



BENQI Finance

Smart Contract Security Audit

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Date of Engagement: **May 3rd-23rd, 2021**

Visit: **Halborn.com**

DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY	4
CONTACTS	4
1 EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW	5
1.1 INTRODUCTION	6
1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY	7
1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY	7
RISK METHODOLOGY	8
1.4 SCOPE	10
2 ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW	12
3 FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS	13
3.1 (HAL-01) MISSING PAYMENT AMOUNT CHECK - MEDIUM	15
Description	15
Code Location	15
Recommendation	16
Remediation Plan	17
3.2 (HAL-02) MISSING ADDRESS VALIDATION - LOW	18
Description	18
Code Location	18
Risk Level	19
Recommendation	20
Remediation Plan	20
3.3 (HAL-03) USAGE OF BLOCK.TIMESTAMP - LOW	21
Description	21
Code Location	21

Risk Level	22
Recommendation	22
Remediation Plan	22
3.4 (HAL-04) PRAGMA VERSION - LOW	23
Description	23
Code Location	23
Risk Level	23
Recommendation	24
Remediation Plan	24
3.5 (HAL-05) FLOATING PRAGMA - LOW	25
Code Location	25
Risk Level	25
Recommendation	26
Remediation Plan	26
3.6 (HAL-06) USAGE OF INLINE ASSEMBLY - LOW	27
Description	27
Risk Level	28
Recommendation	28
Remediation Plan	28
3.7 (HAL-07) INCORRECT DIVISION ON WHITEPAPER INTEREST RATE MODEL - INFORMATIONAL	29
Description	29
Code Location	30
Risk Level	30
Recommendation	30
Remediation Plan	30

3.8 (HAL-08) LACK OF INPUT VALIDATION - INFORMATIONAL	31
Description	31
Code Location	31
Risk Level	31
Recommendation	31
Remediation Plan	32
3.9 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT	33
Description	33
Results	33
3.10 AUTOMATED SECURITY SCAN	41
Description	41
Results	42

DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

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1.0	Final Edits	05/26/2021	Ataberk Yavuzer
1.1	Remediation Plan	06/17/2021	Ataberk Yavuzer

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

1.1 INTRODUCTION

BENQI Finance engaged Halborn to conduct a security assessment on their Smart contracts beginning on May 3rd, 2021 and ending May 23rd, 2021. The security assessment was scoped to the BENQI Finance and an audit of the security risk and implications regarding the changes introduced by the development team at **BENQI Finance** prior to its production release shortly following the assessments deadline.

Though this security audit's outcome is satisfactory, the most essential aspects were tested and verified to achieve objectives and deliverable set in the scope due to time and resource constraints. It is essential to note the use of the best practices for secure smart-contract development.

Halborn recommends performing further testing to validate extended safety and correctness in context to the whole set of contracts. External threats, such as economic attacks, oracle attacks, and inter-contract functions and calls should be validated for expected logic and state.

1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided two weeks for the engagement and assigned one full time security engineer to audit the security of the smart contracts. The engineer is a blockchain and smart contract security experts with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit to achieve the following:

- Ensure that smart contract functions as intended.
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts.

In summary, Halborn identified few security risks, and recommends performing further testing to validate extended safety and correctness in context to the whole set of contracts. External threats, such as economic attacks, oracle attacks, and inter-contract functions and calls should be validated for expected logic and state.

1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of the smart contract audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of smart contracts and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose.
- Smart Contract manual code review and walkthrough.
- Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions ([solgraph](#).)

- Manual Assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes ([Hardhat](#) and manual deployments on [Ganache](#).)
- Manual testing with custom Javascript.
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions ([Slither](#).)
- Scanning of solidity files for vulnerabilities, security hotspots or bugs ([MythX](#).)
- Testnet deployment ([Remix IDE](#).)

RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the **LIKELIHOOD** of a security incident, and the **IMPACT** should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. It's quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that was used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of **5** to **1** with **5** being the highest likelihood or impact.

RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 - Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 - High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 - Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 - Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 - Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 - May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 - May cause a significant level of impact or loss.
- 3 - May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 - May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
----------	------	--------	-----	---------------

10 - CRITICAL

9 - 8 - HIGH

7 - 6 - MEDIUM

5 - 4 - LOW

3 - 1 - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

1.4 SCOPE

IN-SCOPE:

The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts:

- BaseJumpRateModelV2.sol
- CarefulMath.sol
- ComptrollerInterface.sol
- Comptroller.sol
- ComptrollerStorage.sol
- DAIInterestRateModelV3.sol
- EIP20Interface.sol
- EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol
- ErrorReporter.sol
- ExponentialNoError.sol
- Exponential.sol
- InterestRateModel.sol
- JumpRateModel.sol
- JumpRateModelV2.sol
- LegacyInterestRateModel.sol
- LegacyJumpRateModelV2.sol
- Maximillion.sol
- PriceOracle.sol
- QiAvax.sol
- QiErc20Delegate.sol

- QiErc20Delegator.sol
- QiErc20Immutable.sol
- QiErc20.sol
- QiQiLikeDelegate.sol
- QiTokenInterfaces.sol
- QiToken.sol
- Reservoir.sol
- SafeMath.sol
- Timelock.sol
- Unitroller.sol
- WhitePaperInterestRateModel.sol
- Chainlink/AggregatorV2V3Interface.sol
- Chainlink/BenqiChainlinkOracle.sol
- Governance/Benqi.sol
- Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol
- Lens/BenqiLens.sol

Commit ID: b94b5fde3f4ac03a6d73a1308854ae493eaa722a


OUT-OF-SCOPE:

- ComptrollerG1.sol
- ComptrollerG2.sol
- ComptrollerG3.sol
- ComptrollerG4.sol
- ComptrollerG5.sol
- ComptrollerG6.sol
- SimplePriceOracle.sol
- QiDaiDelegate.sol

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	0	1	5	2

LIKELIHOOD




EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDIATION DATE
MISSING PAYMENT AMOUNT CHECK	Medium	ACCEPTED RISK
MISSING ADDRESS VALIDATION	Low	SOLVED: 06/14/2021
USAGE OF BLOCK.TIMESTAMP	Low	NOT APPLICABLE
OUTDATED PRAGMA VERSION	Low	SOLVED: 06/14/2021
FLOATING PRAGMA	Low	SOLVED: 06/14/2021
USAGE OF INLINE ASSEMBLY	Low	ACCEPTED RISK
WRONG DIVISION ON INTEREST RATE MODEL	Informational	SOLVED: 06/14/2021
LACK OF INPUT VALIDATION	Informational	SOLVED: 06/14/2021
STATIC ANALYSIS	-	-



FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS



3.1 (HAL-01) MISSING PAYMENT AMOUNT CHECK - MEDIUM

Description:

The BENQI Finance protocol includes some financial functions such as **borrow**, **liquidate**, **transfer**, etc. Attackers could use these functions with large amounts in Flash-Loan or similar financial attacks. Other DeFi platforms (The DAO, Spartan, and others) were hacked, and attackers stole a significant amount of funds. We observed during the test that there are no restrictions on large transfers.

Code Location:

`Comptroller.sol` Lines #330-363

```
contracts > Comptroller.sol
330   function borrowAllowed(address qitoken, address borrower, uint borrowAmount) external returns (uint) {
331     // Pausing is a very serious situation - we revert to sound the alarms
332     require(!borrowGuardianPaused[qitoken], "borrow is paused");
333
334     if (!markets[qitoken].isListed) {
335       return uint(Error.MARKET_NOT_LISTED);
336     }
337
338     if (!markets[qitoken].accountMembership[borrower]) {
339       // only qitokens may call borrowallowed if borrower not in market
340       require(msg.sender == qitoken, "sender must be qitoken");
341
342       // attempt to add borrower to the market
343       Error err = addToMarketInternal(QiToken(msg.sender), borrower);
344       if (err != Error.NO_ERROR) {
345         return uint(err);
346       }
347
348       // it should be impossible to break the important invariant
349       assert(markets[qitoken].accountMembership[borrower]);
350     }
351
352     if (oracle.getUnderlyingPrice(QiToken(qitoken)) == 0) {
353       return uint(Error.PRICE_ERROR);
354     }
355
356     uint borrowCap = borrowCaps[qitoken];
357     // Borrow cap of 0 corresponds to unlimited borrowing
358     if (borrowCap != 0) {
359       uint totalBorrows = QiToken(qitoken).totalBorrows();
360       uint nextTotalBorrows = add_(totalBorrows, borrowAmount);
361       require(nextTotalBorrows < borrowCap, "market borrow cap reached");
362     }
363 }
```

