

THORSwap Aggregators

Smart Contract Security Audit

Prepared by: Halborn

Date of Engagement: April 1st, 2022 - April 17th, 2022

Visit: Halborn.com

DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY 3			
CONTACTS	3		
1 EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW	4		
1.1 INTRODUCTION	5		
1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY	5		
1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY	5		
RISK METHODOLOGY	6		
1.4 SCOPE	8		
2 ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW	9		
3 FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS	10		
3.1 (HAL-01) INITIAL vTHOR SHARE PRICE MANIPULATION EXPOSURE	- LOW 12		
Description	12		
Proof of Concept	12		
Risk Level	12		
Recommendation	13		
Remediation Plan	13		
3.2 (HAL-02) MISSING RE-ENTRANCY PROTECTION - LOW	14		
Description	14		
Code Location	14		
Risk Level	16		
Recommendation	16		
Remediation Plan	16		
3.3 (HAL-03) POSSIBLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS - INFORMATI	ONAL		

	Description	17
	Risk Level	17
	Recommendation	17
	Remediation Plan	17
4	AUTOMATED TESTING	18
4.1	STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT	19
	Description	19
	Slither Results	19
4.2	AUTOMATED SECURITY SCAN	26
	MYTHX	26
	Results	26

DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

VERSION	MODIFICATION	DATE	AUTHOR
0.1	Document Creation	04/14/2022	István Böhm
0.2	Document Updates	04/17/2022	István Böhm
0.3	Draft Review	04/17/2022	István Böhm
0.4	Draft Review	04/18/2022	Gabi Urrutia
1.0	Remediation Plan	04/22/2022	István Böhm
1.1	Remediation Plan Review	04/23/2022	Gabi Urrutia

CONTACTS

CONTACT	COMPANY	EMAIL
Rob Behnke	Halborn	Rob.Behnke@halborn.com
Steven Walbroehl	Halborn	Steven.Walbroehl@halborn.com
Gabi Urrutia	Halborn	Gabi.Urrutia@halborn.com
István Böhm	Halborn	Istvan.Bohm@halborn.com

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

1.1 INTRODUCTION

THORSwap engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their Aggregator smart contracts beginning on April 1st, 2022 and ending on April 17th, 2022. The security assessment was scoped to the Aggregator and vTHOR smart contracts provided in the exchange-contracts GitHub repository thorswap/thorswap-contract-v2.

1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided two weeks for the engagement and assigned one full-time security engineer to audit the security of the smart contract. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn identified few security risks that were mostly addressed by the THORSwap team.

1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the bridge code and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose
- Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough
- Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions (solgraph)
- Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes
- Manual testing by custom scripts
- Scanning of solidity files for vulnerabilities, security hotspots or bugs. (MythX)
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. (Slither)
- Testnet deployment (Brownie, Remix IDE)

RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the LIKELIHOOD of a security incident and the IMPACT should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of 5 to 1 with 5 being the highest likelihood or impact.

RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 May cause a significant level of impact or loss.

- 3 May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of 10 to 1 with 10 being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
----------	------	--------	-----	---------------

10 - CRITICAL

9 - 8 - HIGH

7 - 6 - MEDIUM

5 - 4 - LOW

3 - 1 - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

1.4 SCOPE

IN-SCOPE:

The security assessment was scoped to the following smart contracts:

- TSAggregator.sol
- TSAggregator2LegUniswapV2.sol
- TSAggregator2LegUniswapV3.sol
- TSAggregatorGeneric.sol
- TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.sol
- TSAggregatorUniswapV2.sol
- TSAggregatorUniswapV3.sol
- vTHOR.sol

Audited Commit ID:

- 6f85c1ebc0e9f8c3ed10c49d4a6db2781c6f5e90

Fixed Commit ID:

- 54fad56917f7055327c7bd2d043259121050923d

IMPACT

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	0	0	2	1

LIKELIHOOD

(HAL-01) (HAL-02) (HAL-03)

