



SMART CONTRACT AUDIT REPORT

for

Double Protocol



Prepared By: Yiqun Chen

PeckShield
January 21, 2022

Document Properties

Client	Double Protocol
Title	Smart Contract Audit Report
Target	Double
Version	1.0
Author	Xuxian Jiang
Auditors	Patrick Liu, Xuxian Jiang
Reviewed by	Yiqun Chen
Approved by	Xuxian Jiang
Classification	Public

Version Info

Version	Date	Author(s)	Description
1.1	January 21, 2022	Xuxian Jiang	Final Release (Update #1)
1.0	January 16, 2022	Xuxian Jiang	Final Release
1.0-rc1	January 11, 2022	Xuxian Jiang	Release Candidate #1

Contact

For more information about this document and its contents, please contact PeckShield Inc.

Name	Yiqun Chen
Phone	+86 183 5897 7782
Email	contact@peckshield.com

Contents

1	Introduction	4
1.1	About Double Protocol	4
1.2	About PeckShield	5
1.3	Methodology	5
1.4	Disclaimer	7
2	Findings	9
2.1	Summary	9
2.2	Key Findings	10
3	Detailed Results	11
3.1	Proper ownerOf() Logic in VirtualDoNFT	11
3.2	Improved Sanity Checks For System Parameters	12
3.3	Trust Issue of Admin Keys	13
3.4	Removal of Unused State/Code	14
4	Conclusion	16
	References	17

1 | Introduction

Given the opportunity to review the design document and related smart contract source code of the Double protocol, we outline in the report our systematic approach to evaluate potential security issues in the smart contract implementation, expose possible semantic inconsistencies between smart contract code and design document, and provide additional suggestions or recommendations for improvement. Our results show that the given version of smart contracts can be further improved due to the presence of several issues related to either security or performance. This document outlines our audit results.

1.1 About Double Protocol

Double is an NFT rental protocol designed for blockchain games with a unique set of use cases based on WEB 3.0. The protocol aims to allow its users earn passive income by renting out valuable NFTs with utilities, for example, a virtual property on Decentraland or metaverse. The protocol also comes with a number of unique features, including compatibility with all ERC-721 tokens, reservation system, no collateral requirement, and sublet function. The basic information of the audited protocol is as follows:

Table 1.1: Basic Information of Double

Item	Description
Name	Double Protocol
Website	https://double.one/
Type	Ethereum Smart Contract
Platform	Solidity
Audit Method	Whitebox
Latest Audit Report	January 21, 2022

In the following, we show the Git repository of reviewed files and the commit hash value used in this audit.

- <https://github.com/emojidao/double-contract.git> (5489c06)

And here is the commit ID after all fixes for the issues found in the audit have been checked in.

- <https://github.com/emojidao/double-contract.git> (1d02550)

1.2 About PeckShield

PeckShield Inc. [10] is a leading blockchain security company with the goal of elevating the security, privacy, and usability of current blockchain ecosystems by offering top-notch, industry-leading services and products (including the service of smart contract auditing). We are reachable at Telegram (<https://t.me/peckshield>), Twitter (<http://twitter.com/peckshield>), or Email (contact@peckshield.com).

Table 1.2: Vulnerability Severity Classification

Impact	High	Critical	High	Medium
	Medium	High	Medium	Low
	Low	Medium	Low	Low
		High	Medium	Low
		Likelihood		

1.3 Methodology

To standardize the evaluation, we define the following terminology based on the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology [9]:

- Likelihood represents how likely a particular vulnerability is to be uncovered and exploited in the wild;
- Impact measures the technical loss and business damage of a successful attack;
- Severity demonstrates the overall criticality of the risk.

Likelihood and impact are categorized into three ratings: *H*, *M* and *L*, i.e., *high*, *medium* and *low* respectively. Severity is determined by likelihood and impact and can be classified into four categories accordingly, i.e., *Critical*, *High*, *Medium*, *Low* shown in Table 1.2.

Table 1.3: The Full Audit Checklist

Category	Checklist Items
Basic Coding Bugs	Constructor Mismatch
	Ownership Takeover
	Redundant Fallback Function
	Overflows & Underflows
	Reentrancy
	Money-Giving Bug
	Blackhole
	Unauthorized Self-Destruct
	Revert DoS
	Unchecked External Call
	Gasless Send
	Send Instead Of Transfer
	Costly Loop
	(Unsafe) Use Of Untrusted Libraries
	(Unsafe) Use Of Predictable Variables
	Transaction Ordering Dependence
	Deprecated Uses
Semantic Consistency Checks	Semantic Consistency Checks
Advanced DeFi Scrutiny	Business Logics Review
	Functionality Checks
	Authentication Management
	Access Control & Authorization
	Oracle Security
	Digital Asset Escrow
	Kill-Switch Mechanism
	Operation Trails & Event Generation
	ERC20 Idiosyncrasies Handling
	Frontend-Contract Integration
	Deployment Consistency
Additional Recommendations	Holistic Risk Management
	Avoiding Use of Variadic Byte Array
	Using Fixed Compiler Version
	Making Visibility Level Explicit
	Making Type Inference Explicit
	Adhering To Function Declaration Strictly
	Following Other Best Practices

To evaluate the risk, we go through a checklist of items and each would be labeled with a severity category. For one check item, if our tool or analysis does not identify any issue, the contract is considered safe regarding the check item. For any discovered issue, we might further deploy contracts on our private testnet and run tests to confirm the findings. If necessary, we would additionally build a PoC to demonstrate the possibility of exploitation. The concrete list of check items is shown in Table 1.3.

In particular, we perform the audit according to the following procedure:

- Basic Coding Bugs: We first statically analyze given smart contracts with our proprietary static code analyzer for known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) all the issues found by our tool.
- Semantic Consistency Checks: We then manually check the logic of implemented smart contracts and compare with the description in the white paper.
- Advanced DeFi Scrutiny: We further review business logics, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.
- Additional Recommendations: We also provide additional suggestions regarding the coding and development of smart contracts from the perspective of proven programming practices.

To better describe each issue we identified, we categorize the findings with Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE-699) [8], which is a community-developed list of software weakness types to better delineate and organize weaknesses around concepts frequently encountered in software development. Though some categories used in CWE-699 may not be relevant in smart contracts, we use the CWE categories in Table 1.4 to classify our findings. Moreover, in case there is an issue that may affect an active protocol that has been deployed, the public version of this report may omit such issue, but will be amended with full details right after the affected protocol is upgraded with respective fixes.

1.4 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release, and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues of the given smart contract(s) or blockchain software, i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues. As one audit-based assessment cannot be considered comprehensive, we always recommend proceeding with several independent audits and a public bug bounty program to ensure the security of smart contract(s). Last but not least, this security audit should not be used as investment advice.




Table 1.4: Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) Classifications Used in This Audit

Category	Summary
Configuration	Weaknesses in this category are typically introduced during the configuration of the software.
Data Processing Issues	Weaknesses in this category are typically found in functionality that processes data.
Numeric Errors	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper calculation or conversion of numbers.
Security Features	Weaknesses in this category are concerned with topics like authentication, access control, confidentiality, cryptography, and privilege management. (Software security is not security software.)
Time and State	Weaknesses in this category are related to the improper management of time and state in an environment that supports simultaneous or near-simultaneous computation by multiple systems, processes, or threads.
Error Conditions, Return Values, Status Codes	Weaknesses in this category include weaknesses that occur if a function does not generate the correct return/status code, or if the application does not handle all possible return/status codes that could be generated by a function.
Resource Management	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper management of system resources.
Behavioral Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to unexpected behaviors from code that an application uses.
Business Logic	Weaknesses in this category identify some of the underlying problems that commonly allow attackers to manipulate the business logic of an application. Errors in business logic can be devastating to an entire application.
Initialization and Cleanup	Weaknesses in this category occur in behaviors that are used for initialization and breakdown.
Arguments and Parameters	Weaknesses in this category are related to improper use of arguments or parameters within function calls.
Expression Issues	Weaknesses in this category are related to incorrectly written expressions within code.
Coding Practices	Weaknesses in this category are related to coding practices that are deemed unsafe and increase the chances that an exploitable vulnerability will be present in the application. They may not directly introduce a vulnerability, but indicate the product has not been carefully developed or maintained.

2 | Findings

2.1 Summary

Here is a summary of our findings after analyzing the implementation of the `Double` protocol. During the first phase of our audit, we study the smart contract source code and run our in-house static code analyzer through the codebase. The purpose here is to statically identify known coding bugs, and then manually verify (reject or confirm) issues reported by our tool. We further manually review business logic, examine system operations, and place DeFi-related aspects under scrutiny to uncover possible pitfalls and/or bugs.

Severity	# of Findings	
Critical	0	
High	0	
Medium	2	
Low	1	
Informational	1	
Total	4	

We have so far identified a list of potential issues: some of them involve subtle corner cases that might not be previously thought of, while others refer to unusual interactions among multiple contracts. For each uncovered issue, we have therefore developed test cases for reasoning, reproduction, and/or verification. After further analysis and internal discussion, we determined a few issues of varying severities need to be brought up and paid more attention to, which are categorized in the above table. More information can be found in the next subsection, and the detailed discussions of each of them are in [Section 3](#).