Figure 1: Missing Payment Amount Check - Comptroller

Comptroller.sol Lines #463-493

```
contracts > Comptroller.sol
463 function liquidateBorrowAllowed(
464     address qTokenBorrowed,
465     address qTokenCollateral,
466     address liquidator,
467     address borrower,
468     uint repayAmount) external returns (uint) {
469     // Shh - currently unused
470     liquidator;
471
472     if (!markets[qTokenBorrowed].isListed || !markets[qTokenCollateral].isListed) {
473         return uint(Error.MARKET_NOT_LISTED);
474     }
475
476     /* The borrower must have shortfall in order to be liquidatable */
477     (Error err, , uint shortfall) = getAccountLiquidityInternal(borrower);
478     if (err != Error.NO_ERROR) {
479         return uint(err);
480     }
481     if (shortfall == 0) {
482         return uint(Error.INSUFFICIENT_SHORTFALL);
483     }
484
485     /* The liquidator may not repay more than what is allowed by the closeFactor */
486     uint borrowBalance = QToken(qTokenBorrowed).borrowBalanceStored(borrower);
487     uint maxClose = mul_ScalarTruncate(Exp({mantissa: closeFactorMantissa}), borrowBalance);
488     if (repayAmount > maxClose) {
489         return uint(Error.TOO MUCH REPAY);
490     }
491
492     return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
493 }
```

Figure 2: Missing Payment Amount Check - Comptroller

Comptroller.sol Lines #595-612

```
contracts > Comptroller.sol
595 function transferAllowed(address qToken, address src, address dst, uint transferTokens) external returns (uint) {
596     // Pausing is a very serious situation - we revert to sound the alarms
597     require(!transferGuardianPaused, "transfer is paused");
598
599     // Currently the only consideration is whether or not
600     // the src is allowed to redeem this many tokens
601     uint allowed = redeemAllowedInternal(qToken, src, transferTokens);
602     if (allowed != uint(Error.NO_ERROR)) {
603         return allowed;
604     }
605
606     // Keep the flywheel moving
607     updateQISupplyIndex(qToken);
608     distributeSupplierQi(qToken, src);
609     distributeSupplierQi(qToken, dst);
610
611     return uint(Error.NO_ERROR);
612 }
```

Figure 3: Missing Payment Amount Check - Comptroller

Recommendation:

It is recommended to implement a mechanism which controls payment amount.

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

Remediation Plan:

Accepted Risk: It was not considered appropriate to limit users in transactions.

3.2 (HAL-02) MISSING ADDRESS VALIDATION - LOW

Description:

A few contracts in the BENQI project are missing a safety check inside the constructors. The address-type parameter setter should include a zero-address test; otherwise, the contract's functionality may become inaccessible or tokens burnt forever.

Code Location:

Timelock.sol



```
contracts > ✨ Timelock.sol
54 |     function setPendingAdmin(address pendingAdmin_) public {
55 |         require(msg.sender == address(this), "Timelock::setPendingAdmin: call must come from Timelock.");
56 |         pendingAdmin = pendingAdmin_;
57 |
58 |         emit NewPendingAdmin(pendingAdmin);
59 |
60 }
```

Figure 4: Missing Address Validation - Timelock

Reservoir.sol



```
contracts > ✨ Reservoir.sol
32 |     constructor(uint dripRate_, EIP20Interface token_, address target_) public {
33 |         dripStart = block.timestamp;
34 |         dripRate = dripRate_;
35 |         token = token_;
36 |         target = target_;
37 |         dripped = 0;
38 |
39 }
```

Figure 5: Missing Address Validation - Reservoir

Benqi.sol

```
77 /**
78 * @notice Approve `spender` to transfer up to `amount` from `src`
79 * @dev This will overwrite the approval amount for `spender`
80 * and is subject to issues noted [here](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20#approve)
81 * @param spender The address of the account which may transfer tokens
82 * @param rawAmount The number of tokens that are approved (2^256-1 means infinite)
83 * @return Whether or not the approval succeeded
84 */
85 function approve(address spender, uint rawAmount) external returns (bool) {
86     uint96 amount;
87     if (rawAmount == uint(-1)) {
88         amount = uint96(-1);
89     } else {
90         amount = safe96(rawAmount, "Benqi::approve: amount exceeds 96 bits");
91     }
92     allowances[msg.sender][spender] = amount;
93     emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, amount);
94     return true;
95 }
96
97 }
```

Figure 6: Missing Address Validation - Benqi

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 2

Impact - 2

Recommendation:

It would be safer to perform additional validation before assigning user-supplied values on contracts. Usage of a whitelist method or a modifier could solve the issue.

For example:

Listing 1

```
1 modifier validAddress(address addr) {
2     require(addr != address(0), "Address cannot be 0x0");
3     require(addr != address(this), "Address cannot be contract
4         address");
5 }
```

Remediation Plan:

Solved: BENQI Finance team implemented necessary controls on the address checks.


3.3 (HAL-03) USAGE OF BLOCK.TIMESTAMP - LOW

Description:

The contracts `Timelock.sol`, `Comptroller.sol`, `ComptrollerG1.sol`, `Reservoir.sol` and `GovernorAlpha.sol` use `block.timestamp`. The global variable `block.timestamp` does not necessarily hold the current time, and may not be accurate. Miners can influence the value of `block.timestamp` to perform Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) attacks. There is no guarantee that the value is correct, only that it is higher than the previous block's timestamp.

Code Location:


`Timelock.sol`



```
contracts > ♦ Timelock.sol
108  v   function getBlockTimestamp() internal view returns (uint) {
109    |   // solium-disable-next-line security/no-block-members
110    |   return block.timestamp;
111  }
112 }
```

Figure 7: Usage of `block.timestamp` - Timelock

`Comptroller.sol`



```
contracts > ♦ Comptroller.sol
1322
1323   function getBlockTimestamp() public view returns (uint) {
1324     return block.timestamp;
}
```

Figure 8: Usage of `block.timestamp` - Comptroller

Reservoir.sol

```
contracts > Reservoir.sol
45  function drip() public returns (uint) {
46      // First, read storage into memory
47      EIP20Interface token_ = token;
48      uint reservoirBalance_ = token_.balanceOf(address(this)); // TODO: Verify this is a static call
49      uint dripRate_ = dripRate;
50      uint dripStart_ = dripstart;
51      uint dripped_ = dripped;
52      address target_ = target;
53      uint blockNumber_ = block.timestamp;
```

Figure 9: Usage of `block.timestamp` - Reservoir

GovernorAlpha.sol

```
contracts > Governance > GovernorAlpha.sol
155     uint startTimestamp = add256(block.timestamp, votingDelay());
156     uint endTimestamp = add256(block.timestamp, add256(votingPeriod(), votingDelay()));
```

Figure 10: Usage of `block.timestamp` - GovernorAlpha

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1**Impact** - 3

Recommendation:

Use `block.number` instead of `block.timestamp` to reduce the risk of MEV attacks. If possible, use an oracle.

Remediation Plan:

Not Applicable: The `timestamp` keyword has been used intentionally. It is not necessary to change the contract given the risk. The consensus protocols of the Avalanche chain will prevent this attack.


3.4 (HAL-04) PRAGMA VERSION - LOW

Description:

In the Benqi contracts use pragma version 0.5.16. The latest pragma version is (0.8.3) was released in April 2021. Many pragma versions have been released, going from version 0.6.x to the recently released version 0.8.x. in just 6 months.

Code Location:

QiToken.sol Line #1



```
contracts > QiToken.sol
1 pragma solidity ^0.5.16;
2
3 import "./ComptrollerInterface.sol";
4 import "./QiTokenInterfaces.sol";
5 import "./ErrorReporter.sol";
6 import "./Exponential.sol";
7 import "./EIP20Interface.sol";
8 import "./InterestRateModel.sol";
```

Figure 11: Pragma Version - QiToken

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

In the Solidity Github repository, there is a json file listing the bugs reported for each compiler version. No bugs have been found in `> 0.7.3` versions and very few in `0.7.0 -- 0.7.3`. The latest stable version is `pragma 0.6.12`. Furthermore, `pragma 0.6.12` is widely used by Solidity developers and has been extensively tested in many security audits. We recommend using at minimum the latest stable version.

Reference: https://github.com/ethereum/solidity/blob/develop/docs/bugs_by_version.json

Remediation Plan:

Solved: The `BENQI Finance` team fixed this issue by setting the pragma version to `0.5.17` which is one of the stable releases.

3.5 (HAL-05) FLOATING PRAGMA - LOW

Benqi contracts use the floating pragma `^0.5.12`. Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested with thoroughly. Locking the **pragma** helps to ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using another pragma, for example, either an outdated pragma version that might introduce bugs that affect the contract system negatively or a recently released pragma version which has not been extensively tested.

Reference: [ConsenSys Diligence - Lock pragmas](#)

Code Location:

`QiToken.sol` Line #1

```
contracts > QiToken.sol
1 pragma solidity ^0.5.16;
2
3 import "./ComptrollerInterface.sol";
4 import "./QiTokenInterfaces.sol";
5 import "./ErrorReporter.sol";
6 import "./Exponential.sol";
7 import "./EIP20Interface.sol";
8 import "./InterestRateModel.sol";
```

- This is an example when we can find the use of floating pragma `^0.5.12`.

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

Lock the pragma version whenever possible and avoid using a floating pragma in the final deployment. The pragma can be locked in the code by removing the caret (^) and by specifying the exact version in the Truffle configuration file `truffle-config.js` or `hardhat.config.js` if using the HardHat framework.

Remediation Plan:

Solved: The BENQI Finance team solved the issue by locking the pragma on the contracts.

3.6 (HAL-06) USAGE OF INLINE ASSEMBLY - LOW

Description:

Inline assembly is a way to access the **Virtual Machine** at a low level. This discards several important safety features in Solidity.

Benqi.sol Line #297

```
contracts > Governance > Benqi.sol
295     function getChainId() internal pure returns (uint) {
296         uint256 chainId;
297         assembly { chainId := chainid() }
298         return chainId;
299     }
```

QiErc20.sol Lines #158-170

```
contracts > QiErc20.sol
158     assembly {
159         switch returndatasize()
160             case 0 { success := not(0) } // This is a non-standard ERC-20
161             success := true // set success to true
162         case 32 { returndatacopy(0, 0, 32) }
163             success := mload(0) // Set `success = returndata` of external call
164         default { revert(0, 0) } // This is an excessively non-compliant ERC-20, revert.
165     }
166 }
```

QiErc20Delegator.sol Lines #449-453

```
contracts > QiErc20Delegator.sol
422     assembly [
423         if eq(success, 0) {
424             revert(add(returnData, 0x20), returndatasize)
425         }
426     ]
```

Unitroller.sol Lines #139-146

```
contracts > Unitroller.sol
139     assembly {
140         let free_mem_ptr := mload(0x40)
141         returndatacopy(free_mem_ptr, 0, returndatasize)
142
143         switch success
144         case 0 { revert(free_mem_ptr, returndatasize) }
145         default { return(free_mem_ptr, returndatasize) }
146     }
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

The contracts should avoid using inline assembly because it interacts with the AVM (Avalanche Virtual Machine) at a low level. An attacker could bypass many essential safety features of Solidity.

Remediation Plan:

Accepted Risk: The contracts require inline assembly, and the risk is acceptable.

3.7 (HAL-07) INCORRECT DIVISION ON WHITEPAPER INTEREST RATE MODEL - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In the `WhitePaperInterestRateModel.sol` contract, there is an incorrect division operation. According to comments in the contract, the interest rate is raised by `1e18`. Some functions multiply user-controlled values by `1e18`. However, the constructor doesn't have this multiplication operation. The `timestepsPerYear` variable is defined as `31536000`. When the contract is deployed, to set "200" as the `baseRatePerTimestamp` variable, the deployer must use `200 * 31536000` for the `baseRatePerYear` variable. If the deployer sets the `baseRatePerYear` variable to "200", then the contract will execute the following code to calculate `baseRatePerTimestamp` variable:

Listing 2

```
1 1. baseRatePerTimestamp = baseRatePerYear.div(timestepsPerYear);  
2 2. baseRatePerTimestamp = 200.div(31536000);  
3 3. baseRatePerTimestamp = 0
```

Code Location:

WhitePaperInterestRateModel.sol Line #19-41

```
contracts > ♦ WhitePaperInterestRateModel.sol
19     uint public constant timestampsPerYear = 31536000;
20
21     /**
22      * @notice The multiplier of utilization rate that gives the slope of the interest rate
23      */
24     uint public multiplierPerTimestamp;
25
26     /**
27      * @notice The base interest rate which is the y-intercept when utilization rate is 0
28      */
29     uint public baseRatePerTimestamp;
30
31     /**
32      * @notice Construct an interest rate model
33      * @param baseRatePerYear The approximate target base APR, as a mantissa (scaled by 1e18)
34      * @param multiplierPerYear The rate of increase in interest rate wrt utilization (scaled by 1e18)
35      */
36     constructor(uint baseRatePerYear, uint multiplierPerYear) public {
37         baseRatePerTimestamp = baseRatePerYear.div(timestampsPerYear);
38         multiplierPerTimestamp = multiplierPerYear.div(timestampsPerYear);
39
40         emit NewInterestParams(baseRatePerTimestamp, multiplierPerTimestamp);
41     }
42 }
```

Figure 12: Incorrect Division on Interest Rate Model

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 2

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

Multiply the `baseRatePerYear` and `multiplierPerYear` variables as a mantissa value raised by `1e18` power before division. Otherwise, the result will be zero.

Remediation Plan:

Solved: The BENQI Finance team solved this issue by adding new multiplication and division operations to the related functions.

3.8 (HAL-08) LACK OF INPUT VALIDATION - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In the `GovernorAlpha.sol` contract, The description parameter can be left empty by the function.

Code Location:

`GovernanceAlpha.sol` Line #142

```

142+     function propose(address[] memory targets, uint[] memory values, string[] memory signatures, bytes[] memory calldatas, string memory description) public returns (
143+         require(bengi.getPriorVotes(msg.sender, sub256(block.number, 1)) > proposalThreshold), "GovernorAlpha::propose: proposer votes below proposal threshold");
144+         require(targets.length == values.length && targets.length == signatures.length && targets.length == calldatas.length, "GovernorAlpha::propose: proposal function");
145+         require(targets.length != 0, "GovernorAlpha::propose: must provide actions");
146+         require(targets.length <= proposalMaxOperations(), "GovernorAlpha::propose: too many actions");
147+
148+         uint latestProposalId = latestProposalIds[msg.sender];
149+         if (latestProposalId != 0) {
150+             ProposalState proposersLatestProposalState = state(latestProposalId);
151+             require(proposersLatestProposalState != ProposalState.Active, "GovernorAlpha::propose: one live proposal per proposer, found an already active proposal");
152+             require(proposersLatestProposalState != ProposalState.Pending, "GovernorAlpha::propose: one live proposal per proposer, found an already pending proposal");
153+         }
154+
155+         uint startTimestamp = add256(block.timestamp, votingDelay());
156+         uint endTimestamp = add256(block.timestamp, add256(votingPeriod(), votingDelay()));
157+
158+         proposalCount++;
159+         Proposal memory newProposal = Proposal{
160+             id: proposalCount,
161+             proposer: msg.sender,
162+             eta: 0,
163+             targets: targets,
164+             values: values,
165+             signatures: signatures,
166+             calldatas: calldatas,
167+             startTimestamp: startTimestamp,
168+             endTimestamp: endTimestamp,
169+             startBlock: 0,
170+             forVotes: 0,
171+             againstVotes: 0,
172+             canceled: false,
173+             executed: false
174+         };
175+
176+         proposals[newProposal.id] = newProposal;
177+         latestProposalIds[newProposal.proposer] = newProposal.id;

```

Figure 13: Lack Of Input Validation

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

The contract should implement validation on the user controlled inputs which should be performed using a `require` statement.

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

Remediation Plan:

Solved: The BENQI Finance team fixed this issue by implementing input validation to the contract.

3.9 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance coverage of certain areas of the scoped contract. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified all the contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their abi and binary formats, Slither was run on the all-scoped contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire codebase.

Results:

Comptroller.sol

```

INFO:detectors:
Comptroller (contracts/comptroller.sol#15-133) contract sets array length with a user-controlled value:
    - allMarkets.push(qlendingqTokenContract,contractId) (#941)
Comptroller (contracts/comptroller.sol#15-133) contract sets array length with a user-controlled value:
    - accountAssets[borrower].push(qToken) (contracts/comptroller.sol#149)
INFO:detectors:
UniswapV2Router (contracts/unirouter.sol#35-147) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-documentation#array-length-assignment
INFO:detectors:
UniswapV2Router (contracts/unirouter.sol#35-147) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-documentation#controlled-delegatecall
INFO:detectors:
Comptroller.grantQlInternal(address,uint256) (contracts/comptroller.sol#125-126) ignores return value by bengi.transfer(user,amount) (contracts/Comptroller.sol#126)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-documentation#unchecked-transfer
INFO:detectors:
UniswapV2Router (contracts/unirouter.sol#35-147) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-documentation#array-length-assignment
INFO:detectors:
UniswapV2Router (contracts/unirouter.sol#35-147) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-documentation#controlled-delegatecall
INFO:detectors:
Comptroller.adminOrInitialStorage.controllerImplementation (contracts/comptrollerstorage.sol#20) is never initialized. It is used in:
    - comptroller.adminOrInitialStorage() (contracts/comptroller.sol#1050-1052)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-documentation#uninitialized-state-variables
INFO:detectors:
Comptroller._mintVerify(address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/Comptroller.sol#250-261) uses a Boolean constant improperly:
    - false (contracts/Comptroller.sol#258)
Comptroller._borrowVerify(address,address,uint256) (contracts/Comptroller.sol#387-397) uses a Boolean constant improperly:
    - false (contracts/Comptroller.sol#395)
Comptroller._liquidateBorrowVerify(address,address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/Comptroller.sol#436-453) uses a Boolean constant improperly:
    - false (contracts/Comptroller.sol#448)
Comptroller._liquidateBorrowVerify(address,address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/Comptroller.sol#503-522) uses a Boolean constant improperly:
    - false (contracts/Comptroller.sol#519)
Comptroller._getSupplyState(address,address,address,uint256) (contracts/Comptroller.sol#568-585) uses a Boolean constant improperly:
    - false (contracts/Comptroller.sol#582)
Comptroller._transferVerify(address,address,address,uint256) (contracts/Comptroller.sol#621-632) uses a Boolean constant improperly:
    - false (contracts/Comptroller.sol#629)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-documentation#misuse-of-a-boolean-constant
INFO:detectors:
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function Interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transfer(address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#34)
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function Interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#48)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-documentation#incorrect-erc20-interface
INFO:detectors:
Comptroller._grantQl(address,uint256) (contracts/Comptroller.sol#1275-1280) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(amountLeft == 0,insufficient bengi for grant) (contracts/Comptroller.sol#1278)
Comptroller._getSupplyState(address,address,uint256,uint256) (contracts/Comptroller.sol#707-703) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - qlSupplierBalance <= 0 (contracts/Comptroller.sol#721)
Comptroller._liquidateBorrowAllowed(address,address,address,uint256) (contracts/Comptroller.sol#463-493) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - shortfall == 0 (Contracts/Comptroller.sol#481)
ExponentialNoError.mul(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/ExponentialNoError.sol#150-157) uses a dangerous strict equality:
ExponentialNoError.mul(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/ExponentialNoError.sol#150-157) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(c / a == b,errorMessage) (contracts/ExponentialNoError.sol#155)
Comptroller.setQsSpeedInternal(QlToken,uint256) (contracts/Comptroller.sol#1061-1092) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - qlSupplyState.address(qlToken).index == 0 & qlSupplyState(address(qlToken)).timestamp == 0 (contracts/Comptroller.sol#1073)
Bengi.withdrawBengi(uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/Bengi.sol#203-212) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - checkpoints < 0 && checkpoints[deleteqteelIndex] == 0 (contracts/Governance/Bengi.sol#204)
QlToken.accrueInterest() (Contracts/QlToken.sol#184-462) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - accrualBlockTimestampPrior == currentBlockTimestamp (contracts/QlToken.sol#390)
QlToken.accrueInterest() (Contracts/QlToken.sol#184-462) uses a dangerous strict equality:

```

CarefulMath.sol

```
INFO:Detectors:
CarefulMath.addInthenSubUint(uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#76-84) is never used and should be removed
CarefulMath.addInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#83-73) is never used and should be removed
CarefulMath.subInthenAddUint(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#111-101) is never used and should be removed
CarefulMath.mulInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#24-36) is never used and should be removed
CarefulMath.subInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#52-58) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikl/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
INFO:Slither:contracts/carefulmath.sol analyzed (1 contracts with 75 detectors), 5 result(s) found
INFO:Slither:use https://crytic.io/ to get access to additional detectors and Github Integration
```

Chainlink/BenqiChainlinkOracle.sol

```
INFO:Detectors:
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transfer(address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#34)
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#48)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikl/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-erc20-interface
INFO:Detectors:
QIToken.accrueInterest() (contracts/QIToken.sol#88-402) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - accrueBalanceInternal (contracts/QIToken.sol#39-29)
QIToken.accrueInterest() (contracts/QIToken.sol#184-462) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,could not calculate block delta) (contracts/QIToken.sol#406)
QIToken.balanceOfUnderlying(address) (contracts/QIToken.sol#190-193) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,underlying balance failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#193)
QIToken.borrowBalanceStored(address) (contracts/QIToken.sol#271-275) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(err == MathError.NO_ERROR,borrowBalanceStored: borrowBalanceStoredInternal failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#273)
CarefulMath.divUint(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#41-47) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - b == 0 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#42)
QIToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/QIToken.sol#320-332) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(err == MathError.NO_ERROR,exchangeRateStored: exchangeRateStoredInternal failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#330)
QIToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/QIToken.sol#339-369) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - totalSupply == 0 (contracts/QIToken.sol#341)
QIToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,string,string,uint64) (contracts/QIToken.sol#193-55) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(accrueInterest == 0 && borrowIndex == 0,market may only be initialized once) (contracts/QIToken.sol#32)
QIToken.initializeComptrollerInterface.InterestRateModel(uint256,string,uint64) (contracts/QIToken.sol#25-56) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(err == uint256(error.NO_ERROR),setting comptroller failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#40)
QIToken.initializeComptrollerInterface.InterestRateModel(uint256,string,uint64) (contracts/QIToken.sol#25-50) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(err == uint256(error.NO_ERROR),setting interest rate model failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#40)
QIToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#1000-1024) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(amountSeizeError == uint256(error.NO_ERROR),LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_CALCULATE_AMOUNT_SEIZE_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#1000)
QIToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,QITokenInterface) (contracts/QIToken.sol#955-1024) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(setzeError == uint256(error.NO_ERROR),token seizure failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#1014)
QIToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#1025-1048) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_EXCHANGE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#1036)
QIToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#544)
QIToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#547)
Exponential._mulExp(exponentialError,Exp_ExponentialError) (contracts/Exponential.sol#135-155) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - assert(bool)(err2 == MathError.ERROR) (contracts/Exponential.sol#152)
CarefulMath.mulInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#24-32) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,REPAY_BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#901)
QIToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#852-919) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,REPAY_BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#901)
QIToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#852-919) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,REPAY_BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#904)
QIToken.transferTokens(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#115-135) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - transferTokens(msg.sender,msg.sender,dstAmount) == uint256(error.NO_ERROR) (contracts/QIToken.sol#136)
QIToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#146-148) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - transferTokens(msg.sender,src,dst,amount) == uint256(error.NO_ERROR) (contracts/QIToken.sol#147)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikl/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities
JNBridge: QIToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,QITokenInterface) (contracts/QIToken.sol#929-944):
    External calls:
        - error = QITokenCollateral.accrueInterest() (contracts/QIToken.sol#930)
        - liquidateBorrowFresh(msg.sender,borrower,repayAmount,QITokenCollateral) (contracts/QIToken.sol#943)
```

BaseJumpRateModelV2.sol

```

INFO:Detectors:
BaseJumpRateModelV2.getSupplyRate(uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/BaseJumpRateModelV2.sol#115-120) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
    -rateToPool = borrowRate.mul(oneMinusReserveFactor).div(lei8) (contracts/BaseJumpRateModelV2.sol#118)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply

INFO:Detectors:
SafeMath.add(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/SafeMath.sol#43-48) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256) (contracts/SafeMath.sol#167-169) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/SafeMath.sol#82-105) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mul(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/SafeMath.sol#107-119) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#add-code
INFO:Detectors:
Constant BaseJumpRateModelV2.timestampsPerYear (contracts/BaseJumpRateModelV2.sol#23) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
INFO:Detectors:
getSupplyRate(uint256,uint256,uint256) should be declared external:
    - BaseJumpRateModelV2.getSupplyRate(uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/BaseJumpRateModelV2.sol#115-120)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external
INFO:Slither:contracts/baseJumpRateModelV2.sol analyzed (2 contracts with 75 detectors), 7 result(s) found
INFO:Slither:use https://crytic.io/ to get access to additional detectors and Github Integration

```

Governance/Benqi.sol

