

Audit Report May, 2022



For





Table of Content

Executive Summary				
Checked Vulnerabilities				
Techniques and Methods				
Manual Testing05				
High Severity Issues				
Medium Severity Issues 05				
1	State Variable are written after the external call	05		
Low Severity Issues 06				
2	used Locked Pragma Version	06		
3	Owner should be Multisig	06		
4	Contracts have non Indexed Events	06		
Informational Issues				
5	Gas optimization	07		
6	Natspec Comments are missing	07		
Automated Tests				
Closing Summary				
About QuillAudits14				

Executive Summary

Project Name Carpe Diem Savings

Overview Carpe Diem Savings is a blockchain based decentralized savings

account for your cryptocurrency assets. Carpe Diem Savings is a decentralised framework that combines different types of savings

accounts into one model and applies them to existing

cryptocurrencies using blockchain-based smart contract technology.

Timeline 6th April, 2022 to 9th May, 2022

Method Manual Review, Functional Testing, Automated Testing etc.


Scope of Audit The scope of this audit was to analyse Carpe Diem Savings codebase

for quality, security, and correctness.

Codebase <u>https://github.com/CarpeDiemSavings/contracts/tree/main/contracts</u>

Commit hash 9aaf7559d66756b8d6fd11a06929a2a5977dd8f8

Fixed In 66e9a0801eaa4dacc06479aca67b33cb93fb755c



	High	Medium	Low	Informational
Open Issues	0	0	0	0
Acknowledged Issues	0	0	0	0
Partially Resolved Issues	0	0	0	1
Resolved Issues	0	1	3	1

audits.quillhash.com

01

Types of Severities

High

A high severity issue or vulnerability means that your smart contract can be exploited. Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance or functionality, and we recommend these issues be fixed before moving to a live environment.

Medium

The issues marked as medium severity usually arise because of errors and deficiencies in the smart contract code. Issues on this level could potentially bring problems, and they should still be fixed.

Low

Low-level severity issues can cause minor impact and or are just warnings that can remain unfixed for now. It would be better to fix these issues at some point in the future.

Informational

These are severity issues that indicate an improvement request, a general question, a cosmetic or documentation error, or a request for information. There is low-to-no impact.

Types of Issues

Open

Security vulnerabilities identified that must be resolved and are currently unresolved.

Resolved

These are the issues identified in the initial audit and have been successfully fixed.

Acknowledged

Vulnerabilities which have been acknowledged but are yet to be resolved.

Partially Resolved

Considerable efforts have been invested to reduce the risk/impact of the security issue, but are not completely resolved.

Checked Vulnerabilities

Re-entrancy

✓ Timestamp Dependence

Gas Limit and Loops

Exception Disorder

✓ Gasless Send

✓ Use of tx.origin

Compiler version not fixed

Address hardcoded

Divide before multiply

Integer overflow/underflow

Dangerous strict equalities

Tautology or contradiction

Return values of low-level calls

Missing Zero Address Validation

Private modifier

Revert/require functions

Using block.timestamp

Multiple Sends

✓ Using SHA3

Using suicide

Using throw

Using inline assembly



Techniques and Methods

Throughout the audit of smart contract, care was taken to ensure:

- The overall quality of code.
- Use of best practices.
- Code documentation and comments match logic and expected behaviour.
- Token distribution and calculations are as per the intended behaviour mentioned in the whitepaper.
- Implementation of ERC-20 token standards.
- Efficient use of gas.
- Code is safe from re-entrancy and other vulnerabilities.

The following techniques, methods and tools were used to review all the smart contracts.

Structural Analysis

In this step, we have analysed the design patterns and structure of smart contracts. A thorough check was done to ensure the smart contract is structured in a way that will not result in future problems.

Static Analysis

Static analysis of smart contracts was done to identify contract vulnerabilities. In this step, a series of automated tools are used to test the security of smart contracts.

