

THE DIALECTICAL METHOD OF
NĀÇĀRJUNA
Vigrahavyāvartanī



KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA
E.H. JOHNSTON • ARNOLD KUNST

THE
DIALECTICAL METHOD
OF
NĀGĀRJUNA

(VIGRAHAVYĀVARTANĪ)

*Translated from the original Sanskrit
with Introduction and Notes*

By

KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA

Text critically edited

By

E. H. JOHNSTON and ARNOLD KUNST

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS
Delhi :: Varanasi :: Patna

CONTENTS

TRANSLATION

Preface	v
Introduction	1
Translation and Notes	5
Abbreviations and bibliographical references	49
Index of the significant Nyāya technical terms used in the <i>Vigrahaṣyāvartanī</i>	51
Index of uncommon words	51
Index of the ancient authorities quoted in the Introduction and in the Notes	52

TEXT

Preface	1
Introduction	4
Abbreviations	9
Text of the <i>Vigrahaṣyāvartanī</i>	10
Index of <i>kārikās</i>	54

© MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

Indological Publishers & Booksellers

Head Office : BUNGALOW ROAD, JAWAHAR NAGAR, DELHI-7

Branches : 1. CHOWK, VARANASI-1 (U.P.)

2. ASHOK RAJPATH, PATNA-4 (BIHAR)

First Edition : Delhi, 1978

Price : Rs. 35.00

Printed in India

BY SHANTILAL JAIN AT SHRI JAINENDRA PRESS, A-45, PHASE-1, INDUSTRIAL
AREA, NARAINA, NEW DELHI-28 AND PUBLISHED BY NARENDRA PRAKASH JAIN
FOR MOTILAL BANARSIDASS, BUNGALOW ROAD, JAWAHAR NAGAR, DELHI-7

PREFACE

An English translation of the *Vigrahavyāvantarī* with Introduction and Notes was published, under the same title, in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy* (Dordrecht, Holland), Vol. 1, 1971. Since then, this work has undergone a good deal of transformation. Thanks to the initiative taken by Messrs. Motilal Banarsidass, it is now being printed, revised and enlarged, along with the Sanskrit original, edited by E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst.

My heartiest thanks are due to my friend E. Gene Smith, not only for revising the proofs and making valuable suggestions but also for his warm hospitality in Delhi while this book was being printed.

KAMALESWAR BHATTACHARYA

Centre National de la Recherche
Scientifique, Paris, and University of Toronto
1978

INTRODUCTION

In this short treatise¹, Nāgārjuna shows all his dialectical skill in refuting the criticisms of a realist — a Naiyāyika. Nāgārjuna does not disdain formal logic. Why are all things 'void' (*śūnya*) or 'devoid of an intrinsic nature' (*niḥsvabhāva*) ? Nāgārjuna's 'reason' (*hetu*) is that all things are 'dependently originated' (*pratītyasamutpanna*)². But the best way for Nāgārjuna to refute his opponent's criticisms is to show the inner contradictions of the latter's thought and to use against him his own logic³. And that, I think, he does admirably well⁴. We find here, especially, a brilliant criticism of the *pramāṇas* of the Nyāya system, which occupies in this work the central position (vv. XXXI-LI).

Nāgārjuna strives to express the Inexpressible. All his expressions, therefore, are bound to remain inadequate. 'All things are void (or devoid of an intrinsic nature)' is not a "proposition" which denies or affirms something. By 'making known' the 'voidness' of all things (v. LXIV), it only expresses, indirectly, the Absolute, which is 'perfectly appeased' and 'isolated' from all its appearances (commentary on v. XXIX, and notes).

Nāgārjuna seems to be a mystic. But he is not a mystic who renounces thought and its expression in language. Along with all mystical philosophers, he knows that 'the ultimate in thinking as the ultimate in communication is silence'⁵. Like them, too, he uses thought in order to transcend it. It is only when by his inexorable logic he has been able to bring to light all the contradictions inherent in our relational way of thought, that he experiences Being or Nirvāṇa, which is beyond all relations, — in a shipwreck so to say⁶.

Nāgārjuna's Absolute is neither the world nor apart from the world. It is the 'intrinsic nature' of the world. But to say 'It is the intrinsic nature of the world', is to make of it an object, standing in relation, on one hand, to the thinking subject, and on the other, to other objects, and thus to deprive it of its all-encompassing character. The only way in which Nāgārjuna can speak of it (or,

rather, *out of* it) is to say : 'All things in the world are devoid of an intrinsic nature', i.e., the things in the world are not as they appear to us'.

Here Nāgārjuna had to face the objection: If all things are void, how can our activities in the world become possible ? Even the religious discipline taught by the Buddha becomes meaningless. But this objection, Nāgārjuna replies, springs from a fundamental misunderstanding of 'voidness', i.e., 'dependent origination'. All our activities — religious or not — are possible only in this relational world of becoming. If 'voidness', i.e. becoming, is denied, then the world itself is assumed to be the Absolute, 'not born, not destroyed, immutable, free from the manifold states (of its becoming)'⁸. 'There is nothing to be done, no work is undertaken, the agent does not do any work'⁹.

Thus, Nāgārjuna neither denies the world nor affirms it. His is a 'middle path' (*madhyamā pratipad*), whence the name of his philosophy, 'Madhyamaka'¹⁰. It is in the world that he transcends the world and thus transfigures it. 'There is not the slightest difference between *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*':

na saṃsārasya nirvāṇāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam |
na nirvāṇasya saṃsārāt kiṃcid asti viśeṣaṇam ||
nirvāṇasya ca yā koṭiḥ koṭiḥ saṃsāraṇasya ca |
na tayoṛ antaraṃ kiṃcit susūkṣmaṃ api vidyate || (MK. XXV, 19-20).

'The difference between them is in *our way of looking at them*'¹¹. *Nirvāṇa* is *saṃsāra* without appearance and disappearance, without 'dependent origination':

ya dīvaṃjavitbhdva upādāya pratītya vā |
so'pratītyānupādāya nirvāṇam upadiśyate || (MK. XXV, 9).

The reason why I decided to translate this text was that no complete translation of it from the Sanskrit original was available¹², while there were already two translations based on the Tibetan and the Chinese versions. The authors of these two translations, S. Yamaguchi¹³ and Professor G. Tucci¹⁴, were not fortunate enough to be able to use the Sanskrit original, which was discovered later in a Tibetan monastery by Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana; and, as will be seen, there are notable divergences between their translations and mine.

The text was edited for the first time by K. P. Jayaswal and Rāhula Sāṅkrtyāyana in an appendix to Vol. XXIII, Part III (1937), of the *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Patna. The present translation is based on the improved edition by E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst in *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, published by the Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, Vol. IX: 1948-51 (Bruxelles 1951), pp. 99-152. It is to the labors of these two distinguished scholars that we owe now 'the possibly nearest approximation of Nāgārjuna's original text'. In some places I have differed from them; but I admire the patience and the sense of Sanskrit of these two scholars, to whose introductory remarks I refer the reader for further details about the text¹⁵.

NOTES TO THE INTRODUCTION

¹ I have not been able to find an adequate English expression for the title. In German it is rendered well: 'Die Streitabwehrerin' (Frauwallner, p. 199).

² *Infra*, p. 45, Note.—For Nāgārjuna, 'voidness' (*śūnyatā*) is the same thing as 'being devoid of an intrinsic nature' (*naiḥsvābhāvyā* and similar expressions). In order to avoid a misunderstanding of this essential idea of Nāgārjuna, it may be well to indicate here what he means by 'intrinsic nature' (*svabhāva*): 'Eigenes Wesen', writes E. Frauwallner, 'bedeutet nach Nāgārjuna, der indischen Wortbedeutung entsprechend, ein Sein aus sich selbst und nur durch sich selbst bedingt, unabhängig von allem andern. Daraus folgt aber, dass ein solches eigenes Wesen nicht entstanden ist, weil es nicht verursacht sein kann, und dass es nicht dem Vergehen unterworfen ist, weil sein Bestehen von nichts anderem abhängt. Es ist daher ewig und unvergänglich. Und so folgert denn Nāgārjuna, dass die Dinge der Erscheinungswelt, weil sie dem ständigen Werden und Vergehen unterliegen, kein eigenes Wesen besitzen können'. (Frauwallner, p. 173).

³ Cf. Candrakīrti, *MKV.*, p. 19: *idam evāsya spaṣṭataraṃ dūṣaṇaṃ yad uta svapratijñā-tārthasādhandsāmāthyam iti, kim atrānūmānabādhodbhāvanayā prayojanam?* — On this dialectical method, known as *prasaṅga*, cf. Murti, pp. 131-132.

⁴ E. Frauwallner writes about this work (p. 199): 'Es ist eines seiner besten Werke und zeigt ihn in seiner ganzen Eigenart, vor allem in seiner unbeirraren Folgerichtigkeit'.

⁵ 'Das Letzte des Denkens wie der Communication ist Schweigen', Karl Jaspers, *Vernunft und Existenz* (= *Aula-Voordrachten der Rijksuniversiteit te Groningen*, No. 1, 1935), p. 74.—Cf. *infra*, pp. 23-24, nn. 2-3 on v. XXIX.

⁶ 'Im Scheitern das Sein zu erfahren', Jaspers, *Philosophie III* (Berlin 1932), p. 235.—Cf. Murti, p. 160: 'Negation is thus the despair of thought; but it is at once the opening up of a new avenue — the path of intuition... Śūnyatā is negative only for thought; but in itself it is the non-relational knowledge of the absolute'.

Professor Paul Demiéville, in his Preface to May, p. ii, quotes from Giacomo Leopardi's poem, *L'Infinito*: 'E il naufragar m'è dolce in questo mare'.

⁷ Cf. Jaspers, *Philosophie* III, p. 234: 'Das Nichtsein allen uns zugänglichen Seins, das sich im Scheitern offenbart, ist das Sein der Transzendenz'. Jaspers has written on Buddhism and Nāgārjuna. See Koshiro Tamaki's interesting paper, 'Jaspers' Auffassung über den Buddhismus', in *Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies* (Tokyo), Vol. VIII, No. 2 (March 1960), pp. 10-20 (768-758).

⁸ *ajātam aniruddhaṃ ca kūṣasthaṃ ca bhaviṣyati |
vicitrābhir avasthābhiḥ svabhāve rahitaṃ jagat || MK. XXIV, 38.*

⁹ *na kartavyaṃ bhavet kiñcid anārabdhā bhavet kriyā |
kāraṇaḥ syād akurvāṇaḥ śūnyatāṃ pratibādhataḥ || Ibid., 37.—Cf. infra, pp. 35ff., vv. LIV-LVI.*

¹⁰ *yaḥ pratyāsamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tām pracakṣmaḥ |
sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā || Ibid., 18.*

'Dependent Origination is that which we call Voidness. It is a mere designation based on something, and it is the Middle way'.—Note the expression *upādāya prajñaptiḥ* 'a mere designation based on something' ('blosse Benennung auf irgendwelcher Grundlage', Frauwallner, p. 190). It is only an expression of the Inexpressible based on the conventional truth (cf. *infra*, pp. 21ff., v. XXVIII).

The term 'Madhyamaka' is used by Nāgārjuna's followers as the name of the philosophy, while they call themselves 'Mādhyamika'. The non-Buddhist writers, however, invariably refer both to the philosophy and to its adherents as 'Mādhyamika'.

¹¹ Murti, p. 163.

¹² E. Frauwallner translated a few passages, pp. 200-4. More recently, Professor Gnoli translated into Italian the *kārikās* only: R. Gnoli, *Nāgārjuna: Madhyamaka-Kārikā* (Torino 1961), pp. 139ff.

After I completed this work in July 1970, I came to know of a work done on the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* by the veteran scholar, Professor Satkari Mookerjee (*Nava-Nālandā-Mahāvihāra Research Publication*, Vol. I, 1957). I am grateful to Professors B.K. Matilal and J.L. Masson for having made that work available to me from the University of Toronto. Professor Mookerjee gives an exposition of the arguments of our text 'in a language and manner intelligible to the modern mind'.—I have not been able to consult F.J. Streng, *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning* (Nashville, Tenn., Abingdon Press, 1967).

¹³ *Traité de Nāgārjuna: Pour écarter les vaines discussions*, traduit et annoté par Susumu Yamaguchi, in *Journal Asiatique*, juillet-septembre 1929, pp. 1-86.

¹⁴ *Vigrahavyāvartanī* by Nāgārjuna, Translation from the Chinese and Tibetan Text, in the author's *Pre-Diñnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, Baroda 1929 (*Gaekwad's Oriental Series*, No. XLIX).

¹⁵ The relationship between the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and the *Nyāyasūtras* has been studied by G. Oberhammer ('Ein Beitrag zu den Vāda-Traditionen Indiens', in *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für indische Philosophie* [Vienna] VII [1963], pp. 63ff.), and by myself ('On the Relationship between Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and the *Nyāyasūtras*', in *Journal of Indo-European Studies* [USA], forthcoming issue). On the significant Nyāya technical terms used in the *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, see Glossary published in *JIPh.* 5 (1977).

TRANSLATION

I

OBJECTIONS

I. If an intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*) of the things (*bhāva*), whatever they may be, exists nowhere (*sarvatra na vidyate*), your [very] statement must be devoid of an intrinsic nature (*asvabhāva*). It is not, therefore, in a position to deny the intrinsic nature [of the things].

Whether in the causes (*hetu*), in the conditions (*pratyaya*), in the combination of the causes and the conditions (*hetupratyayasāmagrī*), or in a different thing, nowhere does exist an intrinsic nature of the things, whatever they may be. On this ground it is said that all things are void (*śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ*). For instance, the sprout is neither in the seed, its cause, nor in the things known as its conditions, viz., earth, water, fire, wind, etc., taken one by one, nor in the totality of the conditions, nor in the combination of the causes and the conditions, nor is it anything different from the causes and the conditions (*na hetupratyayavinirmuktaḥ pṛthag eva ca*). Since there is nowhere an intrinsic nature, the sprout is devoid of an intrinsic nature (*nīḥsvabhāva*). Being devoid of an intrinsic nature, it is void (*śūnya*). And just as this sprout is devoid of an intrinsic nature and hence void, so also are all the things.

Here we observe: If this is so, your statement that all things are void, must also be void. — Why? — Because your statement is neither in its cause — the [four] great elements (*mahābhūta*), taken collectively or individually (*saṃprayukteṣu viprayukteṣu vā*); — nor in its conditions, the efforts made in the breast, the throat, the lips, the tongue, the roots of the teeth, the palate, the nose, the head, etc. (*urahkṣaṇṭhauṣṭhājihvādantamūlatālunāsikāmūrdhaprabhṛtiṣu yatneṣu*); — nor in the combination of both [the cause and the conditions]; — nor again is it anything apart from the cause and the conditions. Since it is nowhere, it is devoid of an intrinsic nature, [and] since it is devoid of an intrinsic nature, it is void. For this reason, it is incapable of

denying the intrinsic nature of all things. A fire that does not exist cannot burn, a weapon that does not exist cannot cut, water that does not exist cannot moisten; similarly a statement that does not exist cannot deny the intrinsic nature of all things. In these circumstances, your statement that the intrinsic nature of all things has been denied, is not valid.

II. Now, if this sentence (*vākya*) is endowed with an intrinsic nature (*sasvabhāva*), your former proposition (*pūrvā pratijñā*) is destroyed (*hatā*). There is a discordance¹, and you should state the special reason for it (*tasmin viśeṣahetuś ca vaktavyaḥ*).

Now you may think, in order to avoid this defect (*mā bhūdeṣa doṣa iti*): this sentence is endowed with an intrinsic nature, and being endowed with an intrinsic nature, it is non-void (*aśūnya*); thus the intrinsic nature of all things has been denied by it. — To this we reply: If so, then your former proposition 'All things are void' is destroyed.

Furthermore:

Your statement is included in all things (*sarvabhāvāntargata*). [Now] if all things are void, for what reason is your statement non-void, — that statement which has denied the intrinsic nature of all things because it is [itself] non-void (*yenāśūnyatvāt sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ pratiśiddhaḥ*)? Thus arises a controversial discussion in six points (*ṣaṣkoṭiko vādaḥ*)².—How is it? — Well,

(1) If all things are void, then your statement is void, being included in all things. [And] a negation by that [statement] which is void is a logical impossibility (*tena śūnyena pratiśedhānupapattiḥ*). In these circumstances, the negation that all things are void is not valid (*anupapanna*). (2) If, on the other hand, the negation that all things are void is valid, then your statement is non-void. [But] that negation which it establishes because it is non-void, is not valid (*aśūnyatvād anena pratiśedho 'nupapannaḥ*)³. (3) Now, if all things are void, but your statement by which is effected the negation (*yena pratiśedhaḥ*) is non-void, then your statement is not included in all things (*sarvatrāsaṃgrhitam*). Your proposition, there, is contradicted by the example⁴. (4) If, on the contrary, your statement is included in all things, and if all things are void, then your statement also is void.

[And] since it is void, it cannot establish a negation (*śūnyatvād anena nāsti pratiśedhaḥ*). (5) Let us then assume that it is void and that there is the negation by it (*atha śūnyam asti cānena pratiśedhaḥ*): 'All things are void'. But, in that case, all things, though void, would be capable of performing actions (*śūnyā api sarvabhāvāḥ kāryakriyāsamarthā bhaveyuh*) — which is absurd (*na caitat iṣṭam*). (6) Let it be granted, then, that all things are void and that they are not capable of performing actions (*atha śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā na ca kāryakriyāsamarthā bhavanti*); let the proposition be not contradicted by the example (*mā bhūd dṛṣṭāntavirodhaḥ*). In that case, however, the negation of the intrinsic nature of all things by your void statement is not valid.

Furthermore:

Thus, if your statement exists (*tadastitvāt*), there arises the following discordance: some things are void, and some other things, non-void (*kiñcid chūnyam kiñcid aśūnyam*). And you should state the special reason for that discordance, explaining why some things are void, while some others are not. You have, however, not stated that reason. In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

¹ Yamaguchi's explanation of *vaiśamikatva* by *vaiśamavāpti* is 'anachronistic', as pointed out by the editors (p. 11, n. 9). The word has the same meaning as the usual *vaiśamya*.

² This has nothing to do with the *śaṭpakṣīrūpakathābhāsa* (*Nyāyasūtras* V, 1, 39-43) —despite Yamaguchi's note (2).

³ For the statement is 'included in all things'. — This is certainly the correct interpretation, as suggested in the Edition, p. 12, n. 3 (and not that on p. 3). The Naiyāyika's objection here is closely related to that raised in the *Nyāyasūtras* II, 1, 13-14, in connection with the Mādhyamika negation of the Naiyāyika *pramāṇas* (cf. vv. XXXI-LI below): *sarvaprāmāṇapratīśedhāc ca pratīśedhānupapattiḥ*; — *tatprāmāṇye vā na sarvaprāmāṇavipratīśedhaḥ*. Cf. also Vātsyāyana on *Nyāyasūtra* IV, 2, 27.

⁴ *tatra dṛṣṭāntavirodhaḥ*. — The proposition, 'All things are void', is contradicted by the example (*dṛṣṭānta*) of the statement that is non-void. Since the statement is not 'included in all things', there can be no question of *all* things being void.

Moreover:

III. If you think that it is like 'Do not make a sound', [we reply:] this

also is not valid. For here a sound that is existent prevents the other sound that will be (*śabdena hy atra satā bhaviṣyato vāraṇaṃ tasya*).

You may think: When somebody says: 'Do not make a sound', he himself makes a sound, and that sound prevents the other sound; in just the same manner, the void statement that all things are void prevents the intrinsic nature of all things. — To this we reply: This also is not valid. — Why? — Because here a sound that is existent negates the future sound. In your case, however, it is not an existent statement that negates the intrinsic nature of all things. For, in your opinion (*tava hi matena*) the statement is non-existent, the intrinsic nature of all things is non-existent (*vacanam apy asaṭ sarvabhāvasvabhāvo 'py asan*). Thus, 'It is like "Do not make a sound"' is a defective proposition (*viśamopanyāsa*)¹.

¹ *viśama upanyāsaḥ* is a favorite remark of Patañjali, author of the *Mahābhāṣya*. Cf. L. Renou, *Terminologie grammaticale du Sanskrit* (Paris 1942 and 1957), s.v. *upanyāsa*. — Let it be noted in passing that Nāgārjuna's prose—of which the commentary on the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* is the only extant example—is very similar to that of the *Mahābhāṣya*. Among the 'imitators' of Patañjali's style (cf. on this point L. Renou, *Histoire de la langue sanskrite*, Lyon-Paris 1956, pp. 135-6) is therefore to be counted now Nāgārjuna.

Moreover:

IV. If you think that the same holds true of the negation of the negation (*pratiśedhapratiśedha*) also, that is false. It is your proposition which by virtue of its specific character is thus rendered defective (*lakṣaṇato dūṣyate*), not mine.

You may think: 'According to this very method (*anenaiva kalpena*), a negation of negation also is impossible; so your negation of the statement negating the intrinsic nature of all things is impossible (*tatra yad bhavān sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ pratiśedhavad vacanaṃ pratiśedhayati tad anupapannam iti*)'. — To this we reply: This also is false. — Why? — Because the objection applies [only] to the specific character of your proposition, not to that of mine. It is you who say that all things are void, not I. The initial thesis (*pūrvakaḥ pakṣaḥ*) is not mine. — In these circumstances, your statement that, such being the case (*evam sati*), a negation of negation also is impossible, is not valid¹.

¹ According to the realist, the Mādhyamika commits the logical error of negating, through a void statement, the intrinsic nature of all things. The realist, however,

does not commit any such error when he negates the Mādhyamika's statement negating the intrinsic nature of all things — for he does not hold that all things are void; his statement, therefore, is not void.

Moreover:

V. Now, if [you say that] you deny the things after having apprehended them through perception (*pratyakṣa*)¹, [we reply:] that perception through which the things are apprehended does not exist (*tan nāsti pratyakṣam bhāvā yenopalabhyante*).

You cannot say that you deny all things in the statement 'All things are void', after having apprehended them through perception. — Why? — Because even perception, an instrument of true cognition (*pramāṇa*), is void, being included in all things (*sarvabhāvāntargatatvāt*). The person who apprehends the things (*yo bhāvān upalabhate*) is also void. Thus, there is no such thing as apprehension through perception, an instrument of true cognition (*tasmāt pratyakṣeṇa pramāṇena nopalambhabhāvaḥ*); and a negation of that which is not apprehended is a logical impossibility (*anupalabdhasya ca pratishedhānuṣapattiḥ*). In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

You think, perhaps (*syāt te buddhiḥ*), that you deny all things (*sarvabhāvavyāvartanam kriyate*) after having apprehended them through inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*āgama*) and identification (*upamāna*)².

¹ Here and in the following verse are mentioned the four *pramāṇas* or 'instruments of true cognition', typical of the Nyāya school, viz., perception (*pratyakṣa*), inference (*anumāna*), verbal testimony (*āgama* or *śabda*), and identification (*upamāna*). [On the meaning of *upamāna*, adopted here, see A. Foucher, *Le Compendium des Topiques (Tarka-saṃgraha) d'Annambhaṭṭa* (Paris, 1949), pp. 148ff. See also Daniel H. H. Ingalls, *Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic* (=Harvard Oriental Series 40, Cambridge, Mass., 1951, p. 29, n. 6)].

² Cf. preceding note.

To this we reply:

VI. In our refutation of perception, we have [already] refuted inference, verbal testimony and identification, as well as the objects to be established by inference, verbal testimony and identification (*anumānāgasasādhya ye' rthā dṛṣṭāntasādhyaś ca*)¹.

We have [already] refuted inference, identification and verbal testimony, in our refutation of the 'instrument of true cognition' (*pramāṇa*), perception. Just as perception, an 'instrument of true cognition', is

void because all things are void (*sarvabhāvānām śūnyatvāt*), so also are inference, identification and verbal testimony void because all things are void. Those objects which are to be established by inference, verbal testimony and identification, are also void because all things are void. The person who apprehends the things through inference, identification and verbal testimony, is also void. Thus, there is no apprehension of things (*tasmād bhāvānām upalāmbhābhāvali*), and a negation of the intrinsic nature of things that are not apprehended is a logical impossibility (*anupalabdhanām ca svabhāvapratiṣedhānupapattiḥ*). In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

¹ *Dṛṣṭānta* is used here in the sense of *upamāna*. Notice that in the commentary portion *upamāna* is used throughout.

Moreover:

VII. People conversant with the state of things (*dharmāvasthāvīdo janāḥ*) think that the good things have a good intrinsic nature (*kuśalānām dharmānām manyante kuśalaṃ svabhāvam*). The same distinction (*vinīyoga*) is made with regard to the rest [of the things] too (the bad things, and so on).

The commentary on this verse is a long list of 119 *kuśaladharma*s and of other *dharma*s, which is of no particular interest in a treatise on dialectics. Quite a number of technical terms used remain, moreover, uncertain. Cf. Text, p. 15, n. 6, which refers to E. H. Johnston's article 'Nāgārjuna's List of Kuśaladharma's', in *Indian Historical Quarterly*, XIV, pp. 314—323.

In their Introduction (pp. 7-8), the editors observe: 'While the text is divided in two parts, 20 verses setting out the opponents' criticisms of Nāgārjuna's views and 50 verses giving his reply, the objections are not in fact all made by the same critic. The *dharmāvasthāvīdo* theorists of verse 7 are clearly Buddhist; though it is difficult to determine their school, the details in the commentary exclude the possibility of their being Sarvāstivādins, to whose theory of the *dharma*s much of the argument elsewhere would apply'. Professor Tucci holds the same view (*Pre-Diñnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic*, p. xiii). For my part, I am rather inclined to think that the author of this objection is the Naiyāyika himself, who uses against Nāgārjuna, a Buddhist, the standpoint of the Buddhist realists. Cf. *infra*, p. 38, n. 2, on LV.

VIII. And those things which lead to emancipation (*nairyāṇika*) have an intrinsic nature that leads to emancipation (*nairyāṇikasvabhāva*). Similarly with the things which do not lead to emancipation, and so on (*anairyāṇikādīnām*), things which have been mentioned in connection with the state of things (*dharmāvasthoktānām*).

The commentary gives an enumeration of the *dharmas* and then says, as at the end of the commentary on the preceding verse: Thus, since the intrinsic nature of things is in this way seen to be of different kinds (*anekapṛakāra*), your statement that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature and that being devoid of an intrinsic nature they are void (*niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūṇyā iti*), is not valid.

Furthermore:

IX. If the things had no intrinsic nature, then even the name 'absence of intrinsic nature' would not exist (*niḥsvabhāva ity evaṃ nāmāpi bhaven naivam*)¹; for there is no name without an object [to be named] (*nāma hi nirvastukaṃ nāsti*).

If all things were devoid of an intrinsic nature, there would, nevertheless, be an absence of intrinsic nature (*yadi sarvadharmāṇāṃ svabhāvo na bhavet tatrāpi niḥsvabhāvo bhavet*). [But] then, even the name 'absence of intrinsic nature' would not exist (*tatra niḥsvabhāva ity evaṃ nāmāpi na bhavet*). — Why? — Because there is no name whatsoever without an object [to be named] (*nāma hi nirvastukaṃ kimcid api nāsti*). — Thus, since the name exists (*nāmasadbhāvāt*), there is an intrinsic nature of the things; and since they have an intrinsic nature, all things are non-void (*asūnya*). Your statement, therefore, that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature and that, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, they are void, is not valid.

¹At the end of the first line I prefer to read, with Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana, *evam* (*eva* in Johnston and Kunst's edition).

Moreover:

X. Now you may say: There is an intrinsic nature, but that does not belong to the things (*sa ca dharmāṇāṃ na vidyate*). There is, then, an intrinsic nature without the things (*dharmair vinā svabhāvaḥ*), and you should explain to what it belongs (*sa yasya tad yuktam upadeṣṭum*).

Now you may fancy: Let there be no name without an object; there is an intrinsic nature, but that does not belong to the things; thus, the voidness of the things because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature will be established (*evaṃ dharmasūnyatā niḥsvabhāvatvād dharmāṇāṃ siddhā bhaviṣyati*), and the name will not be without an object [to be named]. — To this we reply: You should explain that object, apart from the things, to which now belongs thus that intrinsic nature (*evaṃ yasyedāniṃ sa sva bhāvo dharmavinirmuktasyārthasya sa yuktam upadeṣṭum arthaḥ*). You have, however, not explained that. Hence your assumption (*kalpanā*): 'there is an intrinsic nature but it does not belong to the things', is ruled out (*hinā*).

Furthermore:

XI. Since the negation 'There is no pot in the house' (*nāsti ghaṭo ghe*) is seen to be only of an existent (*sata eva*), this negation of yours is that of an existent intrinsic nature (*sataḥ svabhāvasya*).

It is only an existent object that is negated, not a non-existent one. For instance, when it is said: 'There is no pot in the house', it is an existent pot that is negated, not a non-existent one (*sato ghaṭasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate nāsataḥ*). In like manner it follows that the negation 'The things have no intrinsic nature' (*nāsti svabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ*) is the negation of an existent intrinsic nature, not of a non-existent one. In these circumstances, the statement that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature is not valid. By the very fact that a negation is possible, the intrinsic nature of all things is non-negated¹.

¹ *pratiṣedhasambhāvād eva sarvasvabhāvasvabhāvo' pratiṣiddhaḥ*. Or 'svabhāvaḥ prasiddhaḥ' ('the intrinsic nature of all things is established')? Cf. Text, p. 18, n. 9 and v. LXI below. — 'Whenever we talk of negation or absence, it is relevant to ask of what the absence or negation is that we are talking about. Nyāya does not accept any such thing as 'pure negation'. Thus, an absence, it claims, must be an absence of something. This something is termed the *pratiyogin* (the counterpositive) of the absence in question. In this respect the term 'absence' is comparable to the term 'cognition' (*jñāna*). An instance of cognition is also a cognition of something.

'...Nyāya arrives at absence as a property by a hypostasis of denial. It interprets denials like "a is not there" or "a is absent there" as "there is an absence of a there." Thus the absence of a is asserted as a separate entity, and a, the object of denial, is called the 'counterpositive'. (B. K. Matilal, *The Navya-nyāya Doctrine of Negation: The Semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-nyāya Philosophy* [=Harvard Oriental Series, 46, Cambridge, Mass., 1968], p. 52).

Cf. *Vaiṣeṣikasūtra IX*, 1, 10: *nāsti ghaṭo geḥa iti sato ghaṭasya gehasamyogapratīṣedhaḥ* (*nāsti ghaṭo*, 'smin deṣe kāle veti deśādiniṣedho ghaṭādeḥ, na svarūpato niṣedhaḥ kriyāta iti, Candrānanda, in *Vaiṣeṣikasūtra of Kapāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*, critically edited by Muni Śrī Jambuvijayaji, Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 136, Baroda 1961, p. 68). Cf. also Uddyotakara, *Nyāyavārttika* on II, 1, 12 (p. 427 in *Nyāyadarśanam I*, Calcutta): *na hy anyam nāstind samānādhikaraṇo ghaṭādīśabdo ghaṭābhāvam pratīpādayati, api tu gehaghaṭasamyogam vā kālavīṣeṣam vā ghaṭasya sāmāthyam vā pratīṣedhati...*

XII. If that intrinsic nature does not exist, what, then, do you negate by this statement? The negation of a non-existent is established without words (*nte vacanāt pratīṣedhaḥ sidhyate hy asataḥ*).

If that intrinsic nature does not really exist, what do you negate by this statement: 'All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature'? The negation of a non-existent, e.g., that of the coolness of fire (*agneḥ śaityasya*) or of the heat of water (*apām auṣṇasya*), is established without words¹.

¹ Cf. Matilal, *op. cit.*, p. 54, n. 9: 'Nyāya insists that the negate of a negation, i.e., the counterpositive of an absence, must not be an unexampled term. In other words, we cannot simply negate a term which has no denotation. To put it in another way, we cannot have an absence whose counterpositive is a fictitious entity'. The author cites Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali III*, 2. See also Dinesh Chandra Guha, *Navya Nyāya System of Logic (Some Basic Theories & Techniques)* [Vārāṇasi, 1968], pp. 112-113. Our passage seems to be an early and simple statement of this theory. See also B. K. Matilal, 'Reference and Existence in Nyāya and Buddhist Logic', *JIPh.* 1 (1970), pp. 83-110.

Furthermore:

XIII. Just as ignorant people (*bāla*) wrongly perceive a mirage as water¹, [and that wrong perception is removed by some person who knows, in like manner you may think that] you negate a wrong perception of a non-entity (*evam mithyāgrāhaḥ syāt te pratīṣedhyato hy asataḥ*)².

When ignorant people wrongly perceive a mirage as water, a scholarly person (*pañḍitajātyiyeṇa puruṣeṇa*), in order to remove that perception, says: 'But that mirage is without water' (*nirjalā sā mṛga-tṣṇā*). Likewise, you may think that the statement 'All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature' is meant for removing people's perception of an intrinsic nature in things that are devoid of an intrinsic nature (*evam niḥsvabhāveṣu yaḥ svabhāve grāhaḥ sattvānām tasya vyāvar-tanārtham niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ity ucyata iti*).

¹ *mṛgatṛṣṇādyāṃ yathājalagrāhaḥ*. The compound *yathājalagrāha*, which also occurs in the commentary on v. LXVI below, is explained in the commentary on the present verse as: *jalam iti grāhaḥ*.

² On *pratiśedhyatas*, cf. Text, p. 19, n. 7 (and Introduction, p. 7).

To this we reply:

XIV. But this being so, the aggregate of the six following things exists: the perception (*grāha*), the object to be perceived (*grāhya*), the perceiver of that object (*tadgrahitṛ*), the negation (*pratiśedha*), the object to be negated (*pratiśedhya*), and the negator (*pratiśeddhṛ*).

If this is so, then the perception of people, the object to be perceived, people who perceive it, the negation of that wrong perception, the object to be negated, viz., the wrong perception, and people like you who negate this perception (*pratiśeddhāro yuṣmadādayo' sya grāhasya*)—all these exist. The aggregate of the six is, therefore, established (*siddham śaṅkam*). [And] that aggregate of the six being established (*tasya śaṅkasya prasiddhatvāt*), your statement that all things are void is not valid.

XV. You may think that there is no perception, no object to be perceived, and no perceiver. But, in that case, there is no negation, no object to be negated, and no negator.

If, in order to avoid this defect (*mā bhūd eṣa doṣa iti kṛtvā*), you say that there is no perception, no object to be perceived, and no perceiver, then even the negation of the perception, viz., the statement that all things are void (*grāhasya yaḥ pratiśedho niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti*), does not exist. The object to be negated and the negators, too, do not exist.

XVI. And if there is no negation, no object to be negated and no negator, then all things are established, as well as their intrinsic nature (*siddhā hi sarvabhāvās teṣām eva svabhāvaś ca*).

And if there is no negation, no object to be negated, and no negator, then all things are non-negated (*apratiśiddhāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ*), and they have an intrinsic nature (*asti ca sarvabhāvānām svabhāvaḥ*).

Furthermore:

XVII. Your 'reason' [for establishing your thesis] cannot be established (*hetoś ca te na siddhiḥ*). How can there be, indeed, a 'reason' for

you, when everything is devoid of an intrinsic nature (*naiḥsvābhāvyāt kuto hi te hetuḥ*)? And this thesis of yours which is devoid of a 'reason', cannot be established (*nirhetukasya siddhir na copapannāsyā te' rthasya*).

Your reason for the thesis that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature cannot be established (*niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ity etasminn arthe te hetor asiddhiḥ*). — Why? — Because all things, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, are void. How, therefore, can there be a reason (*tato hetuḥ kutaḥ*)? [And] if there is no reason (*asati hetau*), how indeed can the thesis devoid of a reason, namely that all things are void, be established? — In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid.

Moreover:

XVIII. If your negation of the intrinsic nature is established without any reason (*yadi cāhetuḥ siddhiḥ svabhāvavinivartanasya te bhavati*), my affirmation of the things' being endowed with an intrinsic nature is also established without any reason (*svābhāvyaśāstitvaṃ mamāpi nirhetukaṃ siddham*).

[The commentary is merely a paraphrase of the verse. For a similar argument cf. Candrakīrti, *MKV.*, pp. 55-6 (L. de La Vallée Poussin pointed this out in his note 1 on page 56).]

XIX. Nor can you hold that the things' being devoid of an intrinsic nature is the existence of the reason (*atha hetor āstitvaṃ bhāvāsvābhāvyaṃ ity anupapannam*); for there is not a single thing in the world which is devoid of an intrinsic nature and [at the same time] existent (*lokeṣu niḥsvabhāvo na hi kaścana vidyate bhāvāḥ*).

If you think that the fact that the things are devoid of an intrinsic nature is the existence of the reason, [we answer:] that argument is not valid. — Why? — Because there is nothing in the world that is existent, while being devoid of an intrinsic nature¹.

¹ This is how I understand this passage. According to the editors (p. 22, n. 1), 'The argument is that "if you suppose that the cause exists in reality and that all things (which include the cause) are without essence (so that the cause is at the same time really existent and without essence)", that argument is not valid'. About the commentary sentence, *yadi hetor āstitvaṃ manyase niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti, tad anupapannam*, they further observe: 'This sentence may not be in order; it would improve it to put *manyase* before *hetor* and add *ca* after *niḥsvabhāvāḥ*'. All that, it seems to me, is unnecessary.

Furthermore :

XX. It is not possible to hold that the negation comes first and then the thing to be negated. Nor is it possible to hold that the negation comes after [the thing to be negated], or that they are simultaneous. — The intrinsic nature of the things is, therefore, existent (*yataḥ svabhāvaḥ san*).

It is not possible to hold that the negation comes first and then the thing to be negated. For, if the thing to be negated does not exist (*asati hi pratiśedhye*), of what is the negation (*kasya pratiśedhaḥ*)? Nor is it possible to hold that the negation comes after the thing to be negated. For, if the thing to be negated is [already] established (*siddhe hi pratiśedhye*), what purpose is served by the negation (*kim pratiśedhaḥ karoti*)? Now [if you say that] the negation and the thing to be negated are simultaneous, [we answer]: even in that way, the negation is not the cause of the object to be negated, nor is the object to be negated the cause of the negation (*na pratiśedhaḥ pratiśedhyasyārthasya kāraṇam, pratiśedhyo na pratiśedhasya ca*), just as of the two horns¹, grown simultaneously (*yugapadutpannayoh*), the right horn is not the cause of the left horn, nor is the left horn the cause of the right horn. — In these circumstances, your statement that all things are void is not valid².

¹ *śata*^o in the text is an unnecessary addition to *viśāṇa*, as the editors have rightly observed (p. 22, n. 9). — Cf. Candrakīrti on MK. XX, 7: *na caikakālayoh saṃyetarago-viśāṇayor janyajanakatvaṃ dṛṣṭam, vāmadakṣiṇakarayoḥ carāṇayor vā*. — *Vaidalyaparakaraṇa*, quoted by Yamaguchi, p. 78; *Tarkasāstra* in Tucci, p. 18; Gauḍapāda, *Āgamaśāstra* (= *Māṇḍūkyakārikā*) IV, 16 (cf. Vidhuśekhara Bhaṭṭācārya, *Gauḍapādīyam Āgamaśāstram*, University of Calcutta, 1950, pp. 115-6); Jayantabhaṭṭa, *Nyāyamañjarī*, p. 628, l. 13; Bhāsarvajña, *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p. 350, l. 18 (read *saṃyetarayoh*, instead of *sādhyetarayoh*).

² Cf. *Nyāyasūtra* II, 1, 12: *traikālyāsiddheḥ pratiśedhānupapattiḥ*. — Vātsyāyana: *pūrvam hi pratiśedhasiddhau asati pratiśedhye kim anena pratiśidhyate? paścātsiddhau pratiśedhyāsiddhiḥ, pratiśedhābhāvād iti. yugapatsiddhau pratiśedhyāsiddhyabhyanuññānād anarthakaḥ pratiśedha iti*. As will be seen, Vātsyāyana's interpretation is a little different from that given in the commentary on our verse here. See also *Nyāyasūtra* V, 1, 20.

II

REPLY¹

[Refutation to the first objection]

XXI. If my statement does not exist in the combination of the cause and the conditions, or independently of them, then the voidness of the things is established because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature (*śūnyatvaṃ siddhaṃ bhāvānām asvabhāvatvāt*).

If my statement does not exist in its cause and in its conditions...², it is devoid of an intrinsic nature and thus void. Now the voidness of this statement of mine is established because of its being devoid of an intrinsic nature. And just as this statement of mine is void because of its being devoid of an intrinsic nature, so also are all things void because of their being devoid of an intrinsic nature. In these circumstances, your statement: 'Because of the voidness of your statement it is not possible to establish the voidness of all things', is not valid.

¹ In this part Nāgārjuna quotes all the verses translated above, and then gives his reply. I have not thought it necessary to repeat them here.

² The commentary here is a restatement of what was said by the opponent in verse I above.

Furthermore :

XXII. That nature of the things which is dependent is called voidness¹, for that nature which is dependent is devoid of an intrinsic nature (*yaś ca pratityabhāvo bhavati hi tasyāsvabhāvatvam*).

You have not understood the meaning of the voidness of the things. So you have set out to criticize me, saying: 'Since your statement is devoid of an intrinsic nature, the negation of the intrinsic nature of the things is not valid'. That nature of the things which is dependent is voidness. — Why? — Because it is devoid of an intrinsic nature. Those things which are dependently originated are not, indeed, endowed with an intrinsic nature; for they have no intrinsic nature (*ye hi pratityasamutpannā bhāvās te na svasvabhāva bhavanti, svabhāvābhāvāt*). — Why? — Because they are dependent on causes and conditions (*hetupratyayasāpekṣatvāt*). If the things were by their own nature (*svabhāvataḥ*), they would be even without the aggregate of causes and conditions (*pratyākhyāyāpi hetupratyayam*). But

they are not so. Therefore they are said to be devoid of an intrinsic nature, and hence void. Likewise it follows that my statement also, being dependently originated (*pratityasamutpannatvāt*), is devoid of an intrinsic nature, and hence void. — But things like a cart, a pot, a cloth, etc., though devoid of an intrinsic nature (*svabhāvasūnya*) because of being dependently originated, are occupied with their respective functions, e.g., carrying wood, grass and earth, containing honey, water and milk, and protecting from cold, wind and heat. Similarly this statement of mine, though devoid of an intrinsic nature because of being dependently originated, is engaged in the task of establishing the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of the things (*niḥsvabhāvatvaprasādhane bhāvānām vartate*). — In these circumstances, your statement: 'Your statement, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, is void, and, being void, it cannot negate the intrinsic nature of all things', is not valid.

¹ *yaś ca pratityabhāvo bhāvānām sūnyateti sā proktā*. — Cf. MK. XXIV, 18: *yaḥ pratitya-samutpādaḥ sūnyatām tām pracakṣmahe*. (*yaḥ pratityādhino sa sūnya uktaḥ*, *Anavataptahradāpa-saṃkramaṇa-Sūtra*, quoted by Candrakīrti, several times. Cf. *supra*, p. 1).

Furthermore:

XXIII. Suppose that a person, artificially created (*nirmitaka*), should prevent (*pratīśedhayeta*) another artificial person, or that a magic man (*māyāpuruṣa*) should prevent another man created by his own magic (*svamāyayā sṛṣṭam*) [from doing something]. Of the same nature would be this negation (*pratīśedho' yaṃ tathaiva syāt*)¹.

Suppose that an artificial man should prevent another artificial man occupied with something (*kasmīṃścid arthe vartamānam*), or that a magic man created by a magician (*māyākāreṇa sṛṣṭaḥ*) should prevent another magic man created by his own magic and occupied with something. There, the artificial man who is prevented is void, and he (the artificial man) who prevents is also void; the magic man who is prevented is void, and he (the magic man) who prevents is also void. In like manner, a negation of the intrinsic nature of all things by my statement is possible, even though this statement is void (*evam eva madvacanena sūnyenāpi sarvabhāvānām svabhāvapratīśedha upapannaḥ*). In these circumstances, your statement: 'Because of the voidness of your statement, a negation of the intrinsic nature of all things is not possible', is not valid. In this way is also prevented

the controversial discussion in six points that you spoke of (*tatra yo bhavatā śaṅkoṣiko vāda uktaḥ so 'pi tenaiva pratiśiddhaḥ*)¹. For, this being so, it is not true that my statement is not included in all things; there is nothing that is non-void; nor are all things non-void².

¹ Cf. *MA. XVII*, 31-32.

² P. 5, above.

³ According to the opponent, either the Mādhyamika's statement is not 'included in all things', and in that case some things are void and some others, non-void; or the statement, being 'included in all things', is itself void and thus non-existent and hence incapable of performing an action, viz., the 'negation'. But the Mādhyamika says in reply that his statement is 'included in all things', being void like all other things. There can be no question of some things being void and of some others being non-void. It cannot be maintained, however, that the statement does not exist at all: it exists in a certain manner — like the artificial man or the magic man. Though void, the latter prevent other void persons from doing something; similarly the statement, though void, can negate other void things.

Now about your statement [contained in v. II above]:

XXIV. This statement is not endowed with an intrinsic nature (*na svābhāvikaṃ etad vākyam*). There is therefore no abandonment of position on my part (*tasmān na vādahānir me*). There is no discordance (*nāsti ca vaiśamikatvam*), and [hence] there is no special reason to be stated (*viśeṣaheṭuś ca na nigadyaḥ*).

This statement of mine, being dependently originated, is not endowed with an intrinsic nature (*na svābhāvopapañnam*). As previously stated, since it is not endowed with an intrinsic nature, it is void. And since this statement of mine is void, just as all other things are void, there is no discordance. For, there would be a discordance [only] if we said: This statement is non-void (*aśūnya*), while all other things are void (*śūnya*). We, however, do not say that. There is, therefore, no discordance. And since the following discordance, this statement is non-void while all other things are void, does not exist, we do not have to state the special reason (*tasmād asmābhir viśeṣaheṭur na vaktavyaḥ*): for this reason (*anena hetunā*) this statement is non-void while all [other] things are void. — In these circumstances, your statement: 'There is on your part an abandonment of position, there is a discordance, and you should state the special reason', is not valid.

[Refutation of the second objection: see v. III above.]

XXV. The example given by you: 'It is like "Do not make a sound"', is not appropriate. There a sound is prevented by another sound, but the case here is not just the same (*śabdena tac ca śabdasya vāraṇaṃ naivam evaitat*).

This example, moreover, is not ours (*nāpy ayam asmākaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ*). That void statement does not prevent voidness (*na śūnyatām pratiśedhayati*) as a person, when he says: 'Do not make a sound', makes a sound and at the same time prevents a sound. — Why? — Because, in this example, a sound is prevented by another sound. But the case here is not the same. We say: all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature, and hence void. — Why?

XXVI. Because, if things devoid of an intrinsic nature were prevented by something devoid of an intrinsic nature (*naiḥsvābhāvvyānāṃ cen naiḥsvābhāvvyena vāraṇaṃ yadi*), with the cessation of [their] being devoid of an intrinsic nature would be established [their] being endowed with an intrinsic nature (*naiḥsvābhāvyanivṛttau svābhāvyaṃ hi prasiddhaṃ syāt*)¹.

This example would be appropriate if by a statement devoid of an intrinsic nature were prevented things devoid of an intrinsic nature — as by the sound: 'Do not make a sound' is prevented another sound. Here, however, by a statement devoid of an intrinsic nature is negated the intrinsic nature of the things (*iha tu naiḥsvābhāvvyena vacanena bhāvānāṃ svabhāvapratiśedhaḥ kriyate*). If by a statement devoid of an intrinsic nature were negated the things' being devoid of an intrinsic nature (*yadi naiḥsvābhāvvyena vacanena bhāvānāṃ naiḥsvābhāvvyapratiśedhaḥ kriyate*), the things, by the very fact of being negated in their quality of being devoid of an intrinsic nature (*naiḥsvābhāvvyapratiśiddhatvād eva*), would be endowed with an intrinsic nature (*sasvabhāvā bhavēyuh*). Being endowed with an intrinsic nature, they would be non-void. We, however, declare that the things are void, not that they are non-void (*śūnyatām ca vāyaṃ bhāvānāṃ ācakṣmahe, nāśūnyatām*). This, therefore, is a non-example (*adṛṣṭānta evāyam*)².

¹ *naiḥsvābhāvya* is used here both as an adjective and as a noun. The first is derived from *naiḥsvabhāva* 'absence of an intrinsic nature', and the second, from *niḥsvabhāva* 'devoid of an intrinsic nature'. Cf. v. IX above.

* For the Mādhyamika, the opponent's example is not appropriate. When one says: 'Do not make a sound', one prevents by the sound one makes another sound. The Mādhyamika, however, by his void statement, 'All things are void', does not negate other void things but only negates the things that we regard as *non-void*. There is thus no agreement between the two cases.

XXVII. Or suppose that an artificial person should prevent the false notion of somebody who with regard to an artificial woman thinks: 'This is a woman'. This would be like that (*evaṃ bhaved etat*).

Or suppose that in an artificial woman, void of an intrinsic nature (*svabhāvasūnya*), some man should have the false notion (*asadgrāha*) that it is really (*paramārthataḥ*) a woman and, as a result of that false notion, should feel desire for her. The Tathāgata or a disciple of the Tathāgata would [then] create an artificial man (*nirmitako nirmitaḥ syāt*), [and] the latter would dispel the false notion of that man, through the power (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the Tathāgata or of the disciple of the Tathāgata. Likewise, by my void statement, comparable to the artificial man (*nirmitakopamena sūnyena madvacanena*), is prevented the idea of an intrinsic nature in all things which are devoid of an intrinsic nature and comparable to the artificial woman (*nirmitakāstrisadyeṣu sarvabhāveṣu niḥsvabhāveṣu yo 'yaṃ svabhāvagrāhaḥ sa nivartyate*). Thus, this is an appropriate example for establishing voidness, not the other one (*tasmād ayam atra dṛṣṭāntaḥ sūnyatāprasādhanaṃ praty upapadyamānaḥ, netaraḥ*)¹.

¹ *upapadyamāna* in this sentence is not so 'odd' as the editors think (p. 28, n. 12). See also the end of the commentary on the next verse, and that on v. LIV. The word occurs also in other texts.

XXVIII. Or this reason (*hetu*) is similar in nature to the thesis to be established (*sādhyasama*), for sound has no [real] existence (*na hi vidyate dhvaneḥ sattā*). We do not speak, however, without having recourse to the conventional truth (*samvyavahāra*).

The reason (*hetu*)¹ 'It is like "Do not make a sound"' is of the same nature as the thesis to be established — Why? — Because all things, being devoid of an intrinsic nature, are alike (*naiḥsvabhāvayenāviśiṣṭatvāt*). That sound, being dependently originated, has no existence by its own nature (*na hi tasya dhvaneḥ pratityasamutpannatvāt svabhāvasattā vidyate*). [And] since it has no existence by its own nature, your statement: 'For here a sound that is existent prevents the other sound that will be', is precluded (*vyāhanyate*). It is not, however, without having

recourse to the conventional truth (*vyavahārasatya*), it is not by rejecting the conventional truth, that we say: All things are void. For it is not possible to teach the absolute truth (*dharma*) without having recourse to the conventional truth. As it is said:

'The transcendent truth cannot be taught without having recourse to the conventional truth. [And] Nirvāṇa cannot be attained without realizing the transcendent truth'².

Thus, all things are void like my statement (*tasmān madvacanavac chūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ*), and that all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature, follows in both ways (*ubhayathopapadyamānam*) [i.e., both by virtue of the 'reason' and of the thesis to be established]³.

¹ The term *hetu* 'reason' is used here in the sense of *drṣṭānta* 'example'. A similar instance is furnished by Gauḍapāda's *Āgamaśāstra* (= *Māṇḍūkyaśārikā*) IV, 20 (quoted in my paper referred to in note 3 below). Śāṅkara, in his comment on the latter passage, observes: *hetur iti drṣṭānto 'trābhipretaḥ, gamakatvāt. prakṛto hi drṣṭānto na hetuḥ*. Note that the 'reason' is inseparably connected with the 'example' in the Nyāya inferential system. See *Nyāyasūtra* I, 1, 34-37, and Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* on I, 1, 39. Cf. also *Nyāyasūtra* V, 1, 11: *pratidrṣṭāntahetur ca nāhetur drṣṭāntaḥ*.

² *vyavahāram anāśritya paramārtho na dehyate* | *paramārtham anāgamyā nirodhaṃ nādhigamyate* || (MK. XXIV, 10).—The verb *ā-gam-* is used in both the senses 'to have recourse to' and 'to understand, realize'. On its use in the latter sense cf. Aśvaghoṣa, *Buddhacarita* XII, 38 and 116; Saundarananda XVI, 42 (both in E. H. Johnston's editions, Lahore 1936 and 1928, respectively; reprint: Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1972 and 1975).

The absolute truth is beyond words (*anākṣara*). But it is taught 'through superimposition' (*samāropāt*), with the help of the conventional truth. — See Murti, pp. 232, 253.

³ For the realist, when one says: 'Do not make a sound', a sound that is existent prevents another sound that is not existent, whereas the Mādhyamika's statement 'All things are void' cannot prevent anything, for it is itself void. To this the Mādhyamika replies that there is no sound that is 'existent'; the objection, therefore, is not valid. — The idea of *sādhyasama* will occur again when Nāgārjuna takes up the question of the possibility of a negation in the three times (v. LXIX). This is one of the several Naiyāyika technical terms used by Nāgārjuna in this treatise (see Glossary, published in *JIPh.* 5 [1977]). It should be noted, however, that Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti do not use the term in the sense in which Nyāya uses it. See my 'Note on the interpretation of the term *sādhyasama* in Mādhyamaka Texts', in *JIPh.* 2, 3/4 (March/June 1974), pp. 225-30. Cf. also, for instance, Candrakīrti, *MKV.*, p. 283, 11, 3ff. There is a verse in Āryadeva's *Catuhṣataka* (reconstructed from the Tibetan), which, although it does not use the term *sādhyasama*, is clearly reminiscent of the Nyāya use of it (on which cf. B. K. Matilal, 'A Note on the Nyāya Fallacy *Sādhyasama* and *Petitio Principii*', in *JIPh.* 2, 3/4, pp. 211-24). The opponent wants to prove the reality of the sense-objects on the ground that they are perceived.

But Āryadeva argues that they are not perceived, and concludes: *tasmāt sādhyena sādhyasya siddhir naivopapadyate*. Since the 'reason', the fact of being perceived (*pratyakṣatva*), is itself to be proved (*sādhyā*), it cannot establish the thesis to be established (*sādhyā*). (*The Catuḥṣataka of Āryadeva, Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts with copious extracts from the Commentary of Candrakīrti*, reconstructed and edited by Vidhushekhara Bhat-tacharya, *Viśva-Bhārat Series* 2, Calcutta 1931, Ch. XIII, v. 5 [*Kārikā* 305, p. 172]). So far as I can see, Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti never express themselves in this way. — Vaidya's interpretation of Āryadeva's *Kārikā* 396 (Ch. XVI, v. 21), followed by May (P. L. Vaidya, *Etudes sur Āryadeva et son Catuḥṣataka, chapitres VIII-XVI*, Paris 1923, p. 166; cf. May, p. 93, n. 205), is inexact. See Candrakīrti's comment, pp. 289-90. The rendering of *sādhyasama* by '*petitio principii*', '*pétition de principe*', found in the modern translations of Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti, is to be modified in the light of these recent contributions.

Now about your statement [contained in v. IV]:

XXIX.¹ If I had any proposition (*pratijñā*), then this defect (*doṣa*) would be mine. I have, however, no proposition (*nāsti ca mama pratijñā*). Therefore, there is no defect that is mine (*tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ*).

If I had any proposition, then the defect previously stated by you would be mine, because it would affect the specific character of my proposition (*mama pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptatvāt*). [But] I have no proposition. Thus [we observe:] When all things are void, perfectly appeased and by nature isolated², how can there be a proposition? How can something affect the specific character of a proposition (*kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptiḥ*)? [And] how can there be a defect, caused by the fact of affecting the specific character of a proposition (*kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptikṛto doṣaḥ*)? — In these circumstances, your statement: 'The defect is only yours because it affects the specific character of your proposition', is not valid³.

¹This and the following verse are quoted by Candrakīrti, *MKV.*, p. 16 (cf. p. 30).

²*śūnyeṣv atyantopasānteṣu prakṛtīvivikteṣu*. — The things' being devoid of an intrinsic nature does not mean that they have no nature at all. In their essential nature (*prakṛti*), they are nothing but the universal and absolute Reality, which is 'perfectly appeased' (*atyantopasānta*) and 'by nature isolated' (*prakṛtīvivikta*). That Nature, isolated from its appearances, is not, however, an entity that can be determined objectively. 'By their nature, the things are not a determinate entity. Their nature is a non-nature; it is their non-nature which is their nature. For they have only one nature, i.e., no nature (from the objective standpoint)': *prakṛtyaiva na te dharmāḥ kiṃcit. yā ca prakṛtiḥ sāprakṛtiḥ, yā cāprakṛtiḥ sā prakṛtiḥ sarvadharmāpām — eka lakṣaṇatvāt*

yad utālakṣaṇatvāt. (*Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, p. 96, ed. by P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga, 1960). — The expression *praktivivikta* occurs on the same page of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*. Nāgārjuna uses the words *sānta* and *upaśānta* in the same sense. The Absolute is 'appeased', because it is not 'grasped', and hence not expressed in words. Cf. *MK. XVIII, 9; XXV 24*.

In the Mahāyāna works the Absolute is often spoken of as beyond 'grasping' (*upalambha*). Objectively speaking, it is 'non-existent'. But from its objective non-existence we should not conclude its metaphysical non-existence. On the contrary, its objective 'non-existence' is evidence of its highest metaphysical 'existence', its being 'not grasped' in an objective sense is evidence of its being 'grasped' in the highest metaphysical sense, i.e., beyond the subject-object split. We read thus in the *Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṅkāra*:

*yāvidyamānatā saiva paramā vidyamānatā/
sarvathānupalambhaś ca upalambhaḥ paro mataḥ ||* (IX, 78; ed. by S. Lévi, Paris, 1907).

Cf. also Candrakīrti, *MKV.*, p. 265: *avidyātīmitiraprabhāvopalaḍḍhaṃ bhāvajātaṃ
yenātmanā vigatāvidyātīmitirāpāṃ āryāṇāṃ adarśanayogena viśayatvaṃ upayāti tad eva svarūpaṃ
eṣāṃ svabhāva iti vyavasthāpyate... sa ca iṣa bhāvānāṃ anutpādātmakaḥ svabhāvo 'kimcittvenā-
bhāvamātratvād asvabhāva eveti kṛtvā nāsti bhāvasvabhāva iti vijñeyam.* [*Supra*, p. 1.
See also Ātman-Brahman, p. 67, n. 3; pp. 96-8].

³ The Mādhyamika may say that, if in the realist's opinion he cannot deny with his void statement the reality of the things, the realist himself cannot deny the Mādhyamika's negation. To this the realist replies that the objection does not apply to him, for it is the Mādhyamika, not he, who holds that all things are void; his statement negating the Mādhyamika's negation is therefore not void. — But the Mādhyamika replies in turn that the realist's objection is not valid, for the Mādhyamika has no proposition of his own. 'All things are void' is not a "proposition". It only expresses the Inexpressible, with the help of the conventional truth — as he has already explained in the preceding verse. The real language here would be silence: *paramārtho hy āryāṇāṃ tūṣṇīmabhāvaḥ*, Candrakīrti (*MKV.*, p. 57; cf. Murti, p. 232; *supra*, p. 1).

[Refutation of the third objection; see vv. V, VI above].

XXX. If I apprehended something with the help of perception, etc., then I would either affirm or deny (*pravartayeyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā*). [But] since that thing does not exist, I am not to blame (*tadābhāvān me 'nupalambhaḥ*).

If I apprehended something with the help of the four *pramāṇas*, viz., perception, inference, identification and verbal testimony, or with the help of one of these, then only would I either affirm or deny. [But] since I do not even apprehend an object of any kind (*yathārtham evāhaṃ kaṃcin nopalabhe*), I neither affirm nor deny (*tasmān na pravartayāmi na nivartayāmi*). In these circumstances, your criticism (*yo bhavato-pālambha uktaḥ*): 'If [you say that] you deny the things after having apprehended them through one of the *pramāṇas*, viz., perception, etc.,

[we reply:] those *pramāṇas* do not exist, nor do exist the objects to be apprehended through them (*tais ca pramāṇair api gamyā arthāḥ*), does not concern me at all (*sa me bhavaty evānupālambhaḥ*).

Furthermore:

XXXI. If such and such objects are established for you through the *pramāṇas* (*yadi ca pramāṇatas te teṣāṃ teṣāṃ prasiddhir arthānām*), tell me how those *pramāṇas* are established for you (*teṣāṃ punaḥ prasiddhiṃ brūhi katham te pramāṇānām*)¹.

If you think that such and such 'objects of true cognition' (*arthānām prameyānām*) are established through the 'instruments of true cognition' (*pramāṇa*), just as the things to be measured (*meya*) are established through the measuring instruments (*māna*), [we ask:] How are those 'instruments of true cognition', viz., perception, inference, identification and verbal testimony, established? If [you say that] the *pramāṇas* are established without the help of *pramāṇas* (*yadi tāvan niṣpramāṇānām pramāṇānām syāt prasiddhiḥ*), then [your] proposition that [all] objects are established through *pramāṇas* is abandoned (*pramāṇato 'rthānām prasiddhir iti hiyate pratijñā*)².

¹ The Mādhyamika-Naiyāyika controversy over the *pramāṇas* is well known from the *Nyāyasūtras* II, 1, 8-19. Vācaspatimiśra, in his *Nyāyavārttikatātparyatikā* (p. 249 in *Vizianagram Sanskrit Series* No. 15, Benares 1898), expressly states that the objector is a Mādhyamika. Furthermore: 'L'attitude des philosophes bouddhiques est expliquée avec précision' (L. de La Vallée Poussin, *MKV*, p. 56, n. 1). Here we have the Mādhyamika's own version of this controversy. See on this question Murti, pp. 149ff.

² Because the *pramāṇas*, the 'means of true cognition', are also 'objects' (*artha*). Cf. v. XXXIII below. — 'It might be better to omit the entire sentence' (Text, p. 31, n. 5).

XXXII a-b. If the *pramāṇas* are established through other *pramāṇas*, then there is an infinite series (*anavasthā*).

If you think that the 'objects of true cognition' (*prameya*) are established through the 'means of true cognition' (*pramāṇa*) and that those 'means of true cognition' are established through other 'means of true cognition', then there follows an infinite series. — What harm is there if there is an infinite series?—

XXXII c-d. Neither the beginning nor the middle nor the end can then be established.

If there is an infinite series, the beginning cannot be established. — Why? — Because those *pramāṇas* are established through other *pramāṇas*, and those others again through other *pramāṇas*. Thus there is no beginning. [And] if there is no beginning, how can there be a middle? how can there be an end?

Consequently, the statement that those *pramāṇas* are established through other *pramāṇas* is not valid¹.

¹ Cf. *Nyāyasūtra* II, 1, 17, with Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*, Uddyotakara's *Vārttika* and Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*.

XXXIII. Now, if [you think that] those *pramāṇas* are established without *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇair vinā*), then your philosophic position is abandoned (*vihiyate vādaḥ*). There is a discordance, and you should state the special reason for that.

Now, if you think: those *pramāṇas* are established without *pramāṇas*; the objects to be cognized (*prameyāṇām arthānām*), however, are established through the *pramāṇas*, then your position that [all] objects are established through *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhir arthānām*) is abandoned. There is, moreover, a discordance, namely that some objects are established through *pramāṇas*, while some others are not (*keṣāṃcid arthānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ keṣāṃcin neti*). And you should state the special reason why some objects are established through *pramāṇas*, while some others are not. But you have not stated that. Thus this assumption, too, is not valid (*tasmād iyam api kalpanā nopapanneti*)¹.

The opponent replies: The *pramāṇas* establish themselves as well as other things. As it is said:

'Fire illuminates itself as well as other things. Likewise, the *pramāṇas* establish themselves as well as other things'².

(The commentary on this verse is just a paraphrase.)

¹ After having refuted the charge of 'discordance' (*vaiśamikatva*; v. II) brought against him by his opponent, Nāgārjuna here returns the same charge to his opponent. — In *Nyāyasūtra* II, 1, 18, the following objection is raised: If the *pramāṇas* are established without *pramāṇas*, then the *prameyas* also should be established without *pramāṇas*: *tadviniortter vā pramāṇasiddhivat prameyasiddhiḥ*. In other words, it would be vain to talk about *pramāṇas*: *evaṃ ca sarvaḥ pramāṇavilopaḥ* (Vātsyāyana).

² *dyotayati svātmānaṃ yathā hutāśas tathā parātmānaṃ |
svaparātmānāv evaṃ prasādhayanti pramāṇāni |*

The view put forward in this verse is in accord with *Nyāyasūtra* II, 1, 19: *na, prāptiprapakāśa (siddhi) vat tatsiddheḥ*. This seems, at least, to have been the view of

Gautama and of some of his followers. Vātsyāyana's interpretation is different. See on this question my paper entitled 'On the Relationship between Nāgārjuna's *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and the *Nyāyasūtras*', in *Journal of Indo-European Studies* (USA), forthcoming issue.

Here we observe:

XXXIV. This is a defective proposition (*viśamopanyāsa*)¹. Fire does not illuminate itself, for its non-perception is not seen to be comparable to that of a pot in darkness (*na hi tasyānupalabdhir dṛṣṭā tamasiḥ kumbhasya*).

Your proposition that the *pramāṇas* establish themselves as well as other things like fire [that illuminates itself as well as other things] is defective. For fire does not illuminate itself. A pot, not illuminated by fire, is first not perceived in darkness. Then, being illuminated by fire, it is perceived. If, in the same manner, fire, not being illuminated, first existed in darkness and then were illuminated, it would be possible to say: it illuminates itself (*evam eva yady aprakāṣitaḥ prāg agnis tamasi syād uttarakālam agneḥ prakāśanam syāt, ataḥ svātmānam prakāśayet*). This, however, is not the case. Thus this assumption, too, is not valid.

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 8, commentary on v. III.

Furthermore:

XXXV. If, as you say, fire illuminates itself as it illuminates other things, then it will also burn itself.

If, as you say, fire illuminates itself just as it illuminates other things, then it will also burn itself just as it burns other things. This, however, is not the case. In these circumstances, your statement that fire illuminates itself as it illuminates other things, is not valid¹.

¹ The subject cannot be the object of its own act. Cf. Śaṅkara, *Upadeśasāhasrī*, *padya XVI*, 13 (in *Minor Works of Śrī Śaṅkarācārya* [ed. by H. R. Bhagavat] = *Poona Oriental Series*, No. 8, second edition, 1952):

*yaddharmā yaḥ padārtho na tasyaiveyāt sa karmatām/
na hy ātmānam dahaty agnis tathā naiva prakāśayet||*

Śaṅkara criticizes there the Buddhist idealists (*Vijñānavādin*), who hold that cognition is self-luminous, like a lamp. See also *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya II*, 2, 28. On *svātmani kriyāvirodha* see also *Ātman-Brahman*, p. 52 & n. 7. In his comment on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka - Upaniṣad IV*, 3, 7, Śaṅkara uses arguments which recall those used by Nāgārjuna in the preceding verse: *yat tūcyate, prāḍiḥ ātmānam ghaṭaṁ cāvabhāṣayatīti*,

*tad asat. — kasmāt? — yaddātmāṇaṁ nāvabhāṣayati tadā kīdṛśaḥ syāt? na hi tadā prādīpasya svato vā parato vā viśeṣaḥ kaścid upalabhyate. sa hy avabhāṣyo bhavati yasyāvabhāṣakasam-
nidhāv asaṁnidhau ca viśeṣa upalabhyate, na hi prādīpasya svātmāsamnidhir asaṁnidhir vā
takyāḥ kalpayitum. asati ca kāddācīke viśeṣa ātmāṇaṁ prādīpaḥ prakāśayati mṛṣaivocyate.*
(*Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series*, 15, Poona, second edition, 1902, pp. 568-9).

Besides:

XXXVI. If, as you say, fire illuminates both other things and itself, then darkness will cover both other things and itself¹.

If in your opinion fire illuminates both other things and itself, then its opposite (*tatpratīpakṣabhūtaḥ*), darkness, too, would cover both other things and itself. This, however, is not seen. In these circumstances, your statement that fire illuminates both other things and itself is not valid.

¹ Cf. *MK. VII* 12:

*prādīpaḥ svaparātmānau samprakāśayate yadi/
tamo 'pi svaparātmānau chādayiṣyaty asaṁśayam||*

Again:

XXXVII. There is no darkness in fire nor in something else in which fire stands (*nāsti tamaḥ ca jvalane yatra ca tiṣṭhati parātmāni jvalanaḥ*). How can it [then] illuminate? For illumination is destruction of darkness¹.

Here, in fire, there is no darkness. Nor is there any darkness where fire is. Now, illumination is obstruction caused to darkness (*tamaṣaḥ pratighātaḥ*). But since there is no darkness in fire nor where fire is, what is that darkness which is obstructed by fire, and by virtue of whose obstruction it illuminates both other things and itself (*kasya tamaṣaḥ pratighātam agniḥ karoti, yasya pratighātād agniḥ svaparātmānau prakāśayati*)?

The opponent replies: But is it not true that fire illuminates both other things and itself, for this very reason that there is no darkness in fire nor where fire is (*nanu yasmād evaṁ nāgnau tamo 'sti nāpi yatrāgnis tatra tamo 'sti, tasmād eva svaparātmānau na prakāśayaty agniḥ kutaḥ*)? For, in the very process of its origination, fire obstructs darkness (*tena hy utpadyamānenaivāgninā tamaṣaḥ pratighātaḥ*). If there is no darkness in fire nor where fire is, it is because in the very process of its origination fire illuminates both other things and itself

(*tasmān nāgnau tamo 'sti nāpi yatrāgnis tatra tamo 'sti, yasmād utpadyamāna evobhayaṃ prakāśayaty agniḥ svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ceti*).

¹ Cf. MK. VII, 9:

*pradīpe nāndhakāro 'sti yatra cāsau pratiṣṭhitaḥ/
kiṃ prakāśayati dīpaḥ prakāśo hi tamovadhaḥ||*

Here we observe:

XXXVIII. It is wrong to say (*asadvāda*) that fire illuminates in the very process of its origination. For, in the very process of its origination, fire does not come in contact with darkness¹.

The opinion that fire, in the very process of its origination, illuminates both other things and itself, is not tenable. — Why? — Because, in the very process of its origination, fire does not come in contact with darkness; since it does not come in contact with it, it does not destroy it; and since darkness is not destroyed, there is no illumination (*tamasas cānupaghātān nāsti prakāśaḥ*).

¹ Cf. MK, VII, 10:

*katham utpadyamānena pradīpena tamo hatam/
notpadyamāno hi tamaḥ pradīpaḥ prāpnute yadā||*

Light and darkness cannot coexist: *alokāndhakārayor yaugapadyābhāvāt*, Candrakīrti on this verse.

XXXIX. Or, if fire destroyed darkness even without coming in contact with it, then this fire, standing here, would destroy darkness in all the worlds¹.

Or, if you think that fire destroys darkness even without coming in contact with it, then this fire, standing here at this moment, will equally (*tulyam*)² destroy the darkness existing in all the worlds, without coming in contact with it. This, however, is not seen to be the case (*na caitat evaṃ dṛṣṭam*). Thus, your opinion that fire destroys darkness even without coming in contact with it, is not valid.

¹ Cf. MK. VII, 11:

*apṛāpyaiva pradīpena yadi vā nihataṃ tamaḥ/
ihasthaḥ sarvalokasthaṃ sa tamo nihanīṣyati||*

— Cf. Vātsyāyana on *Nyāyasūtra* V, 1, 7: *nāprāptaḥ pradīpaḥ prakāśayati* (similarly Jayantabhaṭṭa, *Nyāyamahārjī*, p. 624; Bhāsarvajña, *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, p. 346; *Tarkatāstra* in Tucci, p. 18).

² I differ here from the editors (see their note, p. 35, n. 5, and Introduction, p. 7).

Furthermore:

XL. If the *pramāṇas* are self-established (*yadi svataḥ ca pramāṇasiddhiḥ*), then the 'means of true cognition' are established for you independently of the 'objects of true cognition' (*anapeksya tava prameyāṇi bhavati pramāṇasiddhiḥ*). For self-establishment does not require another thing (*na parāpekṣā svataḥ siddhiḥ*)¹.

(The commentary is merely a paraphrase.)

The opponent replies: What defect will ensue (*ko doṣo bhaviṣyati*) if the means of true cognition do not require the objects to be cognized (*prameyāṇ arthān*)?

¹ On this and the following verses cf. *MK. X*, 8-12.

Here we observe:

XLI. If you think that the 'means of true cognition' (*pramāṇa*) are established independently of the 'objects to be cognized' (*prameyāṇ arthān*), then those *pramāṇas* are [*pramāṇas*] of nothing (*na bhavanti kasyacid evaṃ imāni tāni pramāṇāni*).

If [you think that] the 'means of true cognition' are established independently of the 'objects to be cognized', then those *pramāṇas* are *pramāṇas* of nothing (*evaṃ tānimāni pramāṇāni na kasyacid pramāṇāni bhavanti*). Thus there is a defect (*evaṃ doṣaḥ*). If, however, the *pramāṇas* are *pramāṇas* of something, they do not then become 'means of true cognition' independently of the 'objects to be cognized' (*atha kasyacid bhavanti pramāṇāni naivedānim anapeksya prameyāṇ arthān pramāṇāni bhavanti*).

XLII. [The opponent may reply:] If it is admitted that they are established in relation [to the objects to be cognized], what defect is there? — [The defect is that] what is [already] established is established [again] (*siddhasya sādhanam syāt*). For something that is not established does not require something else (*nāsiddho 'pekṣate hy anyat*).

If it is admitted that the 'means of true cognition' are established in relation to the 'objects to be cognized', then the four 'means of true cognition', which are [already] established, are established [anew]. — Why? — Because an object that is not established does not require

something else]. For instance, Devadatta, who is not [yet] established, does not require anything whatever. But it is not admissible (*iṣṭa*) that something that is [already] established be established [anew]. One does not do something that is [already] done.

Besides:

XLIII. If the *pramāṇas* are at all events (*sarvathā*) established in relation to the *prameyas*, the *prameyas* are not established in relation to the *pramāṇas*.

If the *pramāṇas* are established in relation to the *prameyas*, then the *prameyas* are not established in relation to the *pramāṇas*. — Why? — Because the object to be established (*sādhya*) does not establish the instrument by which it is established (*sādhana*). The *pramāṇas*, however, it is said, are the instruments by which the *prameyas* are established (*sāadhanāni ca kila prameyāṇām pramāṇāni*)¹.

¹ This is the ordinary view. But, if it is thought that the *pramāṇas* themselves are established by the *prameyas*, in other words, that they are *sādhya*s in relation to the *prameyas*, which are *sādhana*s, they cannot establish the *prameyas*, for the *sādhya* cannot establish the *sādhana*. — Note the use of the particle *kila* 'it is said'. By this Nāgārjuna reports a view ordinarily accepted in the world. Cf. *MK. I*, 5.

XLIV. And if the *prameyas* are established even independently of the *pramāṇas*, what do you gain by establishing the *pramāṇas* (*kiṃ te pramāṇasiddhyā*)? That whose purpose they serve is [already] established (*tāni yadārthaṃ prasiddhaṃ tat*).

(The commentary is just a paraphrase.)

XLV. Besides, if you establish the *pramāṇas* in relation to the *prameyas*, then there is certainly an interchange of *pramāṇas* and *prameyas* (*vyatyaya evaṃ sati te dhruvaṃ pramāṇaprameyāṇām*).

Moreover, if you think, in order to avoid the defect stated before¹, that the 'means of true cognition' exist only in relation to the 'objects to be cognized', then there is an interchange of *pramāṇas* and *prameyas*. Your *pramāṇas* become *prameyas*, because they are established by the *prameyas* (*prameyairiḥ sādhitatvāt*). And the *prameyas* become *pramāṇas*, because they establish the *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇānām sādhatvāt*).

¹ Cf. v. XLI.

XLVI. Now, if you think that through the establishment of the *pramāṇas* are established the *prameyas*, and that through the establishment of the *prameyas* are established the *pramāṇas*, then neither the *prameyas* nor the *pramāṇas* are established for you.

Now, if you think that through the establishment of the *pramāṇas* are established the *prameyas* — because the *prameyas* require the *pramāṇas* — and that through the establishment of the *prameyas* are established the *pramāṇas* — because the *pramāṇas* require the *prameyas* — then neither the *prameyas* nor the *pramāṇas* are established. — Why? —

XLVII. Because, if the *prameyas* owe their establishment to the *pramāṇas*, and if those *pramāṇas* are to be established by those very *prameyas* (*śidhyanti hi pramāṇair yadi prameyāṇi tāni tair eva sādhyāni ca prameyair*), how will the *pramāṇas* establish [the *prameyas*] ?

Because, if the *prameyas* owe their establishment to the *pramāṇas*, and if those *pramāṇas* are to be established by those very *prameyas* (*tāni ca pramāṇāni tair eva prameyair sādhyatavyāni*), [we encounter the following difficulty:] the *prameyas* not having been established, the *pramāṇas* are not established, for their cause (*kāraṇa*)¹ is not established. How, then, will the *pramāṇas*² establish the *prameyas* ?

¹ I.e., the *prameyas*.

² Which themselves are not yet established.

XLVIII. And if the *pramāṇas* owe their establishment to the *prameyas*, and if those *prameyas* are to be established by those very *pramāṇas*, how will the *prameyas* establish [the *pramāṇas*] ?

And if the *pramāṇas* owe their establishment to the *prameyas*, and if those *prameyas* are to be established by those very *pramāṇas*, [we encounter the following difficulty:] the *pramāṇas* not having been established, the *prameyas* are not established, for their cause¹ is not established. How, then, will the *prameyas*² establish the *pramāṇas*³ ?

¹ I.e., the *pramāṇas*.

² Which themselves are not yet established.

³ In *MK. XXIII*, 10-11, Nāgārjuna argues in a similar way to show the hollowness of the ideas of good and evil :

*anapekṣya śubhaṃ nāsty aśubhaṃ prajñāpayemahi/
 yaś pratītya śubhaṃ tasmāc chubhaṃ naivopapadyate||
 anapekṣyāśubhaṃ nāsti śubhaṃ prajñāpayemahi/
 yaś tityāśubhaṃ tasmād aśubhaṃ naiva vidyate||*

XLIX. If the son is to be produced (*utpādya*) by the father, and if that father is to be produced by that very son, tell me which of these produces which other (*vada tatrotpādayati kaḥ kam*).

Supposing somebody said: the son is to be produced (*utpādaniya*) by the father, and that father is to be produced by that very son, tell me who is to be produced by whom (*kena ka utpādayitavya iti*). In exactly the same manner you say: the *prameyas* are to be established by the *pramāṇas*, and those very *pramāṇas* in turn are to be established by those very *prameyas*. Now, which of these are to be established for you by which others (*tatredāniṃ te katamaiḥ katamāni sādhayitavyāni*)?

L. Tell me which of these is the father, and which other the son. Both of them bear, indeed, the marks of a father and that of a son (*tāv ubhāv api ca pitṛputralakṣaṇadharau*), wherefore we have a doubt here (*yato bhavati no' tra saṃdehaḥ*).

Of that father and that son, mentioned before, which is the son, and which other the father? Both of them, as producers (*utpādakatvāt*), bear the mark of a father, and, as produced (*utpādyatvāt*), the mark of a son. We have a doubt here: which of these is the father, and which other the son? In just the same manner, of these *pramāṇas* and *prameyas* of yours, which are the *pramāṇas*, and which others the *prameyas*? For both of these, as those which establish (*sādhakatvāt*), are *pramāṇas*, and as those which are to be established (*sādhyatvāt*), *prameyas*. We have a doubt here as to which of these are the *pramāṇas*, and which others the *prameyas*¹.

¹ *Pramāṇa* and *prameya* are relative terms. One exists only in relation to the other. They are 'dependently originated', and hence 'void'. In an absolute sense, there is neither any *pramāṇa* nor any *prameya*. The example of the father and the son indicates it. The father exists only in relation to the son, and the son exists only in relation to the father; in an absolute sense, there is neither a father nor a son:

*pitā cen na vinā putrāt kutaḥ putrasya sambhavaḥ/
putrābhāve pitā nāsti tathāsattvaṃ tayor dvayoḥ*|| (Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* IX, 114 [ed. by P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga, 1960]).

We should not conclude, however, that Nāgārjuna does not recognize any empirical validity of the *pramāṇas* and the *prameyas*, of the ideas of the father and the son, and so on. On the contrary, he would say, in accord with his doctrine of action (*supra*, p. 2; *infra*; vv. LIV-LVI), that it is their 'voidness' which establishes their empirical validity. If 'voidness', i.e. 'dependent origination', is denied, then they become the suprarational Absolute, and thus annul themselves as such. — Cf. Candrakīrti, *MKV.*, p. 69.

LI. The *pramāṇas* are not established by themselves (*svataḥ*) or by one another (*parasparataḥ*) or by other *pramāṇas* (*paraḥpramāṇaiḥ*)¹. Nor are they established by the *prameyas*, or accidentally (*akasmāt*)².

Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is not established by that very perception, inference (*anumāna*) is not established by that very inference, identification (*upamāna*)³ is not established by that very identification, and testimony (*āgama*) is not established by that very testimony. Nor are they established by one another, i.e., perception by inference, identification and testimony, inference by perception, identification and testimony, identification by perception, inference and testimony, and testimony by perception, inference and identification. Nor are perception, inference, identification and testimony established, respectively (*yathāsvam*), by another perception, another inference, another identification, and another testimony. Nor are the *pramāṇas* established by the *prameyas*, taken collectively or individually (*samastavyastaiḥ*), each *pramāṇa* being established either by the corresponding *prameya* or by the other *prameyas* too (*svaviśayaparaviśayasamgrhitaiḥ*). Nor are they established accidentally. Nor again are they established by a combination of the causes mentioned before (*samuccayenaiteṣāṃ kāraṇānāṃ pūrvoddīṣṭānāṃ*), whatever their number: twenty, thirty, forty or twenty-six⁴. — In these circumstances, your statement: 'Because the things to be cognized are to be apprehended through the means of true cognition (*pramāṇādhiḡamyatvāt prameyānāṃ bhāvānāṃ*), those things to be cognized (*prameyā bhāvāḥ*) exist as well as those means of true cognition through which those things to be cognized are apprehended (*santi ca te prameyā bhāvās tāni ca pramāṇāni yaśi te pramāṇaiḥ prameyā bhāvāḥ samadhigatā iti*)', is not valid.

¹ I do not see how the correction suggested by Arnold Kunst in his *Preface*, p. 3, can be accepted.

² Cf. *MK.* I, 1:

*na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ/
utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana||*

³ Cf. *supra*, p. 9, n. 1 on v. V.

⁴ What is the meaning of these numbers, and especially of the number twenty-six, which closes the series? We obtain, in fact, the number twenty, if we combine the causes enumerated above, up to 'another testimony'. Perhaps the author wants, first, to increase that number by ten, then that number again by ten, and finally to

multiply twenty by some number. Instead of *śaṭvīmśati* (sic), I am tempted to read *śatavīmśati* 'hundred times twenty'. All that, of course, is mere conjecture.

[Refutation of the fourth objection; see v. VII above]

LII. If people conversant with the state of things say that the good things have a good intrinsic nature, that has to be stated in detail (*evam pravibhāgenābhidheyaḥ syāt*).

People conversant with the state of things think that the good things have a good intrinsic nature. But that has to be stated by you in detail: this is that good intrinsic nature; these are those good things; this is that good consciousness (*kuśalaṃ vijñānam*); this is that intrinsic nature of the good consciousness (*kuśalavijñānasvabhāva*), and so on (*evam sarveṣāṃ*). This, however, is not seen to be so (*na caitad evaṃ dṛṣṭam*). Thus your statement that the intrinsic nature of each individual thing has been explained (*yathāsvam upadiṣṭaḥ*) is not valid.

Furthermore:

LIII. If the good intrinsic nature originates dependently (*pratitya utpadyate*), it is an extrinsic nature (*parabhāva*) of the good things. How can it be thus their intrinsic nature (*svabhāva evaṃ katham bhavati*)?

If the intrinsic nature of the good things originates in dependence upon the cause-condition complex (*hetupratyayasāmagriṃ pratityotpadyate*), how can it, being born of an extrinsic nature (*parabhāvād utpannaḥ*), be the intrinsic nature of the good things? The same holds true of the bad and other things (*evam evākuśalaprabhṛtīnāṃ*). — In these circumstances, your statement that the good intrinsic nature of the good things has been explained, as well as the bad intrinsic nature of the bad things, and so on, is not valid.

LIV. Now, if [you think:] that intrinsic nature of the good things originates without depending on anything (*na pratitya kiṃcit*), then there would be no practice of religious life (*evaṃ syād vāso na brahmacaryasya*)¹.

Now, if you think that the good intrinsic nature of the good things originates without depending on anything, and that the same is true of the bad intrinsic nature of the bad things and of the indeterminate

(*avyākṛta*) intrinsic nature of the indeterminate things, then there is no practice of religious life (*evaṃ saty abrahmacaryavāso bhavati*). — Why? — Because, if this is so, one rejects Dependent Origination (*pratityasamutpādasya hy evaṃ sati pratyākhyānaṃ bhavati*). By rejecting Dependent Origination, one rejects the vision of Dependent Origination (*pratityasamutpādasya pratyākhyānāt pratityasamutpādadarśanapratyākhyānaṃ bhavati*). For if Dependent Origination does not exist, there can be no question of its vision (*na hy avidyamāṇasya pratityasamutpādasya darśanam upapadyamānaṃ bhavati*). If there is no vision of Dependent Origination, there is no vision of Dharma. For the Lord has said: 'O monks, he who sees the *pratityasamutpāda* sees the Dharma'². [And] if one does not see the Dharma, there is no practice of religious life (*dharmadarśanābhāvād brahmacaryavāsābhāvaḥ*).

Or, rejecting Dependent Origination, one rejects the origination of sorrow (*atha vā pratityasamutpādapratyākhyānād duḥkhasamudayaḥ pratyākhyānaṃ bhavati*). For Dependent Origination is the origination of sorrow (*pratityasamutpādo hi duḥkhasya samudayaḥ*). By rejecting the origination of sorrow, one rejects sorrow (*duḥkhasamudayasya pratyākhyānād duḥkhapratyākhyānaṃ bhavati*). For, if there is no origination, how will that sorrow originate (*asati hi samudaye tat kuto duḥkhaṃ samudēsyati*)? If sorrow and [its] origination are rejected, then the cessation (*nirodha*) of sorrow is rejected. For if there is no origination of sorrow, what will come to cease through abandonment (*kasya prahāṇān nirodho bhaviṣyati*)? [And] if the cessation of sorrow is rejected, the Way (*mārga*) is rejected. For, if there is no cessation of sorrow, for obtaining what will there be a way leading to the cessation of sorrow (*kasya prāptaye mārgo bhaviṣyati duḥkhanirodhagāmī*)? Thus, the Four Noble Truths will cease to exist (*evaṃ caturṇām āryasatyānām abhāvaḥ*). If they do not exist, there is no result of monasticism (*śrāmanyaphala*). For it is through the vision of [those] Truths that the results of monasticism are attained (*satyadarśanāc chrāmanyaphalāni hi samadhiḥ gamyante*). [And] if the results of monasticism do not exist, there is no practice of religious life.

¹ Apparently, the Mādhyamika's assertion that all things are void ruins the foundation of all religious practice. But the Mādhyamika says in reply that it is on the contrary if things are *not void*, that all religious practice becomes meaningless. Voidness is 'dependent origination' (*pratityasamutpāda*). But if there is no 'dependent origination', then there is no sorrow, no origination of sorrow, and for that reason, no destruction of sorrow and no way leading to that destruction. Everything is immut-

able, free from the vicissitudes of the empirical world, being the Absolute itself. Thus, if Voidness is not admitted, the Four Noble Truths, which constitute the foundation of all religious practice in Buddhism, cannot be understood. — The whole thing has to be read along with *MK. XXIV* (cf. E. Frauwallner's introduction to his translation of this chapter, pp. 187ff.). See also p. 2 above, and the concluding verse of our treatise.

² This is a quotation from the *Śālistamba-sūtra* (cf. *Mahāyāna-Sūtra-saṃgraha* I [ed. by P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga, 1961], p. 100). For the Pāli version see *Majjhima-Nikāya* I, pp. 190-1 (Pāli Text Society edition). — *Dharma*, as equivalent to *pratitya-samutpāda*, does not mean the Absolute Truth (in which there is no dependent origination: cf. *supra*, p. 2), but is only a *negative expression* of the Absolute. Cf. *Ātman-Brahman*, pp. 95, 97.

Furthermore:

LV. There would be neither merit (*dharma*) nor demerit (*adharma*) nor the worldly conventions (*saṃvṛtyavahārās ca laukikāḥ*). All things, being endowed with an intrinsic nature, would be permanent — for that which has no cause is permanent (*nityāś ca sasvabhāvāḥ syur nitya-tvād ahetumataḥ*).

If this is so, what defect follows for you who reject Dependent Origination (*evam sati pratityasamutpādaṃ pratyācakṣāṇasya bhavataḥ ko doṣaḥ prasajyate*)? — There is no merit. There is no demerit. Nor do exist the worldly conventions. — Why? — Because all that is dependently originated; how will it be, if there is no dependent origination (*pratityasamutpannaṃ hy etat sarvam; asati pratityasamutpāde kuto bhaviṣyati*)? Moreover, being endowed with an intrinsic nature (*sasvabhāva*), not dependently originated (*apratityasamutpanna*) and devoid of a cause (*nirhetuka*), it would be permanent (*nitya*)¹. — Why? — Because things that have no cause are permanent (*nirhetukā hi bhāvā nityāḥ*). — There would thus follow that very non-practice of religious life (*sa eva cābrahmacāryavāsaḥ prasajyeta*). And you would contradict your own tenet (*svasiddhāntavirodhaś ca*)². — Why? — Because the Lord has taught that all conditioned things are impermanent (*anityā hi bhagavatā sarve saṃskārā nirdiṣṭāḥ*). They become permanent, because they are [supposed to be] endowed with an intrinsic nature and hence [to be] permanent (*te sasvabhāvanityatvān nityā hi bhavanti*).

¹ The sentence, *api ca sasvabhāvo 'pratityasamutpanno nirhetuko nityaḥ syāt*, does not seem to be all right. The editors suggest: 'sc. bhāvāḥ?' (Text, p. 43, n. 8). But it would perhaps be better to read: *sasvabhāvam apratityasamutpannaṃ nirhetukaṃ nityaṃ syāt*.

² I do not see why we *should* conclude from this that the objection formulated in v. VII springs from a Hinayānist (cf. p. 10, above). The Naiyāyika realist, who uses against Nāgārjuna, a Buddhist, the standpoint of the Buddhist realists, must also accept their tenet — in order to be consistent with himself. Nāgārjuna here uses against his opponent what is commonly regarded as the essence of the Buddha's teaching, namely that all conditioned things are impermanent (*anitya*).

LVI. And the same defect exists also with regard to the bad things, the indeterminate things, those things which lead to emancipation, and so on (*naiyāṇikādiṣu*). Thus, all that is conditioned certainly becomes for you unconditioned (*tasmāt sarvaṃ saṃskṛtaṃ asaṃskṛtaṃ te bhavaty eva*).

And the same method that has been indicated, concerning the good things (*yaś caīṣa kuśaleṣu dharmeṣu nirdiṣṭaḥ kalpaḥ*), applies also to the bad things, to the indeterminate things, to those things which lead to emancipation, and so on (*naiyāṇikaṇābhṛtiṣu*). Thus all that, though conditioned, turns out to be unconditioned for you (*tasmāt te sarvaṃ idaṃ saṃskṛtaṃ asaṃskṛtaṃ saṃpadyate*). — Why? — Because, there being no cause, there is no origination, no subsistence and no destruction (*hetau hy asaty utpādasthitibhaṅgā na bhavanti*). [And] there being no origination, no subsistence and no destruction, all that is conditioned turns out to be unconditioned, because of the absence of the specific character of the conditioned (*saṃskṛtalakṣaṇābhāvāt*). — In these circumstances, your statement that all things are non-void because the good and other things have an intrinsic nature (*kuśalādīnāṃ bhāvānāṃ svabhāvasadbhāvād aśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti*), is not valid.

[Refutation of the fifth objection; see v. IX above].

LVII. He who says that the name (*nāman*) is existent (*sadbhūta*), deserves indeed the answer from you: 'There is an intrinsic nature'¹. We, however, do not say that (*brūmaś ca na vyaṃ tat*).

He who says that the name is existent, deserves the answer from you: 'There is an intrinsic nature'. That intrinsic nature, which is designated by the existent name, must also be, for that reason, existent (*yasya sadbhūtaṃ nāma svabhāvasya tasmāt tenāpi svabhāvena sadbhūtena bhavitavyam*). For a non-existent intrinsic nature cannot have an existent name (*na hy asadbhūtasya svabhāvasya sadbhūtaṃ nāma bhavati*). We, however, do not say that the name is existent. Since the things have no intrinsic nature, that name also is devoid of an intrinsic nature

(*niḥsvabhāva*). For that reason, it is void (*fūnya*), and, being void, it is non-existent (*asadbhūta*). — In these circumstances, your statement that because of the existence of the name (*nāmasadbhāvāt*) the intrinsic nature is existent (*sadbhūtaḥ svabhāvaḥ*), is not valid.

¹ *sasvabhāva ity evaṃ bhavatā prativaktavyo nāma*. — *sasvabhāva* here is used as the opposite of *niḥsvabhāva* or *asvabhāva* 'absence of intrinsic nature' (vv. IX, LIX). Let us remember that according to the opponent, there can be no name without an object. The name 'absence of intrinsic nature' proves, therefore, that very intrinsic nature which it is supposed to deny. The Mādhyamika's reply to this is that the name 'absence of intrinsic nature' does not exist any more than the proposition 'All things are void' (*supra*, p. 1).

Furthermore:

LVIII. Does this name 'non-existent' designate something existent or non-existent (*nāmāsad iti ca yad idaṃ tat kiṃ nu sato bhavaty utāpy asataḥ*)? Be it the name of an existent or of a non-existent thing, in both ways your position is abandoned (*yadi hi sato yady asato dvidhāpi te hiyate vādaḥ*).

Does this name 'non-existent' designate something existent or non-existent? Be it the name of an existent or of a non-existent thing, in both ways the proposition (*pratijñā*) is abandoned. If [the thing named is] existent, the proposition ['The name is:] "Non-existent" is abandoned. For the same thing cannot be now non-existent, now existent (*na hidāniṃ tad asat idāniṃ sat*). If, on the other hand, [you say that] the thing named is non-existent, [it has to be replied:] that which is non-existent has no name (*asadbhūtasya nāma na bhavati*)¹. — Thus your proposition that the name has an existent intrinsic nature is abandoned (*tasmād yā pratijñā nāmnaḥ sadbhūtaḥ svabhāva iti sā hinā*)².

¹ For the text cf. Kunst's *Preface*, p. 3.

² For the opponent, even the name 'non-existent' is existent. But, for the Mādhyamika, it involves a self-contradiction. See also on this self-contradiction, B. K. Matilal, 'Reference and Existence in Nyāya and Buddhist Logic', *loc. cit.* pp. 90-93.

Furthermore:

LIX. We have already established the voidness of all things (*sarveśāṃ bhāvānāṃ fūnyatvaṃ copapāditaṃ pūrvam*). This criticism, therefore, turns out to be one of something which is not a proposition (*sa upālambhas tasmād bhavaty ayaṃ cāpratijñāyāḥ*).

Here we have already established in detail (*vistarataḥ*) the voidness of all things. Even the name has already been stated to be void. Now you, assuming non-voidness, have returned to the charge (*sa bhavān aśūnyatvaṃ parigrhya parivṛtto vaktum*): If the things had no intrinsic nature, then even the name 'absence of intrinsic nature' would not exist (*yadi bhāvānāṃ svabhāvo na syād aśvabhāva iti nāmāpidaṃ na syād iti*). Your criticism, therefore, turns out to be one of something which is not a proposition (*tasmād apratijñopālambho 'yaṃ bhavataḥ saṃpadyate*)¹. We do not say, indeed, that the name is existent (*na hi vayaṃ nāma sadbhūtam iti brūmaḥ*).

¹ Because the Mādhyamika has no 'proposition' at all.

Now about your statement [contained in v. X]:

LX. 'Now [you may say:] There is an intrinsic nature, but that does not belong to the things' — this suspicion of yours is not shared by us (*idam āśaṅkitam yad uktam bhavaty anāśaṅkitam tac ca*).

We do not, indeed, deny the intrinsic nature of the things (*na hi vayaṃ dharmāṇāṃ svabhāvaṃ pratiśedhayāmaḥ*). Nor do we affirm the intrinsic nature of a certain object apart from the things (*dharmavinirmuktasya vā kasyacid arthasya svabhāvaṃ abhyupagacchāmaḥ*). Now, this being so, your criticism: 'If the things are devoid of an intrinsic nature, you should explain to what other object, apart from the things, there now happens to belong the intrinsic nature (*kasya khalv idānīm anyasyārthasya dharmavinirmuktasya svabhāvo bhavati*)', is thrown far away (*dūrāpakṛṣṭam evaitad bhavati*). It is no criticism at all (*upālambho na bhavati*)¹.

¹ As we shall see later on (v. LXIV), Nāgārjuna does not 'deny' anything; he only 'makes known' the voidness of the things.

[Refutation of the sixth objection; see v. XI above].

LXI. If [it is true that] negation is only of an existent, then this voidness is established (*śūnyatvaṃ nanu prasiddham idam*) — for you negate the things' being devoid of an intrinsic nature (*pratiśedhayate hi bhavān bhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ*).

If negation is only of the existent and not of the non-existent (*yadi sata eva pratiśedho bhavati nāsataḥ*), and if you negate the being-devoid-

of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things (*bhavāṃś ca sarvabhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ pratiśedhayati*), then the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things is established (*nanu prasiddhaṃ sarvabhāvānāṃ niḥsvabhāvatvam*). Since, in virtue of your statement (*tvaḍvacanena*), negation exists (*pratiśedhasadbhāvāi*)¹, and since the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things has been negated (*niḥsvabhāvatvasya ca sarvabhāvānāṃ pratiśiddhatvāt*), voidness is established (*prasiddhā śūnyatā*).

¹ Read *pratiśedhya*° 'object to be negated'?

LXII. Now, if you negate voidness, and if that voidness does not exist (*pratiśedhayase 'tha tvam śūnyatvaṃ tac ca nāsti śūnyatvam*), then your position that negation is of an existent is abandoned (*pratiśedhaḥ sata iti te nanv eṣa vihiyate vādaḥ*).

Now, if you negate the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of all things, i.e. their voidness, and if that voidness does not exist, then your proposition (*pratiñā*) that negation is of an existent and not of a non-existent, is abandoned¹.

¹ The Mādhyamika here uses the opponent's own logic against him. If the latter's proposition that a significant negation is only of an existent is right, then he proves the Mādhyamika's position, by proving the voidness he negates. If, on the other hand, the voidness he negates does not exist, then he abandons his own proposition.

Besides:

LXIII. I do not negate anything, nor is there anything to be negated (*pratiśedhayāmi nāhaṃ kiṃcit pratiśedhyam asti na ca kiṃcit*). You, therefore, calumniate me when you say: 'You negate' (*tasmāt pratiśedhayasity adhilaya eṣa twayā kriyate*)¹.

Even that you could rightly say, if I negated something. I, however, do not negate anything, for there is nothing to be negated (*na caivāhaṃ kiṃcit pratiśedhayāmi, yasmān na kiṃcit pratiśeddhavyam asti*). Thus, while, all things being void, there is neither a thing to be negated (*pratiśedhya*) nor a negation (*pratiśedha*), you make an absurd calumny (*aprastuto 'dhilayaḥ*) when you say: 'You negate'.

¹ *adhilaya* 'calumny' has been recorded so far only in MK. (F. Edgerton, *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary* [New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953], s.v.).

Now about your statement (contained in v. XII):

LXIV. Regarding your assertion that the statement of the negation of the non-existent is established without words (*ṛte vacanād asataḥ pratiśedhavacanasiddhir iti*), we observe: Here speech makes it known as non-existent, it does not deny it (*atra jñāpayate vāg asad iti tan na pratinihanti*).

Regarding your statement: 'The negation of the non-existent is established even without words; what purpose is, therefore, served by your statement "All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature" (*tatra kiṃ niḥsvabhāwāḥ sarvabhāvā ity etat tvadvacanam karoti*)?', we observe: The statement: 'All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature', does not make all things devoid of an intrinsic nature (*niḥsvabhāwāḥ sarvabhāvā ity etat khalu vacanam na niḥsvabhāvān eva sarvabhāvān karoti*). But, since there is no intrinsic nature (*asati svabhāve*), it makes known (*jñāpayati*) that the things are devoid of an intrinsic nature (*bhāvā niḥsvabhāvā iti*). Here is an example: While Devadatta is not in the house, somebody says that Devadatta is in the house (*avidyamānagrhe Devadatte 'sti grhe Devadatta iti*)¹. On that occasion, somebody tells him in reply: 'He is not [in the house]'. That statement does not create Devadatta's non-existence, but only makes known Devadatta's non-existence in the house (*na tad vacanam Devadattasyāsadbhāvam karoti, kiṃ tu jñāpayati kevalam asaṃbhavam grhe Devadattasya*). Similarly the statement, 'The things have no intrinsic nature' does not create the being-devoid-of-an-intrinsic-nature of the things, but makes known the absence of an intrinsic nature in all things (*na bhāvānām niḥsvabhāvatvam karoti, kiṃ tu sarvabhāveṣu svabhāvasyābhāvam jñāpayati*). — In these circumstances, your statement: 'If there is no intrinsic nature, what purpose is served by the statement "There is no intrinsic nature"? The absence of an intrinsic nature is established even without words', is not appropriate (*na yuktam*)².

¹ 'avidyamānagrha is a curious compound but occurs in other texts'. (Text, p. 48, n. 14).

² Nāgārjuna is not unaware of the weight of the Naiyāyika's objection. It does not, however, apply to him, for he does not negate anything but only 'makes known' the voidness, i.e. the 'dependent origination', of the things, where people wrongly see their non-voidness. — In the *Mādhyamakakārikās* Nāgārjuna often uses the Naiyāyika's principle in his own argumentations. Candrakīrti makes this clear in his comments. Thus in *Prasannapadā* on XXVII, 28 he writes: *pratiśedhyasya vastuno 'saṃbha-*

vāt pratiśedhasyāpy asambhava iti. ato 'ntavattve cānantavattve cobhayasminn opratīte kasya pratiśedhena naivāntavān nānantavām loka iti dṛṣṭisambhavaḥ syād iti. The point under discussion here has also been clearly stated by Candrakīrti in his comment on MK. XV, 11 (MKV. pp. 273, 1. 12-274, 1. 4).

[Refutation of the seventh objection].

Now about the four verses (XIII-XVI) uttered by you:

LXV. You have introduced a great deliberation (*mahāṃś carcaḥ*) with the example of the mirage. Listen to the decision in that matter also (*tatrāpi nirṇayaṃ śṛṇu*), showing how that example is appropriate (*yathā sa dṛṣṭānta upapannaḥ*).

(The commentary is a mere paraphrase).

LXVI. If that perception were by its own nature, it would not be dependently originated (*sa yadi svabhāvataḥ syād grāho na syāt pratītya sambhūtaḥ*). That perception, however, which comes into existence dependently is voidness indeed (*yaś ca pratītya bhavati grāho nanu sūn-yatā saiva*).

If that perception of a mirage as water (*mṛgatīṣṇāyām sa yathājala-grāhaḥ*)¹ were by its own nature, it would not be dependently originated. Since, however, it comes into existence in dependence upon the mirage, the wrong sight (*viparītaṃ darśanam*) and the distracted attention (*ayoniśomanaskāra*), it is dependently originated (*pratītyasamutpanna*). And since it is dependently originated, it is indeed void by its own nature (*svabhāvataḥ sūnya eva*) — as previously stated (*yathā pūrvam uktam tathā*).

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 14, n. 1 on XIII.

Furthermore:

LXVII. If that perception were by its own nature, who would remove that perception (*kaś taṃ nivartayed grāham*)? The same method applies to the rest [of the things] too (*śeṣeṣv apy eṣa vidhiḥ*). Hence this is a non-criticism (*tasmād eṣo 'nupālambhaḥ*).

If the perception of water in a mirage (*mṛgatīṣṇāyām jalagrāhaḥ*) were by its own nature, who indeed would remove it? For an intrinsic

nature cannot be removed (*na hi svabhāvaḥ śakyo vinivartayitum*): e.g., the heat of fire, the fluidity of water, the openness (*nirāvaraṇatva*) of space¹. Its removal, however, is seen (*dṛṣṭaṃ cāsyā vinivartanam*). The intrinsic nature of the perception is, therefore, void (*tasmāc chūnyasvabhāvo grāhaḥ*). The same method (*krama*) is to be understood (*pratyavagantavya*) with regard to the rest of the things too (*śeṣeṣv api dharmeṣu*), viz., the five things beginning with the object to be perceived (*grāhya-prabhṛtiṣu pañcasu*)². — In these circumstances, your statement that all things are non-void because of the existence of the aggregate of the six (*ṣaṭkabhāvāt*), is not valid³.

¹ Cf. *MK. XXIII*, 24, with Candrakīrti's comment.

² Cf. v. XIV.

³ According to the realist, the Mādhyamika cannot avoid the difficulty he has been put into, even by affirming that, in saying 'All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature', he only negates a wrong perception of a non-existent, comparable to the perception of water in a mirage. For even when one claims to negate a wrong perception of a non-existent, one is bound to admit the six things, viz., the perception, the object to be perceived, the perceiver, the negation, the object to be negated, and the negator (v. XIV). — The Mādhyamika's rejoinder to this is that the opponent's criticism springs from a misunderstanding of the meaning of 'being devoid of an intrinsic nature'. When the Mādhyamika says that all things are 'devoid of an intrinsic nature' or 'void', he does not at all mean to say that they are non-existent, but only that they are 'dependently originated'. The six things of which the opponent speaks exist *only insofar as they are dependently originated* (cf. *supra*, p. 33, n. 1 on L.).

Perhaps we may pursue our elucidation of this passage further. Nāgārjuna does not confound truth and error. He can distinguish just as a realist can between delusive and non-delusive perceptions, and by the same criteria. The heat of fire, the fluidity of water, and so on, are not just the same thing as the perception of water in a mirage. The latter is erroneous and hence can be removed by a knowing person, whereas the truth of the former is not questioned by anybody in the world. But when Nāgārjuna says that the heat of fire is an 'intrinsic nature' (*svabhāva*), he does not mean to say that it is so in an absolute sense. The heat of fire, too, is 'dependently originated' (cf. Candrakīrti, *MKV.*, pp. 260ff.). Truth and error have this in common, that both are 'dependently originated'. The example of the mirage has been chosen because it is the most comprehensive, including as it does not only the perception, the object to be perceived and the perceiver, but also the negation, the object to be negated and the negator. Empirically speaking, all these exist, being related to one another; but in an absolute sense, none of these can be said to exist — for the very same reason that they are 'dependently originated'.

Thus, the doctrine of voidness has a twofold function: on one hand, it establishes the empirical reality; on the other, it points to its Beyond.

[Refutation of the eighth objection; see v. XVII above].

LXVIII. The case being the same (*śamatvāt*), we have already answered by what precedes [the objection of] absence of reason (*hetvabhāva*), which was stated in [your] refutation of the example of the mirage (*mṛgatṛṣṇādṛṣṭāntavyāvṛttividhau ya uktah prāk*).

It should be understood (*avagantavya*) that by the preceding deliberation (*carcena pūrvoktena*) we have also answered [the objection of] absence of reason. The same deliberation regarding the negation of the aggregate of the six (*ṣaṭkapratīśedha*), which was stated in the preceding reason (*pūrvasmin hetau*), should also be considered here (*ihāpi carcayitavyaḥ*)¹.

¹ Why are all things 'void' or 'devoid of an intrinsic nature'? The Mādhyamika's 'reason' is that they are dependently originated' (*pratītyasamutpanna*). Put in the standard Naiyāyika form of syllogistic inference (*anumāna*), it comes to this:

- | | |
|----------------------|---|
| (1) <i>Pratijñā</i> | <i>niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ</i> |
| (Proposition): | (All things are devoid of an intrinsic nature). |
| (2) <i>Hetu</i> | <i>pratītyasamutpannatvāt</i> |
| (Reason): | (Because of being dependently originated). |
| (3) <i>Udāharaṇa</i> | <i>yat pratītyasamutpannam tan niḥsvabhāvaṃ dṛṣṭam: yathā</i> |
| (Exemplification): | <i>mṛgatṛṣṇāyām jalagrāhaḥ</i> |
| | (What is dependently originated is seen to be devoid of an intrinsic nature: for example, the perception of water in a mirage). |
| (4) <i>Upanaya</i> | <i>tathā ca pratītyasamutpannāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ</i> |
| (Application): | (Even so are all things dependently originated). |
| (5) <i>Nigamaṇa</i> | <i>tasmāt pratītyasamutpannatvān niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ</i> |
| (Conclusion): | (Therefore, because of being dependently originated, all things are devoid of an intrinsic nature). |

Unlike Bhāvaviveka, a later Mādhyamika, Nāgārjuna does not show any predilection for 'independent inference' (*svatantrānumāna*), for he has no 'position' to defend. His 'position' is, in fact, a 'non-position'. He expresses the Inexpressible. And the best way for him to refute his opponent's criticism is to show the contradictions inherent in the latter's own way of thought (cf. *supra*, p. 1 and n. 3). He is a *prāsaṅgika*, not a *svāntarika*. However, he cannot be accused of not vindicating his position from the standpoint of formal logic. — Cf. Candrakīrti's remarks on Buddhapālita, a strict follower of Nāgārjuna (*MKV.*, pp. 20-21: Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa* [Leningrad, 1927], pp. 99ff.).

[Refutation of the ninth objection; see v. XX above].

LXIX. We have already answered [the question relating to] the reason [for a negation] in the three times (*traikālyā*)¹, for the case is

the same (*śamatvāt*). And a counter-reason for the three times (*traikālyapratihetu*) is obtained for the upholders of the doctrine of voidness (*śūnyatāvādinām prāptaḥ*).

It has to be understood (*pratyavagantavya*) that the question why a negation is possible in the three times (*hetus traikālye pratiśedhavāci*) has already received its answer (*uktottaraḥ*). — Why? — Because the reason is of the same nature as the thesis to be established (*sādhyaśamatvāt*). To explain: In virtue of your statement (*tvadvacanena*), a negation is not possible in the three times, and, like the negation, the thing to be negated, also, does not exist². Thus, there being no negation and no object to be negated (*pratiśedhapratiśedhye 'sati*), your opinion that the negation has been negated (*yad bhavān manyate pratiśedhaḥ pratiśiddha iti*), is untenable. That very reason which expresses a negation of the three times is obtained for the upholders of the doctrine of voidness, for they negate the intrinsic nature of all things, — not for you (*yas trikālapratiśedhavāci hetur eṣa eva śūnyatāvādinām prāptaḥ sarva-bhāvasvabhāvapratiśedhakatvān na bhavataḥ*)³.

Or it has been answered in the following way:

'I do not negate anything, nor is there anything to be negated. You, therefore, calumniate me when you say: "You negate" '⁴.

Now, if you think: the negation is established in all the three times (*triṣu api kāleṣu pratiśedhaḥ siddhaḥ*); we see the antecedent cause, the subsequent cause, and the simultaneous cause (*dṛṣṭaḥ pūrvakālino 'pi hetuḥ, uttarakālino 'pi, yugapatkālino 'pi hetuḥ*): antecedent cause, e.g., the father as the cause of the son; subsequent cause, e.g., the disciple as the cause of the teacher; simultaneous cause, e.g., the lamp as the cause of the light, — we reply: this is not so. For in this way are stated the three former defects (*uktā hy etasmin krame trayaḥ pūrvadoṣāḥ*)⁵. Moreover, if this is so, you admit the existence of a negation, and you abandon your proposition (*api ca yadyevam, pratiśedhasadbhāvas tvayābhyupagamyate, pratiññāhāniś ca te bhavati*); the negation of an intrinsic nature is also established in this way (*etena krameṇa svabhāvapratiśedho 'pi siddhaḥ*).

¹ Cf. v. XX, and *Nyāyasūtra* II, 1, 12, quoted above, p. 16, n. 2.

² Read: *pratiśedhas traikālye 'nupapannaḥ, pratiśedhavat sa pratiśedhyo 'pi*.

³ For the realist, a negation is not possible in all the three times (cf. v. XX). The Mādhyamika uses his opponent's own argument to prove that, if the latter's contention is valid, he cannot negate the Mādhyamika's negation. The Mādhyamika himself, however, is safe in his position, for he holds that the three times are as void as all

the other things (cf. *MK. XIX*). (Note the way in which Nāgārjuna uses the two expressions: *hetus traikālye pratiṣedhavadī* 'reason expressing a negation in the three times', and *trikālapratiṣedhavadī hetuḥ* 'reason [for a negation in the three times] which expresses a negation of the three times'.) — On *sādhyaśama* cf. n. 3 on v. XXVIII above.

⁴ V. LXIII above.

⁵ Cf. v. XX.

LXX. All things prevail for him for whom prevails this voidness (*prabhavati ca śūnyateyaṃ yasya prabhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ*). Nothing prevails for him for whom voidness does not prevail (*prabhavati na tasya kiṃcin na prabhavati śūnyatā yasya*)¹.

For whom this voidness prevails, for him all things — mundane and supramundane (*sarvārthā laukikalokottarāḥ*) — prevail. — Why? — Because Dependent Origination prevails for him for whom voidness prevails. The Four Noble Truths prevail for him for whom Dependent Origination prevails. The results of monastic life as well as all special acquisitions (*viśeṣādhigama*)² prevail for him for whom the Four Noble Truths prevail. The Three Jewels (*triṇi ratnāni*), viz., the Buddha, the Dharma and the Saṃgha, prevail for him for whom all the special acquisitions prevail. For whom Dependent Origination prevails, for him merit (*dharma*), the cause of merit (*dharmahetu*), the result of merit (*dharmaphala*), demerit (*adharma*), the cause of demerit (*adharma-hetu*), the result of demerit (*adharma-phala*), — all these prevail. For whom merit and demerit, the causes of merit and demerit and the results of merit and demerit prevail, for him passion (*kleśa*)³, the origination of passion (*kleśasamudaya*), and the objective grounds of passion (*kleśavastūni*)⁴ prevail. For whom all that prevails (*yasyaitat sarvaṃ prabhavati pūrvoktam*), for him the law concerning the happy and the unhappy states (*sugatidurgativyavasthā*), the attainment of those states (*sugatidurgatigamana*), the way leading to those states (*sugatidurgatigāmi mārgaḥ*), the act of passing beyond those states (*sugatidurgativyatikramaṇa*), the means of passing beyond those states (*sugatidurgativyatikramaṇopāya*), and all worldly conventions (*sarvasaṃvyavahārāś ca laukikāḥ*) are established (*vyavasthāpitāḥ*). They are to be understood individually by each person, following this direction (*svayam adhigantavyā anyā dīśā*): a part [only] can be taught in words (*kiṃcic chakyaṃ vacanenopadeṣṭum*).

Here again,

I adore that incomparable Buddha (*tam apratimabuddham*) who taught Voidness, Dependent Origination and the Middle Way as equivalent (*ekārtha*)⁵.

Here ends this work of the venerable master Nāgārjuna⁶.

¹ Cf. *MK. XXIV*, 14:

*sarvaṃ ca yujyate tasya śūnyatā yasya yujyate/
sarvaṃ na yujyate tasya śūnyam yasya na yujyate||*

Concluding the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* with this verse, Nāgārjuna shows that his doctrine of voidness does not reject the empirical world. On the contrary, it establishes on a solid foundation all our activities in the empirical world. — See above, p. 2; p. 33, n. 1 on L; p. 44, n. 3; vv. LIV-LVI.

² On this term cf. May, n. 828.

³ Cf. *MK. XXIII*.

⁴ On *vastu* cf. *MK. XXIII*, 7, with Candrakīrti's comment (May, [p. 185 and n. 603]).

⁵ Cf. *MK. XXIV*, 18, quoted on p. 4, n. 10, above.

⁶ That both the *kārikās* and the *ṣṭī* were composed by Nāgārjuna is clearly stated by Candrakīrti, *MKV.*, pp. 25, 30.

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES

(For the works rather frequently used)

- Ātman-Brahman —K. Bhattacharya, *L'Ātman-Brahman dans le Bouddhisme ancien*, Paris 1973 (*Publications de l'Ecole française d'Extrême-Orient*, Vol. XC).
- Frauwallner —E. Frauwallner, *Die Philosophie des Buddhismus*, Berlin 1956 (third edition : 1969).
- JIPh. —*Journal of Indian Philosophy*, Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
- May —J. May, *Candrakīrti: Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti* (Douze chapitres traduits du sanscrit et du tibétain...), Paris 1959.
- MK. —Nāgārjuna, (*Mūla-*)*Madhyamaka-kārikā*, ed. by L. de La Vallée Poussin, St. — Pétersbourg 1903-13 (*Bibliotheca Buddhica* IV).
- MKV. —Candrakīrti's commentary on the preceding, called *Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*; same edition.
- Murti —T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism : A Study of the Mādhyamika System*, London 1955.
- Bhāsarvajña, *Nyāyabhāṣya*, ed. by Svāmī Yogīndrananda, Varanasi 1968.
- Jayantabhaṭṭa, *Nyāyamañjarī*, ed. by Mahāmahopādhyāya Gaṅgādhara Śāstri Tailaṅga, Benares 1895 (*Vizianagram Sanskrit Series* No. 10).
- Nyāyasūtra*. The following editions have been used :
Ed. by Gaṅgānātha Jhā. *Poona Oriental Series* No. 58, Poona 1939.
— *The Nyāya-Darśana. The Sūtras of Gautama and Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana with two commentaries* : (1) *The Khadyota by Mahāmahopādhyāya Gaṅgānātha Jhā*, and (2) *The Bhāṣyacandra by Raghūttama — up to Adhyāya iii, Āhnika ii, Sūtrā 17 only. With Notes by Pandit Ambādās Shastri*. Edited by Mahāmahopādhyāya Gaṅgānātha Jhā and Pandit Dhunḍhirāja Śāstri Nyāyopādhyāya, Benares 1925 (*Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series*). [Contains also the *Nyāyasūcīnibandha* of Vācaspati-miśra]. — Ed. with Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*, and Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*, *Anandāśrama Sanskrit Series* 91, Poona 1922. — *Nyāyadarśana* I, edited with Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya*, Uddyotakara's *Vārttika*, Vācaspati-miśra's *Tātparyāṣikā*, and Viśvanātha's *Vṛtti*, by Tārānātha Nyāya-Tarkatīrtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatīrtha, Calcutta 1936 (*Calcutta Sanskrit Series* XVIII). Up to the end of Adhyāya III only.
- Uddyotakara, *Nyāyavārttika*. *Bibliotheca Indica* Edition. See also above: *Nyāyasūtra*.
- Tucci —G. Tucci, *Pre-Diṇḍaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, Baroda 1929 (*Gaekwad's Oriental Series* XLIX).
- Yamaguchi —*Traité de Nāgārjuna: Pour écarter les vaines discussions* [Vigraha-vyāvartani], traduit et annoté par Susumu Yamaguchi, in *Journal Asiatique* (Paris), juillet-septembre 1929, pp. 1-86.

A complete translation of Nāgārjuna's major work, the *Madhyamaka-kārikās*, along with Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*, is now available:

Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāṇa*, Leningrad, 1927 (chapters I, XXV).

St. Schayer, *Ausgewählte Kapitel aus der Prasannapadā*, W. Krakow, 1931 (chapters V, XII-XVI).

St. Schayer, 'Feuer und Brennstoff', *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* VII, 1931, pp. 26-52 (chapter X).

E. Lamotte, *Le Traité de l'acte de Vasubandhu, Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, Bruges, 1936 (extrait des *Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques* publiés par L'Institut Belge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, Vol. IV), pp. 121-144 (chapter XVII).

J. W. de Jong, *Cinq chapitres de la Prasannapadā*, Paris, 1949 (chapters XVIII-XXII).

J. May, *Candrakīrti: Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*, Paris, 1959 (chapters II-IV, VI-IX, XI, XXIII-XXIV, XXVI-XXVII). This work contains also an important bibliography.

Besides, R. Gnoli's *Nāgārjuna: Mādhyamaka Kārikā*, in Italian (Torino, 1961), gives a complete translation of Nāgārjuna's *Kārikās*, and E. Frauwallner's *Die Philosophie des-Buddhismus*, pp. 178ff., 243ff., gives a translation of the chapters I, XV, XVIII, XXIV and XXV of Nāgārjuna's *Kārikās*, and of part of chapter 1 of Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā*.

INDEX OF THE SIGNIFICANT NYĀYA TECHNICAL TERMS USED IN THE VIGRAHAVYĀVARTANĪ¹

dṛṣṭānta = *upamāna*. *Kārikā* VI (*upamāna* in the *vṛtti*).

dṛṣṭāntavirodha. *Vṛtti* on *kārikā* II (cf. Translation, p. 7, n. 4).—A variety of *pratijñāvirodha*, which is a *nigrahasthāna* 'ground of defeat.'

pratijñāhāni (also *vādahāni*). *Kārikās* XXIV (cf. *kārikā* II), XXXIII, LVIII, LXII and *vṛtti* on *kārikās* XXXI and LXIX. Also a *nigrahasthāna*.

sādhyasama. XXVIII, LXIX. Cf. Translation, Note 3 on XXVIII.

siddhasādhana. XLII. cf. also *MK.* X, 9, and Candrakīrti's comment (which gives the same example as the *vṛtti* on *kārikā* XLII of our text: *na hy avidyamāno Devadatto grhe kaṃcid apekṣate*)—A fallacious reason (*hetvābhāsa*) according to the old school of Nyāya, but a separate *nigrahasthāna* according to the modern school.

svasiddhāntavirodha. *Vṛtti* on LV. Cf. *apasiddhānta*, a *nigrahasthāna*.

hetu = *dṛṣṭānta* XXVIII (cf. Translation, p. 22, n. 1).

1. For detailed references see Glossary in *JIPh.* 5 (1977).

INDEX OF UNCOMMON WORDS

adhilaya LXIII and *vṛtti*.

avidyamānagṛha *Vṛtti* on LXIV.

naiḥsvābhāvya XVII; XXVI and *Vṛtti*; *Vṛtti* on XXVIII.

— See also Vṛṣabha's *Paddhati* on *Vākyapadiya* I, 5 (*Vākyapadiya* of Bhartṛhari with the Commentaries *Vṛtti* and *Paddhati* of Vṛṣabhadeva Kāṇḍa I., edited by K.A. Subramania Iyer, Poona 1966 [*Deccan College Monograph Series* 32], p. 23, l. 23).

yathājalagrāha XIII and *Vṛtti* on LXVI.

vaiśamikatva II and *Vṛtti*; XXIV and *Vṛtti*; XXXIII and *Vṛtti*.

INDEX OF THE ANCIENT AUTHORITIES QUOTED
IN THE INTRODUCTION AND IN THE NOTES

Āryadeva: *Catuhśataka* Note 3 on XXVIII. (pp. 22-3)

Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Note 2 on XXIX.

Aśvaghoṣa: *Buddhacarita* and *Saundarananda* Note 2 on XXVIII. (p. 22).

Bhāsarvajña: *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* Note 1 on XX; Note 1 on XXXIX.

Bhāvaviveka Note on LXVIII.

Buddhapālita Note on LXVIII.

Candrakīrti: *Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti* (MKV.) p. 3, n. 3; p. 15;

Note 1 on XX; Note on XXII (p. 18); Note 3 on XXVIII (p. 22); Notes 1, 2 and 3 on XXIX; Note on XXXVIII; Note on L; Note 2 on LXIV (pp. 42-3); Notes 1 and 3 on LXVII (p. 44); Note on LXVIII; Notes 4 and 6 on LXX.

—Commentary on the *Catuhśataka* Note 3 on XXVIII (p. 23).

Gauḍapāda: *Āgamaśāstra* (*Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*) Note 1 on XX; Note 1 on XXVIII (p. 22).

Jayantabhaṭṭa: *Nyāyamañjari* Note 1 on XX; Note 1 on XXXIX.

Mahāyāna-Sūtrālaṅkāra Note 2 on XXIX (p. 24).

Majjhima-Nikāya Note 2 on LIV (p. 37).

Nāgārjuna: (*Mūla*-) *Madhyamaka-kārikā* (MK.) p. 2; p. 4, nn.

8, 9, 10; Note on XXII (p. 18); Note 1 on XXIII (p. 19); Note 2 on XXVIII (p. 22); Note 2 on XXIX (p. 24); Notes on XXXVI-XL; Note on XLIII; Note 3 on XLVIII; Note 2 on LI; Note 1 on LIV (p. 37); Note on LXIII; Note 2 on LXIV; Notes 1 and 3 on LXVII (p. 44); Note 3 on LXIX (p. 47) Notes 1, 3, 4 and 5 on LXX (p. 48).

—*Vaidalyaprakaraṇa* Note 1 on XX.

Nyāyasūtra Notes 2 and 3 on II (p. 7); Note 2 on XX; Note 1 on XXVIII (p. 22); Note 1 on XXXI; Note on XXXII (p. 26); Notes 1 and 2 on XXXIII; Note 1 on LXIX (p. 46).

Patañjali: *Mahābhāṣya* Note on III (p. 8).

Śaṅkara: *Brahmasūtra-bhāṣya* Note on XXXV.

—*Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad-bhāṣya* Note on XXXV.

- Commentary on the *Āgamaśāstra* Note 1 on XXVIII (p. 22).
 —*Upadeśasāhasri* Note on XXXV.

Śālistamba-Sūtra Note 2 on LIV (p. 37).

Śāntideva: *Bodhicaryāvatāra* Note on L.

Tarkaśāstra Note 1 on XX; Note 1 on XXXIX.

Udayana: *Nyāyakusumāñjali* Note on XII.

Uddyotakara: *Nyāyavārttika* Note on XI (p. 13); Note on XXXII (p. 26).

Vācaspatimiśra: *Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā* Note 1 on XXXI.

Vātsyāyana: *Nyāyabhāṣya* Note 2 on II (p. 7); Note 2 on XX; Note 1 on XXVIII (p. 22); Note on XXXII (p. 26); Notes 1 and 2 on XXXIII; Note 1 on XXXIX.

Viśvanātha: *Nyāyasūtravṛtti* Note on XXXII (p. 26).

Vaiśeṣikasūtra (with the commentary of Candrānanda) Note on XI (p. 13).

**THE VIGRAHAVYĀVARTANĪ
OF
NĀGĀRJUNA**

TEXT

The
VIGRAHAVYĀVARTANĪ of NĀGĀRJUNA
with the Author's Commentary
Edited by
E. H. JOHNSTON
AND
ARNOLD KUNST

P R E F A C E

The present work, which is the result of a joint effort of Professor E. H. Johnston and myself, was just completed before the former's sudden and premature death at Oxford, England, in 1942. Almost immediately after Professor Johnston's death the paper was submitted to the Royal Asiatic Society, which accepted it for publication, but owing to technical and financial difficulties that arose in connection with the war and its aftermath, the manuscript lay for a number of years in the safe of the Society, which was not in a position to effect the publication. Owing to these circumstances the RAS agreed to the withdrawal of the paper; it has now found a hospitable reception by the "Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques", to which the writer

feels greatly indebted on behalf of the deceased and on his own behalf. It is hoped that in spite of the inevitable delay this modest contribution will still serve its purpose as an addition to the treasury of important texts.

When Professor Johnston suggested to me some years ago the joint restoration of Nāgārjuna's treatise I grasped the opportunity of rendering useful and palatable an important Buddhist text whose defects in the only available Sanskrit version edited by R. Sāṅkrtyāyana had worried me since I first came to read it. In the course of our collaboration we used to meet two or three times a week for discussion, and after nearly two years' work the common task took shape in what is presented to the Sanskrit student as the possibly nearest approximation, as we both believed it, of Nāgārjuna's original text.

Professor Johnston's tragic death rendered impossible the joint utilization of a number of remaining sheets with his and my scribbled comments. The arrangement of the text, the introduction and the critical apparatus are the result of joint work. A few dubious points, however, had been tentatively left unsolved in the otherwise final draft with the intention to discuss and possibly insert or substitute them at some later stage. This never materialized and there was never an opportunity of discussing them together. With the purpose of presenting the text as it was left off at Johnston's death it has remained unaltered except for some minor modifications and corrections of errors. It has been also found more practical to publish the text in Roman characters rather than in Devanāgarī, in which it was originally written.

The following list, which has been prepared later, suggests therefore in addition a few supplementary adjustments and alterations which, in my opinion, render the text final, and may serve as variants to the notes originally attached to the text. The reader will make his own choice as to the preferable version.

Text p. II, 16-17, note 13: It may be better to maintain partly the text as conveyed in R and to read śūnyeṣu sarvabhāveṣu tvadvacanamaśūnyam, yenāśūnyatvāt sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ prasiddhaḥ.

This reading seems to be the simplest and it fulfills the test of fitting into the actual discussion: "If you maintain that, whereas all bhāvas are void, your words are not void, then by means of non-void words you prove the svabhāva of all bhāvas." The proof arises from the exclusion of words (of which the sarvabhāvas are predicable) from the sarvabhāvas which thus stop being sarvabhāvas. I also suggest a slightly different interpretation of the meaning in the phrase on p. 12, 5, note 3: If the pratiṣedha is valid, then the words expressing this pratiṣedha are void, and so any statement uttered by means of void words is consequently not valid.

As for kārikā 21 the cæsura between the first and second quarter falls in the middle of the word, i.e. before the locative ending of sāmagrī. A similar phenomenon occurs in kārikā 25 where the cæsura between the third and fourth quarter falls before the genitive ending of śabda.

On p. 27, 3, note 1 for preference read with R śūnyena vacanena in spite of T and Y.

In kārikā 35 (note 8) the reading samparidhākṣyatyapi instead of paridhākṣyatyapi seems to give a satisfactory solution to the difficulty in metre.

P. 36, 11, note 8: Kasyacid is meant to be ambiguous. It probably alludes to the old controversy as to whether para in the parārthānumāna refers to the object being proved or to the "other" person for whom it is being proved. Therefore C must have meant it rather "for" than "of" a certain man.

Read kārikā 51 b: parasparato na cānyaiḥ pramāṇair vā. This reading seems to be accounted for also by the commentary; anya fits better in the context than para.

Although the wording as given on p. 45, 10-13, notes 6-9, renders the text more lucid than it is in R, R's version could be maintained with some slight modifications, namely: tatra yadi tāvat sad, asad iti pratijñā hiyate / na hidāniṃ tad asad idāniṃ sad / athāsad: asadbhūtasya nāma na bhavati / tasmād...

INTRODUCTION

Among the minor works of Nāgārjuna the Vīgrahavyāvartanī takes a special place as an admirable illustration of his dialectical methods, as the only extant example of his prose style, and as a lucid exposition of his views on the conceptions of śūnyatā and svabhāva. While sufficient material for the study of the work has been published in recent years, it has not appeared in a form which made understanding of his arguments easy or even certain.

Tibetan translations have proved more than once invaluable help in restoring corrupt Sanskrit texts and thus it is hoped that workers in the field of Buddhist studies and Indian philosophy will find it convenient to have an edition of the Sanskrit text, which is readable and as close to the original as the materials permit; hence this volume, providing what might perhaps be called better a restoration rather than an edition of the treatise.

Of the three available authorities the first is the Sanskrit MS., discovered by Rev. Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana in the Tibetan monastery of Žalu and edited by him in an appendix to Vol. XXIII, Part III, of the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society, referred to henceforward by the letter R. The MS. was written, probably in India, by a Tibetan in the Tibetan character and dates probably to the beginning of the XIIth century. Assuming that it has been correctly transcribed, it is incredibly corrupt, with innumerable mistakes, omissions and interpolations, and the majority of the kārīkās offend, often unnecessarily, against the rules of prosody. R corrects some of the minor mistakes (additions in round brackets), and has made additions from the Tibetan version (square brackets in text) or has given alternative readings from the same source in the footnotes; but unfortunately these additions and alternatives often fail to reproduce correctly the information the Tibetan gives us about the state of the text it used, and in general the edition should be regarded as a copy of the MS. with little change. Next there is the Tibetan

translation, for which has been used the version published by Tucci in the Pre-Diñnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, hereafter called T; though it is far from being a critical edition and has a number of passages which are corrupt or from which an essential word has dropped out, it has not been possible to go behind it, as it makes use of all the Tibetan editions available in the course of this work. Help has been however derived in doubtful passages from an excellent French translation of it, published by S. Yamaguchi in the Journal Asiatique, tome CCXV, pp. 1-86, hereafter called Y. As usual, the Tibetan text appears to be verbatim, but it has one unusual feature in that there exist two separate translations of the kārikās, one of which often fails to give either the text or the sense of the Sanskrit correctly¹; in the majority of cases where the differences occur the version put by Tucci in the footnotes is the more correct. Finally there is the Chinese translation, here denoted by C, for which has been used the text printed as No. 1631 in the Taisho Issaikyo edition of the Chinese Tripiṭaka, Vol. XXXII. It is the work of Gautama Prajñāruci and is dated 541 A.D. Much of it follows the Sanskrit closely, far more so than might appear from the translation which Tucci gave of it in the volume quoted above, but occasionally its version is so far removed from the Sanskrit and Tibetan as well as from the logical developement of the argument, that it can only be supposed either that the translator had failed to understand the original or that he was unable to express it in Chinese. The translation of the kārikās is in general more defective than that of the commentary.

The textual problems to be solved by this edition are of unusual complexity and no uniform rule can be rigidly applied for their solution. Inevitably R provides the basis for the Sanskrit, and owing to the large amount of repetition there is seldom any difficulty in settling the particular terms used or the equivalents of T's and

¹ For more details cf. ARNOLD KUNST, *Kamalaśīla's Commentary on Śāntarakṣita's Anumānaparīkṣā of the Tattvasaṃgraha*, Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, vol. VIII, pp. 154-155, offprint pp. 48-49.

C's versions. Thus except for minor details the text which T had before him can almost invariably be restored with certainty, but necessarily this is not the case with C, which accordingly is mainly of use for its corroboration of one of the other authorities when they differ. Where possible then, in such instances, the text confirmed by C has been accepted. In a very few cases preference was given to C over the other two, in view of its age; the most important instance is the final clause of kārīkā 20, where the opponent states his conclusion. When C is ambiguous or when all three authorities differ among themselves, the judgement on the nature of the argument and of Nāgārjuna's highly individual style had to decide on the reading. In the result it appears that nearly all the kārīkās now are presented in the form which the author gave to them, and that too with a minimum of conjecture. The number of kārīkās has been reduced to 70, the traditional number for such works because the opponent's verse preceding 34, which has hitherto been treated as a kārīkā, is shown by the Sanskrit wording to be a quotation, while the final verse, numbered 72 in R, belongs to the commentary, not to the main work. For the commentary a similar degree of certainty is unattainable; the best has been done so that Nāgārjuna's arguments seem to have been rendered correctly except for a few doubtful passages and two or three minor details, in particular the use of particles such as api and iti and variations between the sources in the longer or shorter statement of argument cannot be decided for good and all. Nevertheless these uncertainties, however trying such minutiae are to the editor, are not such as to impair the value of the text as a statement of Nāgārjuna's views. The apparatus criticus, unavoidably lengthy, has been kept within bounds as much as possible; no mention is made of cases where R has made acceptable minor emendations of the MS. or where the division of the sentences has been altered. Where the text rests on T as against R, the Tibetan text is not quoted as it is easily accessible; and when T differs from the text adopted, generally its reading is quoted only in what is taken to be the form of the Sanskrit text used by the translator. No suggestions of

amendments have been made which would be necessary to put C's text in order. C has not been quoted in full when it corroborates R or T against the other, but new translation has been occasionally given of troublesome passages. For the corrupt list of kuśala dharmas in the commentary on verse 7 it was deemed sufficient to give a general reference to the paper in the Indian Historical Quarterly, XIV, pp. 314 ff., where the complicated evidence was fully set out and discussed. Except for these cases, omissions from the apparatus, which unfortunately could not be entirely avoided, are due to oversight. In the text use is made occasionally of commas to facilitate its comprehension.

The scope of this work does not include discussion of the more general problems raised by the text, but on one or two points a few words are desirable. In the first place it is a perfect specimen of contemporary dialectics, illustrating such old descriptions as we have of philosophical disputations. Every point has to be stated in the full and every objection has to be taken in its proper order and refuted. The style accordingly is decidedly archaic in character, devoid of the allusive references and elliptic statements which often make the dialectics of a later period hard to read. The Sanskrit, in general, is good, and the few usages, to which exception might be taken, are probably due to uncorrected corruptions, for instance the curious compound avidyamānagrha in the commentary on verse 64 in the sense of "not being present in the house", and the phrase tulyam ayam aprāptaḥ, "like this (fire which dispels darkness) without coming in contact with it", in the commentary on verse 39. Specifically Buddhist words and usages are rare, the two most obvious cases being adhilaya "libel", in verse 63, and pratiśedhyato "(taking a thing) as capable of being refuted", in verse 13. The rules governing the āryā metre are found to be strictly observed when the verses are restored to their correct form, thus proving that this type of verse must have been well established for some time before the second century A.D.

While the text is divided in two parts, 20 verses setting out the

opponents' criticisms of Nāgārjuna's views and 50 verses giving his reply, the objections are not in fact all made by the same critic. The dharmāvasthāvid theorists of verse 7 are clearly Buddhist; though it is difficult to determine their school, the details in the commentary exclude the possibility of their being Sarvāstivādins, to whose theory of the dharmas much of the argument elsewhere would apply. The polemic against the validity of the Naiyāyikā pramāṇas in verses 30-51 is more important, because it raises by its parallelism with Nyāyasūtras, II, i, 8-19, the question, whether Adhyāya ii of that composite work was in existence when Nāgārjuna wrote. The parallelism has already been dealt with by Y in his notes, by Tucci on pp. 34 ff. of the notes on his translation, and by R in his Introduction. Without going into details it may be remarked that Vātsyāyana's bhāṣya clearly has Nāgārjuna's position in mind, but it is not obvious that either Nāgārjuna knew the sūtras or vice versa; till the matter is more fully examined all that can safely be said is that the two works reflect the dispute between the two schools at much the same stage, but not necessarily with reference by one to the other. But one point is certain and that is that Nāgārjuna took some of the Naiyāyika arguments from a different work of that school. For he quotes a verse from it just before kārikā 34, and the Naiyāyikas evidently admitted the validity of his criticisms, since the views put forward in that verse are mentioned by Vātsyāyana only to be rejected as incorrect and are stated by Vācaspati Miśra, Tātparyatikā on II, i, 19, to have been held by an ācāryadeśiya. It appears therefore that the verse in question is quoted from some treatise by this discredited teacher, whose name we are never likely to learn. It also seems doubtful if the Naiyāyika principle quoted in the commentary on verse 31, pramāṇato 'rthānām prasiddhiḥ, is in exact accord with the Sūtras; for the opening words of the bhāṣya on Nyāyasūtras, I, i, 1, appear to have been chosen with great care precisely with the object of evading Nāgārjuna's criticisms.

A B B R E V I A T I O N S

- C *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, Chinese translation, *Chinese Tripiṭaka*, Taisho Issaikyo, XXXII, No. 1631.
- MMK *Mūlamadhyamikakārikās*, ed. LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, Bibl. Buddh. IV.
- R *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, Sanskrit text, ed. Rāhula SĀṆKṚTYĀ-YANA, JBORS, XXIV, III.
- T *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, Tibetan translation in G. TUCCI, *Pre-Diñnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*, Gaekwad's Or. Ser., XLIX.
- Y *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, French translation of the Tibetan translation, by S. YAMAGUCHI, *Journal Asiatique*, CCXV, pp. 1-86.
- e.c. ex conjectura.
- om. omits.

THE VIGRAHAVYĀVARTANĪ

sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate
 svabhāvaścet/
 tvadvacanamasvabhāvaṃ na nivartayit-
 tum svabhāvamalam¹//1//

yadi sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ hetau pratyayeṣu ca hetupratyayasā-
 magryāṃ ca prthak ca² sarvatra svabhāvo na vidyata iti kṛtvā
 śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti³ / na hi bīje hetubhūte 'ñkuro 'sti, na
 prthivyaptejovāyāvādīnāmekaikasmin pratyayasamjñite⁴, na praty-
 yeṣu samagreṣu⁵, na hetupratyayasāmagryāṃ, na hetupratya-
 yavinirmuktaḥ prthageva ca⁶ / yasmādatra sarvatra⁷ svabhāvo
 nāsti tasmānniḥsvabhāvo 'ñkuraḥ / yasmānniḥsvabhāvastasmāc-
 chūnyaḥ⁸ / yathā cāyamañkuro⁹ niḥsvabhāvo niḥsvabhāvatvācca
 śūnyastathā sarvabhāvā api¹⁰ niḥsvabhāvatvācchūnyā iti /

atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ¹¹ / yadyevam, tavāpi¹² vacanaṃ yadetac-
 chūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tadapi śūnyam / kiṃ kāraṇam / tadapi hetau
 nāsti mahābhūteṣu samprayukteṣu viprayukteṣu vā, pratyayeṣu
 nāstyurahrkaṇṭhauṣṭhahijhvādantamūlatālunāsikāmūrdhaprabhṛtiṣu
 yatneṣu¹³, ubhayasāmagryāṃ nāsti¹⁴, hetupratyayavinirmuktaṃ
 prthageva ca¹⁵ nāsti / yasmādatra sarvatra nāsti tasmānniḥsvabhā-

¹ *asvabhāvam*, R.

² R adds *yatra*.

³ T om. *iti*.

⁴ *°samjñeti*, R.

⁵ R adds *na hetupratyayeṣu samagreṣu*.

⁶ *vā*, R.

⁷ R om. *sarvatra*, but cf. similar sentence below. T adds *ayam*.

⁸ T om. *yasmān niḥsvabhāvas*, which C has.

⁹ T om. *ayam*.

¹⁰ R om. *api*.

¹¹ T om. this sentence.

¹² T om. *api*.

¹³ *yan naiva*, R.

¹⁴ R om. *na*.

¹⁵ *vā*, R.

vam / yasmānñiḥsvabhāvaṃ tasmācchūnyam¹ / tasmādanena sarva-
bhāvasvabhāvavyāvartanamaśakyam² kartum³ / na hyasatāgninā⁴
śakyam dagdhum / na hyasatā śastreṇa śakyam chettum / na
hyasatibhiradbhiḥ⁵ śakyam kledayitum / evamasatā vacanena⁶ na
śakyaḥ sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedhaḥ kartum⁷ / tatra yaduktam
sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ pratiṣiddha⁸ iti tanna /

athā sasvabhāva metadvākyam pūrvā⁹
hatā pratijñā te/
vaiśamikatvam tasmīn viśeṣa hetuśca
vaktavyaḥ // 2 //

athāpi manyase mā bhūdeṣa doṣa iti sasvabhāva metadvākyam
sasvabhāvatvāccāśūnyam¹⁰ tasmādanena sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ pra-
tiṣiddha¹¹ iti, atra brūmaḥ / yadyevam, yā te pūrvā¹² pratijñā
śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti hatā sā /

kiṃ cānyat / sarvabhāvāntargataṃ ca tvadvacanam / kasmāc-
chūnyeṣu sarvabhāveṣu tvadvacanamaśūnyam, yenāśūnyatvātsar-
vabhāvasvabhāvaḥ pratiṣiddhaḥ¹³ / evaṃ ṣaṭkoṭiko vādaḥ prasak-
taḥ / sa punaḥ kathamiti / hanta cetpunaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāstena

¹ niḥsvabhāvatvācchūnyam, T.

² T om. *svabhāva*.

³ R adds *kiṃ kāraṇam*, not in C.

⁴ *asadagninā*, R.

⁵ R om. *hi*.

⁶ T adds *api*.

⁷ R adds the gloss *na śakyaḥ sarvabhāvasvabhāvo nivartayitum*.

⁸ R adds *sarvatra bhāvasvabhāvo vinivartate*.

⁹ *śrūtā*, R; C as in text. Y's explanation of *vaiśamikatva* by *viśamavyāpti* is anachronistic; here it means "discordance".

¹⁰ T has *tasmāc* for *sasvabhāvatvāc*.

¹¹ R adds *sarvabhāvasvabhāvo vinivartate*.

¹² R om. *evaṃ yā* and *pūrvā*; C has the latter.

¹³ The three authorities differ hopelessly in this sentence. The text follows R, adding *chūnyeṣu*, which appears in both T and C, and substituting *pratiṣiddhaḥ* for its *svabhāvaprasiddhaḥ*. T has approximately *kasmāt? sarvabhāveṣu śūnyeṣu satsv evam aśūnyatvāt tena sarvabhāvasvabhāvaḥ pratiṣiddha iti tvadvacanam aśūnyam bhavet*. C literally would give *yasmāc chūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ tasmāt tvadvacanam śūnyam, tena śūnyatvāt sarvabhāvapratiṣedho na bhavet*.

tvadvacanam śūnyam sarvabhāvāntargatatvāt ¹ / tena śūnyena
 pratiśedhānupapattiḥ / tatra yaḥ pratiśedhaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā ²
 iti so 'nupapannaḥ / upapannaścetpunāḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti
 pratiśedhastena tvadvacanamapyāśūnyam / āśūnyatvādanena pra-
 tiśedho 'nupapannaḥ ³ / atha śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāstadvadvacanam
 cāśūnyam yena pratiśedhaḥ, tena tvadvacanam sarvatrāsaṃgrhī-
 tam ⁴ / tatra dṛṣṭāntavirodhah / sarvatra cetpunāḥ saṃgrhītam ⁵
 tvadvacanam sarvabhāvāśca śūnyāstena tadapi śūnyam / śūnya-
 tvādanena nāsti pratiśedhaḥ / atha śūnyamasti cānena pratiśedhaḥ
 śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tena śūnyā api sarvabhāvāḥ kāryakriyāsam-
 arthā bhavyeḥ / na caitadiṣṭam / atha śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā na
 ca kāryakriyāsamarthā bhavanti mā bhūd dṛṣṭāntavirodha iti
 kṛtvā, śūnyena tvadvacanena sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratīśedho no-
 papanna iti ⁶ /

kiṃ cānyat / evaṃ tadastitvād⁷ vaiśamikatvaprasaṅgaḥ kiṃ-
 cicchūnyam kiṃcidaśūnyamiti / tasmimśca ⁸ vaiśamikatve viśe-
 ṣaheturvaktavyo yena ⁹ kiṃcicchūnyam kiṃcidaśūnyam syāt / sa
 ca nopadiṣṭo hetuḥ / tatra yaduktam śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tanna /
 kiṃ cānyat /

mā śabdavadityetatsyātte buddhirna
 caitadupapannam /

¹ R adds *tvadvacanasya*.

² *śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā*, R, which omits *so*.

³ The three authorities differ for these two sentences. The text follows C, the argument being that, if the *pratiśedha* is valid, the words expressing it must be non-void, and since they are non-void and are included in all things, the statement that all things are void is not valid. T reads *anupapannas*, *śūnyam* and *śūnyatvāt*, which does not give as good sense. R as in text, but omitting *o* *apy* *āśūnyam* *a*^o.

⁴ T seems to have had *sarvāntarasāṃgrhītam*, which is perhaps better.

⁵ R om. *saṃ*.

⁶ T om. *iti*.

⁷ T has *de skad zer na* for *tadastitvād*, the equivalent of which is not clear; C is no help, and it seems necessary to have something to show that the case contemplated is that in which the statement is non-void.

⁸ T apparently had *sati ca* for *tasmimśca*.

⁹ R adds *hi viśeṣaheturā*.

śabdena hyatra¹ satā bhaviṣyato vāra-
ṇaṁ tasya // 3 //

syātte buddhiḥ², yathā nāma kaścīd brūyānmā śabdaṁ kārṣīriti³
svayāmeva śabdaṁ kuryāttena ca śabdena tasya śabdasya⁴ vyāvar-
tanaṁ kriyeta⁵, evameva śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti śūnyena⁶ vacanena
sarvabhāvasvabhāvasya vyāvartanaṁ kriyata iti / atra vyaṁ
brūmaḥ / etadapyanupapannam / kiṁ kāraṇam⁷ / satā hyatra
śabdena bhaviṣyataḥ śabdasya pratiśedhaḥ kriyate / na punariha⁸
bhavataḥ satā vacanena sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiśedhaḥ kriyate /
tava hi matena vacanamapyasat, sarvabhāvasvabhāvō 'pyasan /
tasmādayaṁ mā śabdavaditi viṣamopanyāsaḥ⁹ /

pratiśedhapratiśedho 'py¹⁰ evamiti ma-
taṁ bhavettadasadeva /
evam tava pratijñā lakṣaṇato dūṣyate
na mama // 4 //

syātte buddhiḥ, pratiśedhapratiśedho 'py¹¹ anenaiva kalpenānu-
papaṇaḥ, tatra yadbhāvān sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiśedhavacanam
pratiśedhayati¹² tad¹³ anupapannamiti / atra vyaṁ brūmaḥ /
etadapyasadeva¹⁴ / kasmāt / tava hi pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptaṁ¹⁵ na

¹ T and R omit *hy*, which is required by the metre and is given by R when the verse is repeated before *kārikā* 25.

² T omits the phrase, but C has it.

³ R repeats *mā śabdaṁ kārṣīr* and omits *svayam eva śabdaṁ kuryāt*; T and C as in text.

⁴ R om. *tasya śabdasya*.

⁵ *kriyate*, R.

⁶ *svabhāvasūnyena*, T.

⁷ T om. *kiṁ kāraṇam*, certified by C.

⁸ T om. *punar*.

⁹ *onyāso 'sann iti*, R, which then adds *kiṁ ca*, not in T or C.

¹⁰ *pratipratiśedhye 'py*, R.

¹¹ *pratiśedhaḥ pratiśedhyo 'py*, R.

¹² T, which is not clear, apparently read *bhavataḥ... vacanapratiśedhavacanam*, omitting *pratiśedhayati*.

¹³ T adds *apy*.

¹⁴ *etadaśabdena sad eva*, R.

¹⁵ *prāpte mataṁ*, R. C, as well as T, omits *matam*.

mama / bhavān bravīti śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti nāham¹ / pūrvakah
pakṣo na mama² / tatra yaduktam pratiṣedhapratiṣedho 'pyevam
satyanupapanna iti³ tanna /
kiṃ cānyat /

pratyakṣeṇa hi tāvadyadyupalabhya vi-
nivartayasi bhāvān/
tannāsti pratyakṣam bhāvā yenopala-
bhyante // 5 //

yadi pratyakṣataḥ sarvabhāvānupalabhya bhavānnivartayati
śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tad⁴anupapannam / kasmāt / pratyakṣamapi
hi pramāṇam sarvabhāvāntargatatvācchūnyam / yo bhāvān⁵upala-
bhate so 'pi śūnyāḥ / tasmāt pratyakṣeṇa⁶ pramāṇena nopalam-
bhabhāvo 'nupalabdhasya ca pratiṣedhānupapattiḥ / tatra yad-
uktam⁷ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tadanupapannam /

syātte buddhiḥ, anumānenāgamenopamānena vā sarvabhā-
vānupalabhya⁸ sarvabhāvavyāvartanam kriyata iti, atra brūmaḥ /

anumānam pratyuktam pratyakṣeṇāga-
mopamāne ca/
anumānāgamasādhya ye 'rthā dṛṣṭānta-
sādhyaśca // 6 //

anumānopamānāgamāśca pratyakṣeṇa pramāṇena pratyuktāḥ
yathā⁹ hi pratyakṣam pramāṇam śūnyam sarvabhāvānām śūnya-
tvādevamanumānopamānāgamā¹⁰ api śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvānām śū-

¹ R adds *tasmāt tvatpratiṣṭhān napayāmi*.

² T omits these two sentences, which C has.

³ *pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyo 'py evam matam iti upapannam iti*, R.

⁴ T adds *api*.

⁵ *yo 'pi sarvabhāvān*, R.

⁶ T om. *pratyakṣeṇa*. This and the previous sentence appear very differently in C, which brings in *anumāna*, apparently confusing it with *upalabdhī*.

⁷ R om. *tatra yad uktam*.

⁸ T om. *sarvabhāvān*, and adds *etat* before *sarvabhāvān*.

⁹ *tathā*, T.

¹⁰ *anumānamopamānāgamā*, R.

nyatvāt / ye¹ 'numānasādhyā arthā āgamasādhyā upamānasādhyāśca
 te 'pi śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvānām śūnyatvāt / anumānopamānāga-
 maiśca yo² bhāvānupalabhate so 'pi śūnyāḥ³ / tasmādbhāvānām-
 upalambhābhāvo 'nupalabdhānām ca svabhāvapratiṣedhānupa-
 pattiḥ / tatra yaduktaṁ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tanna /
 kiṁ cānyat /

kuśalānām dharmānām dharmāvasthāvi-
 daśca manyante /
 kuśalam janāḥ svabhāvam⁴ śeṣeṣv-
 apyeṣa viniyogaḥ // 7 //

iha janā⁵ dharmāvasthāvīdo manyante kuśalānām dharmā-
 nāmekonavimśasatam⁶ / tadyathaikadeśo vijñānasya vedanāyāḥ
 saṁjñāyāścetanāyāḥ sparśasya manasikārasya cchandasyādhimo-
 kṣasya vīryasya smṛteḥ samādheḥ prajñāyā upekṣāyāḥ prayogasya
 saṁprayogasya prāpteradhyāsayasyāpratighasya ratervyavasāya-
 syautsukyasyonmugdherutsāhasyāvighātasya vaśitāyāḥ pratighāta-
 syāvipratīṣāsyā parigrahasyāparigrahasya ... dhṛteradhyavasāya-

¹ R adds *api*.

² R adds *api*.

³ *śūnyāḥ syāt*, R; *syāt* is probably a corruption from *tasmāt*, missing at the beginning of the next sentence.

⁴ *janasvabhā*, R, omitting *vaṁ*.

⁵ R om. *janā*.

⁶ The following list of 119 qualities has been fully discussed in E. H. Johnston's, *Nāgārjuna's List of Kuśala-dharmas*, IHQ, XIV, 314-323, and therefore the full apparatus criticus which was given there is here omitted. The text of R has many corruptions and some omissions, and C gives 107 qualities only, so that the list cannot be restored in its entirety. Probable suggestions cannot be made for the following numbers, 30 (*dran pa*, T, possibly a formation from *smṛ* signifying remorse), 51 (R and T between them suggest something like *ananukūlābhyava-hāratā*), 70 (*vyavakāratā*?), 76 (possibly *middha*, not considered loc. cit., but see on 75 below) and 107 (*ṛddhi* or an equivalent word). The following restorations are uncertain in varying degrees, 22 (*unmugdhi*) a word not otherwise known, 26 (*pratighāta*), 28 and 29 (*parigraha* and *aparigraha*), 34 (*anunmugdhi*, cf. on 22), 71 (*dākṣya*), 75 (possibly *upayāsa* only, the rest of the word going to 76, for which see above), 80 (*adhyātmasaṁprasāda*), 102 (*manana*) and 106 (*araṇā*). The first 81 qualities are in the genitive after *ekadeśa*, because they are *kuśala* in certain aspects only, not in all.

syānautsukyasyānunmugdheranutsāhasya prārthanāyāḥ praṇidhermadasya viṣayāṇāṃ viprayogasyānairyāṇikatāyā utpādasya sthiteranīyatāyāḥ samanvāgamasya jarāyāḥ paritāpasyāratervitarkasya prīteḥ prasādasya ... premṇaḥ pratikūlasya pradakṣiṇagrāhasya vaiśāradyasya gauravasya citrikārasya bhakterabhakteḥ śuśrūṣāyā ādarasyānādarasya praśrabdherhāsasya vācṣ vispandanāyāḥ siddhasyāprasādasyāpraśrabdheḥ ... dākṣyasya sauratyasya vipratīsārasya śokasyopāyāsāyāsasya ... apradakṣiṇagrāhasya saṃśayasya saṃvarāṇāṃ pariśuddheradhyātmasaṃprasādasya bhīrutāyāḥ, śra ddhā hrīrārjavamavañcanamupaśamo 'cāpalamapramādo mārda-vaṃ pratisaṃkhyānaṃ nirvairaparidāhāvamado 'lobho 'doṣo 'mohaḥ sarvajñatāpratiniḥsargo vibhavo 'patrāpyamapricchada-naṃ mananaṃ kāruṇyaṃ maitryadīnatāraṇā ... anupanāho 'nīrṣyā cetaso 'paryādānaṃ kṣāntirvyavasargo 'sauratyāṃ paribhogānvayaḥ puṇyamasamjñīsamāpattirnairyāṇikatāsarvajñatāsamskṛtā dharmā ityekonaviṃśasātaṃ kuśālānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ ¹ kuśalaḥ svabhāvaḥ.

tathākuśālānāṃ dharmāṇāmakuśalaḥ ² svabhāvaḥ, nivṛtāvyākṛtānāṃ ³ nivṛtāvyākṛtaḥ ⁴, prakṛtāvyākṛtānāṃ prakṛtāvyākṛtaḥ ⁵, kāmoktānāṃ kāmoktaḥ, rūpoktānāṃ rūpoktaḥ, ārūpyoktānām-ārūpyoktaḥ, anāsravāṇāmanāsravaḥ, duḥkhasamudayanīrodhamārgoktānāṃ duḥkhasamudayanīrodhamārgoktaḥ ⁶, bhāvanāprahātavyānāṃ bhāvanāprahātavyaḥ, aprahātavyānāmaprahātavyaḥ ⁷ / yasmādevamanekaprakāro dharmaḥsvabhāvo dṛṣṭastasmādyaduk-taṃ ⁸ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvācchūnyā iti tanna / kiṃ cānyat /

¹ R om. *dharmāṇāṃ*; ² *śatasya* would be better.

² R om. *dharmāṇāṃ*.

³ R om. *nivṛtāvyākṛtānāṃ*.

⁴ T adds *svabhāvaḥ*, which C omits.

⁵ *anivṛtāvyākṛtānāṃ anivṛtāvyākṛtaḥ svabhāvaḥ*, T; but C supports R, suggesting however *prakṛtya* or *prākṛtā*. The category cannot be recognized.

⁶ R gives these four separately, *duḥkhoktānāṃ duḥkhoktaḥ* etc., against C and T.

⁷ C om. *aprahātavyānāṃ aprahātavyaḥ*, and R adds *prahātavyānāṃ prahāta-vyaḥ*.

⁸ R adds *iha* after *tasmā*.

nairyāṇikasvabhāvo dharmā¹ nairyāṇi-
kāśca ye teṣāṃ/
dharmāvasthoktānāmevamanairyāṇikādī-
nām² // 8 //

iha ca dharmāvasthoktānām³ nairyāṇikānām dharmānām nairyā-
ṇikaḥ svabhāvaḥ, anairyāṇikānāmanairyāṇikaḥ⁴, bodhyaṅgikānām
bodhyaṅgikaḥ, abodhyaṅgikānāmbodhyaṅgikaḥ, bodhipakṣikā-
nām⁵ bodhipakṣikaḥ, abodhipakṣikānāmbodhipakṣikaḥ / eva-
māpi⁶ śeṣānām / tadyasmād⁷evamanekaprakāro dharmānām sva-
bhāvo dṛṣṭastasmād⁸yadyuktam niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā niḥsva-
bhāvatvācchūnyā iti tanna /

kiṃ cānyat /

yadi ca na bhavetsvabhāvo dharmānām
niḥsvabhāva ityeva⁹ /
nāmāpi bhavennaivam nāma hi¹⁰ nir-
vastukam nāsti // 9 //

yadi sarvadharmānām svabhāvo na bhavettatrāpi niḥsvabhāvo
bhavet / tatra niḥsvabhāva ityevam nāmāpi na bhavet / kasmāt /
nāma hi nirvastukam kiṃcidapi nāsti / tasmānnāmasadbhāvātstva-
bhāvo bhāvānāmasti svabhāvasadbhāvāccāśūnyāḥ¹¹ sarvabhāvāḥ /
tasmādyaduktam¹² niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvācchū-
nyā iti tanna /

¹ dharmo, R.

² eva ca nair^o, R; C also shows *evam*.

³ dharmo 'vastho', R; C omits the entire compound.

⁴ T adds *svabhāvaḥ*, and C adds the same word after each item.

⁵ R's *bodhipakṣika* is contrary to Buddhist usage.

⁶ R om. *api*.

⁷ *tasmād*, T, for *tad yasmād*.

⁸ *yasmād*, R.

⁹ *ity evam*, R.

¹⁰ *nāmāpi*, R, against the metre; cf. the repetition of the verse before *kārikā* 57.

¹¹ R omits most of this passage from the beginning of the commentary up to here, probably passing from the first *svabhāvo* to the second; it runs: *yadi dharmā-
nām svabhāvo bhāvānām svabhāvānām sabbhāvāc cāśūnyāḥ*. This is restored
from T, and C agrees in sense.

¹² *tatra yad uktam*, R.

kiṃ cānyat /

atha vidyate svabhāvaḥ sa ca dhar-
māṇāṃ na vidyate tasmāt/
dharmaīrvinā svabhāvāḥ sa yasya¹ tad-
yuktamupadeṣṭum // 10 //

atha manyase mā bhūdavastukaṃ nāmeti kṛtvāsti svabhāvaḥ,
sa punardharmāṇāṃ² na sambhavati, evaṃ dharmasūnyatā
niḥsvabhāvatvāddharmāṇāṃ siddhā³ bhaviṣyati, na ca nirvastukaṃ
nāmeti, atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ / evaṃ yasyedānīm⁴ sa svabhāvo
dharmavinirmuktasyārthasya sa⁵ yuktamupadeṣṭumarthaḥ / sa ca
nopadiṣṭaḥ / tasmādyā kalpanāsti svabhāvo na sa⁶ punardhar-
māṇāmiti sā hīnā /

kiṃ cānyat /

sata eva pratiṣedho nāsti ghaṭo geḥa
ityayaṃ yasmāt/
dṛṣṭaḥ pratiṣedho 'yaṃ sataḥ svabhā-
vasya te tasmāt // 11 //

iha ca sato 'rthasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate nāsataḥ / tadyathā nāsti
ghaṭo geḥa iti sato ghaṭasya pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate nāsataḥ / evameva
nāsti svabhāvo⁷ dharmāṇāmiti sataḥ svabhāvasya pratiṣedhaḥ
prāpnoti nāsataḥ / tatra yaduktam niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā⁸ iti
tanna / pratiṣedhasambhavādeva sarvabhāvasvabhāvo 'pratiṣid-
dhaḥ⁹ /

kiṃ cānyat /

¹ yaryāsti, R, against the metre; cf. the repetition of the verse before kārīkā 60.

² sarvadharmāṇāṃ, T.

³ niḥsvabhāvatvam and siddham, R.

⁴ kasyedānīm, R.

⁵ tatra, R, for sa.

⁶ R om. sa.

⁷ R om. svā.

⁸ R adds niḥsvabhāvatvāc chūnyā, not in C or T.

⁹ *svabhāvāḥ prasiddhaḥ, T; C's equivalent is not clear, but it certainly did not have prasiddhaḥ.

atha nāsti sa svabhāvaḥ kiṃ nu prati-
 ṣidhyate tvayānena/
 vacanenarte vacanātpatiṣedhaḥ sidhy-
 ate hyasataḥ // 12 //

atha nāstyeva sa svabhāvo¹ 'nena vacanena niḥsvabhāvāḥ²
 sarvabhāvā³ iti kiṃ bhavatā pratiṣidhyate / asato hi⁴ vacanādvina⁵
 siddhaḥ patiṣedhaḥ, tadyathāgneḥ śaityasya, apāmauṣṇyasya /
 kiṃ cānyat /

bālānāmiva mithyā mṛgatṛṣṇāyām yathā-
 jalagrāhaḥ⁶ /
 evaṃ mithyāgrāhaḥ syātte patiṣedhy-
 ato⁷ hyasataḥ // 13 //

syātte buddhiḥ, yathā bālānām mṛgatṛṣṇāyām mithyā jalamiti
 grāho bhavati, nanu⁸ nirjalā sā mṛgatṛṣṇeti tatra paṇḍitajātīyena
 puruṣeṇocyate tasya grāhasya⁹ vinivartanārtham, evaṃ niḥsva-
 bhāveṣu yaḥ svabhāve grāhaḥ¹⁰ sattvānām tasya vyāvartanārtham
 niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ityucyata iti¹¹, atra brūmaḥ /

nanvevaṃ satyasti grāho grāhyam ca
 tadgrahītā¹² ca/
 patiṣedhaḥ patiṣedhyam patiṣeddhā
 ceti ṣaṭkaṃ tat // 14 //

¹ R om. *atha* and *sa* and adds *iti* after *svabhāvo*.

² T om. *svabhāvāḥ*, possibly owing to a misprint.

³ R om. *sarva*.

⁴ T has *evam* for *hi*.

⁵ *vināpi*, T.

⁶ In view of the commentary on verse 66, *yathājālagrāhaḥ* must be a compound here.

⁷ *pratiṣidhyato*, R. Translate according to the common use of *-tas*, "Thus would be your misconception of the non-existing as something that can be refuted."

⁸ T om. *nanu*.

⁹ *mithyāgrāhasya*, R.

¹⁰ Should the reading be *svabhāvagrāhaḥ*?

¹¹ T om. *ucyata iti*, which is given also by C.

¹² *tadgrahītaṃ*, R.

yadyevaṃ¹, asti tāvatsattvānām grāhaḥ², asti grāhyam, santi
 ca tadgrahītāraḥ³, asti pratiṣedhastasyāpi mithyāgrāhasya, asti
 pratiṣedhyam yadidaṃ⁴ mithyāgrāho⁵ nāma, santi ca⁶ pratiṣed-
 dhāro yuṣmadādayo 'sya grāhasyeti'⁷ siddham ṣaṭkam / tasya
 ṣaṭkasya prasiddhatvād⁸yaduktam śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tanna /

atha naivāsti grāho naiva⁹ grāhyam
 na ca grahītāraḥ /
 pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyam pratiṣeddhāro
 nanu¹⁰ na santi // 15 //

atha mā bhūdeṣa doṣa iti kṛtvā naiva grāho 'sti naiva grāhyam
 na ca grahītāra ityevaṃ sati grāhasya yaḥ¹¹ pratiṣedho niḥsvabhāvāḥ
 sarvabhāvā iti so 'pi nāsti, pratiṣedhyamapi nāsti, pratiṣeddhāro
 'pi na santi /

pratiṣedhaḥ pratiṣedhyam pratiṣeddhā-
 raśca yadyuta na santi /
 siddhā hi sarvabhāvāsteṣāmeva¹² sva-
 bhāvaśca // 16 //

yadi ca na pratiṣedho na pratiṣedhyam na pratiṣeddhāraḥ
 santyapratīṣiddhāḥ sarvabhāvā asti ca sarvabhāvānām¹³ svabhāvāḥ /
 kiṃ cānyat /

¹ R adds *namu eva saty*.

² *mithyāgrāhaḥ*, R; *grāho* 'pi, T.

³ *santi satvā grahītāraḥ*, R.

⁴ T om. *yad* and adds *api*.

⁵ *grāhyam*, R.

⁶ R om. *ca*.

⁷ *mithyāgrāhasyeti*, R.

⁸ *ṣaṭkasyāpy aprasiddhatvāt*, R, omitting *tasya*; *aprasiddhatvād*, T; C shows
 °*siddha*.

⁹ *na ca*, R, against the metre; cf. the commentary.

¹⁰ e.c.: *rya tu*, R, which C and T omit.

¹¹ R om. *yaḥ*.

¹² *yeṣāṃ evaṃ*, R.

¹³ T om. *sarva*, which C has.

hetośca te¹ na siddhirnaiḥsvābhāvyāt²
kuto hi te hetuḥ/
nirhetukasya siddhirna copapannāsyā te
'rthasya // 17 //

niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ityetasminnarthe te hetorasiddhiḥ /
kiṃ kāraṇam / niḥsvabhāvatvāddhi sarvabhāvānām śūnyatvāttato³
hetuḥ kutaḥ / asati hetau nirhetukasyārthasya śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā
iti kuta eva prasiddhiḥ / tatra yaduktaṃ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti
tanna /

kiṃ cānyat /

yadi cāhetuḥ siddhiḥ svabhāvavinivartanasya te bhavati/
svābhāvyasyāstitvaṃ mamāpi nirhetukam siddham // 18 //

atha manyase nirhetukī⁴ siddhirniḥsvabhāvatvasya bhāvānāmiti
yathā tava svabhāvavinivartanaṃ⁵ nirhetukaṃ siddhaṃ tathā
mamāpi svabhāvasadbhāvo⁶ nirhetukaḥ siddhaḥ⁷ /

atha hetorastitvaṃ bhāvāsvābhāvyam⁸ -
ityanupapannam /
lokeṣu niḥsvabhāvo⁹ na hi kaścana
vidyate bhāvāḥ // 19 //

¹ *hetos tato*, R; cf. the repetition of the verse before kārikā 68.

² *naiḥsvābhāvyā* is an odd form; the length of the second syllable is guaranteed by the metre. In the four occurrences in MMK, the text has *naiḥsvābhāvyā* twice, and *naiḥsvabhāvyā* twice, but none of them occur in a verse.

³ *śūnyatvān na tato*, R, which omits *kutaḥ*, but C as well as T has *kutaḥ*.

⁴ *nairhetukī*, R; T adds *tatra*.

⁵ R om. *vi*, but cf. the kārikā.

⁶ R adds '*pi*'.

⁷ T adds a gloss, *mamāpīti mamāsti*.

⁸ *bhāvanaiḥsvabhāvyam*, R, against the metre.

⁹ *loke naiḥsvabhāvyāt*, R, but T and the commentary show *niḥsvabhāvo*; *lokeṣu* is uncertain, as T does not show the plural, and perhaps therefore *loke* '*pi*'.

yadi hetorastitvaṃ manyase¹ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti,
tadanupapannam / kiṃ kāraṇam / na hi loka niḥsvabhāvāḥ kaścīd-
bhāvo 'sti /

kiṃ cānyat /

pūrvam cetpratiśedhaḥ paścātpratiśe-
dhyamityanupapannam²

paścāccānupapanno³ yugapacca yataḥ
svabhāvāḥ san⁴ // 20 //

iha pūrvam cetpratiśedhaḥ paścacca pratiśedhyamiti⁵ nopapannam / asati. hi pratiśedhye kasya pratiśedhaḥ / atha paścātpratiśedhaḥ pūrvam pratiśedhyamiti ca⁶ nopapannam / siddhe hi pratiśedhye kiṃ pratiśedhaḥ karoti / atha yugapatpratiśedha-
pratiśedhya iti⁷ tathāpi na pratiśedhaḥ pratiśedhyasyārthasya kāraṇam⁸, pratiśedhyo na pratiśedhasya ca, yathā yugapadutpannayoh śaśaviśāyayornaiva⁹ dakṣiṇam savyasya kāraṇam savyam vā dakṣiṇasya kāraṇam bhavatīti¹⁰ / tatra yaduktam niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tanna /

¹ This sentence may not be in order; it would improve it to put *manyase* before *hetor* and add *ca* after *niḥsvabhāvāḥ*. R inserts *iha* at the beginning, and C seems to have had *niḥsvabhāvāḥ* before *hetor*. T is ambiguous, but probably had *bhāvānām niḥsvabhāvānām eva* (or possibly in the locative) before *hetor* and also *eva* after *astitvam*. The argument is that "if you suppose that the cause exists in reality and that all things (which include the cause) are without essence (so that the cause is at the same time really existent and without essence), that argument is not valid."

² *iti ca nopapannam*, R, against the metre and the reading in the repetition before *kārikā* 69.

³ R om. *ccā*, but see the repetition.

⁴ *svabhāvo 'san*, R and T; but C's reading followed above is unquestionably correct as giving the opponent's final conclusion. *Yataḥ* here means "and therefore", a common use at the close of a verse.

⁵ R adds *niḥsvabhāvayam* and T *niḥsvabhāvam* before *iti*, an obvious interpolation which C omits.

⁶ T om. *ca*.

⁷ T om. *iti*.

⁸ R adds *prati na*.

⁹ C omits *śaśa*, possibly rightly, as the argument applies equally well to real horns.

¹⁰ T om. *iti*.

atrocyate / yattāvadbhavatoktaṃ
sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ sarvatra na vidyate svabhāvaścet /
tvadvacanamasvabhāvaṃ na nivartayitum svabhāvamalamiti //
atra brūmaḥ /

hetupratyayasāmagryāṃ ca pṛthag kāpi¹
madvaco na yadi/
nanu śūnyatvaṃ siddhaṃ bhāvānām-
asvabhāvatvāt // 21 //

yadi madvaco hetau nāsti mahābhūteṣu² samprayukteṣu vipra-
yukteṣu vā³, pratyayeṣu nāstyuraḥkaṇṭhauṣṭhajihvādantamūlatālu⁴-
nāsikāmūrdhnaprabhṛtiṣu yatneṣu, nobhayasāmagryāmasti⁵, hetu-
pratyayasāmagrīvinirmuktaṃ pṛthageva ca nāsti⁶, tasmānniḥsva-
bhāvaṃ⁷, niḥsvabhāvatvācchūnyam / nanu⁸ śūnyatvaṃ siddhaṃ
niḥsvabhāvatvādasya madiyavacasaḥ / yathā caitanmadvacanāṃ
niḥsvabhāvatvācchūnyam tathā sarvabhāvā api⁹ niḥsvabhāva-
tvācchūnyā¹⁰ iti / tatra¹¹ yadbhavatoktaṃ tvadiyavacasaḥ śūnya-
tvācchūnyatā sarvabhāvānām nopapadyata iti tanna /

kiṃ cānyat /

yaśca pratītyabhāvo bhāvānāṃ śūnyateti
sā proktā¹² /

yaśca¹³ pratītyabhāvo bhavati hi tasya-
asvabhāvatvam // 22 //

¹ R omits the first *ca*, then reads *pṛthagbhāve* 'pi against the metre.

² *he nāsti mātoḥābhūteṣu*, R.

³ *vāpi*, T.

⁴ *kaṇṭhojihvādantatālu*, R.

⁵ R om. *yatneṣu nobhayasā*.

⁶ *pṛthag vāsti*, R.

⁷ *abhāva*, R.

⁸ R adds *evam* before *namu*.

⁹ R om. *api*.

¹⁰ *chūnyam*, R.

¹¹ R om. *tatra*.

¹² R om. *bhāvo* and *sā proktā*; the restoration of the last word (*brjod*, T) is not certain.

¹³ R om. *yaśca*.

śūnyatārthaṃ ca bhavān¹ bhāvānāmanavasāya pravṛtta upālam-
bhaṃ vaktuṃ tvadvacanasya niḥsvabhāvatvādbhāvānām² svabhā-
vapratīṣedho nopapadyata iti / iha hi yaḥ pratītyabhāvo bhāvānām³
sā śūnyatā / kasmāt / niḥsvabhāvatvāt / ye hi pratītyasamutpannā
bhāvās te na sasvabhāvā bhavanti svabhāvābhāvāt / kasmāt⁴ /
hetupratyayasāpekṣatvāt⁵ / yadi hi svabhāvatvato bhāvā bhaveyuh,
pratītyakhyāyāpi hetupratyayaṃ ca⁶ bhaveyuh / na caivaṃ bhavanti /
tasmānniḥsvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvācchūnyā ityabhidhīyante / evaṃ
madīyamapi vacanaṃ pratītyasamutpannatvānniḥsvabhāvaṃ⁷
niḥsvabhāvatvācchūnyamityupapannam / yathā ca pratītyasamut-
pannatvāt svabhāvasūnyā api⁸ rathapaṭaḥṭādayaḥ sveṣu sveṣu
kāryeṣu kṣāṭhatṛṇamṛttikāharaṇe madhūdakapayasāṃ dhāraṇe śīta-
vātātāpāparitrāṇaprabhṛtiṣu vartante⁹, evamidam¹⁰ madīyavacanam
pratītyasamutpannatvān¹¹ niḥsvabhāvamapi¹² niḥsvabhāvatvaprasā-
dhane bhāvānām¹³ vartate / tatra yaduktaṃ niḥsvabhāvatvāt
tvadiyavacanasya śūnyatvaṃ, śūnyatvāttasya ca tena¹⁴ sarvabhā-
vasvabhāvapratīṣedho nopapanna iti tanna /

¹ *bhāvān*, R.

² The text is uncertain; it seems correct to follow T as reproducing the wording of *kārikā* 1. R reads *tvadvacanasya śūnyatvāt tvadvacanasya niḥsvabhāvatvād evaṃ tvadvacanena niḥsvabhāvena bhāvānām*. C suggests an original *tvadvacanam śūnyam niḥsvabhāvatvāt, tena niḥsvabhāvena bhāvānām*, which finds some confirmation in the last sentence of the commentary on this verse.

³ R reads *pratītya bhāvānām bhāvāḥ*.

⁴ *tasmāt*, R; C om. *kasmāt*.

⁵ *°pratyayasāpekṣa*, R.

⁶ Should *ca* be omitted?

⁷ *°samutpannam tasmān niḥsvabhāvam*, T.

⁸ R om. *api*.

⁹ For the restoration of this sentence it is advisable to follow C, which gives the text, except that it appears to read *°prabhṛtiparitrāṇe*. T om. *ratha, kṣāṭha-ṭṛṇamṛttikā* and *prabhṛtiṣu*. R has *kṣāṭhāṇamṛttikāharaṇam ... dhāraṇam*. Better perhaps *rathaghaṭapaṭādayaḥ*, as suggested by T and the order of the following locatives.

¹⁰ T om. *idam*, substituting probably *api*.

¹¹ *pratyayasamut*, R.

¹² R om. *api*.

¹³ *sādhanaṃ pratyayabhāvānām*, R.

¹⁴ T om. *śūnyatvaṃ śūnyatvāt tasya ca tena*, but C apparently had the text also.

kiṃ cānyat /

nirmitako nirmitakaṃ māyāpuruṣaḥ sva-
māyayā sṛṣṭam /
pratiṣedhayeta¹ yadvat pratiṣedho 'yaṃ
tathaiva syāt // 23 //

yathā nirmitakaḥ puruṣo 'nyam nirmitakaṃ puruṣam kas-
miṃścidarthe vartamānaṃ² pratiṣedhayet, māyākāreṇa vā sṛṣṭo
māyāpuruṣo 'nyam māyāpuruṣam svamāyayā sṛṣṭam³ kasmiṃścid-
arthe vartamānaṃ pratiṣedhayet, tatra yo nirmitakaḥ puruṣaḥ
pratiṣidhyate so 'pi⁴ śūnyaḥ / yaḥ pratiṣedhayati so 'pi śūnyaḥ⁵ /
yo māyāpuruṣaḥ pratiṣidhyate so 'pi śūnyaḥ / yaḥ pratiṣedhayati
so 'pi⁶ śūnyaḥ / evameva madvacanena śūnyenāpi⁷ sarvabhāvā-
nām svabhāvapratiṣedha upapannaḥ / tatra yadbhavatoktaṃ⁸
śūnyatvāttvadvacanasya sarvabhāvasvabhāvapratiṣedho nopapanna
iti tanna / tatra yo bhavatā⁹ śatkoṭiko vāda uktaḥ so 'pi tenaiva¹⁰
pratiṣiddhaḥ / naiva hyevaṃ sati na sarvabhāvāntargataṃ madva-
canaṃ, nāstyāśūnyam¹¹, nāpi sarvabhāvāśūnyaḥ¹² /

yatpunarbhavatoktaṃ

atha sasvabhāvametaadvākyam pūrvā hatā pratijñā te /

vaiśamikatvaṃ tasmin viśeṣahetuśca vaktavya iti //

¹ *pratiṣedhayate*, R; but grammar and the commentary require the optative. For the verse cf. MMK, xvii, 31, 32.

² So T, adding the necessary *anyam* from C. R has *yathā nirmitakaḥ puruṣam abhyāsataṃ tu kaścid arthena vartamānaṃ*.

³ T omits *svamāyayā sṛṣṭam*, which should be quoted here from the verse; it is probably the phrase underlying R's reading, *māyāpuruṣa samanyāva tan na*. C omits the phrase both in the verse and here.

⁴ R om. *api*.

⁵ R om. *śūnyaḥ / yo*.

⁶ R om. *pratiṣidhyate so 'pi śūnyaḥ / yaḥ pratiṣedhayati so 'pi*.

⁷ R om. *api*.

⁸ T om. *bhavatā*.

⁹ R om. *tatra yo bhavatā*.

¹⁰ *sa evaṃ*, R.

¹¹ *nāsti śūnyam*, R.

¹² *śūnyaḥ*, R.

atrāpi brūmaḥ /

na svābhāvikametadvākyam tasmānna
vādahānirme /

nāsti ca vaiṣamikatvaṃ viśeṣahetuśca
na nigadyaḥ // 24 //

na tāvanmamaitadvacanam¹ pratītyasamutpannatvāt svabhāvopapannam / yathā pūrvamuktaṃ svabhāvānupapannatvācchūnyam-
iti² / yasmāccedamapi madvacanam sūnyam śeṣā api sarva-
bhāvāḥ³ sūnyāḥ, tasmānnāsti vaiṣamikatvaṃ / yadi hi vayaṃ
brūma idam vacanamaśūnyam śeṣāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ sūnyā iti tato
vaiṣamikatvaṃ syāt⁴ / na caitadevam / tasmānna vaiṣamikatvaṃ /
yasmācca vaiṣamikatvaṃ na sambhavatīdam vacanamaśūnyam
śeṣāḥ punaḥ⁵ sarvabhāvāḥ sūnyā iti, tasmādasmbhīrviśeṣahe-
turna⁶ vaktavyo 'nena hetunedam⁷ vacanamaśūnyam sarva-
bhāvāḥ punaḥ⁸ sūnyā iti / tatra yadbhavatoktaṃ⁹ vādahāniste
vaiṣamikatvaṃ ca viśeṣahetuśca tvayā vaktavya iti tanna /

yatpunarbhavatoktaṃ¹⁰

mā śabdavadityetatsyātte buddhirna caitadupapannam /
śabdena hyatra satā bhaviṣyato vāraṇam tasyeti //

atra brūmaḥ /

mā śabdavaditi nāyam dṛṣṭānto yastvayā
samārabdhaḥ /

śabdena¹¹ tacca śabdasya vāraṇam nai-
vamevaitat¹² // 25 //

¹ R om. *etad*; possibly *na tāvad etan madvacanam*.

² R om. *iti*.

³ T om. *sarva*, but has it in the next sentence.

⁴ T adds *api*.

⁵ T om. *punaḥ*.

⁶ T om. *viśeṣa*.

⁷ R om. *hetunā*.

⁸ T om. *punaḥ*.

⁹ T om. *bhavatā*.

¹⁰ T om. *bhavatā*.

¹¹ R adds *hi* against the metre; alternatively read *śabdena hi tac chabdasya*.

¹² *naiṣa me vacaḥ*, R.

nāpyayamasamākāṃ dr̥ṣṭāntaḥ / yathā kaścīnmā śabdaṃ kārṣīriti
 bruvaṇ śabdameva karoti śabdaṃ ca pratiśedhayati, tadvat tacchū-
 nyaṃ vacanaṃ na ¹ śūnyatām pratiśedhayati / kiṃ kāraṇam / atra
 hi dr̥ṣṭānte śabdena śabdasya vyāvartanaṃ kriyate / na caitadevaṃ /
 vayaṃ brūmo niḥsvabhāvāḥ ^{v3} sarvabhāvā niḥsvabhāvatvācchūnyā
 iti ² / kiṃ kāraṇam /

naiḥsvābhāvvyānām cennaiḥsvābhāvvyena ³
 vāraṇam yadi hi/
 naiḥsvābhāvyanivṛttau svābhāvyaṃ hi
 prasiddham syāt // 26 //

yathā mā śabdaṃ kārṣīriti ⁴ śabdena śabdasya vyāvartanaṃ
 kriyate, evaṃ yadi naiḥsvābhāvvyena vacanena naiḥsvābhāvvyānām
 bhāvānām ⁵ vyāvartanaṃ kriyate tato 'yaṃ dr̥ṣṭānta upapannaḥ
 syāt / iha tu naiḥsvābhāvvyena vacanena bhāvānām svabhāva-
 pratiśedhaḥ kriyate / yadi ⁶ naiḥsvābhāvvyena vacanena bhāvānām ⁷
 naiḥsvābhāvvyapratīśedhaḥ kriyate naiḥsvābhāvvyapratīśiddhatvā-
 eva ⁸ bhāvāḥ ⁹ sasvabhāvā bhavyeḥ / sasvabhāvatvādaśūnyāḥ
 syuḥ / śūnyatām ca vayaṃ bhāvānāmācakṣmahe nāśūnyatāmity-
 adr̥ṣṭānta evāyamiti ¹⁰ /

athavā nirmītakāyāṃ yathā striyāṃ
 striyamityasadgrāham ¹¹ /

¹ So T, supplying *de* before *ltar* in Tucci's text, as Y's translation shows he had it; *yadvat śūnyena vacanena*, R.

² *tvāt tad aśūnyam iti*, R.

³ Here and several times more in this passages R has *naiḥsvabhāvya*.

⁴ R om. *kārṣīr*.

⁵ R om. *bhāvānām*.

⁶ R inserts *evaṃ* before *yadi*.

⁷ *niḥsvabhāvānām*, R.

⁸ So T clearly; *pratiśedhād eva*, R.

⁹ R om. *bhāvāḥ*.

¹⁰ T omits *iti* in both occurrences here.

¹¹ e.c.: *striyam*, R; T om. *iyam*. R misprints *asagrāham*; similarly in the commentary.

nīrmitakāḥ pratihanyāt¹ kasyacidevaṃ
bhavedetat // 27 //

athavā yathā² kasyacitpuruṣasya nīrmitakāyāṇ. striyāṃ svabhā-
vaśūnyāyāṃ paramārthataḥ striyāḥ³ yasadgrāhaḥ⁴ syāt, evaṃ⁵
tasyāṃ tenāsadgrāheṇa sa⁶ rāgamutpādayet /⁷ tathāgatena vā
tathāgataśrāvakeṇa⁸ vā nīrmitako nīrmitaḥ syāt / tathāgatā-
dhiṣṭhānena vā tathāgataśrāvakādhiṣṭhānena vā⁹ sa¹⁰ tasya tama-
sadgrāhaṃ vinivartayet / evameva nīrmitakopamena śūnyena
madvacanena¹¹ nīrmitakatrīsadrīṣeṣu¹² sarvabhāveṣu niḥsvabhāveṣu
yo 'yaṃ svabhāvagrāhaḥ sa¹³ nivartyate / tasmādayamatra drṣṭāntaḥ
śūnyatāprasādhanam pratyupapadyamāno¹⁴ netaraḥ /

athavā sādhyasamo 'yaṃ heturna hi
vidyate dhvaneḥ sattā/
saṃvyavahāraṃ ca vayaṃ nānabhyupa-
gamyā kathayāmaḥ // 28 //

mā śabdavaditi sādhyasama evāyaṃ hetuḥ / kasmāt / sarva-
bhāvānāṃ naiḥsvabhāvyenāvisiṣṭatvāt¹⁵ / na hi tasya dhvaneḥ
pratītyasamutpannatvāt svabhāvasattā vidyate / tasyāḥ¹⁶ svabhā-
vasattāyā avidyamānatvādyaduktam

śabdena hyatra satā bhaviṣyato vāraṇam tasyeti tadvyāhanyate /

¹ C omits *nīrmitakāḥ pratihanyāt* in translating the verse.

² R om. *yathā*.

³ *striyam*, R.

⁴ T om. *evam*.

⁵ R om. *sa*.

⁶ R inserts *tad yathā*.

⁷ *tacchrāvakeṇa*, R, but C supports T.

⁸ T omits the reference to *adhiṣṭhāna*, but C has it.

⁹ R om. *sa*.

¹⁰ R om. *mad*.

¹¹ *śādrīyeṣu*, R, which omits *sarvabhāveṣu*.

¹² T om. *ayam* and *sa*. R adds the gloss, *sa pratiṣidhyate*.

¹³ *upapadyamāno* is odd, but occurs again at the end of the commentary on the next verse.

¹⁴ *naiḥsvabhāvyenā*, R.

¹⁵ T om. *tasyāḥ* and has *evam* or *tathā* instead.

api ca na vyaṃ vyavahārasatyamanabhyupagamyā vyavahāra-
 satyaṃ ¹ pratyākhyāya kathayāmaḥ śūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti / na hi
 vyavahārasatyamanāgamyā śakyā dharmadeśanā kartum / yathoktaṃ
 vyavahāramanāśritya paramārtho na deśyate /
 paramārthamanāgamyā nirvāṇaṃ nādhigamyata iti ² //
 tasmānmadvacanavacchūnyāḥ sarvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ ca
 niḥsvabhāvatvamubhayathopapadyamānamiti /
 yatpunarbhavatoktaṃ
 pratiśedhapratiśedho ³ 'pyevamiti mataṃ bhavet tadasadeva
 evaṃ tava pratijñā lakṣaṇato dūṣyate na mameti //
 atra brūmaḥ /

yadi kācana pratijñā syānme tata eṣa ⁴
 me bhaveddoṣaḥ /
 nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmānnaivāsti
 me doṣaḥ // 29 //

yadi ca kācinmama pratijñā syāt tato mama pratijñālakṣaṇa-
 prāptatvātpūrvako ⁵ doṣo yathā tvayoktastathā ⁶ mama syāt / na
 mama kācidasti pratijñā / tasmāt sarvabhāveṣu śūnyeṣvatyantopa-
 śānteṣu prakṛtīvivikteṣu kutaḥ pratijñā ⁷ / kutaḥ pratijñāla-
 kṣaṇaprāptiḥ ⁸ / kutaḥ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptikṛto ⁹ doṣaḥ / tatra
 yadbhavatoktaṃ ¹⁰ tava ¹¹ pratijñālakṣaṇaprāptatvāttavaiva doṣa
 iti tanna /

¹ T om. *vyavahārasatyam*, which C has as well as R. R transposes *anabhyu-*
pagamyā and *pratyākhyāya*.

² This verse is *MMK*, xxiv, 10.

³ *pratiśedhaḥ pratiśedho*, R.

⁴ *tatra syāt eṣa*, R; the verse is quoted *MMK*, p. 16, where the editor reads *eva*
 against the MSS.

⁵ R inserts *sa* before *pūrvako*; T may have read *pūrvamāgamo*.

⁶ *tvayoktaṃ bhāvāḥ tathā*, R. T om. *mama*.

⁷ R om. *kutaḥ pratijñā*.

⁸ T om. *prāptiḥ*, which is shown by C, and it adds *api*.

⁹ T seems to have had *lakṣaṇasambhavaś ca*. Would *akṛte* be better?

¹⁰ T om. *bhavatā*.

¹¹ R om. *tava*.

yatpunarbhavatoktaṃ

pratyakṣeṇa hi tāvadyadyupalabhya vinivartayasi ¹ bhāvān /

tannāsti pratyakṣaṃ bhāvā yenopalabhyante //

anumānaṃ pratyuktaṃ pratyakṣeṇāgamopamāne ca /

anumānāgamasādhyā ye 'rthā dṛṣṭāntasādhyāśceti //

atra vayaṃ brūmaḥ /

yadi kiṃcidupalabheyaṃ ² pravartayeyaṃ

nivartayeyaṃ vā /

pratyakṣādibhirarthaistadabhāvān me 'nupālambhaḥ // 30 //

yadyaḥaṃ kaṃcidarthamupalabheyaṃ ³ pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamaiścaturbhiḥ ⁴ pramāṇaiścaturṇāṃ vā pramāṇānāmanyatamena ⁵, ata eva ⁶ pravartayeyaṃ vā nivartayeyaṃ vā / yathārthamevāhaṃ kaṃcinnopalabhe⁷ tasmānna pravartayāmi na nivartayāmi / tatraivaṃ sati yo bhavatopālambha ukto yadi pratyakṣādīnāṃ pramāṇānāmanyatamenopalabhya bhāvānvinivartayasi ⁸ nanu tāni ⁹ pramāṇāni na santi taiśca pramāṇairapi ¹⁰ gamyā arthā na santīti ¹¹ sa me bhavatyevānupālambhaḥ /

kiṃ cānyat /

yadi ca pramāṇataste ¹² teṣāṃ teṣāṃ prasiddhirarthānāṃ /

¹ R om. *vi*.

² *upalabheya* would be better here and in the commentary; the verse is quoted MMK, p. 16.

³ *kiṃcid*, R.

⁴ R om. *mānāgamaiś ca*.

⁵ *anyatamānyatamena*, R.

⁶ *evaṃ*, R.

⁷ R's MS. omits *nivartayeyaṃ vā / yathā*, and then has *artham evāhaṃ kiṃcin nopalabhate*.

⁸ R adds *iti*.

⁹ *bhavatoktāni*, R.

¹⁰ T om. *pramāṇair api*.

¹¹ R om. *na santi*.

¹² R om. *te*; T omits one *teṣāṃ* and adds *eva*, as if reading *pramāṇata eva bhavatas teṣāṃ*.

teṣāṃ punaḥ prasiddhiṃ brūhi katham
te¹ pramāṇānām // 31 //

yadi ca pramāṇatasteṣāṃ² teṣāmarthānām prameyānām prasiddhiṃ³ manyase yathā mānairmeyānām⁴, teṣāmidānīm pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamānām caturṇām pramāṇānām kutaḥ prasiddhiḥ / yadi tāvanniṣpramāṇānām pramāṇānām syātprasiddhiḥ⁵, pramāṇato 'rthānām prasiddhiriti hiyate pratijñā / tathāpi⁶ /

anyairyadi pramāṇaiḥ pramāṇasiddhir-
bhavettadanavasthā⁷ /

yadi punarmanyase pramāṇaiḥ prameyānām prasiddhisteṣāṃ pramāṇānām anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhirevamaṇavasthāprasaṅgaḥ⁸ / anavasthāprasaṅge ko doṣaḥ⁹ /

nādeḥ siddhistatrāsti naiva madhyasya
nāntasya // 32 //

¹⁰anavasthāprasaṅga ādeḥ siddhirnāsti / kiṃ kāraṇam / teṣāmapi

¹ teṣāṃ, R.

² T omits one teṣāṃ and has *eva* instead.

³ R om. *pra*.

⁴ R inserts *tathā*.

⁵ So R, after substituting *pramāṇānām* for *pramāṇair* and cutting out an interpolation which consists of 32 *cd* and the first words of the commentary on it. C is word for word the same as the text, but T, which is corrupt at the end, reads *yadi tāvat teṣāṃ pramāṇānām anyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ syāt*, or *prasiddhir na syāt*, according as one reads *yod par hgrub la* or *med par hgrub la*. The argument is that according to the Naiyāyika system the principle is that *arthas* can only be proved by *pramāṇas*; but the *pramāṇas* are themselves *arthas*, and therefore if they are not proved by other *pramāṇas*, the principle does not hold. But this is repeated under *kārikā* 33, and the text seems to have already been out of order by C's time, as it has the argument of 32 *ab* in the commentary under 30 and does not treat 32 as a *kārikā*. It might therefore be better to omit the entire sentence. Note that Vātsyāyana in the opening of his *bhāṣya* on the *Nyāyasūtras* puts the function of the *pramāṇas* in different language, so that his statements could not be twisted in the way Nāgārjuna twists his opponent's views here.

⁶ *athāpi*, T.

⁷ e.c.: *bhavaty anavasthā*, R, one mora short. The optative is required, but T gives no help for the missing syllable.

⁸ R om. *evam*; *ity evam* would be better.

⁹ T adds *tatraivaṃ brūmaḥ*.

¹⁰ R adds *asya* at the beginning.

hi pramāṇānāmanyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhisteṣāmanyairi
 ādiḥ / āderasadbhāvāt kuto madhyam kuto 'ntaḥ / tas
 pramāṇānāmanyaiḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiriti yaduktam tannopa-
 padyata ² iti /

teṣāmatha pramāṇairvinā prasiddhirvi-
 hiyate vādaḥ /
 vaiṣamikatvam tasminvīṣeṣa hetuśca vak-
 tavyaḥ // 33 //

atha manyase teṣāṃ pramāṇānāṃ vinā pramāṇaiḥ ³ prasiddhiḥ,
 prameyāṇāṃ punararthhānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiriti, evaṃ sati
 yaste vādaḥ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhirarthhānāṃ iti sa ⁴ hiyate / vaiṣa-
 mikatvam ca bhavati keṣāṃcidarthhānāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ
 keṣāṃcīnneti / viṣeṣa hetuśca vaktavyo yena hetunā keṣāṃcidarthhā-
 nāṃ pramāṇaiḥ prasiddhiḥ keṣāṃcīnneti / sa ca nopadiṣṭaḥ ⁵ /
 tasmādiyamapi kalpanā nopapanneti ⁶ /

atrāha / pramāṇānyeva ⁷ svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ca prasā-
 dhayanti / yathoktam

dyotayati svātmānaṃ yathā hutāsastathā parātmānaṃ /
 svaparātmānāvevaṃ prasādhayanti pramāṇānīti //
 yathāgniḥ svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ca prakāśayati tathaiva pra-
 māṇāni prasādhayanti ⁸ svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ ceti /
 atrocyate /

viṣamopanyāso 'yam na hyātmānaṃ pra-
 kāśayatyagniḥ /
 na hi tasyānupalabdhirdṛṣṭā tamasīva
 kumbhasya // 34 //

¹ T has *atra* for *iti*.

² R om. *iti yad uktam tan*, but C supports T.

³ T adds *api*.

⁴ R om. *sa*.

⁵ *sā ca nopadiṣṭā*, R.

⁶ T om. *īyam* and *iti*.

⁷ R adds *mama*.

⁸ R omits from *iti* at the end of the verse to *prasādhayanti* inclusive, having simply *param iva*.

viṣama evopanyāso 'gnivat pramāṇāni svātmānaṃ ca prasādhayanti parātmānaṃ ca prasādhayantīti ¹ / na hyagnirātmānaṃ prakāśayati ² / yathā prāgevāgninā prakāśitastamasi kumbho nopalabhyate 'thottarakālamupalabhyate ³ 'gninā prakāśitaḥ san, evameva yadyaprakāśitaḥ prāgnistamasi syād⁴uttarakālamagneḥ prakāśanaṃ syāt, ataḥ svātmānaṃ prakāśayet / na caitadevam ⁵ / tasmādiyamapi kalpanā nopapadyata iti ⁶ /

kiṃ cānyat /

yadi ca ⁷ svātmānamayaṃ tvadvacanena prakāśayatyagniḥ /
paramiva nanvātmānaṃ paridhakṣyatyapi hutāśaḥ ⁸ // 35 //

yadi ca tvadvacanena yathā parātmānaṃ prakāśayatyagnir-evameva svātmānamapi prakāśayati ⁹, nanu yathā parātmānaṃ dahatyevameva svātmānamapi dhakṣyati ¹⁰ / na caitadevam / tatra yaduktaṃ parātmānamiva svātmānamapi ¹¹ prakāśayatyagnirit tanna /

kiṃ cānyat /

yadi ca svaparātmānau tvadvacanena prakāśayatyagniḥ /
pracchādayiṣyati tamah svaparātmānau hutāśa ivā ¹² // 36 //

yadi ca bhavato matena svaparātmānau prakāśayatyagniḥ,

¹ T has merely *svaparātmānau prasādhayantīti*.

² R adds *yadi hi* at the beginning.

³ T om. *atha*.

⁴ *yady agninā na prakāśitaḥ prāg agnir naḥ syād*, R.

⁵ R om. *ca*.

⁶ T om. *tasmād* and *iti*, R *nopapadyanta*.

⁷ R omits *ca* required by the metre; cf. the commentary.

⁸ So R, leaving the line two morae short; T does not give any extra word. See p. 3 supra.

⁹ R adds *agnir iti*.

¹⁰ R adds *iti*.

¹¹ R om. *api*.

¹² Cf. MMK. vii, 12.

nanyidānīm tatpratipakṣabhūtaṃ tamo¹ 'pi svaparātmānau chā-
dayet / na caitad dṛṣṭam² / tatra yaduktaṃ svaparātmānau prakā-
śayatyagniriti tanna /

kiṃ cānyat /

nāsti tamaśca jvalane yatra ca tiṣṭhati
parātmani³ jvalanaḥ /

kurute katham prakāśam sa hi prakāśo
'ndhakāravadhah // 37 //

iha cāgnau nāsti tamo nāpi ca yatrāgnistatrāsti tamaḥ / prakāśaśca
nāma tamasaḥ pratighātaḥ / yasmāccāgnau⁴ nāsti tamo nāpi ca
yatrāgnistatrāsti tamaḥ, tatra kasya⁵ tamasaḥ pratighātamagniḥ
karoti yasya pratighātādagñiḥ⁶ svaparātmānau prakāśayati⁷ /
atrāha⁸ / nanu⁹ yasmādevaṃ¹⁰ nāgnau tamo 'sti nāpi yatrāgnis-
tatra tamo 'sti, tasmādeva¹¹ svaparātmānau na prakāśayatyagniḥ
kutaḥ¹² / tena hyutpadyamānenaivāgninā tamasaḥ pratighātaḥ¹³ /
tasmānnāgnau tamo 'sti nāpi yatrāgnistatra tamo 'sti, yasmādut-
padyamāna evobhayaṃ prakāśayatyagniḥ svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ
ceti / atrocyaṭe /

utpadyamāna eva prakāśayatyagnirity-
asadvādaḥ /

¹ *nanv idānīm pratipakṣabhūtataṃ*, R; T omits *idānīm* and *tamo*; C has *tamo*.

² So C; *naitad iṣṭam*, R; *na caitad evam*, T.

³ *sadātmani*, R; *gṛān na* (= *paratra*), T; "and in the place where (fire) itself and another are present", C. For the verse cf. MMK, VII, 9.

⁴ e.c.; *tasmāc*, T; "if", C. R omits from *yasmāc* to *tatrāsti tamaḥ* inclusive.

⁵ *katham asya*, R.

⁶ R om. *agniḥ*.

⁷ T om. *iti*.

⁸ R om. *atra*.

⁹ R substitutes *yat* for *nanu*.

¹⁰ T omits *evam*; which C has.

¹¹ *yasmād evaṃ*, R; T has dropped a word and may have had *yasmād eva* or *tasmād eva*, but the latter alone is possible.

¹² R puts *kutaḥ* at the end of next sentence, but T shows a question and C has no negative, so that the text reading alone meets the case.

¹³ *pratigrahaḥ*, R.

utpadyamāna eva prāpnoti tamo na hi
hutāśaḥ¹ // 38 //

ayamagnirutpadyamāna eva prakāśayati svātmānaṃ parātmānaṃ
ceti nāyamupapadyate vādaḥ / kasmāt / na hyutpadyamāna
evāgnistamaḥ prāpnoti, aprāptatvānnaivopahanti tamasaścānupa-
ghātānnāsti prakāśaḥ /

kiṃ cānyat /

aprāpto 'pi jvalano yadi vā punarandha-
kāramupahanyāt/
sarveṣu lokadhātuṣu tamo 'yamiha²
saṃsthito hānyat³ // 39 //

athāpi manyase 'prāpto 'pyagnirandhakāramupahantīti nanv-
idānīmiha⁴ saṃsthito 'gniḥ sarvalokadhātusthamupahaniṣyati
tamastulyamayamāprāptaḥ⁵ / na caitadevaṃ dṛṣṭam⁶ / tasmād-
aprāpyaivāgnirandhakāramupahantīti yadiṣṭam tanna /

kiṃ cānyat /

yadi svataśca⁷ pramāṇasiddhiranapekṣya
tava⁸ prameyāṇi/
bhavati pramāṇasiddhirna parāpekṣā
svataḥ siddhiḥ⁹ // 40 //

yadi cāgnivat svataḥ pramāṇasiddhiriti manyase, anapekṣyāpi
prameyānarthān¹⁰ pramāṇānāṃ prasiddhirbhaviṣyati¹¹ / kiṃ kāra-

¹ Cf. MMK, VII, 10.

² ya iha, T.

³ saṃsthita upahanyāt, R, against the metre. Cf. MMK, VII, 11, for the verse.

⁴ T om. idānīm.

⁵ tulyāyām aprāptaḥ, R; this use of *tulyam* seems to have no parallel, but there is no other way of reconstructing T from R, as the palaeographically better *tulyo 'yam* is hardly possible.

⁶ T om. dṛṣṭam, which C has.

⁷ yadi ca svataḥ, R, against the metre.

⁸ te, R, against the metre.

⁹ parāpekṣā hi siddhir iti, R; C, which apparently misunderstood the verse, has *svataḥ* twice. Cf. with the arguments of verses 40-50, MMK, x, 8-12.

¹⁰ prameyāṇi, R.

¹¹ R om. *pra* and adds *iti* at the end.

(*avyākṛta*) intrinsic nature of the indeterminate things, then there is no practice of religious life (*evaṃ sati abrahmacaryavāso bhavati*). — Why? — Because, if this is so, one rejects Dependent Origination (*pratityasamutpādasya hy evaṃ sati pratyākhyānaṃ bhavati*). By rejecting Dependent Origination, one rejects the vision of Dependent Origination (*pratityasamutpādasya pratyākhyānāt pratityasamutpādadarśanapratyākhyānaṃ bhavati*). For if Dependent Origination does not exist, there can be no question of its vision (*na hy avidyamānasya pratityasamutpādasya darśanam upapadyamānaṃ bhavati*). If there is no vision of Dependent Origination, there is no vision of Dharma. For the Lord has said: 'O monks, he who sees the *pratityasamutpāda* sees the Dharma'². [And] if one does not see the Dharma, there is no practice of religious life (*dharmadarśanābhāvād brahmacaryavāsābhāvaḥ*).

Or, rejecting Dependent Origination, one rejects the origination of sorrow (*atha vā pratityasamutpādapratyākhyānād duḥkhasamudayapratyākhyānaṃ bhavati*). For Dependent Origination is the origination of sorrow (*pratityasamutpādo hi duḥkhasya samudayaḥ*). By rejecting the origination of sorrow, one rejects sorrow (*duḥkhasamudayasya pratyākhyānād duḥkhapratyākhyānaṃ bhavati*). For, if there is no origination, how will that sorrow originate (*asati hi samudaye tat kuto duḥkhaṃ samudeśyati*)? If sorrow and [its] origination are rejected, then the cessation (*nirodha*) of sorrow is rejected. For if there is no origination of sorrow, what will come to cease through abandonment (*kasya prahāṇān nirodho bhaviṣyati*)? [And] if the cessation of sorrow is rejected, the Way (*mārga*) is rejected. For, if there is no cessation of sorrow, for obtaining what will there be a way leading to the cessation of sorrow (*kasya prāptaye mārgo bhaviṣyati duḥkhanirodhagāmī*)? Thus, the Four Noble Truths will cease to exist (*evaṃ caturṇām āryasatyānām abhāvaḥ*). If they do not exist, there is no result of monasticism (*śrāmanyaphala*). For it is through the vision of [those] Truths that the results of monasticism are attained (*satyadarśanāc chrāmanyaphalāni hi samadhiḥ gamyante*). [And] if the results of monasticism do not exist, there is no practice of religious life.

¹ Apparently, the Mādhyamika's assertion that all things are void ruins the foundation of all religious practice. But the Mādhyamika says in reply that it is on the contrary if things are *not void*, that all religious practice becomes meaningless. Voidness is 'dependent origination' (*pratityasamutpāda*). But if there is no 'dependent origination', then there is no sorrow, no origination of sorrow, and for that reason, no destruction of sorrow and no way leading to that destruction. Everything is immut-

able, free from the vicissitudes of the empirical world, being the Absolute itself. Thus, if Voidness is not admitted, the Four Noble Truths, which constitute the foundation of all religious practice in Buddhism, cannot be understood. — The whole thing has to be read along with *MK. XXIV* (cf. E. Frauwallner's introduction to his translation of this chapter, pp. 187ff.). See also p. 2 above, and the concluding verse of our treatise.

² This is a quotation from the *Śālistamba-sūtra* (cf. *Mahāyāna-Sūtra-saṃgraha* I [ed. by P. L. Vaidya, Darbhanga, 1961], p. 100). For the Pāli version see *Majjhima-Nikāya* I, pp. 190-1 (Pāli Text Society edition). — *Dharma*, as equivalent to *pratītyasamutpāda*, does not mean the Absolute Truth (in which there is no dependent origination: cf. *supra*, p. 2), but is only a *negative expression* of the Absolute. Cf. *Ātman-Brahman*, pp. 95, 97.

Furthermore:

LV. There would be neither merit (*dharma*) nor demerit (*adharma*) nor the worldly conventions (*saṃvyavahārās ca laukikāḥ*). All things, being endowed with an intrinsic nature, would be permanent — for that which has no cause is permanent (*nityāś ca sasvabhāvāḥ syur nityatvād ahetumataḥ*).

If this is so, what defect follows for you who reject Dependent Origination (*evaṃ sati pratītyasamutpādaṃ pratyācaksāṇasya bhavataḥ ko doṣaḥ prasajyate*)? — There is no merit. There is no demerit. Nor do exist the worldly conventions. — Why? — Because all that is dependently originated; how will it be, if there is no dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpannaṃ hy etat sarvaṃ; asati pratītyasamutpāde kuto bhaviṣyati*)? Moreover, being endowed with an intrinsic nature (*sasvabhāva*), not dependently originated (*apratītyasamutpanna*) and devoid of a cause (*nirhetuka*), it would be permanent (*nitya*)¹. — Why? — Because things that have no cause are permanent (*nirhetukā hi bhāvā nityāḥ*). — There would thus follow that very non-practice of religious life (*sa eva cābrahmacāryavāsaḥ prasajyeta*). And you would contradict your own tenet (*svasiddhāntavirodhaś ca*)². — Why? — Because the Lord has taught that all conditioned things are impermanent (*anityā hi bhagavatā sarve saṃskārā nirdiṣṭāḥ*). They become permanent, because they are [supposed to be] endowed with an intrinsic nature and hence [to be] permanent (*te sasvabhāvanityatvān nityā hi bhavanti*).

¹ The sentence, *api ca sasvabhāvo 'pratītyasamutpanno nirhetuko nityaḥ syāt*, does not seem to be all right. The editors suggest: 'sc. bhāvāḥ?' (Text, p. 43, n. 8). But it would perhaps be better to read: *sasvabhāvaṃ apratītyasamutpannaṃ nirhetukaṃ nityaṃ syāt*.

pramāṇaprameyāṇaṃ bhavati / pramāṇāni te prameyāṇi bhavanti
prameyaiḥ sādhitatvāt ¹ / prameyāṇi ca pramāṇāni ² bhavanti
pramāṇānāṃ sādhatvāt /

atha te pramāṇasiddhyā prameyasiddhiḥ
prameyasiddhyā ca /
bhavati pramāṇasiddhirnāstyubhayasyāpi
te siddhiḥ // 46 //

atha manyase pramāṇasiddhyā prameyasiddhirbhavati pramāṇā-
pekṣatvāt ³ prameyasiddhyā ca pramāṇasiddhirbhavati prameyā-
pekṣatvāditi, evaṃ te satyubhayasyāpi siddhirna bhavati ⁴ / kiṃ
kāraṇam ⁵ /

sidhyanti hi pramāṇairyadi prameyāṇi
tāni taireva /
sādhyāni ca prameyaistāni katham sād-
hayiṣyanti // 47 //

yadi hi pramāṇaiḥ prameyāṇi sidhyanti tāni ca ⁶ pramāṇāni
taireva prameyaiḥ sādhayitavyāni nanvasiddheṣu prameyeṣu kāra-
ṇasyāsiddhatvādasiddhāni katham sādhayiṣyanti prameyāṇi ⁷ /

sidhyanti ca prameyairyadi pramāṇāni
tāni taireva /
sādhyāni ca pramāṇaistāni ⁸ katham
sādhayiṣyanti // 48 //

yadi ca ⁹ prameyaiḥ pramāṇāni sidhyanti tāni ca prameyāṇi
taireva pramāṇaiḥ sādhayitavyāni ¹⁰ nanvasiddheṣu pramāṇeṣu
kāraṇasyāsiddhatvādasiddhāni katham sādhayiṣyanti pramāṇāni /

¹ *prasādhitatvāt*, T.

² R interchanges *prameyāṇi* and *pramāṇāni*.

³ T may read *pramāṇāpekṣayā*, and similarly at the end of the next clause.

⁴ R om. *bhavati*.

⁵ R om. *kiṃ kāra*.

⁶ R om. *ca*.

⁷ R adds *iti*.

⁸ *prameyais tāni*, R.

⁹ R om. *ca*.

¹⁰ R adds *iti*.

pitṛā yadyutpādyah putro yadi tena
caiva putreṇa/
utpādyah sa yadi pitā vada tatrotpā-
dayati kaḥ kam // 49 //

yathāpi nāma¹ kaścid brūyātpitṛā putra utpādanīyah sa ca pitā
tenaiva² putreṇotpādanīya iti, tatredānīm³ brūhi kena ka ut-
pādayitavya iti⁴ / tathaiva khalu⁵ bhavān bravīti pramāṇaiḥ
prameyāṇi sādhayitavyāni tānyeva ca punaḥ⁶ pramāṇāni taireva⁷
prameyairiti⁸, tatredānīm⁹ te katamaiḥ katamāni sādhayitavyāni¹⁰ /

kaśca pitā kaḥ putrastatra tvam brūhi¹¹
tāvubhāvapi ca/
pitṛputralakṣaṇadharau yato bhavati no
‘tra saṁdehaḥ¹² // 50 //

tayośca pūrvopadiṣṭayoḥ pitṛputrayoḥ¹³ katarah putrah katarah
pitā / ubhāvapi tāvutpādakavāt pitṛlakṣaṇadharāvutpādyatvācca
putralakṣaṇadharau / atra naḥ saṁdeho bhavati katarastatra pitā
katarah¹⁴ putra iti / evameva yānyetāni bhavataḥ pramāṇaprameyāṇi
tatra katarāṇi pramāṇāni katarāṇi prameyāṇi / ubhayānyapi hyetāni
sādhakatvāt¹⁵ pramāṇāni¹⁶ sādhyatvāt prameyāṇi¹⁷ / atra naḥ

¹ T omits *nāma*, and R adds *yad* before *yathāpi*.

² R om. *tenaiva*.

³ T om. *idānīm*.

⁴ R om. *iti*.

⁵ T om. *khalu*.

⁶ T om. *ca* or *punaḥ*.

⁷ R om. *r eva*.

⁸ R om. *iti*, and T adds *sādhayitavyāni* before it.

⁹ T om. *idānīm*.

¹⁰ *prasādhayitavyāni*, T.

¹¹ R adds *katham*.

¹² *yato na putrasaṁdehaḥ*, R, against the metre and commentary; T has *tato* for *yato*.

¹³ *pitāputrayoḥ vada*, R.

¹⁴ R adds *tatra*.

¹⁵ R omits *sādhakatvāt*, and T has *prasādhakatvāt*.

¹⁶ R adds *tāni prameyāṇi*.

¹⁷ R adds *iti*.

saṁdeho bhavati katarāṇyatṛa¹ pramāṇāṇi katarāṇi prameyāṇīti² /
 naiva svataḥ prasiddhirna parasparataḥ
 parapramāṇairvā³ /
 na⁴ bhavati na ca prameyairna cāpy-
 akasmāt pramāṇānām // 51 //

na svataḥ prasiddhiḥ pratyakṣasya tenaiva pratyakṣeṇa, anumā-
 nasya tenaivānumānena, upamānasya tenaivopamānena, āgamasya
 tenaivāgamena / nāpi parasparataḥ pratyakṣasyānumānopamānā-
 gamaiḥ, anumānasya pratyakṣopamānāgamaiḥ, upamānasya pra-
 tyakṣānumānāgamaiḥ, āgamasya pratyakṣānumānopamānaiḥ / nāpi
 pratyakṣānumānopamānāgamānāmānyaiḥ⁵ pratyakṣānumānopamā-
 nāgamairiyathāśvam / nāpi prameyaiḥ samastavyastaiḥ svaviśayapa-
 raviśayasamgrhitaiḥ⁶ / nāpyakasmāt / nāpi⁷ samuccayenaiteṣāṃ⁸
 kāraṇānām pūrvoddīṣṭānām viṁśattriṁśaccatvāriṁśatṣaṭviṁśater-
 vā⁹ / tatra yaduktam¹⁰ pramāṇādighamyatvāt prameyāṇām bhā-
 vānām santi ca te¹¹ prameyā bhāvāstāni ca pramāṇāni yaiste¹²
 pramāṇaiḥ prameyā bhāvāḥ¹³ samadhigatā iti tanna /

yatpunarbhavatoktam /

kuśalānām dharmāṇām dharmāvasthāvidaśca manyante /

kuśalaṃ janāḥ svabhāvaṃ¹⁴ śeṣeṣvapyeṣa viniyoga iti //

atra brūmaḥ /

¹ T om. *atra*.

² T om. *iti*.

³ R om. *para*.

⁴ R om. *na*.

⁵ *agamād anyaiḥ*, R.

⁶ *viśa[ya]tāgrhitaiḥ*, R.

⁷ *nāsti*, R.

⁸ Both C and T take *nāpi samuccayena* as a separate clause and evidently began the next one with *naiteṣāṃ*, but this seems bad sense.

⁹ *viṁśatir vā*, R. If C and T's division is accepted, one should read *viṁśati-
 bhir* (palaeographically better than *viṁśatyā*).

¹⁰ T adds *bhavatā*.

¹¹ R has *tu* for *te*.

¹² R reads *tu* for *te*.

¹³ R adds *santāś ca bhāvāḥ*.

¹⁴ *janarvabhāvaṃ manyante*, R.

kuśālānām dharmāṇām dharmāvasthāvīdo
bruvanti yadi ¹/
kuśalam ² svabhāvamevaṃ pravibhāge-
nābhidheyaḥ syāt // 52 //

kuśālānām dharmāṇām dharmāvasthāvīdaḥ kuśalam svabhā-
vaṃ ³ manyante / sa ca bhavatā pravibhāgenopadeṣṭavyaḥ syāt /
ayaṃ sa kuśalaḥ svabhāvaḥ / ime te kuśalā dharmāḥ ⁴ / idaṃ
tatkuśalam vijñānam / ayaṃ sa ⁵ kuśalavijñānasvabhāvaḥ / evaṃ
sarveṣām / na caitadevaṃ drṣṭam ⁶ / tasmādyaduktam yathāsvam-
upadiṣṭaḥ ⁷ svabhāvo dharmāṇāmiti tanna /
kiṃ cānyat /

yadi ca pratītya kuśalaḥ svabhāva ut-
padyate sa kuśālānām/
dharmāṇām parabhāvaḥ svabhāva evaṃ ⁸
katham bhavati // 53 //

yadi ca kuśālānām dharmāṇām svabhāvo hetupratyayasāmagrīṃ
pratītyotpadyate sa ⁹ parabhāvādutpannaḥ kuśālānām dharmāṇām
katham svabhāvo bhavati / evamevākuśalaprabhṛtīnām ¹⁰ / tatra
yaduktam kuśālānām ¹¹ dharmāṇām kuśalaḥ svabhāvo 'pyupa-
diṣṭaḥ ¹², evamakuśalādinām cākuśalādiriti ¹³ tanna /
kiṃ cānyat /

¹ *bruvate yat*, R, against the metre; the text follows the indications of C, but T has *gaḥ (yat)* and an optative would be better. Possibly therefore *bruvīran yat*.

² *kuśala*, R.

³ *janasvabhāvaṃ*, R.

⁴ R adds *iti*.

⁵ R and T omit *sa*, required by the context.

⁶ *na caitad upadiṣṭam*, T; but C as in text and R.

⁷ C and R omit *yathāsvam*, which seems required.

⁸ *eva*, R.

⁹ R om. *sa*.

¹⁰ T adds something like *yuktam*.

¹¹ *kuśalāvyākṛtānām na*, R.

¹² R om. 'py u.

¹³ R omits *ca*, and T adds *svabhāva evopadiṣṭaḥ*.

atha na pratītya kiṃcitsvabhāva utpa-
dyate sa kuśalānām/
dharmāṇāmevaṃ syādvāso na brahmaca-
ryasya¹ // 54 //

atha manyase na kiṃcitpratītya kuśalānām dharmāṇām kuśalaḥ²
svabhāva utpadyate, evamakuśalānām dharmāṇāmakūśalaḥ, avyā-
kṛtānāmavyākṛta³ iti, evam satyabrahmacaryavāso bhavati / kiṃ
kāraṇam / pratītyasamutpādasya hyevaṃ sati pratyākhyānaṃ
bhavati / pratītyasamutpādasya pratyākhyānāt pratītyasamut-
pādadarśana⁴pratyākhyānaṃ bhavati / na hyavidyamānasya pra-
tītyasamutpādasya darśanamupapadyamānaṃ bhavati / asati pra-
tītyasamutpādadarśane dharmadarśanaṃ na bhavati / uktaṃ hi
bhagavatā yo hi bhikṣavaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ paśyati sa dharmam
paśyatīti⁵ / dharmadarśanābhāvād brahmacaryavāsābhāvaḥ /

athavā pratītyasamutpādapratyākhyānādduḥkhasamudayapratyā-
khyānaṃ bhavati / pratītyasamutpādo hi duḥkhasya samudayaḥ /
duḥkhasamudayasya pratyākhyānādduḥkhapratyākhyānaṃ bha-
vati / asati hi samudaye tatkuto⁶ duḥkham samudeśyati / duḥkha-
pratyākhyānāt⁷ samudayapratyākhyānācca duḥkhanirodhasya pra-
tyākhyānaṃ bhavati⁸ / asati hi duḥkhasamudaye⁹ kasya prahā-
ṇānnirodho bhaviṣyati / [duḥkhanirodhapratyākhyānānmārgasya
pratyākhyānaṃ bhavati]¹⁰ / asati hi duḥkhanirodhe kasya
prāptaye mārge bhaviṣyati duḥkhanirodhagāmī / evaṃ caturṇām-
āryasatyānāmbhāvaḥ / teṣāmbhāvāc¹¹chrāmaṇyaphalābhāvaḥ /

¹ Cf. MMK, xxiv, 18-30, for this passage.

² *kuśala*, R.

³ T abridges the two last clauses to *evaṃ cākuśalādīnām*.

⁴ °*darśanaṃ*, R; should it be °*darśanasya*?

⁵ R om. *iti*. Quotation from the *Sālistambasūtra*.

⁶ T om. *tat*.

⁷ R om. *pratyākhyānāt*.

⁸ R om. *bhavati*.

⁹ T takes this compound as a dvandva.

¹⁰ Neither C, T, nor R have this sentence, which is essential to the context.

¹¹ R omits °*ḥ* *teṣām abhāvāc*°, and has °*va*° only instead.

satyadarśanācchrāmaṇya¹phalāni hi samadhighamyante ² / śrāma-
ṇyaphalānāmabhāvādabrahmacaryavāsa iti ³ /

kiṃ cānyat /

nādharmo dharmo vā saṃvyavahārāśca
laukikā na syuḥ /

nityāśca sasvabhāvāḥ⁴ syurnityatvād-
ahetumataḥ // 55 //

evam sati pratītyasamutpādaṃ pratyācakṣāṇasya bhavataḥ ko
doṣaḥ prasajyate / dharmo na bhavati / adharmo na bhavati /
saṃvyavahārāśca laukikā na bhavanti⁵ / kiṃ kāraṇaṃ / pratītyasam-
utpannaṃ hyetatsarvamasati ⁶ pratītyasamutpāde kuto bha-
viṣyati⁷ / api ca sasvabhāvo⁸ 'pratītyasamutpanno nirhetuko
nityaḥ syāt / kiṃ kāraṇaṃ⁹ / nirhetukā hi bhāvā¹⁰ nityāḥ / ¹¹sa eva
cābrahmacaryavāsaḥ prasajyeta ¹² / svasiddhāntavirodhaśca ¹³ /
kiṃ kāraṇaṃ / anityā hi bhagavatā sarve saṃskārā nirdiṣṭāḥ / te
sasvabhāvanityatvānnityā¹⁴ hi bhavanti /

evamakūśa¹⁵leṣvavyākṛteṣu nairyāṇikā-
diṣu¹⁶ ca doṣaḥ /

tasmātsarvaṃ saṃskṛtamasaṃskṛtaṃ te
bhavatyeva¹⁷ // 56 //

¹ °darśanādiśrāma°, R.

² R om. *hi sama*.

³ T om. *iti*.

⁴ So C, rightly as the commentary shows; *sarvabhāvāḥ*, R; *sarvadharmāḥ*, T.
For the first line cf. MMK, xxiv, 33-36.

⁵ *saṃbhavanti*, R.

⁶ T adds *tasmin*.

⁷ *saṃbhaviṣyati*, T possibly.

⁸ C, T and R agree on the reading; sc. *bhāvāḥ*?

⁹ T omits *kiṃ kāraṇaṃ*, but C shows it.

¹⁰ T omits *bhāvā*, which C has.

¹¹ R adds *tatra*.

¹² T omits *prasajyeta*, and R puts a *daṇḍa* before it.

¹³ T om. *sva*, and R om. *ca*.

¹⁴ R omits *sa*, which C and T have.

¹⁵ *eṣa cākūśa*°, R, against the metre.

¹⁶ *nairyāṇadiṣu*, R.

¹⁷ *evam*, R.

yaścaiṣa kuśaleṣu dharmeṣu ¹ nirdiṣṭaḥ kalpaḥ sa evākuśaleṣu,
 sa evāvyaḅkrteṣu, sa eva nairyāṇikaprabhṛtiṣu ² / tasmātte ³ sarvam-
 idaṃ saṃskṛtamasamskṛtaṃ sampadyate / kiṃ kāraṇam / hetau
 hyasatyutpādasthitibhaṅgā na bhavanti / utpādasthitibhaṅgeṣv-
 asatsu ⁴ saṃskṛtalakṣaṇābhāvāt sarvaṃ saṃskṛtamasamskṛtaṃ saṃ-
 padyate / tatra yaduktaṃ kuśalādināṃ bhāvānāṃ svabhāvasadbhā-
 vādaśūnyāḥ sarvabhāvā iti tanna /

yatpunarbhavatoktaṃ

yadi ca na bhavetsvabhāvo dharmāṇāṃ niḥsvabhāva ityeva ⁵ /
 nāmāpi bhavennaivaṃ ⁶ nāma hi nirvastukaṃ nāstīti //
 atra brūmaḥ ⁷ /

yaḥ sadbhūtaṃ nāmātra ⁸ brūyātsa-
 svabhāva ityevam /
 bhavatā prativaktavyo nāma brūmaśca
 na vayaṃ tat // 57 //

yo nāmātra ⁹ sadbhūtaṃ brūyātsasvabhāva iti sa bhavatā
 prativaktavyaḥ syāt / yasya sadbhūtaṃ ¹⁰ nāma svabhāvasya
 tasmātenāpi svabhāvena sadbhūtena bhavitavyam ¹¹ / na hyasad-
 bhūtasya svabhāvasya ¹² sadbhūtaṃ nāma bhavatīti ¹³ / na punar-
 vayaṃ nāma sadbhūtaṃ brūmaḥ / tadapi hi bhāvasvabhāvasyā-

¹ R omits *dharmeṣu*, which C also has.

² R adds *doṣaḥ*, not in C or T; T adds *api* or *ca*.

³ R om. *te*.

⁴ *teṣv asatsu*, T.

⁵ *bhāvānāṃ na svabhāva ity evam*, R.

⁶ *bhaved evam*, R.

⁷ R om. *iti* / *atra brūmaḥ*.

⁸ e.c.; R and T om. *atra*.

⁹ R om. *atra*.

¹⁰ *sadbhūta*, R.

¹¹ This is R's version of the sentence, but *tasmāt* is clumsy; C simplifies and gives no help; T had something like *yady asadbhūto nāmavataḥ svabhāvas tasmāt tenāpi nāmāsadbhūtasvabhāvena bhavitavyam*.

¹² T om. *svabhāvasya*.

¹³ T om. *iti*.

bhāvānnāma niḥsvabhāvam¹, tasmācchūnyam², śūnyatvādasad-
bhūtam / tatra yadbhavatoktaṃ nāmasadbhāvātsadbhūtaḥ svabhāva
iti tanna /

kiṃ cānyat /

nāmāsaditi ca yadidaṃ tatkiṃ nu sato
bhavatyutāpyasataḥ³ /

yadi hi sato yadvācāto dvidhāpi te
hīyate vādaḥ // 58 //

yaccaitannāmāsaditi tatkiṃ sato 'sato vā⁴ / yadi hi satas tan-
nāma⁵ yadyasata ubhayathāpi pratijñā hīyate / tatra yadi tāvatsato
nāmāsaditi⁶ pratijñā hīyate / na hīdānīm tadasadidānīm sat /
athāsato 'saditi⁷ nāma⁸, asadbhūtasya nāma na bhavati⁹ /
tasmādyā pratijñā nāmnaḥ¹⁰ sadbhūtaḥ svabhāva iti sā hinā /

kiṃ cānyat /

sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ śūnyatvam copā-
pāditam pūrvam /

sa upālabhastasmādbhāvatyayam cā-
pratijñāyāḥ // 59 //

iha cāsmābhiḥ pūrvameva sarveṣāṃ bhāvānāṃ vistarataḥ
śūnyatvamupapāditam / tatra prāṇ nāmno 'pi śūnyatvamuktaṃ /
sa bhavānaśūnyatvam¹¹ parigṛhya parivṛtto vaktum yadi bhāvānāṃ

¹ R omits *bhāva* before *svabhāva* and reads *niḥsvabhāvatvāt*.

² R om. *tasmāc*, but should the reading be *niḥsvabhāvatvāt*, as suggested by the readings in the previous note?

³ e.c.; *utāsataḥ*, R, against the metre; the alternative *uta vāsataḥ* would also be unmetrical.

⁴ *sataḥ asataḥ*, R.

⁵ R om. *tan*.

⁶ 'āvat sat ' asad iti, R.

⁷ *athāsata* : *asad iti*, R.

⁸ R inserts *yā pratijñā* wrongly here instead of in the next sentence.

⁹ R adds *astitvasvabhāva itī*.

¹⁰ R om. *yā pratijñā nāmnaḥ*.

¹¹ *sambhavam aśūnyatvam*, R; C as in text; T omits the entire sentence.

svabhāvo na syādasvabhāva iti nāmāpīdam na syāditi ¹ tasmād-
apratijñō²pālambho ³ 'yaṃ bhavataḥ sūpadyate / na hi vayaṃ
nāma sadbhūtamiti brūmaḥ /

⁴yatpunarbhavatoktaṃ

atha vidyate svabhāvaḥ sa ca dharmānām na vidyate tasmāt /
dharmairvinā svabhāvaḥ sa yasya tadyuktamupadeṣṭumiti //
atra brūmaḥ ⁵ /

atha vidyate svabhāvaḥ sa ca dharmā-
nām na vidyate itīdam /
āśaṅkitam yaduktam bhavatyanaśaṅkitam
tacca // 60 //

na hi vayaṃ dharmānām svabhāvaṃ pratiṣedhayāmo dharmā-
vinirmuktasya vā kasyacidarthasya svabhāvamabhyupagacchāmaḥ /
nanvevaṃ sati ya ⁶ upālambho bhavato yadi dharmā niḥsvabhāvāḥ
kasya khalvidānīmanyasyārthasya dharmāvinirmuktasya svabhāvo
bhavati sa yuktamupadeṣṭumiti ⁷ dūrāpakṛṣṭamevaitadbhavati, upā-
lambho na bhavati ⁸ /

⁹yatpunarbhavatoktaṃ

sata eva pratiṣedho nāsti ghaṭo geḥa ityayaṃ yasmāt /
dṛṣṭaḥ pratiṣedho 'yaṃ sataḥ svabhāvasya te tasmāditi //
atra brūmaḥ /

sata eva pratiṣedho yadi śūnyatvaṃ
nanu prasiddham ¹⁰idam /

¹ C seems to have misunderstood and translates as if reading *asvabhāvaṃ nāma syāt*.

² *tasmād prati*°, R.

³ T adds *api*.

⁴ T inserts *anyac ca*.

⁵ R om. *iti* / *atra brūmaḥ*.

⁶ T om. *ya*.

⁷ °*dṛṣṭam iti*, R.

⁸ R om. *upālambho na bhavati*.

⁹ T inserts *anyac ca*.

¹⁰ *nanu apratisiddham*, R, against the metre.

pratiṣedhayate hi bhavān bhāvānām
niḥsvabhāvatvam // 61 //

yadi sata eva pratiṣedho bhavati nāsato bhavāṃśca sarvabhāvā-
nām¹ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ pratiṣedhayati, nanu prasiddhaṃ² sarva-
bhāvānām niḥsvabhāvatvam / tvādvacanena pratiṣedhasadbhāvān³
niḥsvabhāvatvasya ca sarvabhāvānām pratiṣiddhatvāt prasiddhā
śūnyatā⁴ /

pratiṣedhayase 'tha⁵ tvam śūnyatvam
tacca nāsti śūnyatvam /
pratiṣedhaḥ sata iti te nanveṣa⁶ vi-
hiyate vādaḥ // 62 //

atha⁷ pratiṣedhayasi tvam sarvabhāvānām niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ
śūnyatvaṃ nāsti tacca śūnyatvam, yā tarhi te pratijñā sataḥ
pratiṣedho bhavati nāsata iti sā hīnā /

kiṃ cānyat /

pratiṣedhayāmi nāhaṃ kiṃcit pratiṣe-
dhyamasti na ca kiṃcit/
tasmātpратиṣedhayasītyadhilaya eṣa⁸ tvayā
kriyate // 63 //

⁹yadyahaṃ kiṃcitpratiṣedhayāmi tatastadapi tvayā¹⁰ yuktameva
vaktuṃ syāt / na caivāhaṃ kiṃcitpratiṣedhayāmi, yasmānna¹¹

¹ R om. *bhavāṃś ca sarva*.

² *pratisiddham*, R.

³ R adds *yasi tvam* after *pratiṣedha*.

⁴ *pratiṣiddhā śūnyeti*, R.

⁵ *ṣedhayase atha*, R; alternatively read *ṣedhayasy atha*.

⁶ R om. *ṣa*.

⁷ R adds *śūnyatvam*.

⁸ *eva*, R. *Adhilaya* (preferably read *skur pa* for *bkur pa* in T), "calumny", seems to be known only from Mādhyamika works; cf. *MMK*, Index s.v.

⁹ R inserts *evam api tu kṛtvā*.

¹⁰ R om. *tad api tvayā*; *pratiṣedhayeyam* would be better grammar than *pratiṣedhayāmi*.

¹¹ *tasmān na*, R. The text follows T in dividing the sentences, but it would be possible to take *yasmān* with the following *tasmāc*.

kiṃcitpratiṣeddhavyamasti ¹ / tasmācchūnyeṣu sarvabhāveṣvavidyamāne pratiṣedhye pratiṣedhe ca ² pratiṣedhayasīteṣa tvayāprastuto ³ 'dhilayaḥ kriyata iti ⁴ /

⁵yatpunarbhavatoktam

atha nāsti sa svabhāvaḥ kiṃ nu pratiṣidhyate tvayānena /

vacanenarte vacanātpatiṣedhaḥ sidhyate hyasata iti ⁶ //

atra brūmaḥ /

yaccāharte ⁷ vacanādasataḥ pratiṣedha-
vacanasiddhiriti /

atra jñāpayate vāgasaditi tanna pratinihanti // 64 //

yacca bhavān bravīti, ṛte 'pi ⁸ vacanādasataḥ pratiṣedhaḥ prasiddhaḥ, tatra kiṃ niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ityetattvadvacanam ⁹ karotīti, atra brūmaḥ / niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvabhāvā ¹⁰ ityetatkhalu vacanam na niḥsvabhāvāneva ¹¹ sarvabhāvān karoti / kiṃtvasati svabhāve bhāvā niḥsvabhāvā iti ¹² jñāpayati / tadyathā ¹³ kaściddbrūyāda vidyamānagrhe devadatte 'sti ¹⁴ grhe devadatta iti / tatra inam kaścitpratibhūyān nāstīti / na tadvacanam devadatta-

¹ T adds *ca* or *api* after *kiṃcit*.

² R om. *pratiṣedhe ca*, but C has it too.

³ e.c.; *tvayātra sadbhūto*, R. 'T' does not show *atra*, and its *thog tu mi babs pa* means something like "missing the mark", "not meeting the case", and C translates "contrary to reason and perverse". In view of R's extraordinary distortions the conjectural restoration is palaeographically possible.

⁴ T om. *iti*.

⁵ T adds *anyac ca*.

⁶ R. om. *iti*.

⁷ *yac cāham te*, R; *yac cāha* is represented by *ze na* in T.

⁸ *sato pi*, R. 'T' adds *asati ca vacane* before *ṛte*.

⁹ R om. *tvad*.

¹⁰ R om. *oḥ sarvabhāvā*.

¹¹ R om. *eva*.

¹² *kintv asatsvabhāvo bhāvānām asatsvabhāvānām iti*, R.

¹³ *tatra*, R.

¹⁴ *Devadattas tam asti*, R. *avidyamānagrha* is a curious compound but occurs in other texts.

syāsadbhāvaṃ¹ karoti kiṃtu jñāpayati kevalamasan̄rbhavaṃ²
gr̥he devadattasya³ / tadvannāsti svabhāvo bhāvānāmityetad-
vacanaṃ na bhāvānām⁴ niḥsvabhāvatvaṃ karoti kiṃtu sarva-
bhāveṣu⁵ svabhāvasyābhāvaṃ jñāpayati / tatra yadbhavatokaṃ
kimasati svabhāve nāsti svabhāva ityetadvacanaṃ karoti, ṛte 'pi
vacanāt prasiddhaḥ⁶ svabhāvasyābhāva iti tanna⁷ yuktaṃ /

anyacca⁸ /

bālānāmiva mithyā⁹ mṛgaṭṛṣṇāyām¹⁰ yathājalagrāhaḥ /
evaṃ mithyāgrāhaḥ syātte pratiśedhyato¹¹ hyasataḥ //
ityādayo yā punaścatasro gāthā bhavatoktā¹² atra brūmaḥ

mṛgaṭṛṣṇādr̥ṣṭānte yaḥ punaruktas¹³ -
tvayā mahāmścarkaḥ /
tatrāpi nirṇayaṃ śṛṇu yathā sa dr̥ṣṭānta
upapannaḥ // 65 //

ya eta tvayā¹⁴ mṛgaṭṛṣṇādr̥ṣṭānte mahāmścarka uktastatrāpi
yo nirṇayaḥ sa śrūyatām yathopapannā eṣa¹⁵ dr̥ṣṭānto bhavati /

sa yadi svabhāvataḥ syād grāho¹⁶ na
syātpṛatītya sambhūtaḥ¹⁷ /

¹ na ta Devadattasya sambhavam, R; T shows that R has interchanged sambhava and asadbhāva in this sentence.

² asadbhāvaṃ, R.

³ R adds iti.

⁴ svabhāvānām, R.

⁵ R om. kiṃtu sarva. T interpolates a parallel with a māyāpuruṣa, which is not found in C or R.

⁶ prasiddhiḥ, R.

⁷ tat te na, R.

⁸ yad uktam, R.

⁹ R om. mithyā.

¹⁰ R adds sa.

¹¹ prasidhyate, R.

¹² yat punar bhavato mṛgaṭṛṣṇāyām ity, R.

¹³ uktam, R.

¹⁴ T adds tasmin.

¹⁵ R omits yathā and reads eva for eṣa.

¹⁶ bhāvo, R.

¹⁷ samudbhūtaḥ, R, against the metre.

yaśca pratītya bhavati grāho nanu
śūnyatā saiva // 66 //

yadi¹ mṛgaṭṛṣṇāyām. sā yathājalagrāhaḥ svabhāvataḥ syānna
syātpratītyasamutpannaḥ / yato mṛgaṭṛṣṇām ca pratītya viparītaḥ
ca darśanaḥ pratītyāyonīśomanaskāraḥ² ca pratītya syādudbhūto
'taḥ pratītyasamutpannaḥ / yataśca pratītyasamutpanno 'taḥ
svabhāvataḥ śūnya eva / yathā pūrvamuktaḥ tathā /
kiṃ cānyat /

yadi ca svabhāvataḥ syād grāhaḥ kastaḥ
nivartayed³ grāham /
śeṣeṣvapyeṣa vidhistasmādeṣo⁴ 'nupā-
lambhaḥ // 67 //

yadi ca mṛgaṭṛṣṇāyām jalagrāhaḥ svabhāvataḥ syāt ka eva taḥ
vinivartayet / na hi svabhāvaḥ śakyo vinivartayitum⁵ yathā⁶ gner-
uṣṇatvamāpāṃ dravatvamākāśasya nirāvaraṇatvam / dṛṣṭaḥ cāsyā
vinivartanam / tasmācchūnyasvabhāvo grāhaḥ⁷ / yathā⁸ caitad-
evaḥ śeṣeṣvapi dharmeṣveṣa kramaḥ pratyavagantavyo grāhya-
prabhṛtiṣu⁹ pañcasu / tatra yadbhavatoktaḥ śaṭkabhāvādaśūnyāḥ¹⁰
sarvabhāvā iti tanna /

yatpunarbhavatoktaḥ¹¹

hetośca te na siddhirnaiḥsvābhāvvyātkuto hi te hetuḥ /
nirhetukasya siddhirna copapannāsyā te 'rthasyeti //
atra brūmaḥ /

¹ R adds *ca*.

² T om. *pratītya*.

³ *vinivartayed*, R, against the metre.

⁴ *tasmād oṣo*, R.

⁵ *nivartayitum*, R.

⁶ *tathā*^o, R.

⁷ *grāhyaḥ*, R.

⁸ *yadā*, R.

⁹ *prabhṛtiṣu*, R.

¹⁰ R omits *toktaḥ śaṭkabhā*, and T omits *bhavatā*.

¹¹ T has *anyac ca* instead.

etena hetvabhāvaḥ pratyuktaḥ pūrvam-
eva sa samatvāt/
mṛgatṛṣṇādrṣṭāntavyāvṛttividhau ya uk-
taḥ prāk // 68 //

etena cedānīm carcena pūrvoktena hetvabhāvo 'pi pratyukto¹
'vagantavyaḥ / ya eva hi carcaḥ pūrvasmin hetāvuktaḥ śatkapratise-
dhasya sa evehāpi² carcayitavyaḥ /
yatpunarbhavatoktaṃ
pūrvam cetpratiśedhaḥ paścātpратиśedhyamityanupapannam /
paścāccānupapanno yugapacca yataḥ svabhāvaḥ sanniti³ //
atra brūmaḥ /

yastraikālye hetuḥ pratyuktaḥ pūrvam-
eva sa samatvāt/
traikālyapratihetuśca śūnyatāvādinām
prāptaḥ // 69 //

ya eva⁴ hetustraikālye pratiśedhavācī sa uktotaraḥ pratyava-
gantavyaḥ⁵ / kasmāt / sādhyasamatvāt / tathā hi tyadvacanena
pratiśedhastraikālye 'nupapannapратиśedhavatsa pratiśedhyo 'pi⁶ /
tasmāt pratiśedhapратиśedhye 'sati yadbhavan⁷ manyate pratiśe-
dhaḥ pratiśiddha⁸ iti tanna / yastrikālapратиśedhavācī⁹ hetureṣa
eva śūnyatāvādinām prāptaḥ sarvabhāvasvabhāvapратиśedhaka-
tvān¹⁰ na bhavataḥ /

¹ R om. ukto.

² R om. dhasya sa eve.

³ svabhāvo 'san, R and T (cf. note on verse 20). R om. iti.

⁴ e.c.; eṣa, R; T omits the word.

⁵ pratyavamantaḥ, R; T omits the word, but C has it.

⁶ R mutilates this sentence, reading yathā hi pratiśedhas traikālye nopapa-
pratiśedhapратиśedhe 'pi. C supports T, having "Just as the pratiśedha of the
traikālyā is anupapanna, (your) words too are included among the pratiśedhapra-
tiśedhya things".

⁷ R om. yad.

⁸ pratīṣi, R; C seems to have had prāptaḥ.

⁹ yataś caīṣa trikāla°, R; yaś ca trikāla° might be better.

¹⁰ T om. svabhāva.

athavā kathametaduktottaram /
 pratiṣedhayāmi nāhaṃ kiṃcitpratiṣedhyamasti na ca kiṃcit /
 tasmāt pratiṣedhayasityadhilaya eṣa tvayā kriyate //

iti pratyuktam¹ / atha manyase triṣvapi kālēṣu pratiṣedhaḥ
 siddhaḥ², dṛṣṭaḥ pūrvakālīno 'pi hetuḥ, uttarakālīno 'pi, yuga-
 patkālīno 'pi hetuḥ, tatra³ pūrvakālīno hetuṛ'athā⁴ pitā putrasya⁵,
 paścātkālīno yathā śiṣya ācāryasya, yugapatkālīno yathā pradīpaḥ
 prakāśasyetyatra brūmaḥ / na caitadevam / uktā⁶ hyetasmin krame
 trayāḥ⁷ pūrvadoṣāḥ / api ca yadyevam⁸, pratiṣedhasadbhā-
 vastvayābhyupagamyate⁹ pratijñāhāniśca te bhavati / etena krameṇa
 svabhāvapratiṣedho 'pi siddhaḥ¹⁰ /

prabhavati ca śūnyateyaṃ yasya pra-
 bhavanti tasya sarvārthāḥ /
 prabhavati na tasya kiṃcinna prabha-
 vati¹¹ śūnyatā yasya¹² // 70 //

yasya śūnyateyaṃ prabhavati tasya sarvārthā laukikalokottarāḥ
 prabhavanti / kiṃ kāraṇam / yasya hi śūnyatā prabhavati tasya
 pratītyasamutpādaḥ prabhavati / yasya pratītyasamutpādaḥ pra-
 bhavati tasya catvāryāryasatyāni prabhavanti / yasya catvāryāryasa-
 tyāni prabhavanti tasya¹³ śrāmaṇyaphalāni prabhavanti¹⁴, sarva-

¹ R om. *pratyuktam*.

² R omits *pratiṣedhaḥ siddhaḥ*, which C has too.

³ *katham*, R.

⁴ R om. *hetuṛ*.

⁵ R inserts *tvadvacanena*.

⁶ *na caitad eva yuktā*, R.

⁷ R omits *krame*, and T omits *trayaḥ* which C has.

⁸ R adds *kramaḥ*.

⁹ *abhāvātve yā*, R. T adds *tasminn asiddhe*.

¹⁰ R omits *etena krameṇa* and 'pi *siddhaḥ*; C has the latter.

¹¹ *kinna bhavati*, R (two syllables short). For the verse cf. *MMK*, xxiv, 14; Candrakīrti's commentary there follows closely Nāgārjuna's commentary here.

¹² R adds *iti*.

¹³ R omits *prabhavanti tasya*, which is found in C and in T.

¹⁴ R om. *pra*.

viśeṣādhigamāḥ prabhavanti ¹ / yasya sarvaviśeṣādhigamāḥ prabhavanti tasya trīṇi ratnāni buddhadharmasamghāḥ prabhavanti / yasya pratītyasamutpādaḥ prabhavati tasya dharmo dharmahetur-dharmaphalaṃ ca prabhavanti ², tasyādharmo 'dharmaheturadhar-maphalaṃ ca prabhavanti / yasya dharmādharmau dharmādharmahetū dharmādharmaphale ca prabhavanti ³ / tasya kleśaḥ kleśasamudayaḥ kleśavastūni ⁴ ca prabhavanti / yasyaitatsarvaṃ prabhavati ⁵ pūrvoktaṃ tasya sugatidurgativyavasthā sugatidurgatigamanam sugatidurgatigāmī mārgaḥ ⁶ sugatidurgativyatikramaṇam ⁷ sugatidurgativyatikramopāyaḥ sarvasamvyavahārāśca laukikā vyavasthāpitāḥ ⁸ / svayamadhigantavyā anayā diśā kiṃ-cicchakyaṃ vacanenopadeṣṭumiti ⁹ /

bhavati cātra

yaḥ śūnyatām pratītyasamutpādaṃ madhyamām pratipadaṃ ca ¹⁰ / ekārthām nijagāda praṇamāmi tamapratimabuddham ¹¹ // iti ¹² kṛtīriyamācāryanāgārjunapādānām //

¹ R om. *pra*. T abridges these three sentences, reading *yasya hi śūnyatā prabhavati tasya pratītyasamutpādaś catvāry āryasatyāni śrāmaṇyaphalāni sarvaviśeṣādhigamāḥ prabhavanti*; but C corroborates R, except that it omits the reference to the *śrāmaṇyaphalāni*.

² *prabhavati*, R, and again in the next clause. C inserts *yasya dharmo dharmahetuś ca dharmaphalaṃ ca prabhavanti*.

³ R omits this clause, which both C and T have, but the exact wording is uncertain.

⁴ *°vastuno*, R.

⁵ R om. *pra*.

⁶ *sattvaḥ*, T; C perhaps read *dharmāḥ*. The reading is therefore uncertain.

⁷ R adds *gamana* after *durgati*.

⁸ R om. *vyavasthāpitāḥ*.

⁹ R omits *na*, and T omits *iti*.

¹⁰ *pratipadam anekārtham*, R, against the metre and leaving the next line defective.

¹¹ *apratimasambuddham*, R, against the metre.

¹² T om. *iti*.

INDEX OF KĀRIKĀS

- atha tu pramāṇasiddhir 45
 atha te pramāṇasiddhyā 46
 atha na pratītya kiṃcit 54
 atha nāsti sa svabhāvaḥ 12
 atha naivāsti grāho 15
 atha matamapekṣya siddhis 42
 athavā nirmitakāyaṃ 27
 athavā sādhyasamo 'yaṃ 28
 atha vidyate svabhāvaḥ 10, 60
 atha sasvabhāvametaḥ 2
 atha hetorastitvaṃ 19
 anapekṣya hi prameyaṃ 41
 anumānaṃ pratyuktaṃ 6
 anyairyadi pramāṇaiḥ 32
 aprāpto 'pi jvalano 39
 utpadyamāna eva 38
 etena hetvabhāvaḥ 68
 evamakuśaleṣv 56
 kuśālaṇāṃ pitā kaḥ putraḥ 50
 kuśālānāṃ dharmāṇāṃ 7, 52
 teṣāmatha pramāṇair 33
 nanvevaṃ satyasti 14
 na svābhāvikaṃmetad 24
 nādharmo dharmo vā 55
 nāmāsaditi ca yadidaṃ 58
 nāsti tamaśca jvalane 37
 nirmitako nirmitakaṃ 23
 nairyaṇīkasvabhāvo 8
 naiḥsvābhāvyaṇāṃ cen 26
 naiva svataḥ prasiddhir 51
 pītrā yadyutpādyah 49
 pūrvaṃ cetpratiśedhaḥ 20
 pratiśedhaḥ pratiśedhyaṃ 16
 pratiśedhapratiśedho 4
 pratiśedhayase 'tha tvaṃ 62
 pratiśedhayāmi nāhaṃ 63
 pratyakṣeṇa hi tāvat 5
 prabhavati ca śūnyateyaṃ 70
 bālānāmiva mithyā 13
 mā śabdavaditi nāyaṃ 25
 mā śabdavadityetaḥ 3
 mṛgatṛṣṇāḍḍṛṣṭānte 65
 yaḥ sadbhūtaṃ nāmātra 57
 yaccāharte vacanād 64
 yadi kācana pratijñā 29
 yadi kiṃcidupalabheyaṃ 30
 yadi ca na bhavetsvabhāvo 9
 yadi ca pratītya kuśalaḥ 53
 yadi ca pramāṇataste 31
 yadi ca prameyasiddhir 44
 yadi ca svaparātmānau 36
 yadi ca svabhāvataḥ syāt 67
 yadi ca svātmānamayaṃ 35
 yadi cāhetoh siddhiḥ 18
 yadi svataśca pramāṇa 40
 yaśca pratītyabhāvo 22
 yastraikālye hetuḥ 69
 viśamopanyāso 'yaṃ 34
 sata eva pratiśedho 11, 61
 sa yadi svabhāvataḥ syāt 66
 sarveṣāṃ bhāvaṇāṃ 1, 59
 sidhyanti ca prameyair 48
 sidhyanti hi pramāṇair 47
 sidhyanti hi prameyaṇy 43
 hetupratyayasāmagryāṃ 21
 hetośca te na siddhir 17

