VOTING FOR DEMOCRACY: CHILE'S *PLEBISCITO* AND THE ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION OF A GENERATION *

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Abstract

This paper assesses the long-term consequences of voting for democracy. We study Chile's 1988 plebiscite, which ended 15 years of dictatorship and reestablished democracy. Taking advantage of individual-level voting data, we implement an age-based RD design comparing long run registration and turnout rates across marginally eligible and ineligible individuals. We find plebiscite eligibility increased electoral turnout three decades later. Initial mobilization emerges as the mechanism. Plebiscite eligibility induced a sizable share of less educated voters to register compared to other upstream elections. The event contributed to the emergence of one party rule the twenty years following democratization.

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1 Introduction

Important political events often make indelible impressions on the minds and future actions of voters. Mere participation in an election has been shown to impact future partisanship (Madestam et al., 2013; Kaplan and Mukand, 2014), the degree of polarization (Mullainathan and Washington, 2009) and voter turnout (Coppock and Green, 2016; Fujiwara et al., 2016; Meredith, 2009). In fact, early-life political events which are particularly salient may have even larger long-term effects (Sears and Valentino, 1997; Sears and Funk, 1999; Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007; Prior, 2010; Laudenbach et al., 2019). In this paper, we examine the long-run impacts of participating in one of the most consequential elections in recent history: Chile's 1988 plebiscite, which was held to determine whether the country would return to democracy after a 15-year long military dictatorship. Augusto Pinochet came to power under a military coup in 1973 and maintained autocratic control through civil rights restrictions and military rule. In 1980, under international pressure for human rights abuses, the military government wrote a new constitution, which called for a plebiscite to be held eight years later on the restoration of democratic rule. The plebiscite was held on October 5^{th}, 1988, and Pinochet unexpectedly lost.[1] The success of the 'No' vote then ushered in elections for a new President in 1989 and the restoration of a democratically elected regime in 1990 (Loveman, 1995).

This paper quantifies the impact of voting on democracy itself upon future voter registration and electoral turnout. We estimate a regression discontinuity design using age-based plebiscite eligibility. Only citizens who had turned 18 by the closing of the registration rolls on August 30, 1988 were allowed to participate in the election. Taking advantage of individual-level voter data for upwards of 13 million Chileans, coupled with information on individuals' weeks of birth and registration outcomes, we first show that 56% of marginally age-eligible Chileans registered for the 1988 plebiscite. Moreover, we find that these registration gaps persisted. Twenty years later, in 2009, marginally eligible plebiscite participants were still registered at a 12 percentage point higher rate than those born merely one week later. In Chile's old electoral system, citizens who registered to vote remained on the rolls permanently; as a result, the 2009 effects reflect a lack of complete catch-up by plebiscite ineligibles. While actual turnout data for pre-2010 elections is unavailable, we note that voting was mandatory for registered individuals through the 2009 election, and turnout rates exceeded 86% through 2009.

Chile switched from a voluntary to an automatic registration system after the 2009 election, which implied that any pre-reform differences in registration rates across the plebiscite cutoff automatically disappeared. Taking advantage of voter-level data on actual turnout for the 2013 and 2017 Presidential elections as well as for the 2016 municipal election, we thus estimate downstream turnout impacts of plebiscite eligibility which are not mediated by registration differences.

[1] The Constitution called for the Plebiscite to be a Yes/No vote on whether a candidate chosen by the military regime would stay in power for an additional eight years, or whether Chile would return to democratic rule, by holding its first presidential election in 1989. Boas (2015) has shown that a vast majority of polls conducted in 1988 showed the 'Yes' option to be in a commanding lead.

We find that marginal eligibility to vote in the 1988 plebiscite on the restoration of democracy raised turnout by 3.0 and 1.8 percentage points for the 2013 and 2017 Presidential elections, or 6% and 4% of baseline participation rates, respectively.

We further analyze the downstream effects of actual plebiscite voting by estimating a fuzzy regression discontinuity design and find that having voted in the plebiscite increased 2013 and 2017 turnout rates by 5.5 and 3.3 percentage points, respectively. Moreover, inspection of turnout rate by cohort suggests that these persistent turnout impacts are not specific to first-time young voters but rather present for all eligible voters. We also find similar effects for the lower-stakes 2016 municipal election and show that the results are robust to a number of different different functional form and sample choices. These results thus indicate that having voted in Chile's most consequential election had substantial downstream effects even three decades after the return to democracy.

Since the existing studies on downstream voting effects have largely focused on the United States (Coppock and Green, 2016; Meredith, 2009), our estimates are not directly comparable to the literature. As a result, we benchmark the estimated plebiscite turnout effects using age-based discontinuities around other upstream elections. We focus on Chile's first five presidential elections following the restoration of electoral democracy, the first of which took place in December 1989, followed by elections in 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009. We estimate a differences-in-discontinuity design and only find significant turnout effects in the presidential 2017 election for plebiscite eligibles. We further formally decompose the difference between downstream effects of the plebiscite and of subsequent elections. We decompose the effects into an initial mobilization effect and a persistence effect. We find that the substantially larger downstream effects of the plebiscite are due to the size of the initial mobilization rather than greater persistence in voting from the initial mobilization.

We also examine heterogeneous impacts across a number of dimensions, a first in this literature. While in the lead-up to the plebiscite, the 'No' campaign focused its advertisements towards women (Hirmas, 1993), we find larger effects for males, as plebiscite participation results in 14% higher 2017 turnout rates relative to their ineligible counterparts. We find suggestive evidence of larger downstream effects for individuals living in historically left-leaning municipalities, with significant impacts in the 2017 election.

In addition, using two other administrative data sources, which contain detailed information on individuals' educational attainment, we analyze whether the set of compliers varied across upstream elections.[2] We find that plebiscite eligibility induced a sizable share of high school dropouts to initially register to vote, compared to high school dropouts in other upstream elections. Moreover, in specifications with longer bandwidths, which include plebiscite eligibles who had more time to register, the share of high school dropouts who registered to vote increases significantly. These results indicate that both the salience of an election and the time to registration both affect

[2]We analyze information linking the educational attainment data to registration outcomes under the old electoral system, allowing us to explore heterogeneous registration outcomes by education level. Nonetheless, since our turnout data is de-identified, we cannot examine turnout effects by education.

electoral participation heterogeneously by socioeconomic status. Since Chile's old electoral system implied permanent registration (with high turnout rates), we note that the 1988 plebiscite induced a larger share of less educated Chileans to vote. Using survey data, we document that this group tends to support left-learning parties in Chile. As a result, we lastly posit that the structure of the plebiscite likely contributed to the the 20-year period of one-party rule — a common feature in various post-dictatorship countries — by a left-leaning coalition (*Concertación*) in Chile.

Previous work has examined the impacts of upstream election eligibility on downstream turnout in the United States, using the age-18 eligibility cut-off as well. Using data from California, Meredith (2009) documents that presidential election eligibility increases subsequent participation up to four years later. Coppock and Green (2016), on the other hand, show persistent effects of early-life electoral participation on future voter turnout over a period of two decades. We note, however, that Nyhan et al. (2017) has shown that registration itself is endogenous, leading to bias in the estimation of voting persistence. By contrast, since our files contain the entirety of the Chilean population, not just those who are registered to vote, our empirical strategy for estimating the impact of initial voter participation upon future voting is robust to this criticism.

We note that our analysis of complier characteristics across upstream elections provides important evidence as to why downstream effects may vary across elections. In fact, this is the first paper to document substantial heterogeneity in concurrent registration rates by educational attainment, and we further show that less educated voters are far more likely to register in more salient elections and when they have more time to do so. We thus contribute quasi-experimental evidence to an extensive experimental literature considering the factors which drive voter turnout, see (Gerber and Green, 2000; Gerber et al., 2003, 2008; Arceneaux and Nickerson, 2009; Green and Gerber, 2019), among others. Moreover, given the prevalence of one-party rule in various countries after the reinstatement of democracy, we present suggestive evidence that the nature of the Chilean plebiscite may have contributed to the twenty years of *Concertación* rule, by inducing less educated citizens to vote.

We also contribute to a growing literature analyzing Chile's 1988 plebiscite. Other papers have used cross-sectional variation to estimate the impact of exposure to military repression (proxied by distance to a military base) (Bautista et al., 2019) and the penetration of the 'No' campaign (González and Prem, 2018), defined by TV-ownership rates across municipalities, on support for the 'No' position in the plebiscite. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to consider the long-term electoral consequences of the plebiscite. Furthermore, we present the first estimates of downstream electoral persistence in a non-US context using reliable administrative data.

Another advantage of our approach is that ours is the first paper to consider the long-term effects of an election held under dictatorial rule. Other work has analyzed downstream effects in developing countries using survey data, including De Kadt (2017) in South Africa and Holbein and Rangel (2019) in Brazil, but always under democratic rules. Furthermore, our administrative data sources allow us to separately estimate registration and turnout effects. In fact, Chile's electoral reform implies that we recover a turnout effect which is not explained by differential

registration rates but rather reflects a pure effect of voting on future voting — a first in this literature. Moreover, we present evidence on important sources of heterogeneity, analyzing differential effects by gender and partisanship (measured at the municipality level).

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we discuss institutional details. In Section 3, we introduce our data sources and present summary statistics. In Section 4, we present our empirical strategy. Section 5 presents our main results of the long-run effects of Plebiscite eligibility on persistent downstream registration and voting spanning up to three decades. Section 6 documents how our findings vary by gender, education-level and partisan orientation of municipality. We also discuss the implications of our results for partisan mobilization and relate them to single party dominance in newly democratized countries. Finally, Section 7 concludes.

2 Institutional Details

Political Background. In 1970, Salvador Allende and the Socialist Party came to power in a narrowly won and highly contested electoral victory. Allende and his Popular Unity coalition of communists, socialists, social democrats and radicals faced off against the center-left Christian Democrats, led by Radomiro Tomic, and the right wing National Party candidate Jorge Alessandri. Allende received the 36.6% of the votes as compared to Alessandri's 35.2% and Tomic's 28.1% and formed a government with the support of the Christian Democrats.

On September 11, 1973, Salvador Allende's government was overthrown in a military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet. Pinochet's regime suspended civil rights, raided the homes of suspected opposition supporters, and they both kidnapped and murdered potential members of the opposition. The Rettig and Valech reports, conducted after the end of the dictatorship, estimated that the regime was responsible for the murder of 3,216 individuals and the torture of 38,254 Chileans.

Under international pressure over human rights abuses, Pinochet sought to legitimize his regime through a plebiscite proposing a constitutional reform (Varas, 1982).[3] The plebiscite took place on September 11, 1980 and the Constitution was ratified with 67.5% of the vote. The new Constitution ushered in a new eight-year rule for Pinochet, which began on March 11, 1981 and was set to last through March 11, 1989. The Constitution called for the military regime to propose a new candidate for the next eight-year term at least 90 days prior to the end of Pinochet's rule. This candidate would be ratified in a plebiscite in which a "Yes" vote would imply an eight-year term for the proposed candidate, beginning on March 11, 1989 and lasting through March, 1997. A "No" vote would first extend Pinochet's rule for an additional year and then trigger a democratic Presidential election to be held 90 days prior to the end of Pinochet's extended term — in

[3] In 1978, the government had held a plebiscite calling for an up or down vote on the following statement: "Faced with international aggression launched against our fatherland, I support President Pinochet in his defense of the dignity of Chile and reaffirm the legitimacy of the government." Since the regime had destroyed voter rolls under the argument that Allende had manipulated voter registration rolls to secure a win in the 1973 Parliamentary elections, all Chileans over 18 were allowed to vote. The 'Yes' option won with 71% of the vote, though its legitimacy was highly questioned (Welp, 2010).

December, 1989 (Nagy and Leiva, 2005).

While the 1980 Constitution had made voting mandatory, the norms for electoral participation were not defined until the restitution of the Electoral Commission in 1986 (*SERVEL* in Spanish). The guidelines established by SERVEL in 1986 did not require Chileans to register to vote — thus leaving Chile with a unique system of voluntary registration with mandatory voting only for registered citizens.[4]

1988 Plebiscite. The guidelines laid out in the 1980 Constitution implied the plebiscite would be held in 1988, yet a specific date was not announced in advance. Voter registration opened on February 25, 1987, and all Chilean citizens older than 18 years old became immediately eligible to register to vote.[5] By the end of 1987, over 3 million Chileans had registered, reaching 40% of the voting-age population. On August 30^{th} of 1988, the military regime announced that the candidate for the 'Yes' option would be Augusto Pinochet, and that the Plebiscite would be held on October 5^{th} (Boeninger, 1997). Servel also closed voter registration on August 30, with 7.4 million Chileans having registered to vote, encompassing over 90% of the voting age population. Registration was even high among young Chileans; 70% of 18-24 year olds registered in time for the Plebiscite.[6]

In the lead-up to the Plebiscite, the Pinochet government gave both the 'Yes' and 'No' campaigns fifteen minute-long sequential advertisement slots on national television — called the *franja*— every night. The regime and the opposition, a coalition of political parties named *Concertación*, both presented videos supporting their respective positions and the videos were syndicated on all television stations across the country every day between September 5^{th} and October 1^{st} from 8:30 to 9PM. González and Prem (2018) exploit variation in TV penetration across counties (*comunas*) to examine the impact of the *franja* on the 'No' vote share, finding that a one standard deviation increase in television exposure increased 'No' support by two percentage points.

Most polls conducted in 1988 showed the 'Yes' option to be leading among registered voters (Boas, 2015). However, 97% of all registered individuals voted in the Plebiscite and the 'No' option won with 54.7% of the vote. As a result, Pinochet's rule was extended for a year, through March 11^{th}, 1990 and Presidential elections were called for December, 1989.[7]

During 1989, the military regime and the opposition agreed on a number of reforms to the

[4] Navia (2004) has argued that the military regime installed this electoral system in order to skew the electorate in its support. In particular, they assumed that regime supporters would be eager to register whereas the opposition would fracture on whether to encourage registration and potentially legitimize the results of the plebiscite or boycott it, thus leading the 'Yes' option to an easy win. This was of particular concern since, as documented in Fuentes (2013), the 1980 plebiscite was replete with voter fraud on behalf of the regime.

[5] SERVEL's electoral guidelines published in 1986 mentioned that citizens who turned 18 prior to an election, but after the registration closing date could still register to vote. Nonetheless, this rule did not apply for the 1988 Plebiscite as the Plebiscite date had not been announced in advance. As a result, Chileans who turned 18 between February 25^{th} 1987 and registration closing date for the Plebiscite could only register to vote upon turning 18.

[6] The age cut-off described above combined with the sudden announcement of the registration closing date implies that Chileans who turned 18 on August 31^{st} were ineligible to vote in the Plebiscite. At the same time, those who turned 18 on August 30 had only one day to register on that day whereas those born earlier in 1970 had a longer time period during which they could register. For instance, those born on July 30, 1970 had a full month to register.

[7] Electoral registration closed on June 15^{th} in 1989, yet Chileans who would turn 18 by the Presidential election date (on December 14) were allowed to register to vote for both the Constitutional reforms and the Presidential election.

Constitution. A Constitutional referendum was held on July 30^{th} and these reforms were ratified by 85.7% of the electorate. The *Concertación* candidate, Patricio Aylwin, won the Presidential election with 55% of the vote, becoming Chile's first democratically-elected President in seventeen years and ushering in twenty years of *Concertación* Presidents.[8]

Post-Plebiscite Elections and Electoral Reform. In the years following the restoration of democracy, eligible registrants increasingly registered to vote at lower rates. By the time of the 2009 Presidential elections, only 20% of 18-24 year olds had registered to vote and only two-thirds of the entire voting age population had done so (Contreras and Navia, 2013).[9] The large decline in voter registration was partly due to an electoral system which combined voluntary registration with mandatory voting.[10] In contrast to plummeting registration rates, electoral participation among registered voters remained quite high, reaching 86.7% in 2009.

Partly motivated by the aging of the electorate, Chile undertook a sizable change in its electoral system in 2009, moving away from a system with mandatory voting and voluntary registration to one with universal automatic registration and voluntary voting. The new registration system thus resembles that of countries such as Italy, Norway, and Spain as well as by Washington, D.C. and 16 U.S. states including California, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan and Oregon.[11] All eligible adults were immediately registered and all minors were automatically registered at age 18. As a result, the number of registered voters increased from 8.5 to 13.4 million. The new electoral system was first put in place for the 2012 municipal elections, yet despite the sizable increase in the number of registered citizens, turnout actually fell from 7.0 to 5.8 million voters. The decline in voter turnout persisted through the 2013 and 2017 Presidential elections, falling from 7.25 million voters in the 2009 election to 6.7 million in both the 2013 and 2017 Presidential elections. Table 1 shows registration and turnout over time for all Presidential elections, documenting the large registration rates for early elections, along with the sizable decline in turnout following the 2012 electoral reform.

Our analysis of the impact of plebiscite eligibility and plebiscite participation upon long-run voter turnout captures effects of two separate regimes. Up through the 2009 Presidential election,

[8]Chile's post-dictatorship electoral system created a "top two" (two-stage) electoral system for President. In the first round, a candidate wins only with an outright majority of the votes. Otherwise, the election proceeds to a second round with the two top candidates, as was the case in the 1999, 2005, 2009, 2013 and 2017 Presidential elections.

[9]Different additional reasons have been put forth to explain the falling registration rates. First, voters were unable to register during certain times: in off-election years, individuals could only register to vote in the first seven week days of each month. Second, in election years, registration closed three-to-fourth months prior to the election date. In fact, Corvalan and Cox (2018) find that contemporaneous registration rates are 20% lower for those who turn 18 the day after a registration deadline relative to those born one day earlier despite both being eligible to register for an election months in the future.

[10]The mandatory voting system was enforced with substantial fines. SERVEL levied a nominal Peso equivalent of $100 USD in the 1989 Presidential election. Nominal fines increased over time, exceeding $200 by 2009. These fines had not been put in place by the plebiscite.

[11]After the reform was approved, Chile's President, Michelle Bachelet, argued that "expanding the universe of voters is of critical importance, as voter rolls have aged significantly, as such, it is important for young people to express their opinions". Another argument made by the Bachelet government centered around allowing individuals who became interested in voting close to the day of the election to be able to vote.

actual turnout is not directly measured but largely reflects registration since voting was mandatory for the registered. During this period of time, gaps narrow due to catch-up of by initially ineligible individuals. After the 2012 electoral reform, the new regime implemented automatic registration and voluntary voting. In the voting persistence literature focused on the U.S. context (Meredith, 2009; Coppock and Green, 2016), it is not clear whether estimated effects reflect the impact of voter registration upon future voting or of voting itself upon future voting. By contrast, in our paper, since by the 2013 election, registration is automatic, our estimates reflect a pure effect of voting upon future voting.

3 Data Sources and Summary Statistics

3.1 Data Sources

Our main data source comes from de-identified individual-level voting data provided by SERVEL for the 2013 and 2017 residential elections and for the 2016 municipal election.[12] In addition to individual-level turnout data for the three most recent elections, this data set includes information on the birth year and week of Chileans, which we use to determine plebiscite eligibility. Moreover, we observe the year of registration for those who registered voluntarily under the old electoral system. We additionally observe gender and *comuna* of residence at the time of the election.

We take advantage of voters' *comuna* of residence to merge various *comuna*-level characteristics. First, we use data from Chile's last two censuses, conducted in 1992 and 2002, which provide information on *comuna*-level covariates including the share of households with electricity, water, and a toilet in their house respectively, the share of TV ownership along with the literacy and the *comuna* unemployment rate.[13] Furthermore, we analyze heterogeneous downstream effects of the Plebiscite by political affiliation by merging in *comuna*-level vote shares in the 1970 Presidential election for Allende.[14] We note that our analysis of heterogeneous impacts across comuna-level characteristics necessitates that flows of people in and out of *comunas* do not on average change aggregate *comuna* characteristics. While this is a strong assumption, CASEN 2015 data indicates that fewer than one-third of Chileans adults have moved *comunas* since birth. For Chileans who have moved since the upstream election, our procedure imputes incorrect *comuna*-level characteristics, which would lead to attenuation bias if migration were random.[15]

Since the voter turnout data contains limited information on individual-level characteristics,

[12]The Presidential election data data only covers first round election results. We do not observe turnout for the second-stage runoffs in the 2013 and 2017 elections.

[13]To analyze heterogeneous effects by exposure to the *franja*, we obtain the share of television ownership by *comuna* in 1987 from González and Prem (2018), which comes from Chile's 1987 National Socioeconomic Survey (*CASEN*). Since the 1987 CASEN did not cover all *comunas* in Chile, we also rely on TV ownership data from the 1992 Census.

[14]We create a cross-walk of 1970 *comunas* to present-day *comunas*.

[15]Cursory examination of 2015 CASEN data does not show evidence of selective moving patterns towards *comunas* with differential 1970 vote shares or baseline characteristics. As a result, we argue that our *comuna*-level imputation procedure is unlikely to be a source of non-classical measurement error. Nonetheless, since our *comuna*-level analysis relies upon a strong assumption, we remark that our results are suggestive rather than causal.

we complement our analysis using a variety of administrative data sources. First, we use administrative data from SERVEL, which contains exact date of birth, gender and exact registration date for individuals who had voluntarily registered in the old system. Whereas the SERVEL registration data covers the universe of Chileans who had at some point registered to vote prior to automatic registration in 2012, it does not include the birth date of non-registered individuals.

To address this concern, we construct a measure of population size by birth cohort by combining the SERVEL individual data on registration with two other administrative data sets, in which we also observe individuals' educational attainment. First, we use data from Chile's Unemployment Insurance (UI, *Seguro de Cesantía*) database, which contains matched employee-employer data for all formal sector employment contracts signed since November 2002. As a result, this data source covers all Chileans who spent at least one month employed in the formal sector since 2002. These records include upwards of seven million workers. The UI data includes employment status but critically for our analysis, it also contains educational attainment. Since UI data does not capture individuals who have not held formal sector employment since 2002, we complement our analysis with administrative records from the Bureau of Social Protection (FPS, *Ficha de Protección Social* of 2009). The FPS data includes all individuals (along with their family members) who applied for any social program in Chile, covering two-thirds of the Chilean population. From the FPS data, we obtain individuals' educational attainment, as well. These sources of information were merged, generating individual-level records containing educational attainment and date of registration.[16] To ensure that the sample is representative of the Chilean population, we compare it to the SERVEL turnout data for the 2013 election. The 2013 turnout data includes 13.39 million Chileans born before 1995, whereas our data set includes 11.37 million individuals — we observe educational attainment for 9.98 million of them. As a result, we recover educational attainment for 75% of the voting-age population for the 2013 presidential election.[17]

This data set allows us to examine long-term differences in registration rates and to examine compliers' educational attainment across different bandwidths and upstream elections. Nonetheless, we do not observe educational attainment in the SERVEL turnout data. Thus, we cannot estimate heterogeneous impacts of plebiscite eligibility on downstream turnout.

Finally, we also use political opinion survey data conducted by the *Centro de Estudios Publicos* (CEP) for all the election years from 1989-2009. This data set contains demographic data, most notably, socioeconomic status, as well as self-reported turnout and partisanship. We use this data

[16] Unlike the de-identified turnout data, these data sources include individuals' national identification number. The link across various administrative data sources was carried out at the secure server of Chile's Ministry of Finance using fake identifiers. Since the education variables are coded differently in the UI and in the FPS data sets, we classify individuals by whether they were high school dropouts, high school graduates or had at least some post-secondary education by 2009.

[17] The nature of these administrative data sources implies that we better recover educational attainment for working-age individuals in 2013. As a result, our match rate is in the 66% range for individuals born in the 1950s, rising to 73.1% and 77.5% for those born in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively. We find no significant differences in match rates for individuals across the birth date threshold, as we observe educational attainment for 75.3% and 75.4% of Chileans born in 1970 and in 1971, respectively. We formally test for differences in match rates across the various upstream election cut-offs and find no significant differences. These results are available upon request.

to examine the likely partisan impacts of the plebiscite and to test for differential turnout in pre-reform electoral system.

3.2 Summary Statistics

Table 2 presents summary statistics. The combination of our data sources allow us to analyze voting behavior for over 13 million Chileans. The majority of our sample did not complete a high school diploma and *comuna*-level characteristics largely match country-level averages. In terms of voter participation, 60% of our sample had voluntarily registered to vote by 2009, 49.5% and 47.2% actually voted in the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections, respectively.

In the second and third columns, we divide the sample across age-based plebiscite eligibility. Those who had turned 18 prior to the plebiscite unsurprisingly have lower educational attainment relative to their ineligible peers.[18] However, they live in *comunas* with otherwise similar baseline characteristics. Moreover, close to 90% of plebiscite eligibles had registered to vote by 2009 whereas 55% voted in the 2017 election. The electoral participation of eligibles nonetheless far outpaces that of younger Chileans, since just 29.8% of individuals in this group had registered by 2009 and 40% of them had turned out for the 2017 election.

Nonetheless, the differences in electoral participation in these two groups could be explained by life-cycle voting patterns. As a result, in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2, we compare individuals who were marginally eligible to participate to those who were marginally ineligible, restricting our attention to Chileans who turned 18 in a 12-month window across the Plebiscite eligibility cut-off. In this group, we find similar differences in terms of electoral participation between elgibiles and non-eligibles. 86% of eligible individuals had registered to vote by 2009, in contrast to just 69% of marginally ineligible Chileans. Moreover, we find analogous results in terms of voting in the 2013 Presidential election, with the older group having turned out at 55% rate compared to a 50% turnout rate for their younger counterparts. Similar differences emerge for the 2016 municipal and 2017 Presidential elections.

4 Empirical Strategy and Model Selection

To identify the impact of Plebiscite eligibility on downstream electoral turnout, we take advantage of the sharp cut-off introduced by the age-18 eligibility requirement, which implied that Chileans born after August 30, 1970 were ineligible to vote in the 1988 Plebiscite. We follow Meredith (2009), Coppock and Green (2016) and Fujiwara et al. (2016) among others and implement a regression discontinuity design. We regress downstream registration and turnout on initial eligibility, controlling for the relationship between registration or turnout in the future election on birth date.

[18] Differences in educational attainment across the Plebiscite cut-off are explained by increasing participation in higher education over time in Chile (Ferreyra et al., 2017).

Our basic regression model can be specified as follows:

$$Y_i^j = \alpha^j + \delta^j Before_i + \mu^j(Cutoff_i) + Before_i \times \mu^j(Cutoff_i) + \varepsilon_i^j \quad (1)$$

where Y_i^j is a binary variable which represents either registration by person i in or before the registration deadline for the election in year j or voter turnout by individual i in downstream election j. $Before_i$ is a dummy variable which equals 1 if person i turned 18 prior to the eligibility cutoff for the 1988 plebiscite, $Cutoff_i$.[19] $\mu^j(Cutoff_i)$ is a flexible function of the distance (in weeks) of person i's age-18 birthday to the same cut-off. The interaction term allows for the relationship between plebiscite eligibility and long-term voting behavior to vary depending upon the distance to the cut-off.

The identifying assumption behind the regression discontinuity design presented is that the unobserved characteristics of individuals are continuous across the cut-off (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008), that is, eligible and ineligible individuals should only differ in terms of their ability to have voted in the 1988 Plebiscite. In fact, both eligible and ineligible individuals were exposed to the electoral fervor surrounding the possible return to democracy, with the only difference being the older group's ability to vote.

While our main focus is on the impact of eligibility for the 1988 plebiscite, we also consider eligibility thresholds for other upstream presidential elections, including the 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 elections. This analysis provides a credible internal benchmark to determine whether the impacts of plebiscite eligibility are salient vis-a-vis other upstream elections. We do so by re-estimating equation (1) for each election separately. Thus, for any pair of these elections $\{k, j\}$ with $j \geq k$ we estimate:

$$Y_i^j = \alpha_k^j + \delta_k^j Before_{i,k} + \mu_k^j(Cutoff_{i,k}) + Before_{i,k} \times \mu_k^j(Cutoff_{i,k}) + \varepsilon_{i,k}^j \quad (2)$$

where $Before_{i,k}$ is a dummy variable which equals 1 if person i turned 18 prior to the eligibility cut-off for upstream election k. Expression (2) produces the main results presented in Section 5 across elections (j and k). In addition, to formally test for whether the effects of the plebiscite are statistically different from other upstream elections, we also consider a differences-in-discontinuity design. Let E_i^k be a dummy variable which equals one if person i turned 18 around the eligibility cut-off for upstream election k, such that $\sum_{k=0}^{j} E_i^k = 1$. Thus, if we define the 1988 plebiscite as the baseline ($k = 0$) election, we can write:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_i^j &= \alpha_0^j + \delta_0^j Before_{i,0} + \mu_0^j(Cutoff_{i,0}) + Before_{i,0} \times \mu_0^j(Cutoff_{i,0}) \\ &+ \sum_{k=1}^{j} E_i^k \times \left[\alpha_k^j + \delta_k^j Before_{i,k} + \mu_k^j(Cutoff_{i,k}) + Before_{i,k} \times \mu_k^j(Cutoff_{i,k})\right] + \epsilon_i^j, \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

[19] We omit the week of August 30^{th}, 1970 from our estimation some individuals born in that week were eligible to register in time for the 1988 plebiscite whereas others were not. We also estimate assigning the week of August 30^{th}, 1970 as part of the treatment group and our results do not substantively differ.

from where we can test whether eligibility to vote in the 1988 plebiscite has a differential effect on Y_i^j relative to eligibility in other upstream elections (we examine the coefficient on $\beta_k^j = \delta_k^j - \delta_0^j$ for any election k prior to j). To formally test for differences in estimates across upstream elections, we estimate equation (3) using as outcomes voter turnout in the three downstream elections with automatic registration and voluntary voting, that is the 2013, 2016 and 2017 elections. To construct the set of right-hand side variables, we use election eligibility for 1988 (baseline), 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009.

The specification of $\mu(\cdot)$. Across equations (1)-(3), the optimal bandwidth selection procedure varies by the functional form of $\mu(\cdot)$. In our context, we consider linear, quadratic, cubic, quartic and non-parametric specifications. Thus, we jointly select bandwidths and functional forms. To this end, we implement two approaches: five-fold cross-validation and the Akaike information criterion (AIC) procedure.

We first assess the goodness-of-fit across functional form assumptions for different bandwidths. For both approaches, we do not find significant differences in terms of model fit (see Table A.1 in Appendix). Therefore, we follow Gelman and Imbens (2019) and choose a linear functional form as our main specification.[20]

To select a bandwidth, in principle, one could examine the optimal CCT bandwidth (Calonico et al., 2014) across upstream and downstream elections as well as for each specification. However, this strategy yields a large number of different values, which are not comparable across elections and outcome variables. We therefore select a 26-week bandwidth, which gives us a full year of coverage for each upstream election.[21] In the Appendix we show our results are robust to different values ranging between two-weeks and one-year, including the optimal bandwidth from the CCT algorithm.[22,23]

[20] Gelman and Imbens (2019) note that higher order models are more subject to small-sample over-fitting; given the possibility of over-fitting based upon cohort-specific random shocks which would be common across the random samples combined with the small differences in fit across specifications, we opt to follow their recommendation.

[21] The most prominent papers in this literature use different bandwidths, from six weeks in Meredith (2009) to one year in Coppock and Green (2016). The 26-week bandwidth is selected somewhat arbitrarily, though to present comparable estimates, we need some level of discretion given the large set of possible specifications.

[22] We present the optimal bandwidth from the CCT algorithm for each of these combinations in Table A.2. The optimal bandwidth yields 140 different values — ranging from a 4 week bandwidth with a linear functional form for the 1988 first stage to a 61 week bandwidth with a quartic functional form for the downstream effects of the Plebiscite on 2017 turnout. It is worth noting that our bandwidth selection of 26 weeks is the closest to those reported as optimal bandwidths for the linear functional forms presented in Table A.2.

[23] In Table A.3, we present evidence on covariate balance across marginally eligible and ineligible individuals by estimating equation (2) with a linear polynomial and a 26 week bandwidth using different covariates as outcomes. We do not find significant differences in any covariate across the Plebiscite cut-off. Nonetheless, in a few of the other upstream elections, we find minor differences in educational attainment across the eligibility cut-off. These differences are likely driven by Chile's school enrollment cut-off, which is on April 1. A 26-week bandwidth around elections which take place in December capture some individuals in different school cohorts (McEwan and Shapiro, 2008). As a result, we also present balance in educational attainment in Table A.3 using a 13-week bandwidth, where we do not find differences across the cut-off in other upstream elections. Moreover, except for two coefficients for the 2005 upstream election, though the standard errors rise with the restricted 13 week bandwidth, the coefficients for difference across the threshold fall in size such that they would not be significantly distinguishable from zero even with the 26 week standard errors. The fact that the treated and the control have different average first year of entry into school may affect

5 Main Effects

5.1 Effects on Voter Registration

We first present our benchmark estimates of plebiscite eligibility upon downstream registration and downstream voting over a period of three decades. In Figure 1, we plot 1988 plebiscite registration rates by birth week. As mandated by law, the data confirm that no one who was born after August, 1970 registered in time for the plebiscite. Thus, unsurprisingly, we have full compliance for those who were ineligible to vote. We see that approximately 20% of the cohort who were born in the last week of August registered in time for the plebiscite. Upwards of 40% of the cohort born in the second to last week of August registered to vote. Thus, even having one additional week to register dramatically increased registration rates. The rate of increase in registration rates per additional week of time to register is large — about two-thirds of those who turned 18 eight weeks prior to the cut-off had registered to vote. There is a smaller, though steady, rate of increase in registration rates over the next 4 months. Those who had six months to register signed up at a near 75% rate.

While the initial differences in registration rates across the cutoff may not seem surprising, these patterns seem to be highly persistent over time. When we look at registration by birth cohort two decades later, we see that these differences remain and are quite large. Figure 2 displays 2009 registration rates by cohort for those born up to 1000 weeks (almost 20 years) before the last week of August, 1970 and up to 1500 weeks afterwards. Registration rates are roughly constant at approximately 90% for cohorts born before 1970. There is a slight decline in registration rates for those who turned 18 just before the plebiscite registration cutoff and a sharp 13 percentage point drop right at the cutoff, to approximately 70%. Registration continues to decline for younger cohorts with smaller yet observable discontinuities at eligibility cutoffs for other elections.

Table 3 presents regression discontinuity estimates of the impact of marginal eligibility upon registration for both the contemporaneous as well as for subsequent elections (see equation (2)). We use our benchmark specification of a linear functional form and 26 week bandwidth. In Panel A, we show that marginal eligibility for the plebiscite increased contemporaneous turnout by 56 percentage points in 1988. By the following Presidential election, held in 1989, 31% of marginally ineligible Chileans had registered to vote, despite the early registration deadline. Nonetheless, sizable differences in registration rates remained across the two groups, exceeding 30 percentage points. Registration rates increased significantly for both groups in the next two decades, yet marginal plebiscite eligibility led to registration rates which were 13 percentage points higher than their marginally ineligible counterparts.[24]

other papers in this literature, which generally use even larger bandwidths (Coppock and Green, 2016). Due to these concerns, in Section 5, we show that our results are robust to a 13-week bandwidth and that the regression discontinuity design for other upstream elections is not compromised due to small differences in educational attainment.

[24]While the old electoral system mandated Chileans to vote, we do not observe whether the differences in registration rates do in fact correspond to differences in turnout. To this end, we take advantage of political opinion surveys conducted by the *Centro de Estudios Publicos* (CEP). While the post-2005 surveys do not contain information on year of birth, we combine five surveys conducted in the 2001-2005 period which retroactively asked Chileans whether they

These results are consistent with rational political behavior. Registration in Chile before the 2012 electoral reform was costly not only due to the time it took to figure out how to register and to then sign up, but also because it entailed a permanent future commitment to voting enforced by the possibility of non-trivial fines. Since the 1988 plebiscite was particularly salient, it is certainly possible that the costs of registration were the same for marginally eligible and marginally ineligible cohorts but that the benefits of registration were substantially higher for the marginally eligible given the importance of the plebiscite itself.

In Panels B-F of Table 3, we present regression discontinuity estimates of the impact of marginal eligibility of other Presidential elections. Whereas the 1989 Presidential election was held just 14 months after the 1988 plebiscite, only 14.5% of marginal eligibles registered to vote despite the fact that, in contrast to the plebiscite, the registration deadline was announced months ahead of time. This 74% decline in the impact of marginal eligibility on contemporaneous registration suggests that the electoral fervor surrounding the return to democracy had quickly died down, potentially due to the absence of mass mobilization (González and Prem, 2018).[25] The substantially smaller effects of marginal eligibility on registration persisted for all subsequent elections in the pre-reform era. Only the 1993 effect is larger (20.3 percentage points) than the 1989 effect. The effects for all other years were are below 10 percentage points and the effect for the 1999 election is below 5%.

The last column of Table 3 examines whether marginal eligibility for upstream elections led to differences in registration rates in 2009. We find that marginal eligibility for the 1989 and 1999 elections both resulted in higher registration for marginal eligibles, yet the differences are small, in the range of 2 percentage points. While the differences associated with 1993 election eligibility are larger (5.4 percentage points) than the downstream 2009 registration effects of all other elections, the effects are far smaller than for the 1988 plebiscite.

The results presented thus far are robust to different combinations of functional forms and bandwidths used in the literature. Table A.4 shows that across a number of bandwidths and functional forms, plebiscite eligibility led to higher registration rates through 2009, in the range of 9.7-14 percentage points. In addition, Figure A.1 shows robust graphical evidence of the effects of upstream election eligibility on contemporaneous registration rates, which correspond to those presented in Table 3. Finally, Figure 3 presents graphical evidence on long-term registration differences across the various upstream election cutoffs, confirming that that plebiscite eligibility leads

had voted in the 2001 Congressional elections. Among Chileans who had registered to vote, we do not find differences in stated 2001 turnout rates between those born in 1967-1969 (90.4%) and those in 1971-1973 (89.4%) — these results are available upon request. Survey responses do not constitute causal evidence of turnout effects, as plebiscite eligibility may have induced individuals to over-report their political participation. However, these differences are consistent with the turnout results presented in Section 5.2. As a result, adjusting our registration estimates by the turnout rate for the corresponding election (presented in Table 1) may provide a reasonable estimate of turnout effects under the old electoral system.

[25] An alternative explanation for the decline in the initial eligibility effect is that 1988 plebiscite marginal eligibles were those who had just turned 18. On the other hand, marginal eligibles for subsequent elections captured those who would turn 18 just before the election. If most potential voters pay attention to voter registration only upon turning 18, closing registration early while allowing voting-eligible 17 year olds to register may reduce the impact of marginal eligibility. We find that the first stage results are robust to longer bandwidths — which include marginal eligibles who had turned 18 by the registration deadline — suggesting the results are robust to such concerns.

to significantly larger long-run registration effects than in any subsequent election.

5.2 Effects on Voter Turnout

We turn to the individual-level voter turnout data to examine the impacts of plebiscite eligibility on turnout for the 2013, 2016 and 2017 elections. Since Chile's 2009 electoral reform led to automatic registration for all age-eligible Chileans, the estimated impacts of plebiscite eligibility on downstream registration rates disappeared following the reform.

The bulk of the literature on downstream voting effects has focused on the United States, where electoral participation requires individuals to register to vote. As a result, upstream election eligibility may lead to higher downstream turnout rates partly through differences in registration rates across the eligibility cut-off.[26] In fact, the existing literature does not identify whether downstream voting effects are driven by a one-time registration effect or a long-run increased preference for casting a ballot (Coppock and Green, 2016). Our estimates overcome this issue due to the implementation of universal registration following Chile's electoral reform.[27] As a result, though we do not argue that our estimates are externally valid to the United States, our estimates do present the first pure estimates of persistence in voting unmediated by registration. This result is behaviorally important. One plausible reason for persistence in voting in the U.S. could merely be that voting requires registration (except in North Dakota) which lowers the marginal cost of voting in the future for purely institutional reasons. Our estimates suggest that voting reduces future psychological costs of voting, generating persistence.[28]

Figure 4 displays raw voter turnout rates for the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections by birth week cohorts from 1950 through 1990. Figure 4 shows a large secular decline in turnout rates across birth cohorts: 70% of Chileans born in 1950 turned out for the 2013 election, doubling the participation of their counterparts born 40 years later. As with the registration time series, there is one discontinuity which shows up clearly over the entire 40-year period across both elections, which corresponds to the eligibility threshold for the 1988 plebiscite. This suggests that the well-identified estimates we find using regression discontinuity techniques likely are not specific to the particular cohort of first-time voters in 1988 but rather general for all eligible voters.

Our difference-in-discontinuity (equation (3)) estimates of marginal upstream election eligibility upon voter turnout in the 2013, 2016 and 2017 elections are presented in Table 4. Its first

[26] Those eligible for the upstream election may act upon their initial excitement by registering to vote just after turning 18. Meanwhile, those who are marginally ineligible are substantially older when they first vote and may thus have less enthusiasm for voting than their marginally older counterparts. The fixed costs of registering to vote may not be worthwhile for the marginally younger voter and thus a permanent turnout gap may emerge due to differences in registration rates — fully consistent with rational behavior.

[27] Franklin and Hobolt (2011) estimate impacts of first voting in a low salience European Union election as opposed to a high salience national election; the countries in their sample either do not have voter registration or have a mandatory registration system. However, they use a 1,000 observation data set from a 27-country household survey which relies on self-reported turnout — known to suffer from over-reporting issues — and they estimate effects based upon differences across rather than within cohorts. Fujiwara et al. (2016) do not find differences across U.S. states with automatic versus manual turnout persistence, which is suggestive that the fixed cost of registering to vote may not fully explain persistence in the U.S.

[28] We include information required about voting such as polling location as part of these psychological costs.

row shows the estimated impact of plebiscite eligibility, which suggests statistically significant impacts across all three elections. We find that eligibility to participate in the plebiscite increased voter turnout in the first round of the 2013 and 2017 Presidential elections by 3 and 1.8 percentage points, respectively. Relative to baseline turnout rates in both elections — 49.6% and 47.2%, respectively — the estimated impacts of Plebiscite eligibility correspond to an increased turnout rate of 6% and 4% in the 2013 and 2017 elections.

We also find a significant effect on a lower-stakes municipal election held in 2016, such that upstream eligibility resulted in increased turnout by 2.1 percentage points, or 6%, relative to baseline participation rates. The estimated effects are highly persistent through 2017, reaching close to thirty years since the plebiscite. The original event has therefore had an impact over a time period corresponding to around half of an adult's political life.[29]

The results in Table 4 are further confirmed by the graphical evidence presented in the first panel of Figures 5-7, which again show a linear decline in turnout for cohorts closer to the eligibility cutoff. This decline can be explained by the results shown in Figure 1, as cohorts born closer to the cutoff were substantially less likely to register in time than those born even a few weeks earlier. Meanwhile, turnout rates are largely flat across the cutoff for marginally-ineligible Chileans.

Our appendix presents evidence on the robustness of our baseline estimates to bandwidth and functional form assumptions.[30] In particular, we estimate equation (2) and present 12 different estimates for each upstream/downstream election pair, as we combine three bandwidths (26-week, 52-week and CCT) with four polynomials (linear, quadratic, cubic and quartic). The estimated impacts of plebiscite eligibility are significant across all bandwidths in the linear and quadratic polynomials for all downstream elections. See Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7 for the 2013, 2016 and 2017 elections, respectively.

Table 4 analyzes the comparative effects of eligibility for other upstream elections (relative to the plebiscite) on downstream turnout rates. For the 2013 election, we find that Plebiscite eligibility had a significantly larger impact than any other upstream election. In fact, only the marginal eligibility for the 1993 Presidential election had a positive effect on 2013 turnout, in the range of 1.3 percentage points.[31] We find similar results for the 2016 and 2017 elections, as the differential downstream voting impacts of other election are all statistically distinguishable from the plebiscite effect. While 1993 election eligibility increased turnout in the 2013 election, the effect faded for the

[29] Figure A.2 shows estimates of plebiscite eligibility on 2017 election turnout using placebo cut-offs within a six-year window of the plebiscite registration date. We find that only the actual cutoff is associated with higher downstream turnout effects.

[30] Throughout the analysis, we cluster standard errors at the week-of-birth level. Alternatively, we consider clustering by month, yet this approach leaves us with a number of clusters that is too small to claim asymptotic validity of the errors. We address this issue by using the wild cluster bootstrap and separately estimating using Newey-West standard errors with one, two, four and eight lags. Significance levels change trivially across all results. These results are available upon request.

[31] Table A.8 in the appendix displays estimates of equation (2) for each upstream election using a linear polynomial with two different bandwidths. To address concerns of covariate imbalance in educational attainment for other upstream elections, columns (1)-(3) additionally present estimates of equation (2) using a 13-week bandwidth. Results for a 26-week bandwidth are reported in columns (4)-(6). We do not find significant differences across specifications, underlying the robustness of our results.

two subsequent elections. Moreover, we find that 2005 election eligibility may have had negative impacts on 2017 turnout.[32] We confirm these results by presenting graphical evidence in the remaining panels of Figures 5-7. These graphs show a positive effect of 1993 eligibility on 2013 turnout, which fades by 2016, along with insignificant impacts for other upstream elections.

Figure 7 suggests that plebiscite eligibility increased 2017 turnout rates by upwards of five percentage points for individuals who had six months to register. Thus, the results presented in Table 4 likely underestimate the average effect of the plebiscite on the full sample: while the RD estimate for the 1988 referendum captures the impact of eligibility for individuals who only had one week to register, the corresponding estimate for other upstream elections recovers the effect for Chileans who had close to a full year to do so. All in all, the results presented so far indicate that the sizable downstream voting effects of the 1988 election seem to be unique to the plebiscite.

While we do not observe turnout for the pre-reform elections, CEP survey data indicates that turnout rates are not different for registered individuals across the plebiscite cut-off. In Figure A.3, we thus show the dynamic impact of plebiscite eligibility on turnout over time by graphing the pre-reform registration effects for the pre-2010 period and the turnout impacts following 2013.[33] The downstream effect by the 1989 election is close to 30 percentage points, falling almost in half by 1993, and declining steadily through 2009. Assuming equal 2009 turnout rates across the cut-off, this result implies that downstream turnout effects fell from around 11 percentage points to 3 percentage points between the 2009 and 2013 presidential elections with the removal of mandatory voting and the introduction of automatic registration. The reform both made it easier for non-registrants to vote and allowed prior registrants not to vote. Both of these changes likely narrowed the turnout differences between marginal eligibles and marginal ineligibles. Though the effect size has declined since the reform, it remains positive and statistically significant even 29 years after the plebiscite. Moreover, Chile's electoral reform implies that we can rule out that the persistent voting effect is due to the fixed cost of voter registration. We can thus conclude, and hereby differentiate ourselves from the prior literature, that plebiscite eligibility led to a significant long-term shift in the preference to vote.

5.3 Mechanisms: Persistence and Initial Mobilization

Two alternative channels could explain our estimated impact of plebiscite eligibility on downstream electoral turnout: a large mobilization (i.e. turnout) in the original plebiscite and a high degree of turnout persistence afterwards. A large initial mobilization results in larger downstream effects as the size of the treated group is larger, whereas a higher degree of persistence leads to larger downstream effects since the effects last longer. In this section, we formally decompose the difference in downstream voter turnout effects across upstream elections into a mobilization

[32] Coppock and Green (2016) have also documented that participation in certain upstream elections in the United States has negative consequences on downstream turnout. For example, participating in an election where ex-post the executive disappointed voters could make those who voted less likely to participate in the future relative to those who were not able to participate.

[33] We adjust the pre-reform registration effects by election turnout rates equally on both sides of the cut-off.

component and a persistence component.

In order to empirically implement our decomposition, we first must obtain our long run effect (which we decompose), our mobilization effect and our persistence effect. We recover the 'mobilization' effect across upstream elections $k \in \{0, ..., K\}$ by leveraging the age-18 cut-off to estimate the impact of eligibility on concurrent electoral turnout from equation (2) under $j = k$. These results are presented along the diagonal of Table 3. The resulting parameters, δ_k^k, recover the estimated impact of marginal eligibility for election k on concurrent electoral turnout. We then take advantage of these estimated parameters to predict turnout in upstream election k, $\widehat{Y_i^k}$, for voters who turned 18 around the eligibility cut-off. We subsequently regress downstream election turnout Y_i^j on turnout in different upstream elections:

$$Y_i^j = \alpha + \sum_{k=0}^{K} \gamma_k^j \widehat{Y_i^k} + e_i^j \tag{4}$$

where Y_i^j denotes having turned out to vote in the post-reform downstream election j ($j > k$). γ_k^j captures the 'persistence' effect – that is, the extent to which having voted in upstream election k results in turnout in downstream election j. We examine the degree to which turning out for the Plebiscite differentially affects downstream turnout in election j vis-a-vis having turned out for other upstream elections k, that is, $\gamma_0^j - \gamma_k^j$.

Table 5 presents our persistence estimates by upstream and downstream elections. We recover the effect of upstream participation on downstream turnout by dividing the reduced form estimate displayed in Table 4 by the first stage — equal to 56 percentage points for the Plebiscite (Table 3). As a result, we find that having voted in the plebiscite is associated with a higher turnout rate of 5.5 percentage points in the 2013 presidential election, or 11% relative to baseline participation rates. The persistence estimate declines to 3.8 percentage points for the 2016 election, which still represents 11% of baseline participation, due to low turnout in municipal elections. On the other hand, the estimated impact falls to 3.3 percentage points by Chile's last presidential election, yet the turnout effects remain statistically significant almost 30 years after the plebiscite.[34] We also present the persistence effects of other upstream elections to consider whether the effects of the initial plebiscite effects are particularly long lasting. We find that voting in the plebiscite had larger effects on 2013 turnout than having voted in any other election, except for the 1993 election. For the 2017 presidential election, the persistence effects of the plebiscite are not distinguishable from those for the 1989 and 1999 elections. Similarly, the 2016 effects are only statistically larger than those in the 1999 and 2009 upstream elections.[35]

[34]Similar to the results presented in Section 5.2, we present various robustness checks to bandwidth and functional form assumptions in Tables A.9, A.10 and A.11 for the 2013, 2016 and 2017 elections, respectively. As in Tables A.5-A.7, we find that the effects of plebiscite participation on downstream turnout are significant across all bandwidths in the linear and quadratic polynomials. However, we find four insignificant coefficients in the cubic and quartic 26-week bandwidth specifications for the 2016 election and the 26-week/cubic and CCT-bandwidth/quartic specifications for the 2017 election. In Figure A.4, we show the robustness of the estimated effects of plebiscite participation on downstream turnout to bandwidths ranging from two weeks to one year.

[35]Table A.12 presents the results for each upstream election. Columns (1)-(3) correspond to the findings using a 13-

While the persistence estimates for the plebiscite are larger than those of other upstream elections for at least one of the three downstream elections, these differences are not as large as those shown in Table 4, which showed the plebiscite had a far larger downstream impact than any other election. In fact, the plebiscite persistence estimates are also not necessarily larger than those found in the United States (Coppock and Green, 2016). In contrast, the mobilization effects for the plebiscite are between 2 and 12 times as large as the mobilization effects for any of the presidential elections. To examine the relative importance of this dimension, we take advantage of the estimated mobilization (first stage) effects presented in Table 3, along with the degree of persistence shown in Table 5. We decompose the difference in the effects of plebiscite eligibility on downstream turnout against that of other upstream elections as follows:

$$\delta_0^j - \delta_k^j = \underbrace{(\gamma_0^j - \gamma_k^j)\delta_k^k}_{\text{Mobilization}} + \underbrace{\gamma_0^j(\delta_0^0 - \delta_k^k)}_{\text{Persistence}}, \tag{5}$$

where δ_0^j is the effect of plebiscite eligibility on turnout in downstream election j and δ_k^j represents the corresponding effect for upstream election k. δ_0^0 and δ_k^k represent the initial mobilization (first stage) for the plebiscite and upstream election k, respectively, and γ_0^j and γ_k^j capture the persistence of having voted in the plebiscite, or in election k on downstream election turnout (j), respectively.[36] As such, the first term of equation (5) measures the mobilization effect whereas the second captures differential persistence from the plebiscite. We bootstrap the standard errors for the mobilization share and the persistence share with 1,000 replications.[37]

We present our decomposition results in Table 6. We normalize the mobilization and persistence as shares of the long run effect on voter turnout.[38] We find that in all 15 upstream-downstream election pairs, the majority of the gap can be explained by the mobilization effect. Due to weakness of the initial mobilization and the subsequent statistical weakness of our persistence estimates, not all mobilization share estimates are significantly different from zero. However, they are statistically distinguishable from zero in 12 out of 15 cases with a 99% level of

week bandwidth and (4)-(6) a 26-week bandwidth, which confirm that our results are robust to the bandwidth selection. The results show that voting in the 1999, 2005 and 2009 may have depressed turnout in downstream elections. Coppock and Green (2016) also find a wide range of positive persistence effects including a number that are negative though not negative and statistically significant. This result could arise in an upstream election with a disappointing outcome for young voters, which subsequently discourages future participation. For example, since previous work (Titiunik, 2009) has found a negative party incumbency effect in Brazil, experiencing a party in power may move voters away from supporting that party or even away from politics more broadly.

[36] Equation (5) exploits that $\gamma_k^j = \delta_k^j / \delta_k^k$. We recover the γ_0^j and γ_k^j estimates from Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7 for each upstream election (2013, 2016, and 2017, respectively), using a 26-week linear functional form for the 2013, 2016 and 2017 elections, respectively. The estimates of γ_0^j and γ_k^j, meanwhile, follow from results in Tables A.9, A.10 and A.11. Lastly, δ_0^0 and δ_k^k follow from the results presented in Table 3.

[37] For each replication, this entails re-estimating the contemporaneous mobilization effect for each downstream election as well as both the long-run turnout effect and the persistence effect for each pair of upstream-downstream election pair. We then compute the mobilization, persistence and residual shares relative to the long-run turnout effect for each replication.

[38] Though our decomposition is an exact one, the mobilization estimates and the persistence estimates come from different regressions. Thus, we have a small residual error which we also report. The size of the error is small, never getting above 4% in magnitude and usually remaining below 2%.

confidence. For the 2013 and 2016 downstream elections, the mobilization component accounts for upwards of 65% of the differential effects of the plebiscite against other upstream elections. For 2017, the persistence component accounted for almost half of the differential effect of the plebiscite against the 1993 and 2005 Presidential elections. Nonetheless, these results largely show the large impacts of plebiscite eligibility on downstream participation are not due to an unusually high degree of persistence, but rather because of an unusually large initial mobilization to vote.

6 Heterogeneous Effects and Complier Characteristics

How did plebiscite eligibility affect downstream electoral outcomes across different groups? Despite the fact that we do not observe turnout outcomes by educational attainment through 2009, we can characterize differential registration effects by education, a first in the literature. We also analyze heterogeneous effects by gender and by partisanship. Since the downstream plebiscite estimates presented in Section 5 vary by bandwidth, we also check for heterogeneity in complier characteristics across bandwidths. We use this heterogeneity in effect sizes and in complier characteristics to interpret the variation in effect sizes by bandwidth.

6.1 Gender, Partisanship and Education

Gender. Women in Latin American countries are more likely than men to both register and turn out to vote (Espinal and Zhao, 2015). However, this fact need not translate into women being more or less reactive to the long-run effects of plebiscite participation. For example, Kaplan and Yuan (2020) show that women are more reactive to early voting in the United States despite also be overall more likely to vote. Hirmas (1993) argues that Pinochet's opposition decided to target women in their *franja* slot based upon focus groups and research by consulting firms. As a result, the effect of plebiscite participation for marginally-eligible women may have been larger. We thus examine the heterogeneous effects of plebiscite eligibility on registration and downstream electoral turnout by gender, a first in the literature.

We estimate equations (1)-(2) separately by gender and present the results in Table 7. The first two columns show that plebiscite eligibility increased concurrent female registration by 53 percentage points though the corresponding effect for men was larger, reaching 59 percentage points.[39] We also find differences in downstream turnout effects by gender. Plebiscite eligibility increased 2013 election turnout by 3.7 percentage points for men, or 8% of baseline participation. Meanwhile, the corresponding effect for women reached 1.9 percentage points, or 3.4% of baseline electoral turnout. These differences persisted through the 2017 Presidential election, when the turnout effect for men accounted for 5.4% of baseline turnout rates (Figure A.5). Table A.13 reports heterogeneous effects of upstream eligibility on downstream turnout for other elections and we fail to find larger effects for men than for women. All in all, these results indicate that the

[39] Pooled regression results indicate the differences are statistically significant across gender.

persistence effect for men was substantial but specific to the plebiscite. Dividing by the first stage, plebiscite participation raised male turnout in the 2013 election by 14% of baseline participation rates.

Partisanship: Effects by Salvador Allende's 1970 Support. Since we do not directly observe voters' partisan affiliation at the individual level, we rely on pre-plebiscite measures of political affiliation in order to analyze how downstream effects vary by partisanship. We thus consider heterogeneous effects by Allende vote share at the *comuna* level in the last pre-dictatorship election, held in 1970. Allende's support was highly heterogeneous across the country, as he received less than 15% of the vote in *comunas* such as Providencia and over 65% of electoral support in Coronel and Lota. Similar to González and Prem (2018), we estimate heterogeneity in initial registration by prior Allende vote-share to analyze whether the plebiscite differentially mobilized the left and also in downstream persistence, to analyze whether the long-term effects were larger for left-leaning groups.[40]

We estimate an interactive regression discontinuity design, interacting each term in equation (1) with $Allende_{ic}$, which corresponds to Salvador Allende's vote share in the 1970 election in person i's *comuna* (c) of residence at the time of registration. We also control for various *comuna*-level characteristics measured in the 1992 census, including *comuna*-level unemployment rate, literacy rate, and various measures of household well-being. We present our results in Table 8. The first column shows that eligible Chileans living in high-Allende support *comunas* had lower registration rates for the plebiscite vis-a-vis their counterparts in less left-leaning localities. On the other hand, in the last three columns, we show that plebiscite eligibles who lived in left-leaning *comunas* had higher downstream turnout rates, the effect is only statistically significant for the 2017 election. The coefficient for the 2017 election indicates that an increase in the Allende share from 0% to 100% is associated with a 8.7 percentage point higher impact of plebiscite eligibility on downstream turnout. The analogous estimates for the 2013 and 2016 elections are similar, ranging from five to eight percentage points. These results are suggestive, especially since we do not observe *comuna* of residence at the time of the plebiscite; yet they suggest that participating in the plebiscite may have had larger long-term effects for left-leaning individuals.[41]

Educational Attainment. An extensive literature has documented higher turnout rates among highly educated citizens, both in developed countries (Milligan et al., 2004; Dee, 2004; Sondheimer and Green, 2010; Marshall, 2019; Kaplan and Spenkuch, 2019) and in Latin America (Haime, 2017). However, to the best of our knowledge, the existing literature has not yet examined how up-

[40] As noted above, our analysis of heterogeneous effects across geographic areas relies on the assumption that individuals did not move their *comuna* of registration. In the presence of random migration, this would lead to attenuation of our estimated effects.

[41] We have separately examined the role that media played by intermediating the effect of the plebiscite, particularly in light of the importance of the "No" campaign on television. We did not find larger downstream effects for individuals residing in *comunas* with higher TV penetration (individually) nor interacted with Allende baseline support. However, the standard errors are quite large. These results are available upon request.

stream election eligibility affects participation differentially by education. While we do not observe turnout effects by education, we examine heterogeneous registration effects by education, providing an important contribution to the literature .

We estimate equation (2) using a linear polynomial with a 26-week bandwidth separately for high school dropouts, high school graduates and those who have gone beyond high school. We present the results in Table 9.[42] The first panel shows the estimated effects for the plebiscite. We find larger first-stage effects for more highly educated individuals, as eligibility induces 48 percent of those with at least some post-secondary education to register, relative to 30.6 percent of high school dropouts. On the other hand, by 2009, we find similar registration effects in absolute levels between eligibles and ineligibles for the three educational groups. In fact, since high school dropouts have far lower baseline 2009 registration rates, plebiscite eligibility resulted in downstream registration rates which were 16.7% higher than those for their ineligible counterparts — significantly higher than the corresponding effect (11.2%) for those in the highest-education group.

In the remaining panels, we examine whether registration effects vary by upstream election. We find multiple substantial differences. First, initial mobililzation (first stage) effects of post-1988 elections are smaller in magnitude uniformly for all educational groups than for the plebiscite, confirming the results presented in Table 3. Second, we find far larger initial mobililization effects for the beyond-high-school groups vis-a-vis high school dropouts in each election. Third, the mobillization gap across educational groups is by far the smallest for the plebiscite: while the ratio of the first-stage coefficient for these two groups equals 1.6 in the plebiscite, it exceeds 3 in all other upstream elections. Fourth, different from the plebiscite where we still see 9.9 percentage point higher registration rates in 2009, we find that initial eligibility for high school dropouts yields small differences in 2009 registration rates among eligibles relative to ineligibles for all other elections. The largest downstream effect for the 1999 presidential election, only reaches 2.2 percentage points, or one-fourth of the estimated plebiscite effect. These results thus indicate that plebiscite eligibility induced a sizably larger share of less educated individuals to initially register to vote and initial eligibility was associated with higher downstream registration rates for this group only for the plebiscite.

6.2 Complier Characteristics

We have shown that the effect of upstream election participation on downstream turnout varies both within elections and across bandwidths (Tables A.9-A.11). In what follows, we examine whether differences in the types of compliers may account for the variation between the estimated impacts across the plebiscite and subsequent presidential elections. We first identify complier characteristics following the approach presented in Abadie (2002), where compliers are the marginally eligible individuals who registered to vote in the corresponding election.[43]

[42] As discussed in Section 3, we do not observe educational attainment for all individuals in our sample. As a result, the estimated combined sample sizes for the three educational attainment groups are smaller than in Table A.8.

[43] Since Chileans who had not turned 18 by the date of the election could not register to vote, there are no always-takers or defiers in our context.

Table 10 presents our results for the 26-week bandwidth across individuals' educational attainment, gender and the *comuna*-level variables discussed above. We include three columns for each upstream election, covering average characteristics for the full sample (26-weeks on both sides of the cut-off), average characteristics only for compliers, and the average characteristics for the ratio between the two. The share of compliers is far larger for the plebiscite than for other elections, as shown in Table 3. Furthermore, as discussed in Section 6.1, we find significant differences in terms of compliers' educational attainment across upstream elections. In the plebiscite, the complier ratio for high school dropouts equals 0.89, and the corresponding ratio for all other elections does not surpass 0.82. By 2009, the ratio had fallen to below 0.32.[44] For the other characteristics, the differences are not as stark. We note that the plebiscite as well as the 1989 and 1993 elections had a higher male complier ratio, which reversed in subsequent upstream elections. We do not find significant differences in complier characteristics across *comuna*-level variables, though compliers in the 1999, 2005 and 2009 elections are more likely to come from lower Allende-supported *comunas* with lower unemployment rates.

Since the estimated average effects vary across different bandwidths, we also examine variation in complier characteristics across these bandwidths. We consider 13- and 52-week bandwidths and present the results in Table A.14. For the plebiscite, the male complier ratio decreases with longer bandwidths, indicating that the persistence estimates with larger bandwidths include a larger share of women in the complier group. This, however, is not the case for other upstream elections. On the education side, we find that the complier ratio for high school dropouts is lower (0.857) for the 13-week bandwidth and significantly higher (0.933) for the 52-week bandwidth. These patterns hold across other elections as well, yet the absolute complier ratios for high school dropouts are far lower than for the plebiscite, independent of the selected bandwidth. All in all, these results indicate that lower educated citizens are far more likely to register to vote when they have additional time to do so, but also are more likely to register for more consequential elections.

Angrist and Fernandez-Val (2010) present a strategy for recovering the source of differences in LATE estimates across samples by separately estimating the local average treatment effect for each complier group/cell and re-weighting the samples to make the LATE estimates comparable. However, this approach is not feasible in our context, as we cannot estimate downstream voting impacts by education groups. Nonetheless, we approximate their analysis by presenting graphical evidence on both treatment on the treated effects and complier characteristics using twelve different bandwidths, ranging from one- to twelve-months, in Figure 8. The estimated persistence estimates for the 2013 and 2017 Presidential elections covary positively with the high school dropout and the female complier ratios, which may indicate larger downstream effects of early-life political participation for less educated voters.

[44] The ratio is far lower for the 1989, 1999, 2005 and 2009 elections. The complier ratio for high school dropouts in the 1993 election is somewhat closer to that for the plebiscite. Since this election had a larger first-stage effect (20.3%) relative to other elections, it may also, as with the plebiscite, have induced a relatively higher fraction of less educated voters to register.

6.3 Partisanship Effects

The results presented so far show a sizable share of Chileans over 18 were induced to register to vote due to age-based eligibility, and that these individuals were relatively more likely to be less educated vis-a-vis compliers in comparison with other subsequent elections. As a result, the plebiscite permanently shifted the composition of the Chilean electorate under the old electoral system. We thus examine whether the Plebiscite had an impact on subsequent electoral outcomes, given the twenty years of *Concertación* Presidents after the reinstatement of democracy.[45] The analysis presented here is suggestive, as we do not observe individual-level partisan turnout/support.

In order to compute a back-of-the-envelope estimate of the impact of the plebiscite upon the *Concertación* vote share, we rely on four pieces of information. First, we recover the number of Plebiscite eligibles by educational attainment group.[46] We then multiply this number by the estimated downstream election registration effect by education group presented in Table 9. We further adjust this number by the average turnout rate for each presidential election, which ranged between 86.7% and 94.5%, as shown in Table 1. Lastly, we impute the partisanship effect by taking advantage of pre-election polls conducted by CEP in 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 — these polls include measures of heterogeneous support for the *Concertación* by educational attainment.[47]

We present our results in Table 11. We find significant gains for the *Concertación* in the 1989 and 1993 elections, reaching close to 2.6 percentage points, which correspond to 50% and 33% of the average margin of victory for the coalition, respectively. While the effects decline for the 1999 and 2005 elections, largely due to a changing education-*Concertación* gradient, the effects remain positive through the 2009 Presidential election. Furthermore, while we cannot extend this exercise through the 2013 and 2017 elections, the results presented in Table 8 indicated larger effects in left-learning municipalities, suggesting the plebiscite may have shifted electoral outcomes for close to three decades in Chile. We further note that the estimates presented in Table 11 are likely lower bounds. First, we make a conservative assumption by only considering eligible individuals as 'treated' if they were born between 1930 and 1970. More importantly, we do not observe partisanship and therefore cannot directly estimate the differential turnout impacts upon those who would vote left versus right (the maximum differential voting rates for the left across our three educational groups and all elections is 0.08). Thus, since education is weakly correlated with and thus an imperfect signal for partisanship, using education as a proxy should attenuate

[45] As noted above, *Concertación* was the political organization that formed in order to defeat the plebiscite on continued Pinochet rule back in 1988.

[46] We construct this number as follows. From the merged administrative data, we directly observe the number of individuals who turned 18 prior to the eligibility cut-off by attainment group. In Table 2, we had shown that the merged administrative data under counts the number of eligible individuals. We address this issue by multiplying the number of eligibles by education group by 1.4, which is the ratio of eligible individuals observed in the SERVEL data to the number in the merged administrative data. We thus assume that attainnment is missing at random. Since the registration data was collected in 2009, we restrict our analysis to eligible individuals born in 1930-1970 to avoid including older citizens who had died by 2009, which provides a conservative estimate of partisanship effects.

[47] These surveys were conducted 1-2 months prior to each election and include 1,000-1,500 respondents each. Since CEP surveys do not include a consistent measure of educational attainment, we rely on their socioeconomic status indicator which classifies respondents by three categories. The 1993 CEP survey includes respondents' educational attainment and socioeconomic status, we rely on this cross-tabulation to impute stated vote shares by education group.

our estimates. Nonetheless, we find moderate partisan impacts even two decades after the 1988 plebiscite.

Our estimates provide a potential partial explanation of one party dominance in newly democratic (including post-colonial) states (Magaloni, 2006; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010). In Figure A.6, we first document the extent of party transitions in newly democratized countries. On average, the first post-dictatorship party remains in power longer than the second party, but this result is driven by a long right tail, as the first post-dictatorship party has remained in power for more than twenty years in six different countries, including Chile.[48] We remark that to the best of our knowledge, ours is the first paper to document this result. While the existing literature has examined the importance of the extensive margin of support (broad popularity) for the party establishing democracy as a mechanism for lengthy initial one party dominance, we suggest an additional and novel mechanism which is also quantitatively important. We add an intensive margin mechanism: the party that wins democratic rights may become popular (extensive margin). but it may also bolster turnout (intensive margin) and for decades to come.

7 Conclusion

Electoral participation can be consequential even many decades later. We document that voting for the restoration of democracy in Chile's 1988 plebiscite, which ended 15 years of military rule, boosted turnout in the 2017 presidential election by 3.3 percentage points or by 7.1%. Inspection of turnout by age for the entirety of Chile suggests that the effects were likely for all those eligible to vote in the 1988 plebiscite rather than just the young. We furthermore demonstrate that the long-lasting impacts of the plebiscite differ across elections mainly due to initial mass mobilitiztion rather than differential persistence of voting. We document heterogeneous effects in concurrent registration and turnout rates by gender, by town partisanship and by education. We explore the long-term effects of voting for democracy under dictatorial rules, a first in this literature.

Different from the results in the existing literature, our findings reflect a pure effect of voting on future voter turnout as Chile abandoned voluntary registration as a precondition for voting after the 2009 presidential election. Since our empirical strategy does not rely upon voter registration files, our findings are robust to the biases resulting from the selectivity of registration, a common problem in this literature. Finally, we provide suggestive evidence that electoral participation in the plebiscite shifted the electorate to the left by bolstering future turnout for *Concertación*. Increased turnout for the party that wins democracy can help explain one party dominance in newly democratized countries.

[48] These cases include the Cambodian People's Party (Cambodia), *Concertación* (Chile), People's Progressive Party (Guyana), Mongolian People's Party (Mongolia), Mozambique Liberation Front (Mozambique), and Movement for Multiparty Democracy (Zambia). Table A.15 includes the full list of democratic transitions, along with the length of government for the first (and second) party in power.

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Tables and Figures

Figure 1: The Effect of Plebiscite Eligibility on Plebiscite Participation



Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*. Note: Figure 1 shows graphical evidence of Plebiscite registration rates by week of birth within a year of registration closing for the Plebiscite. Week 0 corresponds to the August 30^{th} week.

Figure 2: Long-Term Differences in 2009 Registration Rates by Birth Cohort



Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*. Note: Figure 2 shows graphical evidence of the share of individuals who had voluntarily registered to vote by the 2009 by week of birth cohort. Week 0 corresponds to the August 30^{th}, 1970 birth cohort. Gray lines denote age-based cutoffs for eligibility in Presidential elections which took place in 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009.

Figure 3: Differences in 2009 Registration Rates Across Eligibility Cutoff in Various Elections



Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL).*
Note: Figure 3 shows graphical evidence of differences in 2009 voluntary registration rates in a linear specification across the eligibility cut-off (26-week bandwidth) in the 1988 Plebiscite and the 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections.

Figure 4: Long-Term Differences in 2013 and 2017 Election Turnout Rates by Birth Cohort



Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*. Note: Figure 4 shows graphical evidence of the share of individuals who had turned out to vote for the 2013 and 2017 Presidential elections by week of birth cohort. Week 0 corresponds to the August 30^{th}, 1970 birth cohort. Gray lines denote age-based cutoffs for eligibility in Presidential elections which took place in 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009.

Figure 5: Differences in 2013 Election Turnout Rates Across Eligibility Cutoff in Various Elections



Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*.
Note: Figure 5 shows graphical evidence of differences in 2013 Presidential election turnout rates in a linear specification across the eligibility cut-off (26-week bandwidth) in the 1988 Plebiscite and the 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections.

Figure 6: Differences in 2016 Election Turnout Rates Across Eligibility Cutoff in Various Elections



Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*.
Note: Figure 6 shows graphical evidence of differences in 2016 Presidential election turnout rates in a linear specification across the eligibility cut-off (26-week bandwidth) in the 1988 Plebiscite and the 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections.

Figure 7: Differences in 2017 Election Turnout Rates Across Eligibility Cutoff in Various Elections



Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*.
Note: Figure 7 shows graphical evidence of differences in 2017 Presidential election turnout rates in a linear specification across the eligibility cut-off (26-week bandwidth) in the 1988 Plebiscite and the 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections.

Figure 8: Treatment on the Treated Effects and Complier Characteristics by Bandwidths

(a) 2013 Presidential Election



(b) 2017 Presidential Election



Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*. Note: Figure 8 shows graphical evidence of the estimated treatment on the treated effect of plebiscite participation on 2013 and 2017 Presidential election turnout for twelve different bandwidths. It also includes the complier ratio for high school dropouts and females across these bandwidths presented in Tables 10 and A.14.

Table 1: Aggregate Voter Turnout for Presidential Elections

	Eligible	Registered	Votes Cast	Share Registered	Share Voting	Turnout Rate
1988	8,062,000	7,436,000	7,251,000	0.922	0.899	0.975
1989	8,243,000	7,558,000	7,159,000	0.917	0.868	0.947
1993	8,951,000	8,085,000	7,377,000	0.903	0.824	0.912
1999	9,945,000	8,084,000	7,272,000	0.813	0.731	0.900
2005	10,800,000	8,221,000	7,207,000	0.761	0.667	0.877
2009	12,226,000	8,285,000	7,186,000	0.678	0.588	0.867
2013	13,188,000	13,388,000	6,634,000	1.000	0.496	0.496
2017	14,080,000	14,080,000	6,646,000	1.000	0.472	0.472

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL).*
Note: Table 1 presents summary statistics of voter registration and turnout for the 1988 Plebiscite and for all Presidential elections since 1989.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics

	Full Sample	Before Plebiscite	After Plebiscite	6 Months Before	6 Months After
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Individual-Level Characteristics					
Male	0.487	0.472	0.503	0.494	0.496
	(0.500)	(0.499)	(0.500)	(0.500)	(0.500)
HS Dropout	0.521	0.538	0.510	0.339	0.343
	(0.500)	(0.499)	(0.500)	(0.474)	(0.475)
HS Graduate	0.373	0.372	0.373	0.512	0.503
	(0.484)	(0.483)	(0.484)	(0.500)	(0.500)
$>$ HS Graduate	0.106	0.090	0.117	0.149	0.154
	(0.308)	(0.286)	(0.321)	(0.356)	(0.361)
Comuna-Level Characteristics					
Allende Share	0.372	0.370	0.374	0.372	0.372
	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.103)	(0.102)
TV Ownership Share	0.846	0.846	0.846	0.846	0.847
	(0.102)	(0.103)	(0.101)	(0.100)	(0.100)
Electricity in Home	0.908	0.904	0.912	0.902	0.905
	(0.137)	(0.141)	(0.133)	(0.140)	(0.139)
Water in Home	0.754	0.750	0.759	0.745	0.749
	(0.193)	(0.197)	(0.189)	(0.197)	(0.194)
Toilet in Home	0.701	0.695	0.706	0.689	0.693
	(0.235)	(0.239)	(0.230)	(0.238)	(0.236)
Literacy Rate	0.904	0.903	0.905	0.902	0.903
	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Unemployment Rate	0.087	0.087	0.087	0.088	0.088
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)
Registration Outcomes					
Registered for Plebiscite	0.406	0.809	0.000	0.669	0.000
	(0.491)	(0.393)	(0.000)	(0.471)	(0.000)
Registered by 2009	0.598	0.895	0.298	0.864	0.692
	(0.490)	(0.307)	(0.457)	(0.343)	(0.462)
Turnout Outcomes					
Voted in 2013 Election	0.495	0.617	0.373	0.554	0.504
	(0.500)	(0.486)	(0.484)	(0.497)	(0.500)
Voted in 2016 Election	0.352	0.452	0.265	0.398	0.369
	(0.478)	(0.498)	(0.442)	(0.489)	(0.483)
Voted in 2017 Election	0.472	0.559	0.400	0.515	0.483
	(0.499)	(0.496)	(0.49)	(0.500)	(0.500)
Sample Size (Turnout)	13,393,246	6,724,234	6,669,012	114,521	13,0684
Sample Size (Education)	11,370,669	4,797,356	6,034,206	87,595	97,518

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL). Seguro de Cesantia*, *Ficha de Proteccion Social*, 1992 and 2002 Chilean Census.
Note: Table 2 presents summary statistics for the sample considered in the paper. The first column shows summary statistics for the full sample. The second and third columns present descriptive statistics for Chileans born before and after the Plebiscite, respectively. The last two columns present information for individuals who turned 18 six months before and after the Plebiscite, respectively. In each column, we include individuals' gender, comuna-level characteristics matched to their 2013 comuna of residence and educational attainment from the FPS/SC merged dataset. In the last two rows, we include the sample size for the turnout data as well as the sample size for whom we observe educational attainment.

Table 3: Downstream Registration Effects of Upstream Election Eligibility

	Downstream Election					
	1988 Plebiscite	1989 Election	1993 Election	1999 Election	2005 Election	2009 Election
Upstream Election	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. 1988 Plebiscite						
Before	0.560	0.318	0.157	0.143	0.130	0.124
	(0.020)***	(0.016)***	(0.010)***	(0.009)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***
Control Mean		0.310	0.626	0.654	0.679	0.692
Observations			250,388			
Panel B. 1989 Election						
Before		0.145	0.024	0.020	0.018	0.017
		(0.002)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***
Control Mean			0.577	0.614	0.645	0.661
Observations			261,786			
Panel C. 1993 Election						
Before			0.203	0.082	0.060	0.054
			(0.007)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***
Control Mean				0.289	0.375	0.416
Observations			248,871			
Panel D. 1999 Election						
Before				0.045	0.024	0.019
				(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***
Control Mean					0.235	0.298
Observations			274,566			
Panel E. 2005 Election						
Before					0.088	0.033
					(0.002)***	(0.003)***
Control Mean						0.165
Observations			287,364			
Panel F. 2009 Election						
Before						0.068
						(0.002)***
Control Mean						
Observations			296,631			

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the week-of-birth level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Table 3 presents estimates of equation (2) using a linear functional form with a 26 week bandwidth across each election cut-off. The results refer to the estimated impacts of upstream election eligibility (1988 Plebiscite, 1989 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections) on differential registration rates across various downstream elections. The values along the diagonal correspond to the first-stage results. The 'Control Mean' row corresponds to the share of marginally ineligible individuals who had registered to vote in the downstream election denoted in each column.

Table 4: Estimated Effects of Upstream Election Eligibility on 2013, 2016 and 2017 Turnout

	2013 Election	2016 Election	2017 Election
Before	0.0300***	0.0206***	0.0180***
	(0.0048)	(0.0036)	(0.0036)
Before × 1989 Election	-0.0303***	-0.0157***	-0.0151***
	(0.0057)	(0.0047)	(0.0052)
Before × 1993 Election	-0.0165***	-0.0147***	-0.0214***
	(0.0062)	(0.0056)	(0.0056)
Before × 1999 Election	-0.0379***	-0.0252***	-0.0197***
	(0.0056)	(0.0051)	(0.0050)
Before × 2005 Election	-0.0373***	-0.0212***	-0.0281***
	(0.0066)	(0.0050)	(0.0050)
Before × 2009 Election	-0.0350***	-0.0281***	-0.0238***
	(0.0067)	(0.0055)	(0.0055)
Observations	1,587,822	1,583,460	1,583,419

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL).*
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the week-of-birth level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
Table 4 presents estimates of equation (3) using a linear functional form with a 26 week bandwidth across each election cut-off. The results refer to the estimated differential impacts of upstream election eligibility (1988 Plebiscite compared to the 1989 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections) on turnout in the 2013, 2016 and 2017 elections.

Table 5: Estimated Effects of Upstream Election Participation on 2013, 2016 and 2017 Turnout

	2013 Election	2016 Election	2017 Election
Before	0.0551***	0.0379***	0.0331***
	(0.0075)	(0.0062)	(0.0061)
Before × 1989 Election	-0.0568**	-0.0033	-0.0130
	(0.0222)	(0.0219)	(0.0262)
Before × 1993 Election	0.0119	-0.0083	-0.0498**
	(0.0201)	(0.0217)	(0.0221)
Before × 1999 Election	-0.2309***	-0.1399*	-0.0702
	(0.0674)	(0.0793)	(0.0777)
Before × 2005 Election	-0.1381***	-0.0437	-0.1484***
	(0.0534)	(0.0390)	(0.0397)
Before × 2009 Election	-0.1286*	-0.1468**	-0.1184*
	(0.0700)	(0.0617)	(0.0607)
Observations	1,587,822	1,583,460	1,583,419

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL).*
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the week-of-birth level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.
Table 5 presents estimates of a fuzzy differences-in-discontinuity using a linear functional form with a 26 week bandwidth across each election cut-off. The results refer to the estimated differential impacts of upstream election participation (1988 Plebiscite compared to the 1989 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections) on turnout in the 2013, 2016 and 2017 elections.

Table 6: Decomposition of Total Effects: Mobilization and Persistence in Plebiscite v. Other Upstream Elections

	2013			2016			2017		
	Mobilization	Persistence	Residual	Mobilization	Persistence	Residual	Mobilization	Persistence	Residual
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
1989	0.747	0.271	0.018	0.960	0.027	-0.013	0.883	0.116	0.001
	(0.091)***	(0.096)**		(0.378)**	(0.382)		(0.194)***	(0.209)	
1993	1.205	-0.165	0.040	0.878	0.108	-0.011	0.542	0.474	0.018
	(1.654)	(1.653)		(1.312)	(1.204)		(0.151)***	(0.167)**	
1999	0.732	0.271	0.003	0.733	0.239	-0.028	0.824	0.155	-0.021
	(0.076)***	(0.076)***		(0.062)***	(0.058)***		(0.182)***	(0.180)	
2005	0.689	0.326	0.015	0.794	0.172	-0.034	0.538	0.462	0.001
	(0.063)***	(0.065)***		(0.185)***	(0.179)		(0.050)***	(0.0594)***	
2009	0.759	0.247	0.006	0.650	0.360	0.005	0.656	0.332	-0.013
	(0.082)***	(0.077)**		(0.102)***	(0.109)***		(0.091)***	(0.086)***	

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*. Note: Table 6 presents a formal decomposition of the total effects of plebiscite eligibility on downstream election turnout against the estimated impacts for other upstream elections. The decomposition is calculated using results from the first stage presented in Table 3, the total effects for each upstream election using a linear polynomial with a 26-week bandwidth (Tables A.5, A.6 and A.7) and the persistence effects for each upstream election in the same specification (Tables A.9, A.10 and A.11) for the 2013, 2016 and 2017 downstream elections, respectively). For example, 0.271 reported under row (2) is obtained as [0.054-(-0.002)]*0.145/[0.0300-(-0.0003)] where 0.054 and -0.002 come from Table A.9, 0.03 and -0.0003 from Table A.9, and 0.145 from Table 3. The values are reported as shares of the total difference. The formal decomposition is presented in equation (5). The persistence share is the fraction of the decomposed gap explained by differences in persistence of the voting effect. The mobilization share is the fraction of the gap in the total effect explained by the size of the initial mobilization (first stage). The residual share is the remainder fraction due to rounding and estimation error. Bootstrapped standard errors are reported in parentheses. *: p-value $\leq$ 0.1, **: p-value $\leq$ 0.05, ***: p-value $\leq$ 0.01.

Table 7: Heterogeneous Effects of Plebiscite Eligibility by Gender

	1988 Plebiscite		2009 Registration		2013 Turnout		2016 Turnout		2017 Turnout	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Before	0.531	0.590	0.111	0.129	0.019	0.037	0.008	0.027	0.010	0.024
	(0.022)***	(0.019)***	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.007)**	(0.007)***	(0.006)	(0.005)***	(0.006)*	(0.006)***
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.688	0.698	0.552	0.455	0.405	0.334	0.525	0.441
Observations	126,343	124,045	126,343	124,045	126,343	124,045	125,952	123,321	126,056	123,209

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the week-of-birth level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Table 7 presents evidence of heterogeneous effects of Plebiscite eligibility on concurrent Plebiscite registration, 2009 registration and downstream 2013, 2016 and 2017 election participation in a linear, 26-week bandwidth specification.

Table 8: Heterogeneous Effects of Plebiscite Eligibility by Partisanship: Allende Support

Outcome Variable	First Stage	2009 Registration	2013 Turnout	2016 Turnout	2017 Turnout
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Before	0.588***	0.086***	-0.004	-0.004	-0.017
	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.019)
Before × Allende Share	-0.094**	0.079*	0.075	0.049	0.087*
	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.050)
Observations	216,086	216,086	216,086	215,069	214,766

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)* and 1992 Chilean Census.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the week-of-birth and comuna level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Table 8 presents evidence of heterogeneous effects of Plebiscite eligibility on concurrent Plebiscite registration, 2009 registration and downstream 2013, 2016 and 2017 election participation in a linear, 26-week bandwidth specification by 1970 Allende vote share. We cluster standard errors at the week-comuna level. We control for 1992 Census comuna characteristics including unemployment rate, literacy rate and the share of household with electricity, water and toliet in the home.

Table 9: Heterogeneous Effects of Upstream Election Eligibility by Educational Attainment

	Initial Registration			2009 Registration		
	HS Dropouts	HS Graduates	> HS Graduates	HS Dropouts	HS Graduates	> HS Graduates
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. 1988 Plebiscite						
Before	0.306	0.387	0.482	0.099	0.103	0.087
	(0.042)***	(0.044)***	(0.030)***	(0.021)***	(0.016)***	(0.007)***
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.601	0.688	0.774
Observations	63,187	93,905	28,021	63,187	93,905	28,021
Panel B. 1989 Election						
Before	0.053	0.085	0.169	-0.011	0.012	0.039
	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.006)**	(0.008)***
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.58	0.66	0.723
Observations	63,286	98,873	31,549	63,286	98,873	31,549
Panel C. 1993 Election						
Before	0.085	0.135	0.200	0.020	0.045	0.071
	(0.017)***	(0.012)***	(0.011)***	(0.014)	(0.008)***	(0.009)***
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.323	0.378	0.505
Observations	54,416	99,126	36,959	54,416	99,126	36,959
Panel D. 1999 Election						
Before	0.008	0.009	0.059	0.022	0.017	0.012
	(0.003)***	(0.004)**	(0.008)***	(0.010)**	(0.003)***	(0.008)
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.185	0.236	0.388
Observations	47,421	121,034	48,213	47,421	121,034	48,213
Panel E. 2005 Election						
Before	0.014	0.035	0.116	0.005	0.011	0.060
	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.005)***	(0.003)*	(0.004)***	(0.009)***
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.066	0.103	0.215
Observations	28,074	132,316	57,646	28,074	132,316	57,646
Panel F. 2009 Election (Columns (1)-(3) identical to (4)-(6))						
Before	0.010	0.047	0.063	0.010	0.047	0.063
	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.008)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.008)***
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Observations	35,805	174,064	7,373	35,805	17,4064	7,373

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL). Seguro de Cesantia*, *Ficha de Proteccion Social*, 1992 and 2002 Chilean Census.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the month-of-birth level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Table 9 presents evidence of heterogeneous effects of upstream election eligibility on concurrent registration (first three columns) and 2009 registration in a linear, 6-month bandwidth specification (last three columns).

Table 10: Complier Characteristics by Upstream Election

Upstream Election	1988 Plebiscite			1989 Election			1993 Election			1999 Election			2005 Election			2009 Election		
	Sample (1)	Compliers (2)	Ratio (3)	Sample (4)	Compliers (5)	Ratio (6)	Sample (7)	Compliers (8)	Ratio (9)	Sample (10)	Compliers (11)	Ratio (12)	Sample (13)	Compliers (14)	Ratio (15)	Sample (16)	Compliers (17)	Ratio (18)
Panel A. Individual Characteristics																		
HS Dropouts	0.341	0.304	0.891	0.327	0.206	0.631	0.286	0.234	0.818	0.219	0.111	0.507	0.129	0.054	0.416	0.165	0.051	0.312
HS Graduates	0.507	0.53	1.045	0.510	0.511	1.000	0.52	0.523	1.006	0.559	0.436	0.78	0.607	0.443	0.73	0.801	0.891	1.112
> HS Graduates	0.151	0.166	1.097	0.163	0.283	1.739	0.194	0.243	1.252	0.223	0.454	2.038	0.264	0.503	1.904	0.034	0.057	1.687
Male	0.495	0.499	1.007	0.496	0.570	1.149	0.500	0.549	1.098	0.501	0.484	0.967	0.506	0.463	0.915	0.507	0.455	0.898
Panel B. Comuna Characteristics																		
Allende Vote	0.366	0.365	0.997	0.366	0.357	0.975	0.365	0.360	0.984	0.367	0.339	0.924	0.369	0.350	0.948	0.371	0.345	0.930
% Electricity	0.903	0.909	1.006	0.907	0.923	1.018	0.908	0.887	0.976	0.915	0.912	0.996	0.916	0.914	0.998	0.911	0.918	1.008
% Water in Home	0.747	0.751	1.005	0.750	0.778	1.037	0.754	0.724	0.961	0.766	0.78	1.018	0.763	0.773	1.013	0.755	0.78	1.034
% TV Ownership	0.867	0.871	1.005	0.870	0.885	1.017	0.872	0.855	0.980	0.877	0.88	1.004	0.878	0.880	1.003	0.873	0.883	1.011
% Toilet in Home	0.691	0.697	1.009	0.696	0.729	1.048	0.700	0.661	0.944	0.714	0.725	1.015	0.712	0.721	1.013	0.701	0.729	1.039
Literacy Rate	0.902	0.904	1.001	0.903	0.910	1.008	0.904	0.898	0.993	0.906	0.911	1.005	0.906	0.909	1.003	0.903	0.91	1.008
Unemployment Rate	0.088	0.088	0.999	0.087	0.084	0.960	0.087	0.088	1.015	0.086	0.080	0.928	0.087	0.083	0.956	0.088	0.082	0.932
Share Compliers			0.666			0.160			0.287			0.076			0.120			0.102
Panel C. Sample Size																		
Sample Size (Educ.)	185,113			193,708			190,501			216,668			218,036			217,242		
Sample Size	236,347			247,191			234,435			258,832			271,090			279,495		
Ratio	0.783			0.784			0.813			0.837			0.804			0.777		

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL).*
Note: Table 10 presents complier characteristics by each upstream election using a 26-week bandwidth. Complier characteristics are calculated using the methodology in Angrist and Pischke (2008). The complier ratio equals the characteristics of compliers divided by those of the full sample across the 26-week cut-off.

Table 11: Vote Gain from the 1988 Plebiscite

Year of Election		1989	1993	1999	2005	2009
Turnout Rate		0.947	0.912	0.900	0.877	0.867
Size of treatment effect	HS Dropouts (3,321,300[a])	0.209	0.096	0.095	0.094	0.099
	HS Graduates (2,443,900[a])	0.225	0.10 8	0.106	0.104	0.107
	$>$ HS Grads (591,900[a])	0.246	0.112	0.109	0.101	0.089
Concertación vote share	HS Dropouts	0.592	0.678	0.526	0.529	0.588
	HS Graduates	0.560	0.652	0.496	0.520	0.561
	$>$ HS Grads	0.503	0.616	0.445	0.488	0.517
Total effect of the plebiscite on the left wing vote share		2.57%	2.59%	0.09%	0.33%	1.10%
Concertación vote margin		5.17%	7.98%	1.31%	3.49%	-1.60%

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)* for turnout effects, *Seguro de Cesantia* and *Ficha de Proteccion Social* for number of eligibles by educational attainment. *Centro de Estudios Publicps*, CEP: pre-electoral surveys conducted in 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 for partisanship effects.
(a): figures in parenthesis represent the number of individuals eligible by education group (E_k). These are calculated from the number of eligible individuals born between 1930-1970 from the merged administrative data multiplied by the ratio of non-missing educational attainment.
Note: The turnout rate follows from Table 1 (T_t). The size of the treatment effect follows from Table 9 and from results available upon request for the 1993, 1999 and 2005 elections (γ_t^k). Lastly, the *Concertación* vote share (L_t^k) follows from CEP data from surveys conducted 1-2 months prior to each Presidential election (1989-2009) and shows stated the share of *Concertación* voters by educational attainment. CEP surveys include respondents' socioeconomic status. We use information from the 1993 survey, which includes respondents' SES survey and educational attainment, to impute voting intent by educational attainment for all Presidential elections using the cross SES-education tabulation. The non-*Concertación* share (R_t^k) is equal to one minus L_t^k. We examine the impacts on first round elections. We calculate the effect of the Plebiscite on the *Concertación* vote share in election t (η_t) as follows:

$$\eta_t = \sum_{k=1}^{K} E_k \times T_t \times \gamma_t^k \times (L_t^k - R_t^k).$$

Appendix

A Tables and Figures

Figure A.1: Differences in First-Stage Registration Across Eligibility Cutoff in Various Elections

(a) 1989 Election



(b) 1993 Election



(c) 1999 Election



(d) 2005 Election



Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL).*
Note: Figure A.1 shows graphical evidence of differences in first-stage election registration rates across the eligibility cut-off (26-week bandwidth) in the 1989, 1993, 1999 and 2005 Presidential elections.

Figure A.2: Effect of Plebiscite Eligibility on 2017 Election Turnout: Placebo Cutoffs



Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*. Note: Figure A.2 shows the estimated effect of Plebiscite eligibility (equation (2) using placebo cutoffs within a three-year window on either side of the cutoff.

Figure A.3: The Effect of Plebiscite Eligibility on Voter Turnout



Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*. Note: Figure A.3 shows graphical evidence of Plebiscite registration rates on differential turnout rates by downstream year. The pre-2009 values correspond to differences in registration rates across the eligibility cut-off deflated by the corresponding election turnout rate — non-election years are deflated by the average turnout rate in the two closest Presidential elections. The post-2009 values correspond directly to the turnout effects presented in Table 4.

Figure A.4: Effects of Plebiscite Participation on Downstream Electoral Turnout: Robustness to Bandwidth Selection



Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*.
Note: Figure A.4 shows the estimated impacts of Plebiscite participation on turnout in the 2013, 2017 Presidential and 2016 municipal elections across the eligibility cut-off in bandwidths ranging from two weeks to one year. The results follow from a linear first-stage specification presented in equation (2) and the instrumental variables specification in Section 5.3.

Figure A.5: Downstream Election Turnout Effects of Plebiscite Eligibility by Gender

(a) 2013 Election Turnout: Females



(b) 2013 Election Turnout: Males



(c) 2016 Election Turnout: Females



(d) 2016 Election Turnout: Males



(e) 2017 Election Turnout: Females



(f) 2017 Election Turnout: Males



Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*.
Note: Figure A.5 shows graphical evidence of differences in 2013, 2017 Presidential and 2016 municipal election turnout rates across the eligibility cut-off (26-week bandwidth) in the 1988 Plebiscite by gender.

Figure A.6: Extent of One-Party Rule in Post-Dictatorship Countries



Source: Polity IV Project.
Note: Figure A.6 shows evidence on the length of governments for the first post-dictatorship party ('First Transition') and the corresponding length for the second party ('Second Transition'). The list of countries considered in this figure follows directly from Table A.15 and includes Albania where democracy was re-established in 1997, Argentina in 1983, Armenia in 1998, Bangladesh in 1991, Benin in 1991, Bolivia in 1982, Brazil in 1946 and 1985, Bulgaria in 1990, Cambodia in 1998, Cape Verde in 1991, Chile in 1989, Colombia in 1957, Comoros in 2002, Croatia in 1999, Cyprus in 1968, Czech Republic in 1989, Djibouti in 1999, Dominican Republic in 1978, Ecuador in 1979, El Salvador in 1982, Estonia in 1991, Estonia in 1991, Fiji in 1990, Georgia in 1991, Ghana in 1996, Greece in 1974, Guatemala in 1986, Guyana in 1992, Honduras in 1980, Hungary in 1989, Indonesia in 1999, Kenya in 2002, South Korea in 1987, Latvia in 1991, Lesotho in 1999, Liberia in 2003, Lithuania in 1991, Madagascar in 1991, Malawi in 1994, Mali in 1992, Mexico in 1994, Mongolia in 1990, Mongolia in 1990, Mozambique in 1994, Nicaragua in 1990, Nigeria in 1999, Panama in 1989, Paraguay in 1989, Peru in 1993, Philippines in 1986, Poland in 1989, Portugal in 1975, Portugal in 1975, Romania in 1990, Senegal in 2000 Sierra Leone in 2001, Slovakia in 1990, Slovenia in 1991, Spain in 1976, Suriname in 1990, Taiwan in 1992, Turkey in 1946, Turkey in 1983, Ukraine in 1991, Uruguay in 1952, Uruguay in 1985, Venezuela in 1958, and Zambia in 1991.

Table A.1: The Specification of $\mu_i^k(\cdot)$
Five Fold Cross-Validation and AIC Procedure

Panel A. Five Fold Cross-Validation

Outcome Variable	First Stage			2013 Turnout			2016 Turnout			2017 Turnout		
Bandwidth	13	17	26	13	17	26	13	17	26	13	17	26
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Linear	0.338	0.332	0.324	0.499	0.499	0.499	0.485	0.486	0.486	0.500	0.500	0.500
Quadratic	0.338	0.332	0.323	0.499	0.499	0.499	0.485	0.486	0.486	0.500	0.500	0.500
Cubic	0.338	0.332	0.323	0.499	0.499	0.499	0.485	0.486	0.486	0.500	0.500	0.500
Quartic	0.338	0.332	0.323	0.499	0.499	0.499	0.485	0.486	0.486	0.500	0.500	0.500
Non-Parametric	0.339	0.333	0.324	0.499	0.499	0.499	0.485	0.486	0.486	0.500	0.500	0.500

Panel B. AIC Procedure

Outcome Variable	First Stage			2009 Registration			2013 Turnout			2016 Turnout			2017 Turnout		
Bandwidth	13	26	52	13	26	52	13	26	52	13	26	52	13	26	52
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)
Linear	85285	142938	252254	138550	259069	494905	184133	354521	703661	176202	340330	676500	183653	354081	705314
Quadratic	84956	142155	250541	138527	258988	494713	184132	354516	703604	176195	340332	676493	183656	354083	705270
Cubic	84916	141942	250059	138527	258971	494665	184132	354515	703590	176198	340329	676491	183658	354082	705264
Quartic	84920	141896	249603	138529	258972	494642	184135	354518	703592	176201	340325	676488	183661	354085	705265

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*.
Note: The first panel of Table A.1 presents the root mean square error (RMSE) from a five-fold cross-validation procedure applied to different functional form assumptions and bandwidths for the first stage and the downstream elections. The second panel presents the Akaike information criterion (AIC) across polynomial/bandwidth combinations for the first stage, 2009 registration rates and downstream election turnout rates. For the cross-validation approach, we randomly split our sample for a given bandwidth into five equally-sized components. In a hold-out sample we estimate the parameters of our model and in the four other samples, we project our model and compute mean-squared error. We then average the mean-squared errors across the four samples and for different functional form assumptions. We see no difference in mean-squared error (cross-validation) to three digits across all functional form choices. This holds for all bandwidths. The results for AIC largely follow those of cross-validation, indicating no significant differences across polynomials.

Table A.2: Optimal Bandwidth Selection: CCT Algorithm

	First Stage (1)	2009 Registration (2)	2013 Turnout (3)	2016 Turnout (4)	2017 Turnout (5)
A. 1988 Plebiscite					
Linear	3.784	9.937	14.280	23.748	16.539
Quadratic	9.560	23.296	29.006	29.271	31.515
Cubic	18.033	36.041	42.592	40.297	45.123
Quartic	30.355	52.081	59.046	55.346	61.288
B. 1989 Presidential Election					
Linear	8.277	11.585	18.865	22.055	15.687
Quadratic	13.308	20.632	24.818	27.273	27.329
Cubic	21.780	32.715	40.338	38.069	42.653
Quartic	23.629	37.083	39.275	43.790	38.390
C. 1993 Presidential Election					
Linear	8.498	10.525	14.411	22.747	16.576
Quadratic	12.870	21.061	26.089	26.851	24.876
Cubic	30.563	32.778	45.328	41.244	45.249
Quartic	45.376	52.251	48.454	48.614	49.004
D. 1999 Presidential Election					
Linear	9.965	28.262	20.584	33.084	31.929
Quadratic	17.217	31.732	26.654	30.950	28.467
Cubic	24.253	54.649	43.668	49.086	36.340
Quartic	22.495	43.549	48.070	55.556	47.930
E. 2005 Presidential Election					
Linear	16.092	22.140	33.194	29.196	21.763
Quadratic	22.844	35.248	34.006	35.017	29.057
Cubic	24.842	39.835	41.989	37.178	47.067
Quartic	32.975	56.525	53.563	51.926	47.822
F. 2009 Presidential Election					
Linear	9.561	9.561	35.774	28.305	23.404
Quadratic	19.132	19.132	23.934	31.985	31.481
Cubic	21.204	21.204	37.351	35.831	33.134
Quartic	32.459	32.459	55.425	55.807	42.208
G. Differences-in-Discontinuity: Equation (3)					
Linear	12.430	12.860	20.576	23.875	14.947
Quadratic	17.632	19.033	23.017	24.730	26.151
Cubic	32.155	33.520	43.787	38.344	39.074
Quartic	53.004	40.029	42.115	38.338	41.349

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*.
Note: Table A.2 presents the optimal CCT bandwidth (Calonico et al., 2014) for different specifications of equation (2), including five outcome variables (first stage participation, 2009 registration, 2013, 2016 and 2017 turnout) as well as six upstream elections (1988 Plebiscite and 1989, 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections). Moreover, we consider four different polynomials when selecting the optimal bandwidth. The last panel shows the optimal bandwidth for the differences-in-discontinuity regression (equation (3)).

Table A.3: Covariate Balance

	1988 Plebiscite		1989 Election		1993 Election		1999 Election		2005 Election		2009 Election	
	Level	Diff.	Level	Diff.	Level	Diff.	Level	Diff.	Level	Diff.	Level	Diff.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
					A. Individual-Level Characteristics							
Male	0.493	-0.003	0.496	-0.002	0.501	0.003	0.500	0.000	0.508	0.000	0.505	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Educational Attainment*												
					26-Week Bandwidth							
HS Dropout	0.358	-0.006	0.327	0.014	0.282	0.017	0.222	0.004	0.126	0.006	0.154	0.008
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.005)**	(0.006)	(0.008)**	(0.001)	(0.002)**	(0.001)	(0.002)***	(0.005)	(0.007)
HS Graduate	0.495	0.009	0.510	-0.005	0.521	-0.015	0.559	-0.003	0.602	0.001	0.813	0.000
	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)***	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.006)
> HS Graduate	0.147	-0.003	0.163	-0.009	0.197	-0.002	0.219	0.000	0.272	-0.007	0.033	-0.009
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)***	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)*	(0.001)	(0.006)
					13-Week Bandwidth							
HS Dropout	0.357	0.003	0.332	0.004	0.288	0.004	0.223	0.002	0.128	0.008	0.161	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)*	(0.002)	(0.005)
HS Graduate	0.498	0.001	0.508	-0.001	0.519	-0.004	0.561	-0.010	0.601	0.004	0.806	0.004
	(0.003)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.005)
> HS Graduate	0.145	-0.004	0.160	-0.002	0.193	0.000	0.216	0.008	0.271	-0.012	0.033	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.006)*	(0.001)	(0.002)
					B. Comuna-Level Characteristics							
Electricity in Home	0.900	-0.001	0.907	-0.003	0.912	-0.005	0.919	-0.005	0.918	-0.004	0.912	-0.005
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Water in Home	0.744	-0.002	0.751	-0.002	0.759	-0.007	0.77	-0.007	0.765	-0.005	0.756	-0.005
	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Toilet in Home	0.687	-0.002	0.696	-0.003	0.707	-0.009	0.72	-0.009	0.714	-0.006	0.702	-0.006
	(0.007)	(0.01)	(0.007)	(0.01)	(0.007)	(0.01)	(0.007)	(0.01)	(0.007)	(0.01)	(0.007)	(0.010)
Literacy Rate	0.901	0.000	0.903	-0.001	0.905	-0.002	0.907	-0.002	0.906	-0.001	0.903	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Unemployment Rate	0.088	0.000	0.088	0.000	0.087	0.000	0.086	0.000	0.087	0.000	0.088	0.000
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
TV Ownership Rate	0.844	0.001	0.847	0.000	0.85	-0.002	0.852	-0.002	0.848	-0.004	0.842	-0.003
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.011)
Allende Share	0.370	0.001	0.372	-0.001	0.372	-0.002	0.373	-0.001	0.375	-0.002	0.374	-0.002
	(0.006)	(0.01)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.01)	(0.006)	(0.01)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.009)
Sample Size	250388		253165		248871		274566		287364		296631	
(*): Sample Size (Education)	185113		195039		191341		216989		218353		218433	

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL).*
Note: Table A.3 presents estimates of equation (2) in a linear functional form with a 26-week bandwidth. For education variables, we also use a 13-week bandwidth to avoid to ensure that individuals are in the same academic year. We use relevant covariates as outcome variables. *Level* and *Diff.* refer to α_0 and α_1 in equation (2), respectively. For individual-level covariates, we cluster standard errors at the week level. For education-level covariates, we cluster standard errors at the month level. For comuna-level covariates, we cluster standard errors at the comuna-week level.

Table A.4: Robustness Checks: First-Stage and 2009 Registration Results

Panel A. First-Stage Registration Rates

Upstream Election	1988 Plebiscite			1989 Election			1993 Election			1999 Election			2005 Election			2009 Election		
Bandwidth	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Panel (a). Functional Form: Linear Polynomial																		
Before	0.56	0.612	0.433	0.145	0.118	0.147	0.203	0.229	0.235	0.045	0.051	0.055	0.088	0.105	0.083	0.068	0.088	0.068
	(0.02)***	(0.016)***	(0.011)***	(0.002)***	(0.005)***	(0.002)***	(0.007)***	(0.005)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.002)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***
Observations	245205	487056	40164	256697	510154	82775	243912	488826	75923	269271	528369	104890	281837	564578	176946	290900	582406	115225
Panel (b). Functional Form: Quadratic Polynomial																		
Before	0.495	0.550	0.423	0.153	0.132	0.145	0.243	0.195	0.238	0.056	0.050	0.057	0.081	0.086	0.083	0.059	0.066	0.072
	(0.02)***	(0.02)***	(0.009)***	(0.003)***	(0.006)***	(0.002)***	(0.005)***	(0.009)***	(0.005)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***	(0.004)***
Observations	245205	487056	98433	256697	510154	133849	243912	488826	123682	269271	528369	178338	281837	564578	250228	290900	582406	214525
Panel (c). Functional Form: Cubic Polynomial																		
Before	0.450	0.509	0.419	0.146	0.168	0.144	0.248	0.219	0.259	0.066	0.042	0.062	0.094	0.080	0.093	0.076	0.056	0.075
	(0.016)***	(0.022)***	(0.009)***	(0.003)***	(0.006)***	(0.002)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.01)***	(0.006)***	(0.005)***	(0.006)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.005)***	(0.003)***	(0.006)***
Observations	245205	487056	174239	256697	510154	219299	243912	488826	288875	269271	528369	248674	281837	564578	271090	290900	582406	235960
Panel (d). Functional Form: Quartic Polynomial																		
Before	0.422	0.460	0.428	0.142	0.165	0.145	0.220	0.264	0.263	0.043	0.069	0.043	0.093	0.082	0.097	0.069	0.064	0.079
	(0.012)***	(0.015)***	(0.012)***	(0.003)***	(0.009)***	(0.003)***	(0.005)***	(0.011)***	(0.012)***	(0.003)***	(0.006)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.007)***
Observations	245205	487056	279951	256697	510154	237610	243912	488826	418777	269271	528369	228557	281837	564578	355036	290900	582406	355378

Panel B. 2009 Registration Rates

Upstream Election	1988 Plebiscite			1989 Election			1993 Election			1999 Election			2005 Election			2009 Election		
Bandwidth	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Panel (a). Functional Form: Linear Polynomial																		
Before	0.124	0.140	0.108	0.017	0.000	0.025	0.054	0.063	0.076	0.019	0.016	0.018	0.033	0.040	0.032	0.068	0.088	0.068
	(0.008)***	(0.007)***	(0.007)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.004)***	(0.006)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***
Control Mean	0.692	0.684	0.691	0.661	0.665	0.652	0.416	0.415	0.413	0.298	0.293	0.298	0.165	0.164	0.165			
Observations	245205	487056	98433	256697	510154	123649	243912	488826	104262	269271	528369	289901	281837	564578	239804	290900	582406	115225
Panel (b). Functional Form: Quadratic Polynomial																		
Before	0.115	0.127	0.109	0.028	0.015	0.027	0.082	0.049	0.084	0.020	0.020	0.023	0.03	0.031	0.029	0.059	0.066	0.072
	(0.007)***	(0.008)***	(0.007)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.007)***	(0.007)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.005)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.002)***	(0.004)***
Control Mean	0.692	0.684	0.694	0.661	0.665	0.655	0.416	0.415	0.415	0.298	0.293	0.298	0.165	0.164	0.165			
Observations	245205	487056	218698	256697	510154	210339	243912	488826	197564	269271	528369	319943	281837	564578	376015	290900	582406	214525
Panel (c). Functional Form: Cubic Polynomial																		
Before	0.097	0.112	0.107	0.033	0.030	0.027	0.085	0.069	0.093	0.030	0.017	0.017	0.038	0.030	0.029	0.076	0.056	0.074
	(0.006)***	(0.008)***	(0.006)***	(0.005)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.009)***	(0.007)***	(0.008)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.006)***	(0.004)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.003)***	(0.006)***
Control Mean	0.692	0.684	0.695	0.661	0.665	0.660	0.416	0.415	0.415	0.298	0.293	0.297	0.165	0.164	0.165			
Observations	245205	487056	333887	256697	510154	321578	243912	488826	306775	269271	528369	528369	281837	564578	431061	290900	582406	235960
Panel (d). Functional Form: Quartic Polynomial																		
Before	0.099	0.099	0.099	0.044	0.041	0.029	0.066	0.093	0.093	0.023	0.028	0.030	0.036	0.031	0.031	0.069	0.063	0.079
	(0.007)***	(0.007)***	(0.007)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.006)***	(0.01)***	(0.008)***	(0.008)***	(0.007)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.009)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.007)***
Control Mean	0.692	0.684	0.692	0.661	0.665	0.660	0.416	0.415	0.415	0.298	0.293	0.297	0.165	0.164	0.164			
Observations	245205	487056	487056	256697	510154	359259	243912	488826	488826	269271	528369	448408	281837	564578	564578	290900	582406	355378

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL).*
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the week-of-birth level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Table A.4 presents estimates of equation (2) for first-stage registration and registration by the 2009 election.

Table A.5: Robustness Checks. Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Upstream Elections on 2013 Turnout

Upstream Election	1988 Plebiscite			1989 Election			1993 Election			1999 Election			2005 Election			2009 Election		
Bandwidth	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Panel A. 2013																		
Panel (a). Functional Form: Linear Polynomial																		
Before	0.03	0.038	0.026	0.000	-0.008	0.003	0.014	0.011	0.022	-0.008	-0.006	-0.009	-0.007	-0.009	-0.006	-0.005	-0.006	-0.007
	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.006)***	(0.003)	(0.002)***	(0.004)	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.005)	(0.003)***	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)**	(0.004)*
Control Mean	0.504	0.5	0.503	0.489	0.486	0.488	0.41	0.408	0.411	0.364	0.358	0.364	0.344	0.343	0.344	0.315	0.312	0.314
Observations	245205	487056	136524	256697	510154	191578	243912	488826	133171	269271	528369	218527	281837	564578	355036	290900	582406	398822
Panel (b). Functional Form: Quadratic Polynomial																		
Before	0.025	0.034	0.021	0.004	-0.004	0.004	0.025	0.009	0.025	-0.006	-0.013	-0.006	-0.008	-0.006	-0.008	0.001	-0.006	0.004
	(0.006)***	(0.005)***	(0.006)***	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)***	(0.005)*	(0.004)***	(0.004)	(0.004)***	(0.004)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Control Mean	0.504	0.500	0.505	0.489	0.486	0.489	0.41	0.408	0.41	0.364	0.358	0.363	0.344	0.343	0.344	0.315	0.312	0.315
Observations	245205	487056	271177	256697	510154	247191	243912	488826	243912	269271	528369	279692	281837	564578	365408	290900	582406	268437
Panel (c). Functional Form: Cubic Polynomial																		
Before	0.016	0.021	0.020	-0.009	0.008	0.004	0.024	0.027	0.029	0.000	-0.002	-0.002	-0.006	-0.007	-0.01	0.008	0.000	0.008
	(0.007)**	(0.005)***	(0.006)***	(0.005)*	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Control Mean	0.504	0.500	0.503	0.489	0.486	0.487	0.410	0.408	0.408	0.364	0.358	0.359	0.344	0.343	0.343	0.315	0.312	0.314
Observations	245205	487056	399620	256697	510154	389115	243912	488826	418777	269271	528369	448408	281837	564578	453275	290900	582406	409389
Panel (d). Functional Form: Quartic Polynomial																		
Before	0.026	0.017	0.016	-0.005	0.004	-0.008	0.02	0.027	0.031	-0.005	-0.004	-0.002	0.000	-0.011	-0.012	0.008	0.005	0.004
	(0.01)***	(0.007)**	(0.006)***	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)***	(0.004)***	(0.005)***	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.015)	(0.011)	(0.01)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Control Mean	0.504	0.500	0.498	0.489	0.486	0.486	0.410	0.408	0.408	0.364	0.358	0.358	0.344	0.343	0.343	0.315	0.312	0.312
Observations	245205	487056	557003	256697	510154	379020	243912	488826	447969	269271	528369	487850	281837	564578	586456	290900	582406	618523

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL).*
Note: Table A.5 presents estimates of equation (2) for each upstream election on 2013 electoral turnout. The column 'Optimal' refers to the estimated optimal CCT bandwidth for the corresponding polynomial presented in Table A.2.

Table A.6: Robustness Checks. Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Upstream Elections on 2016 Turnout

Upstream Election	1988 Plebiscite			1989 Election			1993 Election			1999 Election			2005 Election			2009 Election		
Bandwidth	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Panel (a). Functional Form: Linear Polynomial																		
Before	0.021	0.021	0.02	0.005	-0.003	0.006	0.006	0.005	0.008	-0.005	-0.004	-0.007	-0.001	-0.002	0.000	-0.007	-0.005	-0.009
	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.003)*	(0.002)	(0.003)**	(0.004)	(0.003)*	(0.004)**	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)**	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)*	(0.003)*	(0.004)**
Control Mean	0.369	0.368	0.370	0.359	0.358	0.359	0.319	0.314	0.320	0.271	0.266	0.268	0.234	0.233	0.234	0.221	0.219	0.221
Observations	244113	484999	226512	255715	508273	218470	243323	487590	215129	268891	527539	339024	281466	563803	312696	289952	580553	311374
Panel (b). Functional Form: Quadratic Polynomial																		
Before	0.02	0.025	0.018	0.004	0.003	0.005	0.016	0.003	0.0150	-0.007	-0.009	-0.003	0.001	0.002	0.001	-0.007	-0.010	-0.005
	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)***	(0.005)	(0.006)**	(0.005)	(0.004)**	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)**	(0.006)
Control Mean	0.369	0.368	0.370	0.359	0.358	0.359	0.319	0.314	0.319	0.271	0.266	0.268	0.234	0.233	0.233	0.221	0.219	0.220
Observations	244113	484999	270003	255715	508273	265198	243323	487590	252387	268891	527539	319458	281466	563803	375461	289952	580553	354208
Panel (c). Functional Form: Cubic Polynomial																		
Before	0.007	0.016	0.012	-0.001	0.008	0.004	0.012	0.018	0.016	-0.004	-0.003	-0.002	-0.004	-0.002	-0.001	0.003	-0.007	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.006)	(0.004)**	(0.005)	(0.007)*	(0.006)***	(0.006)***	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Control Mean	0.369	0.368	0.37	0.359	0.358	0.359	0.319	0.314	0.316	0.271	0.266	0.267	0.234	0.233	0.234	0.221	0.219	0.221
Observations	244113	484999	369248	255715	508273	367664	243323	487590	379912	268891	527539	398265	281466	563803	396834	289952	580553	397517
Panel (d). Functional Form: Quartic Polynomial																		
Before	-0.017	0.011	0.011	0.006	0.007	-0.003	0.024	0.014	0.013	0.006	-0.005	-0.004	-0.005	0.002	0.002	-0.001	-0.003	-0.003
	(0.008)**	(0.005)**	(0.004)***	(0.008)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)***	(0.006)**	(0.006)**	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.01)	(0.008)	(0.007)
Control Mean	0.369	0.368	0.368	0.359	0.358	0.358	0.319	0.314	0.315	0.271	0.266	0.266	0.234	0.233	0.233	0.221	0.219	0.219
Observations	244113	484999	514893	255715	508273	427697	243323	487590	457737	268891	527539	567688	281466	563803	563803	289952	580553	662677

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL).*
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the week-of-birth level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Table A.6 presents estimates of equation (2) for each upstream election on 2016 electoral turnout. The column 'Optimal' refers to the estimated optimal CCT bandwidth for the corresponding polynomial presented in Table A.2.

Table A.7: Robustness Checks. Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Upstream Elections on 2017 Turnout

Upstream Election	1988 Plebiscite			1989 Election			1993 Election			1999 Election			2005 Election			2009 Election		
Bandwidth	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Panel (a). Functional Form: Linear Polynomial																		
Before	0.018	0.027	0.016	0.003	-0.004	0.008	-0.003	-0.006	0.007	-0.002	-0.005	-0.005	-0.010	-0.013	-0.01	-0.006	-0.01	-0.007
	(0.004)***	(0.003)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)**	(0.004)	(0.003)**	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)*	(0.003)*	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.004)**	(0.004)	(0.003)***	(0.005)
Control Mean	0.483	0.482	0.483	0.476	0.474	0.473	0.441	0.435	0.443	0.398	0.393	0.396	0.386	0.383	0.386	0.376	0.372	0.376
Observations	244110	486272	163608	255900	508650	163030	243443	487852	160480	268775	527447	329029	281427	563723	239489	289764	580243	256631
Panel (b). Functional Form: Quadratic Polynomial																		
Before	0.016	0.022	0.013	0.013	-0.002	0.014	0.014	-0.006	0.013	-0.005	-0.004	-0.003	-0.009	-0.013	-0.007	-0.009	-0.010	-0.002
	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)	(0.005)***	(0.006)**	(0.005)	(0.007)*	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.004)***	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)**	(0.006)
Control Mean	0.483	0.482	0.485	0.476	0.474	0.476	0.441	0.435	0.441	0.398	0.393	0.397	0.386	0.383	0.385	0.376	0.372	0.375
Observations	244110	486272	296205	255900	508650	265397	243443	487852	233981	268775	527447	289371	281427	563723	312640	289764	580243	343107
Panel (c). Functional Form: Cubic Polynomial																		
Before	0.004	0.009	0.009	0.002	0.015	0.021	0.009	0.013	0.014	-0.008	-0.003	-0.004	-0.004	-0.007	-0.004	-0.010	-0.004	-0.008
	(0.006)	(0.005)*	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.005)***	(0.006)***	(0.008)	(0.006)**	(0.006)**	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)
Control Mean	0.483	0.482	0.484	0.476	0.474	0.474	0.441	0.435	0.436	0.398	0.393	0.395	0.386	0.383	0.383	0.376	0.372	0.376
Observations	244110	486272	417328	255900	508650	418091	243443	487852	417920	268775	527447	368113	281427	563723	508030	289764	580243	364724
Panel (d). Functional Form: Quartic Polynomial																		
Before	0.013	0.010	0.005	0.008	0.017	0.003	0.010	0.013	0.018	0.002	-0.004	-0.001	0.001	-0.004	-0.004	-0.021	-0.008	-0.012
	(0.007)*	(0.006)*	(0.006)	(0.013)	(0.006)***	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)*	(0.008)**	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)***	(0.007)	(0.007)*
Control Mean	0.483	0.482	0.481	0.476	0.474	0.474	0.441	0.435	0.435	0.398	0.393	0.393	0.386	0.383	0.383	0.376	0.372	0.374
Observations	244110	486272	576709	255900	508650	367980	243443	487852	457980	268775	527447	486985	281427	563723	518990	289764	580243	465555

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL).*
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the week-of-birth level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Table A.7 presents estimates of equation (2) for each upstream election on 2017 electoral turnout. The column 'Optimal' refers to the estimated optimal CCT bandwidth for the corresponding polynomial presented in Table A.2.

Table A.8: Estimated Regression Discontinuity Effects of Upstream Election Eligibility on 2013, 2016 and 2017 Turnout

	13-Week Bandwidth			26-Week Bandwidth		
	2013	2016	2017	2013	2016	2017
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. 1988 Plebiscite						
Before	0.026	0.020	0.014	0.030	0.021	0.018
	(0.006)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.005)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***
Control Mean	0.503	0.368	0.484	0.504	0.369	0.483
Observations	132363	131739	131740	250388	249273	249265
Panel B. 1989 Election						
Before	-0.003	0.001	0.004	0.000	0.005	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Control Mean	0.487	0.356	0.472	0.489	0.359	0.476
Observations	138938	138445	138569	261786	260791	260984
Panel C. 1993 Election						
Before	0.020	0.009	0.007	0.014	0.006	-0.003
	(0.004)***	(0.005)*	(0.006)	(0.004)***	(0.004)	(0.004)
Control Mean	0.410	0.320	0.440	0.410	0.319	0.441
Observations	128641	128336	128406	248871	248262	248386
Panel D. 1999 Election						
Before	-0.006	-0.009	-0.008	-0.008	-0.005	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.005)*	(0.004)*	(0.003)**	(0.004)	(0.003)
Control Mean	0.364	0.27	0.398	0.364	0.271	0.398
Observations	142265	142107	142010	274566	274187	274071
Panel E. 2005 Election						
Before	-0.005	0.000	-0.007	-0.007	-0.001	-0.010
	(0.008)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)***
Control Mean	0.345	0.235	0.386	0.344	0.234	0.386
Observations	150043	149869	149843	287364	286995	286954
Panel F. 2009 Election						
Before	0.000	-0.005	-0.009	-0.005	-0.007	-0.006
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)*	(0.004)
Control Mean	0.314	0.222	0.374	0.315	0.221	0.376
Observations	155248	154694	154575	296631	295661	295466

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the week-of-birth level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Table A.8 presents estimates of equation (2) using a linear functional form with a 13-week (columns (1)-(3)) and 26-week (columns (4)-(6)) bandwidth across each election cut-off. The results refer to the estimated impacts of upstream election eligibility (1988 Plebiscite, 1989 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections) on turnout in the 2013, 2016 and 2017 elections.

Table A.9: Robustness Checks. Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Upstream Elections on 2013 Turnout

Upstream Election	1988 Plebiscite			1989 Election			1993 Election			1999 Election			2005 Election			2009 Election		
Bandwidth	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Panel (a). Functional Form: Linear Polynomial																		
Before	0.054	0.061	0.05	-0.002	-0.071	0.018	0.067	0.049	0.095	-0.175	-0.117	-0.189	-0.083	-0.085	-0.068	-0.073	-0.071	-0.090
	(0.007)***	(0.006)***	(0.01)***	(0.021)	(0.022)***	(0.023)	(0.019)***	(0.013)***	(0.018)***	(0.066)***	(0.046)**	(0.073)***	(0.053)	(0.029)***	(0.042)	(0.069)	(0.037)*	(0.051)*
Control Mean	0.504	0.500	0.503	0.489	0.486	0.488	0.410	0.408	0.411	0.364	0.358	0.364	0.344	0.343	0.344	0.315	0.312	0.314
Observations	245205	487056	136524	256697	510154	191578	243912	488826	133171	269271	528369	218527	281837	564578	355036	290900	582406	398822
Panel (b). Functional Form: Quadratic Polynomial																		
Before	0.050	0.062	0.042	0.027	-0.027	0.025	0.105	0.046	0.105	-0.106	-0.271	-0.104	-0.103	-0.065	-0.098	0.023	-0.088	0.060
	(0.011)***	(0.008)***	(0.011)***	(0.032)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.017)***	(0.023)**	(0.017)***	(0.068)	(0.078)***	(0.068)	(0.105)	(0.059)	(0.087)	(0.129)	(0.078)	(0.123)
Control Mean	0.504	0.500	0.505	0.489	0.486	0.489	0.410	0.408	0.410	0.364	0.358	0.363	0.344	0.343	0.344	0.315	0.312	0.315
Observations	245205	487056	271177	256697	510154	247191	243912	488826	243912	269271	528369	279692	281837	564578	365408	290900	582406	268437
Panel (c). Functional Form: Cubic Polynomial																		
Before	0.035	0.042	0.041	-0.059	0.047	0.027	0.096	0.122	0.122	-0.001	-0.048	-0.045	-0.065	-0.089	-0.129	0.107	-0.008	0.128
	(0.014)**	(0.01)***	(0.012)***	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.034)	(0.023)***	(0.02)***	(0.02)***	(0.056)	(0.087)	(0.069)	(0.131)	(0.097)	(0.112)	(0.122)	(0.126)	(0.123)
Control Mean	0.504	0.500	0.503	0.489	0.486	0.487	0.410	0.408	0.408	0.364	0.358	0.359	0.344	0.343	0.343	0.315	0.312	0.314
Observations	245205	487056	399620	256697	510154	389115	243912	488826	418777	269271	528369	448408	281837	564578	453275	290900	582406	409389
Panel (d). Functional Form: Quartic Polynomial																		
Before	0.061	0.037	0.033	-0.038	0.026	-0.061	0.091	0.103	0.118	-0.122	-0.061	-0.028	-0.001	-0.140	-0.143	0.115	0.082	0.066
	(0.021)***	(0.014)***	(0.013)**	(0.05)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.033)***	(0.018)***	(0.02)***	(0.13)	(0.059)	(0.063)	(0.159)	(0.132)	(0.129)	(0.18)	(0.131)	(0.136)
Control Mean	0.504	0.500	0.498	0.489	0.486	0.486	0.410	0.408	0.408	0.364	0.358	0.358	0.344	0.343	0.343	0.315	0.312	0.312
Observations	245205	487056	557003	256697	510154	379020	243912	488826	447969	269271	528369	487850	281837	564578	586456	290900	582406	618523

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL*).
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the week-of-birth level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Table A.9 presents fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates for each upstream election on 2013 electoral turnout. The column 'Optimal' refers to the estimated optimal CCT bandwidth for the corresponding polynomial presented in Table A.2.

Table A.10: Robustness Checks. Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Upstream Elections on 2016 Turnout

Upstream Election	1988 Plebiscite			1989 Election			1993 Election			1999 Election			2005 Election			2009 Election		
Bandwidth	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Panel (a). Functional Form: Linear Polynomial																		
Before	0.037	0.035	0.036	0.034	-0.023	0.041	0.029	0.024	0.038	-0.101	-0.088	-0.149	-0.006	-0.017	0.004	-0.109	-0.058	-0.123
	(0.006)***	(0.005)***	(0.007)***	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.023)*	(0.021)	(0.014)*	(0.02)*	(0.079)	(0.05)*	(0.068)**	(0.038)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.061)*	(0.032)*	(0.057)**
Control Mean	0.369	0.368	0.370	0.359	0.358	0.359	0.319	0.314	0.32	0.271	0.266	0.268	0.234	0.233	0.234	0.221	0.219	0.221
Observations	244113	484999	226512	255715	508273	218470	243323	487590	215129	268891	527539	339024	281466	563803	312696	289952	580553	311374
Panel (b). Functional Form: Quadratic Polynomial																		
Before	0.041	0.046	0.036	0.025	0.019	0.032	0.067	0.015	0.063	-0.130	-0.173	-0.062	0.013	0.025	0.015	-0.126	-0.150	-0.079
	(0.01)***	(0.007)***	(0.009)***	(0.027)	(0.026)	(0.027)	(0.025)***	(0.024)	(0.024)***	(0.089)	(0.077)**	(0.095)	(0.052)	(0.042)	(0.052)	(0.115)	(0.068)**	(0.098)
Control Mean	0.369	0.368	0.370	0.359	0.358	0.359	0.319	0.314	0.319	0.271	0.266	0.268	0.234	0.233	0.233	0.221	0.219	0.220
Observations	244113	484999	270003	255715	508273	265198	243323	487590	252387	268891	527539	319458	281466	563803	375461	289952	580553	354208
Panel (v). Functional Form: Cubic Polynomial																		
Before	0.015	0.031	0.026	-0.007	0.047	0.025	0.048	0.080	0.066	-0.053	-0.083	-0.041	-0.040	-0.028	-0.007	0.042	-0.121	-0.035
	(0.012)	(0.009)***	(0.009)***	(0.041)	(0.026)*	(0.029)	(0.027)*	(0.025)***	(0.023)***	(0.08)	(0.119)	(0.091)	(0.054)	(0.051)	(0.052)	(0.097)	(0.112)	(0.114)
Control Mean	0.369	0.368	0.370	0.359	0.358	0.359	0.319	0.314	0.316	0.271	0.266	0.267	0.234	0.233	0.234	0.221	0.219	0.221
Observations	244113	484999	369248	255715	508273	367664	243323	487590	379912	268891	527539	398265	281466	563803	396834	289952	580553	397517
Panel (d). Functional Form: Quartic Polynomial																		
Before	-0.039	0.025	0.023	0.042	0.040	-0.019	0.108	0.054	0.051	0.140	-0.078	-0.070	-0.057	0.024	0.024	-0.021	-0.048	-0.049
	(0.018)**	(0.01)**	(0.009)**	(0.058)	(0.03)	(0.043)	(0.033)***	(0.024)**	(0.024)**	(0.135)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.073)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.138)	(0.12)	(0.118)
Control Mean	0.369	0.368	0.368	0.359	0.358	0.358	0.319	0.314	0.315	0.271	0.266	0.266	0.234	0.233	0.233	0.221	0.219	0.219
Observations	244113	484999	514893	255715	508273	427697	243323	487590	457737	268891	527539	567688	281466	563803	563803	289952	580553	662677

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL).*
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the week-of-birth level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Table A.10 presents fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates for each upstream election on 2016 electoral turnout. The column 'Optimal' refers to the estimated optimal CCT bandwidth for the corresponding polynomial presented in Table A.2.

Table A.11: Robustness Checks. Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Estimates: Upstream Elections on 2017 Turnout

Upstream Election	1988 Plebiscite			1989 Election			1993 Election			1999 Election			2005 Election			2009 Election		
Bandwidth	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal	26	52	Optimal
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)
Panel (a). Functional Form: Linear Polynomial																		
Before	0.032	0.044	0.030	0.020	-0.035	0.051	-0.017	-0.028	0.032	-0.037	-0.109	-0.118	-0.115	-0.125	-0.120	-0.085	-0.110	-0.112
	(0.006)***	(0.005)***	(0.007)***	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.028)*	(0.021)	(0.014)**	(0.022)	(0.077)	(0.055)**	(0.071)*	(0.039)***	(0.024)***	(0.048)**	(0.06)	(0.036)***	(0.069)
Control Mean	0.483	0.482	0.483	0.476	0.474	0.473	0.441	0.435	0.443	0.398	0.393	0.396	0.386	0.383	0.386	0.376	0.372	0.376
Observations	244110	486272	163608	255900	508650	163030	243443	487852	160480	268775	527447	329029	281427	563723	239489	289764	580243	256631
Panel (b). Functional Form: Quadratic Polynomial																		
Before	0.032	0.039	0.025	0.089	-0.019	0.090	0.060	-0.032	0.055	-0.097	-0.074	-0.048	-0.117	-0.154	-0.090	-0.148	-0.149	-0.028
	(0.009)***	(0.006)***	(0.01)**	(0.031)***	(0.032)	(0.03)***	(0.026)**	(0.025)	(0.027)**	(0.087)	(0.077)	(0.086)	(0.074)	(0.047)***	(0.071)	(0.116)	(0.071)**	(0.108)
Control Mean	0.483	0.482	0.485	0.476	0.474	0.476	0.441	0.435	0.441	0.398	0.393	0.397	0.386	0.383	0.385	0.376	0.372	0.375
Observations	244110	486272	296205	255900	508650	265397	243443	487852	233981	268775	527447	289371	281427	563723	312640	289764	580243	343107
Panel (c). Functional Form: Cubic Polynomial																		
Before	0.008	0.017	0.018	0.012	0.089	0.102	0.036	0.060	0.060	-0.114	-0.063	-0.059	-0.042	-0.089	-0.057	-0.132	-0.070	-0.126
	(0.014)	(0.009)*	(0.011)*	(0.049)	(0.028)***	(0.031)***	(0.033)	(0.027)**	(0.027)**	(0.083)	(0.109)	(0.085)	(0.089)	(0.071)	(0.082)	(0.084)	(0.116)	(0.117)
Control Mean	0.483	0.482	0.484	0.476	0.474	0.474	0.441	0.435	0.436	0.398	0.393	0.395	0.386	0.383	0.383	0.376	0.372	0.376
Observations	244110	486272	417328	255900	508650	418091	243443	487852	417920	268775	527447	368113	281427	563723	508030	289764	580243	364724
Panel (d). Functional Form: Quartic Polynomial																		
Before	0.030	0.021	0.010	0.056	0.106	0.024	0.044	0.050	0.067	0.036	-0.062	-0.022	0.010	-0.048	-0.048	-0.302	-0.128	-0.172
	(0.016)*	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.089)	(0.037)***	(0.06)	(0.033)	(0.029)*	(0.032)**	(0.154)	(0.077)	(0.087)	(0.123)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.097)***	(0.112)	(0.102)*
Control Mean	0.483	0.482	0.481	0.476	0.474	0.474	0.441	0.435	0.435	0.398	0.393	0.393	0.386	0.383	0.383	0.376	0.372	0.374
Observations	244110	486272	576709	255900	508650	367980	243443	487852	457980	268775	527447	486985	281427	563723	518990	289764	580243	465555

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL).*
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the week-of-birth level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Table A.11 presents fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates for each upstream election on 2017 electoral turnout. The column 'Optimal' refers to the estimated optimal CCT bandwidth for the corresponding polynomial presented in Table A.2.

Table A.12: Estimated Regression Discontinuity Effects of Upstream Election Participation on 2013, 2016 and 2017 Turnout

	13-Week Bandwidth			26-Week Bandwidth		
	2013	2016	2017	2013	2016	2017
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A. 1988 Plebiscite						
Before	0.050	0.040	0.027	0.054	0.037	0.032
	(0.010)***	(0.009)***	(0.008)***	(0.007)***	(0.006)***	(0.006)***
Control Mean	0.503	0.368	0.484	0.504	0.369	0.483
First Stage	0.510	0.510	0.509	0.560	0.560	0.559
First Stage F-Stat	528	535	529	752	757	756
Observations	132363	131739	131740	250388	249273	249265
Panel B. 1989 Election						
Before	-0.018	0.004	0.029	-0.002	0.034	0.020
	(0.029)	(0.025)	(0.03)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.025)
Control Mean	0.487	0.356	0.472	0.489	0.359	0.476
First Stage	0.149	0.149	0.149	0.145	0.145	0.145
First Stage F-Stat	4504	4721	4446	4507	4489	4347
Observations	138938	138445	138569	261786	260791	260984
Panel C. 1993 Election						
Before	0.087	0.039	0.032	0.067	0.029	-0.017
	(0.018)***	(0.023)*	(0.024)	(0.019)***	(0.021)	(0.021)
Control Mean	0.410	0.320	0.440	0.410	0.319	0.441
First Stage	0.232	0.233	0.232	0.203	0.204	0.203
First Stage F-Stat	7584	7308	7827	797	794	802
Observations	128641	128336	128406	248871	248262	248386
Panel D. 1999 Election						
Before	-0.111	-0.165	-0.142	-0.175	-0.101	-0.037
	(0.07)	(0.089)*	(0.080)*	(0.066)***	(0.079)	(0.077)
Control Mean	0.364	0.270	0.398	0.364	0.271	0.398
First Stage	0.056	0.056	0.056	0.045	0.045	0.045
First Stage F-Stat	657	653	667	264	268	268
Observations	142265	142107	142010	274566	274187	274071
Panel E. 2005 Election						
Before	-0.059	-0.005	-0.079	-0.083	-0.006	-0.115
	(0.084)	(0.042)	(0.062)	(0.053)	(0.038)	(0.039)***
Control Mean	0.345	0.235	0.386	0.344	0.234	0.386
First Stage	0.089	0.089	0.089	0.088	0.088	0.088
First Stage F-Stat	2623	2630	2573	1714	1714	1687
Observations	150043	149869	149843	287364	286995	286954
Panel F. 2009 Election						
Before	0.006	-0.070	-0.128	-0.073	-0.109	-0.085
	(0.099)	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.069)	(0.061)*	(0.06)
Control Mean	0.314	0.222	0.374	0.315	0.221	0.376
First Stage	0.069	0.069	0.069	0.068	0.069	0.069
First Stage F-Stat	575	568	577	759	753	756
Observations	155248	154694	154575	296631	295661	295466

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the week-of-birth level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Table A.12 presents estimates of an instrumented regression discontinuity design, where the first stage is given by equation (2) using a linear functional form with 13 (columns (1)-(3)) and 26 (columns (4)-(6)) week bandwidth across each election cut-off. The results refer to the estimated impacts of upstream election participation (1988 Plebiscite, 1989 1993, 1999, 2005 and 2009 Presidential elections) on turnout in the 2013, 2016 and 2017 elections.

Table A.13: Heterogeneous Effects of Upstream Election Eligibility by Gender

	Upstream Election		2009 Registration		2013 Turnout		2016 Turnout		2017 Turnout	
	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male	Female	Male
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Panel A. 1989 Election										
Before	0.121	0.169	0.0170	0.017	-0.006	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.000	0.005
	(0.004)***	(0.002)***	(0.004)***	(0.007)**	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.653	0.669	0.537	0.440	0.391	0.327	0.519	0.432
Observations	129223	127474	129223	127474	129223	127474	128877	126838	129124	126776
Panel B. 1993 Election										
Before	0.182	0.223	0.050	0.057	0.015	0.013	0.005	0.008	-0.009	0.003
	(0.008)***	(0.007)***	(0.008)	(0.007)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)**	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.419	0.412	0.456	0.364	0.353	0.285	0.485	0.396
Observations	122002	121910	122002	121910	122002	121910	121819	121504	121965	121478
Panel C. 1999 Election										
Before	0.049	0.040	0.011	0.028	-0.011	-0.004	-0.002	-0.007	0.002	-0.005
	(0.003)***	(0.003)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)***	(0.005)**	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.286	0.309	0.405	0.322	0.302	0.239	0.437	0.358
Observations	134462	134809	134462	134809	134462	134809	134416	134475	134498	134277
Panel D. 2005 Election										
Before	0.097	0.079	0.035	0.030	-0.012	-0.003	-0.003	0.002	-0.013	-0.007
	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***	(0.007)*	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)***	(0.005)
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.171	0.158	0.379	0.301	0.265	0.204	0.423	0.350
Observations	139339	142498	139339	142498	139339	142498	139304	142162	139394	142033
Panel E. 2009 Election										
Before	0.077	0.060	0.077	0.060	-0.005	-0.005	-0.006	-0.008	-0.003	-0.008
	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.003)***	(0.002)***	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)***	(0.006)	(0.006)
Control Mean	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.348	0.282	0.251	0.193	0.415	0.338
Observations	143421	147479	143421	147479	143421	147479	143369	146583	143411	146353

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL)*.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the week-of-birth level. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Table A.13 presents evidence of heterogeneous effects of upstream eligibility on concurrent upstream election registration, 2009 registration and downstream election participation in a linear, 26-week bandwidth specification.

Table A.14: Complier Characteristics by Upstream Election and Bandwidth

Panel A. 13-Week Bandwidth

Upstream Election	1988 Plebiscite			1989 Election			1993 Election			1999 Election			2005 Election			2009 Election		
	Sample (1)	Compliers (2)	Ratio (3)	Sample (4)	Compliers (5)	Ratio (6)	Sample (7)	Compliers (8)	Ratio (9)	Sample (10)	Compliers (11)	Ratio (12)	Sample (13)	Compliers (14)	Ratio (15)	Sample (16)	Compliers (17)	Ratio (18)
Panel A. Individual Characteristics																		
HS Dropouts	0.348	0.299	0.857	0.328	0.208	0.633	0.285	0.219	0.770	0.22	0.102	0.465	0.129	0.047	0.364	0.158	0.048	0.301
HS Graduates	0.503	0.529	1.050	0.510	0.503	0.986	0.518	0.520	1.003	0.558	0.398	0.713	0.605	0.42	0.694	0.809	0.902	1.114
> HS Graduates	0.148	0.173	1.164	0.162	0.289	1.787	0.197	0.261	1.325	0.222	0.500	2.249	0.266	0.533	2.002	0.032	0.051	1.571
Male	0.495	0.508	1.028	0.494	0.571	1.155	0.501	0.552	1.102	0.500	0.468	0.936	0.507	0.458	0.902	0.507	0.453	0.893
Panel B. Comuna Characteristics																		
Allende Vote	0.365	0.364	0.997	0.366	0.356	0.972	0.366	0.358	0.979	0.367	0.333	0.907	0.369	0.348	0.943	0.371	0.343	0.925
% Electricity	0.901	0.908	1.008	0.907	0.924	1.019	0.909	0.887	0.976	0.916	0.914	0.998	0.916	0.916	1.000	0.91	0.919	1.009
% Water in home	0.745	0.751	1.008	0.751	0.78	1.039	0.755	0.727	0.964	0.766	0.789	1.03	0.763	0.776	1.018	0.754	0.783	1.039
% TV Ownership	0.865	0.871	1.006	0.870	0.886	1.018	0.872	0.855	0.98	0.877	0.884	1.008	0.877	0.881	1.005	0.872	0.884	1.013
% Toilet in Home	0.688	0.697	1.013	0.696	0.731	1.050	0.701	0.664	0.947	0.714	0.736	1.030	0.711	0.725	1.020	0.700	0.733	1.047
Literacy Rate	0.902	0.903	1.002	0.903	0.91	1.008	0.904	0.899	0.994	0.906	0.913	1.008	0.905	0.909	1.004	0.903	0.911	1.009
Unemployment Rate	0.088	0.088	0.998	0.087	0.084	0.958	0.087	0.088	1.009	0.086	0.078	0.906	0.087	0.082	0.947	0.088	0.081	0.924
Share Compliers			0.615			0.155			0.249			0.061			0.101			0.082
Panel C. Sample Size)																		
Sample Size (Educ.)	97047			100269			96103			109552			111611			111121		
Sample Size	117823			123649			113963			126333			133208			138047		
Ratio	0.824			0.811			0.843			0.867			0.838			0.805		

Panel B. 52-Week Bandwidth

Upstream Election	1988 Plebiscite			1989 Election			1993 Election			1999 Election			2005 Election			2009 Election		
	Sample (1)	Compliers (2)	Ratio (3)	Sample (4)	Compliers (5)	Ratio (6)	Sample (7)	Compliers (8)	Ratio (9)	Sample (10)	Compliers (11)	Ratio (12)	Sample (13)	Compliers (14)	Ratio (15)	Sample (16)	Compliers (17)	Ratio (18)
Panel A. Individual Characteristics																		
	Sample	Compliers	Ratio	Sample	Compliers	Ratio	Sample	Compliers	Ratio	Sample	Compliers	Ratio	Sample	Compliers	Ratio	Sample	Compliers	Ratio
HS Dropouts	0.341	0.318	0.933	0.326	0.221	0.679	0.284	0.235	0.827	0.218	0.126	0.577	0.129	0.058	0.452	0.192	0.046	0.242
HS Graduates	0.507	0.524	1.035	0.511	0.523	1.023	0.521	0.536	1.029	0.558	0.466	0.834	0.613	0.446	0.728	0.768	0.853	1.110
> HS Graduates	0.152	0.158	1.035	0.163	0.256	1.567	0.195	0.229	1.174	0.223	0.408	1.828	0.257	0.495	1.925	0.04	0.101	2.511
Male	0.496	0.494	0.996	0.497	0.557	1.122	0.500	0.542	1.083	0.502	0.503	1.002	0.506	0.466	0.923	0.507	0.462	0.911
Panel B. Comuna Characteristics																		
Allende Vote	0.366	0.365	0.998	0.366	0.36	0.983	0.366	0.363	0.993	0.367	0.345	0.939	0.369	0.351	0.951	0.371	0.347	0.936
% Electricity	0.903	0.906	1.003	0.906	0.919	1.015	0.909	0.892	0.982	0.915	0.91	0.994	0.916	0.915	0.999	0.911	0.919	1.010
% Water in home	0.747	0.748	1.001	0.75	0.771	1.029	0.754	0.728	0.965	0.766	0.774	1.011	0.763	0.774	1.015	0.755	0.781	1.034
% TV Ownership	0.867	0.869	1.002	0.869	0.881	1.014	0.872	0.859	0.985	0.877	0.877	1.001	0.877	0.880	1.003	0.873	0.884	1.013
% Toilet in Home	0.691	0.693	1.003	0.695	0.721	1.037	0.700	0.666	0.951	0.714	0.719	1.007	0.711	0.722	1.015	0.702	0.730	1.04
Literacy Rate	0.902	0.903	1.000	0.903	0.908	1.006	0.904	0.899	0.994	0.906	0.909	1.003	0.905	0.909	1.004	0.903	0.910	1.008
Unemployment Rate	0.088	0.088	1.000	0.088	0.085	0.973	0.087	0.088	1.018	0.086	0.082	0.948	0.087	0.083	0.957	0.088	0.082	0.939
Share Compliers			0.718			0.215			0.354			0.099			0.132			0.114
Panel C. Sample Size)																		
Sample Size (Educ.)	366706			386733			382522			424834			437883			436478		
Sample Size	477129			499957			478760			518629			553317			570793		
Ratio	0.769			0.774			0.799			0.819			0.791			0.765		

Source: Chile's Electoral Commission (*Servicio Electoral de Chile, SERVEL*.
Note: Table A.14 presents complier characteristics by each upstream election and two different bandwidths.

Table A.15: Democratic Transitions

Country	Transition Year	Years in Democracy	Branch	First Party	Transition (I)	Second Party	Transition (II)
Albania	1997	21	Leg	Socialist Party	8	Democratic Party	8
Argentina	1983	35	Exec	Radical Civic Union	6	Justicialist Party	10
Armenia	1998	20	Exec	Republican Party	10	Independent	10
Bangladesh	1991	16	Leg	Bangladesh Nationalist Party	5	Awami League	5
Benin	1991	27	Exec	Benin Rebirth Party	2	Independent	3
Bolivia	1982	36	Exec	Leftwing Revolutionary Nationalist Movement	3	Revolutionary Nationalist Movement	4
Brazil	1946	18	Exec	Social Democratic Party	5	Brazilian Labor Party	3
Brazil	1985	33	Exec	Brazilian Democratic Movement Party	5	Party of National Reconstruction	4
Bulgaria	1990	28	Exec	Union of Democratic Forces	12	Bulgarian Socialist Party	10
Bulgaria	1990	28	Leg	Union of Democratic Forces	1	Bulgarian Socialist Party	1
Cambodia	1998	20	Leg	Cambodian People's Party*	21	NA	NA
Cape Verde	1991	27	Exec	Movement for Democracy	10	African Party of Independence of Cape Verde	10
Chile	1989	29	Exec	Concertación	21	Coalition for Change	4
Colombia	1957	61	Exec	Liberal Party	4	Conservative Party	4
Comoros	2002	16	Exec	National Front for Justice	4	Convention for the Renewal of the Comoros	10
Croatia	1999	19	Leg	Croatian Democratic Union	1	Social Democratic Party	3
Cyprus	1968	50	Exec	Democratic Party	9	Democratic Rally	11
Czech Republic	1989	29	Leg	Civic Forum	2	Civil Democratic Party	6
Djibouti	1999	19	Exec	People's Rally for Progress	4	Union for the Presidential Majority*	16
Dominican Republic	1978	40	Exec	Dominican Revolutionary Party	8	Social Christian Reformist Party	10
Ecuador	1979	39	Exec	Concentration of People's Forces	2	Popular Democracy	3
El Salvador	1982	36	Exec	Democratic Action Party	2	Christian Democratic Party	5
Estonia	1991	27	Exec	Pro Patria National Coalition Party	9	People's Union of Estonia	5
Estonia	1991	27	Leg	Popular Front	1	Pro Patria National Coalition Party	2
Fiji	1990	16	Leg	Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei	7	Fijian Labour Party	1
Georgia	1991	27	Exec	United Citizens of Georgia	11	United National Movement	9
Ghana	1996	22	Exec	National Democratic Congress	5	New Patriotic Party	8
Greece	1974	44	Leg	New Democracy	7	Panhellenic Socialist Movement	8
Guatemala	1986	32	Exec	Guatemalan Christian Democracy	5	Solidarity Action Movement	2
Guyana	1992	26	Exec	People's Progressive Party	23	People's National Congress Reform*	4
Honduras	1980	38	Exec	Liberal Party of Honduras	8	National Party of Honduras	4
Hungary	1989	29	Leg	Hungarian Democratic Forum	4	Hungarian Socialist Party	4
Indonesia	1999	19	Exec	National Awakening Party	2	Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle	3
Kenya	2002	16	Exec	National Rainbow Coalition	5	Party of National Unity	6
Korea South	1987	31	Exec	Democratic Justice Party	3	Democratic Liberal Party	5
Latvia	1991	27	Leg	Popular Front of Latvia	2	Latvian Way	2
Lesotho	1999	19	Leg	Lesotho Congress for Democracy	13	All Basotho Convention	3
Liberia	2003	15	Exec	Liberian Action Party	3	Unity	12
Lithuania	1991	27	Exec	Lithuanian Reform Movement	1	Democratic Labour Party of Lithuania	6
Madagascar	1991	18	Exec	Association for the Rebirth of Madagascar	2	National Union for Development and Democracy	3
Malawi	1994	24	Exec	United Democratic Front	11	Democratic Progressive Party	7
Mali	1992	20	Exec	Alliance for Democracy in Mali	10	Independent*	10
Mexico	1994	24	Exec	Institutional Revolutionary Party	6	National Action Party	12
Mongolia	1990	28	Exec	Mongolian People's Party	3	Social Democratic Party	4
Mongolia	1990	28	Leg	Mongolian People's Party	22	Democratic Party	4
Mozambique	1994	24	Exec	Mozambique Liberation Front*	25	NA	NA
Nicaragua	1990	28	Exec	National Opposition Union	3	Liberal Alliance	3
Nigeria	1999	19	Exec	People's Democratic Party	16	All Progressives Congress*	4
Panama	1989	29	Exec	Panameista Party	1	Democratic Revolutionary Party	4
Paraguay	1989	29	Exec	Colorado Party	19	Patriotic Alliance for Change	5
Peru	1993	25	Exec	Change '90	8	Peru Possible	5
Philippines	1986	32	Exec	Unido	6	Lakas	6
Poland	1989	29	Exec	Polish United Workers' Party	1	Solidarity Citizens' Committee	5
Portugal	1975	43	Exec	Socialist Party	10	Social Democratic Party	20
Portugal	1975	43	Leg	Socialist Party	3	Social Democratic Party	4
Romania	1990	28	Leg	National Salvation Front	1	Party of Social Democracy in Romania	1
Senegal	2000	18	Exec	Alliance for the Republic	12	Senegalese Democratic Party*	7
Sierra Leone	2001	17	Exec	All People's Congress	6	Sierra Leone People's Party	11
Slovakia	1990	29	Leg	Public Against Violence	2	Christian Democratic Movement	1
Slovenia	1991	27	Leg	Slovene Christian Democrats	1	Liberal Democracy of Slovenia	11
Spain	1976	42	Leg	Union of the Democratic Center	5	Spanish Socialist Workers' Party	14
Suriname	1990	28	Leg	National Party of Suriname	6	National Democratic Party	4
Taiwan	1992	26	Exec	Kuomintang	8	Democratic Progressive Party	8
Turkey	1946	25	Leg	Democrat Party	4	Republican People's Party	11
Turkey	1983	33	Leg	Motherland	8	True Path Party	5
Ukraine	1991	27	Exec	Our Ukraine	14	Party of Regions	5
Uruguay	1952	20	Exec	Colorado	7	National	8
Uruguay	1985	33	Exec	Colorado	5	National	5
Venezuela	1958	51	Exec	Democratic Action	1	Copei	10
Zambia	1991	27	Exec	Movement for Multiparty Democracy	20	Patriotic Front*	8

Source: Polity IV Project.
Note: Table A.15 presents evidence on countries which underwent democratic transitions. The second column denotes the year of the transition to democratic rule. The third column refers to the number of years of uninterrupted democratic rule. The fourth rule includes the branch of government of the party in power. The fifth column includes the name of the first party in power, along with the length of their time in power (Column 6). The last two columns denote the second party in power (if any) and the length of their government.