

Intermediate Macroeconomics

Econ 102 - UCLA - Fall 2018

François Geerolf

Contents

Econ 102 Material	13
Syllabus	15
1 Introduction to Macroeconomics	19
1.1 The Product Approach to GDP	19
1.1.1 Consumption (C)	20
1.1.2 Investment (I)	22
1.1.3 Government Purchases (G)	22
1.1.4 Net Exports (NX)	22
1.2 The Income Approach to GDP	24
1.2.1 Cobb-Douglas Production function	24
1.2.2 The Income Side in the Data	26
Readings - To go further	27
2 The Solow Growth Model	29
2.1 General Production Function	29
2.1.1 The Solow Model	29
2.1.2 Law of motion for capital per worker	30
2.1.3 Steady-state	31
2.1.4 Convergence to the steady-state	31
2.2 Cobb-Douglas production function	31
2.2.1 Production function	31
2.2.2 Law of motion for capital	32
2.2.3 Steady-state	32
2.2.4 Golden Rule	33
2.3 Some Data	35
Readings - To go further	35
3 Two Period Consumption Problem	39
3.1 The Two-Period Consumption Problem	39
3.1.1 Assumptions	39
3.1.2 Constrained Optimization Problem	40
3.1.3 4 methods	40
3.2 Some examples	42
3.2.1 Log utility, no discounting	42
3.2.2 Log utility, with discounting	42
3.3 Generalization	43
Readings - To go further	43
4 The Overlapping Generations Model	45
4.1 Assumptions	45

4.1.1	Time	45
4.1.2	Demographics	45
4.1.3	Production	46
4.2	Solution	46
4.2.1	Saving	46
4.2.2	Capital accumulation	46
4.2.3	Numerical Application	47
4.3	Why do people save?	47
4.3.1	Some data	47
4.3.2	Saving of the rich	50
	Readings - To go further	51
5	Technological Change	53
5.1	Long-run Economic Growth	53
5.1.1	The Facts of Growth	53
5.1.2	The Mathematics of Growth	53
5.1.3	Questions	56
5.2	Endogenous Growth Model	58
5.2.1	Objects VS Ideas	58
5.2.2	Increasing Returns	59
5.2.3	Model	59
5.2.4	Solution	60
5.2.5	Shortcomings	60
	Readings - To go further	61
6	The Labor Market and Unemployment	63
6.1	The Neoclassical Model	63
6.1.1	Assumptions	63
6.1.2	Solution	64
6.1.3	A Simple Example	65
6.1.4	An Example: A Shock to Labor Demand	66
6.2	The “Keynesian” Model	66
6.3	The Bathtub Model	68
6.3.1	Model	68
6.3.2	Solution	68
6.3.3	Data on Job Churning	69
	Readings - To go further	69
7	The Consumption Function and the Multiplier	71
7.1	The Demand for Goods	72
7.1.1	Consumption Demand	72
7.1.2	Investment Demand	73
7.1.3	Government Spending	73
7.2	The Simple Goods Market Model	74
7.2.1	Algebraic derivation of the multiplier	74
7.2.2	Four interpretations	75
7.3	Extensions of the Goods Market Model	76
7.3.1	Automatic Stabilizers	76
7.3.2	“Accelerator” Effect	77
	Required Readings	78
	Readings - To go further	78
8	The Paradox of Thrift	79
8.1	Simple goods market model	80
8.1.1	$\Delta c_0 < 0$	81

8.1.2 Fall in spending $\Delta G < 0$	82
8.1.3 Increase in net taxes $\Delta T > 0$	82
8.2 Extended goods market model	83
8.2.1 $\Delta c_0 < 0$	83
8.2.2 Fall in spending $\Delta G < 0$	84
8.2.3 Increase in net taxes $\Delta T > 0$	85
Readings - To go further	86
9 Redistributive Policies	87
9.1 Assumptions	88
9.1.1 Consumption and Income	88
9.1.2 Taxes	88
9.1.3 Investment	88
9.2 Aggregate Demand	89
9.2.1 Income	89
9.2.2 Taxes	90
9.2.3 Consumption	90
9.2.4 Aggregating	91
9.3 Fiscal Policies	92
9.3.1 Redistribution	92
9.3.2 Tax cuts for high income earners	93
9.3.3 Tax cuts for low income earners	94
Readings - To go further	95
10 Public Debt, Say's Law	97
10.1 Sustainability of Public Debt	98
10.1.1 Law of motion for Public Debt	98
10.1.2 Condition for Sustainability	99
10.1.3 Is public debt sustainable in the U.S.?	99
10.2 Public Debt in the Overlapping Generations Model	101
10.2.1 Overlapping Generations Model	101
10.2.2 Without Government Debt	102
10.2.3 With Government Debt	104
10.3 The Treasury View, and Say's Law	106
10.3.1 Treasury View: The Effects of Deficit Spending on Investment	106
10.3.2 Say's law: supply creates its own demand	107
Readings - To go further	108
11 The Open Economy and the Multiplier	109
11.1 Aggregate Demand in the Open Economy	110
11.1.1 Assumption: No Exchange Rates	110
11.1.2 National Accounting	110
11.2 Multiplier in the Open Economy	110
11.2.1 Output in the Open Economy	111
11.2.2 Open Economy Multiplier	111
11.3 Twin Deficits?	113
11.3.1 "Saving Equals Investment" in the open economy	113
11.3.2 A Budget Deficit and a Trade Deficit	113
11.3.3 A Budget Surplus and a Trade Deficit	116
Readings - To go further	117
12 Monetary Policy	119
12.1 The exchange rate channel	119
12.1.1 The Mundell Trilemma	119
12.1.2 Nominal and Real Exchange Rates	120

12.1.3 Multilateral Exchange Rates	121
12.1.4 Uncovered Interest Parity	121
12.2 The Credit Channel	123
Readings - To go further	125
13 Theoretical Controversies	127
13.1 Austrian VS Keynesian Economics	127
13.2 Short-run Keynes: The Neoclassical Synthesis	128
13.3 Neoclassical Economics	128
13.4 Long-run Keynes: Secular stagnation	129
Readings - To go further	130
14 Empirical Macroeconomics	131
14.1 Aggregate Studies	131
14.1.1 Government Spending Multipliers	131
14.1.2 Tax Multipliers	132
14.1.3 Advantages and Drawbacks	135
14.2 Individual-Level Studies	135
14.2.1 Labor Supply Elasticity	136
14.2.2 Marginal Propensity to Consume	137
14.3 Cross-Sectional Studies	137
Readings - To go further	142
15 A Macroeconomic History of the U.S.	143
15.1 The success of Keynesian Economics	143
15.2 Post-war Macroeconomic Performance	146
15.3 U.S. Fiscal Policy	148
15.4 Trade Deficits and Manufacturing Decline	148
Readings - To go further	154
A Problem Set 1	159
A.1 Geometric Sums	159
A.2 Taylor Approximations	159
A.3 Growth Rates	160
B Problem Set 2	161
B.1 Solow Growth Model if $\alpha = 1/2$ and $A = 1/2$	161
B.2 Solow Growth Model if $\alpha = 1/3$	161
B.3 An increase in the depreciation rate	162
B.4 Deficits and the capital stock	162
B.5 U.S. saving and government deficits	162
C Problem Set 3	165
C.1 Two-period Intertemporal Optimization	165
C.2 Another Overlapping Generations model	165
D Problem Set 4	167
D.1 The Solow Growth Model with Exogenous Growth	167
D.2 The Neoclassical Labor Market Model	168
D.3 The “Keynesian” Labor Market Model	168
D.4 The Bathtub model	168
E Problem Set 5	171
E.1 Gregory N. Mankiw - NYT - Nov 30, 2008	171
E.2 Procyclical Government spending	171

E.3 Accelerator and Automatic Stabilizer	172
F Problem Set 6	173
Another Numerical Example	173
G Problem Set 7	175
Another overlapping-generations model with government debt	175
H Problem Set 8	177
H.1 Optimal Taxation: The “Supply Side” (Neoclassical) View	177
H.2 Paul Krugman VS Robert Barro on the Bush tax cuts	178
I Problem Set 9	179
I.1 A Budget Surplus and a Trade Deficit	179
I.2 Coordination of Economic Policies	179
J Problem Set 1 - Solution	181
J.1 Geometric Sums	181
J.2 Taylor Approximations	182
J.3 Growth Rates	183
K Problem Set 2 - Solution	185
K.1 Solow Growth Model if $\alpha = 1/2$ and $A = 1/2$	185
K.2 Solow Growth Model if $\alpha = 1/3$	186
K.3 An increase in the depreciation rate in the Solow growth model	187
K.4 Deficits and the capital stock	188
K.5 U.S. saving and government deficits	189
L Problem Set 3 - Solution	191
L.1 Two-period Intertemporal Optimization	191
L.2 Another Overlapping Generations model	192
M Problem Set 4 - Solution	195
M.1 The Solow Model with Exogenous Growth	195
M.2 The Neoclassical Labor Market Model	200
M.3 The “Keynesian” Labor Market Model	204
M.4 The Bathtub model	205
N Problem Set 5 - Solution	207
N.1 Gregory N. Mankiw - NYT - Nov 30, 2008	207
N.2 Procyclical Government Spending	208
N.3 Accelerator and Automatic Stabilizer	209
O Problem Set 6 - Solution	211
Another Numerical Example	211
P Problem Set 7 - Solution	215
Another overlapping-generations model with government debt	215
Q Problem Set 8 - Solution	221
Q.1 Optimal Taxation: The Supply Side View	221
Q.2 Paul Krugman VS Robert Barro on the Bush tax cuts	227
R Problem Set 9 - Solution	231
R.1 A Budget Surplus and a Trade Deficit	231
R.2 Coordination of Economic Policies	234

List of Tables

5.1 COUNTRIES WITH GDP PER CAPITA LOWER THAN \$1.5K.	57
5.2 COUNTRIES WITH GDP PER CAPITA HIGHER THAN \$40K.	58

List of Figures

1.1	US GDP AND CONSUMPTION FROM NIPA (BEA)	20
1.2	US GDP AND CONSUMPTION FROM NIPA (BEA) - LOG SCALE	21
1.3	CONSUMPTION AS A SHARE OF GDP FROM NIPA (BEA)	21
1.4	GOODS AND SERVICES CONSUMPTION AS A SHARE OF GDP FROM NIPA (BEA)	22
1.5	INVESTMENT AS A SHARE OF GDP FROM NIPA (BEA)	23
1.6	GOVERNMENT PURCHASES AS A SHARE OF GDP FROM NIPA (BEA)	23
1.7	NET EXPORTS AS A SHARE OF GDP FROM NIPA (BEA)	24
1.8	COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES AS A SHARE OF GDP FROM NIPA (BEA)	26
2.1	GROSS SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. (WDI)	35
2.2	NET SAVINGS AND GROSS SAVINGS (WDI)	36
2.3	INVESTMENT (% OF GDP), 2016	36
2.4	GROSS SAVING (% OF GDP), 2016	37
4.1	AGGREGATE US HOUSEHOLD WEALTH, 1913–2013. SOURCE: SAEZ, ZUCMAN (2016).	48
4.2	SAVING RATE BY WEALTH CLASS (DECENNIAL AVERAGE). SOURCE: SAEZ, ZUCMAN (2016).	48
4.3	TOP 10% WEALTH SHARE. SOURCE: SAEZ, ZUCMAN (2016).	49
4.4	TOP 1-10% AND TOP 1% WEALTH SHARE. SOURCE: SAEZ, ZUCMAN (2016).	49
5.1	1200-2010 GDP PER CAPITA (MADDISON DATA)	54
5.2	1700-2010 GDP PER CAPITA (MADDISON DATA)	54
5.3	1800-2010 GDP PER CAPITA (MADDISON DATA)	55
5.4	1900-2010 GDP PER CAPITA (MADDISON DATA)	55
5.5	2014 GDP PER CAPITA, BY COUNTRY (PENN WORLD TABLES)	57
6.1	SHOCK TO LABOR DEMAND IN THE NEOCLASSICAL AND KEYNESIAN MODELS	67
6.2	MONTHLY HIRES AND SEPARATIONS, IN THOUSANDS. SOURCE: BLS-JOLTS	69
6.3	MONTHLY JOB OPENINGS, LAYOFFS AND QUITs, IN THOUSANDS. SOURCE: BLS-JOLTS	70
7.1	THE SIMPLE GOODS MARKET (ZZ)-(YY) MODEL	75
7.2	SIMPLE KEYNESIAN CROSS: GRAPHICAL INTERPRETATIONS	76
7.3	VARIATIONS: AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS, ACCELERATOR EFFECT	77
10.1	10-YEAR TREASURY RATE (SOURCE: FRED)	100
10.2	10-YEAR TREASURY INFLATION PROTECTED SECURITIES RATE (SOURCE: FRED)	100
10.3	INTEREST PAYMENTS ON GOVERNMENT DEBT AS % OF GDP (SOURCE: FRED)	101
12.1	FIRST VERSION OF THE BIG MAC INDEX, 1986	121
12.2	SCREENSHOT OF THE ECONOMIST WEBSITE, 2018	122
12.3	FED FUNDS RATES. SOURCE: GUERRIERI, UHLIG (2016)	124
12.4	DELINQUENCY RATES ON MORTGAGES: PRIME, SUBPRIME, ADJUSTABLE, FIXED. SOURCE: GUERRIERI, UHLIG (2016)	125

14.1 IMPACT ON GDP OF A 1% OF GDP AGGREGATE TAX INCREASE. SOURCE: ROMER, ROMER (2010).	133
14.2 LIST OF MAJOR U.S. TAX CHANGES IN ROMER, ROMER (2010). SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).	134
14.3 IMPACT ON INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF GDP OF A 1% OF GDP AGGREGATE TAX INCREASE. SOURCE: ROMER, ROMER (2010).	135
14.4 SELF-REPORTED MPC FROM TRANSITORY INCOME SHOCK. SOURCE: JAPPELLI, PISTAFERRI (2014).	138
14.5 AVERAGE MPC BY CASH-ON-HAND PERCENTILES. SOURCE: JAPPELLI, PISTAFERRI (2014).	138
14.6 VARIOUS TYPES OF U.S. TAX REFORMS. SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).	139
14.7 AN EXAMPLE OF TAX INCREASE ON HIGH INCOME EARNERS: 1992 AND 1993 INCOME TAX SCHEDULES. SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).	139
14.8 FEDERAL INCOME AND PAYROLL TAX CHANGES BY AGI QUINTILE. SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).	140
14.9 SHARE OF HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS. SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).	140
14.10 EMPLOYMENT TO POPULATION RATIO. SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).	141
14.11 EMPLOYMENT. SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).	141
14.12 NOMINAL GDP, REAL GDP, PRICE INDEXES. SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).	142
 15.1 U.S. REAL GDP (1929-2018).	144
15.2 U.S. STOCK MARKET (1920-1936).	144
15.3 U.S. PRICE LEVEL (1917-1939).	145
15.4 AVERAGE GDP GROWTH. SOURCE: BLINDER, WATSON (2016).	146
15.5 AVERAGE VALUES OF MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES BY PARTY OF PRESIDENT. SOURCE: BLINDER, WATSON (2016).	147
15.6 GROWTH RATES BY YEAR, WITHIN PRESIDENTIAL TERMS. SOURCE: BLINDER, WATSON (2016).	148
15.7 EXPLAINING THE DEMOCRAT-REPUBLICAN GROWTH GAP. SOURCE: BLINDER, WATSON (2016).	149
15.8 AVERAGE TAX RATES: TOP 1%, BOTTOM 50%. SOURCE: PIKETTY ET AL. (2017).	150
15.9 >AVERAGE TAX RATES: TOP 10%, BOTTOM 90%. SOURCE: PIKETTY ET AL. (2017).	150
15.10 AVERAGE TAX RATES: TOP 1%, TOP 0.5%, TOP 0.1%. SOURCE: PIKETTY ET AL. (2017).	151
15.11 TOP MARGINAL TAX RATES, INCOME SHARES. SOURCE: PIKETTY ET AL. (2014).	151
15.12 NET EXPORTS AS A SHARE OF GDP FROM NIPA (BEA).	152
15.13 BUDGET SURPLUS (% OF GDP).	152
15.14 MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT. SOURCE: CHARLES ET AL. (2018).	154
15.15 EMPLOYMENT RATE, PRIME-AGE INDIVIDUALS, 1980–2015. SOURCE: CHARLES ET AL. (2016).	155
15.16 TOTAL MONTHLY U.S. EMPLOYMENT. SOURCE: CHARLES ET AL. (2016).	155
15.17 CONSTRUCTION, MANUFACTURING, AND NONEMPLOYMENT SHARES, NONCOLLEGE MEN. SOURCE: CHARLES ET AL. (2016).	156
15.18 MANUFACTURING DECLINE AND OPIOID CRISIS. SOURCE: CHARLES ET AL. (2018).	156
 M.1 LABOR MARKET: PRODUCTIVITY SHOCK.	203
M.2 LABOR MARKET: LAZINESS SHOCK.	203
 N.1 GRAPHICAL INTERPRETATION FOR THE MULTIPLIER.	209

Econ 102 Material

This website contains most of the class material for *Intermediate Macro (Econ 102)* I teach at UCLA. The Moodle platform should be used for the discussion board as well as some additional readings.

All lectures. Below is an up-to-date version to all lectures and problem sets in pdf format, as well as a beta ebook version of the class.

- All lectures and Problem Sets. pdf / epub.

Lectures. Below is an html and a pdf version of all individual lectures, as well as a timetable of the class. I do not recommend using the individual pdf files, as the links across lectures and problem sets are missing.

- Oct 01. html / pdf. Lecture 1 - Introduction to Macroeconomics. Slides.
- Oct 03. html / pdf. Lecture 2 - The Solow Growth Model. Slides.
- Oct 08. html / pdf. Lecture 3 - Two Period Consumption Problem. Slides.
- Oct 10. html / pdf. Lecture 4 - The Overlapping Generations Model. Slides.
- Oct 15. html / pdf. Lecture 5 - Technological Growth. Slides.
- Oct 17. html / pdf. Lecture 6 - The Labor Market and Unemployment. Slides.
- Oct 22. html / pdf. Lecture 7 - The Consumption Function and the Multiplier. Slides.
- Oct 24. html / pdf. Lecture 8 - The Paradox of Thrift. Slides.
- Oct 31. html / pdf. Lecture 9 - Redistributive Policies. Slides.
- Nov 07. html / pdf. Lecture 10 - Public debt, Say's law. Slides.
- Nov 19. html / pdf. Lecture 11 - The Open Economy and the Multiplier.
- Nov 26. html / pdf. Lecture 12 - Monetary Policy.
- Nov 28. html / pdf. Lecture 13 - Theoretical Controversies.
- Dec 03. html / pdf. Lecture 14 - Empirical Macroeconomics. Slides.
- Dec 05. html / pdf. Lecture 15 - A Macroeconomic History of the U.S. Slides.

Problem Sets. Below is an html version of all problem sets and solutions. I do not recommend using the individual pdf files, as the links across lectures and problem sets are missing.

- Week 1. html / pdf. Solutions. html / pdf. Spreadsheet. web / ods / xlsx.
- Week 2. html / pdf. Solutions. html / pdf. Spreadsheet. web / ods / xlsx.
- Week 3. html / pdf. Solutions. html / pdf. Spreadsheet. web / ods / xlsx.
- Week 4. html / pdf. Solutions. html / pdf. Spreadsheet. web / ods / xlsx.
- Week 5. html / pdf. Solutions. html / pdf.
- Week 6. html / pdf. Solutions. html / pdf.
- Week 7. html / pdf. Solutions. html / pdf.
- Week 8. html / pdf. Solutions. html / pdf. Spreadsheet. web / ods / xlsx.
- Week 9. html / pdf. Solutions. html / pdf.
- Week 10. Review session.

Help with maths. For this class, you are expected to be fluent with algebra and some calculus. If you do not like maths at all, you are best advised to take Econ 102 in another term, with another instructor using less quantitative methods. The only maths you are responsible for are those used in lectures and problem sets for this class. The following references might be useful at some point; but they contain much more than

what you will need.

- Math Review. pdf1 / pdf2.
- Calculus made easy. pdf.

Past exams. Below is a list of past exams, for your reference. I would not try to look at past exams from 2015 or 2016, since I was then using a different textbook. Under “Spring 2018 (list)”, I also provide the list of exercises from Spring 2018 which you can solve using this year’s material. Anything that I do not go over this quarter is not exam material. In order to succeed in the class, it is best to first and primarily review the lectures and the problem sets.

- **Fall 2018.** Midterm / Solution ; Final / Solution.
- **Spring 2018.** Midterm / Solution ; Final / Solution.
- **Spring 2018 (list).** Midterm / Final.
- **Winter 2016.** Midterm 1 / Solution ; Midterm 2 / Solution ; Final / Solution.
- **Winter 2015.** Midterm 1 / Solution ; Midterm 2 / Solution ; Final / Solution.

Textbook. There is no required textbook for this class. However, a rough correspondance to chapters in Olivier Blanchard’s *Macroeconomics* textbook is provided here.

Syllabus

Lectures: Mondays and Wednesdays, 3:30-4:45pm, Dodd Hall, Room 147.

Office hours: Tuesdays, 4-6pm. (Bunche 8389)

Moodle Website: <https://moodle2.sscnet.ucla.edu/course/view/18F-ECON102-1>

Graduate Student Instructors (GSIs): Graduate Student Instructors are all graduate students in the UCLA Economics Department. They will teach sections and hold 2 hours of office hours in the Alper Room every week:

- Sections 1E-1I. Paula Beltran. OH: F 11-12; 2-3. pabeltran90@gmail.com
- Sections 1H-1M. Alvaro Boitier. OH: M 2:30-3:30; T 2-3. alvaro.boitier@gmail.com
- Sections 1N-1K. Conor Foley. OH: T 2-4. conor.teaches.econ@gmail.com
- Sections 1D-1J. Kun Hu. OH: R; 9-11. rickhukun@ucla.edu
- Sections 1G-1O. Ivan Lavrov. OH: W 1-3. ilavrov113@gmail.com
- Sections 1B-1C. Anthony Papac. OH: M 10-11; R 12:30-1:30. anthony.papac@g.ucla.edu
- Sections 1A-1F. Mengbo Zhang. OH: W 10-12. zmbruc@gmail.com

Course description. This course is meant to provide an intermediate-level treatment of macroeconomic topics, including the study of economic growth, business cycle fluctuations, unemployment, inflation, as well as open-economy macroeconomic issues such as trade imbalances and exchange rate policy. Although the title of the class is “Macroeconomic Theory”, students will learn both the theory as well as some of the empirical evidence behind the theory, and its practical implications. Special emphasis will be placed on the application of economic tools to contemporary economic problems and policies. Competing schools of thought will be presented, with a particular emphasis on Neoclassical and Keynesian theories, and they will be discussed in the light of macroeconomic data. Class meetings will be highly interactive, with many opportunities for you to both ask and answer questions.

Course Objectives. My objective is that, by the end of the course, you will be able to read, and critically assess writings from *The Economist*, *The Wall Street Journal*, or *The New York Times*. Macroeconomics is everywhere in the news, and I want to walk you through the tools you need to understand it better. Economics is ultimately an empirical subject, so as much as possible I will try to convey not just the theory of how the economy works, but also the evidence supporting, or contradicting the theory. We will not always reach definitive conclusions on most of the issues we will examine, but you should have a more informed opinion on each of them and why these questions are hard and debated scientifically.

Prerequisites. A strict prerequisite for the class is that you have taken Econ 101. If you do not meet this prerequisite, you are advised to take this course during another term. You should also be familiar with some elementary mathematics. For example, you need to know what a logarithm is, and how to calculate a geometric sum:

$$1 + c_1 + c_1^2 + \dots = \frac{1}{1 - c_1} \quad \text{if } 0 < c_1 < 1,$$

because that is really useful to understand how a Keynesian multiplier works, for example. If you do not know that already, that is fine too, but you should at least be willing to learn. If you want a treatment of Econ 102 which is less heavy on algebra, you are best advised to take this class in another term.

Textbook (optional): Olivier Blanchard's *Macroeconomics*, 7th Edition (previous editions should be fine, too).

Questions? If you have any question about the material covered during the course, you should consider the following options in order:

1. First, you should never refrain from asking questions during class.
2. Second, you may ask questions during recitation sections. The smaller group should allow you to ask questions more freely. Our teaching assistants are all passionate graduate students, writing a PhD thesis on macroeconomics or other related subjects, so they will be very happy to help you.
3. Third, TAs will hold their office hours. The times for their office hours is reminded here:
 - Paula Beltran. OH: F 11-12; 2-3. pabeltran90@gmail.com
 - Alvaro Boitier. OH: M 2:30-3:30; T 2-3. alvaro.boitier@gmail.com
 - Conor Foley. OH: T 2-4. conor.teaches.econ@gmail.com
 - Kun Hu. OH: R; 9-11. rickhukun@ucla.edu
 - Ivan Lavrov. OH: W 1-3. ilavrov113@gmail.com
 - Anthony Papac. OH: M 10-11; R 12:30-1:30. anthony.papac@g.ucla.edu
 - Mengbo Zhang. OH: W 10-12. zmbruc@gmail.com
4. Fourth, you should feel free to ask questions on the discussion board (not by email). We will never respond to questions about contents by email (in particular those starting with "is X, Y, Z, test material"), because doing so would be unfair to the rest of the class. In contrast, we commit to respond to all questions on the Moodle Website within 24 hours (either me or the TAs will). Beware ! You should start studying for the midterm exam earlier than November 4 – we will stop answering questions at **6pm the day before each exam** (either the midterm on November 5, or the final on December 14).
5. Finally, I will hold regular office hours on Tuesdays, 4-6pm, in my office 8389. Please send me an email prior if you plan to arrive after 5pm.

Class notes. Class notes will be posted *after* each class, so as to encourage you to take notes. Notes might not always be comprehensive, and everything I will say during class is potentially examinable, even if it does not appear in the notes. Thus, to do well it's best if you attend all lectures.¹

(Optional) Would-be Data scientists. A lot of what we do in the class involves a fair amount of data. I use the *R statistical software* in order to prepare my lecture notes and input the data from official sources, to provide you with the most up-to-date statistics. I will try to provide the required code to replicate all the analysis available in my lecture notes, as much as possible. For example, lecture 1 has the R code added to the lecture notes available here. An introduction to R statistical software is available here. I think that data science, statistics and economics are very complementary skills (so does the Massachusetts Institute of Technology). However, understanding code is not required at all to succeed in that class. You will not be penalized in any way if you skip this.

Grades. Your final grade has two components: one midterm exam, and a comprehensive final exam. Your final grade will be given by whichever of these two options gives you the best grade: (**Midterm (40%) + Final Exam (60%)**) or (**Final Exam (100%)**) at the following dates:

1. November 5, 3:30pm to 4:45pm: Midterm Exam.
2. December 14, 11:30am to 2:30pm: Final Exam.

No make-up exams. In any case, there will be no make-up exams. If a midterm exam is missed due to a documented serious illness or emergency, the final exam will be worth 100 % of your grade. Note that attending the midterm is like an "option value": you are necessarily better off attending the midterm, no matter what your grade is. Please make sure right away that you can be there on November 5 !

¹David Romer, a leading macroeconomist at U.C. Berkeley, has some evidence on this: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2138449>.

Regrade Policy. Students who wish to have their midterm or their final examinations regraded should submit a request in written form to their assigned Graduate Student Instructor, clearly explaining why they think they deserve a regrade. If a student requests a regrade, the whole exam will be regraded. Therefore, the grade can increase or decrease.

Exam content. Everything that I say during the class, that is covered during recitation sections, is potentially exam material. Exams will be a combination of multiple choice and short essay questions. Therefore, it is absolutely necessary that you attend all lectures! I encourage you to take notes during the class.

Exam practicalities. During exams, sufficient space will be provided on the sheets to answer. No notes, no books, no smartphones, no calculators, will be allowed during the exam. You must bring your UCLA ID in order to take the exam. Without a UCLA ID, you will not be allowed to take the exam. You will not need to bring scantrons, as we will be using Scantrons from the Office of Instructional Development (OID).

Other. For more details about policies regarding grading, exams and other matters please refer to the following link: <https://www.econ.ucla.edu/undergraduate/>. I will adhere to the guidelines specified in this webpage. If you wish to request an accommodation due to a suspected or documented disability, please contact the Center for Accessible Education as soon as possible at A255 Murphy Hall, (310) 825-1501, (310) 206-6083 (telephone device for the deaf). The website is <http://www.cae.ucla.edu/>.

Teaching Philosophy. To the extent possible, I will strive to emphasize **facts** over **theories**. This is a major difference with the way that I taught this class in the past. Many of the issues that we will look at are politically charged, and various theories have been developed which usually speak to either ideological views. Theory usually does not allow to conclude definitively. This is unfortunate, because macroeconomic questions are debated on both sides of the political spectrum:

- Do advanced economies have too high levels of public debt?
- Should fiscal stimulus be used to fight recessions?
- What is the cause of unemployment? (how much is voluntary or involuntary?)

... and many other questions. Fortunately, these questions are increasingly studied on the empirical front. Whenever possible, we shall try to “let the data speak”, and put the different theories that we will study to the test. Empirical research is still ongoing, and I will do my best to teach you the most up-to-date findings. In doing so, I will try to be as objective as possible, and try to avoid any conservative or liberal bias. According to this article (link), the latter is more of a risk than the former. I will always try to give you both sides of the debate, and arguments supporting each side. You are welcomed (and even encouraged !) to disagree with what I say during class !

Lecture 1

Introduction to Macroeconomics

GDP is the value of all final goods and services produced in a country within a given period. There are two sides to GDP, the demand side and the supply side:

1. On the **demand side**, the **product approach to GDP** recognizes that total aggregate demand is made of four components:
 - Consumption spending by households (C).
 - Investment spending by households and corporations (I).
 - Government purchases (G).
 - Net exports (NX).

This approach to GDP based on aggregate demand for goods will be central in lectures 7, 8, 9 and 11. It is presented in section 1.1.

2. On the **supply side**, the production of output involves the use of factors of production, typically limited to capital (K) and labor (L). These factors of production receive payment for their use, whose sum equals GDP.¹ The **income approach to GDP** consists in dividing up these payments into the different factors of production. Again, this often simply means a division of total value added into capital income, and labor income. It is presented in section 1.2.

1.1 The Product Approach to GDP

GDP is equal to the total aggregate demand for goods:

$$Y = C + I + G + X - M.$$

We often define net exports as:²

$$NX \equiv X - M,$$

so that GDP is simply:

$$Y = C + I + G + NX.$$

We examine each component of aggregate demand in turn:

- Consumption (C): in section 1.1.1

¹Note that we are assuming here that there are no “rents” in the economy, that is that nothing can be obtained without either labor or capital. This is not exactly true, as for example oil is clearly more valuable than the costs of extracting it for the soil. Land is another example of something that is preexisting, but nevertheless earns a payment. It is a good first-order approximation however, as most production in fact requires either labor or capital.

²In some textbooks (as well as in earlier versions of these lecture notes), imports are denoted by IM instead of M .




Figure 1.1: US GDP AND CONSUMPTION FROM NIPA (BEA).

- Investment (I): in section 1.1.2
- Government Purchases (G): in section 1.1.3
- Net Exports (NX): in section 1.1.4

1.1.1 Consumption (C)

Figure 1.1 plots GDP from the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) produced by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), as well as Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE), in billions of dollars. We can see that Gross Domestic Product is currently in the vicinity of \$20 trillion (or \$20,000 billion). For this figure, data is retrieved from <https://db.nomics.world>, a great source of macroeconomic data. For example, data for Gross Domestic Product is available here and data for Personal Consumption Expenditures is available there.

We also note that growth of GDP and consumption is roughly exponential over time, because it looks almost linear when plotted on a **log scale** (for the y-axis).

To get a better of sense of how big consumption is as a fraction to GDP (although you may eyeball it on this picture), we might plot consumption as a function of GDP, which is what I do on Figure 1.3. You can see that Personal Consumption Expenditures are approximately **60 to 70 % of GDP**. You can also see that it has been rising since the end of the sixties. We will discuss that.

Personal Consumption Expenditures are divided up into:

- Durable Goods (more than 3 years of durability): e.g. cars.
- Non-durable Goods (less than 3 years of durability).
- Services.

Services have become more important than Goods in total consumption since the 1970s, as Figure 1.4 shows.




Figure 1.2: US GDP AND CONSUMPTION FROM NIPA (BEA) - LOG SCALE.




Figure 1.3: CONSUMPTION AS A SHARE OF GDP FROM NIPA (BEA).




Figure 1.4: GOODS AND SERVICES CONSUMPTION AS A SHARE OF GDP FROM NIPA (BEA).

1.1.2 Investment (I)

Investment has two components:

- **non residential investment** is the purchase of new capital goods by firms: structures, new plants.
- **residential investment** is the purchase of new houses.

Gross private domestic investment is approximately **15 to 20 % of GDP**, as you can see on Figure 1.5. It is also very volatile over the cycle.

1.1.3 Government Purchases (G)

Government purchases are composed of purchases of goods by the government plus the compensation of government employees. Overall, they comprise about approximately 20% of GDP, as can be seen on Figure 1.6. Note however that they do not include transfers from the government or interest payments on government debt.

1.1.4 Net Exports (NX)

Net exports of goods and services are approximately **-2 to -6 % of GDP**, at least in the modern period (and in the U.S.), as you can see on Figure 1.7.




Figure 1.5: INVESTMENT AS A SHARE OF GDP FROM NIPA (BEA).




Figure 1.6: GOVERNMENT PURCHASES AS A SHARE OF GDP FROM NIPA (BEA).




Figure 1.7: NET EXPORTS AS A SHARE OF GDP FROM NIPA (BEA).

1.2 The Income Approach to GDP

1.2.1 Cobb-Douglas Production function

In order to organize our thinking, let's write out a Cobb-Douglas production function, defined as:

$$Y_t = A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha},$$

where α is a number between 0 and 1. We will see later that this α is related to the share of capital versus labor in value added. In practice, you should think of α as close to $1/3$. Again, we shall explain why at the end of this lecture.

To proceed further, it is useful to think of a firm which would choose the amount of labor it uses L_t as well as the amount of capital it uses K_t in order to maximize its profits.³

$$\max_{K_t, L_t} \quad A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha} - R_t K_t - w_t L_t,$$

In this expression, R_t is the **rental rate** of capital, also called the **gross return** to capital. This represents how much it costs to rent one unit of capital. This cost actually has two components:

1. It includes a conventional interest rate r_t , which is the cost of borrowing money to invest in capital. You should think of this as the real interest rate which is charged by a bank to borrow money.
2. It also includes a depreciation rate δ , which accounts for the wear and tear of the capital stock, implying that its value drops over time. If capital is bought, then the resale price for each unit of capital is lower by a fraction δ , which is a cost to the investor. If capital is rented, then capital needs to be given back to the owner in its original state.

³You may be asking yourself what this firm is. We are looking at aggregates here, and there sure isn't just one firm in the economy. However, if all firms were identical, because of constant return to scale, the "representative" firm aggregating the decisions of all individual firms would seem to be solving that problem.

We have that the rental rate or gross return is equal to the net return plus the depreciation rate:

$$R_t = r_t + \delta.$$

From Econ 11, it should be clear that a way to solve this problem is to set the derivative of the profit function equal to 0 with respect to K_t and L_t :

- Differentiating with respect to K_t implies:

$$\alpha A_t K_t^{\alpha-1} L_t^{1-\alpha} - R_t = 0 \Rightarrow R_t = \alpha A_t K_t^{\alpha-1} L_t^{1-\alpha}.$$

- Differentiating with respect to L_t implies:

$$(1 - \alpha) A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{-\alpha} - w_t = 0 \Rightarrow w_t = (1 - \alpha) A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{-\alpha}.$$

Note that an alternative, and more direct way to get at that same result, would be to use Econ 11 directly, and write that the marginal products have to be equal to prices:

- The **rental rate of capital** R_t is the marginal product of capital. The marginal product of capital is how much more output is obtained when the capital stock is increased by one unit, which is just the derivative of output with respect to capital $\partial Y_t / \partial K_t$:

$$\begin{aligned} R_t &= \frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial K_t} \\ &= \frac{\partial (A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha})}{\partial K_t} \\ R_t &= \alpha A_t K_t^{\alpha-1} L_t^{1-\alpha} \end{aligned}$$

- The **wage** w_t is the marginal product of labor. The marginal product of labor is how much more output is obtained when the quantity of labor is increased by one unit, which is just the derivative of output with respect to labor $\partial Y_t / \partial L_t$:

$$\begin{aligned} w_t &= \frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial L_t} \\ &= \frac{\partial (A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha})}{\partial L_t} \\ w_t &= (1 - \alpha) A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{-\alpha} \end{aligned}$$

The total capital income $R_t K_t$ is a fraction α of output Y_t :

$$\begin{aligned} R_t K_t &= \alpha A_t K_t^{\alpha-1} L_t^{1-\alpha} \cdot K_t \\ &= \alpha A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha} \\ R_t K_t &= \alpha Y_t. \end{aligned}$$

This implies that the share of capital income in output (or equivalently, value added) is:

$$\frac{R_t K_t}{Y_t} = \alpha.$$

The total wage bill $w_t L_t$ is a fraction $1 - \alpha$ of output Y_t :

$$\begin{aligned} w_t L_t &= (1 - \alpha) A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{-\alpha} \cdot L_t \\ &= (1 - \alpha) A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha} \\ w_t L_t &= (1 - \alpha) Y_t \end{aligned}$$




Figure 1.8: COMPENSATION OF EMPLOYEES AS A SHARE OF GDP FROM NIPA (BEA).

The share of labor income in output $w_t L_t / Y_t$ (or equivalently, value added) is:

$$\boxed{\frac{w_t L_t}{Y_t} = 1 - \alpha}.$$

Note that capital income plus labor income equals total output:

$$R_t K_t + w_t L_t = Y_t.$$

Another way to say the same thing is that the share of capital income in output and that of labor income in output add up to one:

$$\boxed{\frac{R_t K_t}{Y_t} + \frac{w_t L_t}{Y_t} = 1}.$$

1.2.2 The Income Side in the Data

In practice, how much goes to the compensation of employees (labor income), and how much goes to the returns to capital (capital income)? The answer is that it goes approximately for 1/3 to capital and for 2/3 to labor. In turn, this implies that we will, in numerical applications of our theories, often assume that:

$$\alpha = \frac{1}{3}$$

The calculations for these are less straightforward than for computing the share of consumption, investment, as we did above. The reason is that in practice, the division between labor and capital is not as clear cut in the national accounts as one might hope: for example, someone who owns her/his own business reports most of her/his income in the form of capital income, even when a large part of it is actually labor income, so that compensation of employees is (vastly) understated. Figure 1.8 shows which results are obtained using this understated measure. It needs to be adjusted upwards by about 10% of GDP, for the reasons mentioned above.

For our purposes, we only need to remember that the share of compensation of employees is approximately 2/3 of value added:

$$1 - \alpha \approx \frac{2}{3} \Rightarrow \boxed{\alpha \approx \frac{1}{3}}.$$

Therefore, we will very often work with a Cobb-Douglas production function where $\alpha = 1/3$, implying that production is given by:

$$Y_t = A_t K_t^{1/3} L_t^{2/3}.$$

Lecture 2 will walk you through the Solow growth model, where we shall make heavy use of that Cobb-Douglas production function.

Readings - To go further

The Economics of Well Being, *Harvard Business Review*.

G.D.P. R.I.P., *The New York Times*, August 9, 2009.

(Gated) Keeping up with the Karumes, *The Economist*, October 29, 2015.

(More Difficult Read) Abraham, Katharine G. "Distinguished Lecture on Economics in Government-What We Don't Know Could Hurt Us: Some Reflections on the Measurement of Economic Activity." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 19, no. 3 (September 2005): 3–18.

Lecture 2

The Solow Growth Model

What are the sources of GDP growth, and of GDP differences across countries? As a matter of pure accounting, the supply-side approach to GDP presented in lecture 1, with GDP given as $Y_t = A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}$, implies that growth in GDP may arise from technology, capital, or population. Population is natural, and probably not that interesting from an economist's point of view, since the object of interest for an economist usually is GDP per capita.¹

So we are left with two factors of potential interest: capital accumulation, and technology growth. In this lecture, we study the Solow-Swan model of economic growth, which deals with the problem of capital accumulation. We study two versions of this model. Section 2.1 considers the case of a Solow growth model with a general, constant returns to scale, production function. Section 2.2 looks at a special case of the Solow growth model for a case of a Cobb-Douglas production function.

2.1 General Production Function

2.1.1 The Solow Model

Production function. Robert Solow, starts from a general production function, giving at any point in time output at time t Y_t as a function of two inputs, capital at time t K_t and labor at time t L_t :

$$Y_t = F(K_t, L_t).$$

He further assumes **constant returns to scale** with respect to capital and labor, so that for any scaling factor a :

$$F(aK_t, aL_t) = aF(K_t, L_t).$$

For example, for $a = 2$, when the quantity of labor and the quantity of capital are doubled, then we get double the quantity of output.²

Because of constant returns to scale, everything "scales with population". For simplicity, we shall assume from now on that the quantity of labor is fixed with $L_t = L$, so that the production function becomes $Y_t = F(K_t, L)$. Because of constant returns to scale with respect to capital and labor (and setting $a = 1/L$ in the previous expression), we can express everything as a function of output per worker Y_t/L and capital per worker K_t/L :

$$\frac{Y_t}{L} = F\left(\frac{K_t}{L}, 1\right) = f\left(\frac{K_t}{L}\right),$$

¹Of course, population is very important for discussions of relative economic or military power.

²This is sometimes called the replication argument. By replicating a factory with the same number of workers, and the same machines in them, then the new factory should be able to produce as much.

where f is defined as a function of F such that:

$$f(x) \equiv F(x, 1).$$

An example of such a production function is the Cobb-Douglas production function, which we started studying in lecture 1, and which we look at in section 2.2.

Saving and Investment. Robert Solow, in his 1956 contribution, abstracts from public saving, so that **total saving** at time t equals **private saving** at time t , and both are denoted S_t , which also equals investment I_t at time t :

$$S_t = I_t.$$

Saving is assumed to be a constant fraction s of output Y_t , and therefore:

$$S_t = sY_t.$$

This constant saving rate may seem a bit ad-hoc; it is. We will investigate more in detail the determinants of saving and consumption behavior in lecture 3. This implies that:

$$I_t = S_t = sY_t.$$

Law of motion for capital. Depreciation of capital is given by a share δ . Think for example that 8% of the capital stock depreciates each period; the rate of depreciation is much lower for structures, and much higher for computers. The capital stock evolves according to:

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) K_t + I_t.$$

2.1.2 Law of motion for capital per worker

The law of motion for capital, together with the constant saving rate, implies:

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) K_t + sY_t.$$

Dividing both sides by L to scale everything by the number of workers (so that we are looking at capital per worker, as well as output per worker):

$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{L} = (1 - \delta) \frac{K_t}{L} + s \frac{Y_t}{L} \Rightarrow \frac{K_{t+1}}{L} - \frac{K_t}{L} = s \frac{Y_t}{L} - \delta \frac{K_t}{L}.$$

The change in the capital stock per worker from t to $t + 1$ has two components:

- investment per worker (equivalently, saving per worker) sY_t/L .
- depreciation per worker $\delta K_t/L$.

