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# **Der Einfluss von Wirtschaftssanktionen auf die Demokratisierung in den Zielländern seit 1945**

## **Codebook**

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**01 Time // year**

Time identifier

Years: 1945-2010

**02 Identifier // id**

Unique case identifier from the excel dataset

Years: 1945-2010

**03 Name of country // c\_name**

Name of country

Years: 1945-2010

**04 Country Code // c\_code**

Citation:

Years: 1945-2010

**05 Country Code // cow\_c**

Citation:

Years: 1945-2010

**06 COW No. // cow**

Citation:

Years: 1945-2010

**07 Regime Type (with categories for ambiguous cases) // v2x\_regime\_amb**

How can the political regime overall be classified considering the competitiveness of access to power (polyarchy) as well as liberal principles?

- 0: Closed autocracy: No multiparty elections for the chief executive or the legislature.
- 1: Closed autocracy upper bound: Same as closed autocracy, but the confidence intervals of the multi-party election indicators overlap the level of electoral autocracies.
- 2: Electoral autocracy lower bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the confidence intervals of one or both multiparty election indicators overlap the level of closed autocracies.
- 3: Electoral autocracy: De-jure multiparty elections for the chief executive and the legislature but failing to achieve that elections are free and fair, or de-facto multiparty, or a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites of polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index (v2x\_polyarchy).
- 4: Electoral autocracy upper bound: Same as electoral autocracy, but the upper bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair and multiparty elections and the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral democracies.
- 5: Electoral democracy lower bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the lower

bounds of the confidence intervals of the indicators for free and fair, or multiparty or the Electoral Democracy Index overlap the level of electoral autocracies.

- 6: Electoral democracy: Free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index, but either access to justice, or transparent law enforcement, or liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive not satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index.
- 7: Electoral democracy upper bound: Same as electoral democracy, but the confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement, and the liberal component index overlap the level of liberal democracies.
- 8: Liberal democracy lower bound: Same as liberal democracy, but the confidence intervals of the indicators for access to justice, and transparent law enforcement, and the liberal component index reaches the level of electoral democracies.
- 9: Liberal democracy: De-facto free and fair multiparty elections and a minimum level of Dahl's institutional prerequisites for polyarchy as measured by V-Dem's Electoral Democracy Index are guaranteed as well as access to justice, transparent law enforcement and the liberal principles of respect for personal liberties, rule of law, and judicial as well as legislative constraints on the executive satisfied as measured by V-Dem's Liberal Component Index.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-9).

Source and aggregation: see V-Dem Codebook

Citation: Coppedge et al. (2021)

Years: 1945-2010

## **08 Liberal Democracy Index // v2x\_libdem**

To what extent is the ideal of liberal democracy achieved?

Clarification: The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. To make this a measure of liberal democracy, the index also takes the level of electoral democracy into account.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (0-1).

Source and Aggregation: see V-Dem Codebook

Citation: Coppedge et al. (2021)

Years: 1945-2010

## **09 Treatment (5 yrs.) // treatment1**

Source: self coded through the TIES dataset

Citation: Bapat, Morgan 2009; Morgan et al. 2014

Years: 1945-2010

**10 Treatment (5 yrs.) adjusted // treatment2**

Source: self coded through the TIES dataset

Citation:

Years: 1945-2010

**11 GDP per capita // e\_migdppe\_c**

GDP refers to gross domestic production, understood on a per capita basis.

Source: The Maddison Project Database (2018)

Citation: Bolt, van Zanden (2014, 2020)

Years: 1945-2010

**12 Total exports (2020 US\$) // e\_cow\_exports\_c**

Total exports in 2014 US millions of dollars.

Citation: Barbieri et al. (2009), Barbieri, Keshk (2016)

Years: 1945-2010

**13 Total imports (2020 US\$) // e\_cow\_imports\_c**

Total imports in 2014 US millions of dollars.

Citation: Barbieri et al. (2009), Barbieri, Keshk (2016)

Years: 1945-2010

**14 Exports to the USA // cow\_exp\_us\_c**

Total Exports from target to the USA

Scale: Continuous

Citation: Barbieri et al. (2009), Barbieri, Keshk (2012)

Years: 1945-2009

**15 Imports from the USA // cow\_imp\_us\_c**

Total Imports to target from the USA

Scale: Continuous

Citation: Barbieri et al. (2009), Barbieri, Keshk (2012)

Years: 1945-2009

**16 Petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals production per capita // e\_total\_resources\_pc\_c**

Real value of petroleum, coal, natural gas, and metals produced per capita.

Scale: Continuous

Citation: Haber, Menaldo (2011).

Years: 1945-2006

**17 Political polarization // v2cacamps**

Is society polarized into antagonistic, political camps? Here we refer to the extent to which political differences affect social relationships beyond political discussions. Societies are highly polarized if supporters of opposing political camps are reluctant to engage in friendly interactions, for example, in family functions, civic associations, their free time activities and workplaces

- 0: Not at all. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a friendly manner.
- 1: Mainly not. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a friendly than a hostile manner.
- 2: Somewhat. Supporters of opposing political camps are equally likely to interact in a friendly or hostile manner.
- 3: Yes, to noticeable extent. Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to interact in a hostile than friendly manner.
- 4: Yes, to a large extent. Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a hostile manner.

Scale: Interval, from low to high (-4-4).

Citation: Pemstein et al. (2021)

Years: 1945-2010

### **18 Country is in an alliance with the USA in a given year // cow\_alliance**

Coded as 1 if the target is in an alliance with the USA in a given year and 0 otherwise.

Scale: Binary (0/1).

Citation: Gibler (2013)

Years: 1945-2010

### **19 Target used to be a democracy in the past // tar\_dem\_pa**

Coded as 1 if the target turns to an autocracy after being a democracy according to v2x\_regime\_amb and zero otherwise.

Scale: Binary (0/1).

Citation: self coded through v2x\_regime\_amb

Years: 1945-2010

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