```

INFO:Detectors:
Benqi._writeCheckpoint(address,uint256,uint96,uint96) (contracts/Governance/Benqi.sol#261-272) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - nCheckpoints > 0 && checkpoints[delegatee][nCheckpoints - 1].fromBlock == blockNumber (contracts/Governance/Benqi.sol#264)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities
INFO:Detectors:
Benqi._redeemSig(address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) (contracts/Governance/Benqi.sol#160-169) uses timestamp for comparisons
    - Dangerous comparisons:
        - require(bool,string)now <= expiry,Benqi::delegatedBySig: signature expired) (Contracts/Governance/Benqi.sol#167)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp
INFO:Detectors:
Benqi.getBenqid() (contracts/Governance/Benqi.sol#295) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (contracts/Governance/Benqi.sol#297)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage
INFO:Detectors:
Contract Benqi.totalsupply (contracts/Governance/Benqi.sol#14) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
INFO:Detectors:
Benqi.slitherConstructorConstantVariables() (contracts/Governance/Benqi.sol#3-300) uses literals with too many digits:
    - totalsupply = 72000000000000000000 (contracts/Governance/Benqi.sol#14)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits
INFO:Detectors:
delegate(address) should be declared external:
    - Benqi.delegate(address) (contracts/Governance/Benqi.sol#147-149)
delegateBySig(address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) should be declared external:
    - Benqi.delegatedBySig(address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) (contracts/Governance/Benqi.sol#160-169)
getPriorVotes(address,uint256) should be declared external:
    - Benqi.getPriorVotes(address,uint256) (contracts/Governance/Benqi.sol#188-220)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external
INFO:Slither:contracts/governance/Benqi.sol analyzed (1 contracts with 75 detectors), 8 results(s) found
INFO:Slither:use https://crytic.io/ to get access to additional detectors and Github Integration

```

Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol

```

INFO:detectors:
GovernorAlpha.execute(uint256) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#199-207) sends eth to arbitrary user
    Dangerous calls:
        - timelock.executeTransaction.value(proposal.values[1]).proposal.targets[1].proposal.values[1].proposal.signatures[1].proposal.calldatas[1].proposal.eta) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#204)
    Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#functions-that-send-ether-to-arbitrary-destinations
INFO:detectors:
GovernorAlpha._queueOrRevert(address,uint256,string,bytes,uint256) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#194-197) ignores return value by timelock.queueTransaction(target,value,signature,data,eta) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#194)
GovernorAlpha._executePendingAdmin() (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#199-207) ignores return value by timelock.executeTransaction.value(proposal.values[1])(proposal.targets[1].proposal.values[1].proposal.signatures[1].proposal.calldatas[1].proposal.eta) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#204)
GovernorAlpha._queueSettimelockPendingAdmin(address,uint256) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#302-305) ignores return value by timelock.queueTransaction(address(timelock),0,setPendingAdmin(address),abi.encode(newPendingAdmin,eta)) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#304)
GovernorAlpha._executeSettimelockPendingAdmin(address,uint256) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#307-310) ignores return value by timelock.executeTransaction(address(timelock),0,setPendingAdmin(addr),abi.encode(newPendingAdmin,eta)) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#309)
    Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#functions-that-send-ether-to-arbitrary-destinations
INFO:detectors:
GovernorAlpha.cancel(uint256).state (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#210) shadows:
    GovernorAlpha.state(uint256) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#233-251) (function)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing
INFO:detectors:
GovernorAlpha.constructor(address,address,bytes) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#136) lacks a zero-check on :
    guardian = guardian; (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#139)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
INFO:detectors:
GovernorAlpha.execute(uint256) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#199-207) has external calls inside a loop: timelock.executeTransaction.value(proposal.values[i])(proposal.targets[i].proposal.values[i].proposal.signatures[i].proposal.calldatas[i].proposal.eta) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#204)
GovernorAlpha.cancel(uint256) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#209-222) has external calls inside a loop: timelock.cancelTransaction(proposal.targets[i].proposal.values[i].proposal.signatures[i].proposal.calldatas[i].proposal.eta) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#210)
    Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#calls-inside-a-loop
INFO:detectors:
GovernorAlpha._queueOrRevert(address,uint256,string,bytes,uint256) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#194-197) uses timestamp for comparisons
    Dangerous comparisons:
        - proposal.timestamp <= proposal.startTimestamp (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#208)
    Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#timestamp-comparisons
Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#195)
GovernorAlpha.state(uint256) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#223-251) uses timestamp for comparisons
    Dangerous comparisons:
        - block.timestamp <= proposal.startTimestamp (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#208)
        - block.timestamp >= proposal.endTimestamp (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#240)
        - block.timestamp >= add256(proposal.eta, timelock.GRACE_PERIOD()) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#248)
GovernorAlpha.add256(uint256,uint256) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#312-316) uses timestamp for comparisons
    Dangerous comparisons:
        - require(bool,string)(c >= a,addition overflow) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#314)
    Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp
INFO:detectors:
GovernorAlpha.getChainId() (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#323-327) uses assembly
    INLNE ASM (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#325)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-use
INFO:detectors:
GovernorAlpha._castVote(address,uint256,bool) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#268-290) compares to a boolean constant:
    -require(bool,string)(receipt.hasVoted == false,GovernorAlpha._castVote voter already voted) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#276)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#boolean-equality
INFO:detectors:
Function GovernorAlpha._acceptAdmin() (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#292-295) is not in mixedCase
Function GovernorAlpha._advocate() (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#297-300) is not in mixedCase
Function GovernorAlpha._queueSettimelockPendingAdmin(address,uint256) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#302-305) is not in mixedCase
Function GovernorAlpha._executeSettimelockPendingAdmin(address,uint256) (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#307-310) is not in mixedCase
Function TimelockInterface.GracePeriod() (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#333) is not in mixedCase
    Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
INFO:detectors:
GovernorAlpha.quorumVotes() (contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol#9) uses literals with too many digits:
    GovernorAlpha.quorumVotes()

```

Maxmillion.sol

```

INFO:detectors:
Maxmillion.repayBehalfExplicit(address,QlAvax) (contracts/Maxmillion.sol#37-46) sends eth to arbitrary user
    Dangerous calls:
        - QlAvax._repayBehalfValue(borrower) (contracts/Maxmillion.sol#41)
    Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#functions-that-send-ether-to-arbitrary-destinations
INFO:detectors:
QlAvax.requireNoError(uint256,string) (contracts/QlAvax.sol#149-167) uses a weak PRNG: "fullMessage[1 + 3] = bytes1(uint8(48 + (errCode % 10)))" (contracts/QlAvax.sol#163)
    Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#weak-prng
INFO:detectors:
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transfer(address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#34)
    Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-erc20-interface
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8)
    Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-erc20-interface
INFO:detectors:
QlToken.accurateInterest() (contracts/QlToken.sol#184-402) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - accrueBlockTimestampPrior == currentBlockTimestamp (contracts/QlToken.sol#39)
QlToken._mint(address,uint256,bytes32) (contracts/QlToken.sol#184-402) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR could not calculate block delta) (contracts/QlToken.sol#406)
QlToken.balanceOfUnderlying(address) (contracts/QlToken.sol#198-199) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,balance could not be calculated) (contracts/QlToken.sol#193)
QlToken.borrowUnderlying(address,uint256) (contracts/QlToken.sol#273-279) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,borrowUnderlyingRestored: borrowUnderlyingInternal failed) (contracts/QlToken.sol#273)
CarefulMath.divInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#41-47) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - b == 0 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#42)
QlAvax.doTransferIn(address,uint256) (contracts/QlAvax.sol#136-141) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(msg.sender == owner) (contracts/QlAvax.sol#137)
QlToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/QlToken.sol#339-369) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - totalSupply == totalSupply (contracts/QlToken.sol#341)
QlAvax.getGasPrice() (contracts/QlAvax.sol#148-150) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(er == MathError.NO_ERROR) (contracts/QlAvax.sol#149)
QlToken.initializeComptrollerInterface.InterestRateModel(uint256,string,uint256) (contracts/QlToken.sol#25-56) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(accrueBlockTimestamp == 0 && borrowIndex == 0,market may only be initialized once) (contracts/QlToken.sol#32)
QlToken.initializeComptrollerInterface.InterestRateModel(uint256,uint256,uint256) (contracts/QlToken.sol#25-56) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(accrueBlockTimestamp == 0 && borrowIndex == 0,market may only be initialized once) (contracts/QlToken.sol#449)
QlToken.initializeComptrollerInterface.InterestRateModel(uint256,string,uint256) (contracts/QlToken.sol#142-145) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(err == uint256(MathError.NO_ERROR),setting interest rate model failed) (contracts/QlToken.sol#48)
QlToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,QlTokenInterface) (contracts/QlToken.sol#955-1024) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(borrowIndex >= 0 && borrowIndex <= 10000,MathError.LIQUIDATION_FAILED) (contracts/QlToken.sol#1000)
QlToken.liquidateBorrow(address,address,uint256,QlTokenInterface) (contracts/QlToken.sol#955-1024) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(seize == uint256(MathError.NO_ERROR),token seizure failed) (contracts/QlToken.sol#1016)
QlToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QlToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_EXCHANGE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QlToken.sol#530)
QlToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QlToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QlToken.sol#544)
QlToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QlToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QlToken.sol#547)
Exponential.mulExp(ExponentialError,Exp,ExponentialError.Exp) (contracts/Exponential.sol#135-155) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,int)(value == 0,MathError.MUL_OVERFLOW) (contracts/Exponential.sol#152)
CarefulMath.mulInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#24-30) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - a == 0 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#25)
QlToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QlToken.sol#852-919) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.REPAY_BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QlToken.sol#901)
    
