



## PoolTogether Aave v3 contest Findings & Analysis Report

2022-06-23

#### Table of contents

- Overview
  - About C4
  - Wardens
- Summary
- Scope
- Severity Criteria
- High Risk Findings (1)
  - [H-O1] A malicious early user/attacker can manipulate the vault's pricePerShare to take an unfair share of future users' deposits
- Medium Risk Findings (5)
  - [M-01] User fund loss in supplyTokenTo() because of rounding
  - [M-02] \_depositAmount requires to be updated to contract balance increase
  - [M-03] Owner or Managers can rug Aave rewards
  - [M-04] RewardsController Emission Manager Can Authorize Users to Claim on Behalf of the AaveV3YieldSource Contract and Siphon Yield

- [M-05] Yield source does not correctly calculate share conversions
- Low Risk and Non-Critical Issues
  - N-01
  - N-02
  - N-03

#### • Gas Optimizations

- G-01 State variables only set in the constructor should be declared immutable
- G-02 internal functions only called once can be inlined to save gas
- G-03 Using > 0 costs more gas than != 0 when used on a uint in a require() statement
- G-04 Usage of uints / ints smaller than 32 bytes (256 bits) incurs overhead
- G-05 Don't use SafeMath once the solidity version is 0.8.0 or greater
- G-06 require() or revert() statements that check input arguments should be at the top of the function
- G-07 Use custom errors rather than revert () / require () strings to save gas
- G-08 Functions guaranteed to revert when called by normal users can be marked payable
- G-09 Method IDs can be fiddled with to reduce gas costs
- Disclosures

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#### Overview

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#### About C4

Code4rena (C4) is an open organization consisting of security researchers, auditors, developers, and individuals with domain expertise in smart contracts.

A C4 audit contest is an event in which community participants, referred to as Wardens, review, audit, or analyze smart contract logic in exchange for a bounty provided by sponsoring projects.

During the audit contest outlined in this document, C4 conducted an analysis of the PoolTogether Aave v3 smart contract system written in Solidity. The audit contest took place between April 29—May 1 2022.

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#### Wardens

44 Wardens contributed reports to the PoolTogether Aave v3 contest:

- 1. ||||||
- 2. leastwood
- 3. unforgiven
- 4. GimelSec (<u>rayn</u> and sces60107)
- 5. 0x1f8b
- 6. MaratCerby
- 7. Certoralno
- 8. berndartmueller
- 9. gzeon
- 10. kebabsec (okkothejawa and FlameHorizon)
- 11. OxDjango
- 12. WatchPug (jtp and ming)
- 13. Tadashi
- 14. reassor
- 15. cccz
- 16. hake
- 17. Oxf15ers (remora and twojoy)
- 18. horsefacts
- 19. **z3**s
- 20. Dravee

- 21. pauliax22. miguelmtzinf23. pedroais24. 0x5225. delfin454000
- 26. 0x4non
- 27. Picodes
- 28. throttle
- 29. rotcivegaf
- 30. joestakey
- 31. fatherOfBlocks
- 32. TrungOre
- 33. tabish
- 34. **Ov3rf1Ow**
- 35. Oxkatana
- 36. 242
- 37. defsec
- 38. peritoflores
- 39. simon135
- 40. slywaters

This contest was judged by Justin Goro.

Final report assembled by <u>liveactionllama</u>.

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## Summary

The C4 analysis yielded an aggregated total of 6 unique vulnerabilities. Of these vulnerabilities, 1 received a risk rating in the category of HIGH severity and 5 received a risk rating in the category of MEDIUM severity.

Additionally, C4 analysis included 15 reports detailing issues with a risk rating of LOW severity or non-critical. There were also 30 reports recommending gas

optimizations.

All of the issues presented here are linked back to their original finding.

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### Scope

The code under review can be found within the <u>C4 PoolTogether Aave v3 contest</u> repository, and is composed of 1 smart contract written in the Solidity programming language and includes ~200 lines of Solidity code.

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## Severity Criteria

C4 assesses the severity of disclosed vulnerabilities according to a methodology based on **OWASP standards**.

Vulnerabilities are divided into three primary risk categories: high, medium, and low/non-critical.

High-level considerations for vulnerabilities span the following key areas when conducting assessments:

- Malicious Input Handling
- Escalation of privileges
- Arithmetic
- Gas use

Further information regarding the severity criteria referenced throughout the submission review process, please refer to the documentation provided on <a href="mailto:the-c4">the C4</a> website.

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## High Risk Findings (1)

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[H-O1] A malicious early user/attacker can manipulate the vault's pricePerShare to take an unfair share of future users' deposits

Submitted by WatchPug, also found by OxDjango, berndartmueller, Certoralnc, gzeon, kebabsec, leastwood, Tadashi, and unforgiven

This is a well-known attack vector for new contracts that utilize pricePerShare for accounting.

#### AaveV3YieldSource.sol#L352-L374

```
/**
* @notice Calculates the number of shares that should be mint
* @param tokens Amount of asset tokens
* @return Number of shares.
* /
function tokenToShares(uint256 tokens) internal view returns
 uint256 supply = totalSupply();
 // shares = (tokens * totalShares) / yieldSourceATokenTotalS
 return supply == 0 ? tokens : tokens.mul( supply).div(aTc
/**
* @notice Calculates the number of asset tokens a user has ir
* @param shares Amount of shares
* @return Number of asset tokens.
* /
function sharesToToken(uint256 shares) internal view returns
 uint256 supply = totalSupply();
 // tokens = (shares * yieldSourceATokenTotalSupply) / totals
 return supply == 0 ? shares : shares.mul(aToken.balanceOf
}
```

A malicious early user can supplyTokenTo() with 1 wei of \_underlyingAssetAddress token as the first depositor of the AaveV3YieldSource.sol, and get 1 wei of shares token.

