



February 16th 2022 — Quantstamp Verified

Gelt Vault V1

This audit report was prepared by Quantstamp, the leader in blockchain security.

Executive Summary

Type	DeFi
Auditors	Marius Guggenmos, Senior Research Engineer Ed Zulkoski, Senior Security Engineer Souhail Mssassi, Research Engineer



Timeline	2022-01-18 through 2022-01-28						
EVM	London						
Languages	Solidity						
Methods	Architecture Review, Unit Testing, Functional Testing, Computer-Aided Verification, Manual Review						
Specification	None						
Documentation Quality	<div><div></div></div> Medium						
Test Quality	<div><div></div></div> High						
Source Code	<table><tr><th>Repository</th><th>Commit</th></tr><tr><td><a href="#">gelt-contracts-v1 (initial audit)</a></td><td><a href="#">b2b87fe</a></td></tr><tr><td><a href="#">gelt-contracts-v1 (reaudit)</a></td><td><a href="#">6f9e489</a></td></tr></table>	Repository	Commit	<a href="#">gelt-contracts-v1 (initial audit)</a>	<a href="#">b2b87fe</a>	<a href="#">gelt-contracts-v1 (reaudit)</a>	<a href="#">6f9e489</a>
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<a href="#">gelt-contracts-v1 (reaudit)</a>	<a href="#">6f9e489</a>						

Total Issues	6 (6 Resolved)
High Risk Issues	0 (0 Resolved)
Medium Risk Issues	1 (1 Resolved)
Low Risk Issues	3 (3 Resolved)
Informational Risk Issues	1 (1 Resolved)
Undetermined Risk Issues	1 (1 Resolved)



High Risk	The issue puts a large number of users' sensitive information at risk, or is reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impact for client's reputation or serious financial implications for client and users.
Medium Risk	The issue puts a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental for the client's reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead to moderate financial impact.
Low Risk	The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low-impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Informational	The issue does not post an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or Defence in Depth.
Undetermined	The impact of the issue is uncertain.

Unresolved	Acknowledged the existence of the risk, and decided to accept it without engaging in special efforts to control it.
Acknowledged	The issue remains in the code but is a result of an intentional business or design decision. As such, it is supposed to be addressed outside the programmatic means, such as: 1) comments, documentation, README, FAQ; 2) business processes; 3) analyses showing that the issue shall have no negative consequences in practice (e.g., gas analysis, deployment settings).
Resolved	Adjusted program implementation, requirements or constraints to eliminate the risk.
Mitigated	Implemented actions to minimize the impact or likelihood of the risk.

## Summary of Findings

**After initial audit:** Quantstamp has performed an audit of the Gelt Vault V1 repository. Overall, the code base is relatively small and makes use of a lot of OpenZeppelin libraries, which were not part of the audit. While the contracts are documented well, we are not aware of any documentation targeting end-users. The project's tests appear fairly extensive, although it is hard to rate the quality without coverage measurements available, which is why we conservatively evaluated the test quality as *medium* instead of *high*. The audit resulted in a total of 6 findings and an additional 1 best practice violations, described below. We confirm that none of the tests are failing when executed on our end. We recommend that all issues reported in this document be addressed.

**After reaudit:** Quantstamp has checked the commit hash [6f9e489](#) and has determined that all of the reported issues have been resolved (that is either fixed or mitigated) by the Gelt team. More details regarding each of the issues are provided in the update messages below each issue recommendation. Additionally, we promoted the test quality to *high* after finding a workaround for computing the test coverage.

ID	Description	Severity	Status
QSP-1	Redemption Fee Precision Check May Lead to Revert	^ Medium	Fixed
QSP-2	Unclear Access Control Policy May Lead to Griefing	○ Informational	Mitigated
QSP-3	<a href="#">minOutputQuantity</a> During Redeems May Lead to Unfavorable Exchanges	▼ Low	Fixed
QSP-4	Privileged Roles and Ownership	▼ Low	Fixed
QSP-5	Missing Input Validation	▼ Low	Fixed
QSP-6	Unclear <a href="#">+1</a> Compensation in <a href="#">_calcStrategyRedeemAmount</a>	? Undetermined	Fixed

## Quantstamp Audit Breakdown

Quantstamp’s objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices.

Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Mishandled exceptions and call stack limits
- Unsafe external calls
- Integer overflow / underflow
- Number rounding errors
- Reentrancy and cross-function vulnerabilities
- Denial of service / logical oversights
- Access control
- Centralization of power
- Business logic contradicting the specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication
- Gas usage
- Arbitrary token minting

### Methodology

The Quantstamp auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following
  - i. Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Quantstamp to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
  - ii. Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - iii. Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Quantstamp describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i. Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
  - ii. Symbolic execution, which is analyzing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, and actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

### Toolset

The notes below outline the setup and steps performed in the process of this audit.

#### Setup

Tool Setup:

- [Slither](#) v0.8.2



Steps taken to run the tools:

1. Installed the Slither tool: `pip install slither-analyzer`
2. Run Slither from the project directory: `slither .`

## Findings

### QSP-1 Redemption Fee Precision Check May Lead to Revert

**Severity:** *Medium Risk*

**Status:** Fixed

**File(s) affected:** `contracts/MstableGeltVault.sol`

**Description:** The internal function `_getStrategyRedeemFeeBps` contains the following code:

```
uint256 redemptionFee = mAsset.data().redemptionFee;

require(redemptionFee >= 1e14, "strategy redemption fee must be scaled to 18 decimals");
```

This assumes that the underlying `mAsset` will never have a fee less than 0.0001. For example, the deployed `mAsset` contract [here](#) has `redemptionFee = 6e14`. If, for example, `mStable` ever lowered the fee to `6e13`, this would still be "scaled to 18 decimals", but the function `_getStrategyRedeemFeeBps` would revert. This affects critical functions such as `voluntaryExit`.

**Recommendation:** Allow `redemptionFee` values below `1e14`. Note that if in practice the fees are below `1e14`, certain basis points calculations may return 0 throughout the code.

**Update:** The percentage calculations now use additional precision to handle lower values. Fixed in [this PR](#).

### QSP-2 Unclear Access Control Policy May Lead to Griefing

**Severity:** *Informational*

**Status:** Mitigated

**File(s) affected:** `contracts/MstableGeltVault.sol`

**Description:** The functions `mintWithAuthorization` and `redeemWithAuthorization` are both operator-only functions. This means, all functions intended for end-users can only be performed through meta-transactions where the operator has to pay for the gas. This could lead to griefing scenarios where users repeatedly mint/redeem at the cost of the operator, potentially only paying minimal redemption fees.

**Recommendation:** Clarify if this access control policy is intended, and whether the above scenario could reasonably occur. In case it is intended, make sure to guard against it in the off-chain components that submit the transactions.

**Update:** The Gelt team clarified that the access control policy is as intended. Since there is no real issue with the contract itself, we have decided to downgrade this to *informational* severity.

### QSP-3 `minOutputQuantity` During Redeems May Lead to Unfavorable Exchanges

**Severity:** *Low Risk*

**Status:** Fixed

**File(s) affected:** `contracts/MstableGeltVault.sol`

**Description:** The function `emergencyExitStrategy` invokes `mAsset.redeem(...)`, using `1` for the `_minOutputQuantity`. If there are issues with the underlying `mAsset` contract, this may cause arbitrarily unfavorable returned quantities of `bAsset` tokens.

**Recommendation:** Consider using a value that is either proportional to the amount of `mAsset` tokens, or is configurable via some parameter to `emergencyExitStrategy`.

**Update:** The function `emergencyExitStrategy` now accepts a parameter for the `_minOutputQuantity` call. This has been added in [this PR](#).

### QSP-4 Privileged Roles and Ownership

**Severity:** *Low Risk*

**Status:** Fixed

**File(s) affected:** `contracts/MstableGeltVault.sol`

**Description:** Public user-facing documentation should detail the actions that can be performed by privileged users. While we don't believe the administrators have unreasonable levels of control, it is especially important to inform users that administrators are able to halt voluntary exits by pausing the contract and thus locking access to the funds.

**Recommendation:** Add public documentation that clearly documents all of the actions privileged users can perform.

**Update:** The project's README file now documents the privileged roles. Added in [this PR](#).

### QSP-5 Missing Input Validation

**Severity:** *Low Risk*

**Status:** Fixed

**File(s) affected:** `contracts/MstableGeltVault.sol`

**Description:** The `initialize` function accepts a number of important contract addresses that are permanently assigned to contract members. To avoid costly re-deployments where any of these parameters are accidentally set to `address(0)`, input validation checks should be added.