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PriceOracle.sol

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INFO:detectors:
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transfer(address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#34)
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#48)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-erc20-interface
INFO:detectors:
QIToken.accurieInterest() (contracts/QIToken.sol#184-402) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - accrualBlockTimestampPrior == currentBlockTimestamp (contracts/QIToken.sol#39)
QIToken.accurieInterest() (contracts/QIToken.sol#184-402) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)natherr == MathError.NO_ERROR,could not calculate block delta) (contracts/QIToken.sol#406)
QIToken.balanceOfUnderlying(address) (contracts/QIToken.sol#190-195) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)natherr == MathError.NO_ERROR,borrowIndex == 0,market may only be initialized once) (contracts/QIToken.sol#32)
QIToken.borrowBalanceStored(address) (contracts/QIToken.sol#271-275) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)err == MathError.NO_ERROR,borrowBalanceStored == borrowBalanceStoredInternal failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#273)
CarefulMath.divInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#41-47) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - b == 0 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#42)
QIToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/QIToken.sol#328-332) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)err == MathError.NO_ERROR,exchangeRateStored == exchangeRateStoredInternal failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#330)
QIToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/QIToken.sol#339-369) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - totalSupply == 0 (contracts/QIToken.sol#341)
QIToken.mintFresh(address,address,uint256,string,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#125-126) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)accrualBlockTimestamp == 0 & borrowIndex == 0,market may only be initialized once) (contracts/QIToken.sol#32)
QIToken.initializeComptrollerInterface.InterestRateModel(uint256,string,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#25-26) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)err == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),setting comptroller failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#40)
QIToken.initializeComptrollerInterface.InterestRateModel(uint256,string,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#25-26) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)err == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),setting comptroller failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#40)
QIToken.liquidateBorrow(address,address,uint256,QITokenInterface) (contracts/QIToken.sol#955-1024) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)amountSeizeError == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_CALCULATE_AMOUNT_SEIZE_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#1000)
QIToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,QITokenInterface) (contracts/QIToken.sol#955-1024) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)selzeError == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),token seizure failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#1014)
QIToken.mint(address,address,uint256,QITokenInterface) (contracts/QIToken.sol#125-126) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)vars.natherr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_EXCHANGE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#36)
QIToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)vars.natherr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#544)
QIToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)vars.natherr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#547)
Exponential.mulExp(ExponentialError,Exp,ExponentialError) (contracts/Exponential.sol#135-155) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - assert(bool)err == MathError.ERROR) (contracts/Exponential.sol#152)
CarefulMath.mulInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#24-30) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - a == 0 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#25)
QIToken.repayBorrow(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#852-910) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)vars.natherr == MathError.NO_ERROR,REPAY_BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#901)
QIToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#852-910) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)vars.natherr == MathError.NO_ERROR,REPAY_BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#904)
QIToken.transferTokens(Msg.sender,Msg.sender,DataStructs.uint256Error) (contracts/QIToken.sol#135-140) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - transferTokensFrom(Address,address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#146-148) uses a dangerous strict equality:
        - transferTokens(Msg.sender,src,dst,amount) == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR) (contracts/QIToken.sol#147)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities
INFO:detectors:
Reentrancy in QIToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,QITokenInterface) (contracts/QIToken.sol#929-944):
External calls:
    - error = @tokenCollateral.accurieInterest() (contracts/QIToken.sol#390)
    - liquidateBorrowFresh(msg.sender,borrower,repayAmount,qlTokenCollateral) (contracts/QIToken.sol#943)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy

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QiAvax.sol

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INFO:detectors:
QiAvax.requireNoError(uint256,string) (contracts/QiAvax.sol#148-167) uses a weak PRNG: "fullMessage[i + 3] = bytes1(uint8(48 + (errCode % 10)))" (contracts/QiAvax.sol#163)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#weak-prng
INFO:detectors:
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transfer(address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#34)
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#48)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-erc20-interface
INFO:detectors:
QIToken.accurieInterest() (contracts/QIToken.sol#184-402) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - accrualBlockTimestampPrior == currentBlockTimestamp (contracts/QIToken.sol#39)
QIToken.accurieInterest() (contracts/QIToken.sol#184-402) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)natherr == MathError.NO_ERROR,could not calculate block delta) (contracts/QIToken.sol#406)
QIToken.balanceOfUnderlying(address) (contracts/QIToken.sol#190-195) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)natherr == MathError.NO_ERROR,balance could not be calculated) (contracts/QIToken.sol#193)
QIToken.borrowBalanceStored(address) (contracts/QIToken.sol#271-275) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)err == MathError.NO_ERROR,borrowBalanceStored == borrowBalanceStoredInternal failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#273)
CarefulMath.divInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#41-47) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - b == 0 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#42)
QiAvax.doTransferIn(address,uint256) (contracts/QiAvax.sol#136-141) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)msg.value == 0,transfer failed) (contracts/QiAvax.sol#137)
QIToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/QIToken.sol#328-332) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)err == MathError.NO_ERROR,exchangeRateStored == exchangeRateStoredInternal failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#330)
QIToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/QIToken.sol#339-369) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - totalSupply == 0 (contracts/QIToken.sol#341)
QiAvax.getCashback() (contracts/QiAvax.sol#148-167) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,)err == MathError.NO_ERROR) (contracts/QiAvax.sol#152)
QIToken.initializeComptrollerInterface.InterestRateModel(uint256,string,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#25-26) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)accrualBlockTimestamp == 0 & borrowIndex == 0,market may only be initialized once) (contracts/QIToken.sol#32)
QIToken.initializeComptrollerInterface.InterestRateModel(uint256,string,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#25-26) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)err == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),setting interest rate model failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#40)
QIToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,QITokenInterface) (contracts/QIToken.sol#955-1024) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)amountSeizeError == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),LIQUIDATE_COMPTROLLER_CALCULATE_AMOUNT_SEIZE_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#1000)
QIToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,QITokenInterface) (contracts/QIToken.sol#955-1024) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)selzeError == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),token seizure failed) (contracts/QIToken.sol#1014)
QIToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)vars.natherr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_EXCHANGE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#536)
QIToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)vars.natherr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#544)
QIToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)vars.natherr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#547)
Exponential.mulExp(ExponentialError,Exp,ExponentialError) (contracts/Exponential.sol#135-155) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - assert(bool)err == MathError.ERROR) (contracts/Exponential.sol#152)
CarefulMath.mulInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#24-30) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - a == 0 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#25)
QIToken.repayBorrow(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#852-910) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)vars.natherr == MathError.NO_ERROR,REPAY_BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#901)
QIToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QIToken.sol#852-910) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)vars.natherr == MathError.NO_ERROR,REPAY_BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QIToken.sol#904)
QiAvax.requireNoError(uint256,string) (contracts/QiAvax.sol#148-167) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - errCode == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR) (contracts/QiAvax.sol#149)
QiAvax.requireNoError(uint256,string) (contracts/QiAvax.sol#148-167) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - 
```

QiToken.sol

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INFO:detectors:
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transfer(address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#34)
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#40)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikl/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-erc20-interface
INFO:detectors:
QiToken.accrueInterest() (contracts/QiToken.sol#184-462) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - accrueBlockTimestamp(currentBlockTimestamp) (contracts/QiToken.sol#393)
QiToken._require(bool,string) (contracts/QiToken.sol#190-195) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string) (nMathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR could not calculate block delta) (contracts/QiToken.sol#406)
QiToken.balanceOfUnderlying(address) (contracts/QiToken.sol#190-195) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(nErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,balance could not be calculated) (contracts/QiToken.sol#193)
QiToken.borrowUnderlying(address) (contracts/QiToken.sol#271-276) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(nErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,borrowUnderlyingFailed: borrowUnderlyingInternal failed) (contracts/QiToken.sol#273)
CarefulMath.divInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#41-47) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    b == 0 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#42)
QiToken.exchangeRateStored() (contracts/QiToken.sol#328-332) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(path == "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",exchangeRateStored: exchangeRateStoredInternal failed) (contracts/QiToken.sol#330)
QiToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/QiToken.sol#339-365) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    totalSupply == 0 (contracts/QiToken.sol#341)
QiToken.initializeControllerInterface(InterestRateModel, string, string, uint64) (contracts/QiToken.sol#25-56) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(accrueBlockTimestamp == 0,markingNotIntialized once) (contracts/QiToken.sol#32)
QiToken._mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QiToken.sol#190-195) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(err == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),setting controller failed) (contracts/QiToken.sol#440)
QiToken.initializeControllerInterface(InterestRateModel,uint256,string,uint64) (contracts/QiToken.sol#25-56) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(err == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),setting interest rate mode failed) (contracts/QiToken.sol#448)
QiToken._mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QiToken.sol#190-195) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(err == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),LIQUIDATE_CONTROLLER_CALCULATE_FAILED: LIQUIDATE_FAILED) (contracts/QiToken.sol#1000)
QiToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QiToken.sol#955-1024) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(setzeErr == 0, (err == NO_ERROR),token seizure failed) (contracts/QiToken.sol#1014)
QiToken._mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QiToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_NEW_TOTAL_SUPPLY_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QiToken.sol#536)
QiToken._mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QiToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QiToken.sol#544)
QiToken._mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QiToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QiToken.sol#547)
ExponentiateMath.exp2(uint256) (contracts/ExponentiateMath.sol#15-155) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - assert(bool)(err2 == MathError.NO_ERROR) (contracts/ExponentiateMath.sol#152)
CarefulMath.mulInt(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#24-36) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    a == 0 (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#25)
QiToken.repayBorrow(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QiToken.sol#190-195) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(vars.mathErr == MathError.REPAY_BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QiToken.sol#901)
QiToken._repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QiToken.sol#852-919) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - require(bool,string)(err == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR),REPAY_BORROW_NEW_TOTAL_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED) (contracts/QiToken.sol#904)
QiToken.transfer(address,uint256) (contracts/QiToken.sol#135-137) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - transferTokens(msg.sender,addr,amount) (contracts/QiToken.sol#136)
QiToken.transferFrom(address,uint256) (contracts/QiToken.sol#146-148) uses a dangerous strict equality:
    - transferTokens(msg.sender,src,dst,amount) == uint256(Error.NO_ERROR) (contracts/QiToken.sol#147)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikl/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities
INFO:detectors:
Reentrancy in QiToken.liquidateBorrowInternal(address,uint256,QiTokenInterface) (contracts/QiToken.sol#929-944):
External calls:
    - error = qitokenCollateral.accrueInterest() (contracts/QiToken.sol#936)
    - liquidateBorrowFresh(msg.sender,borrower,repayAmount,qitokenCollateral) (contracts/QiToken.sol#943)

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QiErc20Delegator.sol