Then the attacker can send 10000e18 - 1 of aToken and inflate the price per share from 1.0000 to an extreme value of 1.0000e22 (from (1 + 10000e18 - 1) / 1).

As a result, the future user who deposits 19999e18 will only receive 1 wei (from 19999e18 \* 1 / 10000e18) of shares token.

They will immediately lose 9999e18 or half of their deposits if they redeemToken() right after the supplyTokenTo().

#### AaveV3YieldSource.sol#L251-L256

```
function redeemToken(uint256 _redeemAmount) external override
  address _underlyingAssetAddress = _tokenAddress();
  IERC20 _assetToken = IERC20(_underlyingAssetAddress);

  uint256 _shares = _tokenToShares(_redeemAmount);
  _burn(msg.sender, _shares);
...
```

Furthermore, after the PPS has been inflated to an extremely high value ( 10000e18 ), the attacker can also redeem tokens up to 9999e18 for free, (burn 0 shares) due to the precision loss.

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#### **Recommended Mitigation Steps**

Consider requiring a minimal amount of share tokens to be minted for the first minter, and send a port of the initial mints as a reserve to the DAO address so that the pricePerShare can be more resistant to manipulation.

```
Also, consder adding require (_shares > 0, "AaveV3YS/shares-gt-zero");
before _burn(msg.sender, _shares);.
```

#### <u>PierrickGT (PoolTogether) confirmed and commented:</u>

PR: https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/pull/15

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## Medium Risk Findings (5)

## [M-O1] User fund loss in supplyTokenTo() because of rounding

Submitted by unforgiven, also found by 0x1f8b

#### <u>AaveV3YieldSource.sol#L231-L242</u> AaveV3YieldSource.sol#L357-L362

When user use <code>supplyTokenTo()</code> to deposit his tokens and get <code>share</code> in <code>FeildSource</code> because of rounding in division user gets lower amount of <code>share.for</code> example if token's <code>\_decimal</code> was <code>1</code> and <code>totalSupply()</code> was <code>1000</code> and <code>aToken.balanceOf(FieldSource.address)</code> was <code>2100</code> (becasue of profits in <code>AavePool balance</code> is higher than <code>supply()</code>, then if user deposit <code>4</code> token to the contract with <code>supplyTokenTo()</code>, contract is going to <code>mint only 1</code> share for that user and if user calls <code>YeildToken.balanceOf(user)</code> the return value is going to be <code>2</code> and user already lost half of his deposit.

Of course if \_precision was high this loss is going to be low enough to ignore but in case of low \_precision and high price token and high balance / supply ratio this loss is going to be noticeable.

#### ত Proof of Concept

This is the code of supplyTokenTo():

```
function supplyTokenTo(uint256 _depositAmount, address _to) e>
  uint256 _shares = _tokenToShares(_depositAmount);
  require(_shares > 0, "AaveV3YS/shares-gt-zero");

address _underlyingAssetAddress = _tokenAddress();
  IERC20(_underlyingAssetAddress).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender,
  _pool().supply(_underlyingAssetAddress, _depositAmount, addr
  _mint(_to, _shares);

emit SuppliedTokenTo(msg.sender, _shares, _depositAmount, _t
}
```

which in line: \_shares = \_tokenToShares(\_depositAmount) trying to calculated shares corresponding to the number of tokens supplied. and then transfer

\_depositAmount from user and mint shares amount for user. the problem is that if user convert \_shares to token, he is going to receive lower amount because in most cases:

```
depositAmount > sharesToToken( tokenToShares( depositAmount))
```

and that's because of rounding in division. Value of \_shares is less than \_depositAmount. so YeildSource should only take part of \_depositAmount that equals to \_sharesToToken(\_tokenToShares(\_depositAmount)) and mint \_share for user.

#### Of course if precision was high and

aToken.balanceOf (FieldSource.address) / totalSupply() was low, then this amount will be insignificant, but for some cases it can be harmful for users. for example this conditions:

- perecision is low like 1 or 2.
- token value is very high like BTC.
- aToken.balanceOf(FieldSource.address) / totalSupply() is high due to manipulation or profit in Aave pool.

#### ര Tools Used

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**Recommended Mitigation Steps** 

To resolve this issue this can be done:

```
function supplyTokenTo(uint256 _depositAmount, address _to) e>
  uint256 _shares = _tokenToShares(_depositAmount);
  require(_shares > 0, "AaveV3YS/shares-gt-zero");

_depositAmount = _sharesToToken(_shares); // added hero to c
  address _underlyingAssetAddress = _tokenAddress();

IERC20(_underlyingAssetAddress).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender,
  pool().supply( underlyingAssetAddress,  depositAmount, address).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender,
```

```
_mint(_to, _shares);

emit SuppliedTokenTo(msg.sender, _shares, _depositAmount, _t
}
```

#### PierrickGT (PoolTogether) confirmed and commented:

PR: https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/pull/16

Justin Goro (judge) decreased severity from High to Medium

[M-O2] \_depositAmount requires to be updated to contract balance increase

Submitted by MaratCerby, also found by berndartmueller, cccz, Certoralnc, IIIIIII, and reassor

#### AaveV3YieldSource.sol#L231-L242

Every time transferFrom or transfer function in ERC20 standard is called there is a possibility that underlying smart contract did not transfer the exact amount entered. It is required to find out contract balance increase/decrease after the transfer. This pattern also prevents from re-entrancy attack vector.

