



Cere - Solidity Bridge

Smart Contract Security Audit

Prepared by: Halborn

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Visit: Halborn.com

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EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Cerebellum Network engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their smart contracts beginning on February 7th, 2022 and ending on February 17th, 2022. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided in the GitHub repository [Cerebellum-Network/chainbridge-solidity/](https://github.com/Cerebellum-Network/chainbridge-solidity/).

1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided two weeks for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to audit the security of the smart contract. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn identified some security risks that were mostly accepted by Cerebellum Network team.

The most critical was in **Bridge** contract. The `_relayerThreshold` state variable records the minimum number of votes needed before a proposal could be executed by a relayer. On the other hand, in the constructor, there was not a minimum threshold for the amount of relayers. The Cerebellum Network team fixed the issue by setting the threshold to 2 and setting up 4 relayers.

1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the bridge code and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose
- Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough
- Graphing out functionality and contract logic/connectivity/functions ([solgraph](#))
- Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes
- Manual testing by custom scripts
- Scanning of solidity files for vulnerabilities, security hotspots or bugs. ([MythX](#))
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions. ([Slither](#))
- Testnet deployment ([Brownie](#), [Remix IDE](#))

RISK METHODOLOGY:

Vulnerabilities or issues observed by Halborn are ranked based on the risk assessment methodology by measuring the **LIKELIHOOD** of a security incident and the **IMPACT** should an incident occur. This framework works for communicating the characteristics and impacts of technology vulnerabilities. The quantitative model ensures repeatable and accurate measurement while enabling users to see the underlying vulnerability characteristics that were used to generate the Risk scores. For every vulnerability, a risk level will be calculated on a scale of **5** to **1** with **5** being the highest likelihood or impact.

RISK SCALE - LIKELIHOOD

- 5 - Almost certain an incident will occur.
- 4 - High probability of an incident occurring.
- 3 - Potential of a security incident in the long term.
- 2 - Low probability of an incident occurring.
- 1 - Very unlikely issue will cause an incident.

RISK SCALE - IMPACT

- 5 - May cause devastating and unrecoverable impact or loss.
- 4 - May cause a significant level of impact or loss.
- 3 - May cause a partial impact or loss to many.
- 2 - May cause temporary impact or loss.
- 1 - May cause minimal or un-noticeable impact.

The risk level is then calculated using a sum of these two values, creating a value of **10** to **1** with **10** being the highest level of security risk.

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
----------	------	--------	-----	---------------

- 10** - CRITICAL
- 9 - 8** - HIGH
- 7 - 6** - MEDIUM
- 5 - 4** - LOW
- 3 - 1** - VERY LOW AND INFORMATIONAL

1.4 SCOPE

IN-SCOPE:

The security assessment was scoped to the following smart contracts:

- ERC20Handler.sol
- ERC721Handler.sol
- GenericHandler.sol
- HandlerHelpers.sol
- Whitelist.sol
- Bridge.sol
- ERC20Safe.sol
- ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.sol
- ERC721Safe.sol

Commit ID: [c1f040684391604638141c9bb3b719ec92942513](#)

2. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW

CRITICAL	HIGH	MEDIUM	LOW	INFORMATIONAL
0	0	1	3	6

LIKELIHOOD

IMPACT


	(HAL-01)			
(HAL-02) (HAL-03)				
		(HAL-04)		
(HAL-05) (HAL-06) (HAL-07) (HAL-08) (HAL-09) (HAL-10)				

EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

SECURITY ANALYSIS	RISK LEVEL	REMEDIATION DATE
HAL01 - LACK OF MINIMUM THRESHOLD FOR INITIALRELAYERS/RELAYERTHRESHOLD	Medium	SOLVED - 02/22/2022
HAL02 - LACK OF LIQUIDITY LOSS PROTECTION	Low	RISK ACCEPTED
HAL03 - ERC20SAFE.SAFECALL DOES NOT VERIFY THAT THE TOKEN ADDRESS IS A CONTRACT	Low	RISK ACCEPTED
HAL04 - MISSING ZERO ADDRESS CHECKS	Low	RISK ACCEPTED
HAL05 - WRONG INFORMATION DISPLAYED IN THE DEPOSIT RECORD WHEN SUPPLYING TRANSFER-ON-FEE OR DEFILATIONARY TOKENS	Informational	ACKNOWLEDGED
HAL06 - USE OF TRANSFER INSTEAD OF CALL TO TRANSFER ETHER	Informational	ACKNOWLEDGED
HAL07 - USING ++I CONSUMES LESS GAS THAN I++ IN LOOPS	Informational	ACKNOWLEDGED
HAL08 - UNNEEDED INITIALIZATION OF UINT256 VARIABLES TO 0	Informational	ACKNOWLEDGED
HAL09 - POSSIBLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS	Informational	ACKNOWLEDGED
HAL10 - UNUSED IMPORTS	Informational	ACKNOWLEDGED



FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS



3.1 (HAL-01) LACK OF MINIMUM THRESHOLD FOR INITIALRELAYERS/RELAYERTHRESHOLD - MEDIUM

Description:

In the contract `Bridge`, the `_relayerThreshold` state variable records the minimum number of votes needed before a proposal can be executed by a relayer. On the other hand, in the constructor, there is not a minimum threshold for the amount of relayers.

Halborn suggests setting a minimum of 2 for the `_relayerThreshold` and a minimum of 3 `initialRelayers`. This way, 2 different relayer votes will be needed before a proposal is executed. In case a relayer is compromised, the other 2 relayers will be able to mitigate his actions.

Furthermore, if a relayer is down, the other 2 relayers will be able to vote for the proposal and get it executed.

If there was just one relayer, and this relayer was down, users would never receive their funds in the destination chain.

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 2

Impact - 4

Recommendation:

It is recommended to set a minimum of 2 for the `_relayerThreshold` and a minimum of 3 `initialRelayers` to maintain redundancy in the system.

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

Remediation Plan:

SOLVED: The Cerebellum Network team fixed the issue by setting the threshold to 2 and setting up 4 relayers.

3.2 (HAL-02) LACK OF LIQUIDITY LOSS PROTECTION - LOW

Description:

In the contract `Bridge` the function `adminWithdraw()` allows the admin to withdraw any fund stored in the different handler contracts. A malicious admin could use this function to perform a rug pull in all the handlers.

Code location:

Listing 1: Bridge.sol (Line 283)

```
276 function adminWithdraw(
277     address handlerAddress,
278     address tokenAddress,
279     address recipient,
280     uint256 amountOrTokenID
281 ) external onlyAdmin {
282     IERCHandler handler = IERCHandler(handlerAddress);
283     handler.withdraw(tokenAddress, recipient, amountOrTokenID);
284 }
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

The `adminWithdraw` function allows the owner of the system to withdraw all the assets from the different handlers. The owner should be limited to the minimum operations possible. These functionalities should be split between multiple role based users with multi-signature wallets for each one. If possible, it is recommended to remove this function. If not, it is recommended to at least use a multisig wallet as the Admin wallet

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

adding also a Timelock.

Remediation Plan:

RISK ACCEPTED: The Cerebellum Network team accepts this risk as they use a multi-signature wallet to manage the admin wallet.

3.3 (HAL-03) ERC20SAFE.SAFECALL DOES NOT VERIFY THAT THE TOKEN ADDRESS IS A CONTRACT - LOW

Description:

In the contract `ERC20Safe` the function `_safeCall()` is used to perform all the token transfers:

Listing 2: ERC20Safe.sol

This function does not verify that the `token` address passed as a parameter is actually a contract allowing, as can be seen below, to perform a transfer using the zero address as the `token` parameter:

This was recently exploited in the Qubit Finance's bridge.

The likelihood of this exploit is very low as the `token` used in the deposits must pass this check:

```
require(_contractWhitelist[tokenAddress], "provided tokenAddress is not whitelisted");
```

This scenario would only become real if an admin called `Bridge.adminSetResource` with an invalid/wrong `tokenAddress`.

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 3

Recommendation:

It is recommended to follow OpenZeppelin's approach and check in the `_safeCall()` function that the `token` address is a contract address. To achieve that, the function `functionCall()` instead of `call()` from OpenZeppelin's `Address.sol` contract can be used.

Also another possible addition would be checking the balance before and after the asset transfer to ensure that the number of the transferred asset complies the expectation.

Remediation Plan:

RISK ACCEPTED: The Cerebellum Network team accepts the risk of this finding.

3.4 (HAL-04) MISSING ZERO ADDRESS CHECKS - LOW

Description:

Multiple contracts are missing address validation in their constructors. Every address should be validated and checked that is different from zero.

Code location:

`ERC20Handler.sol`

- Line 38: `address bridgeAddress`
- Line 40: `address[] memory initialContractAddresses`

`ERC721Handler.sol`

- Line 49: `address bridgeAddress`
- Line 51: `address[] memory initialContractAddresses`
- Line 52: `address[] memory burnableContractAddresses`

`GenericHandler.sol`

- Line 66: `address bridgeAddress`
- Line 68: `address[] memory initialContractAddresses`

`Bridge.sol`

- Line 110: `address[] memory initialRelayers`
- Line 141: `grantRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, newAdmin);`
- Line 180: `grantRole(RELAYER_ROLE, relayerAddress);`
- Line 207: `_resourceIDToHandlerAddress[resourceID] = handlerAddress;`
- Line 227: `_resourceIDToHandlerAddress[resourceID] = handlerAddress;`

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 3

Impact - 2

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

Recommendation:

It is recommended to validate that every address input is different from zero.

Remediation Plan:

RISK ACCEPTED: The Cerebellum Network team accepts the risk of this finding.

3.5 (HAL-05) WRONG INFORMATION DISPLAYED IN THE DEPOSIT RECORD WHEN SUPPLYING TRANSFER-ON-FEE OR DEFLATIONARY TOKENS - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In the contract `ERC20Handler.sol`, the `deposit` function assumes that the total amount of tokens that will be locked in the smart contract after calling `lockERC20(tokenAddress, depositer, address(this), amount)`; is equal to the `amount` parameter (and thus it creates a `depositRecord` accordingly).

Listing 3: ERC20Handler.sol - deposit (Lines 111,120)

```
82     function deposit(
83         bytes32 resourceID,
84         uint8 destinationChainID,
85         uint64 depositNonce,
86         address depositer,
87         bytes calldata data
88     ) external override onlyBridge {
89         bytes memory recipientAddress;
90         uint256 amount;
91         uint256 lenRecipientAddress;
92
93         assembly {
94
95             amount := calldataload(0xC4)
96
97             recipientAddress := mload(0x40)
98             lenRecipientAddress := calldataload(0xE4)
99             mstore(0x40, add(0x20, add(recipientAddress,
100                lenRecipientAddress)))
101             calldatacopy(
```

```
102             recipientAddress, // copy to
103            (destinationRecipientAddress
104              0xE4, // copy from calldata @ 0x104
105              sub(calldatasize(), 0xE) // copy size (
106              calldatasize - 0x104)
107            )
108         }
109
110         address tokenAddress = _resourceIDToTokenContractAddress[
111           resourceID];
112         require(_contractWhitelist[tokenAddress], "provided
113           tokenAddress is not whitelisted");
114
115         lockERC20(tokenAddress, depositer, address(this), amount);
116
117         _depositRecords[destinationChainID][depositNonce] =
118           DepositRecord(
119             tokenAddress,
120             uint8(lenRecipientAddress),
121             destinationChainID,
122             resourceID,
123             recipientAddress,
124             depositer,
125             amount
126           );
127     }
```

However, this may not be true if the `tokenAddress` is a transfer-on-fee token or a deflationary/rebasing token, causing the received amount to be less than the accounted amount in `depositRecord`.

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to get the actual received amount by calculating the difference of token balance before and after the transfers.

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The Cerebellum Network team claims that Bridge uses only the CERE token. The CERE token is not a transfer-on-fee or a deflationary token.

3.6 (HAL-06) USE OF TRANSFER INSTEAD OF CALL TO TRANSFER ETHER - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In the contract `Bridge`, the `transferFunds` function uses `address.transfer()` to transfer Ether to a set of addresses. Any smart contract that uses `transfer()` or `send()` is taking a hard dependency on gas costs by forwarding a fixed amount of gas: `2300`.

Since its introduction, `transfer()` has typically been recommended by the security community because it helps guard against reentrancy attacks. This guidance made sense under the assumption that gas costs wouldn't change, but that assumption turned out to be incorrect. As gas costs are subject to change, then smart contracts can't depend on any particular gas costs, that's why `transfer()` and `send()` should be avoided. `call()` should be used instead.

Code Location:

Listing 4: Bridge.sol (Line 429)

```
427     function transferFunds(address payable[] calldata addrs, uint
428         [] calldata amounts) external onlyAdmin {
429         for (uint i = 0; i < addrs.length; i++) {
430             addrs[i].transfer(amounts[i]);
431         }
432     }
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

Recommendation:

It is recommended to use `call()` instead of `transfer()` to transfer Ether.

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The Cerebellum Network team acknowledged this finding.

