Universität Potsdam

Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät

Lehrstuhl Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung

Der Einfluss von Wirtschaftssanktionen auf die Demokratisierung in den Zielländern seit 1945

Codebook

eingereicht von:

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Inhaltsverzeichnis

01 Time // year

Time-identifier
Years: 1945-2010

02 Identifier // id

Unique case-identifier from the excel dataset
Citation: self-coded
Years: 1945-2010

03 Name of country // c_name

Name of country
Years: 1945-2010

04 Country Code // c_code

Country-code from the World Bank Development Indicators
Citation: World Bank (2021)
Years: 1945-2010

05 Country Code // cow_c

Country-code from the Correlates of War Project
Citation: e.g., Barbieri, und Keshk (2016)
Years: 1945-2010

06 COW No. // cow

Country-no. from the Correlates of War Project
Citation: e.g., Barbieri, und Keshk (2016)
Years: 1945-2010

07 Regime Type (with categories for ambiguous cases) // v2x_regime_amb

How can the political regime overall be classified considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles?
  - 0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature.
  - 1: Closed autocracy upper bound: Same as closed autocracy, but the confidence intervals of the multi-party election indicators overlap the level of electoral autocracies.
  - 2: Electoral autocracy lower bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the confidence intervals of one or both multiparty election indicators overlap the level of closed autocracies.
  - 3: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x_polyarchy).
  - 4: Electoral autocracy upper bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the upper bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair and

multiparty elections and the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral democracies.

5: Electoral democracy lower bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the lower bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair, or multiparty or the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral autocracies.

6: Electoral democracy: Free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V- Dem's Electoral Democracy Index, but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index.

7: Electoral democracy upper bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement, and the liberal component index overlap the level of liberal democracies.

8: Liberal democracy lower bound: Same as liberal democracy, but the confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement, and the liberal component index reaches the level of electoral democracies.

9: Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-9).
Source and aggregation: see V-Dem Codebook
Citation: Coppedge et al. (2021)
Years: 1945-2010

08 Liberal Democracy Index // v2x_libdem

To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

Clarification: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).
Source and Aggregation: see V-Dem Codebook
Citation: Coppedge et al. (2021)
Years: 1945-2010

09 Treatment (5 yrs.) // treatment1

Source: self-coded through the TIES dataset

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)
Years: 1945-2010

10 Treatment (5 yrs.) adjusted // treatment2

Source: self-coded through the TIES dataset
Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)
Years: 1945-2010

11 GDP per capita // e_migdppc_c

GDP refers to gross domestic production, understood on a per capita basis.
Source: The Maddison Project Database (2018)
Citation: Bolt, van Zanden (2014, 2020)
Years: 1945-2010

12 Total exports (2020 US$) // e_cow_exports_c

Total exports in 2014 US millions of dollars.
Citation: Barbieri, Keshk, und Pollins (2009); Barbieri, und Keshk (2016)
Years: 1945-2010

13 Total imports (2020 US$) // e_cow_imports_c

Total imports in 2014 US millions of dollars.
Citation: Barbieri, Keshk, und Pollins (2009); Barbieri, und Keshk (2016)
Years: 1945-2010

14 Exports to the USA // cow_exp_us_c

Total Exports from target to the USA
Scale: Continuous
Citation: Barbieri, Keshk, und Pollins (2009); Barbieri, und Keshk (2012)
Years: 1945-2009

15 Imports from the USA // cow_imp_us_c

Total Imports to target from the USA
Scale: Continuous
Citation: Barbieri, Keshk, und Pollins (2009); Barbieri, und Keshk (2012)
Years: 1945-2009

16 Petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals production per capita // e_total_resources_pc_c

Real value of petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals produced per capita.
Scale: Continuous
Citation: Haber und Menaldo (2011)
Years: 1945-2006

17 Political polarization // v2cacamps

Is society polarized into antagonistic, political camps? Here we refer to the extent to

which political differences affect social relationships beyond political discussions. Societies are highly polarized if supporters of opposing political camps are reluctant to engage in friendly interactions, for example, in family functions, civic associations, their free time activities and workplaces

> 0: Not at all. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a friendly manner.
> 1: Mainly not. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a friendly than a hostile manner.
> 2: Somewhat. Supporters of opposing political camps are equally likely to interact in a friendly or hostile manner.
> 3: Yes, to noticeable extent. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a hostile than friendly manner.
> 4: Yes, to a large extent. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a hostile manner.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (-4-4)
Citation: Pemstein et al. (2021)
Years: 1945-2010

18 Country is in an alliance with the USA in a given year // cow_alliance

Coded as 1 if the target is in an alliance with the USA in a given year and 0 otherwise.
Scale: Binary (0/1)
Citation: Gibler (2013)
Years: 1945-2010

19 Target used to be a democracy in the past // tar_dem_pa

Coded as 1 if the target turns to an autocracy after being a democracy according to v2x_regime_amb and zero otherwise.
Scale: Binary (0/1)
Citation: self-coded through v2x_regime_amb
Years: 1945-2010

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