Therefore, the law of motion for capital per worker is:

$$\underbrace{\frac{K_{t+1}}{L} - \frac{K_t}{L}}_{\text{Change in capital}} = \underbrace{s f\left(\frac{K_t}{L}\right)}_{\text{Investment}} - \underbrace{\delta \frac{K_t}{L}}_{\text{Depreciation}}.$$

2.1.3 Steady-state

The steady state level of the capital stock K^* is such that $K_{t+1} = K_t = K^*$, and it therefore satisfies:

$$sf\left(\frac{K^*}{L}\right) = \delta \frac{K^*}{L}.$$

Note that without further specifying $f(\cdot)$, we can't say much more about the value of K^*/L , we just know it satisfies this implicit equation. The steady-state value of output per worker Y^*/L , as a function of K^*/L is given by:

$$\frac{Y^*}{L} = f\left(\frac{K^*}{L}\right).$$

2.1.4 Convergence to the steady-state

Without further specifying the shape of the production function, we may identify three cases. In all cases, there is convergence to the steady-state level of capital per worker K^*/L which was identified in the previous section.

1. If capital per worker is initially relatively low, that is $K_t/L < K^*/L$, then investment per worker is larger than depreciation per worker, and therefore from the above equation, capital per worker increases:

$$\frac{K_t}{L} < \frac{K^*}{L} \Rightarrow \frac{K_{t+1}}{L} > \frac{K_t}{L}.$$

2. If capital per worker is exactly equal to steady state capital per worker, that is $K_t/L = K^*/L$, then investment per worker is equal to depreciation per worker, and therefore from the above equation, capital per worker stays constant:

$$\frac{K_t}{L} = \frac{K^*}{L} \Rightarrow \frac{K_{t+1}}{L} = \frac{K_t}{L} = \frac{K^*}{L}.$$

3. If capital per worker is relatively high, that is $K_t/L > K^*/L$, then depreciation per worker is larger than investment per worker, and therefore, capital per worker declines:

$$\frac{K_t}{L} > \frac{K^*}{L} \Rightarrow \frac{K_{t+1}}{L} < \frac{K_t}{L}.$$

2.2 Cobb-Douglas production function

2.2.1 Production function

Assume now that the production function is a Cobb-Douglas production function, so that:

$$F(K, L) = K^\alpha L^{1-\alpha}.$$

As we saw during lecture 1, α should be thought of as roughly equal to 1/3. This implies then that function f defined above is such that:

$$f(x) = x^\alpha.$$

2.2.2 Law of motion for capital

The law of motion for capital is given by:

$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{L} = \frac{K_t}{L} + s \left(\frac{K_t}{L} \right)^\alpha - \delta \frac{K_t}{L}.$$

Given $L, K_0, \alpha, s, \delta$, we are able to calculate K_1, K_2, \dots , as well as K_t for any t , by calculating the quantities of capital successively from the formula above. If you do so, you will notice that K_t converges to a steady state value K^* . However, you do not need to perform an infinity of operations to get at this K^* .

2.2.3 Steady-state

Capital per worker. In the Cobb-Douglas case, there is a simpler way to get steady-state capital per worker: what was an implicit equation in section 2.1 can now be solved for explicitly. Capital per worker in steady-state K^*/L solves:

$$s \left(\frac{K^*}{L} \right)^\alpha = \delta \frac{K^*}{L} \Rightarrow \boxed{\frac{K^*}{L} = \left(\frac{s}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}.$$

Output per worker. The steady-state level of output per worker is then:

$$\boxed{\frac{Y^*}{L} = \left(\frac{s}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}.$$

Capital-Output Ratio. We are also able to compute the capital to output ratio K^*/Y^* from the Solow growth model:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{K^*}{Y^*} &= \frac{K^*/L}{Y^*/L} \\ &= \left(\frac{s}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \left(\frac{s}{\delta} \right)^{-\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \\ \frac{K^*}{Y^*} &= \frac{s}{\delta}. \end{aligned}$$

Alternatively, you may obtain this expression much more simply by equating saving sY^* to investment δK^* in the steady state:

$$sY^* = \delta K^* \Rightarrow \boxed{\frac{K^*}{Y^*} = \frac{s}{\delta}}.$$

MPK. Another object of potential interest is the steady-state marginal product of capital (also called Rental Rate of capital R^* , see lecture 1):

$$\begin{aligned} R^* &= \alpha (K^*)^{\alpha-1} L^{1-\alpha} \\ &= \alpha \left(\frac{K^*}{L} \right)^{\alpha-1} \\ &= \alpha \left(\frac{s}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{\alpha-1}{1-\alpha}} \\ R^* &= \frac{\alpha \delta}{s} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the steady-state marginal product of capital is given by:

$$\boxed{R^* = \frac{\alpha \delta}{s}}.$$

Net MPK. The net marginal product of capital r^* , which is the gross marginal product of capital minus depreciation (relevant for calculating the real return to an investor) is thus given by:

$$\begin{aligned} r^* &= R^* - \delta \\ r^* &= \frac{\alpha\delta}{s} - \delta \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the steady-state **net** marginal product of capital is given by:

$$r^* = \frac{\alpha\delta}{s} - \delta.$$

Consumption per worker. Finally, steady-state consumption per worker is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{C^*}{L} &= (1-s)\frac{Y^*}{L} \\ &= (1-s)\left(\frac{s}{\delta}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \\ \frac{C^*}{L} &= \frac{(1-s)s^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, consumption per capita at the steady-state is:

$$\frac{C^*}{L} = \frac{(1-s)s^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}.$$

2.2.4 Golden Rule

Most economists believe that policymakers should not care so much about GDP per person, but rather about consumption per person (however, some people hold a different view - we shall talk about that later). The intuition is simple: if an economy was to produce many goods which were only used for investment purposes (which would be the case if $s = 1$), then people in this economy would be starving, even though it was actually producing a lot. Investment, ultimately, should serve to increase future consumption.

The **Golden Rule level of capital accumulation** is such that the level of steady-state consumption per capita is maximized. Again, from the previous section, steady-state consumption per capita is given by:

$$\frac{C^*}{L} = \frac{(1-s)s^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}.$$

Maximizing this steady state consumption with respect to the saving rate s consists in finding the maximum of that function with respect to s :

$$\frac{d(C^*/L)}{ds} = 0 \Rightarrow \frac{d[(1-s)s^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}]}{ds} = 0.$$

Note that $1/\delta^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}$ is a constant which does not change anything to the maximization. If you are not convinced that it is equivalent to maximize the function of s without the constant, then you may as well compute the derivative with respect to the whole C^*/L expression. The first order condition is therefore:

$$-s^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}(1-s)s^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}-1} = 0.$$

Noting that we can divide by $s^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)}$ and then doing some algebra allows to get at the Golden Rule saving rate:

$$\begin{aligned} -1 + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}(1-s)s^{-1} &= 0 \\ \Rightarrow \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{1-s}{s} &= 1 \\ \Rightarrow \alpha(1-s) &= (1-\alpha)s \\ \Rightarrow \alpha - \alpha s &= s - \alpha s \\ \Rightarrow s &= \alpha. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the saving rate corresponding to the Golden Rule level of capital accumulation is equal to α (again, taking α to be equal to roughly $1/3$, this would suggest that an economy would optimally need to save about a third of its production every year).

We can then use the expressions that were found in section 2.2.3, substituting out the saving rate s with α .

Capital per worker. The Golden Rule level of capital accumulation is then such that capital per worker at the steady-state is:

$$\frac{K^*}{L} = \left(\frac{s}{\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \Rightarrow_{s=\alpha} \boxed{\frac{K_g^*}{L} = \left(\frac{\alpha}{\delta}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}.$$

Output per worker. At the Golden Rule, steady-state GDP per worker is:

$$\frac{Y^*}{L} = \left(\frac{s}{\delta}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \Rightarrow_{s=\alpha} \boxed{\frac{Y_g^*}{L} = \left(\frac{\alpha}{\delta}\right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}.$$

Capital-Output Ratio. At the Golden Rule, the steady-state capital to output ratio is:

$$\frac{K^*}{Y^*} = \frac{s}{\delta} \Rightarrow_{s=\alpha} \boxed{\frac{K_g^*}{Y_g^*} = \frac{\alpha}{\delta}}.$$

MPK. At the Golden Rule, the steady-state Marginal Product of Capital is:

$$R^* = \frac{\alpha\delta}{s} \Rightarrow_{s=\alpha} \boxed{R_g^* = \delta}.$$

Note: Another way to see that for the Golden Rule level of capital, the marginal product of capital R_g^* necessarily equals the rate of depreciation δ is to note that maximizing consumption C^* is the same as maximizing output minus saving $(1-s)Y^* = Y^* - sY^*$, and that saving in the steady-state equals depreciation in the steady-state (see above) so that $sY^* = \delta K^*$. Therefore, maximizing consumption C^* is maximizing $Y^* - \delta K^*$. But the derivative of that expression implies that:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial C^*}{\partial K^*} = 0 &\Rightarrow \frac{\partial(Y^* - \delta K^*)}{\partial K^*} = 0 \\ \Rightarrow \frac{\partial Y^*}{\partial K^*} - \delta &= 0 \Rightarrow R_g^* = \delta. \end{aligned}$$

Intuitively, at the steady-state optimum, the annual gain of an additional unit of capital, $\partial Y^*/\partial K^*$ in additional output, must equal the cost of paying the resulting annual maintenance cost δ for this additional unit. If the marginal gain is higher than the marginal cost, then there is not enough capital. Should the marginal gain be lower than the marginal cost, then there would be too much capital. At the optimum, the marginal gain equals the marginal cost, so $R_g^* = \delta$.

Net MPK. At the Golden Rule, the steady-state net Marginal Product of Capital is:

$$r^* = \frac{\alpha\delta}{s} - \delta \Rightarrow_{s=\alpha} \boxed{r_g^* = 0}.$$




Figure 2.1: GROSS SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. (WDI).

Therefore, at the Golden Rule level of capital accumulation, the net marginal product of capital is equal to 0.

Note: Again, this should be obvious from the previous discussion on R_g^* . Maximizing C^* is maximizing $Y^* - \delta K^*$, and the derivative of this expression is equal to r^* . Therefore, at the Golden Rule, the net return is equal to 0:

$$\frac{\partial C^*}{\partial K^*} = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \frac{\partial Y^*}{\partial K^*} - \delta = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad r_g^* = 0.$$

Consumption per worker. Finally, at the Golden Rule, consumption per worker is:

$$\frac{C^*}{L} = \frac{(1-s)s^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}} \quad \Rightarrow_{s=\alpha} \quad \boxed{\frac{C_g^*}{L} = \frac{(1-\alpha)\alpha^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}.}$$

2.3 Some Data

Figure 2.1 plots gross saving and investment in the United States from the World Development Indicators put together by the World Bank. Figure 2.2 plots net saving and gross saving for the U.S.: net saving (gross saving net of depreciation) is slightly higher than 0, but not by much. Figure 2.3 plots investment as a % of GDP on a map of the world, while figure 2.4 plots gross saving as a % of GDP.

Readings - To go further

Humans 1, Robots 0, *Wall Street Journal*, October 6, 2013.

(Gated) Economists understand little about the causes of growth, *The Economist*, April 12, 2018.




Figure 2.2: NET SAVINGS AND GROSS SAVINGS (WDI).




Figure 2.3: INVESTMENT (% OF GDP), 2016.




Figure 2.4: GROSS SAVING (% OF GDP), 2016.

Lecture 3

Two Period Consumption Problem

Consumption and saving are perhaps the most important and controversial issues in macroeconomics. In the Solow growth model, saving was a constant fraction s of GDP, by assumption. We now build on *Economics 11* (the one where you learn consumer optimization with Lagrangians and all that), in order to derive saving behavior from microeconomic principles. In other words, we work to make saving “endogenous” (that is, explained by the model), while it was previously taken as exogenous (that is, assumed in the model).

Although this discussion may appear somewhat abstract at first, these calculations are the basis of some of the most important controversies in macroeconomics, which we shall come to in the next lectures.

3.1 The Two-Period Consumption Problem

3.1.1 Assumptions

There are two periods, $t = 0$ (think of this as “today”) and $t = 1$ (think of this as “tomorrow”). The consumer values consumption c_0 in period 0 and c_1 in period 1 according to the following utility function:

$$U(c_0, c_1) = u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1).$$

where $u(\cdot)$ is an increasing and concave function, and $\beta \leq 1$. β captures that people typically have a preference for the present. (they are **present-biased**)

Assume that agents earn (labor) income y_0 in period 0, and (labor) income y_1 in period 1. They also are born with some financial wealth f_0 now, and have financial wealth f_1 in period 1, which they consume entirely because this is the last period. (there is no point keeping more money for after period 1, because there is no future at that point) The amount that agents save in this economy is thus $f_1 - f_0$, and the amount of their accumulated savings is the savings they already had plus what they decided to accumulate, so that $f_0 + (f_1 - f_0) = f_1$.

Therefore, consumption in period 0 is given by:

$$c_0 = y_0 - (f_1 - f_0)$$

The second period consumption ($t = 1$) is given by income plus the return to (accumulated !) savings:

$$c_1 = y_1 + (1 + r)f_1.$$

3.1.2 Constrained Optimization Problem

Here, we show that the previous problem can actually be written as a maximization problem, subject to a budget constraint.

Intertemporal budget constraint. Rewriting f_1 from this second equation: $f_1 = (c_1 - y_1)/(1 + r)$, and plugging into the first,

$$c_0 = y_0 - \left(\frac{c_1 - y_1}{1 + r} - f_0 \right).$$

Rearranging, total wealth is then the sum of financial wealth f_0 and of the present discounted value of human wealth:

$$c_0 + \frac{c_1}{1 + r} = \underbrace{f_0 + y_0}_{\text{total wealth}} + \underbrace{\frac{y_1}{1 + r}}_{\text{human wealth}}.$$

The intertemporal budget constraint says that the present discounted value of consumption is equal to total wealth.

Optimization. The problem of the consumer is then simply that of maximizing utility under his budget constraint:

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{c_0, c_1} u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1) \\ \text{s.t. } & c_0 + \frac{c_1}{1 + r} = f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1 + r}. \end{aligned}$$

3.1.3 4 methods

You may solve this optimization in four different ways:

1. Apply the well known ratio of marginal utilities formula from Econ 11. Let us rewrite this optimization problem as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{c_0, c_1} u(c_0) + \beta u(c_1) \\ \text{s.t. } & p_0 c_0 + p_1 c_1 = B. \end{aligned}$$

where we have defined the price of consumption in period 0 by:

$$p_0 \equiv 1,$$

the price of consumption in period 1 by:

$$p_1 \equiv \frac{1}{1 + r},$$

and finally the budget B by the present discounted value of lifetime resources:

$$B \equiv f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1 + r}.$$

Note that the relative price of consumption in period 1 relative to period 0 is given by $1/(1 + r)$: when the interest rate becomes higher, consuming in period 1 becomes relatively cheaper, or consuming in period 0 becomes more expensive (it's really expensive to consume now rather than later if the bank is offering me a really high interest rate). Thus, applying the formula from Econ 11 allows to say that

the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in period 1 c_1 and consumption in period 0 c_0 - the ratio of marginal utilities - is equal to the ratio of prices:

$$\frac{\partial U/\partial c_1}{\partial U/\partial c_0} = \frac{p_1}{p_0} = \frac{1}{1+r} \Rightarrow \boxed{\frac{\beta u'(c_1)}{u'(c_0)} = \frac{1}{1+r}}.$$

2. Apply the following intuitive economic argument. The marginal utility from consuming in period 1 is $\beta u'(c_1)$. The marginal utility from consuming in period 0 is $u'(c_0)$. By putting one unit of consumption in the bank, one forgoes 1 unit of consumption in period 0 to get $1+r$ units of consumption in period 1. The two have to be equal, if one is optimizing. If consuming more in period 0 gives a higher marginal utility, or $u'(c_0) > (1+r)\beta u'(c_1)$, then one should consume more and save less. On the contrary, should $u'(c_0) < (1+r)\beta u'(c_1)$, one should consume less and save more. Therefore, in equilibrium, these two options can only be equal:

$$u'(c_0) = (1+r)\beta u'(c_1) \Rightarrow \boxed{\frac{\beta u'(c_1)}{u'(c_0)} = \frac{1}{1+r}}.$$

3. Replace c_0 from the intertemporal budget constraint above and optimize with respect to c_1 :

$$\max_{c_1} u \left[\left(f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \right) - \frac{c_1}{1+r} \right] + \beta u(c_1).$$

Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to c_1 leads to:

$$\begin{aligned} -\frac{1}{1+r} u' \left[\left(f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \right) - \frac{c_1}{1+r} \right] + \beta u'(c_1) &= 0 \\ \Rightarrow -\frac{1}{1+r} u'(c_0) + \beta u'(c_1) &= 0 \quad \Rightarrow \boxed{\frac{\beta u'(c_1)}{u'(c_0)} = \frac{1}{1+r}}. \end{aligned}$$

where the first substitution uses the intertemporal budget constraint which implies:

$$\left(f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \right) - \frac{c_1}{1+r} = c_0$$

4. Alternatively, you may substitute c_1 out and optimize with respect to c_0 :

$$\max_{c_0} u(c_0) + \beta u \left[(1+r) \left(f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \right) - (1+r)c_0 \right].$$

Taking the derivative of this expression with respect to c_0 leads to:

$$\begin{aligned} u'(c_0) - \beta(1+r)u' \left[(1+r) \left(f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \right) - (1+r)c_0 \right] &= 0 \\ \Rightarrow u'(c_0) - \beta(1+r)u'(c_1) &= 0 \quad \Rightarrow \boxed{\frac{\beta u'(c_1)}{u'(c_0)} = \frac{1}{1+r}}. \end{aligned}$$

where the first substitution uses the intertemporal budget constraint which implies (pre-multiplying both sides by $1+r$):

$$(1+r) \left(f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \right) - (1+r)c_0 = c_1$$

3.2 Some examples

3.2.1 Log utility, no discounting

Log utility implies that $u(c)$ is given by the natural logarithm. Marginal utility is then just:

$$u'(c) = \frac{1}{c},$$

Since $\beta = 1$, the above optimality condition (derived 4 times) can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{u'(c_1)}{u'(c_0)} &= \frac{1}{1+r} \Rightarrow \frac{1/c_1}{1/c_0} = \frac{1}{1+r} \\ \Rightarrow \frac{c_0}{c_1} &= \frac{1}{1+r} \Rightarrow c_0 = \frac{c_1}{1+r} \end{aligned}$$

Substituting out $c_1/(1+r) = c_0$ in the intertemporal budget constraint allows to calculate consumption at time 0 c_0 :

$$\begin{aligned} c_0 + \frac{c_1}{1+r} &= f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \\ \Rightarrow c_0 + c_0 &= f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \\ \Rightarrow c_0 &= \frac{1}{2} \left(f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Finally, we may calculate c_1 :

$$c_1 = (1+r)c_0 = \frac{1+r}{2} \left(f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \right).$$

According to this expression, the **Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC)** out of current wealth f_0 is given by $1/2$. When f_0 rises to $f_0 + \Delta f_0$, the corresponding change in consumption is:

$$\Delta c_0 = \frac{1}{2} \Delta f_0.$$

If we were to study a model with more periods, say T periods, we would find that people Marginal Propensity to Consume is approximately equal to $1/T$, at least according to this model. Whether such is actually the case, and people are that rational, is a subject of fierce debate among macroeconomists, and one that we will take up in the next lectures.

3.2.2 Log utility, with discounting

Marginal utility is then $u'(c) = 1/c$, so that the optimality condition gives:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\beta u'(c_1)}{u'(c_0)} &= \frac{1}{1+r} \Rightarrow \frac{\beta/c_1}{1/c_0} = \frac{1}{1+r} \\ \Rightarrow \frac{\beta c_0}{c_1} &= \frac{1}{1+r} \Rightarrow \beta c_0 = \frac{c_1}{1+r} \end{aligned}$$

Substituting out $c_1/(1+r) = \beta c_0$ in the intertemporal budget constraint allows to calculate consumption at time 0 c_0 :

$$\begin{aligned} c_0 + \frac{c_1}{1+r} &= f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \\ \Rightarrow c_0 + \beta c_0 &= f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \\ \Rightarrow c_0 &= \frac{1}{1+\beta} \left(f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \right) \end{aligned}$$

Finally, we may calculate c_1 :

$$c_1 = \beta(1+r)c_0 = \frac{\beta(1+r)}{1+\beta} \left(f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \right).$$

Because people are more impatient in this case, they consume more, and their Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) is **higher** with $\beta < 1$:

$$\Delta c_0 = \frac{1}{1+\beta} \Delta f_0.$$

Note that the solution with no discounting corresponds to that with discounting when $\beta = 1$, which was expected.

3.3 Generalization

Assume that an individual receives wage w in period 0, and that this wage is expected to grow at rate g in the next T years. What is the present value of his human wealth, assuming that the interest rate is given by R ? The answer is that his human wealth H is given as follows:

$$H = w + w \frac{1+g}{1+r} + w \left(\frac{1+g}{1+r} \right)^2 + \dots + w \left(\frac{1+g}{1+r} \right)^{T-1}$$

$$H = w \frac{1 - \left(\frac{1+g}{1+r} \right)^T}{1 - \frac{1+g}{1+r}}$$

Readings - To go further

“Putting Your Major to Work: Career Paths after College”, The Hamilton Project.

Lecture 4

The Overlapping Generations Model

In the Solow growth model of lecture 2, we assumed that saving was a constant fraction s of GDP. Lecture 3, in turn, has shown how to use basic microeconomic principles, and in particular optimization and market clearing, in order to derive saving behavior endogenously. In this lecture, we present a model that combines the two previous lectures, in order to “endogenize” the saving rate in the Solow model. In this model, the reason why people save is that they want to provide for their old age, when they are retired.¹

More specifically, we develop a simplified version of Peter Diamond’s so-called **overlapping-generations model**.² In this model, people save for life-cycle reasons, in order to provide for retirement in their old age. This model is based on Maurice Allais’ as well as on Paul Samuelson’s. This model is used not just to give microfoundations to Robert Solow’s growth model and endogenize the saving rate s , but also to think about social security, public debt. This task will be taken up in the course of lecture 10.

4.1 Assumptions

4.1.1 Time

We assume that people in this economy live only for 2 periods: People are called “young” in the first period of their life, and “old” in the second. Thus, you should really think that the length of a period is a generation (approximately 30 years). However, instead of referring to these two periods as 0 and 1, I shall refer to them as t and $t + 1$.

4.1.2 Demographics

People from generation t are young in period t , and old in period $t + 1$. We denote their consumption when young by c_t^y and their consumption when old by c_{t+1}^o . In terms of lecture 3, you should really think of c_t^y as c_0 , and of c_{t+1}^o as c_1 .

People work when young, and then receive a wage given by w_t . They retire when old, and then do not work. Their lifetime utility is logarithmic with $\beta = 1$:

$$U = \log(c_t^y) + \log(c_{t+1}^o).$$

¹This is an important reason for saving; although it is probably not the primary one, as we discuss in section 4.3.

²This model was published in an article titled “National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model” in *The American Economic Review* in 1965: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/1809231>. Needless to say, you are not responsible for reading the original paper in the exam!

Their intertemporal budget constraint is given by:

$$c_t^y + \frac{c_{t+1}^o}{1+r} = w_t.$$

There are always two generations living in period t : the previous period's young, born in period $t-1$, now old, consuming the return from their savings; and this period's young, newly born (in period t).

4.1.3 Production

For simplicity, we shall assume a Cobb-Douglas, constant returns to scale, production function:

$$Y_t = K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}.$$

We assume that the labor force is constant and fixed to unity (this is to avoid carrying L around everywhere - from lecture 2, you should now know that everything can be expressed per capita, because of constant returns to scale), and therefore:

$$L_t = L = 1.$$

Again for simplicity, we shall assume that capital depreciates at rate $\delta = 1 = 100\%$. (that is, capital fully depreciates each period - this is not that unreasonable if you take one unit of time to represent one generation, or about 30 years - remember that the depreciation rate for one year was approximately equal to 2% to 30% depending on the type of capital involved.)

4.2 Solution

4.2.1 Saving

Utility is logarithmic, so that the consumption of the young c_t^y and consumption of the old c_{t+1}^o are given as a function of the wage as follows (this is just an application of lecture 3):

$$c_t^y = \frac{w_t}{2} \quad c_{t+1}^o = (1+r)\frac{w_t}{2}.$$

Indeed, if you want to think of this model as the two periods model of lecture 3, think that everything is as if:

$$f_0 = 0, \quad y_0 = w_t, \quad y_1 = 0.$$

4.2.2 Capital accumulation

Saving (and savings) is equal to investment, and therefore we have that:

$$S_t = I_t = w_t - c_t^y = \frac{w_t}{2}.$$

The major difference with the Solow model is that saving is here endogenous, and coming from agents' optimizing choices. In the Solow model in contrast, saving was taken as exogenous and equal to a fraction s .

The wage paid by employers, given that $L = 1$, is:

$$w_t = (1-\alpha)K_t^\alpha L^{-\alpha} = (1-\alpha)K_t^\alpha = (1-\alpha)Y_t.$$

Finally:

$$\Delta K_{t+1} = \frac{w_t}{2} - \delta K_t = \frac{1-\alpha}{2} Y_t - \delta K_t.$$

This is the capital accumulation equation (or law of motion for capital) of the Solow model, with $s = (1-\alpha)/2$. The new element here of course is to get saving endogenously, from agents' optimal decisions. Note that the value for the saving rate has an economic interpretation: wages are only a fraction $1-\alpha$ of output, from lecture 1. On the other hand, savers / consumers want to smooth consumption and therefore want to save a half of that. This is why a fraction $(1-\alpha)/2$ of output is saved.

4.2.3 Numerical Application

Note that if $\alpha = 1/3$, then the saving rate is equal to $s = 1/3$, which happens to be (by coincidence) the Golden Rule level of saving. This does not mean that the Golden Rule level is always satisfied. This only happens by chance in this very stylized model. In particular, saving is not just because of retirement, but also because of precautionary behavior, leaving bequests or simply liking being wealthy. We will come back to these issues in future lectures, but we can look at some data on who owns wealth and how it is divided first, before we move to that.

4.3 Why do people save?

In Peter Diamond's overlapping generations model, saving behavior only has one source: planning for retirement. Reality is a bit more nuanced. This section provides data which is suggestive that much of the wealth does not in fact come from young workers saving to provide for their old age. Thus, the overlapping generations model, in which most saving is lifecycle saving, does not capture an important part of the motive to save. We propose other factors at the end of this note.

4.3.1 Some data

Figure 4.1 from Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, two economists at the University of California, Berkeley, working on the world distribution of wealth, shows the composition of aggregate US household wealth from 1913 to 2013.³ The US tax code includes provisions which strongly encourage retirement saving in the form of retirement accounts. However, houses are also clearly a potential source of revenue for older people – because of the flow of rents that owner-occupied housing provides, but also because there is always an option to liquidate one's house when old.

Figure 4.2 shows the saving rate by wealth class, which echoes the evidence on saving rate by income shown previously in lecture 3.

Figure 4.3 shows the top 10% wealth share. As you can see, nearly 75% of household wealth is held by the top 10% wealth owners. This is more concentrated than labor income (the top 10% in the United States gets about 50% of pre-tax income, and much less after-tax), and therefore does not appear to be solely accounted for by saving for retirement.

Figure 4.4 shows the top 1% wealth share, and the top 1-10% wealth share. As you can see, the top 1% now owns nearly 40% of the wealth in the United States, while it only accounts for about 20-25% of pre-tax income. Again, it does not seem like saving for retirement is the whole story.

³These pictures are taken from work by Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, "Wealth Inequality in the United States since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized Income Tax Data," published in 2016 in *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*. The paper is available here: <https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjw004>.




Figure 4.1: AGGREGATE US HOUSEHOLD WEALTH, 1913–2013. SOURCE: SAEZ, ZUCMAN (2016).




Figure 4.2: SAVING RATE BY WEALTH CLASS (DECENNIAL AVERAGE). SOURCE: SAEZ, ZUCMAN (2016).




Figure 4.3: TOP 10% WEALTH SHARE. SOURCE: SAEZ, ZUCMAN (2016).




Figure 4.4: TOP 1-10% AND TOP 1% WEALTH SHARE. SOURCE: SAEZ, ZUCMAN (2016).

4.3.2 Saving of the rich

Understanding the sources of the capital stock amounts to a first order to understand the saving of people with very high net worth. What leads high income and high net worth people to save so much? A number of explanations have been proposed:

1. **Leaving bequests.** One reason why people might want to save over and above what they need to provide for retirement, is to leave bequests. However, it has been shown that even high income workers without children save a lot, more than warranted by their retirement needs.
2. **Prestige.** Wealth brings prestige. Adam Smith has a great passage in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*, published in 1759:

To what purpose is all the toil and bustle of the world?... It is our vanity which urges us on... It is not wealth that men desire, but the consideration and good opinion that wait upon riches.

3. **Concern for relative wealth.** Related to this explanation is a concern not for the absolute level of wealth per se, but for a relative standing compared to others in society. This is for example echoed in an academic article, published in 1992.⁴

But think for a moment about an already very rich agent such as Donald Trump. Why does he continue to work long days, endure substantial amounts of stress, and take enormous risks? Surely it cannot be that he is savoring the prospect of going to the grocery store with a looser budget constraint next year. He seems to have more money than he could spend in several lifetimes. Even if we are wrong about Trump's net worth, there clearly seem to be wealthy individuals that continue to work very hard and take large risks to increase their net worth. It is hard to reconcile such behavior with the underlying decision making in traditional growth models. We propose that people like Trump continue to care about increasing their net worth because their utility depends not only on the absolute level of their wealth but also on their wealth relative to that of other very rich people.

4. **Religious beliefs and work ethic.** Max Weber has famously proposed the protestant work ethic in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* as one explanation for the emergence of capitalism, and the importance of hard work and saving. John Maynard Keynes, in the *Economic Consequences of the Peace* published in 1919, was thinking very much in these terms:

Europe was so organised socially and economically as to secure the maximum accumulation of capital. While there was some continuous improvement in the daily conditions of life of the mass of the population, society was so framed as to throw a great part of the increased income into the control of the class least likely to consume it. The new rich of the nineteenth century were not brought up to large expenditures, and preferred the power which investment gave them to the pleasures of immediate consumption. In fact, it was precisely the inequality of the distribution of wealth which made possible those vast accumulations of fixed wealth and of capital improvements which distinguished that age from all others. Herein lay, in fact, the main justification of the capitalist system. If the rich had spent their new wealth on their own enjoyments, the world would long ago have found such a régime intolerable. But like bees they saved and accumulated, not less to the advantage of the whole community because they themselves held narrower ends in prospect.

The immense accumulations of fixed capital which, to the great benefit of mankind, were built up during the half century before the war, could never have come about in a society where wealth was divided equitably. The railways of the world, which that age built as a monument to posterity, were, not less than the pyramids of Egypt, the work of labour which was not free to consume in immediate enjoyment the full equivalent of its efforts.

⁴Harold L. Cole, George J. Mailath, and Andrew Postlewaite, "Social Norms, Savings Behavior, and Growth," *Journal of Political Economy* 100, no. 6 (December 1, 1992): 1092–1125, <https://doi.org/10.1086/261855>.

Thus this remarkable system depended for its growth on a double bluff or deception. On the one hand the labouring classes accepted from ignorance or powerlessness, or were compelled, persuaded, or cajoled by custom, convention, authority, and the well-established order of society into accepting, a situation in which they could call their own very little of the cake that they and nature and the capitalists were co-operating to produce. And on the other hand the capitalist classes were allowed to call the best part of the cake theirs and were theoretically free to consume it, on the tacit underlying condition that they consumed very little of it in practice. The duty of 'saving' became nine-tenths of virtue and the growth of the cake the object of true religion. There grew round the non-consumption of the cake all those instincts of puritanism which in other ages has withdrawn itself from the world and has neglected the arts of production as well as those of enjoyment. And so the cake increased; but to what end was not clearly contemplated. Individuals would be exhorted not so much to abstain as to defer, and to cultivate the pleasures of security and anticipation. Saving was for old age or for your children; but this was only in theory – the virtue of the cake was that it was never to be consumed, neither by you nor by your children after you.

5. **A final hypothesis.** An even more mundane explanation (which does not make it wrong!) has been proposed by Lee Iacocca, former CEO from Chrysler. According to him, the rich simply do not know what to do with their money:

Once you reach a certain level in a material way, what more can you do? You can't eat more than three meals a day; you'll kill yourself. You can't wear two suits one over the other. You might now have three cars in your garage-but six! Oh, you can indulge yourself, but only to a point.