3.7 (HAL-07) USING `++I` CONSUMES LESS GAS THAN `I++` IN LOOPS - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In the loop below, the variable `i` is incremented using `++i`. It is known that, in loops, using `++i` costs less gas per iteration than `i++`.

Code Location:

`ERC20Handler.sol`

- Line 47: `for (uint256 i = 0; i < initialResourceIDs.length; i++){`

`ERC721Handler.sol`

- Line 59: `for (uint256 i = 0; i < initialResourceIDs.length; i++){`

- Line 63:

```
for (uint256 i = 0; i < burnableContractAddresses.length; i++){
```

`GenericHandler.sol`

- Line 83: `for (uint256 i = 0; i < initialResourceIDs.length; i++){`

`Bridge.sol`

- Line 120: `for (uint i; i < initialRelayers.length; i++){`

- Line 122: `_totalRelayers++;`

- Line 428: `for (uint i = 0; i < addrs.length; i++){`

Proof of Concept:

For example, based in the following test contract:

`Listing 5: Test.sol`

```
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2 pragma solidity 0.8.9;
3
```

```

4 contract test {
5     function postincrement(uint256 iterations) public {
6         for (uint256 i = 0; i < iterations; i++) {
7     }
8     }
9     function preincrement(uint256 iterations) public {
10    for (uint256 i = 0; i < iterations; ++i) {
11    }
12   }
13 }
```

```

>>> test_contract.postincrement(1)
Transaction sent: 0xlecede6b109b707786d3685bd71dd9f22dc389957653036ca04c4cd2e72c5e0b
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 44
test.postincrement confirmed Block: 13622335 Gas used: 21620 (0.32%)

<Transaction '0xlecede6b109b707786d3685bd71dd9f22dc389957653036ca04c4cd2e72c5e0b'>
>>> test_contract.preincrement(1)
Transaction sent: 0x205f09a4d2268de4cla40f35bb2ec2847bf2ab8d584909b42c7la022b047614a
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 45
test.preincrement confirmed Block: 13622336 Gas used: 21593 (0.32%)

<Transaction '0x205f09a4d2268de4cla40f35bb2ec2847bf2ab8d584909b42c7la022b047614a'>
>>> test_contract.postincrement(10)
Transaction sent: 0x98c04430526a59balcf947c114b62666a4417165947d31bf300cd6ae68328033
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 46
test.postincrement confirmed Block: 13622337 Gas used: 22673 (0.34%)

<Transaction '0x98c04430526a59balcf947c114b62666a4417165947d31bf300cd6ae68328033'>
>>> test_contract.preincrement(10)
Transaction sent: 0xf060d04714eff8482a828342414d5a20be9958c822d42860e7992aba20e1de05
Gas price: 0.0 gwei Gas limit: 6721975 Nonce: 47
test.preincrement confirmed Block: 13622338 Gas used: 22601 (0.34%)

<Transaction '0xf060d04714eff8482a828342414d5a20be9958c822d42860e7992aba20e1de05'>
```

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to use `++i` instead of `i++` to increment the value of an `uint` variable inside a loop. This does not only apply to the iterator variable. It also applies to variables declared inside the loop code block.

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The Cerebellum Network team acknowledged this finding.

3.8 (HAL-08) UNNEEDED INITIALIZATION OF UINT256 VARIABLES TO 0 - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

As `i` is an `uint256`, it is already initialized to `0`. `uint256 i = 0` reassigned the `0` to `i` which wastes gas.

Code Location:

`ERC20Handler.sol`

- Line 47: `for (uint256 i = 0; i < initialResourceIDs.length; i++){`

`ERC721Handler.sol`

- Line 59: `for (uint256 i = 0; i < initialResourceIDs.length; i++){`

- Line 63:

`for (uint256 i = 0; i < burnableContractAddresses.length; i++){`

`GenericHandler.sol`

- Line 83: `for (uint256 i = 0; i < initialResourceIDs.length; i++){`

`Bridge.sol`

- Line 428: `for (uint i = 0; i < addrs.length; i++){`

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to not initialize `uint256` variables to `0` to save some gas. For example, use instead:

`for (uint256 i; i < initialResourceIDs.length; ++i){.`

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The Cerebellum Network team acknowledged this finding.

3.9 (HAL-09) POSSIBLE MISUSE OF PUBLIC FUNCTIONS - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In the following contracts there are functions marked as `public` but they are never directly called within the same contract or in any of their descendants:

`ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.sol`

- `mint()` (`ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.sol#44-49`)
- `pause()` (`ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.sol#60-63`)
- `unpause()` (`ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.sol#74-77`)

`ERC721Safe.sol`

- `fundERC721()` (`ERC721Safe.sol#21-24`)

`ERC20Safe.sol`

- `fundERC20()` (`ERC20Safe.sol#20-23`)

`Bridge.sol`

- `cancelProposal()` (`Bridge.sol#380-390`)

`Whitelist.sol`

- `enableWhitelist()` (`Whitelist.sol#69-73`)
- `disableWhitelist()` (`Whitelist.sol#80-84`)
- `removeFromWhitelist()` (`Whitelist.sol#112-116`)
- `addToWhitelist()` (`Whitelist.sol#100-104`)

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

If the functions are not intended to be called internally or by their descendants, it is better to mark all of these functions as `external` to reduce gas costs.

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The Cerebellum Network team acknowledged this finding.

3.10 (HAL-10) UNUSED IMPORTS - INFORMATIONAL

Description:

In the contracts `ERC20Safe` and `ERC721Safe` `SafeMath.sol` is imported, but it is not used anywhere in the code.

Code location:

Listing 6: ERC20Safe.sol (Lines 3,12)

```
3 import "@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol";
4 import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol";
5
6 /**
7     @title Manages deposited ERC20s.
8     @author ChainSafe Systems.
9     @notice This contract is intended to be used with ERC20Handler
10    ↳ contract.
11 */
12 contract ERC20Safe {
13     using SafeMath for uint256;
```

Listing 7: ERC721Safe.sol (Lines 3,13)

```
3 import "@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol";
4 import "@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/IERC721.sol";
5 import "./ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.sol";
6
7 /**
8     @title Manages deposited ERC721s.
9     @author ChainSafe Systems.
10    @notice This contract is intended to be used with
11    ↳ ERC721Handler contract.
12 */
13 contract ERC721Safe {
14     using SafeMath for uint256;
```

FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 1

Recommendation:

It is recommended to remove the unused imports to reduce the gas deployment costs.

Remediation Plan:

ACKNOWLEDGED: The Cerebellum Network team acknowledges this finding.

MANUAL TESTING

Halborn performed different manual tests in the contracts, trying to reproduce the flow described in the [Chainbridge documentation](#):

4.1 ERC20HANDLER: AS SOURCE CHAIN

1. Some user calls the deposit function on the bridge contract. A depositRecord is created on the bridge and a call is delegated to a handler contract, in this test `ERC20Handler` which is specified by the provided resourceId.
 2. The specified handler's deposit function validates the parameters provided by the user. If successful, a depositRecord is created on the handler.
 3. If the call delegated to the handler is successful, the bridge emits a Deposit event.
 4. Relayers parse the Deposit event and retrieve the associated DepositRecord from the handler to construct a message.

No major issues were found in this flow:

- `depositor` address will usually have to be whitelisted by an Admin. Although this functionality can be removed and it is possible that users can deposit without being whitelisted.

- The handler addresses are only set by admins.
- There is a require check in the line 298 of the `Bridge` contract that checks that the handler is set.
- The `ERC20Handler` contract checks that the `tokenAddress` is whitelisted. This is critical for the security of the bridge.
- There is no way to tamper with the calldata passed to the `ERC20Handler.deposit()` function.

On the other hand, the `ERC20Handler` contract does not check for deflationary/transfer-on-fee tokens.

4.2 ERC20HANDLER: AS DESTINATION CHAIN

1. A Relayer calls `voteProposal` on the `Bridge` contract. If a proposal corresponding with the parameters passed in does not exist, it is created and the Relayer's vote is recorded. If the proposal already exists, the Relayer's vote is simply recorded.
2. Once we have met some vote threshold for a proposal, in this test 2 votes was the threshold, the `Bridge` emits a `ProposalFinalized` event.
3. Upon seeing a `ProposalFinalized` event, Relayers call the `executeDeposit` function on the `Bridge`. `executeDeposit` delegates a call to a handler contract specified by the associated `resourceID`.
4. The specified handler's `executeDeposit` function validates the parameters provided and makes a call to some contract to complete the transfer.

No issues were found in this flow:

- Only `relayers` can vote or execute proposals.
 - The handler addresses are only set by admins.
 - The `ERC20Handler` contract once again checks that the `tokenAddress` is whitelisted.

