

Seascape - Mini Miners

Smart Contract Security Audit

Prepared by: Halborn

Date of Engagement: August 8th, 2022 - August 11th, 2022

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DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

VERSION	MODIFICATION	DATE	AUTHOR
0.1	.1 Document Creation		Manuel García
0.2	0.2 Document Updates		Roberto Reigada
0.3	0.3 Draft Review		Gabi Urrutia
1.0 Remediation Plan		08/17/2022	Roberto Reigada
1.1	Remediation Plan Review	08/17/2022	Gabi Urrutia

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Seascape engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their smart contracts beginning on August 11th, 2022 and ending on August 12th, 2022. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contract provided in the GitHub repository blocklords/miner-smartcontract

1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided a week for the engagement and assigned two full-time security engineers to audit the security of the smart contract. The security engineers are blockchain and smart-contract security experts with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn identified some security risks that were addressed by Seascape team.

1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the code and can quickly identify items that do not follow the security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used during the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose
- Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough
- Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (solgraph)
- Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes
- Manual testing by custom scripts
- Scanning of solidity files for vulnerabilities, security hotspots or bugs. (MythX)
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither)
- Testnet deployment (Brownie, Remix IDE)

RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the LIKELIHOOD of a security incident and the IMPACT should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest likelihood or impact.

RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 May cause a significant level of impact or loss.

- 3 May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
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10 - CRITICAL

9 - 8 - HIGH

7 - 6 - MEDIUM

5 - 4 - LOW

3 - 1 - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

1.4 SCOPE

IN-SCOPE:

The security assessment was scoped to the following smart contract:

- MineNFTFactory.sol
- MinerGame.sol
- MinerNFT.sol
- NFTTypes.sol
- CrownsToken.sol
- MscpToken.sol

Commit ID:

- 7bdc1d62f738d7f7f26051a0dfb357876ddad087

Fixed commit ID:

- b6fa55a42c3f9c95f2ede398b420f90242dcf914

IMPACT

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	0	1	1	3

LIKELIHOOD

	(HAL-02)		(HAL-01)
(HAL-03) (HAL-04) (HAL-05)			

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDIATION DATE
HAL01 - SIGNATURE NONCES ARE IMPLEMENTED INCORRECTLY	Medium	SOLVED - 08/17/2022
HAL02 - REENTRANCY IN MINERGAME.EXPORTNFT FUNCTION	Low	SOLVED - 08/17/2022
HAL03 - UNUSED STORAGE POINTER IN MINERGAME.GOLDCHANGETOKEN FUNCTION	Informational	SOLVED - 08/17/2022
HAL04 - POSSIBLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS	Informational	SOLVED - 08/17/2022
HAL05 - STATE VARIABLES MISSING CONSTANT MODIFIER	Informational	SOLVED - 08/17/2022

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

3.1 (HAL-01) SIGNATURE NONCES ARE IMPLEMENTED INCORRECTLY - MEDIUM

Description:

In the MinerGame contract, a nonce state variable is used to prevent signature replay attacks:

```
Listing 1: MinerGame.sol

22 uint256 public nonce;
```

```
Listing 2: MinerGame.sol (Lines 63,72)
55 function importNft(uint256 _nftId, uint8 _v, bytes32 _r, bytes32
\rightarrow _s) external {
    require(_nftId > 0, "MinerGame: nft Id invalid");
     MineNFT nft = MineNFT(mineNft);
     require(nft.ownerOf(_nftId) == msg.sender, "MinerGame: Not

    mineNft owner");
                               = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_nftId,

    msg.sender, address(this), nonce));
       bytes32 hash
                               = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(prefix,

    message));
       address recover
                                = ecrecover(hash, _v, _r, _s);
       require(recover == verifier, "Verification failed about

    stakeToken");
     nft.safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), _nftId);
     PlayerParams storage _player = player[msg.sender];
     _player.stakeTime = block.timestamp;
```

```
77
78  mineOwners[_nftId] = msg.sender;
79
80  emit ImportNft(msg.sender, _nftId, block.timestamp);
81 }
```

