Fully Homomorphic Encryption and its Use Cases

Master Seminar in Scientific Computing

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welcome to the presentation of my master seminar on the topic fhe cloud usage is increasing very fast and with it
the potential for data breaches

Data breaches in the cloud



Figure 1: Rise of data breaches in the cloud [3]

Datenleck
number of data breaches tripled between 2013 and 2022 (apple survey), first eight months 360 million people in the us victims of data breaches, 1 of 4 people in the us had their health data exposed
98% of companies have relationsship with a vendor that experienced a data breach in the last two years!!! - outsourcing data to compute on is not safe
these figures are frightening, but why is that the case?
more sensitive data is stored in the cloud and software as a service needs to compute on the exported data - thus the data has to be decrypted
consider the following example

FHE allows secure cloud computations

only cloud as encrypted storage



Figure 2: Usage of cloud storage - always encrypted

FHE allows secure cloud computations



Figure 2: Usage of traditional cloud computing - unencrypted

usage of cloud computing with traditional encryption - unencrypted in intermediate steps

FHE allows secure cloud computations

with fhe you can perform operations on encrypted data



Figure 2: Usage of FHE in the public cloud - always encrypted

FHE allows secure cloud computations



Figure 2: Usage of FHE in the public cloud - always encrypted

Functional completeness

Theorem (Functional Complete Set)

The ability to evaluate any function homomorphically is achievable if addition and multiplication can be performed homomorphically and can be iterated, since they constitute a functionally complete set over finite rings.



Figure 3: Example Circuit with XOR and AND

In order to create an encryption scheme allowing the homomorphic evaluation of arbitrary function, it is sufficient to allow only addition and multiplication operations because addition and multiplication are functionally complete sets over finite sets. Par- ticularly, any boolean circuit can be represented using only XOR (addition) and AND (multiplication) gates. Bitwise addition and multipli- cation are thus regarded as foundational operations within FHE schemes.

Procedures in (correct) HE schemes

HE scheme defined as a tuple of probabilistic algorithmsc'
c prime

Table 1: Algorithms and keys of HE vs. classic encryption

		classic encryption	homomorphic encryption
keys	SK	•	•
	PK	•	•
	EK	○	•
procedure	KeyGen	•	•
	Enc	•	•
	Dec	•	•
	Eval	○	•
	Refresh	○	•

Definition ((correct) Eval)

$\mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{EK}, f, c) \to c'$

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Definition ((correct) Eval)

$\mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{EK}, f, c) \to c'$:

$\mathsf{Dec}(c') = \mathsf{Dec}[\mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{EK}, f, c)] = f(m)$.

Correctness

We assume correctness here. Formally correct the Eval function just returns a ciphertext c'.

eval just returns ciphertext c', but correct one returns ciphertext with special propertyc'

c prime

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Definition ((correct) Eval)

$\mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{EK}, f, c) \rightarrow c'$

$\mathsf{Dec}(c') = \mathsf{Dec}[\mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{EK}, f, c)] = f(m).$

Definition (Refresh)

$\mathsf{Refresh}(\mathsf{EK}, c, \mathsf{flag}) \rightarrow c'$:

$$\mathsf{noise}(c') < \mathsf{noise}(c)$$

Correctness

We assume correctness here. Formally correct the Eval function just returns a ciphertext c'.

The desired property of the Refresh function is to transform a complex ciphertext into a "simple" one, allowing more homomorphic operations to be performed on the fresh ciphertext. More information later.c'

c prime

Properties of FHE



Figure 4: Classification of FHE

- efficient: run in polynomial time in relation to the security parameter λ
- secure: IND-CPA secure
- C: allowed binary circuits

Properties of FHE



Figure 4: Classification of FHE

- correct:
  - decrypt the encryption of a message without any error
  - for all functions $f \in C$, it can correctly decrypt the results of the evaluation of f over fresh ciphertexts with overwhelming probability

Properties of FHE



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- compact: the output of the Eval function is not bigger than $p(\lambda)$ bits, independent of the complexity of the evaluated function f
- Max depth of function is d
- Length of Eval output is independant of d

LHE vs. SHE

The difference between those two types of schemes is that SHE schemes do not have to be compact, so evaluating functions of a higher depth can also increase the output length of the evaluation function. Levelled Homomorphic Encryption (LHE) schemes on the other hand are compact and the depth of functions that can be evaluated is a parameter on which the length of the evaluation output does not depend.

