

A ONE-SIDED TALE:

Investigating a few *Code Dependency* **Risks**

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
INTRODUCTION

Software Supply Chain

- code dependencies
- code copying
- author-code knowledge transfer

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
NIST

- Software Supply Chain Security Guidance

Software Supply Chain

- code dependencies

Direct & Indirect
Dependencies



MOTIVATION

Code Dependency Risks

- risky dependencies with certain vulnerabilities & license compatibility issues
- *Surviving Software Dependencies* by Russ Cox
- our goal - to promote a strong need for dependency & license inspection
~*why do these risks exist and why should we care?* ~ *how do we stay on top of them?*

BACKGROUND

Dependency Issues

poorly written code

lack of code
maintenance

poor documentation

Security Vulnerabilities

outdated/malicious
dependencies

supply chain attacks

configuration issues

License Incompatibility

DATA COLLECTION AND TOOLS

JavaScript Projects

- widely used projects with a commercial perspective ~ WOC
- *package.json* files!
- Snyk tool

Into Data Collection

- risky dependencies with their vulnerabilities ~ 75
- the category of the severity of the risks/vulnerabilities through ~ SVD
- licenses of these risky dependencies and others that aren't risky ~ 770 / 75
- Inspection of dependencies based on Maintenance and Usage ~ *Surviving Software Dependencies* by Russ Cox
- are these dependencies direct or indirect ~ *present in package.json?*

METHODOLOGY

Selected/Cloning 15
OS JavaScript
projects by filtering
through WoC

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Snyk Tool to scan for
Risks & Vulnerabilities in
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
Manual inspection of
package
dependencies to
inspect license
compatibility


Selected/Cloning 15
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Snyk Tool to scan for
Risks & Vulnerabilities in
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Manual recording of the
75 risks & vulnerabilities
in an excel file

Manual inspection of
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RESULTS

**RQ1: WHAT RISKS ARE INVOLVED
WITH CODE DEPENDENCIES
AND WHY DO THEY EXIST?**


NUMBER OF RISKS IN EACH PROJECT

| Projects | No. of Found Risks |
|--------------------------------|--------------------|
| ember.js | 5 |
| tone.js | 5 |
| npm/cli | 2 |
| prettier | 2 |
| bootstrap | 2 |
| adonisjs/core | 8 |
| superstruct | 3 |
| googlechromelabs/jvsu | 1 |
| whatsapp-web-reveng | 10 |
| jquery | 12 |
| apollographql/apollo-client | 1 |
| freecodecamp | 4 |
| trekhleb/javascript-algorithms | 1 |
| Glider.js | 9 |
| pencil.js | 10 |


JQUERY RISKS

| Projects | Risks | Vulnerabilities |
|----------|--------------|--|
| jquery | semver-regex | Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) |
| | debug | ReDoS |
| | request | Server-side Request Forgery (SSRF) |
| | growl | Arbitrary Code Injection |
| | ansi-regex | ReDos |
| | minimatch | ReDos |
| | uglify-js | ReDos |
| | word-wrap | ReDos |
| | ajv | Prototype Pollution |
| | underscore | Arbitrary Code Injection |
| | grunt-karma | Prototype Pollution |
| | mocha | ReDos |

Number of Occurences



Number of Occurences



RISKY DIRECT DEPENDENCIES

| Projects | Risks | File |
|-----------------------|-------------|--------------|
| tone.js | webpack | package.json |
| | mocha | package.json |
| GoogleChromeLabs/jvsu | got | package.json |
| prettier | json5 | package.json |
| jquery | uglify-js | package.json |
| | grunt-karma | package.json |
| pencil.js | webpack | package.json |

