



# GlobeDX GDT

## Smart Contract Security Audit

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## DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

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1.0	Final Version	04/23/2021	Gabi Urrutia
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# EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW



## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

The GlobeDX engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their Smart contract beginning on April 18th, 2021 and ending April 23th, 2021. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contract `GDT.sol`. An audit of the security risk and implications regarding the changes introduced by the development team at `GlobeDX` prior to its production release shortly following the assessments deadline.

Though this security audit's outcome is satisfactory, only the most essential aspects were tested and verified to achieve objectives and deliverables set in the scope due to time and resource constraints. It is essential to note the use of the best practices for secure smart-contract development.

## 1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided one week for the engagement and assigned two full time security engineers to audit the security of the smart contract. The security engineers are blockchain and smart-contract security experts with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit to achieve the following:

- Ensure that smart contract functions are intended.
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.

In summary, Halborn identified few security risks, and recommends performing further testing to validate extended safety and correctness in context to the whole of contract. External threats, such as economic attacks, oracle attacks, and inter-contract functions and calls should be validated for expected logic and state.

## 1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose.
- Smart Contract manual code read and walkthrough.
- Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions([solgraph](#))
- Manual Assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions.([Slither](#))
- Testnet deployment ([Truffle](#), [Ganache](#))

### RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the **LIKELIHOOD** of a security incident, and the **IMPACT** should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. It's quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that was used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest likelihood or impact.

### RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 - Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 - High probability of an incident occurring.



- 3 - Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 - Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 - Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

#### RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 - May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 - May cause a significant level of impact or loss.
- 3 - May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 - May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
----------	------	--------	-----	---------------

- 10 - CRITICAL
- 9 - 8 - HIGH
- 7 - 6 - MEDIUM
- 5 - 4 - LOW
- 3 - 1 - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

## 1.4 SCOPE

IN-SCOPE:

Code related to `GDT.sol` smart contract.

Specific commit of contract:

48f1a087e067c32932e5bdc42ec201f81a03de1

## 2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	1	1	1	4

### LIKELIHOOD

IMPACT

			(HAL-01)	
	(HAL-03)	(HAL-02)		
(HAL-04) (HAL-05) (HAL-06) (HAL-07)				

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDIATION DATE
IMPROPER ACCESS CONTROL POLICY	High	SOLVED: 04/27/2021
LACK OF OVERFLOW PROTECTION	Medium	SOLVED: 04/27/2021
LACK OF ADDRESS CONTROL ON THE FUNCTIONS	Low	SOLVED: 04/27/2021
OUTDATED OPENZEPELIN CONTRACT	Low	RISK ACCEPTED: 04/27/2021
PRAGMA VERSION	Informational	RISK ACCEPTED: 04/27/2021
POSSIBLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS	Informational	SOLVED: 04/27/2021
NO TEST COVERAGE	Informational	SOLVED: 04/27/2021
STATIC ANALYSIS		
AUTOMATED SECURITY SCAN RESULTS		



# FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS



## 3.1 (HAL-01) IMPROPER ACCESS CONTROL POLICY - HIGH

### Description:

Implementing a valid access control policy is an essential step in maintaining the security of a smart-contract. All the features of the smart contract, such as add/remove roles and upgrade contracts are given by Access Control. For instance, Ownership is the most common form of Access Control. In other words, the owner of a contract (the account that deployed it by default) can do some administrative tasks on it. Additional authorization levels are needed to implement the least privilege principle, also known as least-authority, which ensures only authorized processes, users, or programs can access the necessary resources or information. The ownership role is useful in a simple system, but more complex projects require the use of more roles by using Role-based access control.

In the `GDT.sol` contract, there is no authorization check on the `burn` function. Each user can burn their own balance on the related function.

### Code Location:

`GDT.sol` Lines #56-66

```
56     function burn(uint256 amount)
57     public
58     returns (bool success)
59     {
60         uint256 accountBalance = balanceOf[msg.sender];
61         require(accountBalance >= amount, "ERC20: burn amount exceeds balance");
62         balanceOf[msg.sender] = accountBalance - amount;
63         totalSupply -= amount;
64         emit Transfer(msg.sender, address(0), amount);
65         return true;
66     }
```

`GDT.sol` Lines #56-66




Figure 1: Any user can burn their own balance.

