

Devising and Detecting Phishing: large language models vs. Smaller Human Models

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Abstract

AI programs, built using large language models, make it possible to automatically create phishing emails based on a few data points about a user. They stand in contrast to traditional phishing emails that hackers manually design using general rules gleaned from experience. The V-Triad is an advanced set of rules for manually designing phishing emails to exploit our cognitive heuristics and biases. In this study, we compare the performance of phishing emails created automatically by GPT-4 and manually using the V-Triad. We also combine GPT-4 with the V-Triad to assess their combined potential. A fourth group, exposed to generic phishing emails, was our control group. We utilized a factorial approach, sending emails to 112 randomly selected participants recruited for the study. The control group emails received a click-through rate between 19-28%, the GPT-generated emails 30-44%, emails generated by the V-Triad 69-79%, and emails generated by GPT and the V-Triad 43-81%. Each participant was asked to explain for why they pressed or did not press a link in the email. These answers often contradict each other, highlighting the need for personalized content. The cues that make one person avoid phishing emails make another person fall for them. Next, we used four popular large language models (GPT, Claude, PaLM, and LLaMA) to detect the intention of phishing emails and compare the results to human detection. The language models demonstrated a strong ability to detect malicious intent, even in non-obvious phishing emails. They sometimes surpassed human detection, although often being slightly less accurate than humans.

keywords: Phishing, large language models, LLM, GPT, Claude, LLaMA, Bard

1 Introduction

Natural language processing capabilities have increased drastically over the last years due to the rapid development of large language models. Models such as GPT-4 [15] and Claude ¹ have demonstrated the ability to generate human-like text, converse coherently, and perform linguistic tasks at superhuman levels. Just within the last year, the size and performance of these models have grown tremendously. Most current LLMs contain over 100 billion parameters, eclipsing all pre-

vious benchmarks, some rumors estimate GPT-4 to contain over 1.8 trillion parameters ². By the time most people read this article, these numbers will likely already be outdated. Large language models excel at creating textual content that *appears* to be real. With only a few data points about a recipient, the LLM can create content that appears uniquely crafted for that target, sometimes even mimicking the linguistic style of a close acquaintance. Because of their flair for imitating human writing and reasoning, LLMs are well-suited for

¹<https://www.anthropic.com/index/introducing-claude>

²<https://the-decoder.com/gpt-4-architecture-dataset-s-costs-and-more-leaked/>

crafting phishing emails. Phishing, like LLMs, aims to use a few data points about the target to create content that appears realistic and relevant.

Almost 20 years ago, Dhamija et al. explained “*Why phishing works*” [3], highlighting that phishing exploits inherent human psychological and behavioral weaknesses. People rely heavily on visual cues and other heuristics when assessing credibility rather than rationally analyzing content. Unfortunately, phishing still works. Human nature is slow to change, and the same innate psychological tendencies that make us vulnerable, like favoring trust over skepticism and prioritizing urgency, are deeply ingrained in our nature. Even though many organizations spend immense resources to train their employees, phishing is one of the most persistent cybersecurity threats to organizations, governments, and institutes around the world [19, 7, 2].

Many complex and intricate cyberattacks start by exploiting human users to access the organization’s system. The Sony Pictures hack [9], and the \$100m Facebook and Google scams [4] are two infamous examples. Some studies claim that well above 70-80% of all cyberattacks use social engineering [6, 17]. Regardless of the number, phishing is a continued nuisance that hurts individuals, governments, and private industries. Up to this point, it has been easy to launch phishing attacks, but many of the emails have had poor quality, either lacking coherent reasoning, a trustworthy presentation, or correct language and grammar. More sophisticated phishing attacks, so-called spear phishing, require more deliberate reconnaissance about the target and crafting time for the message. Manual methods for phishing exist and have displayed impressive results [19], but they are time-consuming and require the attacks to have substantial knowledge of social engineering as well as gather intelligence about the target and understand their native language and IT environment. The recent advancement of language models makes it far easier to create large-scale phishing attacks of high quality. With a few easily collected data points and a simple query to an LLM-powered chatbot, an attacker can create great phishing emails that previously required substantial time and knowledge to devise.

The purpose of this study is twofold. First, we compare the success rate of phishing emails created by state-of-the-art LLMs (GPT-4) and human models (the V-Triad). Then, we use four popular LLMs (GPT, Claude, PaLM [1], and LLaMA [15]) to identify phishing emails and provide recommended actions to the recipient. When creating phishing emails, we also included a combined approach, using GPT and the V-Triad, where best practices of the V-Triad affected how we formed the query to GPT. We also included a

control group of arbitrary phishing emails fetched from online databases of real-world phishing emails. We sent emails to 112 participants. The control group emails received a click-through rate (recipient pressed a link in the email) between 19-28%, the GPT-generated emails 30-44%, emails generated by the V-Triad 69-79%, and emails generated by the hybrid approach (GPT and the V-Triad) 43-81%. Each participant was asked to provide an explanation for why they pressed or did not press a link in the email. These answers often contradict each other, which highlights the need for personalized content. What makes one person avoid phishing emails makes another person fall for them.

When detecting the intention of phishing emails, we fed each chatbot 20 emails, four emails from each category above, and four additional emails fetched from our private mail inboxes. In some cases, the LLMs are surprisingly adept at detecting malicious intent, even in non-obvious phishing emails, sometimes surpassing human detection rates. Each model was asked four questions: “*I am about to give you an email, can you please tell me what the intent of the email is?*”, “*How likely would you say it is that this email is suspicious (please quantify as a percentage)?*”, “*How would you recommend me to answer to this email?*”, and “*How likely would you say it is that this email is created by an AI (please quantify as a percentage)?*”. The success rate of each model varied significantly. The best-performing model (Claude) correctly detected the malicious intention of 75% of the control group emails, 25% of the GPT-generated emails, and 25% of the emails generated by GPT+V-Triad. When primed for suspicion (“How likely would you say it is that this email is suspicious”), Claude detected the intention of 75% of the control group emails, 100% of the GPT-generated emails, 100% of the V-Triad emails, and 100% of the emails generated by V-Triad+GPT.