Code Review / Manual Analysis

Manual analysis or review of code was done to identify new vulnerabilities or verify the vulnerabilities found during the static analysis. Contracts were completely manually analysed, their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the whitepaper. Besides, the results of the automated analysis were manually verified.

Gas Consumption

In this step, we have checked the behaviour of smart contracts in production. Checks were done to know how much gas gets consumed and the possibilities of optimization of code to reduce gas consumption.

Tools and Platforms used for Audit

Remix IDE, Truffle, Truffle Team, Solhint, Mythril, Slither, Solidity statistic analysis.



Manual Testing

High Severity Issues

No issues found

Medium Severity Issues

1. state variable are written after the external call

If the token safeTransferFrom or safeTransfer is malicious then the reentrency can be created in Carpediem.upgradeStake, Carpediem.distributePenalty, Carpediem.deposit.

We recommend to follow CEI pattern to remove reentrency or use Openzepplin ReentrancyGuard.

Status

Fixed



Low Severity Issues

2. Used locked pragma version

The pragma versions used in the contract are not locked. Consider using the latest versions among 0.8.13 for deploying the contracts and libraries, as it does not compile for any other version and can be confusing for a developer. Solidity source files indicate the versions of the compiler they can be compiled with.

pragma solidity ^0.8.0; // bad: compiles between 0.8.0 and 0.8.10 pragma solidity 0.8.0; // good : compiles w 0.8.0 only but not the latest version pragma solidity 0.8.10; // best: compiles w 0.8.10

Status

Fixed

3. Owner should be multisig

We recommend to use multisig account address (gnosis-safe) for owner such that the pool creating is not been malicious in future and the decentralization is achieved in the system.

Status

Fixed

4. Contracts Have Non-indexed Events

No parameters are indexed in the events of most contracts.

For example, StakeUpgraded, Withdraw and StakeRemoved events of Carpediem don't index the depositor/who of the contract.

It is recommended to index the relevant event parameters to allow integrators and dApps to quickly search for these and simplify UIs.

Status

Fixed



Informational Issues

5. Gas optimizations

Carpediem.sol

- 1. On line no 87 and 88 the reinitialize of variable value to 0 is done which is a gas wastage. As by default, the value of uint256 variable is 0. We recommend removing line 87 and 88.
- 2. On line no 252, 52, 48 no need to calculate the length of address as it's a static initialization of length 3. We can directly use 3.
- 3. Most of the constants can be made private instead of public.

CarpediemFacory.sol

- 4. On line no 49 and 52 the calculation of length is not needed as it's static, and we can directly use 5 and 3.
- 5. The constant percentBase should be private instead of public.

Status

Partially Fixed

6. Netspec comments are missing

We recommend to follow <u>netspec</u> spec doc for more readability and better understanding of code.

Status

Fixed

Binance Testnet Contract

<u>0x28e8dA57Acc2D99cE6B92297e6cb979eE158DcbD</u> <u>0xc53b4Ae5fB089ff273b76DC1Ba598c8d1c04C4c6</u>

