



QuillAudits



Audit Report
July, 2021



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Scope of Audit

The scope of this audit was to analyze and document the Dalmatian-INU smart contract codebase for quality, security, and correctness.

Checked Vulnerabilities

We have scanned the smart contract for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities. Here are some of the commonly known vulnerabilities that we considered:

- Re-entrancy
- Timestamp Dependence
- Gas Limit and Loops
- DoS with Block Gas Limit
- Transaction-Ordering Dependence
- Use of tx.origin
- Exception disorder
- Gasless send
- Balance equality
- Byte array
- Transfer forwards all gas
- ERC20 API violation
- Malicious libraries
- Compiler version not fixed
- Redundant fallback function
- Send instead of transfer
- Style guide violation
- Unchecked external call
- Unchecked math
- Unsafe type inference
- Implicit visibility level

Techniques and Methods

Throughout the audit of smart contract, care was taken to ensure:

- The overall quality of code.
- Use of best practices.
- Code documentation and comments match logic and expected behaviour.
- Token distribution and calculations are as per the intended behaviour mentioned in the whitepaper.
- Implementation of ERC-20 token standards.
- Efficient use of gas.
- Code is safe from re-entrancy and other vulnerabilities.

The following techniques, methods and tools were used to review all the smart contracts.

Structural Analysis

In this step we have analyzed the design patterns and structure of smart contracts. A thorough check was done to ensure the smart contract is structured in a way that will not result in future problems.

SmartCheck.

Static Analysis

Static Analysis of Smart Contracts was done to identify contract vulnerabilities. In this step a series of automated tools are used to test security of smart contracts.

Code Review / Manual Analysis

Manual Analysis or review of code was done to identify new vulnerability or verify the vulnerabilities found during the static analysis. Contracts were completely manually analyzed, their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the whitepaper. Besides, the results of automated analysis were manually verified.

Gas Consumption

In this step we have checked the behaviour of smart contracts in production. Checks were done to know how much gas gets consumed and possibilities of optimization of code to reduce gas consumption.

Tools and Platforms used for Audit

Remix IDE, Truffle, Truffle Team, Ganache, Solhint, Mythril, Slither, SmartCheck.

Issue Categories

Every issue in this report has been assigned with a severity level. There are four levels of severity and each of them has been explained below.

High severity issues

A high severity issue or vulnerability means that your smart contract can be exploited. Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance or functionality and we recommend these issues to be fixed before moving to a live environment.

Medium level severity issues

The issues marked as medium severity usually arise because of errors and deficiencies in the smart contract code. Issues on this level could potentially bring problems and they should still be fixed.

Low level severity issues

Low level severity issues can cause minor impact and or are just warnings that can remain unfixed for now. It would be better to fix these issues at some point in the future.

Informational

These are severity four issues which indicate an improvement request, a general question, a cosmetic or documentation error, or a request for information. There is low-to-no impact.

Number of issues per severity

| Type | High | Medium | Low | Informational |
|--------------|------|--------|-----|---------------|
| Open | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Acknowledged | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Closed | 0 | 0 | 1 | 6 |

Introduction

During the period of **July 28,2021 to July 29, 2021** - QuillAudits Team performed a security audit for Dalmatian-INU smart contracts.

The code for the audit was taken from following the official link:
<https://github.com/PranavGarg01/Dalmatian-INU/blob/main/contracts/Dalmatian.sol>

| Note | Date | Commit hash |
|-----------|------------|--|
| Version 1 | 28/07/2021 | ab8df9f888fcfe4c4d623c03241d1d9d898ff5f7 |
| Version 2 | 30/07/2021 | ef4d28a6df79ab1cc134be94182098cf6af8539c |

Issues Found – Code Review / Manual Testing

High severity issues

No issues were found

Medium severity issues

No issues were found

Low level severity issues

1. Fees is not restored after a special fee transaction

Description

In addLiquidityETH function, the owner gets DALMI tokens from the Pool. If the private key of the owner's wallet is compromised, then it will create a problem.

Remediation

Ideally this can be a governance smart contract. On another hand, the owner can accept this risk and handle the private key very securely.

Status: Acknowledged by the Auditee

Comments from developer: "Contract ownership will be renounced in future."

2. Possible to gain ownership

Description

Possible to gain ownership after renouncing the contract ownership. Owner can renounce ownership and make a contract without the owner but he can regain ownership by following the steps below:

1. Owner calls the lock function in the contract to set the current owner as `_previousOwner`.
2. Owner calls unlock to unlock the contract and set `_owner = _previousOwner`.
3. Owner called renounceOwnership to leave the contract without the owner.
4. Owner calls unlock to regain ownership.

Remediation

We suggest removing these lock/unlock functions as this seems not serving a great purpose. Otherwise, always renounce ownership first before calling the lock function.

Status: Fixed

Comments from developer: “The lock and unlock functions have been removed.”

3. Infinite loop

| Line | Code |
|------|---|
| 1117 | <pre>function _getCurrentSupply() private view returns (uint256, uint256) { uint256 rSupply = _rTotal; uint256 tSupply = _tTotal; for (uint256 i = 0; i < _excluded.length; i++) { if (_rOwned[_excluded[i]] > rSupply _tOwned[_excluded[i]] > tSupply) return (_rTotal, _tTotal); rSupply = rSupply.sub(_rOwned[_excluded[i]]); tSupply = tSupply.sub(_tOwned[_excluded[i]]); } if (rSupply < _rTotal.div(_tTotal)) return (_rTotal, _tTotal); return (rSupply, tSupply); }</pre> |
| 1025 | <pre>///@dev Include a user in tax fees reward function includeInReward(address account) external onlyOwner() { require(!_isExcluded[account], "Account is already included"); for (uint256 i = 0; i < _excluded.length; i++) { if (_excluded[i] == account) { _excluded[i] = _excluded[_excluded.length - 1]; _tOwned[account] = 0; _isExcluded[account] = false; _excluded.pop(); break; } } }</pre> |

Description

In includeInReward & _getCurrentSupply functions , for loop do not have _excluded length limit , which costs more gas.

Remediation

We recommend keeping excluded wallets limited, to prevent infinite loop possibility.

Status: Acknowledged by the Auditee

Comments from developer: “Owner will keep a check on the number of excluded wallets.”

Informational

4. Use latest solidity version

pragma solidity 0.8.4

Description

Using the latest solidity will prevent any compiler level bugs.

Remediation

Please use 0.8.6 which is the latest version.

