

Universität Potsdam  
Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät  
Lehrstuhl Methoden der empirischen Sozialforschung



# **Der Einfluss von Wirtschaftssanktionen auf die Demokratisierung in den Zielländern seit 1945**

## **TIES Codebook**

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Prof. Dr. Ulrich Kohler (Erstbegutachtung)  
Dr. Anna Fruhstorfer (Zweitbegutachtung)

eingereicht von:

Felix Hüther      Master Politikwissenschaft, 6. Fachsemester; Matrikelnummer: 777301  
Adresse: Schmollerplatz 17, 12435 Berlin, Telefon: 0049 176 301 62 929  
E-Mail: [huether@uni-potsdam.de](mailto:huether@uni-potsdam.de)

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## Identifier

### **A Case Number // case no**

Implements fixed order for all cases in alphabetical order per country and within each country per year.

Source and aggregation: self-coded

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **B Case ID // caseid**

Case ID given by the TIES Dataset

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **C Targetstate // target**

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **D Double cases // double cases**

Dummy variable that specifies if the target was sanctioned with another sanction of some other type in the first year

Source and aggregation: self-coded

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **E Year of sanction on target // startyear**

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **F Month of sanction // startmonth**

Cases where the explicit month of the beginning is not clear are coded missing

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **G Year of ending // endyear**

Ongoing cases or cases where the explicit ending is not clear are coded missing

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**H Month of end // endmonth**

Ongoing cases or cases where the explicit ending is not clear are coded missing

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**Institutions****I Multilateralism // multi**

0: sanction is implemented by a single sender country

1: sanction is implemented by more than one sender country

Source and aggregation: self-coded via sender states of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**J Institution involved // inst**

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**K EU involved // inst\_eu**

European Union (EU / 1000 / 1830)

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via institution codes of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**L EEC involved // inst\_eec**

European Economic Community (EEC / 1653)

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via institution codes of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**M UN involved // inst\_un**

United Nations (UN / 4400)

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via institution codes of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

#### **N Target State Institution // tar\_inst**

0: target is not part of the institution that issues a threat against it

1: target is part of the institution that issues a threat against it

coded missing if no institution is involved

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **Sender**

#### **O Sender is the United States // usa**

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via sender country codes of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

#### **P Regime type of sender // rt\_sen**

0: autocracy

1: mixed

2: democracy

Coded as 0 if only autocracies are senders in the year of implementation, codes as 1 if democracies and autocracies are senders, codes as 2 if only democracies are senders in the year of implementation, according to variable v2x\_regime\_amb.

Source and aggregation: self-coded via v2x\_regime\_amb of the V-Dem dataset

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014); Coppedge et al. (2021); Lührmann, Tannenberg, und Lindberg (2018)

Years: 1945-2005

#### **Q Regime type of target // rt\_tar**

0: autocracy

1: democracy

Source and aggregation: self-coded via v2x\_regime\_amb of the V-Dem dataset

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014); Coppedge et al. (2021); Lührmann, Tannenberg, und Lindberg (2018)

Years: 1945-2005

## Issue Dummies

These variables are intended to capture as best as possible the issue(s) involved in the threat/imposition of sanctions.

### **R Contain Political Influence // 01\_con\_po\_in**

Sanctions are threatened/imposed to prevent the target from exercising non-military power over a third state, a set of states, or an international institution.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **S Contain Military Behavior // 02\_con\_mi\_be**

Sanctions are threatened alone or in conjunction with other measures for the purposes of preventing military actions by the target state or in response to target military behavior.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **T Destabilize Regime // 03\_de\_re**

Sanctions are threatened/imposed alone or with other measures for the purposes of overthrowing a regime in power.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **U Release Citizens, Property, or Material // 04\_re\_ci\_pro\_ma**

Sanctions are threatened/imposed in response to the seizure of citizens, property, or material by the target state. The seizure need not involve the citizens, property, or material of the sender, but the sender must declare that the sanctions are imposed because of the target's seizure.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005



**V Solve Territorial Dispute // 05\_so\_te\_di**

Sanctions are threatened/imposed to resolve conflicts stemming from territorial disputes between the sanctioning state and the target state, or the target state and a third party. If sanctions are used to terminate a territorial dispute, the issue is coded as 5.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**W Deny Strategic Materials // 06\_de\_stra\_ma**

The goal of the sanctioning state in threatening/imposing sanctions is to deny the target access to all or a particular set of strategic materials. For an incident to qualify under this category, the goal of the sender must be to prevent the target from enhancing its political or military capabilities through the acquisition of a certain good. Examples of strategic materials include, but are not limited to, uranium, advanced weaponry, rocket technology, or supercomputers.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**X Retaliate for Alliance or Alignment Choice // 07\_re\_al\_al**

Sanctions are threatened in response to the possibility or the actual joining of an alliance or alignment between the target state and a third party.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**Y Improve Human Rights // 08\_imp\_hu\_ri**

Sanctions are threatened to induce the target state to end repressive laws, policies, or actions. Sanctions may also be taken to compel the target state to respect individual rights.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**Z End Weapons/Materials Proliferation // 09\_en\_ma\_pro**

Sanctions are threatened/imposed to prevent the target state from supplying weapons or materials to a third-party client.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AA Terminate Support of Non-State Actors // 10\_te\_su\_ac**

Sanctions are threatened/imposed to compel the target state to end its support for a non-state actor. Examples may include ending support for a transnational terrorist organization or ending support for a faction in a civil war.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AB Deter or Punish Drug Trafficking Practices // 11\_de\_dt\_pra**

Sanctions are threatened/imposed to compel the target to adopt alternative drug policies, stricter drug policies, stricter drug enforcement of the drug trade, or as a punishment for failing to adopt acceptable drug policies or practices.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AC Improve Environmental Policies // 12\_imp\_en\_po**

Sanctions are threatened/imposed to compel the target to adopt more stringent environmental controls. Examples of environmental issues include, but are not limited to, protection of wildlife, reduction of emissions, adoption of cleaner technology, or control of acid rain.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AD Trade Practices // 13\_tra\_pra**

Sanctions are threatened to compel the target state to alter a trade practice or to punish a target state for engaging in a particular practice. Examples may include sanctions to end protectionist measures, tariffs, trade restrictions, or devaluations. If the goal of the sender is to affect trading between the sender and the target, the issue should be coded as Trade Practices.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AE Implement Economic Reform // 14\_imp\_ec\_re**

Sanctions are threatened to compel the target state to enact specific economic reforms. Examples may include the implementation of IMF reforms, liberalize a controlled economy, or enact specific economic legislation.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AF Other // 15\_ot**

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via issues of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AG Threat // sanc\_th**

0: sanction was not threatened

1: sanction was threatened

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**Sanction Type Threat Dummies****AH Total Economic Embargo // 01\_tee\_th**

The sender(s) stop the flow of all economic exchange to and from the target state.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threats of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

#### **AI Partial Economic Embargo // 02\_pee\_th**

The sender(s) stop the flow of certain commodities or services to and from the target state. For example, a sender may ban all exchanges in military goods to and from a target. For a case to qualify as a partial embargo, some exchange must still be allowed while a sector's trade must be frozen.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threats of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

#### **AJ Import Restriction // 03\_ir\_th**

The sender(s) refuses to allow or places a restriction on a certain good or set of goods to be imported from the target state. Import restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that import restrictions only restrict the flow of goods into the sender(s). While the sender does not restrict the flow of goods to the target, the sender may prevent target commodities from being traded in its home markets or impose tariffs or duties on target commodities.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threats of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