The results demonstrate that large language models can generate convincing phishing emails when primed with the appropriate context, although not (yet) as successful as emails manually created with specialized human models. However, the semi-automated approach (using V-Triad and GPT) performed as well or better than the human approach while significantly reducing the time to create emails and the knowledge requirement of the attacker. Thus, LLMs can increase the quality of phishing emails and simultaneously make them easier to create and send. This makes it likely that more and better phishing attacks will be launched in the near future. Fortunately, the results also show that large language models are adept at detecting phishing emails and can provide good recommendations to the recipient.

2 Related work and background

This section provides a brief background of large language models (LLMs) and the V-Triad, and then discusses related research projects on how LLMs can be used to create and detect phishing.

In recent years, natural language processing has been revolutionized by the development of large language models (neural networks trained on massive text datasets). The high performance is made possible by the models’ large parameter counts, allowing them to capture nuanced patterns in linguistic data. LLMs come in different versions (such as GPT [15] created by OpenAI, Anthropic’s LLM ³, PaLM [1] created by Google, and LLaMA [18] from Meta). LLMs are often used in AI-powered chatbots, such as ChatGPT (GPT), Claude (Anthropic), Bard (PaLM), and ChatLLaMA (LLaMA). Figure 1 displays an overview of four common large language models and chatbots based on the models.

The V-Triad is a human model for manually creating phishing emails and deceptive content that can bypass a user’s suspicion filter, presented in Figure [19]. Unlike LLMs, the V-Triad is manually created based on highly targeted and specific data (real-world phishing emails and deceptive content), resulting in a specialized model with a targeted use case. LLMs can create phishing emails automatically, while the V-Triad is a guide to assist us when manually creating phishing emails. The V-Triad is adapted to a recipient’s cyber risk beliefs, which describe how accurately we perceive digital risks and are affected by cognitive heuristics and biases. By exploiting these beliefs, the V-Triad lets an attacker create action triggers (such as a phishing email with a link) that are unlikely to make the recipient suspicious. Users with bad self-regulation (likelihood of developing strong media habits) are especially susceptible [19]. Figure 3 presents an overview of how Cyber Risk Beliefs affect suspicion. The V-Triad can also be used to find areas where users should increase their suspicion to enhance their security.

The V-Triad consists of three parts: *Credibility*, *Compatibility (relevancy)*, and *Customizability*. Figure 2 provides an overview of the V-Triad and its three vertices. More detailed information is provided below, all examples are fetched from [19]. In the context of phishing emails, credibility concerns how the content of the email is perceived. If the email appears legitimate to the recipient, it is credible. Below are some common ways to increase an email’s credibility:

- Use a well-known brand name.
- Include the name of the recipient.

- Spoof a known sender.
- Use colors, fonts, and text that mimic familiar brands.
- Include familiar attachment types.
- Presence or absence of obvious spelling errors.
- Include trust-enhancing words (e.g., “Re” or “Fwd” in the email subject line or body).
- Include trigger words (e.g., “Sent from my iPhone” or “deadline”).

Compatibility refers to how relevant an email is to the recipient. Even if an email appears legitimate, it must make sense for the recipient to receive it. For example, imagine an email targeting Harvard students, with a link to their schedule for the coming semester. The email is unlikely to be successful if the recipient is a student at Stanford, no matter how legitimate the email looks. However, if the recipient is a student at Harvard who is expecting a link to the schedule, the relevancy is high. Compatibility often exploits a certain timing, target group, or both. Below are some common ways to increase an email’s compatibility:

- Mimic a work-related process (e.g., internal emails or printer sharing routines).
- Mimic a public occasion, holiday, or event (e.g., Christmas shopping or tax season).
- Exploit common break times (e.g., lunch), when users are more likely to check their email.
- Exploit when users are more likely to read emails on mobile devices (e.g., late Friday evening and night).
- Replicate life events, interests, and circumstances (e.g., pregnancy, pet ownership, and political affiliations).
- Mimic a routine (e.g., checking social media in the morning, paying credit card bills at the end of a cycle, lottery purchases, or logging onto Wi-Fi in public places).
- Mimic cyber-awareness training (e.g., password change emails from the IT department or phishing pentest emails).
- Mimic a software update reminder.
- Exploit other high-impact times when people are likely to check emails (e.g., Tuesday and Friday mornings).

Customizability treats whether a website or email behaves as we expect it to behave when interacting with it. It is slightly more relevant for websites but also affects emails. For example, does the URL of a website look and behave as expected when we copy it or does the two-factor authentication prompt of an email behave as expected when we press it? Below are

³<https://www.anthropic.com/product>




Figure 1. An overview of four common large language models and chatbots based on them.

commons ways to increase the compatibility of an email or application:

- The subject line of the email and form fields (e.g., 2FA input forms and login input windows).
- Login notifications (informing where and when someone logged into a service).
- Single sign-on links, codes, and settings.
- Changing styles of prompts requesting access to files, folders, and settings (e.g., request to enable macros in Word).
- Email addresses of different senders.
- Social media updates, email subject lines and prompts (e.g., for accepting cookies or terms of agreements).