**Recommendation:** Verify that any address arguments in the `initialize` function are not equal to `address(0)`.

**Update:** The initialize function now checks all address parameters for `address(0)`. Added in [this PR](#).

### QSP-6 Unclear `+1` Compensation in `_calcStrategyRedeemAmount`





- ✓ should collect rewards to the pre-set reward collector address
- ✓ should not revert when there are no rewards to collect
- ✓ should revert when the reward collector address is unset

[Scenario] Gelt Vault

- ✓ 3 party deposit
- ✓ 3 party deposits with partial withdrawal
- ✓ 3 party deposit partial withdrawal and redeposit
- ✓ 3 party deposit partial withdrawal and concomitant deposit

[Unit] Gelt Vault: Access Control

Role: Owner

- ✓ should grant the owner role on deployment to the deployer
- ✓ should make the owner role the administrator of all the other roles
- ✓ should allow owner to grant and revoke roles
- ✓ should allow owner to transfer ownership

Role: Administrator

- ✓ should allow administrator to trigger emergency operations
- ✓ should allow administrator to configure the vault
- ✓ should disallow administrator to submit meta-transactions
- ✓ should disallow administrator to interact with the strategy
- ✓ should disallow administrator to upgrade the vault
- ✓ should disallow administrator to transfer ownership

Role: Operator

- ✓ should allow operator to submit meta-transactions
- ✓ should disallow operator to trigger emergency operations
- ✓ should disallow operator to configure the vault
- ✓ should disallow operator to upgrade the vault
- ✓ should disallow operator to transfer ownership

[Unit] Gelt Vault: Upgrades

- ✓ should deploy the vault via a proxy
- ✓ should update an already deployed vault
- ✓ should fail to migrate an already migrated vault
- ✓ should fail to upgrade when storage is incompatible

[Unit] Gelt Vault: Utils

FixedPointMath

#add

- ✓ should add two fixed point numbers
- ✓ should revert on overflow

#sub

- ✓ should subtract two fixed point numbers
- ✓ should revert on underflow

#mul(UFixed256x18, UFixed256x18)

- ✓ should multiply two fixed point numbers
- ✓ should revert on overflow

#mul(UFixed256x18, uint256)

- ✓ should multiply a fixed point number by an unsigned integer
- ✓ should revert on overflow

#div(UFixed256x18, UFixed256x18)

- ✓ should divide two fixed point numbers
- ✓ should revert on overflow

#div(UFixed256x18, uint256)

- ✓ should divide a fixed point number by an unsigned integer

#floor

- ✓ should floor a fixed point number

#toUFixed256x18(uint256)

- ✓ should return a scaled fixed point number
- ✓ should revert on overflow

#toUFixed256x18(uint256, uint256)

- ✓ should return a fixed point number
- ✓ should revert on overflow

PercentageMath

#basisPoints

- ✓ should calculate the correct basis points for the given amount
- ✓ should revert when amount = 0
- ✓ should revert when bps is out of bounds

[Unit] Gelt Vault

#initialize

- ✓ should fail if one of the initialize parameters is the zero address

#mintWithAuthorization

- ✓ should return the initial exchange rate when totalSupply = 0
- ✓ should mint tokens 1:100 when totalSupply == 0
- ✓ should return the correct exchange rate when totalSupply > 0
- ✓ should mint the correct amount of tokens when totalSupply > 0

#redeemWithAuthorization

- ✓ should redeem the correct amount after initial mint
- ✓ should redeem the correct amount after multiple mints
- ✓ should fail to redeem when there are no tokens minted
- ✓ should fail to redeem when trying to redeem more tokens than minted

#executeStrategyNetDeposit

- ✓ should revert when amount = 0

#executeStrategyNetWithdraw

- ✓ should revert when amount = 0

#emergencyExitStrategy

- ✓ should revert when the minimum output quantity is zero

#sweep

- ✓ should sweep the given amount of tokens
- ✓ should revert when amount = 0
- ✓ should revert when trying to sweep a token protected by the vault
- ✓ should revert when the balance is less than the amount

