

# Audit Report September, 2022

For




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# Executive Summary

Project Name	Pi Protocol Staking
Timeline	17 August, 2022 to 1st September, 2022
Method	Manual Review, Functional Testing, Automated Testing etc.
Scope of Audit	<p>The scope of this audit was to analyse Pi Protocol Staking codebase for quality, security, and correctness.</p> <p><a href="https://github.com/Pi-Protocol/PI_BSC_VAULTS/blob/master/contracts/PiStakingVault3.sol">https://github.com/Pi-Protocol/PI_BSC_VAULTS/blob/master/contracts/PiStakingVault3.sol</a></p> <p><a href="https://github.com/Pi-Protocol/pi-gamification_staking/blob/master/contracts/PiGamificationStaking.sol">https://github.com/Pi-Protocol/pi-gamification_staking/blob/master/contracts/PiGamificationStaking.sol</a></p>
Fixed in	7f3341ff05110c514fcc5532e5aff8b7558aa579



	High	Medium	Low	Informational
Open Issues	0	0	0	0
Acknowledged Issues	0	0	2	2
Partially Resolved Issues	0	0	1	0
Resolved Issues	0	0	0	0



## Types of Severities

### High

A high severity issue or vulnerability means that your smart contract can be exploited. Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance or functionality, and we recommend these issues be fixed before moving to a live environment.

### Medium

The issues marked as medium severity usually arise because of errors and deficiencies in the smart contract code. Issues on this level could potentially bring problems, and they should still be fixed.

### Low

Low-level severity issues can cause minor impact and or are just warnings that can remain unfixed for now. It would be better to fix these issues at some point in the future.

### Informational

These are severity issues that indicate an improvement request, a general question, a cosmetic or documentation error, or a request for information. There is low-to-no impact.

## Types of Issues

### Open

Security vulnerabilities identified that must be resolved and are currently unresolved.

### Resolved

These are the issues identified in the initial audit and have been successfully fixed.

### Acknowledged

Vulnerabilities which have been acknowledged but are yet to be resolved.

### Partially Resolved

Considerable efforts have been invested to reduce the risk/impact of the security issue, but are not completely resolved.



# Checked Vulnerabilities



Re-entrancy



Timestamp Dependence



Gas Limit and Loops



Exception Disorder



Gasless Send



Use of tx.origin



Compiler version not fixed



Address hardcoded



Divide before multiply



Integer overflow/underflow



Dangerous strict equalities



Tautology or contradiction



Return values of low-level calls



Missing Zero Address Validation



Private modifier



Revert/require functions



Using block.timestamp



Multiple Sends



Using SHA3



Using suicide



Using throw



Using inline assembly



# Techniques and Methods

Throughout the audit of smart contract, care was taken to ensure:

- The overall quality of code.
- Use of best practices.
- Code documentation and comments match logic and expected behaviour.
- Token distribution and calculations are as per the intended behaviour mentioned in the whitepaper.
- Implementation of ERC-20 token standards.
- Efficient use of gas.
- Code is safe from re-entrancy and other vulnerabilities.

The following techniques, methods and tools were used to review all the smart contracts.

## Structural Analysis

In this step, we have analysed the design patterns and structure of smart contracts. A thorough check was done to ensure the smart contract is structured in a way that will not result in future problems.

## Static Analysis

Static analysis of smart contracts was done to identify contract vulnerabilities. In this step, a series of automated tools are used to test the security of smart contracts.

## Code Review / Manual Analysis

Manual analysis or review of code was done to identify new vulnerabilities or verify the vulnerabilities found during the static analysis. Contracts were completely manually analysed, their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the whitepaper. Besides, the results of the automated analysis were manually verified.

## Gas Consumption

In this step, we have checked the behaviour of smart contracts in production. Checks were done to know how much gas gets consumed and the possibilities of optimization of code to reduce gas consumption.

## Tools and Platforms used for Audit

Remix IDE, Truffle, Truffle Team, Solhint, Mythril, Slither, Solidity statistic analysis.



# Manual Testing

## High Severity Issues

No issues found

## Medium Severity Issues

No issues found

## Low Severity Issues

No issues found

L.1 The Unit test cases are not present

### Description

Unit Test cases for the code are missing. We recommend to make unit test with 100% coverage. It's good practice to cover user based scenarios in these type of tests

### Status

Acknowledged

L.2 Commented code is present

### Contract

PiGamificationStaking.sol

Commented code is present in the code. We recommend to remove it before finalizing the code.

