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# Felicien Jesugo Goudou

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Department of Economics  
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## EDUCATION

**Université de Montréal, Canada**

*Ph.D. in Economics*

2023 (Expected)

Thesis : Essays on Macro-Labor and Firms dynamics.

Thesis Supervisor : Immo Schott (Université de Montreal)

**ENSEA, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire**

*MSc in Statistics and Economics*

2015

with honor, 1<sup>st</sup> ranked

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## FIELDS OF INTEREST

Macroeconomics, Macro-labor, Firms dynamics, Climate economics, Economic Growth.

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## ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

**Research assistant for Prof. Baris Kaymak and Prof. Immo Schott , Université de Montréal, Canada**

*Oct. 2017 – Dec. 2018*

Project : Corporate taxation and labor share

**Consultant for African Development Bank, Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire**

*Nov. 2017 – Jan. 2018*

Central Africa Economic 2018's Outlook: Structural transformation and labor productivity growth

**Economist, Ministry of Economy and Finance, Cotonou, Benin**

*Sept. 2015 – July. 2016*

2016-2019's Macroeconomic Program for Benin

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## TEACHING

**Instructor, Université de Montréal**

*Quantitative Methods for Economics (level 2), undergraduate*

Winter 2018 & 2020, Fall 2019 & 2020, Winter 2021

## **Teaching Assistant, Université de Montréal**

Macroeconomics theory 1 & 2 (Fall 18, Winter 18, 19, 20, 22)

Introduction to Macroeconomics (Fall 19, 21)

Principles of Economics (Fall 20)

Econometrics I (winter 22)

Quantitative methods (graduate, Ph.D. level, Fall 17)

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## **FELLOWSHIPS**

2021-2022 McConnell Chair in American Studies' Scholarship, Université de Montréal.

2021 COVID-19 Scholarship, Economics Department, Université de Montréal.

2016-2020 Ph.D. Scholarship, CIREQ and Economics Department, Université de Montréal.

2016-2018 Tuition-fees Waiver Scholarship, Faculty of Graduate Studies, Université de Montréal.

2012-2015 Odon-Vallet excellence Scholarship

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## **CONFERENCE PRESENTATION**

56<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference of the Canadian Economics Association, Carleton University

61<sup>st</sup> Congres Annuel de la Societe Canadienne de Sciences Economiques, Polytechnique Montreal

16<sup>th</sup> CIREQ Ph.D. Students' Symposium, Université de Montréal (virtual)

55<sup>th</sup> Annual Conference of the Canadian Economics Association, Simon Fraser University (virtual)

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## **DEPARTEMENTAL SERVICE**

Principal organizer of the Ph.D. students' presentations in Economics at the Université de Montreal.  
(2019-2021)

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## **OTHER**

**Citizenship:** Benin, Canadian Permanent Resident

**Softskills:** Matlab, Stata, R, Python, SPSS, Latex, VBA-Excel

**Language:** English : *fluent*; French : *Native*

**Certificate:** Financial Market Analysis, International Monetary Fund

: Machine Learning with Python, IBM (Edx online course)

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## SUMMARY OF THE THESIS

### **The Employment Effects of the Non-compete contracts: Job retention vs. Job creation, *JMP***

This paper studies the labor market effects of Non-Compete Agreements (NCAs) that constrain employee mobility, in a search model featuring random hiring and endogenous separation. Non-compete clauses limit workers' job opportunities; thus, an unemployed worker who is bound by NCAs has a lower job finding rate relative to the unconstrained worker. Moreover, since NCAs encourage firm investment through the lengthening of job tenure, firms prefer to include them and are incentivized to create vacancies for jobs that have a higher probability of including NCAs in their contracts. Hence, the average job finding rate increases with the incidence of NCAs through increased labor market tightness. Conversely, a higher incidence of NCAs also increases the proportion of job seekers that are constrained by NCAs, making job vacancies more difficult to fill. Therefore, the average job finding rate drops through decreasing labor market tightness. Calibrated to the US economy, the model implies a decreasing job finding rate with the incidence of NCAs, consistent with the evidence found in US data. This fact appears as a trade-off for a lower job separation rate and higher firm investment in worker human capital implied by a higher incidence of NCAs. In equilibrium, the model predicts a higher unemployment rate associated with a higher incidence of enforceable NCAs in the economy. In addition, the paper shows that a restriction on the duration of NCAs is welfare improving.

### **Climate Policy, Financial Frictions and Aggregate Productivity,**

This paper examines the macroeconomic effects of climate policy in the presence of financial frictions. Climate policy analyzed are the carbon tax and green financing, a policy that aims to reallocate capital toward environmentally friendly firms. When firms are financially constrained, the imposition of carbon tax helps reallocate capital from low productive firms to high productive firms by increasing the production cost. High-productive firms produce more but also engage in emissions abatement to reduce the carbon tax burden, incentivized by green financing. As a result, emissions decrease, but aggregate productivity and output increase, breaking the positive emissions-output relationship. However, the paper shows that the outlined positive effect of the carbon tax depends on the aggregate response of financing to firm environmental performance.

### **Life-cycle Worker Flows in a Dual Labour Market, *with Jonathan Créchet***

This paper considers labor-market duality between temporary and permanent employment contracts as a source of life-cycle heterogeneity in worker flows. Using panel data from the French Continuous

Employment Survey, we estimate that the transition probabilities from unemployment to temporary (UT) and permanent (UP) employment have a declining profile over the life cycle for high-education workers but a flat profile for low-education workers. The same is observed for the transition probability from temporary to permanent employment (TP). We show that a search-and-matching model with heterogeneous workers and jobs, information frictions and Bayesian learning about worker ability, and match-specific unemployment risk can replicate these facts. Bayesian learning is relatively more prevalent for high-education workers, whereas unemployment-risk heterogeneity is the key driver of life-cycle variation in worker flows for the low-educated. We assess the implications of the model for the effect of temporary contracts and firing costs on employment, mismatch and aggregate productivity, and the life-cycle dynamics of earnings.