RISKY DEPENDENCIES MAINTENANCE AND USAGE

| Risky Dependencies | Last Commit Date | No. of Dependents |
|----------------------|--------------------|-------------------|
| word-wrap | May 4, 2018 | 1365 |
| ansi-regex | October 28, 2021 | 1530 |
| got | March 12, 2023 | 7,780 |
| json5 | January 5, 2023 | 3,625 |
| request | February 11, 2020 | 54,988 |
| minimatch | March 22, 2023 | 7,011 |
| unset-value | February 11, 2022 | 703 |
| minimist | February, 25, 2023 | 21,800 |
| glob-parent | September 29, 2021 | 1,415 |
| mocha | March 30, 2023 | 9,624 |
| webpack | March 29, 2023 | 27,164 |
| kind-of | January 16, 2020 | 1,312 |
| qs | March 6, 2023 | 13,889 |
| set-value | September 12, 2021 | 1, 016 |
| ajv | January 8, 2023 | 9,799 |
| lodash.template | August 18, 2015 | 965 |
| lodash-utils | Not Found | Not Found |
| underscore.string | January 23, 2022 | 3,059 |
| underscore | November 29, 2022 | 22,736 |
| loader-utils | January 13, 2023 | 6,565 |
| decompress-tar | July 27, 2017 | 53 |
| lodash.set | April 23, 2021 | 1,702 |
| decode-uri-component | December 19, 2022 | 808 |
| semver-regex | July 8, 2022 | 243 |
| debug | March 31, 2022 | 46, 478 |
| growl | November 25, 2020 | 485 |
| uglify-js | January 16, 2023 | 4,347 |
| grunt-karma | May 19, 2021 | 69 |
| marked | March 27, 2023 | 7,294 |
| ecstatic | April 1, 2020 | 321 |
| simple-git | March 27, 2023 | 3,500 |
| follow-redirects | December 8, 2022 | 1,278 |
| taffydb | January 14, 2021 | 134 |
| http-cache-semantics | January 26, 2023 | 377 |
| nwsapi | March 13, 2023 | 383 |
| Terser | March 26, 2023 | 1,712 |

- the two most common risky dependencies have not had a commit to the main/master branch for at least 2 years and more
- not found ~ possibly deleted dependency

RQ 2: WHAT ARE THE LIKELY IMPACTS OF THESE RISKS?

Customization to the OWASP Risk Rating Methodology.

- Each component has a number of options ~ **likelihood** rating from 0 to 9
- Four factors:
 - **Ease of Discovery:** *Easy (0) and Difficult (9)*
 - **Severity of Risk:** *Low (2.25), Medium (4.5), High (6.75), and Critical (9)*
 - **Popularity Index:** *Less Popular (0), Mildly Popular (4.5), and Most Popular (9)*
 - **Business impact due to license incompatibility:** *No Violation (0), License Information not Available (4.5), and Violation (9)*

| Likelihood | Impact Intensity |
|------------|------------------|
| 0 to <3 | LOW |
| 3 to <6 | MEDIUM |
| 6 to 9 | HIGH |

- 30 had a medium impact and 45 had the lowest impact

Fig. 1. Likelihood and Impact Intensity Metric

ADDRESSING SOME DATA FACTS

- Why is **ReDos** the most common vulnerability? *ansi-regex? word-wrap?*
- *Freezing the Web: A Study of ReDoS Vulnerabilities in JavaScript-based Web Servers* by Staicu et al.
 - *developers are trained to think about the correctness of regular expressions. What of the security aspect?*
 - *Effects of ReDos ~ bypass checks*
- For license compatibility, *we used the FLOSS license graph by David A. Wheeler.*
- So why no license compatibility risks? *Why does almost everything have the MIT license?*
- License Compatibility X Dependency Risks X Vulnerabilities

THREATS TO VALIDITY (EXTERNAL VALIDITY)

- Diversity and Representativeness
- Time Constraints
- Data's Validity in Relation to Time

DISCUSSION, CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK

Discussion

- How do developers perceive dependency versions? **tone.js** had a webpack risk with a Sandbox Bypass vulnerability. Introduced in **webpack@5.74.0** as webpack has updated to **webpack@5.77.0**
- **Sole Authors** of package dependencies
- **Inspection of dependencies** ~ Paper (Surviving Software Dependencies) by Russ Cox
- Dependency hell ~ an undending loop

Concluding Remarks:

- More than 60 of the risks we found were not direct dependencies
- No license incompatibilities ~ MIT
- Exploring the actual benefits of code dependencies & why these risky dependencies still have dependents?

THANK YOU !

APPENDIX

Furthermore...

- ReDos are incredibly powerful, but they aren't very easy to read or write, and most developers know just enough to be dangerous
- Prototype pollution is an injection attack that targets JavaScript runtimes. With prototype pollution, an attacker might control the default values of an object's properties
- Command injection exploits a programming flaw to execute system commands without proper input validation, escaping, or sanitization, which may lead to arbitrary commands executed by a malicious attacker