Automated Tests

```
December 16 Accordance approach accordance (accordance accordance accordance
```



```
Reentrancy in CarpeDiem.deposit(uint256,uint32) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#675-699):
                                            - Deposit(msg.sender,stakes[msg.sender].length - 1,_amount,_duration) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#690)
- SharesChanged(totalShares,totalShares + shares + lBonusShares + bBonusShares) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#683)
Reentrancy in CarpeDiem.removeDeadStake(address,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#776-813):
     - token.safeTransfer(_user,stakeInfo.amount) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#811)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- StakeRemoved(_user,_stakeId,stakeInfo.amount) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#812)
Reentrancy in CarpeDiem.upgradeStake(uint256,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#781-744):
External calls:
                                                External calls:
- extraShares = _buyShares(_amount) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#718)
- token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender,address(this),_amount) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#878)
- returndata = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeERC28: low-level call failed) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#462)
- (success,returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#199)
    - (success, returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#399)

External calls sending eth:
- extraShares = _buyShares(_amount) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#710)
- (success, returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#199)

Event emitted after the call(s):
- SharesChanged(totalShares,totalShares + extraShares + bBonusShares + bBonusShares - stakeInfo.bBonusShares) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#722-723)
- StakeUpgraded(msg.sender__stakeId__amount_stakeInfo.startTs + stakeInfo.duration - blockTimestamp) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#738-743)

Reentrancy in CarpeDiem.withdraw(uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#746-774):

External calls:
- token.safeTransfer(msg.sender_stakeInfo.amount + reward - penalty) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#772)

Event emitted after the call(s):
       Event emitted after the call(s):
- Withdraw(msg.sender,_stakeId,stakeInfo.amount,reward,penalty) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#773)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
    Carpediem.upgradeStake(uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#701-744) uses timestamp for comparisons

Dangerous comparisons:
- require(bool,string)(block.timestamp < stakeInfo.duration + stakeInfo.startTs,stake matured) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#706-709)

Carpediem.withdraw(uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#746-774) uses timestamp for comparisons

Dangerous comparisons:
- totalShares == 0 (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#763)

Carpediem.removeDeacStake(address,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#776-813) uses timestamp for comparisons

Dangerous comparisons:
- require(bool,string)(uint32(block.timestamp) >= stakeInfo.startTs + stakeInfo.duration + 31536000,stakeAlive) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#780-783)
- totalShares == 0 (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#801)

CarpeDiem.getReward(address,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#847-863) uses timestamp for comparisons

Dangerous comparisons:
       Dangerous comparisons:
- poollambda - stakeInfo.lastlambda > 0 (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#854)
CarpeDiem._getBonusL(uint256,uint32) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#887-898) uses timestamp for comparisons
       Dangerous comparisons:
- _duration < poollBonus (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol#893)
CarpeDiem._getPenalty(address.uint256,uint256) (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol#900-919) uses timestamp for comparisons
   CarpeDiem._getPenalty(address,wint256,wint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#900-715) was timestamp for comparisons

Dangerous comparisons:
- startTs + duration <= blockTimestamp (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#900)
- startTs + duration + MEEK > blockTimestamp (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#910)
- lateWeeks >= MAX_PDNALTY_DURATION (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#912)

CarpeDiem._changeSharesPrice(wint256,wint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#921-930) was timestamp for comparisons

Dangerous comparisons:
- _profit > (oldPrice *_shares) / (MULTIPLIER) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#923)
- newPrice > MAX_PRICE (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#926)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp
  Address.isContract(address) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#94-104) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#100-102)
Address.verifyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#263-283) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#215-278)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage
 Different versions of Solidity is used:

- Version used: ['0.8.7', '0.8.0']

- ^0.8.0 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol#6)

- ^0.8.0 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol#71)

- ^0.8.0 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol#720)

- ^0.8.0 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol#374)

- ^0.8.0 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol#374)

- ^0.8.0 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol#374)

- ^0.8.0 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol#371)

- 0.8.7 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol#571)

- 0.8.7 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol#571)

- 0.8.7 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol#571)

- 0.8.7 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol#571)
Address.functionCall(address,bytes) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#147-149) is never used and should be removed Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#176-182) is never used and should be removed Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#246-258) is never used and should be removed Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#246-255) is never used and should be removed Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#289-211) is never used and should be removed Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#219-228) is never used and should be removed Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#122-127) is never used and should be removed Cantext_mspData() (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#491-493) is never used and should be removed SafeERC20.safeAprove(IERC20,address,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#414-227) is never used and should be removed SafeERC20.safeAprove(IERC20,address,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#438-449) is never used and should be removed SafeERC20.safeAprove(IERC20,address,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#429-436) is never used and should be removed SafeERC20.safeAprove(IERC20,address,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#429-436) is never used and should be removed SafeERC20.safeIncreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#429-436) is never used and should be removed SafeERC20.safeIncreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#429-436) is never used and should be removed SafeERC20.safeIncreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#429-436) is never used and should be removed SafeERC20.safeIncreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#429-436) is never used and should be removed SafeERC20.safeAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#420-436) is never used and should be removed SafeERC20.safeAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (
 Pragma version*8.8.0 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol86) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version*8.8.0 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol871) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version*8.8.0 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol8720) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version*0.8.0 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol874) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version*0.8.0 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol8474) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version*0.8.0 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol8591) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version*0.8.0 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol8571) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 Pragma version*0.8.7 (CarpedienFactory_flat.sol8936) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6 solc=0.8.7 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
 Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#122-127):
- (success) = recipient.call(value: amount)() (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#125)
Low level call in Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#190-201):
- (success,returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#199)
Low level call in Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#219-228):
- (success,returndata) = target.staticcall(data) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#225)
Low level call in Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,string) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#225):
- (success,returndata) = target.delegateCall(data) (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#253)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls
   Parameter CarpeDiem.getStakesLength(address),_staker (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#671) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.deposit(uint256,uint32)._amount (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#675) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.deposit(uint256,uint32)._duration (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#675) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.upgradeStake(uint256,uint326)._stakeId (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#781) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.upgradeStake(uint256,uint256)._smount (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#781) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.withdraw(uint256)._stakeId (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#786) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.removeDeadStake(address,uint256)._user (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#776) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.removeDeadStake(address,uint256)._user (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#7838) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.getPenalty(address,uint256)._user (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#838) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.getPenalty(address,uint256)._stakeId (CarpediemFactory_flat.sol#838) is not in mixedCase
```