#### Risk Level:

Likelihood - 4

Impact - 4

#### Recommendation:

It's recommended to use role-based access control based on the principle of least privilege to lock permissioned functions using different role. In the other words, A white-listing should be applied on the **burn** function via access control policy. The access control policy of function may govern who can burn their balances.

Reference: <https://www.cyberark.com/what-is/least-privilege/>

#### Remediation Plan:

Solved: **GlobeDX** team included the initial address check in the function.

## 3.2 (HAL-02) LACK OF OVERFLOW PROTECTION – MEDIUM

### Description:

In the `GDT.sol` functions, The contract does not perform any precondition checks on the function arguments.

### Code Location:

#### `GDT.sol` Lines #20-27

```
20 ▾ function transfer(address to, uint256 value) public returns (bool success) {
21     require(to != address(0), "ERC20: transfer to the zero address");
22     require(balanceOf[msg.sender] >= value, "ERC20: insufficient balance for transfer");
23     balanceOf[msg.sender] -= value; // deduct from sender's balance
24     balanceOf[to] += value; // add to recipient's balance
25     emit Transfer(msg.sender, to, value);
26     return true;
27 }
28
```

#### `GDT.sol` Lines #42-54

```
42 function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 value)
43     public
44     returns (bool success)
45 {
46     require(to != address(0), "ERC20: transferFrom to the zero address");
47     require(value <= balanceOf[from], "ERC20: insufficient balance for transferFrom");
48     require(value <= allowance[from][msg.sender], "ERC20: unauthorized transferFrom");
49     balanceOf[from] -= value;
50     balanceOf[to] += value;
51     allowance[from][msg.sender] -= value;
52     emit Transfer(from, to, value);
53     return true;
54 }
55
```

#### `GDT.sol` Lines #56-66

```
56 function burn(uint256 amount)
57     public
58     returns (bool success)
59 {
60     uint256 accountBalance = balanceOf[msg.sender];
61     require(accountBalance >= amount, "ERC20: burn amount exceeds balance");
62     balanceOf[msg.sender] = accountBalance - amount;
63     totalSupply -= amount;
64     emit Transfer(msg.sender, address(0), amount);
65     return true;
66 }
67
```



## GDT.sol Lines #68-77

```

68     function increaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 addedValue)
69         public
70         returns (bool)
71     {
72         uint256 currentAllowance = allowance[msg.sender][spender];
73         uint256 newAllowance = currentAllowance + addedValue;
74         require(newAllowance >= currentAllowance, "ERC20: invalid allowance increase");
75         approve(spender, newAllowance);
76         return true;
77     }
78

```

## GDT.sol Lines #79-87

```

79     function decreaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 subtractedValue)
80         public
81         returns (bool)
82     {
83         uint256 currentAllowance = allowance[msg.sender][spender];
84         require(currentAllowance >= subtractedValue, "ERC20: decreased allowance below zero");
85         approve(spender, currentAllowance - subtractedValue);
86         return true;
87     }
88

```

## Risk Level:

Likelihood - 3

Impact - 3

## Recommendation:

A contract should consider using the OpenZeppelin SafeMath library on the decimal calculations and should perform a precondition check to prevent an overflow.

Reference: <https://docs.openzeppelin.com/contracts/2.x/api/math>

## Remediation Plan:

Solved: GlobeDX team will use pragma version 0.8.4.

### 3.3 (HAL-03) LACK OF ADDRESS CONTROL ON THE FUNCTIONS - LOW

#### Description:

Address validation in contract `GDT.sol` is missing. Lack of address validation has been found in the multiple functions.