#setStrategyTolerances

- ✓ should set the strategy tolerances
- ✓ should revert when the tolerances are out of bounds

#setRewardCollector

- ✓ should set the reward collector to the given address
- ✓ should revert when the supplied reward collector is the zero address

#emergencyPause

- ✓ should pause the vault
- ✓ should revert when trying to pause the already paused vault
- ✓ should prevent calling vault operations while paused
- ✓ should unpause after the pause duration

#emergencyUnpause

- ✓ should unpause the vault
- ✓ should revert when trying to unpause the already unpaused vault
- ✓ should allow calling vault operations after the vault is unpaused

#transferOwnership

- ✓ should revert when transferring ownership to the zero address

[Unit] Mock Vault

#mint

- ✓ should mint tokens 1:1 when totalSupply == 0
- ✓ should mint the correct amount when totalSupply > 0
- ✓ should mint the correct amount after strategy generates yield

#withdraw

- ✓ should withdraw the correct amount after initial mint
- ✓ should withdraw the correct amount multiple mints
- ✓ should fail to withdraw when there are no tokens minted
- ✓ should fail to withdraw when trying to withdraw more tokens than minted

Solc version: 0.8.9		Optimizer enabled: true		Runs: 200	Block limit: 30000000 gas	
Methods						
Contract	Method	Min	Max	Avg	# calls	usd (avg)
ERC20Harness	approve	46238	46250	46240	22	-
ERC20Harness	increaseAllowance	-	-	46473	1	-
ERC20Harness	transfer	34427	51527	50811	24	-
ERC20Upgradeable	approve	58098	58110	58102	10	-
ERC20Upgradeable	transfer	46428	63552	60235	31	-
MstableGeltVault	emergencyPause	-	-	74220	1	-
MstableGeltVault	grantRole	56349	56361	56355	13	-
MstableGeltVault	mintWithAuthorization	-	-	151797	1	-
MstableGeltVault	revokeRole	34451	34463	34457	2	-
MstableGeltVault	setCollector	-	-	55356	1	-
MstableGeltVault	transferOwnership	-	-	55993	1	-
MstableGeltVault	upgradeToAndCall	-	-	89564	2	-
MstableGeltVaultHarness	claimGovernanceTokens	119608	162920	148483	3	-
MstableGeltVaultHarness	collectGovernanceTokens	61579	112558	87069	2	-

MstableGeltVaultHarness	emergencyExitStrategy	70388	695493	382941	2	-	
MstableGeltVaultHarness	emergencyPause	-	-	69328	7	-	
MstableGeltVaultHarness	emergencyUnpause	-	-	25198	3	-	
MstableGeltVaultHarness	executeStrategyNetDeposit	718649	718661	718652	12	-	
MstableGeltVaultHarness	executeStrategyNetWithdraw	718163	718177	718168	3	-	
MstableGeltVaultHarness	grantRole	-	-	51463	110	-	
MstableGeltVaultHarness	harnessExecuteStrategyNetDeposit	42530	60466	49870	11	-	
MstableGeltVaultHarness	harnessExecuteStrategyNetWithdraw	-	-	67977	2	-	
MstableGeltVaultHarness	mintWithAuthorization	99383	164168	144646	32	-	
MstableGeltVaultHarness	redeemWithAuthorization	104937	226925	145968	7	-	
MstableGeltVaultHarness	setCollector	-	-	50461	3	-	
MstableGeltVaultHarness	setStrategyTolerances	32325	35137	33731	2	-	
MstableGeltVaultHarness	sweep	-	-	71813	1	-	
MstableGeltVaultHarness	voluntaryExit	136520	779795	519065	5	-	
Deployments				% of limit			
ERC20Harness		-	-	815998	2.7 %	-	
FixedPointMathHarness		-	-	229148	0.8 %	-	
MstableGeltVault		-	-	5250779	17.5 %	-	
MstableGeltVaultHarness		5845445	5858781	5853138	19.5 %	-	
MstableGeltVaultV2		-	-	5311844	17.7 %	-	
PercentageMathHarness		-	-	198823	0.7 %	-	
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119 passing (16m)							

## Code Coverage

There are no instructions on how to compute the test coverage. We briefly tried adding coverage using [solidity-coverage](#) but ran into errors.