Status: Fixed

This issue was reported in Version1 and found fixed in Version2.

5. Make variables constant

| Line | Code |
|------|---|
| 879 | string private _name = "Dalmatian INU"; string private _symbol = "DALMI"; uint8 private _decimals = 9; |
| 856 | <div><pre>uint256 public rewardCycleBlock = 3 days; uint256 public easyRewardCycleBlock = 1 days; uint256 public thresholdDropRate = 10; // 10 percent uint256 public maxTxAmount = tTotal; // should be 0.005% percent per t uint256 public disruptiveCoverageFee = 4 ether; // antiwhale mapping(address => uint256) public nextAvailableClaimDate; bool public swapAndLiquifyEnabled = false; // should be true</pre></div> |

Description

Values defined for variables `easyRewardCycleBlock` and `disruptiveCoverageFee` will be set with the same values in the `activateContract` function.

Remediation

So, please make them constant by adding keyword 'constant' and remove the same assignments for `easyRewardCycleBlock` and `disruptiveCoverageFee` variables in the `activateContract` function. It will save some gas.

Status: Fixed

This issue was reported in Version1 and found fixed in Version2.

6. Function input parameters lack of check

| Line | Code |
|------|---|
| 1151 | <pre>///@dev To send tokens for BNB rewards to contract address function _takeBNB(uint256 tBNB) private { uint256 currentRate = _getRate(); uint256 rBNB = tBNB.mul(currentRate); _rOwned[address(this)] = _rOwned[address(this)].add(rBNB); if (_isExcluded[address(this)]){ _tOwned[address(this)] = _tOwned[address(this)].add(tBNB); } emit Transfer(tx.origin, address(this), tBNB); } function calculateTaxFee(uint256 _amount) private view returns (uint256) { return _amount.mul(_taxFee).div(10 ** 2); } function calculateLiquidityFee(uint256 _amount) private view returns (uint256) { return _amount.mul(_liquidityFee).div(10 ** 2); } function calculateBNBFee(uint256 _amount) private view returns (uint256) { return _amount.mul(_bnbFee).div(10 ** 2); }</pre> |
| 1094 | <pre>function _getRValues(uint256 tAmount, uint256 tFee, uint256 tLiquidity, uint256 tBNB, uint256 currentRate) private pure returns (uint256, uint256, uint256) { uint256 rAmount = tAmount.mul(currentRate); uint256 rFee = tFee.mul(currentRate); uint256 rLiquidity = tLiquidity.mul(currentRate); uint256 rBNB = tBNB.mul(currentRate); uint256 rTransferAmount = rAmount.sub(rFee).sub(rLiquidity).sub(rBNB); return (rAmount, rTransferAmount, rFee); }</pre> |

| Line | Code |
|------|--|
| 986 | <pre>///@dev Give away tAmount of tokens to contract as fees function deliver(uint256 tAmount) external { address sender = _msgSender(); require(!_isExcluded[sender], "Excluded addresses cannot call this function"); (uint256 rAmount,,,,,) = _getValues(tAmount); _rOwned[sender] = _rOwned[sender].sub(rAmount); _rTotal = _rTotal.sub(rAmount); _tFeeTotal = _tFeeTotal.add(tAmount); }</pre> |
| 1129 | <pre>function _takeLiquidity(uint256 tLiquidity) private { //Liquidity + BuyBack uint256 currentRate = _getRate(); uint256 tLiquidity1 = tLiquidity.mul(9).div(14); //2.5% for liquidity + 2% for buyback uint256 rLiquidity1 = tLiquidity1.mul(currentRate); _rOwned[address(this)] = _rOwned[address(this)].add(rLiquidity1); if (!_isExcluded[address(this)]) _tOwned[address(this)] = _tOwned[address(this)].add(tLiquidity1); //adding liquidity and buyback fees to total totalCollectedFees += tLiquidity1; //Marketing currentRate = _getRate(); tLiquidity1 = tLiquidity.mul(5).div(14); //2.5% for marketing uint256 rLiquidity2 = tLiquidity1.mul(currentRate); _rOwned[address(MARKETING_WALLET)] = _rOwned[address(MARKETING_WALLET)].add(rLiquidity2); if (!_isExcluded[address(MARKETING_WALLET)]) _tOwned[address(MARKETING_WALLET)] = _tOwned[address(MARKETING_WALLET)].add(tLiquidity1); emit Transfer(tx.origin, address(MARKETING_WALLET), tLiquidity1); } ///@dev To send tokens for BNB rewards to contract address function _takeBNB(uint256 tBNB) private { uint256 currentRate = _getRate(); uint256 rBNB = tBNB.mul(currentRate); _rOwned[address(this)] = _rOwned[address(this)].add(rBNB); if (!_isExcluded[address(this)]){ _tOwned[address(this)] = _tOwned[address(this)].add(tBNB); } emit Transfer(tx.origin, address(this), tBNB); }</pre> |

Description

Variable validation is not performed in below functions : deliver = tAmount | _getRValues = tAmount , tFee , tLiquidity , tBNB | _takeBNB = tBNB | calculateTaxFee = _amount | calculateBNBFee = _amount | setMaxTxPercent = maxTxPercent | calculateLiquidityFee = _amount | _reflectFee = rFee.

Remediation

Put validation : variable should not be empty and > 0.

Status: Fixed

Comments from Auditee: "Private or internal functions listed in the report do not need any check for parameters because they are called from public/external functions which already have required checks in place. The deliver function, which is an external function, does not need this check because even if input passed to it is 0, there will be no error or problems in the contract working."

7. Critical operation lacks event log

Description

missing event log for :

- removeAllFee
- restoreAllFee
- calculateBNBReward
- activateContract
- deliver

Remediation

Please write an event log for listed events.

Status: Fixed

Comments from developer: The following functions do not need any events :

- removeAllFee
- restoreAllFee
- calculateBNBReward

removeAllFee and restoreAllFee are functions which will be executed at every transaction, and are required only for the internal functioning of the contract. Emitting events for these functions will not be logical.

calculateBNBReward function is a view function, which means it will not change the state of the contract. The function will be used to calculate the BNB reward redeemable by the user. There is no need to emit events for transactions that do not change the state.

8. External instead of public

Description

Consider specifying function visibility to “external” instead of “public”, if that function is not being called internally. It will save some gas as well.

<https://ethereum.stackexchange.com/questions/32353/what-is-the-difference-between-an-internal-external-and-public-private-function/32464>

Status: Fixed

This issue was reported in Version1 and found fixed in Version2.