### Status

Resolved





### L.3 Owner should be multisig

#### Description

We recommend multisig account address (gnosis-safe) for owner such that the onlyOwner functionalities are not compromised and the decentralization is achieved in the system

#### Status

**Acknowledged**

## Informational Issues

### L.4 Gas optimizations and best practice

**Contract:** PiGamificationStaking.sol

#### Description

Safe Math for version greater than 0.8 solc version are inbuilt and no need to use explicitly.

#### Remediation

We recommend to remove the safeMath library and it's operation. Whenever it's not needed then just use the unchecked flag.

The pre-increment operation is cheaper (about 5 GAS per iteration) so use ++i instead of i++ or i+= 1 in for loop. We recommend to use pre-increment in all the for loops.

In for loop the default value initialization to 0 should not be there remove from all the for loop. When the state gets updated the event should always get fired. We recommend to fire the events for all the state changes.

All internal function names should get start with \_ as a good practice to include. It's always recommended to follow CEI pattern.

#### Status

**Acknowledged**





## L. 5 Missing netspec comments

### Remediation

We recommend adding netspec comments for each method and variables for better readability and understanding of code.

### Status

**Acknowledged**



# Functional Testing

## Contracts

PiGamificationStaking - 0x3Abc9D47065CD9F0297022210881aF59277851E2  
PiStakingVault3.sol - 0x94Fba1BB8D7E813a9C5196A3ee4A6c936A856E3A  
ERC20 Test Rewarder Token - 0x4ed807198022415307546511055477E047e4764f  
ERC721 Test Staking Token - 0x18159778F26EC53A8B1F22C89D679313061f5CBB  
BLL test contract - 0x2dC8a4E452EB01d7c225a5009a7C0aEAB1D71466

## Transactions

Initilize Gamification staking -  
0xda4940356b0cc078dc590edeb819534f72d1705eb30fac359192b0aa39fea0a3  
aproveAll -  
0x3537b383aee87635d02d820858c3ab09082246c240eec46a4469b8682b493790  
Initilize 721 mock token -  
0x7cc85fdcb5db69c5f8c9d432c95849225d66cf86e48482419d4273cf5e4585a4  
Initilize bll contract -  
0xff346babdb4c2ddba84a359a90487608976d76efef779c47987495010bbd11c0  
Stake 3 nft's with point's per token to be 0 -  
0x6058faedcc1344577da63fe3885c4ddc7a0e7fe472f16f0a5bff13ece9f9633a  
Withdraw 3 nft's with point's per token to be 0 -  
0x99ab2d10f4c9f86aef409f3fb945f8616fa9ed18798422eaf5dde0f889ddc7b2  
Stake 3 nft's with points per token to be id \* 100 -  
0x233568a04eab0b1313448c45ec4bc566731dc10f2946f3a13a91e6f62bd87667  
Change Factor of BLL to 50 -  
0x45ebdae8caf95d83c06c90dde06ae724a24ec975ba7d08cfe7c75c1aa401f07b  
updateAllPoints -  
0x52393d36095e445bdd84c3483cdcfa7fdf20c9064c6d316e685be81c748b716f  
Withdraw 2 nft's -  
0x4894673aa5f500977c31e35b0c3a5029a7462b961d57b715be888cd3ec6ca03f  
reWithdraw not allowed -  
0x7dbbbd9a687e861f7f6433747d58260e0a07689e2593dc34c75ca81c9e5efd3f  
Refresh All Nft's -  
0x75a7e4d4392bdac9ff28d95fdc447f75884a895a9f8aa6c57d329d2b49ec687a  
Refresh Token Id's -  
0x5e8ffec5fc352b7aca51fa57547314deb0457df9aa40033facd64d4492b71d6f  
Get Reward -  
0xd2eda97d4dbc7f7bba373c86ace04697bca94ac6b70fd5db93e3f95477af3a89



# Functional Testing

Exit - 0xd19084ad7c061108d5a28884769b08925cdf8e91781822bb08c0811927a11742

Initilize Staking v3 -

0x09d67f67801c1514be4dc5c9bfa5aca80ab9a6fcf239a9931dbb36ef4e18ae65

Approve all to staking v3 -

0x317309ca452fcf0e360d2f7ca7fb99da77aa258307d113702f70a14d805f23e6

Stake 1 nft -

0xceb6ba92df9699ed7329720944ccf9ee84054c8e2f03ef050d0bc2642829bbe9

Notify reward amount to 10 -

0x7a9e55aa963caa97aba1d7a56462ad44bbde1fc06acac232dc041a164ff86889

Get reward -

0x252737cf2625d1fb5751b76e7411c8c0a565e1ebde8abac9299e6b8441fc0587

Exit - 0x09c6d3c041ef8818a37012fe1728bfd2ccc7f1a930fd4e5a751c45cf11899c9c



# Automated Tests

No major issues were found. Some false positive errors were reported by the tools. All the other issues have been categorized above according to their level of severity

```
DebitUpgradeable.__gap (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1392) shadowed
= contextUpgradeable.__gap (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1392)
PausableUpgradeable.__gap (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1397) shadowed
= contextUpgradeable.__gap (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1397)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptoc/Slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#state-variable-shadowing

PiGanificationStaking.getReward() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1324-1331) ignores return value by rewardsToken.transfer(_msgSender(),reward) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1628)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptoc/Slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#checked-transfer

MathUpgradeable.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#389-401) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
-denominator = denominator / two (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#401)
-inverse = (2 * denominator) ^ 2 (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#401)
MathUpgradeable.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#389-401) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
-denominator = denominator / two (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#401)
-inverse = 2 = denominator * inverse (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#401)
MathUpgradeable.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#389-401) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
-denominator = denominator / two (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#401)
-inverse = 2 = denominator * inverse (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#401)
MathUpgradeable.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#389-401) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
-denominator = denominator / two (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#401)
-inverse = 2 = denominator * inverse (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#401)
MathUpgradeable.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#389-401) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
-denominator = denominator / two (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#401)
-inverse = 2 = denominator * inverse (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#401)
MathUpgradeable.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#389-401) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
-denominator = denominator / two (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#401)
-inverse = 2 = denominator * inverse (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#401)
MathUpgradeable.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#389-401) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
-denominator = denominator / two (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#401)
-inverse = 2 = denominator * inverse (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#401)
MathUpgradeable.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#389-401) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
-prod = prod / two (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#420)
-result = prod * inverse (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#420)
PiGanificationStaking.netRewardCount(uint256) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1048-1058) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
-rewardRate = reward.div(rewardDuration) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1042)
-leftover = remaining.mul(rewardRate) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1048)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptoc/Slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply

Reentrancy in PiGanificationStaking.exit() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#185-186):
External call:
- _withdrawAll() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#185)
  = stakingToken.safeTransferFrom(address(this),_msgSender(),takeId) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#185)
- getReward() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#193)
  = rewardsToken.transfer(_msgSender(),reward) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#193)
State variables written after the call(s):
- getReward() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#193)
  = lastUpdateTime = lastTimeRewardApplicable() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#193)
- getReward() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#193)
  = rewardPerTokenStored = rewardPerToken() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#193)
- getReward() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#193)
  = rewards[_msgSender()] = 0 (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#193)
  = rewards[account] = earned[account] (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#193)
- getReward() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#193)
  = userRewardPerTokenPaid[account] = rewardPerTokenStored (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#193)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptoc/Slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-1

PiGanificationStaking.tokenIsStaked(address).newErr (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1768) is a local variable never initialized
PiGanificationStaking._withdrawAll().newErr (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1917) is a local variable never initialized
Reference: https://github.com/cryptoc/Slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#uninitialized-local-variables
```

