


# Worm Charming

Harvesting Malware Lures for Fun and Profit

Pedram Amini, InQuest.net



# Who I be.



- Origins: NYC born, self taught in the 90's through SoftICE & phreaking.
- Research: iDEFENSE VCP 2002-2005, TippingPoint ZDI 2005-2010.
- Share: OpenRCE.org, PaiMei, Sulley, Fuzzing (book).
- Build: Jumpshot 2010-2014, InQuest 2014+
- Pitch: Deep File Inspection, Retrohunting, SOC Automation.



# Worm Charming

Competitive sport in East Texas,  
real-world skill for attracting  
earthworms from the ground  
through some form of vibration.



# Agenda

What kind of lures do we want?

Where do we find these lures?

How can we dissect them?


Which are interesting?



# Prolific Malware Carriers

- Typical carriers include: PDF, Office, Java, Flash, scripts in archives, etc.
- Delivery via e-mail attachment or URL.
- Trivial for attackers to envelope their payloads for obfuscation. Matryoshka capable:  

  - e-mail < ZIP < DOCX < DOC < SWF
- Carrier may contain interpreted code, phishing lure, "freebie" (DDE), or exploit:  
CVE-2017-0199, CVE-2017-8759,  
CVE-2018-4878, CVE-2018-4990.



085be1b8b8f3e90be00f6a3bcea2879f.doc Properties

General Security Custom Details Previous Versions

Property	Value
Description	
Title	TVqQAAMAAAAEAAAA//8AALgAA...
Subject	6FKF///tsgAAADoR4X///+2zAAA...
Tags	FUTBiHXYi/joBjehYkAcOf913OhKK...
Categories	
Comments	

Law and ethics in cyberspace  
Information sharing  
Cyber deterrence/cyber power  
Cybersecurity training and exercises  
Emerging opportunities, risks, threats, and vulnerabilities  
Security practices for government and industry  
Threat countermeasures

THE ARMY CYBER INSTITUTE AT WEST POINT 2012

CCDCOE  
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence Tallinn, Estonia

Technically Co-Sponsored by  
IEEE Computer Society

CyCon U.S. is jointly organized by the Army Cyber Institute at the United States Military Academy and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Tallinn, Estonia.

Disclaimer: The views expressed by authors and speakers presenting at the conference are not those of the United States Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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23 October 2017


CyCon U.S. Website Info Used as Decoy in Malicious Campaign

Information from [CyCon U.S. website](#) has been used in a Word document with an intent to deliver malware. This type of attack, where legitimate information is used to attract the attention of victims, is rather common and normally detected and prevented in information systems with widely used safeguards. However, NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence would like to remind that basic cyber hygiene should be followed in handling information related to trusted and well-known sources.

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
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- CVE-2017-0199, ITW October 2016
  - Microsoft RTF OLELink HTTP(HTA)
- CVE-2017-8759, ITW September 2017
  - Microsoft .NET WSDL code-injection
- CVE-2018-4878, ITW February 2018
  - Adobe Flash DRM use-after-free
- CVE-2018-4990, ITW May 2018
  - Adobe PDF JPEG2k/button double-free




# Where to dig?

- Virus Total Intelligence.
- Hybrid Analysis, Any.Run, etc.
- Crawl(OCs(Twitter/RSS)).
- Mapping actor infrastructure.
- Enterprise e-mail spool.



- Self sourcing IOCs:
  - <https://github.com/InQuest/ThreatIngestor>
  - <https://github.com/InQuest/python-iocextract>
- Most payloads are multi-stage.
- Malware authors must either **pwn** or **own**.
- Pivoting to additional IOCs:
  - registrant > domain > DNS server > IP address
  - SSL cert, tracking IDs, filename patterns, etc...
  - <shodan.io>, <greynoise.io>, <domaintools.com>, <virustotal.com> gratis...



- Self sourcing IOCs:

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## IP Pivots:

- <https://github.com/InQuest/python-iocextract>

- <https://reverseip.domaintools.com/search/?q={ip}>

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  - <https://www.shodan.io/host/{ip}>

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- <https://www.virustotal.com/#/ip-address/{ip}>

- Pivoting to additional IOCs:

- **DNS Pivots:** Registrar > Domain > DNS server > IP address


- <http://whois.domaintools.com/{domain}>

- SSL cert, tracking IDs, filename patterns, etc...

- <https://www.virustotal.com/#/domain/{domain}>

- [shodan.io](#), [greynoise.io](#), [domaintools.com](#),  
[virustotal.com](#) (public)

- We'll dive into worm charming over VTI.