9. HardCoded Address

| Line | Code |
|------|---|
| 833 | <pre>contract Dalmatian is Context, IBEP20, Ownable, ReentrancyGuard { using SafeMath for uint256; using Address for address; address payable public constant CURELLA_WALLET = payable(address(0xE3d3D329e2287A7922D35F1D23e0FC146a7c25C9)); address public constant MARKETING_WALLET = address(0xcA3c07f6764b7c6Ce9555279dE9ec82455e12725); }</pre> |

Description

There are hardcoded wallet addresses.

Remediation

Owner must confirm before deploying.

Status: Fixed

Comments from developer: “The addresses have been verified. ”

Functional test

| Function Names | Testing results |
|-----------------------|-----------------|
| name | Passed |
| symbol | Passed |
| decimals | Passed |
| totalSupply | Passed |
| balanceOf | Passed |
| transfer | Passed |
| allowance | Passed |
| approve | Passed |
| transferFrom | Passed |
| increaseAllowance | Passed |
| decreaseAllowance | Passed |
| isExcludedFromReward | Passed |
| totalFees | Passed |
| deliver | Passed |
| reflectionFromToken | Passed |
| tokenFromReflection | Passed |
| excludeFromReward | Passed |
| includeInReward | Passed |
| _transferBothExcluded | Passed |
| excludeFromFee | Passed |

| Function Names | Testing results |
|--------------------------|-----------------|
| includeInFee | Passed |
| setTaxFeePercent | Passed |
| setLiquidityFeePercent | Passed |
| setBNBFeePercent | Passed |
| setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled | Passed |
| receive | Passed |
| _reflectFee | Passed |
| _getValues | Passed |
| _getTValues | Passed |
| _getRValues | Passed |
| _getRate | Passed |
| _getCurrentSupply | Passed |
| _takeLiquidity | Passed |
| _takeBNB | Passed |
| calculateTaxFee | Passed |
| calculateLiquidityFee | Passed |
| calculateBNBFee | Passed |
| removeAllFee | Passed |
| restoreAllFee | Passed |
| isExcludedFromFee | Passed |

| Function Names | Testing results |
|------------------------------|-----------------|
| _approve | Passed |
| _transfer | Passed |
| _tokenTransfer | Passed |
| _transferStandard | Passed |
| _transferToExcluded | Passed |
| _transferFromExcluded | Passed |
| setMaxTxPercent | Passed |
| setExcludeFromMaxTx | Passed |
| calculateBNBReward | Passed |
| getRewardCycleBlock | Passed |
| claimBNBReward | Passed |
| topUpClaimCycleAfterTransfer | Passed |
| ensureMaxTxAmount | Passed |
| disruptiveTransfer | Passed |
| swapAndLiquify | Passed |
| swapBurnAndLiquify | Passed |
| activateContract | Passed |
| changerewardCycleBlock | Passed |
| reflectionfeestartstop | Passed |
| changethreshHoldTopUpRate | Passed |

| Function Names | Testing results |
|-------------------|-----------------|
| nonReentrant | Passed |
| isHuman | Passed |
| owner | Passed |
| onlyOwner | Passed |
| renounceOwnership | Passed |
| transferOwnership | Passed |
| geUnlockTime | Passed |
| lock | Passed |
| unlock | Passed |
| _msgSender | Passed |
| _msgData | Passed |

Automated Testing

Slither

```
INFO:Detectors:
Utils.swapETHForTokens(address,address,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#741-760) sends eth to arbitrary user
  Dangerous calls:
    - pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
Utils.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#762-779) sends eth to arbitrary user
  Dangerous calls:
    - pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#771-778)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#functions-that-send-ether-to-arbitrary-destinations
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in Dalmatian._transfer(address,address,uint256,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#1212-1261):
  External calls:
    - swapAndLiquify(from,to) (Dalmatian.sol#1225)
    - pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#771-778)
    - Utils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),EthPortion) (Dalmatian.sol#1458)
    - pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
    - pancakeRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Dalmatian.sol#732-738)
    - Utils.swapETHForTokens(address(pancakeRouter),address(0xEaD),burnAmountEth) (Dalmatian.sol#1467)
    - Utils.addLiquidity(address(pancakeRouter),owner(),liqPortion,liqBalance) (Dalmatian.sol#1470)
    - Utils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),sellTokens) (Dalmatian.sol#1439)
  External calls sending eth:
    - swapAndLiquify(from,to) (Dalmatian.sol#1225)
    - pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#771-778)
    - pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
  State variables written after the call(s):
    - _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
    - _rOwned[address(this)] = _rOwned[address(this)].add(rBNB) (Dalmatian.sol#1155)
    - _rOwned[address(this)] = _rOwned[address(this)].add(rLiquidity1) (Dalmatian.sol#1134)
```

```
- _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
  - _rOwned[address(this)] = _rOwned[address(this)].add(rBNB) (Dalmatian.sol#1155)
  - _rOwned[address(this)] = _rOwned[address(this)].add(rLiquidity1) (Dalmatian.sol#1134)
  - _rOwned[sender] = _rOwned[sender].sub(rAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1287)
  - _rOwned[sender] = _rOwned[sender].sub(rAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1297)
  - _rOwned[sender] = _rOwned[sender].sub(rAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1042)
  - _rOwned[sender] = _rOwned[sender].sub(rAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1309)
  - _rOwned[recipient] = _rOwned[recipient].add(rTransferAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1288)
  - _rOwned[recipient] = _rOwned[recipient].add(rTransferAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1299)
  - _rOwned[recipient] = _rOwned[recipient].add(rTransferAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1310)
  - _rOwned[address(MARKETING_WALLET)] = _rOwned[address(MARKETING_WALLET)].add(rLiquidity2) (Dalmatian.sol#1145)
  - _rOwned[recipient] = _rOwned[recipient].add(rTransferAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1044)
- _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
  - _rTotal = _rTotal.sub(rFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1083)
- _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
  - _tOwned[address(this)] = _tOwned[address(this)].add(tBNB) (Dalmatian.sol#1157)
  - _tOwned[address(this)] = _tOwned[address(this)].add(tLiquidity1) (Dalmatian.sol#1136)
  - _tOwned[sender] = _tOwned[sender].sub(tAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1308)
  - _tOwned[sender] = _tOwned[sender].sub(tAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1041)
  - _tOwned[recipient] = _tOwned[recipient].add(tTransferAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1298)
  - _tOwned[recipient] = _tOwned[recipient].add(tTransferAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1043)
  - _tOwned[address(MARKETING_WALLET)] = _tOwned[address(MARKETING_WALLET)].add(tLiquidity1) (Dalmatian.sol#1147)
- _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
  - totalCollectedFees += tLiquidity1 (Dalmatian.sol#1139)
Reentrancy in Dalmatian.claimBNBReward() (Dalmatian.sol#1349-1366):
  External calls:
    - (sentTreasury) = address(CURELLA_WALLET).call{value: reward.div(10)}() (Dalmatian.sol#1356)
  State variables written after the call(s):
    - nextAvailableClaimDate[msg.sender] = block.timestamp + getRewardCycleBlock() (Dalmatian.sol#1361)
Reentrancy in Dalmatian.swapAndLiquify(address,address) (Dalmatian.sol#1403-1443):
  External calls:
    - swapBurnAndLiquify(burnTokens,swapTokens) (Dalmatian.sol#1435)
    - pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#771-778)
    - Utils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),EthPortion) (Dalmatian.sol#1458)
    - pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
    - pancakeRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Dalmatian.sol#732-738)
```

```

- swapBurnAndLiquify(burnTokens,swapTokens) (Dalmatian.sol#1435)
- pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#771-778)
- Uutils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),EthPortion) (Dalmatian.sol#1458)
- pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
- pancakeRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Dalmatian.sol#732-738)
- Uutils.swapETHForTokens(address(pancakeRouter),address(0xEaD),burnAmountEth) (Dalmatian.sol#1467)
- Uutils.addLiquidity(address(pancakeRouter),owner(),liqPortion,liqBalance) (Dalmatian.sol#1470)
External calls sending eth:
- swapBurnAndLiquify(burnTokens,swapTokens) (Dalmatian.sol#1435)
- pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#771-778)
- pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
State variables written after the call(s):
- totalCollectedFees = totalCollectedFees.sub(swapTokens).sub(burnTokens) (Dalmatian.sol#1436)
Reentrancy in Dalmatian.swapAndLiquify(address,address) (Dalmatian.sol#1403-1443):
External calls:
- swapBurnAndLiquify(burnTokens,swapTokens) (Dalmatian.sol#1435)
- pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#771-778)
- Uutils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),EthPortion) (Dalmatian.sol#1458)
- pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
- pancakeRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Dalmatian.sol#732-738)
- Uutils.swapETHForTokens(address(pancakeRouter),address(0xEaD),burnAmountEth) (Dalmatian.sol#1467)
- Uutils.addLiquidity(address(pancakeRouter),owner(),liqPortion,liqBalance) (Dalmatian.sol#1470)
- Uutils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),sellTokens) (Dalmatian.sol#1439)
External calls sending eth:
- swapBurnAndLiquify(burnTokens,swapTokens) (Dalmatian.sol#1435)
- pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#771-778)
- pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
State variables written after the call(s):

```

```

ol#771-778)
- pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
State variables written after the call(s):
- inSwapAndLiquify = false (Dalmatian.sol#1441)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities
INFO:Detectors:
Dalmatian._takeLiquidity(uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#1129-1149) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- tLiquidity1 = tLiquidity.mul(9).div(14) (Dalmatian.sol#1132)
- rLiquidity1 = tLiquidity1.mul(currentRate) (Dalmatian.sol#1133)
Dalmatian._takeLiquidity(uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#1129-1149) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- tLiquidity1 = tLiquidity.mul(5).div(14) (Dalmatian.sol#1143)
- rLiquidity2 = tLiquidity1.mul(currentRate) (Dalmatian.sol#1144)
Dalmatian.swapAndLiquify(address,address) (Dalmatian.sol#1403-1443) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- feesPercent = totalCollectedFees.mul(1000000).div(balanceOf(address(this))) (Dalmatian.sol#1425)
- swapTokens = contractTokenBalance.mul(feesPercent).mul(5).div(9).div(1000000) (Dalmatian.sol#1430)
Dalmatian.swapAndLiquify(address,address) (Dalmatian.sol#1403-1443) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
- feesPercent = totalCollectedFees.mul(1000000).div(balanceOf(address(this))) (Dalmatian.sol#1425)
- burnTokens = contractTokenBalance.mul(feesPercent).mul(4).div(9).div(1000000) (Dalmatian.sol#1433)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply
INFO:Detectors:
Uutils.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#762-779) ignores return value by pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#771-778)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return
INFO:Detectors:
Dalmatian.allowance(address,address).owner (Dalmatian.sol#951) shadows:
- Ownable.owner() (Dalmatian.sol#414-416) (function)
Dalmatian._approve(address,address,uint256).owner (Dalmatian.sol#1204) shadows:
- Ownable.owner() (Dalmatian.sol#414-416) (function)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in Dalmatian._transfer(address,address,uint256,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#1212-1261):
External calls:
- swapAndLiquify(from,to) (Dalmatian.sol#1225)
- pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#771-778)
- Uutils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),EthPortion) (Dalmatian.sol#1458)
- pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)

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ol#771-778)
    - Utils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),EthPortion) (Dalmatian.sol#1458)
    - pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.time
stamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
    - pancakeRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Dal
matian.sol#732-738)
    - Utils.swapETHForTokens(address(pancakeRouter),address(0xEaD),burnAmountEth) (Dalmatian.sol#1467)
    - Utils.addLiquidity(address(pancakeRouter),owner(),liqPortion,liqBalance) (Dalmatian.sol#1470)
    - Utils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),sellTokens) (Dalmatian.sol#1439)
    External calls sending eth:
    - swapAndLiquify(from,to) (Dalmatian.sol#1225)
    - pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.s
ol#771-778)
    - pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.time
stamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
    State variables written after the call(s):
    - _bnbFee = 1 (Dalmatian.sol#1242)
    - _bnbFee = 11 (Dalmatian.sol#1250)
    - _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
      - _bnbFee = _previousBNBFee (Dalmatian.sol#1196)
      - _bnbFee = 0 (Dalmatian.sol#1189)
    - _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
      - _liquidityFee = _previousLiquidityFee (Dalmatian.sol#1195)
      - _liquidityFee = 0 (Dalmatian.sol#1188)
    - _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
      - _previousBNBFee = _bnbFee (Dalmatian.sol#1185)
    - _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
      - _previousLiquidityFee = _liquidityFee (Dalmatian.sol#1184)
    - _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
      - _previousTaxFee = _taxFee (Dalmatian.sol#1183)
    - _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
      - _tFeeTotal = _tFeeTotal.add(tFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1084)
    - _taxFee = 10 (Dalmatian.sol#1239)
    - _taxFee = 0 (Dalmatian.sol#1247)
    - _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
      - _taxFee = _previousTaxFee (Dalmatian.sol#1194)
      - _taxFee = 0 (Dalmatian.sol#1187)
    - _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)

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    - _taxFee = 0 (Dalmatian.sol#1187)
    - _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
      - nextAvailableClaimDate[recipient] = nextAvailableClaimDate[recipient] + Utils.calculateTopUpClaim(currentRecipientBalan
ce,basedRewardCycleBlock,threshHoldTopUpRate,amount) (Dalmatian.sol#1372-1377)
    Reentrancy in Dalmatian.constructor(address) (Dalmatian.sol#894-923):
    External calls:
    - pancakePair = IPancakeFactory(_pancakeRouter.factory()).createPair(address(this),_pancakeRouter.WETH()) (Dalmatian.sol#901-902)
    State variables written after the call(s):
    - _isExcludedFromFee[owner()] = true (Dalmatian.sol#908)
    - _isExcludedFromFee[address(this)] = true (Dalmatian.sol#909)
    - _isExcludedFromFee[MARKETING_WALLET] = true (Dalmatian.sol#910)
    - _isExcludedFromFee[CURELLA_WALLET] = true (Dalmatian.sol#911)
    - _isExcludedFromMaxTx[owner()] = true (Dalmatian.sol#916)
    - _isExcludedFromMaxTx[address(this)] = true (Dalmatian.sol#917)
    - _isExcludedFromMaxTx[address(0xEaD)] = true (Dalmatian.sol#918)
    - _isExcludedFromMaxTx[address(0)] = true (Dalmatian.sol#919)
    - _isExcludedFromMaxTx[address(CURELLA_WALLET)] = true (Dalmatian.sol#920)
    - pancakeRouter = _pancakeRouter (Dalmatian.sol#905)
    Reentrancy in Dalmatian.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#960-964):
    External calls:
    - _transfer(sender,recipient,amount,0) (Dalmatian.sol#961)
    - pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.s
ol#771-778)
    - Utils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),EthPortion) (Dalmatian.sol#1458)
    - pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.time
stamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
    - pancakeRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Dal
matian.sol#732-738)
    - Utils.swapETHForTokens(address(pancakeRouter),address(0xEaD),burnAmountEth) (Dalmatian.sol#1467)
    - Utils.addLiquidity(address(pancakeRouter),owner(),liqPortion,liqBalance) (Dalmatian.sol#1470)
    - Utils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),sellTokens) (Dalmatian.sol#1439)
    External calls sending eth:
    - _transfer(sender,recipient,amount,0) (Dalmatian.sol#961)
    - pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.s
ol#771-778)
    - pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.time
stamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
    State variables written after the call(s):

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- pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.time
stamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
State variables written after the call(s):
- _approve(sender,_msgSender(),_allowances[sender][_msgSender()].sub(amount,BEP20: transfer amount exceeds allowance)) (Dalmatian
.sol#962)
- _allowances[owner][spender] = amount (Dalmatian.sol#1208)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2
INFO:Detectors:
Reentrancy in Dalmatian._transfer(address,address,uint256,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#1212-1261):
