

# International Trade of Essential Goods During a Pandemic

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- **Personal protective equipment (PPE):** Gloves, medical masks, face shields, . . .
- **Medical equipment:** Respirators
- **COVID-19 tests**

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- Production of these goods is highly concentrated in a few locations
  - ▶ Only 20% of countries are net exporters of these goods
- Some countries are highly dependent on imports
  - ▶ e.g., US:  $\approx 36\%$  of total absorption of these goods is imported

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⇒ **Increasing unease about relying so much on other countries for these goods**

⇒ **To what extent does trade of these goods affect impact of a pandemic?**

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
### **COVID-19:**

- Global shock, all countries suddenly need more essential goods
- Adjusting production takes time, prices ration limited supply
- If trade breaks down (via prices or trade policy), countries that import these goods may face autarky with very limited access to them


⇒ **This paper: Investigate role of trade of essential goods during pandemic**

# Sharp Trade Policy Changes During COVID-19

Data from **Global Trade Alert + World Bank** as of May 29:



Higher export controls



Lower import barriers

⇒ **Key role of international trade of essential medical goods during a pandemic**



## This Paper

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### To do so:

- Quantitative dynamic trade model with **essential goods**
  - ▶ Preferences for essential goods are non-homothetic
  - ▶ Sectoral adjustment costs on capital and labor
  - ▶ Trade imbalances in essential goods
- Study impact of a pandemic across countries + international trade policy
- Contrast with evidence from COVID-19 + evidence for broader set of essential goods

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⇒ We show trade policy changes during COVID-19 consistent with these findings



## This Paper: Implications

**Our paper has implications beyond COVID-19 and essential medical goods. . .**

### **1. There is a broader range of essential goods subject to shocks**

- Food and agriculture: Natural disasters, famine, pests, global warming
- Defense and steel: Threats to national security, wars

⇒ **We document that trade policy looks different for these goods**

⇒ **They are typically subject to higher trade barriers**

### **2. Quantitative analysis of trade policy under uncertainty**

- Our work connects with theoretical studies from 70s and 80s  
(Feenstra 1977, Newbery and Stiglitz 1984, Eaton and Grossman 1985, Lapan 1988)
- We study trade policy in an environment with uncertainty and agg. fluctuations

### **3. Trade policy in dynamic models of international trade**

(Ravikumar, Santacreu, Sposi 2019; Kohn, Leibovici, Tretvoll 2020)

## Model

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- Two countries: Home, foreign
  - ▶ Present model for home, foreign is symmetric except for parameters
  - ▶ Will be specific about differences in quantitative analysis
- Two sectors: Essential ( $e$ ), non-essential ( $c$ )
- In each country:
  - ▶ Household
  - ▶ Producer of a **domestic variety** in each sector
  - ▶ Producer of **bundles of domestic and imported varieties** in each sector
  - ▶ Essential and non-essential bundles are used for consumption and investment
- International trade
  - ▶ Goods: Essential and non-essential varieties
  - ▶ No trade in financial assets

## Household: Preferences

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### Preferences

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \ln c_t - \gamma \exp \left( \frac{\bar{e}_t}{e_t} \right) \right]$$

where...

- $c_t$ : non-essential goods
- $e_t$ : essential goods
- $\bar{e}_t$ : “reference level” of essential good consumption (exogenous)

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### Idea

- Consumption of essential goods is high or low relative to some reference level
- e.g. Food consumption compared to physical needs
- e.g. Health services compared to medical needs

## Household: Preferences

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### Observation



- Akin to Stone-Geary:  $\ln c_t + \gamma \ln (e_t - \bar{e}_t)$
- Same idea and similar implications as our specification
- But key advantage of our specification: Avoids kink at  $\bar{e}_t$   
(we have  $e_t > 0$  vs.  $e_t > \bar{e}_t$  in Stone-Geary)

## Household: Preferences (cont.)

### Preferences

$$\mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \ln c_t - \gamma \exp \left( \frac{\bar{e}_t}{e_t} \right) \right]$$

To illustrate. . .



