



HighStreetMarket – NFT Pool

Smart Contract Security Audit

Prepared by: Halborn

Date of Engagement: December 21st, 2021 – December 22nd, 2021

Visit: Halborn.com

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DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

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0.2	Document Updates	12/21/2021	Roberto Reigada
0.3	Draft Review	12/23/2021	Gabi Urrutia
1.0	Remediation Plan	12/27/2021	Roberto Reigada
1.1	Remediation Plan Review	12/27/2021	Gabi Urrutia

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW



1.1 INTRODUCTION

HighStreetMarket engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their [HighStreetNftPool.sol](#) smart contract beginning on December 21st, 2021 and ending on December 22nd, 2021. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contract provided in the Github repository [Highstreet-World/StakingPool](#)

1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided a week for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to audit the security of the smart contract. The security engineer a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn identified some security risks that were addressed by [HighStreetMarket team](#).

1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy regarding the scope of this audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the bridge code and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose
- Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough
- Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions ([solgraph](#))
- Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes
- Manual testing by custom scripts
- Scanning of solidity files for vulnerabilities, security hotspots or bugs. ([MythX](#))
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. ([Slither](#))
- Testnet deployment ([Brownie](#), [Remix IDE](#))

RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the **LIKELIHOOD** of a security incident and the **IMPACT** should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest likelihood or impact.

RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 - Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 - High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 - Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 - Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 - Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 - May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 - May cause a significant level of impact or loss.

- 3 - May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 - May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
----------	------	--------	-----	---------------

- 10 - CRITICAL
- 9 - 8 - HIGH
- 7 - 6 - MEDIUM
- 5 - 4 - LOW
- 3 - 1 - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

1.4 SCOPE

IN-SCOPE:

The security assessment was scoped to the following [smart contract](#):

- [HighStreetNftPool.sol](#)

Commit ID: [8f88e62d1c88711f83c233cffe5d5d66d1cb1589](#)

OUT-OF-SCOPE:

Other smart contracts in the repository, external libraries and economical attacks.

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	0	0	0	5

LIKELIHOOD

IMPACT

(HAL-01) (HAL-02) (HAL-03) (HAL-04) (HAL-05)				

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDATION DATE
HAL-01 - AMOUNT PARAMETER CAN BE REMOVED	Informational	SOLVED - 12/23/2021
HAL-02 - EMERGENCYWITHDRAW FUNCTION DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY UTILITY	Informational	SOLVED - 12/23/2021
HAL-03 - SOME FUNCTIONS CAN BE REMOVED	Informational	SOLVED - 12/23/2021
HAL-04 - GAS OVER-CONSUMPTION IN LOOPS	Informational	SOLVED - 12/23/2021
HAL-05 - UNNECESSARY INITIALIZATION OF UINT256 VARIABLES TO 0	Informational	SOLVED - 12/23/2021



FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS



3.1 (HAL-01) AMOUNT PARAMETER CAN BE REMOVED – INFORMATIONAL

Description:

The contract `HighStreetNftPool` contains the function `unstakeReward(uint256 _depositId, uint256 _amount)` which allows a user to unstake a specified amount of rewards. The `_amount` parameter here does not provide any utility, as there is no incentive for the user to just claim a part of his total rewards.

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to remove the `_amount` parameter from the `unstakeReward()` and `_unstakeReward()` functions. The full reward amount should be sent to the user instead. This will simplify the logic of the functions, saving some gas.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The `HighStreetMarket` team solved the issue in the commit ID [079f3c357f653d57452059a13d66ec994c80753a](#)

3.2 (HAL-02) EMERGENCYWITHDRAW FUNCTION DOES NOT PROVIDE ANY UTILITY - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

The contract `HighStreetNftPool` contains the functions `emergencyWithdraw()` and `_emergencyWithdraw()`:

Listing 1: `emergencyWithdraw` - external (Lines 441)

```
439 function emergencyWithdraw(uint256[] calldata _listIds) external
    nonReentrant {
440     // delegate call to an internal function
441     _emergencyWithdraw(msg.sender, _listIds);
442 }
```

Listing 2: `emergencyWithdraw` - internal

```
639 function _emergencyWithdraw(
640     address _staker,
641     uint256[] calldata _listIds
642 ) internal virtual {
643     require(_listIds.length > 0, "zero amount");
644     // limit the max nft transfer.
645     require(_listIds.length <= 40, "length exceeds limitation");
646
647     // get a link to user data struct, we will write to it later
648     User storage user = users[_staker];
649     uint16[] memory list = user.list;
650     uint256 amount = _listIds.length;
651     require(user.tokenAmount >= amount, "amount exceeds stake");
652
653     // update smart contract state
654     _sync();
655
656     // update user record
657     user.tokenAmount -= amount;
658     user.subYieldRewards = tokenToReward(user.tokenAmount,
        yieldRewardsPerToken);
```

```

659     usersLockingAmount = usersLockingAmount - amount;
660
661     uint256 index;
662     uint256[] memory nfts = new uint256[](_listIds.length);
663     for(uint i =0; i < _listIds.length; i++) {
664         index = _listIds[i];
665         if(UINT_16_MAX == list[index]) {
666             nfts[i] = 0;
667         } else {
668             nfts[i] = uint256(list[index]);
669         }
670         IERC721(poolToken).safeTransferFrom(address(this), _staker
        , nfts[i]);
671         if (user.tokenAmount != 0) {
672             delete user.list[index];
673         }
674     }
675
676     if (user.tokenAmount == 0) {
677         delete user.list;
678     }
679
680     emit EmergencyWithdraw(msg.sender, amount, nfts);
681 }

```

The function `_emergencyWithdraw()` contains the same code as the `_unstake()` function, and it is not providing any extra functionality. Furthermore, there is no locking applied to the staked NFTs which means that the user has no restrictions to retrieve them. There is no need for any kind of `emergencyWithdraw` function in the smart contract.

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to remove the `emergencyWithdraw()` and `_emergencyWithdraw()` functions.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The `HighStreetMarket team` solved the issue in the commit ID `a9e1c25ec2de219e1f66c31b51d7b7a7997b15b3`

3.3 (HAL-03) SOME FUNCTIONS CAN BE REMOVED - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

The contract `HighStreetNftPool` contains the function `mintYieldTo()`:

Listing 3: `mintYieldTo`

```
689 function mintYieldTo(address _to, uint256 _amount) internal {
690     // transfer HIGH tokens as required
691     transferHighToken(_to, _amount);
692
693     emit MintYield(_to, _amount);
694 }
```

This `mintYieldTo()` function, all it does is calling another internal function: `transferHighToken()`:

Listing 4: `transferHighToken`

```
842 function transferHighToken(address _to, uint256 _value) internal {
843     // just delegate call to the target
844     SafeERC20.safeTransfer(IERC20(HIGH), _to, _value);
845 }
```

At the same time, the `transferHighToken()` function just calls the `SafeERC20.safeTransfer(IERC20(HIGH), _to, _value);` function.

`mintYieldTo()` and `transferHighToken()` can be removed and instead `SafeERC20.safeTransfer` can be used directly to save some gas.

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to remove the `mintYieldTo()` and `transferHighToken()` functions and instead use directly `SafeERC20.safeTransfer`.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The `HighStreetMarket team` solved the issue in the commit ID `8c6269aff32496a7e75630a63abbf80f5015d18a`

3.4 (HAL-04) GAS OVER-CONSUMPTION IN LOOPS – INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In all the loops, the counter variable is incremented using `i++`. It is known that, in loops, using `++i` costs less gas per iteration than `i++`.

Code Location:

HighStreetNftPool.sol

- Line 307: `for(uint256 i = pageStart; i < pageEnd; i++){`
- Line 350: `for(uint256 i = pageStart; i < pageEnd; i++){`
- Line 520: `for(uint i =0; i < _nftIds.length; i++){`
- Line 571: `for(uint i =0; i < _listIds.length; i++){`
- Line 663: `for(uint i =0; i < _listIds.length; i++){`

Proof of Concept:

For example, based in the following test contract:

Listing 5: Test.sol

```
1 //SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2 pragma solidity 0.8.9;
3
4 contract test {
5     function postiincrement(uint256 iterations) public {
6         for (uint256 i = 0; i < iterations; i++) {
7             }
8     }
9     function preiincrement(uint256 iterations) public {
10        for (uint256 i = 0; i < iterations; ++i) {
11            }
12        }
13 }
```

We can see the difference in the gas costs:

```
>>> test_contract.postiincrement(1)
Transaction sent: 0x1ecede6b109b707786d3685bd71dd9f22dc389957653036ca04c4cd2e72c5e0b
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 44
test.postiincrement confirmed Block: 13622335 Gas used: 21620 (0.32%)

<Transaction '0x1ecede6b109b707786d3685bd71dd9f22dc389957653036ca04c4cd2e72c5e0b'>
>>> test_contract.preiincrement(1)
Transaction sent: 0x205f09a4d2268de4c1a40f35bb2ec2847bf2ab8d584909b42c71a022b047614a
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 45
test.preiincrement confirmed Block: 13622336 Gas used: 21593 (0.32%)

<Transaction '0x205f09a4d2268de4c1a40f35bb2ec2847bf2ab8d584909b42c71a022b047614a'>
>>> test_contract.postiincrement(10)
Transaction sent: 0x98c04430526a59balecf947c114b62666a4417165947d31bf300cd6ae68328033
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 46
test.postiincrement confirmed Block: 13622337 Gas used: 22673 (0.34%)

<Transaction '0x98c04430526a59balecf947c114b62666a4417165947d31bf300cd6ae68328033'>
>>> test_contract.preiincrement(10)
Transaction sent: 0xf060d04714eff8482a828342414d5a20be9958c822d42860e7992aba20e1de05
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 47
test.preiincrement confirmed Block: 13622338 Gas used: 22601 (0.34%)

<Transaction '0xf060d04714eff8482a828342414d5a20be9958c822d42860e7992aba20e1de05'>
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to use `++i` instead of `i++` to increment the value of an `uint` variable inside a loop. This is not applicable outside of loops.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The `HighStreetMarket` team solved the issue in the commit ID `a4017a4a5eedb24d3792744cf71c5d0dcf5394c`

3.5 (HAL-05) UNNECESSARY INITIALIZATION OF UINT256 VARIABLES TO 0 - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

As `i` is an `uint`, it is already initialized to 0. `uint i = 0` reassigns the 0 to `i` which wastes gas.

Code Location:

HighStreetNftPool.sol

- Line 519: `uint256 addedAmount = 0;`
- Line 520: `for(uint i =0; i < _nftIds.length; i++){`
- Line 571: `for(uint i =0; i < _listIds.length; i++){`
- Line 663: `for(uint i =0; i < _listIds.length; i++){`

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to not initialize `i` variable to 0 to save some gas. For example:

```
for(uint i; i < _nftIds.length; i++){
```

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The `HighStreetMarket team` solved the issue in the commit ID [8f715b12b6fcc4ce25f27fc2357ab268a1c35472](#)



AUTOMATED TESTING



AUTOMATED TESTING

22

```

Pragma version^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/Utils/SafeERC20.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721Receiver.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/Utils/ERC721Holder.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.0 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/Utils/Address.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version0.4.5 (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#8) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
solid-0.8.0 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/Utils/Address.sol#44-59):
- (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/Utils/Address.sol#57)
Low level call in Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/Utils/Address.sol#122-133):
- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: value}(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/Utils/Address.sol#123)
Low level call in Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/Utils/Address.sol#151-160):
- (success,returndata) = target.staticCall(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/Utils/Address.sol#153)
Low level call in Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/Utils/Address.sol#178-187):
- (success,returndata) = target.delegateCall(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/Utils/Address.sol#185)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls

Parameter HighStreetMfPool.pending160Rewards(address)_stake (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#180) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.balanceOf(address)_user (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#221) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.getMfId(address,uint256)_user (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#233) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.getMfId(address,uint256)_index (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#238) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.getMfIdLength(address)_user (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#255) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.getDeposit(address,uint256)_user (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#265) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.getDeposit(address,uint256)_depositId (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#269) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.getDepositLength(address)_user (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#282) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.getDepositBatch(address,uint256)_user (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#296) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.getDepositBatch(address,uint256)_pageId (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#296) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.getDepositBatchLength(address)_user (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#321) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.getMfBatch(address,uint256)_user (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#330) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.getMfBatch(address,uint256)_pageId (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#335) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.getMfBatchLength(address)_user (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#373) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.state(uint256[])_mfIds (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#388) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.unstake(uint256[])_listIds (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#405) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.unstakeReward(uint256,uint256)_depositId (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#423) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.unstakeReward(uint256,uint256)_amount (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#423) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.unstakeReward(uint256,uint256)_to (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#489) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.minYieldTo(address,uint256)_amount (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#489) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.minYieldTo(address,uint256)_token (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#493) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.tokenReward(uint256,uint256)_rewardPerToken (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#787) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.rewardPerToken(uint256,uint256)_reward (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#809) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.rewardPerToken(uint256,uint256)_rewardPerToken (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#809) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.transferMfToken(address,uint256)_to (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#842) is not in mixedCase
Parameter HighStreetMfPool.transferMfToken(address,uint256)_value (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#842) is not in mixedCase
Variable HighStreetMfPool.HIGH (contracts/HighStreetMfPool.sol#43) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

onERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes) should be declared external:
- ERC721Holder.onERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/Utils/ERC721Holder.sol#19-24)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external

```

- No major issues found by Slither. All the reentrancies flagged are false positives. All the external functions are protected with the **nonReentrant** modifier.

4.2 AUTOMATED SECURITY SCAN

Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues, and to identify low-hanging fruits on the targets for this engagement. Among the tools used was MythX, a security analysis service for Ethereum smart contracts. MythX performed a scan on all the contracts and sent the compiled results to the analyzers to locate any vulnerabilities.

MythX results:

HighStreetNftPool.sol

Report for contracts/HighStreetNftPool.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/a6c05344-9d68-457f-b8de-021cf4b2a0b7>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
198	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered
199	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
202	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
210	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered
237	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
271	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
297	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
298	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
298	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
301	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered
303	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered
307	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
308	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
308	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered
325	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
325	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered
325	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Compiler-rewritable "<uint> - 1" discovered
325	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
339	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
340	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
340	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
343	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered
345	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered
350	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
351	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
353	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
353	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered
355	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered
355	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access

357	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
357	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
375	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
375	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
375	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Compiler-rewritable "<uint> - 1" discovered
375	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
427	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
491	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
520	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
521	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
522	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
526	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
528	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
531	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered
533	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered
565	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered
567	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
571	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "++" discovered
572	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
573	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
574	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
576	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
578	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
580	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
610	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
617	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
618	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
620	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered
624	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered
657	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "--" discovered
659	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
664	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
665	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
666	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
668	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
670	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
672	(SWC-110) Assert Violation	Unknown	Out of bounds array access
719	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "-" discovered
722	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
725	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered
763	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+" discovered
768	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "+=" discovered
789	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
789	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
802	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "/" discovered
802	(SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow	Unknown	Arithmetic operation "*" discovered
824	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomness.

- Integer Overflows and Underflows flagged by MythX are false positives, as the contract is using Solidity 0.8.10 version. After the Solidity version 0.8.0 Arithmetic operations revert to underflow and overflow by default.
- Assert violations are false positives.

- `block.number` is used but not as a source of randomness.



THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING

// HALBORN