**Update:** The Gelt team informed us that their use of user defined value types (UDVT) are the reason for solidity-coverage not working. We temporarily patched the code to use a struct instead of UDVT to collect coverage data. While this is not 100% accurate, it serves well enough to see that the coverage is relatively high.

File	% Stmts	% Branch	% Funcs	% Lines	Uncovered Lines
contracts/	96.86	81.25	95.92	96.91	
Authorizable.sol	60	40	75	60	... 57,62,67,68
Migratable.sol	100	100	100	100	
MstableGeltVault.sol	100	85.53	100	100	
TemporarilyPausable.sol	100	87.5	100	100	
contracts/harness/	63.33	100	52	63.33	
ERC20Harness.sol	100	100	100	100	
FixedPointMathHarness.sol	0	100	0	0	... 30,34,38,42
MstableGeltVaultHarness.sol	92.31	100	85.71	92.31	32
MstableGeltVaultV2.sol	100	100	100	100	
MstableGeltVaultV2Incompatible.sol	0	100	0	0	10
PercentageMathHarness.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/interface/	100	100	100	100	
IGeltVault.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/interface/strategy/mstable/	100	100	100	100	
IInterestBearingMasset.sol	100	100	100	100	
IMasset.sol	100	100	100	100	
ISaveWrapper.sol	100	100	100	100	
IVaultedInterestBearingMasset.sol	100	100	100	100	
contracts/lib/	75	75	69.23	76	
ECRecover.sol	71.43	50	100	71.43	62,66
EIP712.sol	100	100	100	100	
EIP712Domain.sol	100	100	100	100	
FixedPointMath.sol	55.56	100	55.56	55.56	17,23,35,40
PercentageMath.sol	100	100	100	100	
All files	90.61	80.91	79.31	90.76	



# Appendix

## File Signatures

The following are the SHA-256 hashes of the reviewed files. A file with a different SHA-256 hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. You are cautioned that a different SHA-256 hash could be (but is not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of the review.

### Contracts

22e41ac1a7b64d7d282f9ccc68177bcd616877ce69ed59201baefa853c6727c ./IGeltVault.sol  
c5e5ea3b17b9dc3d999f81b3658eed2d86a11805a9325638aa17965e41816699 ./contracts/Migratable.sol  
8e81f9346a5bf2403634d4185e7da6cde25d6d51da706f6309c8ac6e462b6058 ./contracts/Authorizable.sol  
81033da8e0337480bd395446b985cd4092e011e91d4f3926940f7b7baf0e3105 ./contracts/MstableGeltVault.sol  
a7a24fb29c5ba1c2dc047f0d7e93687b055dee0baa1e4589db9c1fbededf065e ./contracts/TemporarilyPausable.sol  
ac05c8ad3572b0ea0915c6a14b1ca5b9ff4b29ff897d1f59cc8263b7f939bfcf ./contracts/lib/ECRecover.sol  
2ee5c80c3b55c0f480423811f2cd096990363210b09c6fc68ede967caf7d3a43 ./contracts/lib/EIP712.sol  
347d51b8e1286d839c0624e4c4dcea32071b0f2958613f7065851a860c74d20e ./contracts/lib/EIP712Domain.sol  
9b7ff415f33067eb1ed2a3b5a0b479caf5cc7c40ff034027daea025c14581a8 ./contracts/lib/FixedPointMath.sol  
06cf19b1c38e3d0087782505afb031ab78a93cc863e16c011190855d69279f68 ./contracts/lib/PercentageMath.sol

### Tests

acb5e5e189c586b0c023b5525263608abc2329e3dcd7c283444a08622e93c3da ./tests/utils/meta-transactions.ts  
c483a457931693d60c54bb3425c4e3791e8c6fd8efb338d49343fcd71894e077 ./tests/utils/network.ts  
0aa341a935e98b6b7e744dd4955a3c5a3fc791b6261934f04b1961c08d02a25a ./tests/utils/amount.ts  
13a59b938f242f953a450a7cab0290cc5006bd09eb397826285d9a44b16d459f ./tests/utils/fixtures.ts  
236c98b99f7345c457b3456d933497729049ccb84196bc7463c89a9f646c3217 ./tests/utils/eip712/ecdsa-signature.ts  
740875ddb19a6f5cfe0b98de5adda451d14db1ec03df8f779be59d8d2925f022 ./tests/utils/eip712/eip712-type.ts  
381bd8d0ed0b491f6d909189aaf4437807d0deda69be107eb20a5be03771fc31 ./tests/utils/eip712/eip712.ts  
44c42cf33f81bcef3cba9b31e1da0f3f4c239f8b08e6b8074ff64c3aeafe4f95 ./tests/utils/eip712/field-type.ts  
c08a7666391ca4b7d632a203ad636dcc81cfc72a708b50b47595b85dc2c9a283 ./tests/utils/eip712/index.ts  
29574a046feb2606308772f1e1adfb219e4f16b49064b7a66180c635908f5443 ./tests/utils/eip712/eip712-types/index.ts  
66eea3d9e0b3814c30e006d97749d71b308838a9bb75f988d1c0ee64928b1acf ./tests/utils/eip712/eip712-types/mint-with-authorization.ts  
3f84e59dade3a192cd0ccafe616372e6f834fadf1ac68cb919f2a97614feeab6 ./tests/utils/eip712/eip712-types/redeem-with-authorization.ts  
421e253955bb1654d289c58ac112b4c55cdf3df51feb0ea7c2beb57ee97d2aab ./tests/unit/gelt-vault-upgrades.spec.ts  
76f4ae5e141c86559ba89361e804addcc8d2ecf1c7cc5b1e73a19f1fb581b9b2 ./tests/unit/mock-vault.spec.ts  
dc5483824189ed686b5ead0e6cada9334323285d6d7f343b08c6ddde6efc20ab ./tests/unit/gelt-vault-access-control.spec.ts  
c150b4d3bc9da80e533e30feb78a92af6c06e54bcbfe23a5b09d8c60202c9122 ./tests/unit/gelt-vault-utils.spec.ts  
21dafbe641b2dda79e986ccdf4093b704c15d6e6110168702de2e5cb1473a6d2 ./tests/unit/gelt-vault.spec.ts  
75a84c5d97b1446362f5b17f789022b0d1700ddc31b46af38bea12217b4ccf15 ./tests/unit/mocks/mock-vault.ts  
f8b843c13fcb8f6033e874584877f52491a22c948f2b145067ecd442c2bc9269 ./tests/scenario/gelt-vault-scenarios.spec.ts  
d23b99c635986730e2e3f24f705a58c3f65b99e7f5f74ceb75cecbf65c254ef0 ./tests/integration/gelt-vault-execute-strategy.spec.ts  
90a32dd3112bbce7a9d0727fc3e961a8004f479fc0c3c9485c67f5d02f329892 ./tests/integration/integration-test-context.ts  
1ea20e50aa451ffad895706bbd63ded397041c70ae83132fb6303cc7f750737a ./tests/integration/gelt-vault-exit.spec.ts  
8b920e8df701d6201f9b07485f4b956c12804f761b5b58bb1a405064c59d988f ./tests/integration/gelt-vault-rewards.spec.ts  
d907a67a70ce54229018659c9e1cb56d8657636c8fdce5f732db2c6cc18b1128 ./tests/functional/functional-test-context.ts  
31ffa865c5281cb9da99985346962a218fbe573312ad7c6a000ce306a1c1122b ./tests/functional/gelt-vault.spec.ts

## Changelog

- 2022-01-28 - Initial report
- 2022-02-10 - Reaudit report

# About Quantstamp

Quantstamp is a Y Combinator-backed company that helps to secure blockchain platforms at scale using computer-aided reasoning tools, with a mission to help boost the adoption of this exponentially growing technology.

With over 1000 Google scholar citations and numerous published papers, Quantstamp’s team has decades of combined experience in formal verification, static analysis, and software verification. Quantstamp has also developed a protocol to help smart contract developers and projects worldwide to perform cost-effective smart contract security scans.

To date, Quantstamp has protected \$5B in digital asset risk from hackers and assisted dozens of blockchain projects globally through its white glove security assessment services. As an evangelist of the blockchain ecosystem, Quantstamp assists core infrastructure projects and leading community initiatives such as the Ethereum Community Fund to expedite the adoption of blockchain technology.

Quantstamp's collaborations with leading academic institutions such as the National University of Singapore and MIT (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) reflect our commitment to research, development, and enabling world-class blockchain security.

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