

# Securing Data in Low-Resource Systems: Lightweight Block Cryptography Strategies

Presentación examen parcial

Proyecto de Final de Carrera I  
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# Introducción




Figura: Desafíos clave con la criptografía convencional en dispositivos con recursos limitados [1].

## Lightweight Block Ciphers

Algorithm	Key size	Block size	N. of rounds	Structure
DULBC (Yang et al., 2022) [2]	80/128	64	25/30	SPN
GIFT (Yasmin and Gupta, 2023) [3] [4]	128	64/128	28/40	SPN
IVLBC (Huang et al., 2023) [5]	80/128	64	29	SPN
LBC-IoT (Ramadan et al., 2021) [6]	80	32	32	Feistel
SAND (Chen et al., 2021) [7]	128	64/128	48/54	Feistel
LBCCS (Zhu et al., 2022) [8]	128	128	20	Feistel
SCENERY (Feng and Li et al., 2022) [9]	80	64	28	Feistel




Figura: Generalizacion de una Feistel network [10] y Substitution-permutation network [11].

SAND

# SAND

## SAND-64 y SAND-128

- operaciones AND-RX = ligero.
- Synthetic s-box = seguro.
- 128-bit key, 64/128-bit block, 48/54 rounds.





Figura: Comparación de round functions, Feistel network genérica y SAND [7].

**(3) Non-linear Functions  $G_0$  and  $G_1$** 

Let the  $n$ -bit variable  $x$  be the input value of  $G_0$  and  $G_1$ , which is regarded as the concatenation of four  $\frac{n}{4}$ -bit words  $x\{3\}\|x\{2\}\|x\{1\}\|x\{0\}$ . Let  $y = y\{3\}\|y\{2\}\|y\{1\}\|y\{0\}$  denote the output value. For  $G_0$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned}y\{0\} &= x\{3\} \odot x\{2\} \oplus x\{0\}, \\y\{3\} &= y\{0\} \odot x\{1\} \oplus x\{3\}, \\y\{2\} &= x\{2\}, \\y\{1\} &= x\{1\}.\end{aligned}$$

As to the function  $G_1$ , the output is calculated as

$$\begin{aligned}y\{2\} &= x\{3\} \odot x\{1\} \oplus x\{2\}, \\y\{1\} &= y\{2\} \odot x\{0\} \oplus x\{1\}, \\y\{3\} &= x\{3\}, \\y\{0\} &= x\{0\}.\end{aligned}$$

Figura: Definición formal de las funciones G de SAND [7].

# SAND

x	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C
$N_0(x)$	0	1	2	B	4	5	6	F	8	9	A	3	D
$N_1(x)$	0	1	2	3	4	7	6	5	8	9	E	D	C
$Ssb(x)$	00	11	22	B3	44	57	66	F5	88	99	AE	3D	DC

Cuadro: Synthetic S-box de SAND-128



# SAND

x	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
P(x)	7	4	1	6	3	0	5	2

Cuadro: P-box de SAND-64

x	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
P(x)	E	F	8	9	2	3	C	D	6	7	0	1	A	B	4	5

Cuadro: P-box de SAND-128

GIFT

# GIFT

## GIFT-64 y GIFT-128

- Feistel = ligero.
- Bitslice substitution = seguro.

- Involutive permutation = más seguro!
- 128-bit key, 64/128-bit block, 28/40 rounds.





Figura: Comparación de round functions, Substitution-permutation network genérica y GIFT [4].

# GIFT

Se coloca cada bit del plaintext en un bloque.

0	4	8	12
16	20	24	28
32	36	40	44
48	52	56	60

1	5	9	13
17	21	25	29
33	37	41	45
49	53	57	61

2	6	10	14
18	22	26	30
34	38	42	46
50	54	58	62

3	7	11	15
19	23	27	31
35	39	43	47
51	55	59	63

Figura: Posición de los bits. Los sectores 0,1,2,3 están en rojo, amarillo, verde y azul respectivamente [3].

# GIFT




Figura: Representación secuencial de GIFT [4].

La function bit-slice substitution es definida:

$$T_1 = X_1; T_2 = X_0 \wedge T_1; T_3 = X_2 \oplus X_3;$$

$$Y_0 = T_2 \oplus T_3; T_5 = X_3 \vee T_1; T_6 = X_0 \oplus T_5;$$

$$Y_1 = X_2 \wedge T_6; T_8 = X_1 \oplus X_2; T_9 = T_3 \wedge T_6;$$

$$Y_3 = T_8 \wedge T_9; T_{11} = Y_0 \vee T_8; Y_2 = T_6 \wedge T_{11}.$$

donde  $T_i$  indica una variable de 32-bits temporable. El bloque input es  $X$  y el bloque output es  $Y$  [4].

## Conclusiones

# Conclusiones

## Feistel Network




- Simpleza.
- Descifrado sencillo.
- Seguridad.
- Mucha simpleza!

## Substitution-Permutation Network





- Libertad.
  - Diseño.
  - Implementación: paralelismo, hardware/software.
- Mucha libertad!







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