The Flatac Frama-c front-end

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What is flatac ?

- Part of a toolchain that aims at proving that C programs don't generate memory faults and don't violates assertions.
- A front end that generates NTS based models of C programs.
- Coded as a Frama-C plugin.

Typical memory faults :

- Memory access outside and allocated memory zone of the heap
- Access to an array outside of its bounds
- Memory access using a non aligned address
- Double free
- Freeing an allocated segment using an pointer that does not points at the begining of the segment.
- Memory leaks

Two subkinds of properties :

- Properties concerning the memory shape (Simple Separation Logic):
  - Relation between pointer variables (Stack) and location variables (heaps).
  - Memory allocation.
  - Allocated Segment separation.
- Arithmetic properties :
  - Memory segment access within its bounds.
  - Memory address alignment (Congruence).

Tracked property

This front end aims at proving that C programs :

- Have no execution run that lead to memory fault.
- Have no exectution that violates some assertion expressed using arithmetic constraints.

Flatac plugin: Front end of NTS error state reachability analysis

- Extracts models of C Programs using Abstract Interpretation Techniques.
- Adds Numerical Transitions Systems informations on the model for a posteri Verification Phase.

How to do that ?

1. Extracting an extended cfg from Frama-c cfg (Cil statements $\times$SSL memory abstractions)^2
2. Labelling the Ecfg transitions with Numerical Transition System expression –Guards, counter affectation and Function Calls.
3. If a SSL Abs value of a state is $\bot$, define this state as an error state.
4. Export the labelled Ecfg into Nts Format.
5. Ask an analysis tool –Flata, Eldarica, to check whether some error state is reachable from the entry point (main function).

Flatac in the tool-chain:



Abstract interpretation preliminary part

Simple Separation Logic formulae : Abstract domain.

$$
\begin{array}{lcll}
\phi & := & \pi \updownarrow \sigma \mid \exists l.\phi & \text{Formulae} \\
\pi & := & x \mapsto l \mid x \mapsto \text{nil} \mid (l_1 = l_2) \mid \pi_1 \wedge \pi_2 & \text{Pure part} \\
\sigma & := & \text{Emp} \mid \mathit{alloc}(l) \mid \sigma_1 * \sigma_2 & \text{Spatial part}
\end{array}
$$

Properties of SSL

The problem that follows are decidable :

- Satisfiability (Valid configuration)
- Entailment, Equivalence.
- Memory leaks

Those problems are solved using rewriting techniques.

Example of SSL formulae

- $x \mapsto l_1 \wedge y \mapsto l \wedge z \mapsto \text{nil} \updownarrow \text{Emp}$
- $x \mapsto l_1 \wedge y \mapsto l \wedge z \mapsto \text{nil} \updownarrow alloc(l_1)$
- $x \mapsto l_1 \wedge y \mapsto l \wedge z \mapsto \text{nil} \updownarrow alloc(l_1) * alloc(l)$
- $x \mapsto l_1 \wedge y \mapsto l \wedge z \mapsto \text{nil} \updownarrow alloc(l_1) * alloc(l)$
- $x = y \wedge x \mapsto l_1 \wedge y \mapsto l \updownarrow alloc(l_1) * alloc(l)$ (Unsat)
- $x = y \wedge x \mapsto l_1 \wedge y \mapsto \text{nil} \updownarrow alloc(l_1)$ (Unsat)
- $true \updownarrow alloc(l)$ (Leak)

Model extraction :

Input : Cil AST and Control flow graph
Generated Model : Extended CFG,
$(S_i, S_f, S_{err}, S, \rightarrow \in (S \times R \times S))$
where :

- $S \in (\text{Cil\_types.stmt} \times Abs)$,
- $Abs =$ Set of SSL formula $\bigcup \perp$,
- R is a set of possibly guarded NTS transitions.

Memory access rules

Correct access:

$$\{\phi\} \xrightarrow[\substack{0 \leq [\![x]\!]_\phi + \text{sizeof}(\tau) \leq l_{size} \\ \wedge([\![P]\!]_\phi + base_\phi(P)) \equiv 0[\text{sizeof}(\tau)]}]{\text{access}(P)} \{\phi\} \quad alloc(l) \in SP(\phi) \quad \text{where} \begin{cases} P : \tau*, \\ l \equiv base_\phi(P). \end{cases}$$

Access to an unallocated address :

$$\{\exists l.\phi\} \xrightarrow{\text{access}(P)} \{\bot\} \quad alloc(l) \notin SP(\phi), l \in \mathcal{F}Vars(\phi), \text{ where } l \equiv base_\phi(P)$$

Access outside of an allocated zone, or with an unaligned address :

$$\{\phi\} \xrightarrow[\substack{[\![P]\!]_\phi + \text{sizeof}(x) > l_{size} \\ \vee [\![P]\!]_\phi \not\equiv 0[\text{sizeof}(\tau)]}]{\text{access}(P)} \{\bot\} \quad alloc(l) \in SP(\phi) \begin{cases} \text{where } P : \tau*, \\ l \equiv base_\phi(P), \end{cases}$$

Among other things

- Validity of integer values : Initialization, difference between two pointers, (Valid, Not Valid, Don't Know)
- Transitions not generated when guards can be statically proved false.

Verification Phase : Reachability Analysis

- Exporting the Ecfg Hierarchical Numerical Transition System.
- Reachability analisys of the error states by FLATA and/or ELDARICA
- If some error state is reachable : An alarm is raised.
- If no error states is reachable : The program is free of the memory fault we consider.