Properties of FHE



Figure 4: Classification of FHE

Remark (i-hop correctness)

Evaluating an arbitrary function is not equal to consecutively evaluating arbitrary many functions.

$$f(\ldots(f(m))) := F_n(m) \to \mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{EK}, F_n) \checkmark$$

$$\mathsf{Eval}\,(\mathsf{EK}, f\,(\ldots(\mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{EK}, f)))) \to \lightning$$

Notes on classification

Definition (Circuit Privacy)

A C-homomorphic encryption scheme is (perfectly, statistically or computationally) *circuit private* if $D_1 = \mathrm{Eval}(\mathrm{EK}, f, c)$ and $D_2 = \mathrm{Enc}(\mathrm{PK}, f(m))$ are (perfectly, ...) indistinguishable.

function privacy is weaker requirement

A C-homomorphic encryption scheme is (perfectly, statistically or computationally) *circuit private* if for any keys, any function $f \in C$, any fresh ciphertexts c with $\mathrm{Enc}(m) = c$ the distribution of the evaluation of f over the ciphertexts is the same as the distribution of the encryption of the evaluated plaintexts under the function f. [1]

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Table 2: Circuit Privacy vs. Function Privacy

Privacy	Distributions of ... are the same	
Circuit	Eval output of f_1	fresh ciphertexts
Function	Eval output of f_1	Eval output of f_2

FHE does not hide the structure of ML models

[1] Circuit private is sometimes also called "strongly homomorphic".

function privacy is weaker requirement

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FHE generations



Figure 5: Timeline of the main FHE schemes.
■ Schemes based on ideal lattices, ■ Schemes based on AGCD,
■ Schemes based on LWE and RLWE [3]

fhe is very young and the first scheme found by gentry
In general, all known FHE schemes today add some noise during the encryption process that increases with each homomorphic operation until a certain threshold is reached and the ciphertext is not decryptable any more. To reduce the noise growth and the absolute noise of an evaluation output different techniques have been proposed. The FHE generations differ initially in their underlying mathematical problems and later in the techniques used to limit noise growth and refresh ciphertexts.
Approximate - Greatest Common Divisor

FHE generations

Table 3: Comparison of FHE generations

SCHEMES		2nd Generation BGV BFV	3rd Generation TFHE	4th Generation CKKS
		Integer Arithmetic	Bitwise operations	Real Number Arithmetic
FAST OPERATIONS	scalar mult	•	•	•
	arithmetic	•	•	•
	non-arithmetic	○	•	○
PROPERTIES	fast bootstrapping	○	•	◒[4]
	fast packing/ batching/ SIMD	•	○	•
	levelled design	•	•	•
PROS	fast	scalar multiplication linear functions	number comparison -	polynomial approx. multiplicative inverse
	efficient	-	boolean circuits	DFT, logistic regression
CONS		slow non-linear functions	-	slow non-linear functions
USAGE		large arrays of numbers	bit-wise operations	real numbers arithmetic

[4] CKKS has a fast amortized bootstrapping procedure.

From SHE to FHE

Noise reducing techniques

noise growth $\rightarrow$ Refresh procedure needed

- bootstrapping
- key-switching
  - re-linearization
  - modulus switching

In general, all known FHE schemes today add some noise during the encryption process that increases with each homomorphic operation until a certain threshold is reached and the ciphertext is not decryptable any more.
"Therefore either the bootstrapping procedure (flag = "Bootstrap") is performed, which takes a ciphertext with large random error (*noise*) and outputs a new ciphertext of the same message with a fixed amount of noise, or the key-swichting procedure (flag $\in \{\text{Relinearize}, \text{ModSwitch}\}$) is applied, which takes a ciphertext under one key and outputs a ciphertext of the same message under a different key".
Depending on the scheme the output size of the evaluation is bigger than the size of fresh ciphertexts. With *re-linearization*, also called *key-switching*, the ciphertext size is reduced back to normal. *Dimension-modulus reduction*, also called *modulus switching* is a technique to convert a ciphertext $c \bmod q$ to $c' \bmod p$ where p is sufficiently smaller than q.
In general, these techniques allow the transformation from a SHE scheme to a FHE scheme by updating the evaluation output. This theoretically allows a FHE scheme to evaluate any function on ciphertexts. In practice, it is beneficial to sidestep these resource-intensive techniques by limiting the depths of the functions to be evaluated on ciphertexts.
1. squashing - to recude decryption complexity
1. bootstrapping
2- modulus switching