audits.quillhash.com

09

```
Pages writion-field (Compelendation, Tutunial (2009) occurrent to the trusted, Consider deploying with 64.272.7.6
Pages writion-field (Compelendation, Tutunial (2009) occurrent to the trusted, Consider deploying with 64.272.7.6
Pages writion-field (Compelendation, Tutunial (2009) occurrent to the trusted, Consider deploying with 64.272.7.6
Pages writion-field (Compelendation, Tutunial (2009) occurrent to the trusted, Consider deploying with 64.272.7.6
Pages writion-field (Compelendation, Tutunial (2009) occurrent to the trusted, Consider deploying with 64.272.7.6
Pages writion-field (Compelendation, Tutunial (2009) occurrent to the trusted, Consider deploying with 64.272.7.6
Pages writion-field (Compelendation, Tutunial (2009) occurrent to the trusted, Consider deploying with 64.272.7.6
Pages writion-field (Compelendation, Tutunial (2009) occurrent to the trusted, Consider deploying with 64.272.7.6
Pages writion-field (Compelendation, Tutunial (2009) occurrent to the trusted, Consider deploying with 64.272.7.6
Pages writion-field (Compelendation, Tutunial (2009) occurrent to the trusted (Compelendation, Tutunial (2009)) occurrent to the trusted (Compelendation, Tutunial (2009)) occurrent to the trust occurrent to the trus
```

```
Through Composition (LITES), LITES (Capedian, Total LITES) (Capedian, Total LI
```



```
Reentrancy in CarpeDiem.upgradeStake(uint256,uint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#702-745):
External calls:
                                           - extraShares = _buyShares(_amount) (Carpediem_flat.sol#711)
- token.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender,address(this)_amount) (Carpediem_flat.sol#871)
- returndata = address(token).functien(fall(data,SafeER/C20: low-level call failed) (Carpediem_flat.sol#462)
- (success,returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (Carpediem_flat.sol#199)
   External calls sending eth:
- extraShares = _buyShares(_amount) (Carpediem_flat.sol#711)
- (success,returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (Carpediem_flat.sol#199)
State variables written after the call(s):
- totalShares += (extraShares + bBonusShares + lBonusShares - stakeInfo.bBonusShares) (Carpediem_flat.sol#725)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2
                                  - Deposit(msg.sender,stakes(msg.sender).length - 1,_amount,_duration) (Carpediem_flat.sol#699)
- SharesChanged(tetalShares,totalShares + shares + lBonusShares + bBonusShares) (Carpediem_flat.sol#684)
Reentrancy in CarpeDiem.removeDeadStake(address,uint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#777-814);
External calls:
External calls:
- token.safeTransfer(_user,stakeInfo.amount) (Carpediem_flat.sol#812)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- StakeRemoved(_user,_stakeInfo.amount) (Carpediem_flat.sol#813)

Reentransy in CarpeDiem.upgradeStake(uint256, uint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#82-745):
External calls:
- extraShares = _buyShares(_amount) (Carpediem_flat.sol#782-745):
External calls:
- extraShares = _buyShares(_amount) (Carpediem_flat.sol#711)
- token.safeTransferFrominsg.sender,address(this),_amount) (Carpediem_flat.sol#871)
- returndata = address(token).functionCall(data,SafeE8C20: low-level call failed) (Carpediem_flat.sol#462)
- (success,returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (Carpediem_flat.sol#199)
External calls sending eth:
- extraShares = _buyShares(_amount) (Carpediem_flat.sol#711)
- (success,returndata) = target.call(value: value)(data) (Carpediem_flat.sol#199)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- SharesChanged(totalShares,totalShares + extraShares + bBonusShares - stakeInfo.bBonusShares) (Carpediem_flat.sol#723-724)
- StakeUpgraded(msg.sender_,stakeId,_amount,stakeInfo.startTs + stakeInfo.duration - blockTimestamp) (Carpediem_flat.sol#739-744)
Reentrancy in Carpediem_withdrawluint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#747-775):
External calls:
- token.safeTransfer(msg.sender,stakeInfo.amount + reward - penalty) (Carpediem_flat.sol#773)
    - token.safeframsfer(msg.sender,stakeInfo.amount + reward - penalty) (Carpediem_flat.sol#773)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- Withdraw/msg.sender,_stakeId,stakeInfo.amount,reward,penalty) (Carpediem_flat.sol#774)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
   CarpeDiem.upgradeStake(wint256,wint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#782-745) uses timestamp for comparisons

Dangerous comparisons:

- require(bool,string)(block.timestamp < stakeInfo.duration + stakeInfo.startTs,stake matured) (Carpediem_flat.sol#787-718)

CarpeDiem.withdraw(wint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#747-775) uses timestamp for comparisons

Dangerous comparisons:

- totalShares == 0 (Carpediem_flat.sol#764)

CarpeDiem.removeDeadStake(address,wint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#777-814) uses timestamp for comparisons
