



QuillAudits

# Audit Report March, 2022

For

**CUBA  
CITY**

# Contents

Scope of Audit	01
Check Vulnerabilities	01
Techniques and Methods	02
Issue Categories	03
Number of security issues per severity.	03
Introduction	04
High Severity Issues	05
Medium Severity Issues	05
Low Severity Issues	05
Informational Issues	06
Mumbai Testnet Test Contract	08
Functional Tests	08
Automated Tests	09
Closing Summary	11



## Scope of the Audit

The scope of this audit was to analyse and document the Cyber City smart contract codebase for quality, security, and correctness.

## Checked Vulnerabilities

We have scanned the smart contract for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities. Here are some of the commonly known vulnerabilities that we considered:

- Re-entrancy
- Timestamp Dependence
- Gas Limit and Loops
- DoS with Block Gas Limit
- Transaction-Ordering Dependence
- Use of tx.origin
- Exception disorder
- Gasless send
- Balance equality
- Byte array
- Transfer forwards all gas
- ERC20 API violation
- Malicious libraries
- Compiler version not fixed
- Redundant fallback function
- Send instead of transfer
- Style guide violation
- Unchecked external call
- Unchecked math
- Unsafe type inference
- Implicit visibility level



## Techniques and Methods

Throughout the audit of smart contract, care was taken to ensure:

- The overall quality of code.
- Use of best practices.
- Code documentation and comments match logic and expected behaviour.
- Token distribution and calculations are as per the intended behaviour mentioned in the whitepaper.
- Implementation of ERC-20 token standards.
- Efficient use of gas.
- Code is safe from re-entrancy and other vulnerabilities.

The following techniques, methods and tools were used to review all the smart contracts.

### Structural Analysis

In this step, we have analysed the design patterns and structure of smart contracts. A thorough check was done to ensure the smart contract is structured in a way that will not result in future problems.

### Static Analysis

Static analysis of smart contracts was done to identify contract vulnerabilities. In this step, a series of automated tools are used to test the security of smart contracts.

### Code Review / Manual Analysis

Manual analysis or review of code was done to identify new vulnerabilities or verify the vulnerabilities found during the static analysis. Contracts were completely manually analysed, their logic was checked and compared with the one described in the whitepaper. Besides, the results of the automated analysis were manually verified.

### Gas Consumption

In this step, we have checked the behaviour of smart contracts in production. Checks were done to know how much gas gets consumed and the possibilities of optimization of code to reduce gas consumption.

### Tools and Platforms used for Audit

Remix IDE, Truffle, Truffle Team, Solhint, Mythril, Slither, Solidity statistic analysis, Theo.



## Issue Categories

Every issue in this report has been assigned to a severity level. There are four levels of severity, and each of them has been explained below.

Risk-level	Description
<b>High</b>	A high severity issue or vulnerability means that your smart contract can be exploited. Issues on this level are critical to the smart contract's performance or functionality, and we recommend these issues be fixed before moving to a live environment.
<b>Medium</b>	The issues marked as medium severity usually arise because of errors and deficiencies in the smart contract code. Issues on this level could potentially bring problems, and they should still be fixed.
<b>Low</b>	Low-level severity issues can cause minor impact and or are just warnings that can remain unfixed for now. It would be better to fix these issues at some point in the future.
<b>Informational</b>	These are severity issues that indicate an improvement request, a general question, a cosmetic or documentation error, or a request for information. There is low-to-no impact.

## Number of issues per severity

Type	High	Medium	Low	Informational
<b>Open</b>	0	0	0	0
<b>Acknowledged</b>	0	1	1	1
<b>Closed</b>	0	1	3	1



# Introduction

During the period of **Feb 16, 2022 to March 4, 2022** - QuillAudits Team performed a security audit for Cyber City smart contracts.

The code for the audit was taken from following the official link:

**Codebase:** [d3ee2babf96243b262d60c267e0ad1056152d2d9](https://github.com/d3ee2babf96243b262d60c267e0ad1056152d2d9)

**Fixed In:** [c99ecb098ccc1806a847d1a9c3f1aa38549d7c37](https://github.com/c99ecb098ccc1806a847d1a9c3f1aa38549d7c37)



# Issues Found – Code Review / Manual Testing

## High severity issues

No Issues Found

## Medium severity issues

### 1. reentrancy in staking and withdraw function

In stake/withdraw function the transferFrom is called before the state update and the reentrancy is seen in the function.

