

# Sovereign-Risk Doom Loops in the Post-Pandemic Era


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Francisco Roldán  
RES

iLab Spark Series  
November 2020


# Large increases in debt to fight Covid-19 worldwide

Government debts globally (WEO Oct 2020)



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- Recent research has learned from the experience of the **euro** crisis

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# Costs of sovereign risk

- Three sources of costs of sovereign risk

Fiscal  
deterioration

Aggregate  
demand

Investment

*Even without default!*

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
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
# Fiscal

- Anzoategui (2020); Bianchi, Ottonello, and Presno (2020); Philippon and Roldán (2018)
- In a crisis, need to control **debt-to-GDP** ratio
- Aggressive fiscal **consolidation** *can be* self-defeating by deepening the recession




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
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
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
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
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- Defaults would shrink incomes even more  $\implies$  no consumption **smoothing**






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
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
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
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
# Investment

- Bocola (2016); Arellano, Bai, and Bocola (2019)
- Sovereign risk causes lower **risk-appetite**
- Banks curb lending → lower investment → lower growth


## Consequence

- Providing **liquidity** support to banks can help
- Does not fix the **risk-off** problem

## Output and Consumption in Spain




## Output and Consumption in Italy







## Output and Consumption in Germany



## Output and Consumption in France



## Output and Consumption in Austria



- Lessons of the euro crisis

1. No gamble for resurrection

- No “learning to live with” sovereign risk

2. Value in resolving debt crises quickly

- Removing **uncertainty**

## Role of the IMF

- Debt **sustainability** assessments
- Coordinator of last resort?

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