External calls:
- swapAndLiquify(from,to) (Dalmatian.sol#1225)
- pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.s
ol#771-778)
- Utils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),EthPortion) (Dalmatian.sol#1458)
- pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.time
stamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
- pancakeRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Dal
matian.sol#732-738)
- Utils.swapETHForTokens(address(pancakeRouter),address(0xdEaD),burnAmountEth) (Dalmatian.sol#1467)
- Utils.addLiquidity(address(pancakeRouter),owner(),liqPortion,liqBalance) (Dalmatian.sol#1470)
- Utils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),sellTokens) (Dalmatian.sol#1439)
External calls sending eth:
- swapAndLiquify(from,to) (Dalmatian.sol#1225)
- pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.s
ol#771-778)
- pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.time
stamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- Transfer(tx.origin,address(this),tBNB) (Dalmatian.sol#1159)
- _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
- Transfer(sender,recipient,tTransferAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1292)
- _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
- Transfer(sender,recipient,tTransferAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1314)
- _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
- Transfer(sender,recipient,tTransferAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1303)
- _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
- Transfer(tx.origin,address(MARKETING_WALLET),tLiquidity1) (Dalmatian.sol#1148)
- _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)

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- Transfer(tx.origin,address(MARKETING_WALLET),tLiquidity1) (Dalmatian.sol#1148)
- _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
- Transfer(sender,recipient,tTransferAmount) (Dalmatian.sol#1048)
- _tokenTransfer(from,to,amount,takeFee) (Dalmatian.sol#1260)
Reentrancy in Dalmatian.claimBNBReward() (Dalmatian.sol#1349-1366):
External calls:
- (sentTreasury) = address(CURELLA_WALLET).call{value: reward.div(10)}() (Dalmatian.sol#1356)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- ClaimBNBSuccessfully(msg.sender,reward,nextAvailableClaimDate[msg.sender]) (Dalmatian.sol#1362)
Reentrancy in Dalmatian.constructor(address) (Dalmatian.sol#894-923):
External calls:
- pancakePair = IPancakeFactory(_pancakeRouter.factory()).createPair(address(this),_pancakeRouter.WETH()) (Dalmatian.sol#901-902)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- Transfer(address(0),_msgSender(),_tTotal) (Dalmatian.sol#922)
Reentrancy in Dalmatian.swapBurnAndLiquify(uint256,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#1446-1473):
External calls:
- Utils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),EthPortion) (Dalmatian.sol#1458)
- Utils.swapETHForTokens(address(pancakeRouter),address(0xdEaD),burnAmountEth) (Dalmatian.sol#1467)
- Utils.addLiquidity(address(pancakeRouter),owner(),liqPortion,liqBalance) (Dalmatian.sol#1470)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- SwapBurnLiquify(liqPortion,newBalance,liqBalance,burnAmountEth) (Dalmatian.sol#1472)
Reentrancy in Dalmatian.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#960-964):
External calls:
- _transfer(sender,recipient,amount,0) (Dalmatian.sol#961)
- pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.s
ol#771-778)
- Utils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),EthPortion) (Dalmatian.sol#1458)
- pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.time
stamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
- pancakeRouter.swapExactTokensForETHSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens(tokenAmount,0,path,address(this),block.timestamp) (Dal
matian.sol#732-738)
- Utils.swapETHForTokens(address(pancakeRouter),address(0xdEaD),burnAmountEth) (Dalmatian.sol#1467)
- Utils.addLiquidity(address(pancakeRouter),owner(),liqPortion,liqBalance) (Dalmatian.sol#1470)
- Utils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),sellTokens) (Dalmatian.sol#1439)
External calls sending eth:
- _transfer(sender,recipient,amount,0) (Dalmatian.sol#961)
- pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.s
ol#771-778)

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matian.sol#732-738)
    - Utils.swapETHForTokens(address(pancakeRouter),address(0xdEaD),burnAmountEth) (Dalmatian.sol#1467)
    - Utils.addLiquidity(address(pancakeRouter),owner(),liqPortion,liqBalance) (Dalmatian.sol#1470)
    - Utils.swapTokensForEth(address(pancakeRouter),sellTokens) (Dalmatian.sol#1439)
    External calls sending eth:
    - _transfer(sender,recipient,amount,0) (Dalmatian.sol#961)
    - pancakeRouter.addLiquidityETH{value: ethAmount}(address(this),tokenAmount,0,0,owner,block.timestamp + 360) (Dalmatian.s
ol#771-778)
    - pancakeRouter.swapExactETHForTokensSupportingFeeOnTransferTokens{value: ethAmount}(0,path,address(recipient),block.time
stamp + 360) (Dalmatian.sol#754-759)
    Event emitted after the call(s):
    - Approval(owner,spender,amount) (Dalmatian.sol#1209)
    - _approve(sender,_msgSender(),_allowances[sender][_msgSender()].sub(amount,BEP20: transfer amount exceeds allowance)) (D
almatian.sol#962)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
INFO:Detectors:
Ownable.unlock() (Dalmatian.sol#461-466) uses timestamp for comparisons
    Dangerous comparisons:
    - require(bool,string)(block.timestamp > _lockTime,Contract is locked until 7 days) (Dalmatian.sol#463)
Dalmatian.getRewardCycleBlock() (Dalmatian.sol#1343-1346) uses timestamp for comparisons
    Dangerous comparisons:
    - block.timestamp >= disableEasyRewardFrom (Dalmatian.sol#1344)
Dalmatian.claimBNBReward() (Dalmatian.sol#1349-1366) uses timestamp for comparisons
    Dangerous comparisons:
    - require(bool,string)(nextAvailableClaimDate[msg.sender] <= block.timestamp,Error: next available not reached) (Dalmatian.sol#13
50)
Dalmatian.ensureMaxTxAmount(address,address,uint256,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#1380-1394) uses timestamp for comparisons
    Dangerous comparisons:
    - value < disruptiveCoverageFee && block.timestamp >= disruptiveTransferEnabledFrom (Dalmatian.sol#1390)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp
INFO:Detectors:
Address.isContract(address) (Dalmatian.sol#266-275) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (Dalmatian.sol#273)
Address._functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string) (Dalmatian.sol#359-380) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (Dalmatian.sol#372-375)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage
INFO:Detectors:
Dalmatian.ensureMaxTxAmount(address,address,uint256,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#1380-1394) compares to a boolean constant:

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INFO:Detectors:
Dalmatian.ensureMaxTxAmount(address,address,uint256,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#1380-1394) compares to a boolean constant:
    - _isExcludedFromMaxTx[from] == false && _isExcludedFromMaxTx[to] == false (Dalmatian.sol#1387-1388)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#boolean-equality
INFO:Detectors:
Different versions of Solidity is used:
    - Version used: ['0.8.4', '>=0.6.8']
    - 0.8.4 (Dalmatian.sol#3)
    - >=0.6.8 (Dalmatian.sol#673)
    - ABIEncoderV2 (Dalmatian.sol#831)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used
INFO:Detectors:
Address._functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string) (Dalmatian.sol#359-380) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionCall(address,bytes) (Dalmatian.sol#319-321) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionCall(address,bytes,string) (Dalmatian.sol#329-331) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#344-346) is never used and should be removed
Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string) (Dalmatian.sol#354-357) is never used and should be removed
Address.isContract(address) (Dalmatian.sol#266-275) is never used and should be removed
Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#293-299) is never used and should be removed
Context._msgData() (Dalmatian.sol#238-241) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#211-213) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256,string) (Dalmatian.sol#227-230) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
INFO:Detectors:
Dalmatian._rTotal (Dalmatian.sol#852) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
    - (MAX - (MAX % _tTotal))
Dalmatian._maxTxAmount (Dalmatian.sol#858) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
    - _tTotal
Dalmatian._previousTaxFee (Dalmatian.sol#868) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
    - _taxFee
Dalmatian._previousLiquidityFee (Dalmatian.sol#871) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
    - _liquidityFee
Dalmatian._previousBNBFee (Dalmatian.sol#874) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
    - _bnbFee
Dalmatian.minTokenNumberToSell (Dalmatian.sol#877) is set pre-construction with a non-constant function or state variable:
    - _tTotal.mul(1).div(100000)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#function-initializing-state-variables
INFO:Detectors:

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Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#function-initializing-state-variables
INFO:Detectors:
Pragma version0.8.4 (Dalmatian.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version>=0.6.8 (Dalmatian.sol#673) allows old versions
solc-0.8.4 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
INFO:Detectors:
Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#293-299):
- (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}{} (Dalmatian.sol#297)
Low level call in Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string) (Dalmatian.sol#359-380):
- (success,returndata) = target.call{value: weiValue}(data) (Dalmatian.sol#363)
Low level call in Dalmatian.claimBNBReward() (Dalmatian.sol#1349-1366):
- (sentTreasury) = address(CURELLA_WALLET).call{value: reward.div(10)}{} (Dalmatian.sol#1356)
- (sent) = address(msg.sender).call{value: reward}{} (Dalmatian.sol#1364)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls
INFO:Detectors:
Function IPancakePair.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() (Dalmatian.sol#500) is not in mixedCase
Function IPancakePair.PERMIT_TYPEHASH() (Dalmatian.sol#501) is not in mixedCase
Function IPancakePair.MINIMUM_LIQUIDITY() (Dalmatian.sol#518) is not in mixedCase
Function IPancakeRouter01.WETH() (Dalmatian.sol#538) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Dalmatian.setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled(bool)._enabled (Dalmatian.sol#1074) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Dalmatian.calculateTaxFee(uint256)._amount (Dalmatian.sol#1162) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Dalmatian.calculateLiquidityFee(uint256)._amount (Dalmatian.sol#1168) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Dalmatian.calculateBNBFee(uint256)._amount (Dalmatian.sol#1174) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Dalmatian.setExcludeFromMaxTx(address,bool)._address (Dalmatian.sol#1323) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Dalmatian.reflectionfeestartstop(bool)._value (Dalmatian.sol#1510) is not in mixedCase
Parameter Dalmatian.changethreshHoldTopUpRate(uint256)._newrate (Dalmatian.sol#1516) is not in mixedCase
Variable Dalmatian._maxTxAmount (Dalmatian.sol#858) is not in mixedCase
Variable Dalmatian._taxFee (Dalmatian.sol#867) is not in mixedCase
Variable Dalmatian._liquidityFee (Dalmatian.sol#870) is not in mixedCase
Variable Dalmatian._bnbFee (Dalmatian.sol#873) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
INFO:Detectors:
Redundant expression "this (Dalmatian.sol#239)" inContext (Dalmatian.sol#233-242)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
INFO:Detectors:
Variable IPancakeRouter01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountADesired (Dalmatian.sol#543) is too similar to IPancakeRouter01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountBDesired (Dalmatian.sol#544)

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Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
INFO:Detectors:
Redundant expression "this (Dalmatian.sol#239)" inContext (Dalmatian.sol#233-242)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements
INFO:Detectors:
Variable IPancakeRouter01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountADesired (Dalmatian.sol#543) is too similar to IPancakeRouter01.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,address,uint256).amountBDesired (Dalmatian.sol#544)
Variable Dalmatian._takeLiquidity(uint256).rLiquidity1 (Dalmatian.sol#1133) is too similar to Dalmatian._takeLiquidity(uint256).rLiquidity2 (Dalmatian.sol#1144)
Variable Dalmatian._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1286) is too similar to Dalmatian._getTVValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1098)
Variable Dalmatian.reflectionFromToken(uint256,bool).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1002) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferFromExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1307)
Variable Dalmatian._transferFromExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1307) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferFromExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1307)
Variable Dalmatian._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1286) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferFromExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1307)
Variable Dalmatian.reflectionFromToken(uint256,bool).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1002) is too similar to Dalmatian._getTVValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1098)
Variable Dalmatian._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1286) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1286)
Variable Dalmatian._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1286) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1040)
Variable Dalmatian._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1286) is too similar to Dalmatian._getValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1089)
Variable Dalmatian._getValues(uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1090) is too similar to Dalmatian._getTVValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1098)
Variable Dalmatian._transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1040) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1040)
Variable Dalmatian._transferFromExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1307) is too similar to Dalmatian._getTVValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1098)
Variable Dalmatian._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1286) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferToExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1296)
Variable Dalmatian._transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1040) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferToExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1296)
Variable Dalmatian._getValues(uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1090) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferToExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1296)

