

StaderLabs -TokenERC20

Smart Contract Security Audit

Prepared by: Halborn

Date of Engagement: January 7th, 2022 - January 8th, 2022

Visit: Halborn.com

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DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

| VERSION | MODIFICATION | DATE | AUTHOR |
|---------|-------------------------|------------|-----------------|
| 0.1 | Document Creation | 01/07/2022 | Roberto Reigada |
| 0.2 | Document Updates | 01/08/2022 | Roberto Reigada |
| 0.3 | Draft Review | 01/08/2022 | Gabi Urrutia |
| 1.0 | Remediation Plan | 01/17/2022 | Roberto Reigada |
| 1.1 | Remediation Plan Review | 01/17/2022 | Gabi Urrutia |

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

1.1 INTRODUCTION

StaderLabs engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their smart contracts beginning on January 7th, 2022 and ending on January 8th, 2022. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the Github repository stader-labs/stader-token-erc20.

1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided one week for the engagement and assigned a full time security engineer to audit the security of the smart contract. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn identified an informational finding that was addressed by StaderLabs team.

1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the bridge code and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose
- Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough
- Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (solgraph)
- Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes
- Manual testing by custom scripts
- Scanning of solidity files for vulnerabilities, security hotspots or bugs. (MythX)
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither)
- Testnet deployment (Brownie, Remix IDE)

RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the LIKELIHOOD of a security incident and the IMPACT should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest likelihood or impact.

RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 May cause a significant level of impact or loss.

- 3 May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest level of security risk.

| CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW | INFORMATIONAL |
|----------|------|--------|-----|---------------|
|----------|------|--------|-----|---------------|

10 - CRITICAL

9 - 8 - HIGH

7 - 6 - MEDIUM

5 - 4 - LOW

3 - 1 - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

1.4 SCOPE

IN-SCOPE:

The security assessment was scoped to the following smart contract:

• Stader.sol

Commit ID: 9137e229ae01f05d472fee1881f1e8fe862f452c

Fixed Commit ID: 904a150a5458af1d5d6ca043ed05521a2373f587

Stader Token Address: 0x30D20208d987713f46DFD34EF128Bb16C404D10f

IMPACT

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

| CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW | INFORMATIONAL |
|----------|------|--------|-----|---------------|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |

LIKELIHOOD

(HAL-01)

| SECURITY ANALYSIS | RISK LEVEL | REMEDIATION DATE |
|--|---------------|---------------------|
| HAL-01 - SOLC 0.8.2 COMPILER VERSION CONTAINS MULTIPLE BUGS | Informational | SOLVED - 01/17/2022 |

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

3.1 (HAL-01) SOLC 0.8.2 COMPILER VERSION CONTAINS MULTIPLE BUGS - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

Solidity compiler version 0.8.3, 0.8.4 and 0.8.9 fixed important bugs in the compiler. The version 0.8.2 set in the hardhat.config.js file is missing all these fixes:

- 0.8.3
- 0.8.4
- 0.8.9

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to use the most tested and stable versions, such as 0.6.12 or 0.7.6. Otherwise, if you still want to use $^{\circ}0.8.0$, because of the new functionality it provides, it is recommended to use 0.8.9 version.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The StaderLabs team set the pragma to the 0.8.9 version.

MANUAL TESTING

Halborn performed several manual tests in the Stader.sol contract:

```
yymn 5 made: (contract 5 mades)...
section sent: 0x5945621540000000045463140633553269737e450fd32434760e80077
prior: 0.0 gmed Gas lake: 6721075 Nonce: 0
nde:.constructor contract State (F121075 Nonce: 0
nde:.constructor contract State (F121075 Nonce: 0
fiet: chelloged at: 0x102123040e270245826c6094394Ecb3750C7e23a62
        amsaction sent: 0xd10f0955c47ff0fa0027212ee65272465393a8eb5d42470e94c
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 2
Stader.approve confirmed Block: 13957880 Gas used: 44126 (0.66%)
          lling -> contract Stader transferFrom(owner.address, userl.address, 1000, ("from': userl))
unmerting ment "DeabledGetSH44036btDrest1ad85003150720e7df1161309aFe0al175c5220
las prices 7.0 geal Gas list; 671275 Noner.
Stader:transferFrom confirmed Block: 1957591 Gas used: 31568 (0.47%)
          matters_lister.elipomoc.unter.espor.eu

mailing > Outcomoc.fisher.ecorcaethilousoccuserl.edires, 1, lifron's useri))

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```

As the contract just follows the standard OpenZeppelin ERC20 contracts ERC20, ERC20Burnable, ERC20Permit and ERC20Votes, the manual tests were focused on testing the main functions of these contracts:

- approve()
- balanceOf()
- burn()

- burnFrom()
- decreaseAllowance()
- delegate()
- increaseAllowance()
- transfer()
- transferFrom()

The delegateBySig() function was also tested:

```
Transaction went: Gastrication 2010011 100001 (Coloration 1000011 100001 Coloration 1000001 Coloration 100001 Coloration
```

```
Calling > contract_fisder.permit(alice.address, bob.address, lob.address, lob.addre
```

No issues were found during the manual tests.

AUTOMATED TESTING

5.1 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the scoped contracts. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified all the contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their ABI and binary formats, Slither was run on the all-scoped contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.

Slither results:

```
Section 1. All property of the control of the contr
```

• No major issues were found by Slither.

ERC20 checks:

```
Stader.sol
         | Concet ENGIOMERSHAE
| Concet ENGIOMERSHAE
| Concet Engine | Concete Testum value|
| Concete Engine | Concete Engine |
| Concete Engine |
```

```
# Check EGGOPerant

## Check Encions

(*) Cottal Strates:
(*) Challescoff (safers):
(*) Challescoff (safers):
(*) Challescoff (safers):
(*) Challescoff (safers):
(*) Cottal Cottal Strates:
(*) Cottal Strates:
```

```
# Check Stader

## Check Tunctions

(7) total Supply (1) septembly
(8) total Supply (1) septembly
(9) total Supply (1) septembly
(1) total Supply (1) septembly
(1) total Supply (1) septembly
(1) balanceOff (address) = 0 (correct return value)
(1) balanceOff (address) = 0 (correct return value)
(2) transfer(address) = 0 (correct return value)
(3) transfer(address) = 0 (correct return value)
(4) transfer(address) = 0 (correct return value)
(5) transfer(address) = 0 (correct return value)
(6) page (1) transfer(address) = 0 (correct return value)
(7) page (1) transfer(address) = 0 (correct return value)
(8) page (1) page
```

• All the Slither ERC20 checks were passed successfully.

5.2 AUTOMATED SECURITY SCAN

Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues, and to identify low-hanging fruits on the targets for this engagement. Among the tools used was MythX, a security analysis service for Ethereum smart contracts. MythX performed a scan on all the contracts and sent the compiled results to the analyzers to locate any vulnerabilities.

MythX results:

Stader.sol

Report for contracts/Stader.sol

https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/9ff91709-18db-495e-9170-66dd9ad7337d

| Line | SWC Title | Severity | Short Description |
|------|---------------------------|----------|---------------------------|
| 2 | (SWC-103) Floating Pragma | Low | A floating pragma is set. |

No major issues were found by MythX

THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING