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDIATION DATE
HAL01 - INITIAL vTHOR SHARE PRICE MANIPULATION EXPOSURE	Low	RISK ACCEPTED
HAL02 - MISSING RE-ENTRANCY PROTECTION	Low	SOLVED - 04/21/2022
HAL03 - POSSIBLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS	Informational	SOLVED - 04/21/2022

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

3.1 (HAL-01) INITIAL vTHOR SHARE PRICE MANIPULATION EXPOSURE - LOW

Description:

After deployment, the vTHOR contract is initialed without seeding liquidity, exposing the vault to share price manipulation attacks.

Proof of Concept:

- 1. The vTHOR contract is deployed by the THORSwap team.
- 2. An attacker finds the ∨THOR contract before anyone can deposit their tokens.
- 3. The attacker deposits 1 token, for which they receive 1 share. This transaction sets the share price at 1 token/share.
- 4. The attacker then transfers an additional 999 tokens to the vTHOR contract. This transaction increases the share price to 1000 tokens/share.
- 5. A victim user finds the vTHOR contract and deposits 1500 tokens. Due to the integer rounding, the user only receives 1 share. This transaction modifies the share price to 1250 tokens/share.
- 6. The attacker then, withdraws from the contract using the redeem function. Depending on the distribution of shares, they will receive 1250 tokens, of which 250 will belong to the victim user.

We note that the impact and likelihood of the vulnerability are low because the attacker has limited opportunity to exploit the issue. However, contract developers must be aware of the initial exposure to prevent potential damage.

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 3

Recommendation:

One of the possible solutions to avoid the price manipulation attack is to lock some tokens in the contract and then manually validate the share price before the vTHOR contract is made public.

Remediation Plan:

RISK ACCEPTED: The THORSwap team accept the risk of this finding and will deploy vTHOR and deposit THOR from treasury first to mitigate the issue.

3.2 (HAL-02) MISSING RE-ENTRANCY PROTECTION - LOW

Description:

The vTHOR contract missed the nonReentrant guard in the deposit, mint, withdraw and redeem public functions. Even if the functions follow the check-effects-interactions pattern, we recommend using a mutex to be protected against cross-function reentrancy attacks. By using this lock, an attacker can no longer exploit the function with a recursive call.

Note that the vTHOR contract included a mutex implementation called ReentrancyGuard, which provides a modifier to any function called nonReentrant that guards with a mutex against reentrancy attacks. However, the modifier is not used within the contract.

Code Location:

```
Listing 1: vTHOR.sol

73 function deposit(uint256 assets, address receiver) public returns
L, (uint256 shares) {
74     // Check for rounding error since we round down in
L, previewDeposit.
75     require((shares = previewDeposit(assets)) != 0, "ZERO_SHARES")
L,;
76     // Need to transfer before minting or ERC777s could reenter.
77     address(_asset).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this),
L, assets);
78     _mint(receiver, shares);
79     emit Deposit(msg.sender, receiver, assets, shares);
80 }
81
82 function mint(uint256 shares, address receiver) public returns (
L, uint256 assets) {
83     assets = previewMint(shares); // No need to check for rounding
L, error, previewMint rounds up.
84     // Need to transfer before minting or ERC777s could reenter.
85     address(_asset).safeTransferFrom(msg.sender, address(this),
```

```
    assets);
       _mint(receiver, shares);
       emit Deposit(msg.sender, receiver, assets, shares);
88 }
90 function withdraw(
       uint256 assets,
       address receiver,
       address owner
94 ) public returns (uint256 shares) {
       shares = previewWithdraw(assets); // No need to check for
       if (msg.sender != owner) {
           uint256 allowed = allowance[owner][msg.sender]; // Saves
           if (allowed != type(uint256).max) allowance[owner][msg.

    sender] = allowed - shares;

       _burn(owner, shares);
       emit Withdraw(msg.sender, receiver, owner, assets, shares);
       address(_asset).safeTransfer(receiver, assets);
103 }
105 function redeem(
       uint256 shares,
       address receiver,
       address owner
109 ) public returns (uint256 assets) {
       if (msg.sender != owner) {
           uint256 allowed = allowance[owner][msg.sender]; // Saves
           if (allowed != type(uint256).max) allowance[owner][msg.

    sender] = allowed - shares;
       }
       require((assets = previewRedeem(shares)) != 0, "ZERO_ASSETS");
       _burn(owner, shares);
       emit Withdraw(msg.sender, receiver, owner, assets, shares);
       address(_asset).safeTransfer(receiver, assets);
119 }
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 3

Recommendation:

We recommend using ReentrancyGuard through the nonReentrant modifier.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The THORSwap team added the nonReentrant modifier to the deposit, mint, withdraw and redeem functions.

3.3 (HAL-03) POSSIBLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In the Owners and TSAggregator contracts there are management functions marked as public, but they are never directly called within the contract itself or in any of its descendants:

- setOwner(address owner, bool active)public virtual isOwner (Owners.sol#19)
- setFee(uint256 _fee, address _feeRecipient)public (TSAggregator.sol#26)

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1 Impact - 1

Recommendation:

If the functions are not intended to be called internally or by descendants, it is better to mark them as external to reduce gas costs.

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The THORSwap team marked the setOwner and setFee functions as external.

AUTOMATED TESTING

4.1 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance coverage of certain areas of the scoped contract. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified all the contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their abi and binary formats. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.

Slither Results:

```
Contract Locking of their foods:

- This product received (contracts/This programs colled 41) has a symble functions:
- This product received (contracts/This programs colled 41) has a symble functions:
- This product received (contracts/This programs colled 41) has a symble functions:
- This product received (contracts/This programs colled 41) has a symble functions:
- This product description and represent the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product of the function of the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product of the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product of the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product is the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product is the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product is the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product is the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product is the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product is the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product is the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product is the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product is the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product is the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product is the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product is the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product is the statistic received (contracts/This programs colled 41)
- This product is the statistic received (contracts/This product) (contracts/T
```

TSAggregator2LegUniswapV2.sol

```
| Table | Tabl
```

TSAggregator2LegUniswapV3.sol

TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.transferTokens(address,address,address,address,uint256) (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.sol#14-17) uses tx.origin for authorization: require(bool,string) (from — tx.origin || _icto

TSAggregator2LegUniswapV3.swapOut(address, address, uint256) (contracts/TSAggregator2LegUniswapV3.sol#63-74) ignores return value by swapRouter.exactInput(IUniswapRouterV3.ExactInputParams (path, to, type() (uint256).max, amount, amountOutNin)) (contracts/TSAggregator2LegUniswapV3.sol#67-73)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return

```
(path, to, type() (uint256).max, anount, anountOuthin) (contracts/TSAggregator.sol#26)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/ukik/Detector-Documentation#unused-return

TSAggregator.setFee(uint256,address). feeRecipient (contracts/TSAggregator.sol#26) lacks a zero-check on:
- feeRecipient = feeRecipient (contracts/TSAggregator.sol#26)
TSAggregatorZLegdniswapV3.constructorIaddress, uint24, address, address, uint24). legToken (contracts/TSAggregatorZLegdniswapV3.sol#21) lacks a zero-check on:
- Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation

TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy, isContract(address) (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.sol#27)
- NEINE ASM (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenTransferLib.sol#31-22) uses assembly
- NEINE ASM (contracts/TSAggregatorSol#28)
-
```

20

```
SafeTransferLib.safeTransfer(address,address,uint256) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#54-76) is never used and should be removed Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
 Pragma version0.8.10 (contracts/Dmscapes) revision to orecent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.7

Pragma version0.8.10 (contracts/TsAggregator.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.7

Pragma version0.8.10 (contracts/TsAggregator.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.7

Pragma version0.8.10 (contracts/TsAggregator/DschriftransferProxy.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.7

Pragma version0.8.10 (contracts/Interfaces/LinivampMouterVis.ol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.7

Pragma version0.8.10 (contracts/Interfaces/LinivampMouterVis.ol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.7

Pragma version0.8.10 (contracts/Interfaces/LinivampMouterVis.ol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.7

Pragma version0>=0.8.0 (Lib/Reentrans(vigurari.sol#2) allows old versions

Solt-0.8.10 is not recommended for deployment

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
 Parameter TSAggregator.setFee(uint256,address)_fee (contracts/TSAggregator.sol#26) is not in mixedCase
Parameter TSAggregator.setFee(uint256,address).feeRecipient (contracts/TSAggregator.sol#26) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventi
 setOwner(address, bool) should be declared external:

- Owners.setOwner(address, bool) (contracts/Owners.sol#19-21)
setFee(uint256, address) should be declared external:
- Staggregator.setFee(uint256, address) should be declared external:
- Staggregator.setFee(uint256, address) (contracts/TSAggregator.sol#26-31)
swapIn(address, address, string, address, uint256, uint256
  TSAggregatorGeneric.sol
  TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.transferTokens(address,address,address,address,uint256) (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.sol#14-17) uses tx.origin for authorization: require(bool,string) (from == tx.origin || isContract(from),Invalid from address) (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.sol#15)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-usage-of-txorigin
  TSAggregator.setFee(uint256,address)._feeRecipient (contracts/TSAggregator.sol#26) lacks a zero-check on feeRecipient = feeRecipient (contracts/TSAggregator.sol#29)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation

TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy. isContract(address) (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.sol#19-27) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (loNySafeTransferLib.sol#10-19)

SafeTransferLib.safeTransferEHHaddress, uint256) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#13-22) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#10-19)

SafeTransferLib.safeTransferFrom(address, address, uint256) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#28-52) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#0-19)

SafeTransferLib.safeTransfer(address, address, uint256) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#54-76) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#0-173)

SafeTransferLib.safeApprove(address, address, uint256) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#78-109) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#0-173)

SafeTransferLib.didLastOptionalReturnCallSucced(bool) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#106-137) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#0-136)

Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage
 Different versions of Solidity is used:

- Version used: ['0.8.10', '>=0.8.0']

- 0.8.10 (contracts/Owners.sol#2)

- 0.8.10 (contracts/TSAggregator.sol#2)

- 0.8.10 (contracts/TSAggregator/OwnerIra

- 0.8.10 (contracts/TSAggregator/OwnerIra

- 0.8.10 (contracts/ITSAggregator/OwnerIra

- 0.8.10 (contracts/interfaces/IENC20.so

- 0.8.10 (contracts/interfaces/ITHOrchai

- >=0.8.6 (ilb/ReentrancyGuard.sol#2)

->=0,8 0 (ilb/ReantrancyGuard.sol#2)

    ->=0.8.0 (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#2)
    Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used

  SafeTransferLib.safeTransfer(address,address,uint256) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#54-76) is never used and should be removed Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
 Pragma version8.8.10 (contracts/bmers.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 6.6.12/9.7.6/0.8.7
Pragma version8.8.10 (contracts/Shagregator.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 6.6.12/9.7.6/0.8.7
Pragma version8.8.10 (contracts/TsAggregatorGeneric.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 6.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.7
Pragma version8.8.10 (contracts/TsAggregatorGeneric.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 6.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.7
Pragma version8.8.10 (contracts/interfaces/ITBCOs.ol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 6.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.7
Pragma version8.8.10 (contracts/interfaces/ITBCOs.ol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 6.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.7
Pragma version8.8.10 (contracts/interfaces/ITBCOs.ol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 6.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.7
Pragma version—0.8.0 (lib/Senftransfertib.sol#2) allows old versions
solt-0.8.10 is not recommended for deployment
                       -0.8.10 is not recommended for deployment rence: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
 Low level call in TSAggregatorGeneric.swapIn(address,address,string,address,uint256,address,bytes,uint256) (contracts/TSAggregatorGeneric.sol#21-48):
- (success) = router.call(data) (contracts/TSAggregatorGeneric.sol#36)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls
  Parameter TSAggregator.setFee(uint256,address). fee (contracts/TSAggregator.sol#26) is not in mixedCase
Parameter TSAggregator.setFee(uint256,address). feeRecipient (contracts/TSAggregator.sol#26) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
  Reference. In the programment of the programment of
 setOwner(address, bool) should be declared external:

- Owners.setOwner(address, bool) (contracts/Owners.sol#19-21) setFee(uint256, address) should be declared external:

- Thaggregator.setFee(uint256, address) (contracts/TSAggregator.sol#26-31) swapIn(address, storing, address, uint256, address), bytes, uint256) should be declared external:

- TSAggregatorGeneric.swapIn(address, storing, address, storing, address, uint256) address), bytes, uint256) (contracts/TSAggregatorGeneric.sol#21-48) Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external
```

TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.sol

```
TSAggregatorTokenfransferProxy.transferTokens(address, address, address, uint259) (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenfransferProxy.sol#14-17) uses tx.origin for authorization: require(bool,string) (from — tx.origin | 1] isContract(from), Invalid from address) (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenfransferProxy.sol#15)

TSAggregatorTokenfransferProxy.isContract(address) (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenfransferProxy.sol#19-27) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenfransferProxy.sol#29-27) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenfransferProxy.sol#39-27) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenfransferProxy.sol#39-27)

- INLINE ASM (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenfransferProxy.sol#39-27)

- INLINE ASM (citySaffransfertLib.sol#30-40)

- INLINE ASM (citySaffransfertLib.sol#30-13)

- INLINE ASM (citySaffransfertLib.sol#3
```

TSAggregatorUniswapV2.sol

TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.transferTokens(address,address,address,uint256) (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.sol#14-17) uses tx.origin for authorization: require(bool,string) (from = tx.origin | isContract(from),Invalid from address) (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.sol#15) Reference: https://github.com/cyrtyic/slither/uki/Dvetcotro-Documentation#dangerous-usage-of-txorigin

TSAggregator.setFee(uint256,address). feeRecipient (contracts/TSAggregator.sol#26) lacks a zero-check on :
- feeRecipient = _feeRecipient (contracts/TSAggregator.sol#26) lacks a zero-check on :
- TSAggregatorUniswapV2.constructor(address, address, address, loweth (contracts/TSAggregatorUniswapV2.sol#16) lacks a zero-check on
- weth = _weth (contracts/TSAggregatorUniswapV2.sol#18)
Reference: https://github.com/crytics/lither/yiki/pbetector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation

TSAggregatorUniswapV3.sol

TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.transferTokens(address,address,address,address,uint256) (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.sol#14-17) uses tx.origin for authorization: require(bool,string) (from == tx.origin || isContract(from).Invalid from address) (contracts/TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.sol#15)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-usage-of-txorigin

TSAggregatorUniswapV3.swapDut(address,address,uint256) (contracts/TSAggregatorUniswapV3.sol#60-73) ignores return value by swapRouter.exactInputSingle(IUniswapRouterV3.ExactInputSingleParams(address(weth),token,poolFee,to,type()(uint256).max,amount,amountOutMin,0)) (contracts/TSAggregatorUniswapV3.sol#63-72)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return

indegrates, reflectionings, address). Sendencipient (contracts/Tydagregator, soleta) lacks a zero-check on :

Reference. https://github.com/cyric/sitter/sub/fidector/bus/maintainesisiap/zero-address-validation

Talgropostor/bus/maintainesis/move_states/dargross(contracts/Tydagregator) contracts/Tydagregator/bus/maintainesisiap/zero-address-validation

Talgropostor/bus/maintainesis/move_states/dargross(contracts/Tydagregator/bus/maintainesisiap/zero-address-validation

Safetrass(contracts/Tydagregator/bus/fidects

```
vTHOR.sol
  FixedPointMathLib.rpow(uint256,uint256,uint256) (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#74-160) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:
-x = xxRound_rpow_asm 0 / scalar (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#31)
-zx_rpow_asm 0 = 2 * x (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#31)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply
 ERC20Vote. writeCheckpoint(address,uint256,uint256,uint256) (lib/ERC20Vote.sol#264-284) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- ncheckpoints != 0 6& checkpoints[delegatee][ncheckpoints - 1].fromTimestamp == block.timestamp (lib/ERC20Vote.sol#272)
VTHOR.convertToAssets(uint256) (contracts/VTHOR.sol#34-37) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- supply == 0 (contracts/VTHOR.sol#36)
VTHOR.convertToShares(uint256) (contracts/VTHOR.sol#29-32) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- supply == 0 (contracts/VTHOR.sol#31-46) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- supply == 0 (contracts/VTHOR.sol#31-46) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- supply == 0 (contracts/VTHOR.sol#45-51) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- supply == 0 (contracts/VTHOR.sol#48-51) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- supply == 0 (contracts/VTHOR.sol#48-51) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- supply == 0 (contracts/VTHOR.sol#48-51) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- supply == 0 (contracts/VTHOR.sol#48-51) uses a dangerous strict equality:
   ERC20Vote.getPriorVotes(address,uint256).lower (lib/ERC20Vote.sol#202) is a local variable never initialized Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#uninitialized-local-variables
   ERC20Vote.delegateBySig(address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) (lib/ERC20Vote.sol#160-185) uses timestamp for comparisons
  Dangerous comparisons:
- require(bool,string)(block.timestamp ← expiry,SIGNATURE_EXPIRED) (lib/ERC20Vote.sol#182)
ERC20Vote.getPriorVotes(address,wint256) (lib/ERC20Vote.sol#187-225) uses timestamp for comparisons
 Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp

FixedPointMathLib.mulDivOpown(uint256, uint256, (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#34-51) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#39-50)

FixedPointMathLib.mulDivOp(uint256, uint256, uint256) (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#53-72) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#36-71)

FixedPointMathLib.mow(uint256, uint256) (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#74-160) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#79-159)

FixedPointMathLib.sqrt(uint256) (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#74-160) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#16-221) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#16-220)

SafeTransferLib.safeTransferETH(address, uint256) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#31-22) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#16-19)

SafeTransferLib.safeTransferFrom(address, address, uint256) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#28-52) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#36-49)

SafeTransferLib.safeTransfer(address, address, uint256) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#78-100) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#61-37)

SafeTransferLib.safeApprove(address, address, uint256) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#78-100) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#88-97)

SafeTransferLib.safeApprove(address, address, uint256) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#106-137) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#88-97)

SafeTransferLib.diastOtptionalReturnCallSucceed(bool) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#106-137) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#81-97)

SafeTransferLib.diastOtptionalReturnCallSucceed(bool) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#106-137) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#81-97)

SafeTransferLib.diastOtptionalReturnCallSucceed(bool) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#106-137) uses assembly

- INLINE ASM (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#81-97)
  Different versions of Solidity is used:
- Version used: ['0.8.10', '>=0.8.0']
- 0.8.10 (contracts/interfaces/IERC20.sol#2)
                                             0.8.10 (contracts/interfaces/IERC20.sol#2)
0.8.10 (contracts/vTHOR.sol#2)
0.8.10 (contracts/vTHOR.sol#2)
>=0.8.0 (lib/FRC20Vote.sol#2)
>=0.8.0 (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#2)
>=0.8.0 (lib/ReentrancyGuard.sol#2)
>=0.8.0 (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#2)
+btter/visithy.com/contracts/sol#2)
   Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used
  FixedPointMathLib.divWadDown(uint256,uint256) (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#22-24) is never used and should be removed FixedPointMathLib.divWadUp(uint256,uint256) (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#26-28) is never used and should be removed FixedPointMathLib.mulWadUp(uint256,uint256) (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#14-16) is never used and should be removed FixedPointMathLib.mulWadUp(uint256,uint256) (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#18-20) is never used and should be removed FixedPointMathLib.sol#14-160) is never used and should be removed FixedPointMathLib.sol#166-221) is never used and should be removed FixedPointMathLib.sol#166-221) is never used and should be removed SafeTransferLib.safeApprove(address, address, uint256) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#78-100) is never used and should be removed SafeTransferLib.safeApprove(address, uint256) (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#3-22) is never used and should be removed Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code
  Pragma version0.8.10 (contracts/interfaces/IERC20.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.7
Pragma version0.8.10 (contracts/interfaces/IERC4626.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8
Pragma version0.8.10 (contracts/VTHOR.sol#2) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.12/0.7.6/0.8.7
Pragma version>=0.8.0 (lib/FERC20Vote.sol#2) allows old versions
Pragma version>=0.8.0 (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#2) allows old versions
Pragma version>=0.8.0 (lib/FixedPointMathLib.sol#2) allows old versions
Pragma version>=0.8.0 (lib/SafeTransferLib.sol#2) allows old versions
solc-0.8.10 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity
  Contract vTHOR (contracts/vTHOR.sol#11-120) is not in CapWords
Variable vTHOR. asset (contracts/vTHOR.sol#11-120) is not in mixedCase
Function ERC20Vote.DOMAIN_SEPARATOR() (lib/ERC20Vote.sol#322-324) is not in mixedCase
Variable ERC20Vote. delegates (lib/ERC20Vote.sol#35) is not in mixedCase
Variable ERC20Vote.INITIAL CHAIN ID (lib/ERC20Vote.sol#35) is not in mixedCase
Variable ERC20Vote.INITIAL DOMAIN SEPARATOR (lib/ERC20Vote.sol#36) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
```

- No major issues found by Slither.
- The authorization (use of tx.origin) and "send eth to arbitrary user" issues are all false positives.

4.2 AUTOMATED SECURITY SCAN

MYTHX:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detecting well-known security issues and to identify low-hanging fruits on the targets for this engagement. MythX, a security analysis service for Ethereum smart contracts, is among the tools used. MythX was used to scan all the contracts and sent the compiled results to the analyzers to locate any vulnerabilities.

Results:

TSAggregator2LegUniswapV2.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
62	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	Read of persistent state following external call.
63	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	Read of persistent state following external call.
65	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	Read of persistent state following external call.

TSAggregator2LegUniswapV3.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
65	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	Read of persistent state following external call.
66	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	Read of persistent state following external call.

TSAggregatorTokenTransferProxy.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
7	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.
15	(SWC-115) Authorization through tx.origin	Low	Use of tx.origin as a part of authorization control.
15	(SWC-115) Authorization through tx.origin	Low	Use of "tx.origin" as a part of authorization control.

TSAggregatorUniswapV2.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
59	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	Read of persistent state following external call.
61	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	Read of persistent state following external call.
61	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	A call to a user-supplied address is executed.

TSAggregatorUniswapV3.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
62	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	A call to a user-supplied address is executed.
62	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	Read of persistent state following external call.
63	(SWC-113) DoS with Failed Call	Low	Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.
63	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Medium	Write to persistent state following external call
64	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Medium	Read of persistent state following external call

ReentrancyGuard.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
17	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Medium	Write to persistent state following external call

SafeTransferLib.sol

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
48	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	A call to a user-supplied address is executed.
48	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.

- No major issues found by MythX.
- The reentrancy, authorization, DOS and requirement violation issues are all false positives.

THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING

