Origin OETH Integration Audit

OPENZEPPELIN SECURITY | **JUNE 5, 2023**   Security Audits

OETH Integration

June 5, 2023

This security assessment was prepared by **OpenZeppelin**.

Table of Contents

Summary

Type
    DeFi
Timeline
    From 2023-05-3
    To 2023-05-11
Languages
    Solidity

Total Issues
    21 (10 resolved)
Critical Severity Issues
    0 (0 resolved)
High Severity Issues
    0 (0 resolved)
Medium Severity Issues
    1 (1 resolved)
Low Severity Issues
    9 (3 resolved)
Notes & Additional Information
    11 (6 resolved)

- The commit `508921bd39f988fa61b60cea372b910725ff7bd0` of pull request #1271.
- The commit `757ad13fa07ecdff058e55d9beff3c98d5d186a2` of pull request #1341.

In scope were the following contracts:

```
contracts
├── strategies
│       ├── ConvexEthMetaStrategy.sol
│       └── Generalized4626Strategy.sol
├── oracle
│       └── OracleRouter.sol
└── vault
        ├── VaultCore.sol
        └── VaultAdmin.sol
```

System Overview

The changes to the existing OUSD vault codebase introduce support for OETH, which is deployed independently. The code broadens the vault's functionality, enabling it to accommodate yield-generating collateral tokens instead of just stablecoins, so both vaults can use the same codebase. This is achieved by mapping collateral amounts to the corresponding "base token" (USD or ETH) before using them in calculations. The OETH vault will initially be collateralized with Rocket Pool ETH (rETH), Lido Staked ETH (stETH), Frax Ether (frxETH) and Wrapped Ether (WETH). These new tokens are priced using the corresponding Chainlink data feed. To learn more about how the vault works, refer to the following audit report.

We also reviewed a new `Generalized4626Strategy` contract, specifically engineered to support investing collateral into an ERC-4626-compliant vault. This will be used to invest the frxETH.

adapted from an existing Convex Finance strategy, explained in our previous audit report.

Security Model & Trust Assumptions

Minimal modifications were made to the Origin protocol governance system. Therefore, the assumptions are nearly identical to those listed in the published Origin Governance Audit and Origin Dollar Audit reports (1 and 2).

Slight deviations of note include:

- The system now staked ETH derivatives as collateral. Although the system has always relied on the collateral tokens maintaining their expected value, there is now an additional specific mechanism (i.e., slashing) that could undermine this assumption. The Origin team has reviewed the relevant tokens and concluded that this risk is minimal.
- The system relies on additional Chainlink price feeds to support the larger number of collateral tokens, which are presumed to function reliably and accurately.
- The new strategies invest funds in Curve's ETH-OETH pool and the Convex Finance Booster contract, and they are granted infinite allowance to spend the strategies' assets. Therefore, the new strategies rely on these investment contracts to function correctly and safely.
- The new vault code removes the call to the automatic OGN Buyback mechanism. The `Buyback` contract is configured to only perform manual swaps anyway, so this should be functionally equivalent.
- When minting new OUSD or OETH, the price of the deposit (rather than the equivalent number of base units) determines whether the deposit is large enough to trigger a rebase or to allocate vault funds to strategies. This accounts for the possibility of unexpected collateral prices.

Data feeds may be outdated

Chainlink's documentation recommends validating that prices returned by their feeds are recent and fall within reasonable bounds. The `price` function of the `OracleRouterBase` and the `OETHOracleRouter` contracts do not validate these properties directly, although the vault independently requires the price to be within 30% of the expected value. In addition, consider confirming the `updatedAt` parameter is suitably recent to ensure users can mint and redeem OUSD and OETH tokens at a reasonable market price.

Update: *Resolved in pull request #1491 at commit 9cc9626.*

Low Severity

Missing docstrings

Throughout the codebase there are several parts that do not have docstrings. For instance:

- Line 9 in `OracleRouter.sol`
- Line 57 in `OracleRouter.sol`
- Line 77 in `OracleRouter.sol`
- Line 125 in `OracleRouter.sol`
- Line 156 in `OracleRouter.sol`
- Line 159 in `OracleRouter.sol`
- Line 191 in `VaultAdmin.sol`
- Line 750 in `VaultCore.sol`

In addition, the `initialize` function of the `ConvexEthMetaStrategy` contract is missing the `@param` comment for its `_ptokens` parameter.

Consider thoroughly documenting all functions (and their parameters) that are part of any contract's public API. Functions implementing sensitive functionality, even if not public, should be clearly documented as well. When writing docstrings, consider following the Ethereum Natural Specification Format (NatSpec).

Update: *Resolved in pull request #1493 at commit 1e6e230.*

tokens. This allowance can also be renewed by the governor. However, the pool accepts ETH directly and never interacts with the WETH token.

In the interest of limiting the attack surface, consider removing this unnecessary allowance.

Update: Resolved in pull request #1494 at commit 1be6d8.

Minting is still possible even if redemptions are not

When redeeming OUSD or OETH, the corresponding amount of each collateral token is calculated. The operation will fail if any of the tokens drift too far from the expected price. However, when minting new OUSD or OETH, only the deposited collateral needs to be within the acceptable range. This introduces the possibility that users can deposit funds but will be unable to withdraw them.

In the interest of predictability, consider preventing deposits unless all collateral tokens are redeemable. This would help ensure that deposits and withdrawals are enabled and disabled together during unexpected market conditions.

Update: Acknowledged, not resolved. The Origin team stated:

> *For code simplicity, OUSD/OETH prioritizes protecting the protcool over protecting interacting users. If a user mints with a non-depegged coin when another coin is depegged, this is a benefit for the protocol.*

Imbalanced token transfers

The `ConvexEthMetaStrategy` contract invests the exact deposit amount but withdraws *at least* the withdrawal amount. This discrepancy means there could be stray ETH remaining in the contract after each withdrawal. Although this ETH is accounted for in the contract balance, it won't be utilized until an administrator invokes the `withdrawAll` function.

Consider accounting for the contract balance when deciding how many LP tokens to redeem, so that any stray ETH is automatically reused.

Update: Acknowledged, not resolved. The Origin team stated:

Inconsistent asset variables

When initializing the `Generalized4626Strategy` contract, the generic asset variables are set and then the new token variables are redundantly set. If the contract is initialized with multiple asset pairs, or another asset/platform token pair is added, the existing `shareToken` and `assetToken` variables will be overwritten. On the other hand, if an asset is removed, the `shareToken` and `assetToken` will not be affected, and the contract will continue to allow deposits and withdrawals using those tokens. This can lead to inconsistencies in both directions, where the contract incorrectly appears to support unsupported assets or vice versa.

A similar observation applies to the `ConvexEthMetaStrategy` contract, which has variables for WETH and the LP token, even though they are also recorded as the asset and platform token. In this case, the redundant variable will not be overwritten if a new pair of tokens is added, but the other inconsistencies still apply.

In the interest of consistency and predictability, consider using the existing variables to track the asset and share tokens, instead of introducing new ones. The `_abstractSetPToken` function can be used to ensure there is at most one active asset-share token pair.

Update: Acknowledged, not resolved. The Origin team stated:

> *Acknowledged. In* `Generalized4626Strategy`*, we feel that the redundancy in the variables improves the code's comprehensibility.*

Indefinite allowances

The `Generalized4626Strategy` and `ConvexEthMetaStrategy` contracts both approve token allowances for their respective platform contracts. They also include a mechanism for the governor to refresh those allowances. However, there is no mechanism to revoke the allowances if the platform becomes untrustworthy.

Consider allowing the governor to revoke all token allowances.

Update: Acknowledged, not resolved. The Origin team stated:

is empty except for dust.

Possible rounding overcorrection

When withdrawing ETH, the `ConvexEthMetaStrategy` first calculates the number of LP tokens to burn. This calculation <u>adds 1 to the conceptual calculation</u> to account for possible rounding errors. However, this means that the calculated value could exceed the contract's LP token balance, and the contract would attempt to <u>redeem more tokens than it has</u>. Consider restricting the redeemed LP tokens to the contract's token balance.

Update: Acknowledged, not resolved. The Origin team stated:

> *We've decided to rather retain the over-corrected version of the function and to not do an additional balance check call that would make the function more gas expensive.*

Potentially misleading platform token

Investment strategies maintain a <u>token mapping</u> that tracks the platform-specific investment token corresponding to each invested asset. Typically, a user can review the <u>deposit and withdrawal events</u> to identify when funds are swapped for the platform token and vice versa.

However, the `ConvexEthMetaStrategy` invests funds in a two-step process, where ETH is <u>deposited in a Curve pool</u> and then the curve LP tokens are <u>deposited to Convex finance</u>. A user tracking token balances would consider the gauge tokens as representing the investment, since the strategy does not hold any Curve LP tokens, but the events treat the Curve LP token <u>as the platform token</u>. Consider treating the gauge token as the platform token, or including another parameter in the events to distinguish the platform token from the strategy holdings.

Update: Acknowledged, not resolved. The Origin team stated:

> *There is no ERC-20 token created as a result of deploying the LP token to Gauge. Curve LP tokens are the only ERC-20 token that gets moved around as a consequence of deploying liquidity to Curve and deploying to Convex gauge. Convex Gauge just receives that token and reports its balance when asked. This is how Convex works by design and it is somewhat*

Unsafe cast

The `OracleRouterBase` contract uses an unsafe cast to convert the signed price to a `uint256` type. Consider ensuring the price is positive before performing the type conversion. If desired, this could be achieved with OpenZeppelin's `SafeCast` library.

Update: Resolved in pull request #1500 at commit 97a2116.

Notes & Additional Information

State variable visibility not explicitly declared

Throughout the codebase there are state variables that lack an explicitly declared visibility. For instance:

- `MIN_DRIFT` in `OracleRouter.sol`
- `MAX_DRIFT` in `OracleRouter.sol`
- `FIXED_PRICE` in `OracleRouter.sol`
- `shareToken` in `Generalized4626Strategy.sol`
- `assetToken` in `Generalized4626Strategy.sol`
- `MAX_INT` in `VaultCore.sol`

For clarity, consider always explicitly declaring the visibility of variables, even when the default visibility matches the intended visibility.

Update: Resolved in pull request #1501 at commit 73aaad.

Unused imports

In `VaultCore.sol` the imports `Strings`, `IVault` and `IBasicToken` are unused.

In `convexEthMetaStrategy.sol` the import `Helpers` is unused.

Consider removing unused imports to improve the overall clarity and readability of the codebase.

Update: Resolved in pull request #1504 at commit fd28ff.

Consider separating the contracts into their own files to make the codebase easier to understand for developers and reviewers.

Update: Acknowledged, not resolved. The Origin team stated:

> *We prefer one file for these, since the oracle-related contracts are small and deeply interrelated.*

TODO comments

The following TODO comment was found in the codebase. This comment should be tracked in the project's issue backlog.

- The `TODO` comment on line 126 in VaultCore.sol

During development, having well-described TODO/Fixme comments will make the process of tracking and solving them easier. Without this information, these comments might age and important information for the security of the system might be forgotten by the time it is released to production.

Consider removing all instances of TODO/Fixme comments and instead tracking them in the issues backlog. Alternatively, consider linking each inline TODO/Fixme to the corresponding issues backlog entry.

Update: Acknowledged, not resolved. The Origin team stated:

> *The current code errs on the side of caution. We are still carefully investigating if we can safely make a gas optimization here.*

Redundant use of the `SafeMath` library

All solidity compiler versions higher than 0.8.0 implement native overflow protection, which makes using `SafeMath` operations unnecessary for regular arithmetic. Consider removing redundant usage of the `SafeMath` library from the `VaultCore` contract to improve code readability and save gas.

The codebase contains some typographical errors:

- The `InitialiseConfig` struct should be `InitializeConfig` to be consistent with the `initialize` function that it is referencing.
- "seperate" should be "separate".

Update: *Resolved in pull request #1507 at commit 8ed275f.*

Incomplete generalization

The `Vault` code is intended to be generalized to support both OUSD and OETH use cases. However, there are still some values that are only relevant to one of the use cases. For instance:

- The token and several variables have "OUSD" in their name. This is just one example, but several comments, variables and events throughout the `VaultStorage,` `VaultAdmin` and `VaultCore` contracts reference "OUSD" or the `ConvexOUSDMetaStrategy`.
- Some of the comments (e.g., describing the value functions), reference "ETH".
- The redeem functions are described as returning stablecoins.

Consider generalizing the names and comments to apply them to both use cases.

Update: *Acknowledged, will resolve. The Origin team confirmed that they will resolve this issue in the future.*

`require` statements do not check for any conditions

Within `VaultCore.sol` there are multiple `require` statements that do not check for any conditions. For instance:

- The `require` statement on line 657
- The `require` statement on line 688

For clarity, it is recommended to use `revert()` in situations where `require()` does not perform any condition checks.

The new Vault functionality caches the token decimals for each supported asset. However, it unnecessarily casts to a `uint256` type from the `uint8` type specified by the ERC-20 standard. In the interest of consistency, consider retaining the `uint8` type. This will also ensure that `Asset` records only occupy a single storage slot.

Update: Acknowledged, will resolve. The Origin team stated that they will resolve the issue in pull request #1516:

> *Fix needs seperate governance action.*

Redundant code

There are several examples of redundant code. For example:

- The calculation that determines the amount of LP tokens to burn can be simplified to `(_wethAmount + 1) * k`. To see why there is no loss of precision, note that it only uses subtractions and multiplications, which always produce exact integer values if they do not overflow.
- This line retrieves the OETH balance unnecessarily.
- The `ConvexEthMetaStrategy` is initialized with an `_assets` array, but its only element (the WETH address) is already passed to the function.
- This conversion redundantly casts a `uint256` variable to a `uint256` type.

Consider simplifying or removing the redundant code.

Update: Resolved in pull request #1514 at commit d689cf2 and at commit bd38222.

Vault coupled to expected collateral

The `Vault` contract contains a mechanism to match collateral tokens to their equivalent "base" token amount. A similar conversion is used to standardize the price. However, although it is written generically, the `GETEXCHANGERATE` case is coupled to the rETH token. In particular:

- It assumes the existence of a `getExchangeRate` function, which is not part of a known standard. It would not support the cbETH token, for instance.

To simplify the vault, consider moving the token-specific logic into the `OracleRouter` contract or another adapter contract.

Update: *Acknowledged, not resolved. The Origin team stated:*

> *We do plan on keeping conversions to base amounts in the vault for now. This reduces the number of external calls needed, and the number of tokens we need to support is low.*

Conclusions

Several minor vulnerabilities have been found throughout the codebase, and fixes have been suggested. As indicated by the design issues described (with redundant variables or overfitted behaviors), the codebase could benefit from a methodical analysis of the existing system boundaries to determine the ideal way to extend and generalize it. The Origin team has been very responsive and willing to provide context and detailed explanations as needed.

Appendix

Monitoring Recommendations

While audits help in identifying code-level issues in the current implementation and potentially the code deployed in production, the Origin team is encouraged to consider incorporating monitoring activities in the production environment. Ongoing monitoring of deployed contracts helps identify potential threats and issues affecting production environments. With the goal of providing a complete security assessment, the monitoring recommendations section raises several actions addressing trust assumptions and out-of-scope components that can benefit from on-chain monitoring. In addition to the recommendations provided in the previous audit reports, it is recommended to monitor all sensitive actions that affect the new functionality, including:

- Monitor Chainlink oracles to detect unexpected changes between the price of collateral tokens and OETH.
- Monitor Rocket Pool and Lido (and other relevant staking providers) to detect potential slashing conditions that could diminish the value of the collateral.

and any other function called directly or indirectly by a user, checking that the values returned or minted by 3rd party protocols are within certain well-defined boundaries (otherwise, consider them as suspicious transactions). This should include the amount of WETH-OETH LP tokens and corresponding Gauge tokens received, given the amount of collateral being deposited.

Related Posts

Zap Audit

Beefy Zap Audit

BeefyZapRouter serves as a versatile intermediary designed to execute users' orders through routes...

Security Audits

OpenBrush Contracts Library Security Review

OpenBrush Contracts Library Security Review

OpenBrush is an open-source smart contract library written in the Rust programming language and the...

Security Audits

Bridge Audit

Linea Bridge Audit

Linea is a ZK-rollup deployed on top of Ethereum. It is designed to be EVM-compatible and aims to...

Security Audits

OpenZeppelin

Defender Platform

Secure Code & Audit
Secure Deploy
Threat Monitoring
Incident Response
Operation and Automation

Services

Smart Contract Security Audit
Incident Response
Zero Knowledge Proof Practice

Learn

Docs
Ethernaut CTF
Blog

Company

About us
Jobs
Blog

Contracts Library

Docs