Reference: https://github.com/cryptoc/Slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#uninitialized-local-variables

```
RewardDistributionRecipient.setRewardDistribution(address) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1634-1637) should emit an event for:
- rewardDistribution = _rewardDistribution (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1636)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptoc/Slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-events-access-control

PiGanificationStaking.invalidate(address,address,address,address) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1002) lacks a zero-check on :
- rewardDistribution = _rewardDistribution (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1001)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptoc/Slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation

PiGanificationStaking.stake(uint32[]) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1771-1781) has external calls inside a loop: value = ERCContract.getPointsForTokenID(tokenIds[i]),w,1e18) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1775)
PiGanificationStaking.stake(uint32[]) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1771-1781) has external calls inside a loop: stakingToken.safeTransferFrom(_msgSender(),address(this),tokenIds[i]) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1775)
PiGanificationStaking.updatePoints(uint32[]) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1768-1817) has external calls inside a loop: value = ERCContract.getPointsForTokenID(tokenId).mul(1e18) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1805)
PiGanificationStaking.withdraw(uint32[]) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1858-1883) has external calls inside a loop: stakingToken.safeTransferFrom(address(this),_msgSender(),tokenIds[i]) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1865)
PiGanificationStaking._withdrawAll() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1907-1922) has external calls inside a loop: stakingToken.safeTransferFrom(address(this),_msgSender(),tokenId) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1914)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptoc/Slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#calls-inside-a-loop

Reentrancy in PiGanificationStaking._withdrawAll() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1907-1922):
External call:
- stakingToken.safeTransferFrom(address(this),_msgSender(),takeId) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1914)
State variables written after the call(s):
- isStaked[tokenId] = false (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1915)
Reentrancy in PiGanificationStaking.stake(uint32[]) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1771-1781):
External call:
- stakingToken.safeTransferFrom(_msgSender(),address(this),tokenIds[i]) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1775)
State variables written after the call(s):
- tokenIsStaked[_msgSender()],push(tokenIds[i]) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1781)
- _tokenIds.push(tokenIds[i]) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1781)
- isStaked[tokenIds[i]] = true (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1780)
- userHTMPTokenIds[i] = _msgSender() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1780)
Reentrancy in PiGanificationStaking.withdraw(uint32[]) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1858-1883):
External call:
- stakingToken.safeTransferFrom(address(this),_msgSender(),tokenIds[i]) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1865)
State variables written after the call(s):
- isStaked[tokenIds[i]] = false (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1880)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptoc/Slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2

Reentrancy in PiGanificationStaking.exit() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1923-1926):
External call:
- _withdrawAll() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1924)
  = stakingToken.safeTransferFrom(address(this),_msgSender(),takeId) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1924)
- getReward() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1935)
  = rewardsToken.transfer(_msgSender(),reward) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1935)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- RewardPaid(_msgSender(),reward) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1929)
- getReward() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1935)
Reentrancy in PiGanificationStaking.getReward() (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1924-1931):
External call:
- rewardsToken.transfer(_msgSender(),reward) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1929)
Event emitted after the call(s):
- RewardPaid(_msgSender(),reward) (PiGanificationStaking_flat.sol#1929)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptoc/Slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3
```





```
PiGedificationStaking.getRewardTokenAPY() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1741-1747) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- block.timestamp < periodFinish (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1743)
PiGedificationStaking.getRewardTokenAPY() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1749-1755) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- block.timestamp < periodFinish (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1751)
PiGedificationStaking.setRewardAmount(uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1968-1968) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- block.timestamp <= periodFinish (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1968)
- require(bool,string)("rewardRate <= balance.div(rewardsDuration), Provided reward too high") (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1968)
PiGedificationStaking.setRewardDuration(uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1963-1968) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- require(bool,string)("block.timestamp > periodFinish, Previous rewards period must be complete before changing the duration for the new period") (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1963-1965)
References: https://github.com/cryptoc/51lither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp
```

```
MathUpgradeable.withdraw(uint256,uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#389-400) uses assembly
- 39.196 ASM (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#389-390)
- 39.196 ASM (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#390-391)
- 39.196 ASM (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#391-392)
AddressUpgradeable.verifyCallFromThisSol(bytes,string) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#987-987) uses assembly
- 39.196 ASM (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#987-987)
References: https://github.com/cryptoc/51lither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage
```

Different versions of Solidity is used:

- Version used: ["0.8.2", "0.8.0", "0.8.1", "0.8.2"]
- 0.8.2 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#5)
- 0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#17)
- 0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#40)
- 0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#100)
- 0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#253)
- 0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#320)
- 0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#367)
- 0.8.1 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#707)
- 0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#900)
- 0.8.2 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#1113)
- 0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#1233)
- 0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#1293)
- 0.8.2 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#1380)
- 0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#1416)
- 0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#1545)
- 0.8.2 (PiGedificationStaking\_flat.sol#1611)