```

INFO:detectors:
QErc20Delegator.delegateTo(address,bytes) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#420-428) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id
    - (success,returnData) = calles.delegatecall(id) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#421)
QErc20Delegator.fallback() (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#401-475) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled function id
    - (success,returnData) = implementation.delegatecall(msg.data) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#405)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikl/Detector-Documentation#controlled-delegatecall
INFO:detectors:
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transfer(address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#34)
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#8-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#40)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikl/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-erc20-interface
INFO:detectors:
QErc20Delegator._setImplementation(address,bool,bytes) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#60-73):
Reentrancy in QErc20Delegator._setImplementation(address,bool,bytes) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#60-73):
External calls:
    - delegateToImplementation(_abi.encodeWithSignature('_resignImplementation')) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#64)
        - (success,returnData) = calles.delegatecall(data) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#621)
State variables written after the calls:
    - Implementation = implementation_.Implementation_(contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#68)
QErc20Delegator.constructor(address,ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8,address,bytes) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#24-52):
External calls:
    - delegateToImplementation(_abi.encodeWithSignature(initializeAddress,address,address,uint256,string,string,uint8),underlying_,comptroller_,interestRateModel_,initialExchangeRateMantissa_,name_,symbol_,decimals_) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#38-45)
        - (success,returnData) = calles.delegatecall(data) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#22)
        - _setImplementation(_implementation_,false,_becomeImplementationData) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#48)
            - (success,returnData) = calles.delegatecall(data) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#421)
State variables written after the calls:
    - admin = admin_ (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#51)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikl/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-1
INFO:detectors:
QErc20Delegator.constructor(address,ComptrollerInterface,InterestRateModel,uint256,string,string,uint8,address,bytes).admin_ (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#31) lacks a zero-check on :
    - admin = admin_ (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#51)
QErc20Delegator._setImplementation(address,bytes).Implementation_ (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#68) lacks a zero-check on :
    - Implementation = implementation_ (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#68)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikl/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
INFO:detectors:
Reentrancy in QErc20Delegator._setImplementation(address,bool,bytes) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#60-73):
External calls:
    - delegateToImplementation(_abi.encodeWithSignature('_resignImplementation')) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#64)
        - (success,returnData) = calles.delegatecall(data) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#621)
    - delegateToImplementation(_abi.encodeWithSignature('_becomeImplementation(bytes)_becomeImplementationDate')) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#70)
        - (success,returnData) = calles.delegatecall(data) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#621)
Event emitted after the calls():
    - NewImplementation(_implementation_,Implementation_) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#72)
        - setImplementation(_implementation_,false,_becomeImplementationData) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#48)
        - NewImplementation(_implementation_,Implementation_) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#72)
            - setImplementation(_implementation_,false,_becomeImplementationData) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#48)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wikl/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
INFO:detectors:
QErc20Delegator.delegateTo(address,bytes) (contracts/QErc20Delegator.sol#420-428) uses assembly

```

Timelock.sol

```

INFO:detectors:
Timelock.constructor(address,uint256).admin_(contracts/Timelock.sol#20) lacks a zero-check on :
  - admin == admin_(contracts/Timelock.sol#30)
Timelock.setPendingAdmin(address).pendingAdmin_(contracts/Timelock.sol#53) lacks a zero-check on :
  - pendingAdmin == pendingAdmin_(contracts/Timelock.sol#55)
Timelock.executeTransaction(address,uint256,string,bytes,uint256).target_(contracts/Timelock.sol#80) lacks a zero-check on :
  - (success,returnData) = target.call.value(value)(callData) (contracts/Timelock.sol#99)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
INFO:detectors:
Reentrancy in Timelock.executeTransaction(address,uint256,string,bytes,uint256) (contracts/Timelock.sol#80-105):
  External calls:
    - (success,returnData) = target.call.value(value)(callData) (contracts/Timelock.sol#99)
    Event emitted after each call(s):
      Timelock::queueTransaction(address,uint256,uint256,value,signature,data,eta) (contracts/Timelock.sol#102)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
INFO:detectors:
Timelock.queueTransaction(address,uint256,uint256,value,signature,data,eta) (contracts/Timelock.sol#60-69) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
  - require(bool,(getBlockTimestamp() > eta)) == eta, Timelock::executeTransaction: Estimated execution block must satisfy delay. (contracts/Timelock.sol#85)
  - require(bool,(getBlockTimestamp() == eta)) == eta->addGracePeriod(), Timelock::executeTransaction: Transaction is stale. (contracts/Timelock.sol#86)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp
INFO:detectors:
SafeMath.add(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/SafeMath.sol#43-48) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.div(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/SafeMath.sol#12-15) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/SafeMath.sol#147-154) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256) (contracts/SafeMath.sol#167-169) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mul(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/SafeMath.sol#182-185) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mul(uint256,uint256) (contracts/SafeMath.sol#85-97) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.sub(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/SafeMath.sol#170-173) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.sub(uint256,uint256) (contracts/SafeMath.sol#58-60) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.sub(uint256,uint256,string) (contracts/SafeMath.sol#70-75) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
INFO:detectors:
Low level call in Timelock.executeTransaction(address,uint256,string,bytes,uint256) (contracts/Timelock.sol#80-105):
  - (success,returnData) = target.call.value(value)(callData) (contracts/Timelock.sol#99)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls
INFO:detectors:
setDelay(uint256) should be declared external:
  - Timelock.setDelay(uint256) (contracts/Timelock.sol#36-43)
acceptAdmin() should be declared external:
  - Timelock.acceptAdmin() (contracts/Timelock.sol#45-51)
setPendingAdmin(address) should be declared external:
  - Timelock.setPendingAdmin(address) (contracts/Timelock.sol#53-58)
queueTransaction(address,uint256,uint256,value,signature,data,eta) should be declared external:
  - Timelock.queueTransaction(address,uint256,uint256,value,signature,data,eta) (contracts/Timelock.sol#60-69)
cancelTransaction(address,uint256,uint256,value,signature,data,eta) should be declared external:
  - Timelock.cancelTransaction(address,uint256,uint256,value,signature,data,eta) (contracts/Timelock.sol#71-78)
executeTransaction(address,uint256,string,bytes,uint256) should be declared external:
  - Timelock.executeTransaction(address,uint256,string,bytes,uint256) (contracts/Timelock.sol#80-105)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external

```

Unitroller.sol