2.2 Key Findings

Overall, these smart contracts are well-designed and engineered, though the implementation can be improved by resolving the identified issues (shown in Table 2.1), including 2 medium-severity vulnerabilities, 1 low-severity vulnerability, and 1 informational recommendation.

Table 2.1: Key Double Audit Findings

ID	Severity	Title	Category	Status
PVE-001	Medium	Proper <code>ownerOf()</code> Logic in Virtual-DoNFT	Business Logic	Fixed
PVE-002	Low	Improved Sanity Checks Of Function Parameters	Coding Practices	Fixed
PVE-003	Medium	Trust Issue of Admin Keys	Security Features	Mitigated
PVE-004	Informational	Removal of Unused State/Code	Coding Practices	Fixed

Besides the identified issues, we emphasize that for any user-facing applications and services, it is always important to develop necessary risk-control mechanisms and make contingency plans, which may need to be exercised before the mainnet deployment. The risk-control mechanisms should kick in at the very moment when the contracts are being deployed on mainnet. Please refer to Section 3 for details.



3 | Detailed Results

3.1 Proper `ownerOf()` Logic in `VirtualDoNFT`

- ID: PVE-001
- Severity: Medium
- Likelihood: Medium
- Impact: Medium
- Target: `VirtualDoNFT`
- Category: Business Logic [7]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-841 [4]

Description

Double is an NFT rental protocol that allows holders to earn passive income by renting out valuable NFTs with utilities. At the core of the protocol is the `BaseDoNFT` contract, which is inherited by other contracts such as `WrapDoNFT`, `VirtualDoNFT`, and `Dc1DoNFT`. While reviewing the `VirtualDoNFT` contract, we notice that the function `ownerOf()` needs to be improved.

To elaborate, we show below this `ownerOf()` function. As the name indicates, this function is designed to query the owner of the given NFT. It comes to our attention that when the given `tokenId` is a wrapped NFT, the query is redirected to the original token contract. However, it still uses the same `tokenId` (line 19) which only makes sense to itself. In other words, we need to use `doNftMapping[tokenId].oid` as the applicable `tokenId`!

```
17     function ownerOf(uint256 tokenId) public view virtual override returns (address) {
18         if(isWNft(tokenId)){
19             return ERC721(oNftAddress).ownerOf(tokenId);
20         }
21         return ERC721(address(this)).ownerOf(tokenId);
22     }
```

Listing 3.1: `VirtualDoNFT::ownerOf()`

Recommendation Properly use the right `tokenId` to query its owner.

Status This issue has been fixed in the following commit: [f77bd8b](#).

3.2 Improved Sanity Checks For System Parameters

- ID: PVE-002
- Severity: Low
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: Low
- Target: Market
- Category: Coding Practices [6]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-1126 [1]

Description

DeFi protocols typically have a number of system-wide parameters that can be dynamically configured on demand. The Double protocol is no exception. Specifically, if we examine the Market contract, it has defined a number of protocol-wide risk parameters, e.g., `fee` and `royaltyFee`. In the following, we show an example routine that allows for their changes.

```

106     function setFee(uint256 fee_) public onlyAdmin{
107         fee = fee_;
108     }
109
110     function setMarketBeneficiary(address payable beneficiary_) public onlyAdmin{
111         beneficiary = beneficiary_;
112     }
113
114     function claimFee() public{
115         require(msg.sender==beneficiary,"not beneficiary");
116         beneficiary.transfer(balanceOfFee);
117         balanceOfFee = 0;
118     }
119
120     function setRoyalty(address nftAddress,uint256 fee_) public onlyAdmin{
121         royaltyMap[nftAddress].fee = fee_;
122     }
123
124     function setRoyaltyBeneficiary(address nftAddress,address payable beneficiary_)
125         public onlyAdmin{
126         royaltyMap[nftAddress].beneficiary = beneficiary_;
127     }

```

Listing 3.2: Example setters in Market

Our result shows the update logic on the above parameters can be improved by applying more rigorous sanity checks. Based on the current implementation, certain corner cases may lead to an undesirable consequence. For example, an unlikely mis-configuration of a large `fee` parameter will revert every fee payment operation.

Recommendation Validate any changes regarding these system-wide parameters to ensure they fall in an appropriate range. Also, consider emitting related events for external monitoring and

analytics tools.

Status This issue has been fixed in the following commit: [f77bd8b](#).