#### ত Recommended Mitigation Steps

Recommended code:

function supplyTokenTo(uint256 \_depositAmount, address \_to) external override nonReentrant {
 uint256 \_shares = \_tokenToShares(\_depositAmount);
 require(\_shares > 0, "AaveV3YS/shares-qt-zero");

```
address _underlyingAssetAddress = _tokenAddress();
uint256 balanceBefore = IERC20(_underlyingAssetAddress).balance(
IERC20(_underlyingAssetAddress).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, add_depositAmount = IERC20(_underlyingAssetAddress).balanceOf(address).balanceOf(address).
```

```
_pool().supply(_underlyingAssetAddress, _depositAmount, address
_mint(_to, _shares);
emit SuppliedTokenTo(msg.sender, _shares, _depositAmount, _to);
}
```

#### PierrickGT (PoolTogether) acknowledged and commented:

This scenario would only happen if we use fee on transfer tokens. We don't plan to support fee on transfer token, so for this reason, I have acknowledged the issue but we won't implement the code suggestion.

#### Justin Goro (judge) decreased severity to Medium and commented:

This could lead to protocol leakage rather than risk of total funds loss.

Downgrading to Medium Risk.

Reentrancy isn't an issue since the function is marked nonReentrant.

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### [M-03] Owner or Managers can rug Aave rewards

Submitted by IIIIIII, also found by GimelSec

A malicious owner or manager can steal all Aave rewards that are meant for PoolTogether users.

Even if the user is benevolent the fact that there is a rug vector available may negatively impact the protocol's reputation.

#### ত Proof of Concept

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #X

275 function claimRewards(address _to) external onlyManager(
276 require(_to != address(0), "AaveV3YS/payee-not-zero-ac
277
```

```
address[] memory _assets = new address[](1);
assets[0] = address(aToken);

(address[] memory _rewardsList, uint256[] memory _clai
.claimAllRewards( assets, to);
```

#### AaveV3YieldSource.sol#L275-L282

The claimRewards () function allows the caller to send the rewards to an arbitrary address.

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#### **Recommended Mitigation Steps**

Use a poolAddressesProviderRegistry -like contract to determine where the rewards should go, instead of letting an address be passed in

#### PierrickGT (PoolTogether) acknowledged and commented:

Governance will own this contract with a multisig that will need 7 signatures out of 11 members before a transaction can be sent, so it limits the possibilities of a rug pull. These rewards are not tokens deposited by the users, so it's also less of a concern.

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## [M-O4] RewardsController Emission Manager Can Authorize Users to Claim on Behalf of the AaveV3YieldSource Contract and Siphon Yield

Submitted by leastwood

aave/RewardsController.sol#L190-L193
aave/RewardsController.sol#L39-L42
aave/RewardsController.sol#L133-L143
AaveV3YieldSource.sol#L275-L286

The AaveV3YieldSource contract allows the manager or owner of the contract to claim rewards from Aave's rewards controller. However, there is an external

dependency on this periphery Aave contract such that the emission manager of the RewardsController contract may allows other users to be authorized claimers.

Authorized claimers can claim rewards on behalf of the AaveV3YieldSource contract, effectively bypassing any restrictions put in place by this proprietary contract and its claimRewards() function. A malicious emissions manager can effectively siphon yield away from the AaveV3YieldSource contract and redirect it to them-self.

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#### **Recommended Mitigation Steps**

Ensure this is understood and enforce that the RewardsController contract is owner by PoolTogether's multisig.

#### <u>PierrickGT (PoolTogether) acknowledged and commented:</u>

Exactly, we will need to whitelist an address by calling the setClaimer function: aave/RewardsController.sol#L190

We will probably setup a contract that can claim for various yield sources.

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## [M-O5] Yield source does not correctly calculate share conversions

Submitted by IIIIIII

The aTokens' value is pegged to the value of the corresponding supplied asset at a 1:1 ratio and can be safely stored, transferred or traded. All yield collected by the aTokens' reserves are distributed to aToken holders directly by continuously increasing their wallet balance.

#### https://docs.aave.com/developers/tokens/atoken

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#### **Impact**

Incorrect share conversions lead to incorrect pricing of assets and loss of principal. aTokens are rebasing tokens, which means that holders of the token have their <code>balanceof()</code> increase over time, but each token is still redeemable for exactly one underlying asset. Any formula that does not return one out for one in is incorrect.

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol
                                        #X
352
353
         * @notice Calculates the number of shares that should k
354
         * @param tokens Amount of asset tokens
355
         * @return Number of shares.
         * /
356
        function tokenToShares(uint256 tokens) internal view r
357
          uint256 supply = totalSupply();
358
359
360
          // shares = (tokens * totalShares) / yieldSourceAToker
361
          return supply == 0 ? tokens : tokens.mul(supply).c
362
        }
363
364
        /**
         * @notice Calculates the number of asset tokens a user
365
         * @param _shares Amount of shares
366
         * @return Number of asset tokens.
367
         * /
368
369
        function sharesToToken(uint256 shares) internal view r
          uint256 supply = totalSupply();
370
371
          // tokens = (shares * yieldSourceATokenTotalSupply) /
372
          return supply == 0 ? shares : shares.mul(aToken.bal
373
374
        }
```

#### AaveV3YieldSource.sol#L352-L374

The above code is used for both <code>supplyTokenTo()</code> and <code>redeemToken()</code> and does not return one for one. Consider the following chain of events:

- 1. There are no deposits yet
- 2. Alice deposits one wBTC, getting back a AaveV3YieldSource share, while the yield source gets the aToken
- 3. Some time later a total of one extra wBTC worth of aToken is generated as yield and is in the balanceOf(this)

4. Alice attempts to withdraw her one share but gets zero wBTC, because

```
(tokens{1} * totalSupply(){1}) / aToken.balanceOf(this){2} is zero
```

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#### **Recommended Mitigation Steps**

There does not need to be a conversion function - one share must always equal one token.

#### PierrickGT (PoolTogether) acknowledged and commented:

This is a plausible but unlikely scenario since it assumes that only Alice has deposited into the yield source and that the interest rate is so high that I more wBTC is now in the yield source.

We also periodically capture the interest accumulated in the yield source by calling the PrizeFlush contract: <a href="mailto:pooltogether/PrizeFlush.sol#L105">pooltogether/PrizeSplitStrategy.sol#L51</a>.

The capture of the interest happens here:

For these reasons, I've acknowledged the issue but we won't change how shares are calculated.

#### Justin Goro (judge) decreased severity to Medium and commented:

Downgraded severity as this is more of a value leakage situation, especially given the unlikely edge case of an ERC20 token that sets decimals to 0 and uses low base values.

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#### Low Risk and Non-Critical Issues

For this contest, 15 reports were submitted by wardens detailing low risk and non-critical issues. The <u>report highlighted below</u> by <u>MaratCerby</u> received the top score from the judge.

The following wardens also submitted reports: GimelSec, hake, Oxf15ers, gzeon, kebabsec, z3s, Dravee, pauliax, Ox52, OxDjango, IIIIII, delfin454000, reassor, and Picodes.

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### [N-01]

uint256 is assigned to zero by default, additional reassignment to zero is unnecessary Affected code: <a href="mailto:AaveV3YieldSource.sol#L142">AaveV3YieldSource.sol#L142</a>

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**Proof of Concept** 

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.13/control-structures.html#default-value

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**Recommended Mitigation Steps** 

Recommended code: uint256 private constant ADDRESSESPROVIDERID;

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### [N-02]

Since solidity v0.8.0 SafeMath library is used by default in arithmetic operations. Using external SafeMath libraries is unnecessary.

Affected code: AaveV3YieldSource.sol#L361

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**Proof of Concept** 

https://blog.soliditylang.org/2020/12/16/solidity-v0.8.0-release-announcement/#:~:text=the%20near%20future.-,Checked,-arithmetic%2C%20i.e

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**Recommended Mitigation Steps** 

Recommended code: return \_supply == 0 ? \_tokens : (\_tokens \* \_supply) / aToken.balanceOf(address(this));

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[N-03]

Since solidity v0.8.0 SafeMath library is used by default in arithmetic operations. Using external SafeMath libraries is unnecessary.

Affected code: <u>AaveV3YieldSource.sol#L373</u>

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**Proof of Concept** 

https://blog.soliditylang.org/2020/12/16/solidity-v0.8.0-release-announcement/#:~:text=the%20near%20future.-,Checked,-arithmetic%2C%20i.e

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**Recommended Mitigation Steps** 

Recommended code: return \_supply == 0 ? \_shares : (\_shares \* aToken.balanceOf(address(this))) / \_supply;

#### PierrickGT (PoolTogether) commented:

[N-01]: Constant variables need to be initialized, so it is not possible to declare the variable without assigning a value.

[N-02] & [N-03]: SafeMath has been removed in the following PR: <a href="https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/pull/5">https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/pull/5</a>

Great report by this warden that should get extra point for their recommendation to remove SafeMath.

#### Justin Goro (judge) commented:

Severity: There were two issues reported. Both were non-critical.

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### **Gas Optimizations**

For this contest, 30 reports were submitted by wardens detailing gas optimizations. The <u>report highlighted below</u> by IIIIII received the top score from the judge.

The following wardens also submitted reports: <u>horsefacts</u>, <u>miguelmtzinf</u>, <u>pedroais</u>, <u>Ox4non</u>, <u>WatchPug</u>, <u>Dravee</u>, <u>gzeon</u>, <u>throttle</u>, <u>OxDjango</u>, <u>pauliax</u>, <u>rotcivegaf</u>,

joestakey, GimelSec, fatherOfBlocks, TrungOre, tabish, Ov3rf10w, Oxf15ers, Oxkatana, 242, Tadashi, defsec, hake, peritoflores, z3s, Ox1f8b, MaratCerby, simon135, and slywaters.

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## [G-01] State variables only set in the constructor should be declared immutable

Avoids a Gsset (20000 gas) in the constructor, and replaces each Gwarmacces (100 gas) with a PUSH32 (3 gas)

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #1

127 IAToken public aToken;
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3
YieldSource.sol#L127

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L130

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L133

```
index 3975311..1d229ff 100644
--- a/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.orig
+++ b/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.new
@@ -124,13 +124,13 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYiel
  /* ======= */
  /// @notice Yield-bearing Aave aToken address.
  IAToken public aToken;
+ IAToken public immutable aToken;
  /// @notice Aave RewardsController address.
  IRewardsController public rewardsController;
+ IRewardsController public immutable rewardsController;
  /// @notice Aave poolAddressesProviderRegistry address.
  IPoolAddressesProviderRegistry public poolAddressesProviderRe
+ IPoolAddressesProviderRegistry public immutable poolAddresses
  /// @notice ERC20 token decimals.
  uint8 private immutable decimals;
diff --git a/gas.orig b/gas.new
index d87edc2..a6cd51d 100644
--- a/gas.orig
+++ b/gas.new
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
                      · Method
- | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · claimRewards
+| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · claimRewards
.....
-| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · decreaseERC20Allowance ·
+| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · decreaseERC20Allowance ·
- | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · increaseERC20Allowance ·
+| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · increaseERC20Allowance ·
 | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · mint
.....
- | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · redeemToken
+| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · redeemToken
 AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · setManager
```

-  AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · supplyTokenTo		1
+  AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · supplyTokenTo		1
	1	
-  AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · transferERC20		
+  AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · transferERC20	•	
ERC20Mintable · approve		
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@		
·		
Deployments	1	
	1	
-  AaveV3YieldSourceHarness	•	25
+  AaveV3YieldSourceHarness	•	24
ERC20Mintable		
	T	

# © [G-02] internal functions only called once can be inlined to save gas

Not inlining costs 20 to 40 gas because of two extra JUMP instructions and additional stack operations needed for function calls.