Listing 3: MinerGame.sol (Line 126) function goldChangeToken(uint256 _gold, uint8 _v, bytes32 _r, bytes32 _s) external { require(_gold > 0, "MinerGame: The exchange amount must greater than zero"); uint256 chainId; assembly { chainId := chainid() PlayerParams storage _player = player[msg.sender]; bytes memory prefix bytes32 message = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_gold, msg.sender, nonce, address(this), chainId)); bytes32 hash = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(prefix, message)); address recover = ecrecover(hash, _v, _r, _s); require(recover == verifier, "Verification failed about stakeToken"); nonce++; _safeTransfer(token[0], msg.sender, _tokenAmount); emit GoldChangeToken(msg.sender, _gold, _tokenAmount, block. timestamp); 141 }

This nonce variable is increased each time, the functions importNft() or goldChangeToken() are called. Although, the signer does not really know the order in which the users will call these functions. Hence, if the backend for example generates a signature for a user and this user does not call the function right after that, his signature will be invalid after someone else calls any of those functions.

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 5

Impact - 2

Recommendation:

It is recommended to use a mapping instead of a global counter as a nonce to solve this issue:

mapping(address => uint256)public _nonces;

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The Seascape team solved this issue and now uses the suggested mapping as a nonce.

3.2 (HAL-02) REENTRANCY IN MINERGAME.EXPORTNFT FUNCTION - LOW

Description:

In the MinerGame contract, the exportNft() function is used to "unstake" the Mine NFT:

```
Listing 4: MinerGame.sol (Line 88)

84 function exportNft(uint256 _nftId) external {
85    require(mineOwners[_nftId] == msg.sender, "MinerGame: Not the
L, owner");
86

87    MineNFT nft = MineNFT(mineNft);
88    nft.safeTransferFrom(address(this), msg.sender, _nftId);
89

90    PlayerParams storage _player = player[msg.sender];
91    delete _player.nftId;
92    delete _player.stakeTime;
93

94    delete mineOwners[_nftId];
95

96    emit ExportNft(msg.sender, _nftId, block.timestamp);
97 }
```

As we can see above, the Mine NFT is sent back to the user with a safeTransferFrom() call. This safeTransferFrom() calls check if the receiver is a smart contract and if so, it calls the _checkOnERC721Received hook.

This passed the control flow to the receiver and opens up a reentrancy vulnerability as the user, in this case the smart contract, got the NFT but the state variables player[msg.sender] and mineOwners[_nftId] are still not deleted/updated.

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 2 Impact - 2

Recommendation:

It is recommended to add a nonReentrant modifier to the exportNft() function. Other option is updating the exportNft() function as shown below:

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The Seascape team solved this issue and updated the exportNft() function as suggested.