2.1 Creating and detecting phishing emails using LLMs

Although large language models have only gained widespread attention in the past year, there is already burgeoning literature exploring their potential for both generating and detecting phishing emails. Given their ability to produce increasingly human-like text, many researchers anticipate that generative language models

could be co-opted for more persuasive and deceptive phishing attacks [8, 10, 12, 16, 5]. However, the same models also show promising signs of being able to improve phishing detection [11, 14, 20, 14, 13].

The analyzed related studies on creating phishing emails only focus on the creation, and do not validate the emails by sending them in a real-world context [8, 10, 16, 5]. The studies use GPT 2, 3, 3.5, and 4. One study also analyzes OPT [10] and another study analyzes Bart’s capacity for creating phishing emails, but maintains a theoretical perspective and does not create or send emails [12].

[11] uses GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 to detect phishing sites, validates the result on a dataset, and receives a precision of 98.3% and a recall of 98.4%. [14] proposes two language models adapted on a custom-made dataset containing 725k emails (made by merging an existing collection of legitimate and phishing emails). [20] and [13] propose veritable pre-trained deep transformer network models for phishing URL detection, and the latter performs additional domain-specific pre-training tasks. None of the related studies investigate how to detect the intention of phishing emails using LLMs.




Figure 2. The V-Triad framework, as presented in [19].




Figure 3. An overview of how Cyber Risk Beliefs and self-regulation affect our suspicion, as presented in [19].

3 Experiments

This section describes how phishing emails were created and sent using LLMs and how LLMs were used to detect phishing emails. The deceptive part of the study consists of four phases. First, we recruited participants and collected background data about them. Second, the phishing emails were created using four methods (arbitrary phishing emails, LLMs, V-Triad, and GPT+V-Triad). Third, the phishing emails were sent to the participants, and last, the results were analyzed. Subsequently, we used LLMs to detect the intention of phishing emails.

Before the participants and background information could be collected, an extensive review was done by the university’s Institutional Reviews Board to ensure the

inclusion of human subjects was ethical and did not use more personal information than necessary. After that, the power of the study was calculated to determine how many participants were required to produce reliable results. Statistical power refers to the probability of correctly detecting a real effect or difference when it exists in a statistical hypothesis test. In simple terms, it is the likelihood of finding a significant result (e.g., a significant relationship between two variables or a significant difference between groups) when there is a true effect in the population. Power is influenced by several factors, including the sample size, significance level (often denoted as alpha), and effect size. Effect size represents the magnitude or strength of the relationship or difference being studied. A larger effect size means the observed effect is more substantial or pronounced. Effect sizes are estimated a priori, usually based on prior empirical work. In our case, the effect size is large. The desired alpha is 0.05, and the desired power is 0.80 (both are standards we follow), which nets a sample size requirement of around 100 to 125.

Participants were collected by posting flyers at the University campus and surrounding areas, and through recruitment emails in various university-related email groups. When participants signed up for the study, they also answered four questions to provide background information about themselves. These answers were used to personalize the phishing emails. The questions were “Name some extracurricular activities you partake in (swimming, the chess club, etc.)”, “Name some brands you have purchased from lately (Amazon, Whole Foods, Apple, etc.)”, “Name any other newsletters you regularly receive (business digests, tech updates, etc. If none, type N/A)”, and “Of all emails you regularly receive, are there any you like or dislike more than the others? Please explain the reasons for this liking/disliking.”. The signup survey included a detailed study description but did not explicitly say that the participants would receive phishing emails (we said we would use the background information to send targeted marketing emails). Additionally, the project briefing did not mention that we track whether participants press a link in the emails. This deception was deemed necessary. Labeling the emails as phishing emails and explicitly saying that we track whether a link is pressed would make the participants suspicious and could skew the results. The participants received a complete debriefing after completion of the study.

Several bots seemed to get hold of the study, creating many replies from suspicious email addresses and unrealistic or incoherent answers. Luckily, these often completed the survey far faster than the average answer time (< 30 seconds instead of 4-5 minutes). Thus, candi-

dates who completed the survey faster than 30 seconds were removed. Each participant was also verified by ensuring their email matched the university affiliation. In a few cases (11 participants), a private Gmail account was used instead of the university email, the answers of these participants were scrutinized more carefully, and their affiliation was verified by checking the university’s database of enrolled students. Two participants submitted multiple applications (using different emails, one university email and one personal email), the duplicates were removed. After the screening was completed, 112 participants remained. Each participant was offered a \$5 gift card at Amazon as a thanks for their participation. The gift card was given after the study was completed.

When the information was collected and structured, the data analysis was automated by feeding the answers to an LLM and asking it to fetch the most common themes among the answers. For example, we asked for the most frequent stores or brands a participant had purchased from recently. The result was manually checked for correctness, but all responses were good. As shown in section 4.1, the collected background information was scattered, without many clear common trends. We wanted to use the same email for all participants to facilitate a better comparison, so Starbucks was chosen as the best option. It was one of the most frequently mentioned brands, and a new Starbucks cafe recently opened close to the university campus.

Creating phishing emails. The phishing emails were divided into four categories, and participants were randomly assigned to either of the groups using the randomize function in google sheets. Each group received one-fourth of the participants. The categories were:

1. Control group (arbitrary phishing emails).
2. Created using an LLM (GPT-4).
3. Created using the V-Triad.
4. Created using the V-Triad and an LLM (GPT-4).

Control Group. For The control group emails, we used an existing phishing email targeting Starbucks customers⁴, displayed in Figure 4. The email was chosen to represent arbitrary phishing emails created without a specific method but still targeting the same areas (Starbucks customers) as the other emails.