2. relinearization

From SHE to FHE



Figure 6: Illustration of the *bootstrapping* technique by Marcolla et al. [1]

Security



Figure 7: IND-CPA Security

Definition (IND-CPA Security)

The scheme is *IND-CPA* secure if for an efficient adversary $\mathcal{A}$, it holds that:

$$\Pr\left[\mathcal{A}\left(\mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{EK}, \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{PK}}(0)\right) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathcal{A}\left(\mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{EK}, \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{PK}}(1)\right) = 1\right] = \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

where
$(\mathsf{SK}, \mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{EK}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(\lambda)$.

propability that 0 is encrypted and adversary guesses 1 is the same as the probability that 1 is encrpted and adversary guesses 1 - so he can not distinguish

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

Figure 7: IND-CPA Security
repeat $p(\lambda)$ times

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

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Theorem

IND-CPA security is only achievable if the encryption scheme randomizes ciphertexts.

Proof.



Figure 8: IND-CPA Security is only achievable with randomization

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If there is no randomization, an attacker could simply ask for the encryption of a message and compare the encrypted output with the given ciphertext.
In the definition above the message space was restricted to $\{0,1\}$. □

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

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By their design, HE schemes can not achieve indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA2) security.

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

Figure 9: IND-CCA2 Security is not achievable

c' c prime
$\overline{c}$ c bar
20 minutes

Security

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

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Security: malicious adversary



Figure 10: Malicious adversaries are a problem

Possible solutions

- known evaluation results
- statistics
- Trusted Execution Environments
- homomorphic hashes

Additional Notes on Security

The security of FHE

- is based on LWE/ RLWE,
- is considered quantum safe,
- can be implemented leakage resilient,
- can be circuit/ function private,
- allows key evolution,
- and no decryption is needed for outsourcing computations.

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Table 4: Circular Security vs. KDM Security

circular security	KDM
$\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{PK}, \mathsf{SK})$	$\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{PK}_2, \mathsf{SK}_1)$

Limitations

Table 5: Main limitations of FHE and their solution

Limitation	potential solution
computational overhead	Hardware acceleration and better packing techniques
lack of standardization	Homomorphic Encryption Standard and stable open source libraries
hard to use	High level compilers like HElayers

Table 6: Running times of multiplying 2 bits homomorphically [2]

Year	runtime	speedup	speedup per year
2009	30 min	-	-
2014	2000 ns	$9 \cdot 10^8$	$18 \cdot 10^7$
2020	100 ns	20	3.33
	...Hardware Acceleration...		
2024	*0.1 ns*	*1000*	*250*

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Industry:

1. Microsoft
2. Samsung SDS
3. Intel
4. Duality Technologies
5. IBM
6. Google
7. SAP
8. ...

Government:

1. NIST
2. SLAC National Accelerator Lab
3. United Nations / ITU

ITU Internationale Fernmeldeunion

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Compilers adress engineering challenges

- parameter selection
- plaintext encoding
- data-independent execution
- ciphertext maintenance

make longer comment on compilers and libraries
These compilers address prevalent engineering challenges in FHE application development, including parameter selection, plaintext encoding, data-independent execution, and ciphertext maintenance.

Beyond Homomorphic Encryption

	FHE	MPC	TEE
no communication	●	○	●
no computational overhead	○	●	●
no known attacks	●	●	○
security based on	LWE, RLWE	protocols	hardware

Figure 11: Simplified comparison of FHE, MPC and TEE. MPC has a large communication overhead, FHE is computational expensive and TEEs are often proven to be vulnerable against side-channel attacks.

Use case in master thesis



Figure 12: FHE basic use case

More information on use case

The data is related with direct marketing campaigns (phone calls) of a Portuguese banking institution. The classification goal is to predict if the client will subscribe a term deposit (variable y)
45211 Instances, 16 Features

Used Techniques

- model: XGBoost
- scheme: CKKS
- library: to be chosen
- framework: HElayers (IBM)
- dataset: Bank Marketing
- benchmarking modes:
  - all-in-one
  - batch

Evaluation metrics

- latency
- throughput
- accuracy
- libraries
- parameters
- (dataset)
- (compressed model)

Summary

1. Fully Homomorphic Encryption
   - Properties
   - Classification - historical and formal
   - Security
   - Beyond
   - (Implementations)
2. Use Cases
   - (General)
   - Specific use case

Future Developments

Implement and analyze the use case with HeLayers

Thank you for your attention - I am now available for questions.

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Summary

Contribution:

- adding efficiency, security to properties
- distinguish between plain- and ciphertext operations
- increased understanding of i-hop correctness
- security described with practical implications
- KDM vs. circular security
- incorrect evaluation solutions
- limitations of FHE and positioning in cryptography
- overview of most common use cases

Future Developments

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References

See References in the paper of the master seminar and

[1] Frederik Armknecht et al. "A guide to fully homomorphic encryption". In: *Cryptology ePrint Archive* (2015).

[2] Duality. *The HomomorphicEncryption.org Community and the Applied Fully Homomorphic Encryption Standardization Efforts*. https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Presentations/2023/stppa6-fhe/images-media/20230725-stppa6-he-fhe--kurt-rohloff.pdf. Accessed: 2024-01-29. July 2023.

[3] Ph.D. Madnick Stuart E. *The Continued Threat to Personal Data: Key Factors Behind the 2023 Increase*. Tech. rep. Accessed: 18.02.2024. Apple, Dec. 2023.

Encryption during Processing



Figure 13: Problem: Malleability during processing



Figure 14: Solution: signature $sig(D) = \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{normal}}\left(h(D), \mathsf{k}_{\mathsf{priv}}\right)$

Remark (Other solution)

Use traditional encrypted transport protocols additionally to FHE encryption
$\rightarrow$ small overhead, but implemented and known

Beyond Homomorphic Encryption



Figure 15: Beyond FHE

More Use Cases



Figure 16: FHE use cases

Use Case Implementation



Figure 17: ML pipeline with FHE

Overview Schemes

Operation	BFV	BGV	CKKS	FHEW	TFHE
Native Add/Sub	●	●	●	○	○
Native Mult	●	●	●	○	○
SIMD	●	●	●	(●)	(●)
Boolean Logic	○	●	○	●	●
$< 1s$ Bootstrapping	○	○	○	●	●

Figure 18: Schemes

Overview Libraries

	Library	Language	Schemes BGV	BFV	FHEW	TFHE	CKKS
in HeLayers	HEAAN	C++	○	○	○	○	●
	HElib	C++	●	○	○	○	●
	PALISADE	C++	●	●	●	●	●
	OpenFHE	C++	●	●	●	●	●
	Lattigo	Go	●	●	○	○	●
	SEAL	C++/ C#	●	●	○	○	●
	FHEW	C++	○	○	●	○	○
	TFHE	C++/ C	○	○	○	●	○
	concrete	Rust	○	○	○	●	○
	RNS-HEAAN	C++	○	○	○	○	●
	FV-NFLlib	C++	○	●	○	○	○
	CuFHE	Cuda/C++	○	○	○	●	○
	NuFHE	Python	○	○	○	●	○

Figure 19: Libraries

Overview Frameworks

Compiler	Language	Library					
		HElib	SEAL	PALISADE	FHEW	TFHE	HEAAN
ALCHEMY	Haskell	○	○	○	○	○	○
Cingulata	C++	○	○	○	○	●	○
E^3	C++	●	●	●	●	●	○
SHEEP	C++	●	●	●	○	●	○
EVA	C++	○	●	○	○	○	○
Marble	C++	●	●	○	○	○	○
RAMPARTS	Julia	○	○	●	○	○	○
Transpiler	C++	○	○	●	○	●	○
CHET	C++	○	●	○	○	○	●
nGraph-HE	C++	○	●	○	○	○	○
SEALion	C++	○	●	○	○	○	○
HElayers	C++, python API	●	●	●	○	○	●

Figure 20: Compilers/ Frameworks