   CarpeDiem.removeDeadstake(address, uint256) (Carpediem_Flat.sol#777-814) uses timestamp for comparisons

Bangerous comparisons:

- require(bool,string)(uint32(block.timestamp) >= stakeInfo.startTs + stakeInfo.duration + 31536000,stakeAlive) (Carpediem_flat.sol#781-784)

- totalShares == 0 (Carpediem_flat.sol#802)

CarpeDiem.getRevard(address, uint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#848-864) uses timestamp for comparisons

Dangerous comparisons:
   CarpeDiem__getBonusL(wint256,wint32) (Carpediem_flat.sol#888-899) uses timestamp for comparison:
Dangerous comparisons:
   Damperous comparisons:

-_duration < pool.Bonus (Carpediem_flat.sol#894)

CarpeDiem_getPenalty(address,uint256,uint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#901-920) uses timestamp for comparisons

Damperous comparisons:

- startTs + duration <= blockTimestamp (Carpediem_flat.sol#910)

- startTs + duration + MEEK > blockTimestamp (Carpediem_flat.sol#911)

- lateWeeks >= MAX_PENALTY_DURATION (Carpediem_flat.sol#923)

CarpeDiem__changeSharesFrice(uint256,uint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#922-931) uses timestamp for comparisons
    Dangerous comparisons:
- _profit > (oldPrice + _shares) / (MULTIPLIER) (Carpediem_flat.sol#924)
- newPrice > MAX_PRICE (Carpediem_flat.sol#927)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp
   Address.isContract(address) (Carpediem_flat.sol#94-184) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (Carpediem_flat.sol#80-182)
Address.verifyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (Carpediem_flat.sol#263-283) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (Carpediem_flat.sol#275-278)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage
 Address.functionCall(address,bytes) (Carpediem_flat.sol#147-149) is never used and should be removed Address.functionCallWithWalue(address,bytes,uint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#176-182) is never used and should be removed Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes) (Carpediem_flat.sol#236-238) is never used and should be removed Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (Carpediem_flat.sol#246-255) is never used and should be removed Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes) (Carpediem_flat.sol#289-211) is never used and should be removed Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (Carpediem_flat.sol#219-228) is never used and should be removed Address.semeValue(address,uint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#122-127) is never used and should be removed Context_msgData() (Carpediem_flat.sol#120-127) is never used and should be removed SafeERC20.safeApprove(IERC20,address,uint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#14-427) is never used and should be removed SafeERC20.safeApprove(IERC20,address,uint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#418-449) is never used and should be removed SafeERC20.safeIncreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (Carpediem_flat.sol#429-436) is never used and should be removed Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
  Pragma version^0.8.8 (Carpediem_flat.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.8 (Carpediem_flat.sol#29) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.8 (Carpediem_flat.sol#290) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.8 (Carpediem_flat.sol#374) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.8 (Carpediem_flat.sol#374) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.8 (Carpediem_flat.sol#372) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Pragma version^0.8.8 (Carpediem_flat.sol#372) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
solc=0.8.7 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector=Documentation#incorrect=versions=of=solidity
 Parameter CarpeDiem.getStakesLength(address)._staker (Carpediem_flat.sol#672) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.deposit(uint256,uint32)._amount (Carpediem_flat.sol#676) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.deposit(uint256,uint32)._duration (Carpediem_flat.sol#676) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.upgradeStake(uint256,uint256)._stakeId (Carpediem_flat.sol#782) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.upgradeStake(uint256)._stakeId (Carpediem_flat.sol#782) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.withdraw(uint256)._stakeId (Carpediem_flat.sol#782) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.removeDeadStake(address,uint256)._sser (Carpediem_flat.sol#777) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.removeDeadStake(address,uint256)._stakeId (Carpediem_flat.sol#777) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.getPemalty(address,uint256)._stakeId (Carpediem_flat.sol#839) is not in mixedCase
Parameter CarpeDiem.getPemalty(address,uint256)._stakeId (Carpediem_flat.sol#839) is not in mixedCase
```

audits.quillhash.com

11

```
And the St. Contract Support (International Computer International C
```

Results

Major issues are not found and one which is raised are already been categorized above according to their level of severity.

Closing Summary

In this report, we have considered the security of the Carpe Diem Savings. We performed our audit according to the procedure described above.

Some issues of Medium, Low and informational severity were found, Some suggestions and best practices are also provided in order to improve the code quality and security posture. At the end, the Carpe Diem Team fixed all issues.

Disclaimer

QuillAudits smart contract audit is not a security warranty, investment advice, or an endorsement of the Carpe Diem Savings Platform. This audit does not provide a security or correctness guarantee of the audited smart contracts.

The statements made in this document should not be interpreted as investment or legal advice, nor should its authors be held accountable for decisions made based on them. Securing smart contracts is a multistep process. One audit cannot be considered enough. We recommend that the Carpe Diem Savings put in place a bug bounty program to encourage further analysis of the smart contract by other third parties.

About QuillAudits

QuillAudits is a secure smart contracts audit platform designed by QuillHash Technologies. We are a team of dedicated blockchain security experts and smart contract auditors determined to ensure that Smart Contract-based Web3 projects can avail the latest and best security solutions to operate in a trustworthy and risk-free ecosystem.



500+ **Audits Completed**



Secured



500K Lines of Code Audited



Follow Our Journey



























Audit Report May, 2022

For







- Canada, India, Singapore, United Kingdom
- § audits.quillhash.com
- audits@quillhash.com