References: <https://github.com/cryptoc/51lither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragmas-directives-are-used>

```
PiGedificationStaking.withdraw(uint32) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1894-1893) has costly operations inside a loop:
- _totalSupply = _totalSupply.sub(value) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1893)
PiGedificationStaking.withdrawA11() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1907-1922) has costly operations inside a loop:
- _totalSupply = _totalSupply.sub(value) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1912)
References: https://github.com/cryptoc/51lither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#costly-operations-inside-a-loop
```

```
AddressUpgradeable.functionCall(address,bytes) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#970-980) is never used and should be removed
AddressUpgradeable.functionCall(MultiValue,address,bytes,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#997-1010) is never used and should be removed
AddressUpgradeable.functionStaticCall(address,bytes) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#999-1002) is never used and should be removed
AddressUpgradeable.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#999-1000) is never used and should be removed
AddressUpgradeable.sendValue(address,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#953-950) is never used and should be removed
ContextUpgradeable._Context_init() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1207-1208) is never used and should be removed
ContextUpgradeable._Context_init_unchecked() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1270-1271) is never used and should be removed
ContextUpgradeable._msgData() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1270-1270) is never used and should be removed
Initializable._disableInitializers() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1230-1245) is never used and should be removed
MathUpgradeable.average(uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#360-371) is never used and should be removed
MathUpgradeable.culDiv(uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#379-382) is never used and should be removed
MathUpgradeable.max(uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#353-355) is never used and should be removed
MathUpgradeable.withdraw(uint256,uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#389-400) is never used and should be removed
```

```
AddressUpgradeable.sendValue(address,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#953-950) is never used and should be removed
ContextUpgradeable._Context_init() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1207-1208) is never used and should be removed
ContextUpgradeable._Context_init_unchecked() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1270-1271) is never used and should be removed
ContextUpgradeable._msgData() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1270-1270) is never used and should be removed
Initializable._disableInitializers() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1230-1245) is never used and should be removed
MathUpgradeable.average(uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#360-371) is never used and should be removed
MathUpgradeable.culDiv(uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#379-382) is never used and should be removed
MathUpgradeable.max(uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#353-355) is never used and should be removed
MathUpgradeable.withdraw(uint256,uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#389-400) is never used and should be removed
MathUpgradeable.withdraw(uint256,uint256,uint256,MathUpgradeable.Rounding) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#400-400) is never used and should be removed
MathUpgradeable.sqrt(uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#432-440) is never used and should be removed
MathUpgradeable.sqrt(uint256,MathUpgradeable.Rounding) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#432-440) is never used and should be removed
EnumerableUpgradeable._Enumerable_init() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1317-1320) is never used and should be removed
EnumerableUpgradeable._Enumerable_init_unchecked() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1440-1447) is never used and should be removed
EnumerableUpgradeable._Enumerable_init_unchecked() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1440-1440) is never used and should be removed
EnumerableUpgradeable._requirePause() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1400-1400) is never used and should be removed
EnumerableUpgradeable._requirePause() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1400-1400) is never used and should be removed
EnumerableUpgradeable._unpause() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1517-1520) is never used and should be removed
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable._ReentrancyGuard_init() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1571-1571) is never used and should be removed
ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable._ReentrancyGuard_init_unchecked() (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1575-1577) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20Upgradeable.safeApprove(address,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1010-1010) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20Upgradeable.safeDecreaseAllowance(address,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1004-1073) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20Upgradeable.safeIncreaseAllowance(address,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1004-1058) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20Upgradeable.safePermit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1073-1087) is never used and should be removed
SafeERC20Upgradeable.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1010-1027) is never used and should be removed
SafeMathUpgradeable._div(uint256,uint256,string) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#754-753) is never used and should be removed
SafeMathUpgradeable._mul(uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#714-716) is never used and should be removed
SafeMathUpgradeable._mul(uint256,uint256,string) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#700-700) is never used and should be removed
SafeMathUpgradeable._sub(uint256,uint256,string) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#713-740) is never used and should be removed
SafeMathUpgradeable._tryAdd(uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#583-583) is never used and should be removed
SafeMathUpgradeable._tryDiv(uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#627-622) is never used and should be removed
SafeMathUpgradeable._tryMul(uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#630-644) is never used and should be removed
SafeMathUpgradeable._trySub(uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#610-620) is never used and should be removed
SafeMathUpgradeable._trySub(uint256,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#630-620) is never used and should be removed
References: https://github.com/cryptoc/51lither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
```

```
Ppragma version0.8.2 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#9) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#17) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#40) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#100) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#253) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#320) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#367) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.2 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#707) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#900) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.2 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1113) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1233) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1293) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.2 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1380) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1416) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.0 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1545) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
Ppragma version0.8.2 (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#1611) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6
solc-0.8.2 is not recommended for deployment
References: https://github.com/cryptoc/51lither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
```

```
Low level call in AddressUpgradeable.sendValue(address,uint256) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#950-950):
= (success) = recipient.call(value: amount) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#950)
Low level call in AddressUpgradeable.functionCall(MultiValue,address,bytes,uint256,string) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#997-1002):
= (success,returnData) = target.call(value: value)(data) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#999)
Low level call in AddressUpgradeable.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#999-1000):
= (success,returnData) = target.staticCall(data) (PiGedificationStaking_flat.sol#997)
References: https://github.com/cryptoc/51lither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls
```





```

Package version=9.8.8 (liblattice100050436) [file,so:101233] necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider upgrading with 9.8.12/9.7.6
Package version=9.8.8 (liblattice100050436) [file,so:101233] necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider upgrading with 9.8.12/9.7.6
Package version=9.8.8 (liblattice100050436) [file,so:101233] necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider upgrading with 9.8.12/9.7.6
Package version=9.8.8 (liblattice100050436) [file,so:101418] necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider upgrading with 9.8.12/9.7.6
Package version=9.8.8 (liblattice100050436) [file,so:101555] necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider upgrading with 9.8.12/9.7.6
Package version=9.8.1 (liblattice100050436) [file,so:101811] necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider upgrading with 9.8.12/9.7.6
9.8.8.8.2 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/conda-forge/conda-forge.github.io/wiki/conda-forge-documentation/conda-forge-versions-not-so-lazy

```







```
Redundant expression "this (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1217)" inContextUpgradeable (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1207-1213)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptoc/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements

ERC721HolderUpgradeable._gas (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1247) is never used in ERC721HolderUpgradeable (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1233-1248)
OwnershipUpgradeable._gas (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1198) is never used in PiStakingVault3 (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1878-1883)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptoc/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-state-variable

onERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes) should be declared external:
- onERC721ReceivedUpgradeable.onERC721Received(address,address,uint256,bytes) (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1244-1246)
renounceOwnership() should be declared external:
- OwnershipUpgradeable.renounceOwnership() (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1242-1243)
transferOwnership(address) should be declared external:
- OwnershipUpgradeable.transferOwnership(address) (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1254-1258)
recoverToken[ERC1155Upgradeable] should be declared external:
- TokensRecoverableLog.recoverToken[ERC1155Upgradeable] (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1376-1379)
recoverToken[ERC721] should be declared external:
- TokensRecoverableLog.recoverToken[ERC721] (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1381-1384)
recoverERC1155(ERC1155Upgradeable,uint256,uint256) should be declared external:
- TokensRecoverableLog.recoverERC1155(ERC1155Upgradeable,uint256,uint256) (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1390-1395)
recoverERC721(ERC721Upgradeable,uint256) should be declared external:
- TokensRecoverableLog.recoverERC721(ERC721Upgradeable,uint256) (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1391-1394)
initialize(address,address,address) should be declared external:
- PiStakingVault3.initialize(address,address,address) (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1417-1425)
withdraw(uint256) should be declared external:
- PiStakingVault3.withdraw(uint256) (PiStakingVault3_flat.sol#1725-1733)
Reference: https://github.com/cryptoc/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external
PiStakingVault3_flat.sol analyzed (22 contracts with 76 detectors), 118 result(s) found
ethersclog126d886c6d8a/code/PI_ERC_721-masters
```

Results

No major issues in Contracts.  
Some false positive errors were reported by the tool. All the other issues have been categorised above according to their level of severity.

# Closing Summary

Overall, smart contracts are well written and adhere to guidelines.

Some issues of Low and Informational were discovered in the audit, which the Pi Protocol team has Acknowledged.

## Disclaimer

QuillAudits smart contract audit is not a security warranty, investment advice, or an endorsement of the Pi Protocol Platform. This audit does not provide a security or correctness guarantee of the audited smart contracts.

The statements made in this document should not be interpreted as investment or legal advice, nor should its authors be held accountable for decisions made based on them. Securing smart contracts is a multistep process. One audit cannot be considered enough. We recommend that the Pi Protocol Team put in place a bug bounty program to encourage further analysis of the smart contract by other third parties.



# About QuillAudits

QuillAudits is a secure smart contracts audit platform designed by QuillHash Technologies.

We are a team of dedicated blockchain security experts and smart contract auditors determined to ensure that Smart Contract-based Web3 projects can avail the latest and best security solutions to operate in a trustworthy and risk-free ecosystem.



**600+**  
Audits Completed



**\$15B**  
Secured



**600K**  
Lines of Code Audited



## Follow Our Journey





# Audit Report September, 2022

For



QuillAudits

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