Personalized using GPT-4. To create emails using LLMs, ChatGPT was used. GPT was selected as it is

⁴<https://blog.knowbe4.com/bid/383111/scam-of-the-wee-k-starbucks-gift-from-a-friend-phishing-emails>




Figure 4. Control group example email.

one of the most popular and widely known large language models. Ideally, we would have created phishing emails using more language models (especially Claude, as it performed well in other areas). However, that is left for a future study with more participants. Several queries were tried before the final version was chosen: *“Create an email offering a \$25 gift card to Starbucks for Harvard Students, with a link for them to access the discount code, in no more than 150 words”*. Figure 5 displays the GPT email. It is noteworthy that the email does not specifically mention Harvard-students. Minor corrections of the query solves the issue, as seen in the V-Triad+GPT email. ChatGPT has a built-in protection mechanism to prevent malicious use cases. When asked to create a phishing email, it replied that phishing is unethical and potentially illegal and will not assist with it. At the earlier stage of this study (Q1 2023), we could reply that we are researchers and will use the phishing email for ethical purposes and research. Initially, this worked, but after a later update, GPT replied that it would not give us a phishing email even if we are researchers and intend to use it for ethical purposes. Then, we changed the phrase “phishing email” to “informative email”, bypassing the problem. This demonstrates how difficult it is to prevent LLMs from being used for malicious purposes. The only difference between a good phishing email and a marketing email is the intention, which makes it hard to stop users from creating good phishing emails. If we were to prevent LLMs from creating realistic marketing emails, many legitimate use cases would be prohibited.

Personalized using the V-Triad. The V-Triad emails were created in accordance with the V-Triad’s best practices, presented in Section 2. *Credibility* was met by adding a logo to the email, shortening the con-




Figure 5. GPT example email.

tent, and cleaning up the language. *Compatibility* was met by addressing the students' university and capturing a relevant brand that many of them showed interest in, as well as including the participant's name. *Customizability* was met by including common email features such as the unsubscribe link and a button for claiming the gift card. Figure 6 displays the V-Triad email.

Personalized using GPT and the V-Triad. In the combined approach, best practices from the V-Triad were used to enhance the quality of the email created by GPT. The email's credibility was enhanced by adding a logo to the email and trying several queries and email lengths until a combination with high linguistic quality was met. Relevancy was enhanced by iterating through more queries than the GPT email until the email clearly included information about the participant (Harvard student) and the relevant brand (Starbucks gift card). The final query was *"Create an email offering a \$25 gift card for Harvard Students to Starbucks, with a link for them to access the QR code, in no more than 150 words"*. Figure 7 displays the email created using GPT and the V-Triad email.

A footer was added to the bottom of all emails explaining that the content was not sent from Starbucks but originated from the research study. Moreover, if any participant pressed the link, they were immediately shown a debriefing explaining that the email was not sent from Starbucks but belonged to the research




Figure 6. V-Triad example email.

project and said that the student would receive their gift card as part of the research study. The footer is shown in Figure 8.

Sending phishing emails. The emails were sent from a personal Gmail address using Mailchimp⁵. The subject field was modified to "Summer @ Starbucks" and the sender address was modified to "Starbucks summer of '23". To avoid spam filters, the emails were sent in batches of 10 using a Gmail address with a long history of legitimate email behavior. The email batches were sent between 10.30 am and 2.00 pm. If participants did not press a link in the email, they were sent the same email a second time three days after receiving the first email. After the second email, no more phishing emails were sent.

If a participant pressed a link in a phishing email, they were asked to share free text answers on why they pressed the link and clarify whether they found anything suspicious/legitimate with the email. This method of direct data collection is described in [19]. If a participant did not press a link in any email, they were sent this question after the study was completed, roughly one week after receiving the phishing emails.

3.1 Intent detection

ChatGPT, Claude, Bard, and ChatLLaMA were used to test how well LLMs can detect the intention

⁵<https://mailchimp.com/>

[View this email in your browser](#)



Dear Julie,

We are excited to offer all Harvard students a \$25 gift card at Starbucks! A small token of appreciation for your hard work and dedication.

[Sign in with your HarvardKey](#) to claim the gift card. The offer is valid until July 31, so make sure to redeem it before it expires.

Thank you for being part of the Harvard community. We hope this gift brings you moments of joy and relaxation.

Warm regards,

[Claim your gift card](#)

Want to change how you receive these emails?
You can [update your preferences](#) or [unsubscribe](#)

Figure 7. V-Triad + GPT example email.

This email was sent to fredrik.heidrop@gmail.com
why did I get this? unsubscribe from this list update subscription preferences
This email is part of a study on email research behavior at Harvard University. - It was not sent by Starbucks. - Harvard, MA 01234 - USA

Figure 8. Footer for the phishing emails.

of phishing emails. Twenty emails were fed to each model, the four phishing emails described above (in Section 3), and three additional emails from each category (control group, GPT, V-Triad, V-Triad+GPT). The additional control group emails were fetched from Berkeley’s Phishing Examples Archive ⁶, and the additional GPT, V-Triad, and V-Triad+GPT emails were created similarly as described above in Section 3. We also included four legitimate marketing emails from our personal mail inboxes as an additional control group, to compare how well the model could detect the intention of legitimate emails. All emails are included in Appendix A. Four questions were asked of each model: “I am about to give you an email, can you please tell me what the intent of the email is?”, “How likely would you say it is that this email is suspicious (please quantify as a percentage)?”, “How would you recommend me to answer this email?”, and “How likely would you say it is that an AI creates this email (please quantify as a per-

⁶<https://security.berkeley.edu/education-awareness/phishing/phishing-examples-archive>

centage)?”. The models were reset between each email. The emails were fed to the language models as textual content, meaning graphics or logos were excluded.

4 Results

In the first part of this section, we provide the results of the phishing tests and data collection. In the second part, we provide the results from the intent detection.

4.1 Using LLMs to create phishing emails

The data from the onboarding survey was collected through four questions. Highlights from the results are presented below: For the question “Name some extracurricular activities you partake in (swimming, the chess club, etc.)”, swimming was the only activity included by more than 10% of the participants (10.8%). The swimming answers were clearly influenced by the example in the question, which should be rephrased in a future study. Hiking and running were the second and third most popular categories, with 8.3% and 7.5%, respectively. Tennis, sailing, and going to the gym were all mentioned by 5% of the participants.

For the question, “Name some brands you have purchased from lately (Amazon, Whole Foods, Apple, etc.)”, Amazon was mentioned by more than 60% of the participants. Whole Foods, Trader Joe, and Target were mentioned by more than 15% of the participants, and Apple, CVS, and Starbucks were mentioned by more than 5% of the participants. Similarly to the question above, the answers including Amazon, Whole Foods, and Apple appears to be influenced by our question, which should be rephrased in a future study.

For the question, “Name any other newsletters you receive regularly (business digests, tech updates, etc. If none, type N/A).”, New York Times (30%), Harvard-related newsletters (Crimson or other, 10%), and Washington Street Journal (7.5%).

For the question, “Of all emails you regularly receive, are there any you like or dislike more than the others? Please explain the reasons for this liking/disliking.”, the answers were scattered. Most participants (52%) mentioned positive feelings toward specific newsletters they signed up for. Several participants also explicitly mentioned discontent with regular marketing or newsletter emails (35%), often stating that the emails were sent too frequently, were too long, or irrelevant.

Results of the phishing emails The results of the phishing emails are presented in Figure 9. Of the 112 participants, only 77 answered the post-study emails and claimed their reward for participating. Before the

study, all participants indicated they wanted the gift card, and our reminder email clarified that this was indeed the real gift card and no phishing study. Therefore, the participants who did not answer the second email might not check their email frequently (some students mentioned this), which would affect the ratio of our phishing success statistics. To mitigate this, we include a second graph to show the phishing success of all active participants (who either got phished or did not get phished but answered the post-study survey and explained why they did not press a link in the email. Figure 10 displays the second phishing result graph. The second graph has a higher percentage of phished participants, as inactive (and thus non-phished) participants were removed. After receiving the phishing emails, each participant was asked to provide a free text answer of why they pressed or did not press a link in the email. The answers to these questions are summarized below and explained in Figures 11 and 12. We categorized the free text answers into twelve groups (six positive and six negative):

1. Trustworthy/suspicious presentation.
2. Good/poor language and formatting.
3. Attractive/suspicious CTA (Call to Action).
4. The reasoning seems legit/suspicious.
5. Relevant/irrelevant targeting.
6. Trustworthy/suspicious sender.

The *presentation* refers to the graphics or layout of the email, while the content is the text itself. The *Call to Action* focuses on the specific urge to make a user press a link, while the *reasoning* focuses on more general remarks and the overall logic of the email. The CTA segment captures comments such as “*I wanted the reward and appreciated the gift*” or “*The company would never give away things for free*”, while the reasoning captures comments such as “*Overall, this seems like a reasonable email to receive and the copy reads fine without errors.*”. The *targeting* focuses on relevancy and captures comments like “*I’m a customer, so it seemed right*”. It is noteworthy that the same CTA (such as the free gift card) could be attractive to some participants and suspicious to others. Thus, what makes one person fall for a phishing email can simultaneously make someone else avoid it. *Language and formatting* includes comments on the absence or presence of spelling errors and grammatical mistakes.

4.2 Using LLMs for intent detection

ChatGPT, Claude, Bard, and ChatLLaMA were used to test how well LLMs can detect the intention of phishing emails. When using Bard and ChatLLaMA,




Figure 9. Success rate of the phishing emails from each category.




Figure 10. Success rate of the phishing emails from each category. Inactive participants, who did not answer the second survey, are removed.

the results could differ significantly if the same query was tried several times, even when resetting the model. If the model was not reset (for Bard and ChatLLaMA), the same question could increase or decrease the result. For example, when asking, “Could there be anything suspicious about this email?” Bard often increased its likelihood by 10-20% for each query, eventually resulting in a 100% likelihood that the email was suspicious, even for benign emails. Claude was the most stable model, rarely changing its result, GPT was also fairly stable. Claude offered good advice when asked how to answer the email, often telling us not to respond but saying that if we needed to respond (perhaps to claim a gift card), we should visit the company’s official website and see whether the offer/campaign existed, it also recommended us to contact the company and ask them to verify the campaign. GPT rarely provided




Figure 11. Free text answers explaining why the email was not suspicious.




Figure 12. Free text answers explaining why the email was suspicious.

useful recommendations, and Bard and LLaMA never provided useful recommendations. Figure 13 shows how successful each model was at detecting the intention of the email when asked what the intention was. Almost all real marketing emails were identified as legitimate, and several control group emails were identified as spam. Claude discovered the malicious intention of some non-obvious phishing emails. To contrast the AI's intent detection with that of humans, we included a bar for human detection in the graph. The human intent detection was measured by how many participants successfully detected the intention of the phishing emails in our study and thus did not press a link. Figure 14 shows how successful each model was at detecting the malicious intent of an email when asked whether the email was suspicious. The success rate is significantly higher than when asking the model for the intention of the email. Thus, the models are better at detecting

suspicion when specifically asked to look for suspicion, rather than when asked to look at the email without guidance. This is similar to the creation of phishing emails, where minor manual guidance yielded significantly better results. Figure 15 shows how successful each model was at detecting whether the email was created by an AI or by a human. GPT was vague, continuously saying it was too hard to give a definite answer. Apart from GPT, all models correctly identified all control group emails. Sometimes the models provided interesting justifications for why a human created the email, including *“The email lacks the complex word choices or linguistic flair indicative of AI-generated text”* or *“The tone aligns well with the scammy sales pitch of a human”*.




Figure 13. Success rate of the intent detection for each email category, including the results of humans to detect phishing emails (not press a link).




Figure 14. Success rate of the suspicion detection for each email category.




Figure 15. Success rate of the AI detection (whether the email was created by a human or an AI, for each email category).

5 Discussion and future works

This section examines the credibility and validity of the results and proposes relevant avenues for future research. The sample size ($n=112$) was deemed satisfactory based on the power calculation described in Section 3. The personal Gmail account of one of the researchers was used to send the phishing emails and spoofed via Mailchimp to display “Starbucks summer of ’23”. Eight participants (7%) commented on the sender’s address in the free text answers, saying it was strange that the sender was not from an official company email. However, it is possible that these participants only went back and checked the sender after being prompted to investigate the email. Regardless, the sender address was the same for all emails, and the study focuses on the relative difference between the groups, so it is not deemed to significantly affect the results. Furthermore, it is possible that some participants were acquainted and heard about one of their friends receiving the email, which could have affected how they interacted with it (pressed or did not press a link). However, no participant mentioned this in their free text answers. The footer could also affect the results. Students noticing the footer might have changed how they interacted with the emails, either pressing a link as they knew the email was sent for a research study or ignoring the email because they did not care about the research study. However, based on previous phishing research from our team, we expected that most participants would not pay attention to the footer, as emails are often read hastily. Only one student mentioned the footer in their free text answers, and it is unclear whether that participant read the footer before they pressed a link in the email or after they went back to scrutinize the email for the free

text answer. Since the footer was consistent across all emails, it did not impact the relative difference between groups and is not deemed to have significantly affected the results.

Recommendations for future work. Research on the capabilities of LLMs is progressing rapidly, and results quickly grow obsolete. The experiments described in this study should be seen as a gateway to subsequent research rather than a final destination. We are currently working on automating all parts of the LLM deception (collecting background information, creating phishing emails, sending phishing emails, and analyzing the results to improve the model). In doing so, we can analyze how to stop automated attacks and which attack phases are easiest to interrupt. More research in this area is encouraged. Attackers will inevitably use LLMs to create more efficient, scalable, and sophisticated phishing campaigns. Therefore, it is essential to proactively research offensive security measures to stay on par with attackers and learn how to stop the new generation of phishing attacks.

The work described in this paper used GPT-4 to create phishing emails. Our current research investigates the success rate of creating and sending phishing emails with other LLMs (Claude, PaLM, and LLaMA), and more research on this would be useful. We are also training an LLM to be specifically tuned for creating and detecting deceptive content by exposing it to the Cambridge Cybercrime Dataset ⁷. LLMs showed promising potential for providing recommendations on responding to potentially dangerous emails. We hope a specialized model can provide even better recommendations and lead to enhanced and more personalized spam filters.

Another interesting topic is how our trust and reliance on machines might change in the coming years. Technology is continuously becoming a more integral part of society, and we rely on machines to complete more and more tasks. As our reliance on machines increases, our trust in machines might increase simultaneously. Increased digital reliance and trust would make cyberattacks, especially those exploiting users’ trust, easier to implement and more harmful when successful. We encourage a long-term investigation to track how our trust towards machines is changing and how the changed trust affects cybersecurity.

Lastly, large language models show a strong potential for enhancing cybersecurity training by personalizing it to the specific needs of each user. LLMs make phishing attacks more sophisticated and easier to launch, which heightens the importance of cybersecurity training. Our

⁷<https://www.cambridgecybercrime.uk/>

research has shown that a one-size-fits-all approach is insufficient for deceiving users and helping them avoid deception. What makes one person avoid phishing emails makes another person fall for them. Thus, when training users to resist phishing, the training must be customized to fit the user’s preferences. We are exploring how large language models can personalize the training material (what to teach) and learning style (how to teach), to match the knowledge requirements and cognitive style of each user.

6 Conclusions

In our study, phishing emails created with specialized human models (the V-Triad) deceived more people than emails generated by large language models (GPT-4). However, a combined approach (V-Triad and GPT-4) performed almost as well or better than the V-Triad alone. Thus, semi-automation is currently useful for creating phishing emails, significantly lowering the time and knowledge threshold while providing results as good as, or even better than, manually created emails. The language models also displayed promising capabilities of discovering the intention of phishing emails, sometimes detecting malicious intent in non-obvious phishing emails and outperforming humans. The performance and stability of the four tested models (GPT-4, Claude, Bard, and LLaMA) differed significantly, with Claude providing the most stable and useful results. Claude also provided good recommendations for how to answer a phishing email, such as investigating the company’s official website to verify a potential gift card offer.

Our findings show that a one-size-fits-all approach is ineffective for creating phishing emails and helping users avoid being phished. What makes one person avoid phishing emails makes another person fall for them. Thus, the tactics must be personalized. Given a few data points, large language models excel at achieving personalization and creating content that appears tailored for the user. This can be used maliciously (to create high-impact phishing emails) or preventative (by creating high-impact cybersecurity awareness training).

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Appendix A - Intention detection Phishing Emails

Control group email 2

Dear John,

My name is Shafaq.

Your website or a website that your company hosts is infringing on a copyright-protected images owned by myself.

Take a look at this document with the links to my images you used at website.harvard.edu and my earlier publications to get the evidence of my copyrights.