We recommend to use CheckEffectsInteractions pattern throughout the contract or use Openzeppelin reentrancy guard

Status: **Fixed**

### 2. Weak PRNG

The pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) is weak and inefficient.

Everything in blockchain is visible and publicly available. So it's always advised not to generate random numbers in the contract.

We recommend using oracle (outside random data source) for generation of randomness in the contract instead of making our own random function.

Status: **Acknowledged**

## Low severity issues

### 3. calls inside loop

The transferFrom call in withdraw function is inside for loop which can lead to DOS (denial of service attack) and waste of gas.

We recommend it to use the transferFrom outside the for loop and transfer all amount in only one transaction.

**Reference** - #calls-inside-a-loop

Status: **Acknowledged**





#### 4. Used locked pragma version

The pragma versions used in the contract are not locked. Consider using the latest versions among 0.8.11 for deploying the contracts and libraries as it does not compile for any other version and can be confusing for a developer. Solidity source files indicate the versions of the compiler they can be compiled with.

```
pragma solidity ^0.8.0; // bad: compiles between 0.8.0 and 0.8.11
pragma solidity 0.8.0; // good : compiles w 0.8.0 only but not the latest version
pragma solidity 0.8.11; // best: compiles w 0.8.11
```

**Status:** Fixed

#### 5. Unused variable

The variable uint256 num is not being used anywhere in the contract we suggest to remove from the contract and save deployment gas price.

**Status:** Fixed

#### 6. transferFrom return value is ignored

The transferFrom return value is ignored.  
We recommend to use SafeERC20, or ensure that the transfer/transferFrom return value is checked

**Status:** Fixed

### Informational issues

#### 7. Missing comments and description

Comments and Description of the methods and the variables are missing, it's hard to read and understand the purpose of the variables and the methods in context of the whole picture

##### **Recommendation**

Consider adding NatSpec format comments for the comments and state variables

**Status:** Acknowledged



## 8. Public methods only being used externally

‘public’ functions that are never used within the contract should be declared ‘external’ to save gas.

### Recommendation

Make these methods external

saveCellPrice, saveCellBonusChance, saveCellDuration, saveCellRewards, saveCellRandomBonuses, saveMonsterImageUrl, saveMonsterName, saveRegionName, addCell, enableCell, disableCell, myStakeInfo, pause, unpause, stake, withdraw, editStakeToken, editStakeTokenAdmin, getUsers.

**Status:** Fixed



# Mumbai Testnet Test Contract

Contract: 0x594714b143FD58c481c1Af95Fb1FDA5704DC2176

## Functional Tests

- Add new Cell Pass
- Only owner can add new Cell Pass
- No approval for staking contract Pass
- Approve stake price to staking contract Pass
- Stake cell ID-1 Pass
- Already stake for cell ID-1 Pass
- Withdraw no stake tokens Pass
- Withdraw amount is more than allowance Pass
- Approve 1500 to staking contract to send bonus/reward to user Pass
- Withdraw successfully Pass
- Owner add new cellID-2 Pass
- Approve more than stake price to staking contract Pass
- User2 stake cell D-2 Pass
- Withdraw before the staking time end Pass
- Withdraw user stake and send bonus/reward to user Pass



[illegible][illegible]



[illegible]

## Results

No major issues were found. Some false positive errors were reported by the tool. All the other issues have been categorised above according to their level of severity.



## Closing Summary

No instances of Integer Overflow and Underflow vulnerabilities are found in the contract.

Numerous issues were discovered during the initial audit. All issues are Fixed by the Auditee.



## Disclaimer

QuillAudits smart contract audit is not a security warranty, investment advice, or an endorsement of the Cyber City Platform. This audit does not provide a security or correctness guarantee of the audited smart contracts.

The statements made in this document should not be interpreted as investment or legal advice, nor should its authors be held accountable for decisions made based on them. Securing smart contracts is a multistep process. One audit cannot be considered enough. We recommend that the Cyber City Team put in place a bug bounty program to encourage further analysis of the smart contract by other third parties.



# Audit Report March, 2022

For

CYBER  
CITY



QuillAudits

📍 Canada, India, Singapore, United Kingdom

🌐 [audits.quillhash.com](https://audits.quillhash.com)

✉️ [audits@quillhash.com](mailto:audits@quillhash.com)