3.3 Trust Issue of Admin Keys

- ID: PVE-003
- Severity: Medium
- Likelihood: Low
- Impact: High
- Target: Multiple Contracts
- Category: Security Features [5]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-287 [2]

Description

In the Double protocol, there is a privileged `admin` account that plays a critical role in governing and regulating the system-wide operations (e.g., parameter setting and fee adjustment). It also has the privilege to control or govern the flow of assets managed by this protocol. Our analysis shows that the privileged account needs to be scrutinized. In the following, we examine the privileged account and the related privileged accesses in current contracts.

To elaborate, we show below example privileged routines in the `DoNFTFactory` contract. These routines allow the `admin` account to set up a new logic contract, which provides the reference implementation for the NFT wrapping operations.

```

41     function setWrapDoNftImplementation(address imp) public onlyAdmin {
42         wrapDoNftImplementation = imp;
43     }
44
45     function setVritualDoNftImplementation(address imp) public onlyAdmin {
46         vritualDoNftImplementation = imp;
47     }

```

Listing 3.3: `DoNFTFactory::setWrapDoNftImplementation()`

Moreover, the `Market` contract allows the privileged `admin` to specify the payment allocation for the supported lending of NFTs. It would be worrisome if the privileged `admin` account is a plain EOA account. Note that a multi-sig account could greatly alleviate this concern, though it is still far from perfect. Specifically, a better approach is to eliminate the administration key concern by transferring the role to a community-governed DAO. In the meantime, a timelock-based mechanism can also be considered as mitigation.

Recommendation Promptly transfer the privileged account to the intended DAO-like governance contract. All changed to privileged operations may need to be mediated with necessary timelocks.

Eventually, activate the normal on-chain community-based governance life-cycle and ensure the intended trustless nature and high-quality distributed governance.

Status This issue has been confirmed. The team clarifies that a common contract will be deployed on the mainnet, instead of a proxy. And the smart contracts are no longer upgradeable. In addition, the current privileges will be mitigated by a multi-sig account to balance efficiency and timely adjustment.

3.4 Removal of Unused State/Code

- ID: PVE-04
- Severity: Informational
- Likelihood: N/A
- Impact: N/A
- Target: Market
- Category: Coding Practices [6]
- CWE subcategory: CWE-563 [3]

Description

The `Double` protocol makes good use of a number of reference contracts, such as `ERC721`, `Ownable`, and `ReentrancyGuard`, to facilitate its code implementation and organization. For example, the smart contract `Market` has so far imported at least three reference contracts. However, we observe the inclusion of certain unused code or the presence of unnecessary redundancies that can be safely removed.

For example, if we examine closely the `Market` contract, it defines two constant variables: `E5` and `SECONDS_IN_DAY`. However, it turns out the second constant `SECONDS_IN_DAY` is never used. Hence, this constant can be safely removed.

```

8  contract Market is OwnableContract, ReentrancyGuard, IMarket {
9      uint64 constant private E5 = 1e5;
10     uint64 constant private SECONDS_IN_DAY = 86400;
11     mapping(address=>Credit) internal creditMap;
12     mapping(address=>Royalty) internal royaltyMap;
13     uint256 public fee;
14     uint256 public balanceOfFee;
15     address payable public beneficiary;
16     string private _name;
17     ...
18 }
```

Listing 3.4: State Variables Defined in `Market`

Recommendation Consider the removal of the unused constant variable in the above `Market` contract.

Status This issue has been fixed in the following commit: [f77bd8b](#).



4 | Conclusion

In this audit, we have analyzed the design and implementation of the `Double` protocol, which is an `NFT` rental protocol that allows holders to earn passive income by renting out valuable `NFTs` with utilities, for example, a virtual property on `Decentraland` or `metaverse`. The current code base is well structured and neatly organized. Those identified issues are promptly confirmed and addressed.

Moreover, we need to emphasize that `Solidity`-based smart contracts as a whole are still in an early, but exciting stage of development. To improve this report, we greatly appreciate any constructive feedbacks or suggestions, on our methodology, audit findings, or potential gaps in scope/coverage.



References

- [1] MITRE. CWE-1126: Declaration of Variable with Unnecessarily Wide Scope. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1126.html>.
- [2] MITRE. CWE-287: Improper Authentication. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html>.
- [3] MITRE. CWE-563: Assignment to Variable without Use. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/563.html>.
- [4] MITRE. CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/841.html>.
- [5] MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: 7PK - Security Features. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/254.html>.
- [6] MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Bad Coding Practices. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/1006.html>.
- [7] MITRE. CWE CATEGORY: Business Logic Errors. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/840.html>.
- [8] MITRE. CWE VIEW: Development Concepts. <https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/699.html>.
- [9] OWASP. Risk Rating Methodology. https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Risk_Rating_Methodology.

[10] PeckShield. PeckShield Inc. <https://www.peckshield.com>.