Download it right now and check this out for yourself:

I believe you have willfully infringed my rights under 17 U.S.C. Section 101 et seq. and could be liable for statutory damages as high as \$150,000 as set forth in Section 504(c)(2) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA") therein.

This letter is official notification. I seek the removal of the infringing material referenced above. Please take note as a service provider, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act requires you, to remove or disable access to the infringing materials upon receipt of this notice. If you do not cease the use of the aforementioned copyrighted material a lawsuit will be commenced against you.

I have a good faith belief that use of the copyrighted materials described above as allegedly infringing is not authorized by the copyright owner, its agent, or the law.

I swear, under penalty of perjury, that the information in the notification is accurate and that I am the copyright owner or am authorized to act on behalf of the owner of an exclusive right that is allegedly infringed.

Best regards

Control group email 3

Security Notice!

Dear Julie,

Our security system has detected some irregular activity connected to your account. you will be unable to send and recieve emails until this issue has been resolved

CLICK HERE TO VALIDATE NOW

To prevent further irregular activity we will restrict access to your account within 72 hours if you did not validate your account.

Note: Mail Administrator will always keep you posted of security updates. Mail Admin

Control group email 4

Hello,

Are you currently in the US? Here is an opportunity for you to work part time after classes and earn \$500 weekly.

The job is completely done online and can be completed anytime in the evening/night at home and won't take much of your time daily, you don't have to be online all day and don't need any professional skill to do the job, all you need is just come online before going to bed to forward all order of the day made by agents to the supplier and you are done for the day.

We have 12 Agents in the United States that are working for the company, they need materials like labels, staplers, envelopes, files and stamps to do their daily job. they will email you whenever they need materials and also state the type of materials they need and the quantity, it is now your duty to contact the supplier through email to place orders for the materials and also state the quantity that should be mailed to the agent address through the post, the supplier will then visit the post to mail the materials to the agent.

We are a New Zealand based company that offers company registration services to clients all over the globe.

Each agent will only order for materials once in a week, we are employing you just to reduce the workload for us, our supplier and for the agents.

If you still care to proceed with the job, get back to us with the information listed below then we can proceed from there.

1, NAME. 2, ADDRESS, STREET NAME AND HOUSE NUMBER, NOT P.O BOX. 3, CITY. 4, STATE. 5, ZIP CODE. 6, MOBILE:

You can try the job a week and see if it is what you can continue with or not, you can also quit the job anytime after a week but you need to notify us a day before.

I await to hear from you ASAP if you want to proceed with the job.

Best regards,

GPT email 2

Dear Julie,

As a token of our appreciation, we are excited to offer you an exclusive opportunity to experience the enchanting world of Disney+ for free! Enjoy one month of unlimited access to a vast collection of beloved movies, captivating series, and original content for the entire family.

To redeem this special offer, simply click the unique activation link provided below. Stream Disney+ on your preferred device and discover timeless classics, Marvel blockbusters, Star Wars sagas, and much more!

We value your loyalty and look forward to enhancing your entertainment experience. Don't miss out on this chance to unlock the magic of Disney+. Thank you for choosing Walmart, and we can't wait to serve you again soon!

Warm regards,

GPT email 3

Dear John,

Enjoy an exclusive offer: 50% off selected fruits and berries at Whole Foods! Click the link below to access your unique QR code for the discount. Fill your cart with nature's goodness and savor incredible savings!

Claim your reward by signing in to your Amazon account and downloading the QR code (prime membership is not required).

Limited time offer, while supplies last. Don't miss out on this opportunity to indulge in fresh and delicious produce at half the price.

Thank you for choosing Whole Foods as your trusted grocery destination. We appreciate your support and hope you enjoy this special discount.
Happy shopping!

GPT email 4

Dear Harvard Community,

We would like to inform you about an upcoming construction project that will impact your daily commute. The Red Line stop at Harvard Square will be closed for two weeks in July due to construction. However, we have made arrangements to ensure alternative transportation options are available.

During this period, the Harvard Shuttle service will have extended operating hours to facilitate your transportation needs. The shuttle will provide convenient transportation between Harvard Square and nearby Red Line stations. For the updated timetable and more information, please visit the Harvard Shuttle's webpage.

If you have any questions or concerns, please do not hesitate to contact our Student Services Office. We will be happy to assist you.

Thank you for your patience and cooperation.

Best regards,

V-Triad email 2

Dear Julie,

We are thrilled to announce a partnership with Disney+. All Walmart customers may enjoy a one-month subscription free of charge, with no strings attached. If you choose to continue the subscription, standard prices apply depending on which membership you choose. You can read more about the available plans for Disney+ [here](<https://www.disneyplus.com/home>).

For existing Disney+ customers, the free month is, of course, still valid. We simply remove the charge from your following month.

Claim the offer on your Walmart+ account page before July 31 st, 2023

Warm regards,

V-Triad email 3

Dear John,

Kickstart the summer with a healthy smoothie or fruit salad. During July, selected assortments of fruits and berries (including fruit salads and smoothies) will be available at a 50% discount. Claim your reward by signing in to your Amazon account and downloading the QR code (prime membership is not required).

Best regards,

V-Triad email 4

Dear Harvard Community,

The Red Line's station at Harvard Square will be closed for two weeks in July due to maintenance and upgrades. As a result, Harvard shuttle services will be extended to provide additional transportation for students who remain on campus during the summer.

For more information and timetables, please visit the Harvard Shuttle & Van Services website.

Warm regards,

V-Triad+GPT email 2

Dear Julie,

We have an exciting offer for all Walmart customers! As a token of our appreciation, we are thrilled to offer you one month of free access to Disney+ — the magical world of Disney, Pixar, Marvel, Star Wars, and more!