#### **AK Export Restriction // 04\_er\_th**

The sender(s) refuses to allow certain goods or services to be exported to the target state. Export restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that export restrictions only restrict the flow of goods to the target from the sender(s). Although the sender places no restriction on goods from the target for import, the sender does not allow a certain good or set of goods to flow out of the sender(s)' forms to the target. An example of such a restriction is an export control on dual use technology.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threats of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AL Blockade // 05\_b\_th**

The sender(s) attempts to physically prevent all states from engaging in economic transactions with the target state. Such actions may be enforced physically by the sender(s) military. An alternative is for the sender to threaten any state that engages in transactions with the target with similar economic sanctions.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threats of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AM Asset Freeze // 06\_af\_th**

The sender(s) partially or completely seize all assets of the target state under the sender(s)' jurisdiction.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threats of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AN Termination of Foreign Aid // 07\_tofa\_th**

The sender(s) reduces or ends foreign aid or loans if the target state does not comply with the sender(s) demands.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threats of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AO Travel Ban // 08\_tb\_th**

The sender(s) ceases allowing an individual, group, or citizenry of the target country to enter the territory of the sender(s).

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threats of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AP Suspension of Economic Agreement // 09\_soea\_th**

The sender(s) threaten to cancel partially or completely or void previous economic arrangements or contracts between the sender(s) and the target state.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threats of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

#### **AQ Other // 10\_o\_th**

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threats of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

#### **AR Imposition // imp**

0: sanction was not imposed

1: sanction was imposed

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threats of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **Sanction Type Dummies**

#### **AS Total Economic Embargo // 01\_tee\_imp**

The sender(s) stop the flow of all economic exchange to and from the target state

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via sanction types of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

#### **AT Partial Economic Embargo // 02\_pee\_imp**

The sender(s) stop the flow of certain commodities or services to and from the target state. For example, a sender may ban all exchanges in military goods to and from a target. For a case to qualify as a partial embargo, some exchange must still be allowed while a sector's trade must be frozen.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via sanction types of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AU Import Restriction // 03\_ir\_imp**

The sender(s) refuses to allow or places a restriction on a certain good or set of goods to be imported from the target state. Import restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that import restrictions only restrict the flow of goods into the sender(s). While the sender does not restrict the flow of goods to the target, the sender may prevent target commodities from being traded in its home markets or impose tariffs or duties on target commodities.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via sanction types of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AV Export Restriction // 04\_er\_imp**

The sender(s) refuses to allow certain goods or services to be exported to the target state. Export restrictions differ from partial embargoes in that export restrictions only restrict the flow of goods to the target from the sender(s). Although the sender places no restriction on goods from the target for import, the sender does not allow a certain good or set of goods to flow out of the sender(s)' forms to the target. An example of such a restriction is an export control on dual use technology.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via sanction types of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AW Blockade // 05\_b\_imp**

The sender(s) attempts to physically prevent all states from engaging in economic transactions with the target state. Such actions may be enforced physically by the sender(s) military. An alternative is for the sender to threaten any state that engages in transactions with the target with similar economic sanctions.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via sanction types of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**AX Asset Freeze // 06\_af\_imp**

The sender(s) partially or completely seize all assets of the target state under the sender(s)' jurisdiction.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via sanction types of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)  
Years: 1945-2005

#### **AY Termination of Foreign Aid // 07\_tofa\_imp**

The sender(s) reduces or ends foreign aid or loans if the target state does not comply with the sender(s) demands.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via sanction types of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)  
Years: 1945-2005

#### **AZ Travel Ban // 08\_tb\_imp**

The sender(s) ceases allowing an individual, group, or citizenry of the target country to enter the territory of the sender(s).

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via sanction types of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)  
Years: 1945-2005

#### **BA Suspension of Economic Agreement // 09\_soea\_imp**

The sender(s) threaten to cancel partially or completely or void previous economic arrangements or contracts between the sender(s) and the target state.