```



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(uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1089)
Variable Dalmatian._getValues(uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1090) is too similar to Dalmatian._getTVValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1098)
Variable Dalmatian._transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1040) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1040)
Variable Dalmatian._transferFromExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1307) is too similar to Dalmatian._getTVValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1098)
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Variable Dalmatian._takeLiquidity(uint256).rLiquidity1 (Dalmatian.sol#1133) is too similar to Dalmatian._takeLiquidity(uint256).tLiquidity1 (Dalmatian.sol#1132)
Variable Dalmatian._transferFromExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1307) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferToExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1296)
Variable Dalmatian._getRValues(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1107) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1286)
Variable Dalmatian._transferToExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1296) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1286)
Variable Dalmatian._getRValues(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1107) is too similar to Dalmatian._getTVValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1098)
Variable Dalmatian._transferToExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1296) is too similar to Dalmatian._getTVValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1098)
Variable Dalmatian._transferFromExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1307) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1286)
Variable Dalmatian.reflectionFromToken(uint256,bool).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1002) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1286)
Variable Dalmatian.reflectionFromToken(uint256,bool).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1002) is too similar to Dalmatian._getValues(uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1089)
Variable Dalmatian._transferFromExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1307) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferFromExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1307)
```

[illegible]

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Variable Dalmatian._transferToExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1296) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferToExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1296)
Variable Dalmatian._transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1040) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferStandard(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1286)
Variable Dalmatian._getRValues(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1107) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1040)
Variable Dalmatian._transferToExcluded(address,address,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1296) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferBothExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1040)
Variable Dalmatian._getRValues(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256).rTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1107) is too similar to Dalmatian._transferToExcluded(address,address,uint256).tTransferAmount (Dalmatian.sol#1296)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-are-too-similar
INFO:Detectors:
Dalmatian.setMaxTxPercent(uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#1318-1320) uses literals with too many digits:
- _maxTxAmount = _tTotal.mul(maxTxPercent).div(100000) (Dalmatian.sol#1319)
Dalmatian.swapAndLiquify(address,address) (Dalmatian.sol#1403-1443) uses literals with too many digits:
- feesPercent = totalCollectedFees.mul(1000000).div(balanceOf(address(this))) (Dalmatian.sol#1425)
Dalmatian.swapAndLiquify(address,address) (Dalmatian.sol#1403-1443) uses literals with too many digits:
- swapTokens = contractTokenBalance.mul(feesPercent).mul(5).div(9).div(1000000) (Dalmatian.sol#1430)
Dalmatian.swapAndLiquify(address,address) (Dalmatian.sol#1403-1443) uses literals with too many digits:
- burnTokens = contractTokenBalance.mul(feesPercent).mul(4).div(9).div(1000000) (Dalmatian.sol#1433)
Dalmatian.slitherConstructorVariables() (Dalmatian.sol#833-1522) uses literals with too many digits:
- _tTotal = 1000000000 * 10 ** 6 * 10 ** 9 (Dalmatian.sol#851)
Dalmatian.slitherConstructorVariables() (Dalmatian.sol#833-1522) uses literals with too many digits:
- minTokenNumberToSell = _tTotal.mul(1).div(100000) (Dalmatian.sol#877)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#too-many-digits
INFO:Detectors:
Dalmatian._decimals (Dalmatian.sol#881) should be constant
Dalmatian._name (Dalmatian.sol#879) should be constant
Dalmatian._symbol (Dalmatian.sol#880) should be constant
Dalmatian._tTotal (Dalmatian.sol#851) should be constant
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variables-that-could-be-declared-constant
INFO:Detectors:
renounceOwnership() should be declared external:
- Ownable.renounceOwnership() (Dalmatian.sol#433-436)
transferOwnership(address) should be declared external:
- Ownable.transferOwnership(address) (Dalmatian.sol#442-446)
geUnlockTime() should be declared external:
- Ownable.geUnlockTime() (Dalmatian.sol#448-450)

- Ownable.transferOwnership(address) (Dalmatian.sol#442-446)
geUnlockTime() should be declared external:
- Ownable.geUnlockTime() (Dalmatian.sol#448-450)
lock(uint256) should be declared external:
- Ownable.lock(uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#453-458)
unlock() should be declared external:
- Ownable.unlock() (Dalmatian.sol#461-466)
calculateBNBReward(uint256,uint256,uint256) should be declared external:
- Utils.calculateBNBReward(uint256,uint256,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#679-692)
calculateTopUpClaim(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) should be declared external:
- Utils.calculateTopUpClaim(uint256,uint256,uint256,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#694-718)
swapTokensForEth(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- Utils.swapTokensForEth(address,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#720-739)
swapETHForTokens(address,address,uint256) should be declared external:
- Utils.swapETHForTokens(address,address,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#741-760)
addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256) should be declared external:
- Utils.addLiquidity(address,address,uint256,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#762-779)
name() should be declared external:
- Dalmatian.name() (Dalmatian.sol#925-927)
symbol() should be declared external:
- Dalmatian.symbol() (Dalmatian.sol#929-931)
decimals() should be declared external:
- Dalmatian.decimals() (Dalmatian.sol#933-935)
totalSupply() should be declared external:
- Dalmatian.totalSupply() (Dalmatian.sol#937-939)
transfer(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- Dalmatian.transfer(address,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#946-949)
allowance(address,address) should be declared external:
- Dalmatian.allowance(address,address) (Dalmatian.sol#951-953)
approve(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- Dalmatian.approve(address,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#955-958)
transferFrom(address,address,uint256) should be declared external:
- Dalmatian.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#960-964)
increaseAllowance(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- Dalmatian.increaseAllowance(address,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#966-969)
decreaseAllowance(address,uint256) should be declared external:
- Dalmatian.decreaseAllowance(address,uint256) (Dalmatian.sol#971-974)
isExcludedFromFee(address) should be declared external:
- Dalmatian.isExcludedFromFee(address) (Dalmatian.sol#1200-1202)
claimBNBReward() should be declared external:
- Dalmatian.claimBNBReward() (Dalmatian.sol#1349-1366)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external
INFO:Slither:Dalmatian.sol analyzed (12 contracts with 75 detectors), 144 result(s) found
INFO:Slither:Use https://crytic.io/ to get access to additional detectors and Github integration

```

Results

No major issues were found. Some false positive errors were reported by the tool. All the other issues have been categorized above, according to their level of severity.

SOLIDITY STATIC ANALYSIS

SOLIDITY STATIC ANALYSIS

last results for:
contracts/Dalmatian.sol

Security

Transaction origin:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Transaction origin: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

Check-effects-interaction:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Check-effects-interaction: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

Inline assembly:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Inline assembly: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

Block timestamp:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Block timestamp: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

Low level calls:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Low level calls: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

Selfdestruct:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Selfdestruct: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

Gas & Economy

This on local calls:

INTERNAL ERROR in module This on local calls: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

Delete dynamic array:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Delete dynamic array: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

For loop over dynamic array:

INTERNAL ERROR in module For loop over dynamic array: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

Ether transfer in loop:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Ether transfer in loop: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

ERC

ERC20:

INTERNAL ERROR in module ERC20: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

Miscellaneous

Constant/View/Pure functions:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Constant/View/Pure functions: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

Similar variable names:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Similar variable names: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

No return:

INTERNAL ERROR in module No return: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

Guard conditions:

INTERNAL ERROR in module Guard conditions: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

String length:

INTERNAL ERROR in module String length: can't convert undefined to object
Pos: not available

SOLHINT LINTER

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:3:1: Error: Compiler version 0.8.4 does not satisfy the r semver requirement

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:405:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:456:21: Error: Avoid making time-based decisions in your business logic

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:463:17: Error: Avoid making time-based decisions in your business logic

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:500:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:501:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:518:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:538:5: Error: Function name must be in mixedCase

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:673:1: Error: Compiler version >=0.6.8 does not satisfy the r semver requirement

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:701:20: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:737:13: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:758:13: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:777:13: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:800:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:826:17: Error: Avoid to use tx.origin

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:833:1: Error: Contract has 32 states declarations but allowed no more than 15

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:894:5: Error: Explicitly mark visibility in function (Set ignoreConstructors to true if using solidity >=0.7.0)

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1080:32: Error: Code contains empty blocks

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1148:23: Error: Avoid to use tx.origin

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1159:23: Error: Avoid to use tx.origin

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1344:13: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1349:52: Error: Visibility modifier must be first in list of modifiers

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1350:55: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1350:72: Error: Use double quotes for string literals

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1351:44: Error: Use double quotes for string literals

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1356:32: Error: Avoid to use low level calls.

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1357:31: Error: Use double quotes for string literals

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1361:46: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1364:24: Error: Avoid using low level calls.

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1365:23: Error: Use double quotes for string literals

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1390:50: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1449:9: Error: Variable name must be in mixedCase

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1478:33: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic

contracts/Dalmatian.sol:1484:41: Error: Avoid to make time-based decisions in your business logic

Disclaimer

Quillhash audit is not a security warranty, investment advice, or an endorsement of the Dalmatian-INU platform. This audit does not provide a security or correctness guarantee of the audited smart contracts. The statements made in this document should not be interpreted as investment or legal advice, nor should its authors be held accountable for decisions made based on them. Securing smart contracts is a multistep process. One audit cannot be considered enough. We recommend that the Dalmatian-INU Team put in place a bug bounty program to encourage further analysis of the smart contract by other third parties.

Closing Summary

Overall, smart contracts are very well written and adhere to guidelines.

No instances of Integer Overflow and Underflow vulnerabilities or Back-Door Entry were found in the contract, but relying on other contracts might cause Reentrancy Vulnerability.

The majority of the concerns addressed above have been acknowledged, implemented and verified.



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