#### Code Location:

`GDT.sol` Lines #14-18

```
14 ▼ constructor(address manager) {
15     initial_address = manager;
16     balanceOf[initial_address] = totalSupply;
17     emit Transfer(address(0), initial_address, totalSupply);
18 }
19
```

`GDT.sol` Lines #20-27

```
20 ▼ function transfer(address to, uint256 value) public returns (bool success) {
21     require(to != address(0), "ERC20: transfer to the zero address");
22     require(balanceOf[msg.sender] >= value, "ERC20: insufficient balance for transfer");
23     balanceOf[msg.sender] -= value; // deduct from sender's balance
24     balanceOf[to] += value; // add to recipient's balance
25     emit Transfer(msg.sender, to, value);
26     return true;
27 }
28
```

`GDT.sol` Lines #35-42

```
35 function approve(address spender, uint256 value)
36     public
37     returns (bool success)
38 ▼ {
39     allowance[msg.sender][spender] = value;
40     emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, value);
41     return true;
42 }
```

## GDT.sol Lines #42-54

```

42     function transferFrom(address from, address to, uint256 value)
43     public
44     returns (bool success)
45     {
46         require(to != address(0), "ERC20: transferFrom to the zero address");
47         require(value <= balanceOf[from], "ERC20: insufficient balance for transferFrom");
48         require(value <= allowance[from][msg.sender], "ERC20: unauthorized transferFrom");
49         balanceOf[from] -= value;
50         balanceOf[to] += value;
51         allowance[from][msg.sender] -= value;
52         emit Transfer(from, to, value);
53         return true;
54     }
55

```

## Risk Level:

Likelihood - 2

Impact - 3

## Recommendation:

Add proper address validation when assigning a value to a variable from user supplied inputs. As a better solution, a white-listing/black-listing should be applied on the related functions.

## Listing 1

```

1  modifier validAddress(address addr) {
2      require(addr != 0, "Value can not be null");
3      require(addr != address(0), "Address cannot be 0x0");
4      require(addr != address(this), "Address cannot be contract
      address");
5      _;
6  }

```

## Remediation Plan:

Solved: **GlobeDX** team completed address check on the related functions.

### 3.4 (HAL-04) OUTDATED OPENZEPPELIN CONTRACT – INFORMATIONAL

#### Description:

The **GDT** contract used outdated version of the OpenZeppelin contract and was written for Solidity 0.4.21. Even though this outdated version does not pose any high-risk vulnerabilities, some of function implementations have since changed, which may lead to **GlobeDX** being incompatible.

**GDT.sol** Lines #68-88

```

68     function increaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 addedValue)
69         public
70         returns (bool)
71     {
72         uint256 currentAllowance = allowance[msg.sender][spender];
73         uint256 newAllowance = currentAllowance + addedValue;
74         require(newAllowance >= currentAllowance, "ERC20: invalid allowance increase");
75         approve(spender, newAllowance);
76         return true;
77     }
78
79     function decreaseAllowance(address spender, uint256 subtractedValue)
80         public
81         returns (bool)
82     {
83         uint256 currentAllowance = allowance[msg.sender][spender];
84         require(currentAllowance >= subtractedValue, "ERC20: decreased allowance below zero");
85         approve(spender, currentAllowance - subtractedValue);
86         return true;
87     }
88 }

```

Reference: <https://github.com/OpenZeppelin/openzeppelin-contracts/issues/437>

Reference: <https://ethereum.org/tr/developers/tutorials/erc20-annotated-code/>

#### Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 1**

**Impact - 1**

**Recommendation:**

The OpenZeppelin contract should be updated to latest stable version for being compatible with modern ERC-20 tokens.

**Remediation Plan:**

Risk Accepted: the **GlobeDX** team has decided to use the older version of ERC20 token.

## 3.5 (HAL-05) PRAGMA VERSION - INFORMATIONAL

### Description:

GDT.sol uses one of the latest pragma version (0.8.3) which was released on March 23, 2021. The latest pragma version (0.8.4) was released in April 2021. Many pragma versions have been lately released, going from version 0.6.x to the recently released version 0.8.x. in a short time.

### Code Location:

GDT.sol Line #~1

```
1  pragma solidity 0.8.3;
2
3  contract GDT {
4      mapping (address => uint256) public balanceOf;
5  }
```

### Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 1**

**Impact - 1**

### Recommendation:

Consider if possible, using a stable pragma version (0.6.12-0.7.3) that has been well tested to prevent potential undiscovered vulnerabilities.

