

Liquid Collective Security Review

Auditors

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1 About Spearbit

Spearbit is a decentralized network of expert security engineers offering reviews and other security related services to Web3 projects with the goal of creating a stronger ecosystem. Our network has experience on every part of the blockchain technology stack, including but not limited to protocol design, smart contracts and the Solidity compiler. Spearbit brings in untapped security talent by enabling expert freelance auditors seeking flexibility to work on interesting projects together.

Learn more about us at spearbit.com

2 Introduction

Liquid Collective is a multichain capable enterprise-grade liquid staking protocol, launching first on Ethereum. It allows institutional investors to stake and earn staking rewards while evidencing ownership of staked tokens in the form of a liquid staking token. Liquid Collective offers a solution that caters to the needs of institutions including:

- KYC / AML allowlisting process for all participants (including validators).
- Top performing node operators with multi-cloud, multi-region, and multi-client infrastructure.
- · Governance by a broad and dispersed collective of industry participants.

Disclaimer: This security review does not guarantee against a hack. It is a snapshot in time of Liquid Collective according to the specific commit. Any modifications to the code will require a new security review.

3 Risk classification

Severity level	Impact: High	Impact: Medium	Impact: Low
Likelihood: high	Critical	High	Medium
Likelihood: medium	High	Medium	Low
Likelihood: low	Medium	Low	Low

3.1 Impact

- High leads to a loss of a significant portion (>10%) of assets in the protocol, or significant harm to a majority of users.
- Medium global losses <10% or losses to only a subset of users, but still unacceptable.
- Low losses will be annoying but bearable--applies to things like griefing attacks that can be easily repaired
 or even gas inefficiencies.

3.2 Likelihood

- High almost certain to happen, easy to perform, or not easy but highly incentivized
- Medium only conditionally possible or incentivized, but still relatively likely
- · Low requires stars to align, or little-to-no incentive

3.3 Action required for severity levels

- Critical Must fix as soon as possible (if already deployed)
- High Must fix (before deployment if not already deployed)
- · Medium Should fix
- · Low Could fix

4 Executive Summary

Over the course of 3 days in total, Liquid Collective engaged with Spearbit to review

3 code changes since the last engagement. In this period of time a total of 4 issues were found.

Summary

Project Name	Liquid Collective	
Target 1	PR 211	
Target 2	PR 206	
Target 3	PR 202	
Commit	638e033dd3	
Type of Project	Liquid Staking, DeFi	
Audit Timeline	May 22 - May 24	

Issues Found

Severity	Count	Fixed	Acknowledged
Critical Risk	0	0	0
High Risk	0	0	0
Medium Risk	0	0	0
Low Risk	0	0	0
Gas Optimizations	0	0	0
Informational	4	3	1
Total	4	3	1

5 Findings

5.1 Informational

5.1.1 Calculation of CurrentValidatorExitsDemand **and** TotalValidatorExitsRequested **using unsolicited exits can happen at the end of** _setStoppedValidatorCounts(...)

Severity: Informational

Context:

- · OperatorsRegistry.1.sol#L541-L546
- · OperatorsRegistry.1.sol#L569-L574

Description: Calculation of CurrentValidatorExitsDemand and TotalValidatorExitsRequested using unsolicited exits can happen at the end of _setStoppedValidatorCounts(...) to avoid extra operations like taking minimum per iteration of the loops.

Note that:

$$a_n = a_{n-1} - \min(a_{n-1}, b_n) \Rightarrow a_n = a_0 - \min(a_0, \sum_{i=1}^n b_i) = \max(0, a_0 - \sum_{i=1}^n b_i)$$

Recommendation: Calculate the sum of all unsolicited exits and then add that to TotalValidatorExitsRequested and use the above formula to calculate CurrentValidatorExitsDemand at after the 2 for loops.

Liquid Collective: Fixed in 86d45e72e83de8ead43b8b5f85fa583d64599330.

Spearbit: Fixed.

5.1.2 Define a new internal function to update TotalValidatorExitsRequested

Severity: Informational

Context:

- OperatorsRegistry.1.sol#L584-L585
- · OperatorsRegistry.1.sol#L848-L849

Description/Recommendation: It would be best to refactor the logic of updating TotalValidatorExitsRequested and emitting the relevant event by introducing the new internal function:

```
function _setTotalValidatorExitsRequested(uint256 _currentValue, uint256 _newValue) internal {
   TotalValidatorExitsRequested.set(_newValue);
   emit SetTotalValidatorExitsRequested(_currentValue, _newValue);
}
```

Liquid Collective: Fixed in 18fa86eb117431bb2526d0708a359226fde6678a.

Spearbit: Fixed.