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
- <https://www.virustotal.com/#/domain/{domain}>


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




# VTI: Daily Uploads

~1.2M total < ~1M distinct < ~900k distinct new < ~400k malicious


## File types



# VTI: File Distribution

~400k PDF < ~40k Office < ~15k Java < ~12k Excel ...


```
// any Office document with macros.  
rule macro_hunter  
{  
    strings:  
        $ole_marker      = {D0 CF 11 E0 A1 B1 1A E1}  
        $macro_sheet_h1 = {85 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 01 01}  
        $macro_sheet_h2 = {85 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? 02 01}  
    condition:  
        new_file and (  
            tags contains "macros" or (  
                $ole_marker at 0 and 1 of ($macro_sheet_h*)  
            )  
        )  
    }  
}
```



# Hunt Stats: Office Macros

1/15 through 3/15 < 1000/day on average.

```
// any office document with any AV hits or with embedded ActiveX.  
rule maldoc_hunter  
{  
    strings:  
        $docx_magic = /^\x50\x4B\x03\x04\x14\x00\x06\x00/    Hunt: Maldoc  
        $activex_1  = "word/activeX/activeX1.bin"  
        $activex_2  = "word/activeX/activeX1.xml"  
    condition:  
        new_file and not (uint16be(0x0) == 0x4d5a)  
        and  
        (  
            file_type contains "office" or  
            tags      contains "office" or  
            $docx_magic at 0  
        )  
        and  
        (  
            positives > 0 or  
            all of ($activex*)  
        )  
}
```




# Hunt Stats: Office Documents

1/15 through 3/15 < 500/day on average.

```
// any PDF file with JavaScript.  
rule pdfjs_hunter  
{  
    strings:  
        $pdf_header = "%PDF"  
    condition:  
        new_file and  
        (  
            file_type contains "pdf" or  
            $pdf_header in (0..1024)  
        )  
        and tags contains "js-embedded"  
}
```

Hunt: PDF w/JS




# Hunt Stats: PDF Documents

1/15 through 3/15 < 200/day on average.

```
// any RTF files with any AV hits.  
rule rtf_hunter  
{  
    strings:  
        $magic = "{\\rt"  
    condition:  
        new_file and positives > 0 and  
        (  
            file_type contains "rtf" or  
            tags contains "rtf" or  
            $magic at 0  
        )  
}
```


Hunt: RTF



# Hunt Stats: RTF Documents

1/15 through 3/15 < 250/day on average.


```
// any JAR files with any AV hits.  
rule maljar_hunter  
{  
    condition:  
        new_file and positives > 0 and  
        (  
            tags contains "jar" or  
            tags contains "class" or  
            file_type contains "jar" or  
            file_type contains "class"  
        )  
}
```



# Hunt Stats: Java Files

1/15 through 3/15 < 500/day on average.

```
// any office document with an embedded SWF.  
// note that we disqualify PE files here,  
// due to misclassification.  
rule swfdoc_hunter  
{  
    strings:  
        $a = { 6e db 7c d2 6d ae cf 11 96 b8 44 45 53 54 00 00 }  
        $b = { 57 53 }  
    condition:  
        $a and $b and not (uint16be(0x0) == 0x4d5a)  
}
```



# Hunt Stats: SWF in Document

1/15 through 3/15 < 20/day on average.



# Good Vibrations



- 🕵️ MIME evasions ... "={`\rt" vs "={`\rtf1" ... "%PDF" not at 0.
- 🤑 Burning your 0day via symbols: "shellcode","exploit","heapspray",etc.
- 💣 UTF-8 BOM (Byte Order Mark), dates back to April of 2013.
- 🌽 Chaff ...



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
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# Good Vibrations



- 🕵️ MIME evasions ... "{\rt" vs "{\rtf1" ... "%PDF" not at 0.
- 🤖 Burning your 0day via symbols: "shellcode","exploit","heapspray",etc.
- 💣 UTF-8 BOM (Byte Order Mark), dates back to April of 2013.
- 🌽 Chaff ...
- **February of 2018, RTF Byte-Nibble published by Kaspersky.**
  - *April of 2018, CVE-2018-8174 0day ITW utilizes it.*



# Digging Deeper

- Sandboxed detonation.
- IOC extraction.
- Hunt / pivot crawling.
- Static analysis via OSS.



# 🔨 OSS Primitives: Java 🔨

Jad-Retro

<http://jadretro.sourceforge.net/>

CFR 🏆

<https://www.benf.org/other/cfr/>

JDCore 🏃

<http://java-decompiler.github.io/>

FernFlower

[https://github.com/JetBrains/intelliJ-community/tree/  
master/plugins/java-decompiler/engine](https://github.com/JetBrains/intelliJ-community/tree/master/plugins/java-decompiler/engine)

Procyon

[https://bitbucket.org/mstrobol/procyon/wiki/  
Java%20Decompiler](https://bitbucket.org/mstrobol/procyon/wiki/Java%20Decompiler)



# OSS Primitives: Flash



flasm

<http://flasm.sourceforge.net/>

xxxswf

<https://pypi.org/project/xxxswf/>

FFDec

<https://www.free-decompiler.com/flash/>

SWFDump

<http://www.swftools.org/swfdump.html>

JPEXS

<https://github.com/jindrapetrik/jpexs-decompiler>

 OSS Primitives: PDF 


PDF{id,parser}	<a href="https://blog.didierstevens.com/programs/pdf-tools/"><u>https://blog.didierstevens.com/programs/pdf-tools/</u></a>
PeePDF	<a href="https://github.com/jesparza/peepdf"><u>https://github.com/jesparza/peepdf</u></a>
PDFtoText	<a href="https://pypi.org/project/pdftotext/"><u>https://pypi.org/project/pdftotext/</u></a>
ExifTool	<a href="https://www.sno.phy.queensu.ca/~phil/exiftool/"><u>https://www.sno.phy.queensu.ca/~phil/exiftool/</u></a>



# OSS Primitives: Office



OLEDump	<a href="https://blog.didierstevens.com/programs/oledump-py/">https://blog.didierstevens.com/programs/oledump-py/</a>
OLEFile	<a href="https://www.decalage.info/olefile">https://www.decalage.info/olefile</a>
cat{doc,ppt,xls}	<a href="https://github.com/petewarden/catdoc">https://github.com/petewarden/catdoc</a>
xlsx2csv	<a href="https://github.com/dilshod/xlsx2csv">https://github.com/dilshod/xlsx2csv</a>
docx2txt	<a href="http://docx2txt.sourceforge.net/">http://docx2txt.sourceforge.net/</a>



# Real world examples.

CVE-2017-8759, Microsoft .NET WSDL  
code-injection vulnerability.

CVE-2018-4878, Adobe Flash DRM UAF  
vulnerability.

CVE-2018-8174, Microsoft IE VBScript UAF  
vulnerability.



**SHOW ME WHAT  
YOU GOT!**

# Real world examples.

CVE-2017-8759, Microsoft .NET WSDL  
code-injection vulnerability.

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vulnerability.


CVE-2018-8174, Microsoft IE VBScript UAF  
vulnerability.



# CVE-2018-8174

- Sample initially uploaded to VT on 4/18/2018 from a US based source.
- The campaign launches on 4/25/2018.
- Next uploads don't appear until 5/9 and range from: IN, IT, PH, SA, US.
- KR, DE, FR, CN, and SG follow on 5/10.
- Initial AV detection was good, 16 vendors.
- Worm charming vibration: "\\objupdate", RTF Byte Nibble (from 2/2018)

## Detections Evolution



# CVE-2018-8174


2018-04-18T06:50:30			
Ad-Aware	! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen	Antiy-AVL	! Trojan[Exploit]/RTF.CVE-2017-0199
Arcabit	! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen	Baidu	! Win32.Exploit.CVE-2017-0199.f
BitDefender	! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen	CAT-QuickHeal	! Exp.RTF.CVE-2017-0199.AO
Emsisoft	! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen (B)	eScan	! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen
F-Secure	! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen	GData	! Script.Exploit.CVE-2017-0199.A
Kaspersky	! HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic	MAX	! Malware (ai Score=89)
NANO-Antivirus	! Exploit.Rtf.Heuristic-rtf.dinbqn	TrendMicro	! HEUR_RTFMALFORM
TrendMicro-HouseCall	! Mal_CVE20170199-2	ZoneAlarm	! HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic

# CVE-2018-8174

	2018-04-18T06:50:30	
Ad-Aware		! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen
Arcabit		! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen
BitDefender		! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen ! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen (B) ! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen
Emsisoft		
F-Secure		! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen
Kaspersky		! HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic
NANO-Antivirus		! Exploit.Rtf.Heuristic-rtf.dinbqn
TrendMicro-HouseCall		! Mal CVE20170199-2
Antiy-AVL		
Baidu		! Win32.Exploit.CVE-2017-0199.f
CAT-QuickHeal		! Exp.RTF.CVE-2017-0199.AO
eScan		! Exploit.RTF-ObfsStrm.Gen
GData		! Script.Exploit.CVE-2017-0199.A
MAX		! Malware (ai Score=89)
TrendMicro		! HEUR_RTFMALFORM
ZoneAlarm		! HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic

# CVE-2018-4878

- Sample initially uploaded to VT on 1/22/2018 from South Korea.
- Kaspersky and ZoneAlarm each heuristically identified the SWF 0day.
- @issuemakerslab discovers the 0day in-the-wild and publicizes on 2/1.
- Later, we see uploads from the US and detection jumps to 9 vendors.
- More uploads on 2/2 from SG, RU, and JP.
- By 2/5 20 vendors have proper detection.
- Worm charming vibration: RTF w/SWF, SWF exits on debugger detection.



Simon Choi  
@issuemakerslab


Following

Flash 0day vulnerability that made by North Korea used from mid-November 2017. They attacked South Koreans who mainly do research on North Korea. (no patch yet)

	A	B	C
1			
2			
3		인기상품	가격
4		존바바토스 아티산 포 맨	25800원
5		한국오즈카제약 우르오스 올인원 모이스처라이저 스킨 로션 200ml	19,020원
6		탈모닷컴 올뉴 TS 샴푸 500ml	34,220원
7		CJ라이온 아이깨끗해 품 핸드 솝 250ml	2,760원
8		시세이도 센카 퍼펙트 훨 품 클렌징 120g	4,080원
9		갈더마 세타필 모이스처라이징 로션 591ml	10,610원
10		유니레버 도브 실키 바디크림 300ml	13,900원
11		LG생활건강 보닌 트리플 액션 원샷 플루이드 180ml	18,510원
12		두피중심 고체샴푸 28g	12,160원
13		르쥘라야 퓨어텐 클렌저 810ml	18,900원
14			
15			
16			
17			

2:11 AM - 1 Feb 2018

203 Retweets 206 Likes




15

203

206





# CVE-2018-4878

```
if(Capabilities.isDebugEnabled)
{
    return;
}

rule SWF_Exit_On_Debugger_Detection
{
    strings:
        $as  = "package"
        $dbg = /if\s*\(\s*Capabilities.isDebugEnabled[^\\)]*\)\s*\{\?\s*return/
    condition:
        $as at 0 and
        file_filename matches /.*\.\.as/i and
        $dbg
}
```

# CVE-2017-8759

- Sample initially uploaded to VT on 8/24/2017 with 0% detection.
- From 8/24 through 9/12 midday, there are 11 additional scans... 0%.
- 0day campaign is discovered by FireEye and published on 9/12/2017.
- By end of day 9/12, Trend Micro and Symantec add detection.
- By end of day 9/13, 29 vendors have detection. Detection settles on 9/15.
- Worm charming vibrations: evasive magic, chaff (RTF + OLE + \n).

# CVE-2017-8750

	2017-08-24T09:06:07		
Ad-Aware	 Undetected	AegisLab	 Undetected
AhnLab-V3	 Undetected	ALYac	 Undetected
Antiy-AVL	 Undetected	Arcabit	 Undetected
Avast	 Undetected	AVG	 Undetected
Avira	 Undetected	AVware	 Undetected
Baidu	 Undetected	BitDefender	 Undetected
Bkav	 Undetected	CAT-QuickHeal	 Undetected
ClamAV	 Undetected	CMC	 Undetected
Comodo	 Undetected	Cyren	 Undetected
DrWeb	 Undetected	Emsisoft	 Undetected
eScan	 Undetected	ESET-NOD32	 Undetected
F-Prot	 Undetected	F-Secure	 Undetected


## Previous Analyses

Date order ▲

2017-08-24T09:06:07	0 / 58
2017-08-30T11:02:48	0 / 58
2017-09-08T06:25:08	0 / 58
2017-09-08T21:01:39	0 / 59
2017-09-12T17:20:58	0 / 58
2017-09-12T18:20:27	0 / 58
2017-09-12T18:28:37	0 / 57
2017-09-12T18:34:53	0 / 58
2017-09-12T18:40:33	0 / 58
2017-09-12T19:05:22	0 / 58


CV/G 2017 0750

## Detections Evolution




# IOC Harvesting Early Warnings

Released	Earliest	Delta	References
5/13/2018	7/3/2018	~2mo	Charming Kitten, Iran APT
1/13/2018	7/12/2017	~6mo	India MDM Campaign, Talos
8/17/2017	5/1/2018	~9mo	APT 28, LoJack, Arbor/LastLine
9/14/2017	7/25/2018	~10mo	LeafMiner, Symantec



# Notes on Clustering




- K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN)
  - Best applied over extracted features. Visual comparison. Obfuscation identification at a glance.
- Bag-of-Words (BoW) TF/IDF
  - How important is a keyword to the sample (semantics, embedded logic)?
- Small Prime Product (SPP)
- Locality-sensitive hashing (LSH), MinHash, Jaccard similarity
  - <https://inquest.net/blog/2019/02/28/Ex-Machina-Family-Matters>
- AV detection names, XMP.IID, IOCs, metadata anchors, etc.



# Announcing

labs.inquest.net

- File Scanner (DFI light)
    - ~1M initial samples.
  - YARA generators and helpers..
    - mixed hex case helper
    - uint() magic conversion
    - base64 regex generator



# labs.inquest.net

- YARA helpers

```
# mixed hex case example...
$ inquest_mixcase "powershell"
```

- mixed hex case helper

```
[57]0[46]f[57]7[46]5[57]2[57]3[46]8[46]5[46]c[46]c
```

- uint() triggerification

- Reputation Aggregation

- ~50 public domain sources.
- Searchable and API access.

- IOC Aggregation

- File Scanner (DFI light)

- ~1M initial samples.

- Twitter, RSS, samples, etc.

- Searchable and API access

# labs.inquest.net

- YARA helpers

```
# uint() early exit example...
$ inquest_uint_trigger "{\rtf1"
```

- mixed hex case helper

```
/* trigger = '{\rtf1' */
(uint32be(0x0) == 0x7b5c7274 and uint16be(0x4) == 0x6631)
```

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# labs.inquest.net

```
# base64 regex generation example...
$ inquest_base64re "powershell\w+(hidden|execute)\w+(hidden|execute)"
```

```
(cG\x39\x33ZXJzaGVsbHcrZXhlY\x33V\x30ZXcrZXhlY\x33V\x30Z[Q-Za-f] |  
cG\x39\x33ZXJzaGVsbHcrZXhlY\x33V\x30ZXcraGlkZGVu[\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] |  
cG\x39\x33ZXJzaGVsbHcraGlkZGVudytleGVjdXRl[\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] |  
cG\x39\x33ZXJzaGVsbHcraGlkZGVudytoaWRkZW[\x34-\x37] | [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z]  
[\x31\x35\x39BFJNRVZdhlpTx]wb\x33dlcnNoZWxsdytleGVjdXRldytleGVjdXRl[\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] | [\x2b\x2f-  
\x39A-Za-z] [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] [\x31\x35\x39BFJNRVZdhlpTx]wb\x33dlcnNoZWxsdytleGVjdXRldytleGVjdXRl[\x34-  
\x37] | [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z]  
[\x31\x35\x39BFJNRVZdhlpTx]wb\x33dlcnNoZWxsdytoaWRkZW\x35\x33K\x32V\x34ZWN\x31dG[U-X] | [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-  
Za-z] [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] [\x31\x35\x39BFJNRVZdhlpTx]wb\x33dlcnNoZWxsdytoaWRkZW\x35\x33K\x32hpZGRlb[g-  
v] | [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] [\x33HXn]Bvd\x32Vyc\x32hlbGx\x33K\x32V\x34ZWN\x31dGV\x33K\x32V\x34ZWN\x31dG[U-  
X] | [\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] [\x33HXn]Bvd\x32Vyc\x32hlbGx\x33K\x32V\x34ZWN\x31dGV\x33K\x32hpZGRlb[g-v] |  
[\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z] [\x33HXn]Bvd\x32Vyc\x32hlbGx\x33K\x32hpZGRlbncrZXhlY\x33V\x30Z[Q-Za-f] | [\x2b\x2f-  
\x39A-Za-z] [\x33HXn]Bvd\x32Vyc\x32hlbGx\x33K\x32hpZGRlbncraGlkZGVu[\x2b\x2f-\x39A-Za-z])
```

- ~1M initial samples.
- Searchable and API access



# this can and will get silly, real quick ...

```
$ inquest_base64re '(W|Wi|Win|Wind|Windo|Window|WindowS|WindowSt|WindowSty|WindowStyl|WindowStyle) [\t]+([h1]|hi|hid|hidd|hidde|hidden)"
```


# labs.inquest.net

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# Get in touch.



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@InQuest