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #1
369 function sharesToToken(uint256 shares) internal view r
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L369

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #2

388 function poolProvider() internal view returns (IPoolAdo
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3

```
diff --git a/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.orig b/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.
index 3975311..d7ec7ec 100644
--- a/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.oriq
+++ b/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.new
@@ -201,7 +201,12 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYield
    * @return The underlying balance of asset tokens.
   function balanceOfToken(address user) external override retu
     return sharesToToken(balanceOf(user));
    uint256 shares = balanceOf( user);
+
    uint256 supply = totalSupply();
+
    // tokens = (shares * yieldSourceATokenTotalSupply) / total
+
    return supply == 0 ? shares : shares.mul(aToken.balance(
+
+
   / * *
@@ -361,18 +366,6 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYield
     return supply == 0 ? tokens: tokens.mul(supply).div(a]
   }
_ /**
   * @notice Calculates the number of asset tokens a user has i
   * @param shares Amount of shares
   * @return Number of asset tokens.
   * /
   function sharesToToken(uint256 shares) internal view return
    uint256 supply = totalSupply();
    // tokens = (shares * yieldSourceATokenTotalSupply) / total
    return supply == 0 ? shares : shares.mul(aToken.balance(
- }
   /**
   * @notice Returns the underlying asset token address.
   * @return Underlying asset token address.
@@ -381,22 +374,13 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYiel
    return aToken.UNDERLYING ASSET ADDRESS();
   }
   /**
   * @notice Retrieves Aave PoolAddressesProvider address.
```

```
* @return A reference to PoolAddressesProvider interface.
  function poolProvider() internal view returns (IPoolAddresse
   return
    IPoolAddressesProvider(
     poolAddressesProviderRegistry.getAddressesProvidersList
    );
  /**
  * @notice Retrieves Aave Pool address.
  * @return A reference to Pool interface.
  function pool() internal view returns (IPool) {
   return IPool( poolProvider().getPool());
   return IPool(IPoolAddressesProvider(
     poolAddressesProviderRegistry.getAddressesProvidersList
    ).getPool());
diff --git a/gas.orig b/gas.new
index d87edc2..6948266 100644
--- a/gas.orig
+++ b/gas.new
@@ -13,11 +13,11 @@
| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · mint
- | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · redeemToken
+| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · redeemToken
.....
- | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · supplyTokenTo
+ | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · supplyTokenTo
.....
AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · transferERC20
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
Deployments
- | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness
```

[G-03] Using > 0 costs more gas than != 0 when used on a uint in a require() statement

This change saves <u>6 gas</u> per instance

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #1

179     require(decimals_ > 0, "AaveV3YS/decimals-gt-zero");
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3
YieldSource.sol#L179

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #2
233 require( shares > 0, "AaveV3YS/shares-gt-zero");
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3
YieldSource.sol#L233

```
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
  function supplyTokenTo(uint256 depositAmount, address to) €
   uint256 shares = tokenToShares( depositAmount);
   require( shares > 0, "AaveV3YS/shares-gt-zero");
   require( shares != 0, "AaveV3YS/shares-gt-zero");
   address underlyingAssetAddress = tokenAddress();
   IERC20 ( underlyingAssetAddress) .safeTransferFrom (msg.sender
diff --git a/gas.orig b/gas.new
index d87edc2..9a90ad3 100644
--- a/gas.orig
+++ b/gas.new
00 - 17,7 + 17,7 00
| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · setManager
-----
- | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · supplyTokenTo
+ | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · supplyTokenTo
.....
AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · transferERC20
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
Deployments
- | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness
+ | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness
| ERC20Mintable
```

// Approve once for max amount

# [G-04] Usage of uints / ints smaller than 32 bytes (256 bits) incurs overhead

When using elements that are smaller than 32 bytes, your contract's gas usage may be higher. This is because the EVM operates on 32 bytes at a time. Therefore, if the element is smaller than that, the EVM must use more operations in order to reduce the size of the element from 32 bytes to the desired size.

https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.8.11/internals/layout\_in\_storage.html Use a larger size then downcast where needed

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #1
47 uint8 decimals,
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L47

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #2

136 uint8 private immutable _decimals;
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3
YieldSource.sol#L136

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #3

145     uint16 private constant REFERRAL CODE = uint16(188);
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L145