## Household: Income and Household's Problem

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### Income

- One unit of labor supplied inelastically at wage  $w_t$
- Own producers of domestic essential and non-essential varieties, earn  $\pi_{c,t}$  and  $\pi_{e,t}$

### Household's problem:

$$\max_{\{c_t, e_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}} \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t \left[ \ln c_t - \gamma \exp \left( \frac{\bar{e}_t}{e_t} \right) \right]$$

subject to

$$p_{c,t}c_t + p_{e,t}e_t = w_t + \pi_{c,t} + \pi_{e,t} \quad \forall t = 0, \dots, \infty$$

## Producers of Domestic Varieties in Sector $j \in \{c, e\}$

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### Technologies

- 1 Produce varieties:  $Y_{j,t} = A_j N_{j,t}^\alpha K_{j,t}^{1-\alpha}$
- 2 Accumulate capital:  $K_{j,t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_{j,t} + I_{j,t}$

### Sectoral adjustment costs

- Capital:  $\phi_k(K_{j,t+1}, K_{j,t}) = \frac{\Omega_k}{2} \left( \frac{K_{j,t+1}}{K_{j,t}} - 1 \right)^2$
- Labor:  $\phi_n(N_{j,t}, N_{j,t-1}) = \frac{\Omega_n}{2} \left( \frac{N_{j,t}}{N_{j,t-1}} - 1 \right)^2$
- Denominated in units of non-essential goods

### Alternative assumptions on decision-making

- 1 Externality (baseline): Myopic firms, do not discount profits with household's SDF
- 2 No externality: Firms discount profits with household's SDF
  - $\Rightarrow$  Producers of essential goods internalize importance of production in a pandemic?
  - $\Rightarrow$  This talk: Myopic firms as the baseline



## Producers of Domestic Varieties in Sector $j \in \{c, e\}$ (cont.)

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### Producers' problem:

$$\max \mathbb{E}_0 \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} m_t [q_{j,t} Y_{j,t} - w_t N_{j,t} - p_{c,t} l_{j,t} - p_{c,t} \phi_k(K_{j,t+1}, K_{j,t}) - p_{c,t} \phi_n(N_{j,t}, N_{j,t-1})]$$

subject to

$$K_{j,t+1} = (1 - \delta)K_{j,t} + I_{j,t} \quad \forall t = 0, \dots, \infty$$

$$Y_{j,t} = A_j N_{j,t}^{\alpha} K_{j,t}^{1-\alpha} \quad \forall t = 0, \dots, \infty.$$

where...

- control variables:  $\{N_{j,t}, I_{j,t}, K_{j,t+1}, Y_{j,t}\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$

and...

- $m_t = \beta^t$  in baseline,  $m_t = \text{SDF}_t$  in model with no externality
- $q_{j,t}$ : price of domestic variety  $j$
- $p_{j,t}$ : price of bundle of domestic and imported varieties from sector  $j$

## Producers of Composite Good $j \in \{c, e\}$

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### Technology

$$Q_{j,t} = \left[ \omega_j Q_{j,h,t}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} + (1 - \omega_j) Q_{j,f,t}^{\frac{\sigma-1}{\sigma}} \right]^{\frac{\sigma}{\sigma-1}}$$

where...

- $Q_{j,h,t}$ : Domestic variety
- $Q_{j,f,t}$ : Imported variety
- $\omega_j \in (0, 1)$ : Weight across varieties

### International trade

- Imported varieties subject to sector-specific iceberg trade cost  $\tau_j$

### Uses of composite goods

- Non-essential goods: Consumption, investment, adj. costs
- Essential goods: Consumption

## Competitive Equilibrium

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### Home country:

- ① Given prices, allocations solve the household's problem
- ② Given prices, allocations solve problem of domestic producers
- ③ Given prices, allocations solve problem of composite good producers
- ④ Labor market clears:  $N_{c,t} + N_{e,t} = 1 \forall t$
- ⑤ Home essential goods market clearing:  $Q_{e,h,t} + \tau_e^* Q_{e,h,t}^* = Y_{e,t} \forall t$
- ⑥ Home non-essential goods market clearing:  $Q_{c,h,t} + \tau_c^* Q_{c,h,t}^* = Y_{c,t} \forall t$
- ⑦ Essential composite good market clearing:  $e_t = Q_{e,t} \forall t$
- ⑧ Non-essential composite good market clearing:

$$c_t + \sum_{j \in \{c,e\}} \left[ l_{j,t} + \frac{\Omega_k}{2} \left( \frac{K_{j,t+1}}{K_{j,t}} - 1 \right)^2 + \frac{\Omega_n}{2} \left( \frac{N_{j,t}}{N_{j,t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 \right] = Q_{c,t} \forall t$$

⇒ Foreign country is symmetric except for some parameters

## A Pandemic in Our Model

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We model **a pandemic** as...

- **An increase in  $\bar{e}_t$**  (the reference level of essential goods)

**Goal is to capture:**

- Increased need for essential medical goods (e.g., PPE, COVID-19 tests, etc.)
- Utility is lower if these increased needs are not satisfied (e.g., disease, death, etc.)

**Does not capture other important features of a pandemic:**

- Lockdown policies and their economic consequences
- Endogeneity between increased needs and the level of economic activity

⇒ **We take increased needs as exogenous, study role the of international trade**

## What is the Impact of a Pandemic in Our Model?

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### 1. **Sharp increase in the demand for essential medical goods**

- Reallocation of demand from non-essential to essential goods

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### 1. Sharp increase in the demand for essential medical goods

- Reallocation of demand from non-essential to essential goods

### 2. Hard to adjust production and consumption in short-run, prices increase sharply

$$\frac{p_e}{p_c} = \gamma \frac{c}{e} \times \underbrace{\frac{\bar{e}}{e} \exp\left(\frac{\bar{e}}{e}\right)}_{\text{Extra term relative to log-log preferences}}$$

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### 3. Net exporters of essential medical goods are better off, net importers worse off

$$\text{Real Absorption}_t = \frac{\text{PPI}_t}{\text{CPI}_t} \times \text{Real Output}_t$$

$\Rightarrow \text{corr}(p_e/p_c, \text{PPI}_t/\text{CPI}_t) > 0$  for net exporters

$\Rightarrow \text{corr}(p_e/p_c, \text{PPI}_t/\text{CPI}_t) < 0$  for net importers

## Quantitative Analysis

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### We quantitatively investigate:

- ① What is the cross-country impact of a pandemic?
- ② Do countries prefer to be hit with a pandemic in a world with low trade barriers?
- ③ Do countries prefer to decrease trade barriers once the pandemic hits?

### To do so, parametrize model:

- One period = One month
- Two countries: Home is U.S., foreign is the rest of the world
- Both countries are identical except for the sectoral productivities
  - ▶ Home:  $A_c > A_e$
  - ▶ Foreign:  $A_e^* > A_c^*$
  - ▶ Symmetry and normalization:  $A_c = A_e^*, A_e = A_c^* = 1$
- Estimate parameters to match pattern of production and trade in the U.S.



# Parametrization

## Predetermined parameters

Parameter	Value	Description
$\beta$	0.9967	Discount factor (4% annual interest rate)
$\sigma$	4	Elasticity of substitution
$\alpha$	0.66	Labor share
$\delta$	0.06	Capital depreciation rate
$\Omega_k = \Omega_n$	6	Adjustment costs
$\omega_e = \omega_c$	0.50	Weight on home goods

## Estimated parameters

Parameter	Value	Description
$A_c = A_e^*$	1.10	Sectoral productivities
$\gamma$	$7.80 \times 10^{-5}$	Utility weight on essential goods
$\tau_e$	1.52	Trade costs on essential goods
$\tau_c$	1.44	Trade costs on non-essential goods
$\bar{e}$	0.14	Reference level of essential goods

	<i>Targeted</i>		<i>Untargeted</i>
	Home country S.S.		Foreign country S.S.
Moment	Target value	Model	Model
$NX_e / GDP_e$	-0.25	-0.25	0.18
$GDP_e / GDP$	0.03	0.03	0.05
$M_e / p_e e$	0.36	0.36	0.17
$M_c / p_c c$	0.21	0.21	0.24
$e / \bar{e}$	0.20	0.20	0.20

### **Skipping some implementation details**

- Essential goods  $\equiv$  PPE and other medical goods
- Non-essential goods  $\equiv$  All other goods

## Implementation + Reference Level + Pandemic Shock

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### **Key calibration challenge: Pinning down $\bar{e}$ , adj. costs, and shock**

- This talk:
  - ①  $\bar{e}$  such that  $e/\bar{e} = 0.20$
  - ② Shock (AR1 with  $\rho = 0.95$ )  $\Rightarrow$  Quantity dynamics following pandemic
  - ③ Adj. cost  $\Rightarrow$  Price dynamics following pandemic

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- Reasonable reference level?
  - $\Rightarrow$  Income elasticity of essential good imports similar to data during normal times
  - $\Rightarrow$  Similar effects to standard parametrizations of Stone-Geary

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### **This talk: Pin down dynamics focusing on masks, Jan to Apr 2020**

- **Quantities:** 59% increase in N95 masks by 3M in US (22m to 35m per month)
- **Prices:** 429% increase in price of masks imported from China


## Dynamics Following a Pandemic

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**Q1: What is the cross-country impact of a pandemic?**


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# Dynamics Following a Pandemic

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
## 1/2 — Recall:

- Countries are identical except for sectoral productivities
  - ▶  $A_c > A_e \Rightarrow$  Home is a net importer of essential goods
  - ▶  $A_e^* > A_c^* \Rightarrow$  Foreign is a net exporter of essential goods



# Dynamics Following a Pandemic

## Q1: What is the cross-country impact of a pandemic?



## 2/2 — We find:

- Limits to short-run adjustment  $\Rightarrow$  Higher prices  $\Rightarrow$  Hurt importers, benefit exporters
- Trade amplifies impact of pandemic for net importers, mitigates it for net exporters

## Dynamics Following a Pandemic (cont.)

---

**Which channels/ingredients are most important for our findings?**

## Dynamics Following a Pandemic (cont.)

---

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**In the paper, we show that:**

**① Sectoral adjustment costs: Important**

- ▶ Control speed at which production of essential goods can be scaled up
- ▶ Lower adjustment costs  $\Rightarrow$  Importers less hurt, exporters less well off

**② Non-homothetic preferences on essential goods: Important**

- ▶ High curvature to get large price change and heterogeneous impact across countries
- ▶ Same as Stone-Geary w/shock to subsistence,  $\neq$  Cobb-Douglas with shock to weight

**③ Sectoral trade imbalances: Important**

- ▶ Substantially smaller effects in world where sectoral trade flows are balanced

**④ Myopic firms: Important**

- ▶ Net importers less worse off if firms assign more weight to profits during pandemic
- ▶ Trade policy implications: Different incentives of planner vs. individual firms for producing essential goods despite being less productive than trade partners

## Trade Policy at the Onset of the Pandemic


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**Q2: Do countries prefer to be hit with pandemic in a world with low trade barriers?  
(or... should we protect essential sectors?)**


**First pass at answering this question:**

- Examine pandemic in a world with **high initial trade barriers on essential goods**
  - ▶ Global change in trade barriers, not unilateral
  - ▶  $\tau_e = 100$  instead of  $\tau_e = 1.52 \Rightarrow \approx$  Autarky
- For each country, we now contrast world with high vs. low initial trade barriers
- Welfare analysis
  - ▶ This talk: Contrast welfare with high vs. low initial trade barriers
  - ▶ In progress: Optimal trade policy

## Trade Policy at the Onset of the Pandemic (cont.)




## Trade Policy at the Onset of the Pandemic (cont.)



### 1/3 — Net importer of essential goods:

- **Better off with higher trade barriers at the onset of the pandemic**
- More domestic production, lower imbalances  $\Rightarrow$  Smaller impact of higher  $p_e/p_c$


## Trade Policy at the Onset of the Pandemic (cont.)



### 2/3 — Net exporter of essential goods:

- Worse off with lower trade barriers at the onset of the pandemic
- Lower net exports, lower benefits from price increase

## Trade Policy at the Onset of the Pandemic (cont.)



### 3/3 — Thus:

- Protection might be beneficial to mitigate foreign dependence in a **global** pandemic
- i.e. Self-insurance as a way to deal with global shock
- Yet, trade openness preferred without shocks, or even for domestic/local shocks



## Trade Policy Changes During the Pandemic


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**Q3: Do countries prefer to decrease trade barriers once the pandemic hits?**


**First pass at answering this question:**

- Examine pandemic + increase of trade barriers during pandemic
  - ▶  $\tau_e$  increases by 172% (1 log point) on impact, AR(1) with  $\rho = 0.95$
  - ▶ Global change in trade barriers, not unilateral
- For each country, contrast baseline vs. raising trade barriers during pandemic

## Trade Policy Changes During the Pandemic (cont.)




## Trade Policy Changes During the Pandemic (cont.)



### 1/3 — Net importer of essential goods:

- **Worse off with increasing trade barriers**
- Even harder to purchase essential goods, prefers lower trade barriers and thus lower prices during pandemic!


## Trade Policy Changes During the Pandemic (cont.)



### 2/3 — Net exporter of essential goods:

- Better off with increasing trade barriers
- Higher utility due to reallocation of essential goods from exports to domestic sales

## Trade Policy Changes During the Pandemic (cont.)



### 3/3 — Time inconsistency problem in trade policy?

- Net importers want high initial trade barriers, but low trade barriers ex-post
- Net exporters want low initial trade barriers, but high trade barriers ex-post

## Pandemic and Trade Policy: Long-Run Welfare Implications

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### Welfare implications under alternative scenarios:

- Compute consumption-equivalent gains/losses starting from arrival of a pandemic
- Express gains/losses as a permanent change in consumption of non-essential goods

### We find. . .

	Welfare gain/loss for...	
	Home country	Foreign country
Baseline	-1.05%	-0.27%
High initial trade barriers	-0.75%	-0.73%
Raise trade barriers when pandemic hits	-1.79%	-0.32%

**Q4: Findings on trade policy in essential goods consistent with the data?**

**1. Trade barrier changes after COVID-19**

### **Q4: Findings on trade policy in essential goods consistent with the data?**

#### **1. Trade barrier changes after COVID-19**

- Are trade policy changes systematically related to trade imbalances pre-COVID-19?
- Focus on subset of medical goods essential to combat COVID-19
- Data on trade policy changes from Global Trade Alert up to mid-April 2020
  - ▶ Export curbs
  - ▶ Import liberalization
- Data on sectoral trade imbalances from COMTRADE for 2018



### **Q4: Findings on trade policy in essential goods consistent with the data?**

#### **1. Trade barrier changes after COVID-19**

	Number of countries	Share of countries by row (%)	
		Import liberalization	Export curbs
Surplus	22	18.2	86.4
Deficit	87	28.7	46.0

### Q4: Findings on trade policy in essential goods consistent with the data?

#### 1. Trade barrier changes after COVID-19

	Number of countries	Share of countries by row (%)	
		Import liberalization	Export curbs
Surplus	22	18.2	86.4
Deficit	87	28.7	46.0

#### Consistent with the model. . .

- ⇒ Net exporters more likely to introduce export curbs than net importers
- ⇒ Net importers more likely to lower import barriers than net exporters

**Q4: Findings on trade policy in essential goods consistent with the data?**

**2. Trade barriers on broader range of essential goods**

### **Q4: Findings on trade policy in essential goods consistent with the data?**

#### **2. Trade barriers on broader range of essential goods**

- Are essential goods subject to higher trade barriers than non-essential goods?
- Consider broader range of essential goods: Food/agriculture, defense, medical
- Data from UNCTAD:
  - ▶ Tariffs: Effectively applied tariffs, year 2018
  - ▶ Non-tariff barriers: Frequency index (share of goods), coverage ratio (share of trade), years 2012-2018

**Q4: Findings on trade policy in essential goods consistent with the data?**

### **2. Trade barriers on broader range of essential goods**

	Avg. Tariffs (%)	Frequency index (%)	Coverage index (%)
Food	7.9	92.59	92.96
Defense	7.2	90.58	87.73
Medical	1.7	74.51	86.00
Non-essential	5.4	50.21	64.12

### Q4: Findings on trade policy in essential goods consistent with the data?

#### 2. Trade barriers on broader range of essential goods

	Avg. Tariffs (%)	Frequency index (%)	Coverage index (%)
Food	7.9	92.59	92.96
Defense	7.2	90.58	87.73
Medical	1.7	74.51	86.00
Non-essential	5.4	50.21	64.12

⇒ Trade barriers on essential goods typically larger than on non-essential goods

⇒ One exception: Tariffs on medical imports. Lack of awareness of their importance pre-COVID-19?

## Concluding Remarks

**Q: What is the role of intl. trade of essential medical goods during a pandemic?**

**We find:**

- Net trade position key for whether trade amplifies or mitigates pandemic
- Net importers better off with higher initial trade barriers, lower upon pandemic
- Net exporters better off with lower initial trade barriers, higher upon pandemic
- Trade policy implications consistent with data

**Big picture:**

- Optimal trade policy may differ between essential and non-essential goods
- Protectionism might be optimal as self-insurance against global shocks?
- Much broader reach than medical: e.g., food, defense, their inputs, etc.

## Concluding Remarks

**Q: What is the role of intl. trade of essential medical goods during a pandemic?**

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**Lots more work to do:**

- Tighten calibration: Reference level, adjustment costs, shock
- Additional channels: Financial markets, stockpiling/inventories
- Additional results: Unilateral vs. global trade policy, optimal trade policy