Reference: [https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/blob/develop/docs/bugs\\_by\\_version.json](https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/blob/develop/docs/bugs_by_version.json)

### Remediation Plan:

Risk Accepted: **GlobeDX** team considers the use of **pragma 0.8.4** appropriate for the deployment to the mainnet.

## 3.6 (HAL-06) POSSIBLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS – INFORMATIONAL

### Description:

In public functions, array arguments are immediately copied to memory, while external functions can read directly from calldata. Reading calldata is cheaper than memory allocation. Public functions need to write the arguments to memory because public functions may be called internally. Internal calls are passed internally by pointers to memory. Thus, the function expects its arguments being located in memory when the compiler generates the code for an internal function.

### Code Location:

#### Listing 2

```
1 function transfer
2 function transferFrom
3 function burn
4 function increaseAllowance
5 function decreaseAllowance
```

### Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 1**

**Impact - 1**

### Recommendation:

Consider declaring external variables instead of public variables. A best practice is to use external if expecting a function to only be called externally and public if called internally. Public functions are always accessible, but external functions are only available to external callers.



Remediation Plan:

Solved: **GlobeDX** team marked functions as an external.

## 3.7 (HAL-07) NO TEST COVERAGE - INFORMATIONAL

### Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 1**

**Impact - 1**

### Description:

Unlike other software programs, smart contracts can not be modified or removed if deployed once into a specific address except if you deploy them with a proxy contract. Checking the code by automated testing (unit testing or functional testing) is a good practice to be sure all lines of the code work correctly. Mocha and Chai are useful tools to perform unit test in Smart Contracts functions. Mocha is a Javascript testing framework for creating both synchronous and asynchronous unit tests. Moreover, Chai is an assertions library with some interfaces such as assert, expect and should to develop custom unit tests.

### References:

<https://github.com/mochajs/mocha>

<https://github.com/chaijs/chai>

<https://docs.openzeppelin.com/learn/writing-automated-tests>

### Risk Level:

**Likelihood - 1**

**Impact - 1**

### Recommendation:

It is recommended considering to perform as much as possible test cases to cover all possible scenarios in the smart contract.

Remediation Plan:

Solved: **GlobeDX** team implemented test cases via another framework.

## 3.8 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

### Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance coverage of certain areas of the scoped contract. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified all the contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their abi and binary formats. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.

### Results:

```
INFO:Detectors:
GDT.constructor(address).manager (GDT.sol#14) lacks a zero-check on :
- initial_address = manager (GDT.sol#15)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
INFO:Detectors:
Pragma version0.7.2 (GDT.sol#1) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.11
solc-0.7.2 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
INFO:Detectors:
Variable GDT.initial_address (GDT.sol#9) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
INFO:Detectors:
transfer(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- GDT.transfer(address,uint256) (GDT.sol#20-27)
transferFrom(address,address,uint256) should be declared external:
- GDT.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (GDT.sol#42-54)
burn(uint256) should be declared external:
- GDT.burn(uint256) (GDT.sol#56-66)
increaseAllowance(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- GDT.increaseAllowance(address,uint256) (GDT.sol#68-77)
decreaseAllowance(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- GDT.decreaseAllowance(address,uint256) (GDT.sol#79-87)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external
INFO:Slither:GDT.sol analyzed (1 contracts with 72 detectors), 9 result(s) found
INFO:Slither:Use https://crytic.io/ to get access to additional detectors and Github integration
```

Figure 2: Slither Results

According to the test results, most of the findings found by slither were considered as false positives. Relevant findings were reviewed by the auditors.

## 3.9 AUTOMATED SECURITY SCAN

### MYTHX:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues, and to identify low-hanging fruit on the targets for this engagement. Among the tools used was MythX, a security analysis service for Ethereum smart contracts. MythX performed a scan on the testers machine and sent the compiled results to the analyzers to locate any vulnerabilities. Only security-related findings are shown below.

### Results:

#### GDT.sol

Report for Tokens/ERC\_20/Solidity/GDT.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/192faf20-f616-4854-b273-47a26e7e2fbc>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
16	(SWC-100) Function Default Visibility	Low	Function visibility is not set.
22	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
44	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
58	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
70	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
81	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.



THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING

 **HALBORN**