3.3 (HAL-03) UNUSED STORAGE POINTER IN MINERGAME.GOLDCHANGETOKEN FUNCTION - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In the MinerGame contract the goldChangeToken() creates a storage pointer to the player mapping, but then it does not make any use of it:

```
Listing 6: MinerGame.sol (Line 122)
114 function goldChangeToken(uint256 _gold, uint8 _v, bytes32 _r,
→ bytes32 _s) external {
     require(_gold > 0, "MinerGame: The exchange amount must greater

    than zero");
     uint256 chainId;
     assembly {
         chainId := chainid()
     PlayerParams storage _player = player[msg.sender];
       bytes memory prefix
       bytes32 message
                               = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(_gold,

    msg.sender, nonce, address(this), chainId));
       bytes32 hash
                               = keccak256(abi.encodePacked(prefix,

    message));
       address recover
                                = ecrecover(hash, _v, _r, _s);
       require(recover == verifier, "Verification failed about

    stakeToken");
     nonce++;
     _safeTransfer(token[0], msg.sender, _tokenAmount);
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to remove the pointer to the player mapping to reduce the gas costs of the goldChangeToken() function.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The Seascape team solved this issue and removed the pointer to the player mapping.

3.4 (HAL-04) POSSIBLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In multiple contracts there are functions marked as public but they are never directly called within the same contract or in any of their descendants:

MineNFTFactory.sol

- mint() (MineNFTFactory.sol#34-37)
- setNft() (MineNFTFactory.sol#42-44)
- addAdmin() (MineNFTFactory.sol#47-50)
- renounceAdmin() (MineNFTFactory.sol#53-56)
- addGenerator() (MineNFTFactory.sol#85-88)
- removeGenerator() (MineNFTFactory.sol#91-94)

MineNFT.sol

- mint() (MineNFT.sol#35-46)
- setOwner() (MineNFT.sol#48-50)
- setFactory() (MineNFT.sol#52-54)
- setBaseUri() (MineNFT.sol#56-58)

MinerGame.sol

- withdraw() (MinerGame.sol#188-195)
- addToken() (MinerGame.sol#198-206)
- setScale() (MinerGame.sol#209-212)

CrownsToken.sol

- burn() (CrownsToken.sol#96-98)
- burnFrom() (CrownsToken.sol#111-118)
- name() (CrownsToken.sol#127-129)
- symbol() (CrownsToken.sol#135-137)
- decimals() (CrownsToken.sol#148-150)
- totalSupply() (CrownsToken.sol#155-157)
- balanceOf() (CrownsToken.sol#162-164)
- transfer() (CrownsToken.sol#173-176)

- approve() (CrownsToken.sol#203-206)
- transferFrom() (CrownsToken.sol#217-227)
- increaseAllowance() (CrownsToken.sol#241-244)
- decreaseAllowance() (CrownsToken.sol#260-268)

MscpToken.sol

- burn() (MscpToken.sol#96-98)
- burnFrom() (MscpToken.sol#111-118)
- name() (MscpToken.sol#127-129)
- symbol() (MscpToken.sol#135-137)
- decimals() (MscpToken.sol#148-150)
- totalSupply() (MscpToken.sol#155-157)
- balanceOf() (MscpToken.sol#162-164)
- transfer() (MscpToken.sol#173-176)
- approve() (MscpToken.sol#203-206)
- transferFrom() (MscpToken.sol#217-227)
- increaseAllowance() (MscpToken.sol#241-244)
- decreaseAllowance() (MscpToken.sol#260-268)

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 1

Recommendation:

If the functions are not intended to be called internally or by their descendants, it is better to mark all of these functions as external to reduce the gas costs.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The Seascape team solved this issue and declared the functions as external, reducing the gas costs.

3.5 (HAL-05) STATE VARIABLES MISSING CONSTANT MODIFIER - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

State variables can be declared as constant or immutable. In both cases, the variables cannot be modified after the contract has been constructed. For constant variables, the value has to be fixed at compile-time, while for immutable, it can still be assigned at construction time. The following state variables are missing the constant modifier:

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to add the constant modifier to the state variables mentioned.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The Seascape team solved this issue and declared the suggested state variables as constants.

AUTOMATED TESTING

4.1 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the smart contracts in scope. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified the smart contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their abis and binary format, Slither was run against the contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.

Slither results:

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```
Research Responsion This contractor/contemporal contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor/contractor
MinerGame.sol
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   OWS:
able.sol#19 (state variable)
able.sol#19 (state variable)
1/ESC71/ESC71/ESC721,30193) shadows:
1/ESC71.sol#12-129 (function)
1/ESC71.sol#12-129 (function)
1/ESC71.sol#12-129 (state)
1/ESC71.sol#12-129 (sta
```

```
MineNFT.sol
```

```
### STATES AND THE PROPERTY OF THE PROPERTY OF
```

NFTTypes.sol

CrownsToken.sol

No issues found by Slither.

- Outshite.comes:) [contracts/genergeplin/contracts/access/Outshite.col135-77] (function) [Crowdithous.accessory.comes.accesso

```
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```

MscpToken.sol

- The reentrancies flagged were checked individually and are all false positives except the one mentioned in the findings.
- No major issues found by Slither.

THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING