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via sanction types of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)  
Years: 1945-2005

#### **BB Other // 10\_o\_imp**

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via sanction types of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)  
Years: 1945-2005

#### **BC Threat Imposition combined**

0: sanction was threatened

1: sanction was threatened and later implemented

2: sanction was only implemented



Source and aggregation: self-coded via threat and imposition variables of the Original TIES dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **BD Sender commitment // scommit**

- 1: Weak: A statement qualifies as weak if the sender's threat indicates that if the target state fails to alter a certain behaviour, the sender will consider numerous possible options, including sanctions. An example of a very weak commitment is as follows, "French trade policy is unacceptable. Germany will consider study various political and economic courses of actions to address this problem."
- 2: Moderate: A statement qualifies as moderate if the sender's threat indicates that if the target state fails to alter a certain behaviour; the sender will consider sanctions as a possibility. For a commitment to be considered moderate, some form of sanctions must be specifically mentioned as a possible response. An example of a moderate commitment is as follows, "French trade policy is unacceptable. Germany will consider increasing tariffs to address this problem."
- 3: Strong: A statement qualifies as strong if an "if...then" statement can be identified. An "if...then" statement means that the sender is explicit that if a certain behaviour is not altered, then a form of economic sanctions will be imposed. An example is a strong commitment is as follows, "French trade policy is unacceptable. If such policies continue, Germany will increase tariffs to address this problem."

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Morgan et al. (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

## **Threatened Targeted Interest Dummies**

### **BE General // 01\_gen**

0: no

1: yes

The costs of the sanction will be absorbed the entire target state on a roughly equal basis.

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threatened targeted interest variable of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **BF Regime Leadership // 02\_re\_le**

0: no

1: yes

The sanction is designed to impose costs only on the leaders of the target currently in power. The sanction does not affect those citizens within the target state that are not a member of the target's governmental apparatus.

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threatened targeted interest variable of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

#### **BG Business Interest // 03\_bu\_in**

0: no

1: yes

The sanction is designed to target a particular industry or industries of the target state. While the sanction imposes costs on this industry, the sender's sanctions will not affect other industries, political groups, or the general population within the target state.

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threatened targeted interest variable of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

#### **BH Political Interest // 04\_po\_in**

0: no

1: yes

The sanction is designed to target a particular political interest group or set of interest groups in the target state. While the sanction imposes costs on this group or groups, the sender's sanctions will not affect other interest groups, industries, or the population in general.

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threatened targeted interest variable of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

#### **BI Military // 05\_mil**

0: no

1: yes

The sanction is designed to impose costs on the military of the target state. The action will deny the military weapons, funds, spare parts, or other necessary equipment. While the sanction could impose costs on the military, it does not impose costs on other economic or political interests, nor do it harm the target's population in general.

Source and aggregation: self-coded via threatened targeted interest variable of the original Ties dataset, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual, see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

#### **BJ Anticipated Target Economic Costs // an\_tar\_ec\_cost**

- 1: Minor: An episode should be coded as minor if no evidence exists that the health of the target's economy will be impacted by the actions of the sender.
- 2: Major: An episode should be coded as major if evidence exists that the sender's sanctions will impose significant macroeconomic difficulties on the health of the target economy. Evidence of major effects may include abnormal changes

(increases of over 5%) in the inflation or unemployment rate of the target economy or drastic reductions in trade relationships.

- 3: Severe: An episode should be coded as severe if evidence exists that the sender's sanctions have the potential to halt the ability of the target's economy to function. Evidence of a severe threats include reports that a country may lose the ability to obtain critical supplies (such as food, water, electricity, oil), increases the mortality rate, or completely loses the ability to trade with foreign governments.

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **BK Target Economic Costs // tar\_ec\_cost**

This variable is intended to measure the impact of sanctions imposition ex post.

- 1: Minor
- 2: Major
- 3: Severe

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Morgan et al. (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **BL Anticipated Sender Economic Costs // an\_sen\_ec\_cost**

- 1: Minor: An episode should be coded as minor if no evidence exists that the health of the target's economy will be impacted by the actions of the sender.
- 2: Major: An episode should be coded as major if evidence exists that the sender's sanctions will impose significant macroeconomic difficulties on the health of the target economy. Evidence of major effects may include abnormal changes (increases of over 5%) in the inflation or unemployment rate of the target economy or drastic reductions in trade relationships.
- 3: Severe: An episode should be coded as severe if evidence exists that the sender's sanctions have the potential to halt the ability of the target's economy to function. Evidence of a severe threats include reports that a country may lose the ability to obtain critical supplies (such as food, water, electricity, oil), increases the mortality rate, or completely loses the ability to trade with foreign governments.

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

### **BM Sender Economic Costs // sen\_ec\_cost**

This variable is intended to measure the impact of sanctions imposition ex post.

- 1: Minor
- 2: Major
- 3: Severe

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**BN Outcome // outcome**

- 1: Partial Acquiescence by Target to threat: The target state agrees to some of the demands of the sender(s) and adjusts only these behaviors accordingly while continuing the engage in some of the offensive behavior prior to imposition of sanctions.
- 2: Complete Acquiescence by Target to threat: The target state agrees to all the demands of the sender(s) and adjusts its behavior accordingly prior to the imposition of sanctions
- 3: Capitulation by the Sender(s) in threat stage: Although the sender threatens sanctions, the sender refuses to impose sanctions despite the refusal of the target to alter its behavior.
- 4: Stalemate in the Threat Stage: Although the issue remains unresolved following the sender's threat, the target does not alter its behavior and the sender does not impose sanctions.
- 5: Negotiated Settlement: The target state agrees to alter some of its behavior in exchange for actions taken by the sender(s) prior to the imposition of sanctions. The sender(s) must perform some action in exchange for the target state's compliance for this variable to be coded as 1.
- 6: Partial Acquiescence by the Target State following sanctions imposition: The target state agrees to some of the demands of the sender(s) and adjusts only these behaviors accordingly while continuing the engage in some of the offensive behavior after sanctions are imposed.
- 7: Total Acquiescence by Target State following sanctions imposition: The target state agrees to all the demands of the sender(s) and adjusts its behavior accordingly after sanctions are imposed.
- 8: Capitulation by Sender after Imposition: The sender state removes sanctions despite the refusal of the target to alter its behavior.
- 9: Stalemate after Sanctions Imposition: Sanctions are imposed by the sender(s), but the target does not alter its behavior.
- 10: Negotiated Settlement following sanctions imposition: The target state agrees to alter some of its behavior in exchange for actions taken by the sender(s) following the imposition of sanctions. The sender(s) must perform some action in exchange for the target state's compliance for this variable to be coded as 1.

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**BO Settlement Nature for Sender // set\_nat\_sen**

On a scale of 1-10, how did the sender fare because of the threat/imposition of sanctions?

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**BP Settlement Nature for Target // set\_nat\_tar**

On a scale of 1-10, how did the target fare because of the threat/imposition of sanctions?

Source and aggregation: see TIES Data 4.0 Users' Manual

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)  
Years: 1945-2005

**BQ Severity of sanctions // sev\_o\_san**

0: no additional exposure to sanctions

1: exposed to one or more additional sanctions

Variable will be coded as one for all yearly observations in the given time-period even though additional sanctions might have ended before. Additional sanction here including also sanctions that have started before the actual sanction and are still in place.

If a country becomes a democracy in the observation period, the variable is still coded as 0.

Source and aggregation: self-coded through used cases

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014)

Years: 1945-2005

**BR Target used to be a democracy in the past // tar\_dem\_pa**

0: no

1: yes

Source and aggregation: self-coded via v2x\_regime\_amb of the V-Dem dataset

Citation: Bapat, Morgan (2009); Morgan, Bapat, und Kobayashi (2014); Coppedge et al. (2021); Lührmann, Tannenberg, und Lindberg (2018)

Years: 1945-2005

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