

# Audit Report July, 2022



For





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## **Executive Summary**

Pixel War DAO **Project Name** 

The project contains an ERC20 Token called PXP with 1 billion supply **Overview** 

> which will be used for Vesting, Staking and exchanging 1155 tokens with the OrderBook. Staking allows users to deposit PXP in exchange for a governance token. Users can stake PXP and earn additional PXP

as rewards which is in proportion to their share in the pool.

1155OrderBook lists whitelisted ERC1155 tokens escrowed in the

contract, for sale in exchange for PXP.

**Timeline** 26th May, 2022 to 9th June, 2022

**Method** Manual Review, Functional Testing, Automated Testing etc.


**Scope of Audit** The scope of this audit was to analyse PixelWar DAO codebase for

quality, security, and correctness.

https://github.com/PixelWarOrg/dao-contracts

**Commit ID** 0455692954d8bc3b1b0b03eef4f3226a356e5a31

4aa5804e52940f3d4b15530f71321d40c54a3e26 Fixed In



	High	Medium	Low	Informational
Open Issues	0	0	0	0
Acknowledged Issues	0	2	3	2
Partially Resolved Issues	0	0	0	0
Resolved Issues	3	0	1	7

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01



### **Types of Severities**

### High

A high severity issue or vulnerability means that your smart contract can be exploited. Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance or functionality, and we recommend these issues be fixed before moving to a live environment.

### **Medium**

The issues marked as medium severity usually arise because of errors and deficiencies in the smart contract code. Issues on this level could potentially bring problems, and they should still be fixed.

#### Low

Low-level severity issues can cause minor impact and or are just warnings that can remain unfixed for now. It would be better to fix these issues at some point in the future.

### Informational

These are severity issues that indicate an improvement request, a general question, a cosmetic or documentation error, or a request for information. There is low-to-no impact.

## **Types of Issues**

### **Open**

Security vulnerabilities identified that must be resolved and are currently unresolved.

#### Resolved

These are the issues identified in the initial audit and have been successfully fixed.

## **Acknowledged**

Vulnerabilities which have been acknowledged but are yet to be resolved.

### **Partially Resolved**

Considerable efforts have been invested to reduce the risk/impact of the security issue, but are not completely resolved.

## **Checked Vulnerabilities**

Re-entrancy

✓ Timestamp Dependence

Gas Limit and Loops

Exception Disorder

✓ Gasless Send

✓ Use of tx.origin

Compiler version not fixed

Address hardcoded

Divide before multiply

Integer overflow/underflow

Dangerous strict equalities

Tautology or contradiction

Return values of low-level calls

Missing Zero Address Validation

Private modifier

Revert/require functions

Using block.timestamp

Multiple Sends

✓ Using SHA3

Using suicide

Using throw

Using inline assembly



## **Techniques and Methods**

Throughout the audit of smart contract, care was taken to ensure:

- The overall quality of code.
- Use of best practices.
- Code documentation and comments match logic and expected behaviour.
- Token distribution and calculations are as per the intended behaviour mentioned in the whitepaper.
- Implementation of ERC-20 token standards.
- Efficient use of gas.
- Code is safe from re-entrancy and other vulnerabilities.

The following techniques, methods and tools were used to review all the smart contracts.

### **Structural Analysis**

In this step, we have analysed the design patterns and structure of smart contracts. A thorough check was done to ensure the smart contract is structured in a way that will not result in future problems.

### **Static Analysis**

Static analysis of smart contracts was done to identify contract vulnerabilities. In this step, a series of automated tools are used to test the security of smart contracts.

### **Code Review / Manual Analysis**

Manual analysis or review of code was done to identify new vulnerabilities or verify the vulnerabilities found during the static analysis. Contracts were completely manually analysed, their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the whitepaper. Besides, the results of the automated analysis were manually verified.

### **Gas Consumption**

In this step, we have checked the behaviour of smart contracts in production. Checks were done to know how much gas gets consumed and the possibilities of optimization of code to reduce gas consumption.

#### **Tools and Platforms used for Audit**

Remix IDE, Truffle, Truffle Team, Solhint, Mythril, Slither, Solidity statistic analysis.



## **Manual Testing**

## A. Contract - PXP

## **High Severity Issues**

No issues found

## **Medium Severity Issues**

No issues found

## **Low Severity Issues**

### A.1 Floating Pragma

### **Description**

Contracts should be deployed with the same compiler version and flags that they have been tested with thoroughly. Locking the pragma helps ensure that contracts do not accidentally get deployed using, for example, an outdated compiler version that might negatively introduce bugs that affect the contract system.

#### Remediation

Here all the in-scope contracts have an unlocked pragma, it is recommended to use 0.8.12 version.

#### **Auditor's Comment**

As per discussion with Pixelwar team and as Hardhat does not supporting fixed pragma 0.8.12 so ,we recommend, 0.8.4 - 0.8.7 Use a simple pragma version that allows any of these versions. Consider using the latest version of Solidity for testing.

#### **Status**

**Acknowledged** 



### A.2 State variables that could be declared immutable

## **Description**

The value 1000000000 \* 1e18 should be declared as a constant in the contract instead of hardcoding.

### Recommendation

Add the immutable attributes to state variables that never change after contract creation.

### **Status**

Resolved



## **B. Contract - OrderBook**

## **High Severity Issues**

### B.1 Non-whitelisted NFTs and Pay Gem tokens can be used for creating orders

### **Description**

The function offer() is a public function which can be called with any ERC20 and ERC1155 address for pay\_gem and buy\_gem addresses respectively.

### Remediation

It is recommended to restrict the visibility to internal instead of public so that an offer can be created only after verification from make() function

### **Status**

Resolved

## **Medium Severity Issues**

No issues found



## **Low Severity Issues**

### B.2 Renounce ownership

### **Description**

Typically, the contract's owner is the account that deploys the contract. As a result, the owner is able to perform certain privileged activities on his behalf. The renounceOwnership function is used in smart contracts to renounce ownership. Otherwise, if the contract's ownership has not been transferred previously, it will never have an Owner, which is risky.

#### Remediation

It is advised that the Owner cannot call renounceOwnership without first transferring ownership to a different address. Additionally, if a multi-signature wallet is utilized, executing the renounceOwnership method for two or more users should be confirmed. Alternatively, the Renounce Ownership functionality can be disabled by overriding it.

#### **Status**

**Acknowledged** 

### B.3 Add external modifier instead of public

## **Description**

It is recommended to use external access modifier instead of public for the following functions which are not called from the contract:

- bump()
- getOffer()
- make()
- kill()
- take()

### Remediation

As per the solidity security recommendation, the functions should first update the contract states and then interact with external contracts. Please refer solidity documentation <u>here</u>.

#### **Status**

**Acknowledged** 



### B.4 Presence of unused code

Line	Function - offer() and make(), variables
84	84 bool locked;
274	// Make a new offer. Takes funds from the caller into market escrow.  // Make a new offer. Takes funds from the caller into market escrow.  function offer(  uint256 pay_amt,  IERC20 pay_gem,  uint256 buy_amt,  IERC1155 buy_gem,  uint256 token_id  public nonReentrant returns (uint256 id) {  require(uint256(pay_amt) == pay_amt);  require(uint256(buy_amt) == buy_amt);  require(pay_amt > 0);  require(buy_amt > 0);

### **Description**

The program contains code that is not essential for execution, i.e. makes no state changes and has no side effects that alter data or control flow, such that removal of the code would have no impact on functionality or correctness.

#### Remediation

We recommend removing the unused code.

- The variable locked is not used anywhere in the contract.
- The variable pay\_gem can be removed from params as its value is already present in storage.

### **Auditor's Comment for Variable pay\_gem**

As you have removed it from make() and used storage variable instead for calling offer(). But we can recommend you to remove it from offer() as well along with the check: require(address(pay\_gem) == payGemAddress, "Wrong pay\_gem specified"); This will save some gas here.

#### **Status**

**Resolved** 



## B.5 Missing Error messages

## **Description**

The require statements miss error messages which are used to describe the reason for revert.

### Recommendation

It is recommended to add messages in require statement to make the debugging process easier.

#### **Status**

**Resolved** 

### **B.6** General Recommendation

### **Description**

The contracts do not follow naming conventions and the official solidity style guide. It is recommended to improve the readability and code quality of the contracts.

### **Auditor's Comment**

There are still some indentation issues (2 spaces instead of 4 spaces)

#### **Status**

**Resolved** 

## **C. Contract - Staking**

## **High Severity Issues**

## C.1 Wrong check for periodFinish

Line	Function - setRewardsDuration()
250	require( block.timestamp <= periodFinish, "Previous rewards period must be complete before changing the duration for the new period"  ;

## **Description**

The function setRewardsDuration() checks if the periodFinish is greater than the current time but message says the previous reward period must finish before new period.

### Remediation

It is recommended to update the check (block.timestamp <= periodFinish) to: block.timestamp > periodFinish

#### **Status**

**Resolved** 

## **Medium Severity Issues**

#### C.2 Centralization Risk

### **Description**

The function revoke() allows the contract owner to remove all the funds collected in staking contract. This poses a risk for the token holders where their funds can be moved by the contract owner at any time.

### Remediation

We advise the client to handle the governance account carefully to avoid any potential hack. We also advise the client to consider the following solutions: with reasonable latency for community awareness on privileged operations; Multisig with community-voted 3rd-party independent co-signers; DAO or Governance module increasing transparency and community involvement;

#### **Status**

**Acknowledged** 

## **Low Severity Issues**

### C.3 Add external modifier instead of public

## **Description**

It is recommended to use external access modifier instead of public for the following functions which are not called from the contract:

- getRewardForDuration()
- revoke()

### Remediation

As per the solidity security recommendation, the functions should first update the contract states and then interact with external contracts.

Please refer solidity documentation *here*.

### Status

**Resolved** 



### C.4 General Recommendation

## **Description**

The contracts do not follow naming conventions and the official solidity style guide. It is recommended to improve the readability and code quality of the contracts.

### **Status**

**Acknowledged** 

Auditor's Comment: There are still some indentation issues (2 spaces instead of 4 spaces



## **D. Contract - Mission**

## **High Severity Issues**

No issues found

## **Medium Severity Issues**

### D.1 Centralization Risk

### **Description**

The function adminEmergencyWithdraw() allows the contract owner to remove all the funds collected in staking contract. This poses a risk for the token holders where their funds can be moved by the contract owner at any time.

#### Remediation

We advise the client to handle the governance account carefully to avoid any potential hack. We also advise the client to consider the following solutions: with reasonable latency for community awareness on privileged operations; Multisig with community-voted 3rd-party independent co-signers; DAO or Governance module increasing transparency and community involvement;

#### **Status**

**Acknowledged** 

## **Low Severity Issues**

No issues found

### D.2 Presence of unused code

### **Description**

The program contains code that is not essential for execution, i.e. makes no state changes and has no side effects that alter data or control flow, such that removal of the code would have no impact on functionality or correctness.

### Remediation

We recommend removing the unused variable burn

### **Status**

**Fixed** 

## D.3 Misleading Error messages

Line	Function - create_lock() & increase_unlock_time()
75	require(_days >= MINDAYS, "Voting lock can be 7 days min"); require(_days <= MAXDAYS, "Voting lock can be 4 years max");

## **Description**

The following require statements have misleading error messages. The min time and max time is declared different in the contract.

### Remediation

It is recommended to update the messages in require statements.

### **Status**

**Resolved** 

### D.4 State Variable Default Visibility

### **Description**

Labeling the visibility explicitly makes it easier to catch incorrect assumptions about who can access the variable.

- IERC721 heroToken
- IERC20 PXP

### Remediation

Variables can be specified as being public, internal or private. Explicitly define visibility for all state variables. Ref: <a href="https://swcregistry.io/docs/SWC-108">https://swcregistry.io/docs/SWC-108</a>

#### **Status**

**Resolved** 

### D.5 General Recommendation

## **Description**

The contracts do not follow naming conventions and the official solidity style guide. It is recommended to improve the readability and code quality of the contracts.

#### **Status**

### **Acknowledged**

**Auditor's Comment: T**here are still some indentation issues (2 spaces instead of 4 spaces)

## **E.** Contract - Vesting

## **High Severity Issues**

### E.1 Contain fallback function

## **Description**

The contract contains receive() and fallback() to receive ethers but the purpose can be resolved with receive() function only. Since the fallback functions is not only called for plain ether transfers (without data) but also when no other function matches. If the contract is used incorrectly, functions that do not exist are called.

### Remediation

It is recommended to remove the fallback() function and add proper checks in the receive() function to protect the contract and allow only known sources to send the ETH to the contract.

#### **Status**

**Fixed** 

## **Medium Severity Issues**

No issues found

## **Low Severity Issues**

No issues found

## E.2 Missing Error messages

## **Description**

The contract does not contain error messages for a lot of require statements.

### Remediation

It is recommended to add the messages in require statements to improve readability and make it user-friendly.

### **Status**

**Fixed** 

## **Functional Testing**

### Some of the tests performed are mentioned below

- Should be able to deploy and mint the initial token supply.
- Should be able to create make and take orders for gems.
- Should be able to transfer ERC-20 and ERC-1155 tokens to and from orderbook.
- Should be able to buy the tokens from orderbook.
- Should revert if order is cancelled
- Should be able stake and unstake the tokens.
- Should allow users to receive rewards at the end of stake
- Should be able to withdraw & emergencyWithdraw tokens with penalty
- Should allow owner to vest
- Should allow the owner to set the needed details
- Should allow the beneficiary to collect the vested funds according to the time

## **Automated Tests**

No major issues were found after using Slither and Mythril. Some false positive errors were reported by the tools. All the other issues have been categorized above according to their level of severity.

## **Closing Summary**

In this report, we have considered the security of the PixelWar. We performed our audit according to the procedure described above.

Some issues of Medium, Low and informational severity were found, Some suggestions and best practices are also provided in order to improve the code quality and security posture.

## **Disclaimer**

QuillAudits smart contract audit is not a security warranty, investment advice, or an endorsement of the PixelWar Platform. This audit does not provide a security or correctness guarantee of the audited smart contracts.

The statements made in this document should not be interpreted as investment or legal advice, nor should its authors be held accountable for decisions made based on them. Securing smart contracts is a multistep process. One audit cannot be considered enough. We recommend that the PixelWarTeam put in place a bug bounty program to encourage further analysis of the smart contract by other third parties.



## **About QuillAudits**

QuillAudits is a secure smart contracts audit platform designed by QuillHash Technologies. We are a team of dedicated blockchain security experts and smart contract auditors determined to ensure that Smart Contract-based Web3 projects can avail the latest and best security solutions to operate in a trustworthy and risk-free ecosystem.



500+ **Audits Completed** 



\$15B Secured



500K Lines of Code Audited



## **Follow Our Journey**

























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