Yablo's idea can be pushed further.
- Semantic indeterminacy can be expressed in the resulting structures
- ▶ Intrinsic-ness can be expressed in the resulting structures

Concluding

thoughts

- ▶ Yablo's aspiration for a more "Kripkean" conditional is attractive.
- Yablo's idea can be pushed further.
- Semantic indeterminacy can be expressed in the resulting structures
- ▶ Intrinsic-ness can be expressed in the resulting structures

Is the price not too high? Is the aspiration to "add a real conditional" to a theory of reflexive truth a reasonable one?

A tresh start

Concluding houghts

Concluding thoughts

- ► Field, H. Saving Truth From Paradox. Oxford University Press, 2008.
- Kripke, S. Outline of a theory of truth. Journal of Philosophy, 1975.
- Yablo, S. New grounds for naive truth theory. In: J.C. Beall, Liars and Heaps. Oxford University Press, 2003.