4.3 ERC721HANDLER: AS SOURCE CHAIN

No issues were found in this flow:

- `depositor` address will usually have to be whitelisted by an Admin. Although this functionality can be removed and it is possible that users can deposit without being whitelisted.
 - The handler addresses are only set by admins.
 - There is a require check in the line 298 of the `Bridge` contract that checks that the handler is set.
 - The `ERC721Handler` contract checks that the `tokenAddress` is whitelisted. This is critical for the security of the bridge.
 - There is no way to tamper with the calldata passed to the `ERC721Handler.deposit()` function.

4.4 ERC721HANDLER: AS DESTINATION CHAIN

No issues were found in this flow:

- Only `relayers` can vote or execute proposals.
 - The handler addresses are only set by admins.
 - The `ERC721Handler` contract checks that the `tokenAddress` is whitelisted.

4.5 GENERICHANDLER: AS SOURCE CHAIN

No issues were found in this flow.

- `depositor` address will usually have to be whitelisted by an Admin. Although this functionality can be removed and it is possible that users can deposit without being whitelisted.
 - The handler addresses are only set by admins.
 - There is a require check in the line 298 of the `Bridge` contract that checks that the handler is set.
 - The `GenericHandler` contract checks that the `contractAddress` is whitelisted. This is critical for the security of the bridge.

4.6 GENERICHANDLER: AS DESTINATION CHAIN

No issues were found in this flow:

- Only `relayers` can vote or execute proposals.
 - The handler addresses are only set by admins.
 - The `GenericHandler` contract checks that the `contractAddress` is whitelisted.

AUTOMATED TESTING

5.1 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the scoped contracts. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified all the contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their abi and binary formats, Slither was run on the all-scoped contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs across the entire code-base.

Slither results:

ERC20Handler.sol

```

ERC20Handler.constructor(addresses,bytes32[],addressess) ERC20Handler (contracts/handlerz/ERC20Handler.sol#38) lacks a zero-check on :
    - addressess[0].length == 0 (contract/handlerz/ERC20Handler.sol#38)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation

Reentrancy in ERC20Handler.deposit(uint8,uint256,uint256,address,bytes) (contracts/handlerz/ERC20Handler.sol#80-122)
External calls:
    - lockERC20((tokenAddress,depositor,address),amount) (contracts/handlerz/ERC20Handler.sol#11)
        - lockERC20((tokenAddress,depositor,address),call(data)) (contracts/handlerz/ERC20Safe.sol#77)
State variable written after the call(s):
    - depositRecords(destinationChainID) = DepositRecord(tokenAddress,destinationChainID,resourceID,recipientAddress,depositor,amount) (contracts/handlerz/ERC20Handler.sol#113-121)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2

ERC20Handler.deposit(bytes2,int8,uint256,address,bytes) (contracts/handlerz/ERC20Handler.sol#82-122) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (contract/handlerz/ERC20Handler.sol#83-104)
    - INLINE ASM (contract/handlerz/ERC20Handler.sol#134-164) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (contract/handlerz/ERC20Handler.sol#138-151)
    - INLINE ASM (contract/handlerz/ERC20Handler.sol#156-159)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-use

SafeMath.add(uint256,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol#55-59) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.div(uint256,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol#113-118) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.div(uint256,uint256,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol#100-103) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mod(uint256,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol#152-155) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.mul(uint256,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol#101-104) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.sub(uint256,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol#101-104) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.tryAdd(uint256,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol#24-28) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.tryDiv(uint256,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol#40-43) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.tryMod(uint256,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol#44-47) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.tryMul(uint256,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol#48-53) is never used and should be removed
SafeMath.trySub(uint256,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol#35-38) is never used and should be removed
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#read-code

Pragma version=0.6.0+0.8 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/math/SafeMath.sol#83) is too complex
Pragma version=0.6.0+0.8 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol#83) is too complex
Pragma version=0.6.0+0.8 (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol#107-108) is too complex
Pragma version=0.6.0+0.8 (contracts/handlerz/ERC20Handler.sol#1) is too complex
Pragma version=0.6.0+0.8 (contracts/handlerz/HandlerHelpers.sol#1) is too complex
Pragma version=0.6.0+0.8 (contracts/handlerz/HandlerHelpers.sol#2) is too complex
Pragma version=0.6.0+0.8 (contracts/interfacez/IErc20Handler.sol#1) is too complex
Pragma version=0.6.0+0.8 (contracts/interfacez/IErc20Handler.sol#4) is too complex
safe-0.6.8 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Low level call in ERC20Safe._safeCall(ERC20,bytes) (contracts/ERC20Safe.sol#76-84)
External calls:
    - safeCall((token,callData)) (contracts/ERC20Safe.sol#77)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls

Variable ERC20Handler._depositRecords (contracts/handlerz/ERC20Handler.sol#42) is not in mixedCase
Variable HandlerHelpers._bridgeAddress (contracts/handlerz/HandlerHelpers.sol#11) is not in mixedCase
Variable HandlerHelpers._resourceIDToTokenContractAddress (contracts/handlerz/HandlerHelpers.sol#14) is not in mixedCase
Variable HandlerHelpers._tokenContractAddressToResourceID (contracts/handlerz/HandlerHelpers.sol#15) is not in mixedCase
Variable HandlerHelpers._contractWhitelist (contracts/handlerz/HandlerHelpers.sol#20) is not in mixedCase
Variable HandlerHelpers._burnList (contracts/handlerz/HandlerHelpers.sol#23) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

funcERC20(addresses,address,uint256) should be declared external:
    - ERC20Data,funcERC20(addresses,address,uint256) (contracts/ERC20Safe.sol#20-23)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external

```

ERC721Handler.sol

```

ERC721._mint(addresses,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#333-344) ignores return value by _holderTokens[to].add(tokenId) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#339)
ERC721._mint(addresses,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#333-344) ignores return value by _tokenOwners.set(tokenId,to) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#341)
ERC721._burn(uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#336-344) ignores return value by _holderTokens[tokenId].remove() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#349)
ERC721._burn(uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#336-344) ignores return value by _tokenOwners.remove(tokenId) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#351)
ERC721._transfer(address,address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#387-402) ignores return value by _holderTokens[from].remove(tokenId) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#389)
ERC721._transfer(address,address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#387-402) ignores return value by _holderTokens[to].add(tokenId) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#390)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#unused-return

ERC721MinerBurnerFauser.constructor(string,string,string,_name) (contracts/ERC721MinerBurnerFauser.sol#24) shadows:
    - ERC721._name() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#121-123) (function)
    - ERC721MinerBurnerFauser.constructor(string,string,string,_symbol) (contracts/ERC721MinerBurnerFauser.sol#24) shadows:
        - ERC721._symbol() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#128-130) (function)
    - ERC721MinerBurnerFauser.constructor(string,string,string,_baseURI) (contracts/ERC721MinerBurnerFauser.sol#24) shadows:
        - ERC721._baseURI() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#158-160) (function)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing

ERC721Handler.constructor(address,bytes32[],address[]) _bridgeAddress (contracts/handlerz/ERC721Handler.sol#49) lacks a zero-check on :
    - _bridgeAddress = bridgeAddress (contracts/handlerz/ERC721Handler.sol#57)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#missing-zero-address-validation

```


ERC20Safe.sol

AUTOMATED TESTING

```
Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#53-59):
  - (success = recipient.call{value: amount}()) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#57)
Low level call in Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#114-121):
  - (success = target.delegatecall(data)) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#115)
Low level call in Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#139-145):
  - (success,returnData) = target.staticcall(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#143-149)
Low level call in Address.functionCreateWithValue(string,bytes,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#163-169):
  - (success,returnData) = target.delegatecall(data) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol#167)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls

Parameter ERC721.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256,bytes).data (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#245) is not in mixedCase
Parameter ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.mint(address,uint256,string).data (contract/ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.sol#46) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

Redundant expression: "this" (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Context.sol#11) is in Context (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/Context.sol#15-24)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-expressions

getRoleMemberCount(bytes32) should be declared external;
  - AccessControl.getRoleMemberCount(bytes32,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccesControl.sol#95-97)
getRoleMember(bytes32,bytes32) should be declared external;
  - AccessControl.getRoleMember(bytes32,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccesControl.sol#111-113)
getRoleMember(bytes32,bytes32,bytes32) should be declared external;
  - AccessControl.getRoleMember(bytes32) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccesControl.sol#121-123)
grantRole(bytes32,address) should be declared external;
  - AccessControl.grantRole(bytes32,address) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccesControl.sol#135-139)
revokeRole(bytes32,address) should be declared external;
  - AccessControl.revokeRole(bytes32,address) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccesControl.sol#150-154)
renounceRole(bytes32,address) should be declared external;
  - AccessControl.renounceRole(bytes32,address) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccesControl.sol#170-174)
supportsInterface(bytes4) should be declared external;
  - ERC165.supportsInterface(bytes4) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/introspection/ERC165.sol#35-37)
BalanceOf(address) should be declared external;
  - ERC721.balanceOf(address) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#106-109)
name() should be declared external;
  - ERC721.name() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#121-123)
symbol() should be declared external;
  - ERC721.symbol() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#128-130)
tokenURI(uint256) should be declared external;
  - ERC721.tokenURI(uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#135-151)
tokenOfOwnerByIndex(address,uint256) should be declared external;
  - ERC721.tokenOfOwnerByIndex(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#165-167)
totalSupply() should be declared external;
  - ERC721.totalSupply() (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#172-175)
tokenByIndex(uint256) should be declared external;
  - ERC721.tokenByIndex(uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#180-183)
approve(address,uint256) should be declared external;
  - ERC721.approve(address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#189-197)
setApprovalForAll(address,bool) should be declared external;
  - ERC721.setApprovalForAll(address,bool) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#211-216)
transferFrom(address,address,uint256) should be declared external;
  - ERC721.transferFrom(address,address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#228-233)
safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256) should be declared external;
  - ERC721.safeTransferFrom(address,address,uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721.sol#238-240)
burn(uint256) should be declared external;
  - ERC721.burn(uint256) (node_modules/@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/ERC721Burnable.sol#20-24)
mint(address,uint256,string) should be declared external;
  - ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.mint(address,uint256,string) (contracts/ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.sol#44-49)
pause() should be declared external;
  - ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.pause() (contracts/ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.sol#60-63)
unpause() should be declared external;
  - ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.unpause() (contracts/ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.sol#74-77)
funcERC721(address,address,uint256) should be declared external;

  - ERC721Safe.fundERC721(address,address,uint256) (contracts/ERC721Safe.sol#21-24)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#public-function-that-could-be-declared-external
```

- The reentrancies and the uninitialized state variables flagged by Slither are false positives. No major issues were found by Slither.

5.2 AUTOMATED SECURITY SCAN

Description:

Halborn used automated security scanners to assist with detection of well-known security issues, and to identify low-hanging fruits on the targets for this engagement. Among the tools used was MythX, a security analysis service for Ethereum smart contracts. MythX performed a scan on all the contracts and sent the compiled results to the analyzers to locate any vulnerabilities.

MythX results:

ERC20Handler.sol

Report for contracts/handlers/ERC20Handler.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/581af3ef-000b-431f-811f-b1ec610e7426>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
13	(SWC-123) RequirementViolation	Low	Requirement violation.
113	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	Read of persistent state following external call.

ERC721Handler.sol

Report for contracts/handlers/ERC721Handler.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/387b0a42-130e-4720-ba92-067a015fb2fb>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

GenericHandler.sol

Report for handlers/GenericHandler.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/a3146d6d-064e-471d-8215-8c6f61fd5d56>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
173	(SWC-107) Reentrancy	Low	Read of persistent state following external call.

HandlerHelpers.sol

Report for handlers/HandlerHelpers.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/36e575bb-cc7e-4631-b9bf-b9116ebd7b5b>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Whitelist.sol

Report for contracts/utils/Whitelist.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/414e8e7d-2bbd-44cb-a316-107534575c43>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
3	(SWC-103) FloatingPragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

Bridge.sol

Report for contracts/Bridge.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/a79953f9-8609-4af0-8b8d-e4cd6e7e2645>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
17	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.
209	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.
337	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomness.
343	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomness.
385	(SWC-120) Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	Low	Potential use of "block.number" as source of randomness.
429	(SWC-113) DoS with Failed Call	Medium	Multiple calls are executed in the same transaction.

ERC20Safe.sol

Report for contracts/ERC20Safe.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/f303d09a-6d25-460f-bd32-047e6433d22f>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.
11	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.
77	(SWC-123) Requirement Violation	Low	Requirement violation.

ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.sol

Report for contracts/ERC721MinterBurnerPauser.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/5df258b5-90dc-4d86-9183-2b97ec12d705>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

ERC721Safe.sol

Report for contracts/ERC721Safe.sol
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/f9c240b8-ea5d-42f2-9eb2-63497be550f2>

Line	SWC Title	Severity	Short Description
1	(SWC-103) Floating Pragma	Low	A floating pragma is set.

- The floating pragma is correctly flagged, although it is set to the 0.7.6 version in the `truffle-config.js` file.
- The reentrancies flagged by MythX are false positives.
- `block.number` is not used as a source of randomness in any of the smart contracts.
- No major issues were found by MythX.

THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING
HALBORN