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #4

165 uint8 decimals ,
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3
YieldSource.sol#L165

```
diff --git a/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.orig b/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.
index 3975311..0dfa477 100644
--- a/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.orig
+++ b/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.new
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldSou
     IPoolAddressesProviderRegistry poolAddressesProviderRegistr
     string name,
    string symbol,
   uint8 decimals,
   uint256 decimals,
    address owner
  ) ;
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
   IPoolAddressesProviderRegistry public poolAddressesProviderRe
   /// @notice ERC20 token decimals.
- uint8 private immutable decimals;
+ uint256 private immutable decimals;
   /**
   * @dev Aave genesis market PoolAddressesProvider's ID.
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
   uint256 private constant ADDRESSES PROVIDER ID = uint256(0);
  /// @dev PoolTogether's Aave Referral Code
- uint16 private constant REFERRAL CODE = uint16(188);
+ uint256 private constant REFERRAL CODE = 188;
   /* ====== Constructor ====== */
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
     IPoolAddressesProviderRegistry poolAddressesProviderRegist
    string memory name,
    string memory symbol,
uint8 decimals_,
   uint256 decimals ,
    address owner
   ) Ownable (owner) ERC20 (name, symbol) ReentrancyGuard() {
     require (address ( aToken) != address (0), "AaveV3YS/aToken-nc
@@ -218,7 +218,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
    * @return The number of decimals.
   function decimals() public view virtual override returns (uir
    return decimals;
```

```
return uint8 ( decimals);
  /**
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
    address underlyingAssetAddress = tokenAddress();
    IERC20 ( underlyingAssetAddress) .safeTransferFrom (msg.sender
   pool().supply( underlyingAssetAddress, depositAmount, add
   pool().supply( underlyingAssetAddress, depositAmount, add
    mint(to, shares);
diff --git a/gas.orig b/gas.new
index d87edc2..367daee 100644
--- a/gas.orig
+++ b/gas.new
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
Deployments
- | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness
                                                  25
+ | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness
 | ERC20Mintable
```

# [G-05] Don't use SafeMath once the solidity version is 0.8.0 or greater

Version 0.8.0 introduces internal overflow checks, so using SafeMath is redundant and adds overhead

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #1
262  uint256  balanceDiff = afterBalance.sub( beforeBalance);
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #2

361 return supply == 0 ? tokens : tokens.mul(supply).div(a
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3
YieldSource.sol#L361

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #3
373 return _supply == 0 ? _shares : _shares.mul(aToken.balance
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L373

```
diff --git a/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.orig b/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.
index 3975311..6346344 100644
--- a/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.orig
+++ b/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.new
@@ -11,7 +11,6 @@ import { IRewardsController } from "@aave/peri
import { ERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC2
import { IERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IEF
 import { SafeERC20 } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/
-import { SafeMath } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/Sa
 import { ReentrancyGuard } from "@openzeppelin/contracts/securi
import { Manageable, Ownable } from "@pooltogether/owner-manage
@@ -23,7 +22,6 @@ import { IYieldSource } from "@pooltogether/yi
 * @notice Yield Source for a PoolTogether prize pool that gene
 * /
contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldSource, Manageable,
- using SafeMath for uint256;
  using SafeERC20 for IERC20;
   @@ -259,7 +257,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
    pool().withdraw( underlyingAssetAddress, redeemAmount, ac
```

```
uint256 balanceDiff = afterBalance.sub( beforeBalance);
   uint256 balanceDiff = afterBalance - beforeBalance;
   assetToken.safeTransfer(msg.sender, balanceDiff);
   emit RedeemedToken(msg.sender, shares, redeemAmount);
@@ -358,7 +356,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
   uint256 supply = totalSupply();
   // shares = (tokens * totalShares) / yieldSourceATokenTotal
   return supply == 0 ? tokens : tokens.mul( supply).div(a]
+ return supply == 0 ? tokens : tokens * supply / aToken.
  /**
@@ -370,7 +368,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
   uint256 supply = totalSupply();
   // tokens = (shares * yieldSourceATokenTotalSupply) / total
   return _supply == 0 ? _shares : _shares.mul(aToken.balance(
  return supply == 0 ? shares : shares * aToken.balanceOf
  / * *
diff --git a/gas.orig b/gas.new
index d87edc2..1c91b72 100644
--- a/gas.orig
+++ b/gas.new
00 - 13, 11 + 13, 11 00
.....
AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · mint
-| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · redeemToken
+| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · redeemToken
| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · setManager
-| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · supplyTokenTo
+| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · supplyTokenTo
AaveV3YieldSourceHarness transferERC20
```

uint256 afterBalance = assetToken.balanceOf(address(this)

```
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@

Deployments

AaveV3YieldSourceHarness

AaveV3YieldSourceHarness

ERC20Mintable

ERC20Mintable
```

# [G-06] require() or revert() statements that check input arguments should be at the top of the function

Checks that involve constants should come before checks that involve state variables

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #1

177         require(_owner != address(0), "AaveV3YS/owner-not-zero")
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3
YieldSource.sol#L177

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #2

179     require(decimals_ > 0, "AaveV3YS/decimals-gt-zero");
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L179

```
) Ownable (owner) ERC20 (name, symbol) ReentrancyGuard() {
    require (address ( aToken) != address (0), "AaveV3YS/aToken-nc
    require( owner != address(0), "AaveV3YS/owner-not-zero-addr
    require(decimals > 0, "AaveV3YS/decimals-gt-zero");
+
    require(address( rewardsController) != address(0), "AaveV3)
    require(address( poolAddressesProviderRegistry) != address
+
    aToken = aToken;
    require(address( rewardsController) != address(0), "AaveV3)
    rewardsController = rewardsController;
    require(address( poolAddressesProviderRegistry) != address
   poolAddressesProviderRegistry = poolAddressesProviderRegis
   require( owner != address(0), "AaveV3YS/owner-not-zero-addr
    require(decimals > 0, "AaveV3YS/decimals-gt-zero");
   decimals = decimals ;
    // Approve once for max amount
diff --git a/gas.orig b/gas.new
index d87edc2..e76a03d 100644
--- a/gas.orig
+++ b/gas.new
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@
   .....
Deployments
   - | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness
                                                 2.5
+ | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness
| ERC20Mintable
```

# [G-07] Use custom errors rather than revert() / require() strings to save gas

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yieldsource/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L168

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #2
         require(address(_rewardsController) != address(0), "Aa
171
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yieldsource/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L171

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #3
         require(address( poolAddressesProviderRegistry) != add
174
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yieldsource/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L174

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #4
177
         require( owner != address(0), "AaveV3YS/owner-not-zero
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yieldsource/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L177

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #5
          require(decimals_ > 0, "AaveV3YS/decimals-gt-zero");
179
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L179

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #6

233 require( shares > 0, "AaveV3YS/shares-gt-zero");
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L233

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #7

276 require(_to != address(0), "AaveV3YS/payee-not-zero-ac
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3
YieldSource.sol#L276

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #8

337 require(_token != address(aToken), "AaveV3YS/forbid-aT
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3
YieldSource.sol#L337

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #9

349     require( token != address(aToken), "AaveV3YS/forbid-aToken)
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L349

```
diff --git a/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.orig b/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.
index 3975311..0a01635 100644
--- a/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.orig
+++ b/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.new
@@ -26,6 +26,17 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldSo
  using SafeMath for uint256;
   using SafeERC20 for IERC20;
+ error ATokenNotZeroAddress();
+ error RCNotZeroAddress();
  error PRNotZeroAddress();
+ error OwnerNotZeroAddress();
  error DecimalsGtZero();
+
+ error SharesGtZero();
+ error PayeeNotZeroAddress();
  error ForbidATokenTransfer();
  error ForbidATokenAllowance();
+
+
+
   @@ -165,18 +176,18 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYiel
    uint8 decimals ,
    address owner
  ) Ownable( owner) ERC20( name, _symbol) ReentrancyGuard() {
    require(address( aToken) != address(0), "AaveV3YS/aToken-nc
    if (address( aToken) == address(0)) revert ATokenNotZeroAdc
+
    aToken = aToken;
    require(address( rewardsController) != address(0), "AaveV3)
     if (address( rewardsController) == address(0)) revert RCNot
+
     rewardsController = rewardsController;
    require(address( poolAddressesProviderRegistry) != address
    if (address( poolAddressesProviderRegistry) == address(0))
+
    poolAddressesProviderRegistry = poolAddressesProviderRegis
    require( owner != address(0), "AaveV3YS/owner-not-zero-addr
    if ( owner == address(0)) revert OwnerNotZeroAddress();
+
    require(decimals > 0, "AaveV3YS/decimals-gt-zero");
    if (decimals == 0) revert DecimalsGtZero();
+
    decimals = decimals ;
```

```
// Approve once for max amount
@@ -230,7 +241,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
   function supplyTokenTo(uint256 depositAmount, address to) \epsilon
    uint256 shares = tokenToShares( depositAmount);
    require( shares > 0, "AaveV3YS/shares-gt-zero");
    if ( shares == 0) revert SharesGtZero();
    address underlyingAssetAddress = tokenAddress();
     IERC20( underlyingAssetAddress).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender
@@ -273,7 +284,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
    * @return True if operation was successful.
   function claimRewards (address to) external onlyManagerOrOwne
    require ( to != address(0), "AaveV3YS/payee-not-zero-address
    if ( to == address(0)) revert PayeeNotZeroAddress();
    address[] memory assets = new address[](1);
    assets[0] = address(aToken);
@@ -334,7 +345,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
    address to,
    uint256 amount
   ) external onlyManagerOrOwner {
    require(address( token) != address(aToken), "AaveV3YS/forbi
    if (address( token) == address(aToken)) revert ForbidAToker
    token.safeTransfer( to, amount);
    emit TransferredERC20(msg.sender, to, amount, token);
@@ -346,7 +357,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
    * @param token Address of the ERC20 token to check
  function requireNotAToken(address token) internal view {
   require ( token != address (aToken), "AaveV3YS/forbid-aToken-
   if ( token == address(aToken)) revert ForbidATokenTransfer
   }
   / * *
diff --git a/gas.orig b/gas.new
index d87edc2..3aa8ff3 100644
--- a/gas.orig
+++ b/gas.new
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
```

AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · setManager		
	.	
-  AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · supplyTokenTo		1
+  AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · supplyTokenTo		1
	.	
AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · transferERC20		
	.	
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@		
	.	
Deployments		
	.	
-  AaveV3YieldSourceHarness		25
+  AaveV3YieldSourceHarness	•	24
	.	
ERC20Mintable		
	-	

## [G-08] Functions guaranteed to revert when called by normal users can be marked payable

If a function modifier such as onlyOwner is used, the function will revert if a normal user tries to pay the function. Marking the function as payable will lower the gas cost for legitimate callers because the compiler will not include checks for whether a payment was provided. The extra opcodes avoided are

CALLVALUE (2), DUP1 (3), ISZERO (3), PUSH2 (3), JUMPI (10), PUSH1 (3), DUP1 (3), REVER

T (0), JUMPDEST (1), POP (2), which costs an average of about 21 gas per call to the

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #1

275 function claimRewards(address to) external onlyManager(
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L275

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #2

296 function decreaseERC20Allowance(
```

function, in addition to the extra deployment cost

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3
YieldSource.sol#L296-L300

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #3

315 function increaseERC20Allowance(
316 IERC20 _token,
317 address _spender,
318 uint256 _amount
319 ) external onlyManagerOrOwner {
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol#L315-L319

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol #4

332 function transferERC20(

333 IERC20 _token,

334 address _to,

335 uint256 _amount

336 ) external onlyManagerOrOwner {
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3
YieldSource.sol#L332-L336

```
diff --git a/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.orig b/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.
index 3975311..b16b82a 100644
--- a/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.orig
+++ b/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.new
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
```

```
* @param to Address where the claimed rewards will be sent
   * @return True if operation was successful.
- function claimRewards (address to) external onlyManagerOrOwne
+ function claimRewards (address to) payable external onlyManac
    require ( to != address(0), "AaveV3YS/payee-not-zero-address
    address[] memory assets = new address[](1);
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
    IERC20 token,
    address spender,
    uint256 amount
- ) external onlyManagerOrOwner {
+ ) payable external onlyManagerOrOwner {
    requireNotAToken(address( token));
    token.safeDecreaseAllowance( spender, amount);
    emit DecreasedERC20Allowance (msg.sender, spender, amount,
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
    IERC20 token,
    address spender,
    uint256 amount
- ) external onlyManagerOrOwner {
+ ) payable external onlyManagerOrOwner {
    requireNotAToken(address( token));
    token.safeIncreaseAllowance( spender, amount);
    emit IncreasedERC20Allowance (msg.sender, spender, amount,
@@ -333,7 +333,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
    IERC20 token,
    address to,
    uint256 amount
- ) external onlyManagerOrOwner {
+ ) payable external onlyManagerOrOwner {
    require(address( token) != address(aToken), "AaveV3YS/forbi
    token.safeTransfer( to, amount);
    emit TransferredERC20(msg.sender, to, amount, token);
diff --git a/gas.orig b/gas.new
index d87edc2..b10b8b3 100644
--- a/gas.orig
+++ b/gas.new
@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@
                 · Method
```

```
- | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · claimRewards
+| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · claimRewards
-| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · decreaseERC20Allowance
  AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · decreaseERC20Allowance
-| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · increaseERC20Allowance
+| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · increaseERC20Allowance
AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · mint
00 - 19,7 + 19,7 00
AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · supplyTokenTo
- | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · transferERC20
+| AaveV3YieldSourceHarness · transferERC20
· approve
00 - 29,7 + 29,7 00
 Deployments
- | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness
+ | AaveV3YieldSourceHarness
                                          25
| ERC20Mintable
```

## © [G-09] Method IDs can be fiddled with to reduce gas costs

See this page for details

```
File: contracts/AaveV3YieldSource.sol (various lines) #1
```

https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/blob/e63d1b0e396a5bce89f093630c282ca1c6627e44/contracts/AaveV3 YieldSource.sol

```
index 3975311..dc04818 100644
--- a/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.orig
+++ b/AaveV3YieldSource.sol.new
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
    decimals = decimals ;
    // Approve once for max amount
    IERC20( tokenAddress()).safeApprove(address( pool()), type
  IERC20( tokenAddress()).safeApprove(address(_pool_Jo$()), t
+
    emit AaveV3YieldSourceInitialized(
      aToken,
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
    address underlyingAssetAddress = tokenAddress();
    IERC20 ( underlyingAssetAddress) .safeTransferFrom(msg.sender
    pool().supply( underlyingAssetAddress, depositAmount, add
    pool Jo$().supply( underlyingAssetAddress, depositAmount,
+
    mint(to, shares);
@@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
    burn(msg.sender, shares);
    uint256 beforeBalance = assetToken.balanceOf(address(this
    pool().withdraw( underlyingAssetAddress, redeemAmount, ac
    pool Jo$().withdraw( underlyingAssetAddress, redeemAmount
    uint256 afterBalance = assetToken.balanceOf(address(this)
    uint256 balanceDiff = afterBalance.sub( beforeBalance);
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
    * @notice Retrieves Aave PoolAddressesProvider address.
    * @return A reference to PoolAddressesProvider interface.
   * /
- function poolProvider() internal view returns (IPoolAddresse
+ function poolProvider uaF() internal view returns (IPoolAddr
    return
       IPoolAddressesProvider(
        poolAddressesProviderRegistry.getAddressesProvidersList
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ contract AaveV3YieldSource is ERC20, IYieldS
    * @notice Retrieves Aave Pool address.
   * @return A reference to Pool interface.
- function pool() internal view returns (IPool) {
   return IPool( poolProvider().getPool());
+ function pool Jo$() internal view returns (IPool) {
```

return IPool( poolProvider uaF().getPool());

#### PierrickGT (PoolTogether) commented:

Great report by this warden, they should get extra points.

[G-01] State variables only set in the constructor should be declared immutable

PR: https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/pull/2

[G-02] internal functions only called once can be inlined to save gas

We prefer to keep the internal function \_sharesToToken since it's a pretty important one with several lines of code in it.

[G-03] Using > 0 costs more gas than != 0 when used on a uint in a require() statement

[G-05] Don't use SafeMath once the solidity version is 0.8.0 or greater

See comments on issue #11

[G-04] Usage of uints/ints smaller than 32 bytes (256 bits) incurs overhead

We prefer to cast them first instead to have to downcast them in each functions.

[G-06] require() or revert() statements that check input arguments should be at the top of the function

PR: https://github.com/pooltogether/aave-v3-yield-source/pull/12

[G-07] Use custom errors rather than revert()/require() strings to save gas

See comments on issue #13

[G-08] Functions guaranteed to revert when called by normal users can be marked payable

Interesting but since these functions don't accept native assets, we shouldn't mark them as payable

[G-09] Method IDs can be fiddled with to reduce gas costs

Seems overly complicate to save 12 gas.

 $\mathcal{O}_{2}$ 

#### **Disclosures**

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Top

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