```

INFO:detectors:
Unitroller.lock() (contracts/Unitroller.sol#135-147) uses delegatecall to a input-controlled Function id
  - (success) = controllerImplementation.delegatecall(msg.data) (contracts/Unitroller.sol#137)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#controlled-delegatecall
INFO:detectors:
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#80-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transfer(address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#34)
EIP20NonStandardInterface (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#80-70) has incorrect ERC20 function interface:EIP20NonStandardInterface.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/EIP20NonStandardInterface.sol#48)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-erc20-interface
INFO:detectors:
QToken.acquireInterest() (contracts/QToken.sol#284-462) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - accrualLockTimestampPrior == currentBlockTimestamp (contracts/QToken.sol#99)
QToken.acquireInterest() (contracts/QToken.sol#184-462) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - MathError.NO_ERROR.could not calculate block delta (contracts/QToken.sol#406)
QToken.borrowBalanceStoredInternal() (contracts/QToken.sol#191-204) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - require(bool,(error == MathError.NO_ERROR.balance could not be calculated)) (contracts/QToken.sol#193)
QToken.borrowBalanceStored(address) (contracts/QToken.sol#271-275) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - require(bool,(error == MathError.NO_ERROR.borrowBalanceStoredInternal failed)) (contracts/QToken.sol#273)
CarefulMath.divUint(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#41-47) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - totleSupply() (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#32)
QToken.exchangeRateStored() (contracts/QToken.sol#328-332) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - require(bool,(error == MathError.NO_ERROR.exchangeRateStored)) (contracts/QToken.sol#330)
QToken.exchangeRateStoredInternal() (contracts/QToken.sol#339-369) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - totleSupply() (contracts/QToken.sol#341)
QToken.initializeControllerInterface(IControllerInterface,IERC20Interface,IERC20Interface) (contracts/QToken.sol#25-56) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - require(bool,(error == uint256(error.NO_ERROR),setting controller failed)) (contracts/QToken.sol#40)
QToken.initializeControllerInterface(IControllerInterface,IERC20Interface,IERC20Interface) (contracts/QToken.sol#25-56) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - require(bool,(error == uint256(error.NO_ERROR),setting interest rate model failed)) (contracts/QToken.sol#40)
QToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,uint256,string,string,uint8) (contracts/QToken.sol#955-1024) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - require(bool,(amountSeizeError == uint256(error.NO_ERROR),LIQUIDATE_CONTROLLER_CALCULATE_AMOUNT_SEIZE_FAILED)) (contracts/QToken.sol#1000)
QToken.liquidateBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256,QTokenInterface,error) (contracts/QToken.sol#955-1024) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - require(bool,(error == uint256(error.NO_ERROR),LIQUIDATE_CONTROLLER_CALCULATE_AMOUNT_SEIZE_FAILED)) (contracts/QToken.sol#1000)
QToken.mintFresh(address,uint128) (contracts/QToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - require(bool,(error == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_EXCHANGE_CALCULATION_FAILED)) (contracts/QToken.sol#530)
QToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - require(bool,(error == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_NEW_TOKEN_UPPER_CALCULATION_FAILED)) (contracts/QToken.sol#544)
QToken.mintFresh(address,uint256) (contracts/QToken.sol#497-562) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - require(bool,(error == MathError.NO_ERROR,MINT_NEW_ACCOUNT_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED)) (contracts/QToken.sol#547)
Exponential.mulExp(ExponentialError,Exp,ExponentialError).Exp (contracts/Exponential.sol#135-155) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - assert(bool,(err == MathError.NO_ERROR)) (contracts/Exponential.sol#152)
CarefulMath.mulUint(uint256,uint256) (contracts/CarefulMath.sol#24-30) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - (contract(CarefulMath.sol#24-30))
QToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QToken.sol#852-919) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - require(bool,(error == MathError.NO_ERROR,REPAY_BORROW_NEW_ACCOUNT_BORROW_BALANCE_CALCULATION_FAILED)) (contracts/QToken.sol#901)
QToken.repayBorrowFresh(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QToken.sol#852-919) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - transferTokens(QToken.sender,msg.sender,dst,amount) == uint256(error.NO_ERROR) (contracts/QToken.sol#136)
QToken.transfer(address,uint256) (contracts/QToken.sol#135-137) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - transferTokens(QToken.sender,msg.sender,dst,amount) == uint256(error.NO_ERROR) (contracts/QToken.sol#148)
QToken.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (contracts/QToken.sol#146-148) uses a dangerous strict equality:
  - transferTokens(QToken.sender,src,dst,amount) == uint256(error.NO_ERROR) (contracts/QToken.sol#147)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities
INFO:detectors:

```

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

WhitePaperInterestModel.sol

According to the test results, most of the findings found by slither were considered as false positives. Relevant findings were reviewed by the auditors.

3.10 AUTOMATED SECURITY SCAN

Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues, and to identify low-hanging fruit on the targets for this engagement. Among the tools used was MythX, a security analysis service for Ethereum smart contracts. MythX performed a scan on the testers machine and sent the compiled results to the analyzers to locate any vulnerabilities. Only security-related findings were considered as in-scope.

Results:

Comptroller.sol

Report for Comptroller.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/ba61fc34-dde6-4f9a-9acf-0c665ffc8c63>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
15	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.
91	(SWC-128) DoS With Block Gas Limit	Low	Implicit loop over unbounded data structure.
111	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
192	(SWC-128) DoS With Block Gas Limit	Medium	Implicit loop over unbounded data structure.
195	(SWC-128) DoS With Block Gas Limit	Medium	Loop over unbounded data structure.
660	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
686	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
717	(SWC-128) DoS With Block Gas Limit	Medium	Implicit loop over unbounded data structure.
718	(SWC-128) DoS With Block Gas Limit	Medium	Loop over unbounded data structure.
809	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
925	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.
938	(SWC-128) DoS With Block Gas Limit	Medium	Loop over unbounded data structure.
987	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
1004	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
1014	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
1024	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
1033	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
1042	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
1105	(SWC-119) Shadowing State Variables	Low	Local variable shadows a state variable.
1128	(SWC-119) Shadowing State Variables	Low	Local variable shadows a state variable.
1206	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
1207	(SWC-128) DoS With Block Gas Limit	Medium	Implicit loop over unbounded data structure.
1275	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
1287	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
1297	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
1318	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
1319	(SWC-128) DoS With Block Gas Limit	Low	Implicit loop over unbounded data structure.

CarefulMath.sol

Report for contracts/CarefulMath.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/10d2e68f-8ae8-42c2-b733-d629fd32b282>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Chainlink/BenqiChainlinkOracle.sol

Report for Chainlink/BenqiChainlinkOracle.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/27f7ec09-a80a-4bae-a92b-e9f9ecc94c38>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
23	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.

BaseJumpRateModelV2.sol

Report for BaseJumpRateModelV2.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/8eb67782-5d77-41fc-b979-44e00f510c00>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
115	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.

Governance/Benqi.sol

Report for Governance/Benqi.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/ba61fc34-dde6-4f9a-9acf-0c665ffc8c63>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
147	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
160	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
188	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
189	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomness.
262	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomness.

Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol

Report for contracts/Governance/GovernorAlpha.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/566625a1-f990-42a3-8faa-27715380ec04>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
142	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
143	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomness.
183	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
199	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
209	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
214	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomness.
224	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
229	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
255	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
259	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
272	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomness.
273	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomness.
292	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
297	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
302	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
307	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.

Maxmillion.sol

Report for Maxmillion.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/c96c1854-1955-4700-af88-abef3920372e>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
27	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
42	(SWC-134) Message call with hardcoded gas amount	Low	Call with hardcoded gas amount.

PriceOracle.sol

Report for PriceOracle.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/8acbf09c-4967-45da-b419-143c9bf1195b>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

QiAvax.sol

Report for QiAvax.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/c96c1854-1955-4700-af88-abef3920372e>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
145	(SWC-134) Message call with hardcoded gas amount	Low	Call with hardcoded gas amount.

QiToken.sol

Report for QiToken.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/ba61fc34-dde6-4f9a-9acf-0c665ffc8c63>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
25	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
1353	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.

QiErc20Delegator.sol

Report for QiErc20Delegator.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/e15c09c6-930d-42fa-a0fa-2966d89880aa>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
273	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
282	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
292	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
311	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
357	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
408	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.

Timelock.sol

Report for Timelock.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/6e895b2d-94a2-42da-b481-7b03881b2b16>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
36	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
45	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
53	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
60	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
71	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
80	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
95	(SWC-128) DoS With Block Gas Limit	Low	Potentially unbounded data structure passed to builtin.

Unitroller.sol

Report for Unitroller.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/ba61fc34-dde6-4f9a-9acf-0c665ffc8c63>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
38	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
58	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
85	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.
108	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.

WhitePaperInterestRateModel.sol

Report for WhitePaperInterestRateModel.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/11a69f47-9961-47dc-9284-b7138fa72403>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
79	(SWC-000) Unknown	Medium	Function could be marked as external.

THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING
HALBORN