5.1.3 use _setCurrentValidatorExitsDemand

Severity: Informational

Context:

OperatorsRegistry.1.sol#L467

OperatorsRegistry.1.sol#L589-L592

Description: If an update is needed for CurrentValidatorExitsDemand in _setStoppedValidatorCounts(...), the internal function _setCurrentValidatorExitsDemand is not used.

Recommendation: Make sure _setCurrentValidatorExitsDemand is used whenever an update for Current-ValidatorExitsDemand is required

Liquid Collective: Fixed in b39846d23642f833246d0d335c4ad2930ecb515e.

Spearbit: Fixed.

5.1.4 Changes to the emission of RequestedValidatorExits event during catch-up

Severity: Informational

Context:

· OperatorsRegistry.1.sol#L488

• OperatorsRegistry.1.sol#L546

Description: The event log will be different between the old and new implementations.

In the old implementation, the latest RequestedValidatorExits event in the logs will always contain the most up-to-date count of requested exits (count) of an operator after a "catch-up" attempt. This is because a new RequestedValidatorExits event with the up-to-date currentStoppedCount is emitted at the end of the async requestValidatorExits function call.

However, in the new implementation, the latest RequestedValidatorExits event in the logs contains the outdated or previous count of an operator after a "catch-up" attempt since a new RequestedValidatorExits event is not emitted at the end of the Oracle reporting transaction.

If any off-chain component depends on the latest RequestedValidatorExits event in the logs to determine the count of requested exits (count), it might potentially cause the off-chain component to read and process outdated information. For instance, an operator's off-chain component might be reading the count within the latest RequestedValidatorExits event in the logs and comparing it against its internal counter to decide if more validators need to be exited.

The following shows the discrepancy between the events emitted between the old and new implementations.

Catch-up implementation in the previous design

- 1) Catch-up was carried out async when someone called the requestValidatorExits > _pickNextValidatorSToExitFromActiveOperators function
- 2) Within the _pickNextValidatorsToExitFromActiveOperators function. Assume an operator called *opera* and its currentRequestedExits is less than the currentStoppedCount. It will attempt to "catch-up" by performing the following actions:
 - 1) Emit *UpdatedRequestedValidatorExitsUponStopped(oper_a, currentRequestedExits, currentStoppedCount)* event.
 - 2) Let x be the no. of validator count to "catch-up" (x = currentStoppedCount currentRequestedExits)
 - 3) $oper_a.picked$ will be incremented by x. Since $oper_a.picked$ has not been initialized yet, $oper_a.picked = x$
- 3) Assume that the *oper_a* is neither the operator with the highest validation count nor the operator with the second highest. As such, *oper_a* is not "picked" to exit its validators

- 4) Near the end of the _pickNextValidatorsToExitFromActiveOperators function, it will loop through all operators that have operator.picked > 0 and perform some actions. The following actions will be performed against opera since opera.picked > 0:
 - 1) Emit Requested Validator Exits (opera, current Stopped Count) event
 - Set oper_a.requestedExits = currentStoppedCount.
- 5) After the transaction, two events were emitted for opera to indicate a catch-up had been attempted.
 - UpdatedRequestedValidatorExitsUponStopped(oper_a, currentRequestedExits, currentStoppedCount)
 - RequestedValidatorExits(oper_a, currentStoppedCount)

Catch-up implementation in the new design

- 1. Catch-up was carried out within the _setStoppedValidatorCounts function during Oracle reporting.
- 2. Let _stoppedValidatorCounts[idx] be the currentStoppedCount AND operators.requestedExits be currentRequestedExits
- 3. Assume an operator called *oper_a* and its currentRequestedExits is less than the currentStoppedCount. It will attempt to "catch-up" by performing the following actions:
 - 1. Emit *UpdatedRequestedValidatorExitsUponStopped(oper_a, currentRequestedExits, currentStoppedCount)* event.
 - 2. Set oper_a.requestedExits = currentStoppedCount.
- 4. After the transaction, only one event was emitted for opera to indicate a catch-up had been attempted.
 - *UpdatedRequestedValidatorExitsUponStopped(oper_a, currentRequestedExits, currentStoppedCount)*

In addition, as per the comment below, it was understood that unsolicited exits are considered as if exit requests were performed for them. In this case, the latest RequestedValidatorExits event in the logs should reflect the most up-to-date count of exit requests for an operator including unsolicited exits at any time.

Recommendation: Consider updating the implementation to ensure that the latest RequestedValidatorExits event in the logs contains the most up-to-date count of exit requests for an operator including unsolicited exits at any time.

Liquid Collective: We indeed considered that emitting RequestedValidatorExits on catch-up could confuse Node Operators because we are not requesting them to exit.

So what we can consider is

- RequestedValidatorExits is always emitted to signal a NO to perform the action to exit 1 or more validator key.
- UpdatedRequestedValidatorExitsUponStopped is emitted so indexers/off-chain system can update requested values but does not signal NOs.

Spearbit: Acknowledged.