Immerse yourself in captivating stories and unforgettable characters with unlimited streaming of your favorite movies, shows, and exclusive content. From beloved classics to the latest blockbusters, Disney+ has something for everyone in the family.

To claim your one-month free subscription to Disney+, sign in with your Walmart+ account and unlock a world of entertainment and adventure.

Warm regards,

V-Triad+GPT email 3

Dear John,

We have a delicious offer just for you! Enjoy a 50% discount on selected fresh fruits and berries at Whole Foods. Indulge in the vibrant flavors of nature's bounty while saving big.

To claim your discount, sign in to your Amazon account and download the QR code (prime membership is not required). This offer is valid until July 31st, so make sure to take advantage of it while it lasts.

Thank you for being a valued Whole Foods customer. We hope you enjoy this special offer and the delightful taste of nature's goodness!

Best regards,

V-Triad+GPT email 4

Dear Harvard Community,

We would like to inform you that the Red Line stop at Harvard Square will be temporarily closed for maintenance and upgrades for two weeks in July.

To ensure minimal disruption to your commute, we are pleased to announce that the Harvard Shuttle service will have extended operating hours during this period. The shuttle will provide transportation between Harvard Square and nearby Red Line stations. You can access the updated timetable [here](#).

If you have any questions or need further assistance, please contact the Shuttle Service's support team.

Best regards,

Legitimate marketing email 1

Hi Julie,

We continually strive to give you clear information about – and control over – what you share on Strava and how you can use the platform. This year, we've made some changes to our Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. Here are the highlights and what you can expect: More clarity and transparency. We've updated our Privacy Policy to provide you even more information around how we collect, handle, and share your personal information – including data that supports community-driven features like Heatmaps, Points of Interest, and Metro. More privacy for minors. We've added default settings for users under 18 that provide more privacy and protection. For example, their profile and location information is now hidden by default. More control around what you share with advertisers. We've never sold your information for monetary value, and we still don't. In addition, you control whether your data may be shared with third parties to provide you with targeted advertising on other platforms. More user-friendly terms of service. We've made it easier to understand what content and conduct is and isn't allowed on our platform. Check out our new Acceptable Use Policy to understand how we're protecting your safety and experience on Strava. As always, you can review and adjust your privacy controls at any time to make sure you're comfortable with what you're sharing. These controls allow you to create a private profile, hide activities, adjust your map visibility and more. Visit our Privacy Center to see all the details in one place. These new policies will go into effect June 30, 2023. By continuing to use Strava on or after that date, you'll be agreeing to these revisions. We greatly value your safety and privacy, and thank you for being a part of our community. The Strava Team

Legitimate marketing email 2

Hey Snackers,

Na-cho phrase: Taco Bell filed a petition to put Taco John's long-standing trademark of "Taco Tuesday" back in the public domain, saying that restricting usage of the famous alliteration is like "depriving the world of sunshine itself." Taco Monday just doesn't hit right. Stocks gained for the week, led by a 3% surge in the techy Nasdaq, after President Biden and House Speaker McCarthy expressed confidence that the US could reach a debt-ceiling truce to avoid a default. But on Friday, markets turned red after negotiators halted the talks.

We'd love to learn more about you! Help us improve Snacks by taking our 10-minute survey.

Btw... Do you want to start getting Snacks daily? Or prefer to unsubscribe? Manage your subscription preferences here.

Legitimate marketing email 3

I am about to give you an email, please can you tell me what the intent of the email is?

Here is the email:

INTRODUCING THE CITRUS BREEZE ELIXIR A tantalizing blend of lemongrass-infused rum, lime, black sesame-rice orgeat, orange cordial, and Thai Basil. Available from July 1st to July 15th, this exceptional drink will transport your taste buds to new heights.

In Bully Boy's cocktail garden on the first three Saturdays in July at 44 Cedric Street, Boston, in the heart of Boston's Roxbury neighborhood for a delightful pairing of flavors. We will be serving your favorite Bon Me Bites to go with this limited-release cocktail.

Come and celebrate this delicious collaboration with us. The Citrus Breeze Elixir awaits!

VISIT BULLY BOY

Legitimate marketing email 4

Let's get the Rewards started!

WELCOME, FREDRIK! Joining Starbucks® Rewards means earning free treats, accessing easy ordering and enjoying exclusive benefits. You earn Stars with your orders, and can redeem those Stars for free drinks, food and merch. GET TO KNOW YOUR BENEFITS

With the app, customize your order, pay how you like and enjoy fast and easy pickup.

Come in for 1 free drink or food item on your birthday, every year.

Get unlimited refills on iced or hot brewed coffee, tea and cold brew. Earn free Rewards faster with exclusive offers, games and more.

Start earning Starbucks

CASH OR CARD, YOU EARN STARS 2* per dollar Add funds in the app. MONEY ICON Preload Add money to your digital Starbucks Card. Scan and pay in one step, or order ahead in the app. GIFT CARD ICON Register your gift card Then use it to pay through the app.

1* per dollar Pay as you go. SCAN + CREDIT CARD ICON Scan and pay separately Use cash or credit/debit card at the register. PHONE PAYMENT ICON Save payment in the app Check-out faster by saving a credit/debit card or digital wallets to your account. ALL THE WAYS TO REDEEM YOUR STARS

25* Customize your drink (espresso shot, nondairy milk, syrup and more)

100* Brewed hot or iced coffee or tea, bakery item, packaged snack and more

200* Handcrafted drink (cold brew, lattes and more) or hot breakfast

300* Lunch sandwich, protein box or at-home coffee

400* Select Starbucks® merchandise