Most economists are however general skeptical of this type of explanations. What they find puzzling is that high net worth individuals keep working even when they have achieved a sufficient amount of wealth.⁵

All this discussion may seem like armchair theorizing. At the same time, these are probably the most important questions facing macroeconomics. They actually determine the stance that should be taken on optimal capital accumulation, the optimal level of public debt, etc. We shall come back to these issues repeatedly in the following lectures.

Readings - To go further

Emmanuel Saez, Gabriel Zucman, "Exploding wealth inequality in the United States", *Vox EU*, October 29, 2014.

⁵I personally am less sure, as culture and norms certainly play a bigger role than many economists imagine - for example, as explained above, the protestant work ethic, might be one answer.

Lecture 5

Technological Change

In this lecture, we start by reviewing some facts on long-run economic growth in section 5.1. We then review an endogenous growth model 5.2 which tries to account for long-run economic growth.

5.1 Long-run Economic Growth

In this section, we remind ourselves some basic facts on technological growth since the 1200s. We in particular use Angus Maddison's long run data series on GDP per capita in major advanced economies, to show that growth as we know it is a rather recent phenomenon, one that starts at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

5.1.1 The Facts of Growth

The Figures below show GDP per capita in France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States, starting respectively in 1200, 1700, 1800, and 1900. These are presented on a semi-logarithmic scale (that is, the y-axis is in log), also sometimes called a ratio scale. Do not worry too much about the unit in which GDP per capita is expressed in this Maddison data: the unit is called the Geary–Khamis dollar, but we shall come back to it when we discuss the issue of real exchange rates and purchasing power parity comparisons. The reason for using such a semi-logarithmic scale is that growth is roughly exponential, so it is approximately linear on a semi-logarithmic scale.

5.1.2 The Mathematics of Growth

The mathematical orders of magnitude with exponential growth are sometimes hard to grasp intuitively. This section provides you with some maths to help get an intuitive feel for exponential growth. Let's consider an economic quantity y_t , growing at a constant rate g . For our purposes in this lecture, y_t is GDP per capita, but it could also very well be a price level, consumption, or some other economic quantity. Iterating on the difference equation allows to get y_t as a function of the initial value:

$$y_t = (1 + g)y_{t-1} \quad \Rightarrow \quad y_t = (1 + g)^t y_0.$$




Figure 5.1: 1200-2010 GDP PER CAPITA (MADDISON DATA).




Figure 5.2: 1700-2010 GDP PER CAPITA (MADDISON DATA).




Figure 5.3: 1800-2010 GDP PER CAPITA (MADDISON DATA).




Figure 5.4: 1900-2010 GDP PER CAPITA (MADDISON DATA).

How fast of a growth is that? The number of years T it takes for GDP per capita to be multiplied by a factor F (where $F = 2$, if we are looking for GDP to double) is given by :

$$\begin{aligned} y_t &= Fy_0 \Rightarrow (1+g)^t y_0 = Fy_0 \Rightarrow (1+g)^T = F \\ &\Rightarrow \ln(1+g)^T = \ln F \Rightarrow T \ln(1+g) = \ln F \\ &\Rightarrow T = \frac{\ln F}{\ln(1+g)}. \end{aligned}$$

For small rates of growth, we know that a Taylor expansion of the \ln gives $\ln(1+g) = g$, so that this formula can be approximated by:

$$T = \frac{\ln F}{g}.$$

Rule of 70. This formula gives the “rule of 70” for small growth rates. The “rule of 70” states that a quantity which grows at a rate g in percentage terms, takes approximately $70/g$ years to double. This comes from the fact that $100 * \ln(2) \approx 69.3147181$. For example, if GDP per capita is growing at 2% per year, then it takes approximately 35 years for it to double: approximately one generation only. If it is growing at 1% per year, it takes approximately 70 years for it to double, so two generations. Whether you grow to be twice as rich as your parents, or twice as rich as your grandparents on average makes a big difference.

Rule of 230. The same formula also gives the “rule of 230” for small growth rates. The “rule of 230” states that a quantity which grows at a rate g in percentage terms, takes approximately $230/g$ years to be multiplied by 10. This is because: $100 * \ln(10) \approx 230.2585093$. Thus, with a 2% growth rate, GDP per capita is multiplied by 10 over (as an exercise, you may create your own rules...)

5.1.3 Questions

Section 5.1 has shown that economic growth has been 2% on average in advanced economies, in the last two centuries. This raises a number of questions.

Why is there GDP per capita growth at all? One major shortcoming of Bob Solow’s Growth model of lecture 2 and of Peter Diamond’s growth model of lecture 4 is that they fail to account for long run economic growth - rather ironically. According to these models, the process of capital accumulation reaches a steady-state at some point, such that capital per capita, GDP per capita, remain forever constant. This happens for intuitive reasons: if the labor force is given, then growth cannot be sustained through capital accumulation alone. In fact, in the Solow model, even a saving rate equal to 100% would lead to very high GDP, but not to constant GDP growth. At one point, the capital stock would be so large that merely maintaining it would consume all output. Output would then be equal to gross saving, and depreciation. This is coming from the fact that at the steady state of the Solow model, gross saving is given by sY^* which would then be equal to Y^* (if $s = 1 = 100\%$), which is also equal to depreciation as:

$$sY^* = \delta K^*.$$

The Cross-section of Countries: Rich versus Poor Countries. The power of compounding is such that even a few decades of lower growth makes a big difference. Given persistent differences in growth rates, per capita GDP is far from being equalized across countries. Contrary to the predictions in the Solow growth model, there has hardly been a strong catch up of poor countries towards the level of rich countries. On one hand of the spectrum, many countries have very small GDP per capita levels.

On the other, some countries have very high GDP per capita. Table 5.2 below shows the countries that have a GDP per capita higher than \$40K.

Why are poor countries so poor, and largely failing to catch up, and why advanced economies are growing at an average of 2% per year since the beginning of the nineteenth century, are perhaps the potentially most impactful questions for economics, but also those for which economists perhaps know the least. This lecture presents an attempt at endogenizing GDP per capita growth, based on the a very simplified version of Paul Romer’s endogenous growth model. This may allow us to shed light on some of these issues.

Table 5.1: COUNTRIES WITH GDP PER CAPITA LOWER THAN \$1.5K.

Country	GDP per capita
Ethiopia	\$ 1,489
Togo	\$ 1,446
Sierra Leone	\$ 1,353
Guinea-Bissau	\$ 1,257
Madagascar	\$ 1,237
Mozambique	\$ 1,211
D.R. of the Congo	\$ 1,199
Malawi	\$ 971
Liberia	\$ 877
Niger	\$ 868
Burundi	\$ 840
Central African Republic	\$ 599




Figure 5.5: 2014 GDP PER CAPITA, BY COUNTRY (PENN WORLD TABLES).

Table 5.2: COUNTRIES WITH GDP PER CAPITA HIGHER THAN \$40K.

Country	GDP per capita
Qatar	\$ 146,037
China, Macao SAR	\$ 130,758
Norway	\$ 75,920
United Arab Emirates	\$ 68,021
Kuwait	\$ 67,432
Brunei Darussalam	\$ 66,968
Singapore	\$ 66,050
Luxembourg	\$ 65,842
Switzerland	\$ 61,570
United States	\$ 51,623
Ireland	\$ 51,224
Netherlands	\$ 47,392
Saudi Arabia	\$ 46,772
Germany	\$ 46,190
China, Hong Kong SAR	\$ 45,399
Austria	\$ 45,158
Denmark	\$ 43,733
Australia	\$ 43,590
Canada	\$ 42,794
Sweden	\$ 42,117
Taiwan	\$ 41,514

5.2 Endogenous Growth Model

Paul Romer was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences this year. The Economist is a good coverage of his work. In this section, we present a very simplified version of his much more subtle ideas.

5.2.1 Objects VS Ideas

A crucial distinction for understanding endogenous growth theory, is that of objects versus ideas.

Objects. Objects like houses, food, or cell phones are **rivalrous**. That is, one person's use of one of these particular objects prevents its use by someone else. Most goods are rivalrous, and this is what leads to scarcity, the central topic of economics.

Ideas and recipes. In contrast, ideas are **nonrival**. My use of an idea does not prevent someone else's use of that idea. For example, after it has been shot, a movie can be shown in any theatre in the world, and for a cost equal to zero on the internet (apart for the cost of electricity, and of storing the movie on servers). Similarly, a recipe for a pharmaceutical drug takes years to develop. However, once the drug has been invented, the cost of producing this drug is typically very small, much smaller than the associated initial fixed cost. Finally, Antonín Dvořák's 9th Symphony "From the New World" can be performed by any orchestra in the world, Gustavo Dudamel's or Herbert Von Karajan's, once Antonín Dvořák has composed it.

According to Paul Romer, ideas and recipes have the potential to be a source of indefinite economic growth:

Every generation has perceived the limits to growth that finite resources and undesirable side effects would pose if no new recipes or ideas were discovered. And every generation has underes-

timated the potential for finding new recipes and ideas. We consistently fail to grasp how many ideas remain to be discovered.

As Chad Jones puts it describing Paul Romer's contributions in a Vox Eu article:

Once you've got increasing returns, growth follows naturally. Output per person then depends on the total stock of knowledge; the stock doesn't need to be divided up among all the people in the economy. Contrast this with capital in a Solow model. If you add one computer, you make one worker more productive. If you add a new idea – think of the computer code for the first spreadsheet or word processor or even the internet itself – you can make any number of workers more productive. With non-rivalry, growth in income per person is tied to growth in the total stock of ideas – an aggregate – not to growth in ideas per person.

However, ideas implies increasing returns and therefore, potentially inefficient market outcomes.

5.2.2 Increasing Returns

Because of increasing returns, a competitive market economy may not lead to an efficient level of development of ideas. The issue with pure competition is that if a movie director was forced to charge a price equal to the marginal cost of showing a movie, then he would have to charge a zero price for this movie, as it would then be available for everyone to watch on Youtube. Similarly, once a drug against AIDS (for example) has been invented, one would ideally like to give this drug to the largest possible number of people. Indeed, the marginal cost of producing a new drug is much lower than the cost at which it is commercialized. However, this would decrease the incentives to innovate in the first place.

Patents. One way that this market failure has historically been addressed, is by granting patents (property rights) on newly invented ideas. (in biology, scientists are sometimes granted 12 years of exclusivity; in chemistry, they may be granted 5 years) Similarly, intellectual property rights, as well as laws against piracy, have the same purpose: they seek to encourage innovation by preventing 0 marginal cost pricing. Note however that patents should not be too strong either, or they discourage the use of new ideas, potentially at a suboptimal level. In fact, historically, especially in periods of high innovation and economic growth, intellectual property rights were relatively weak. When the US was a rising economic power, it was also a notorious pirate of intellectual property, very much like what China is being accused of today.

Government funded research. One alternative way through which R&D can be incentivized, while allowing for large dissemination, is to have the allow for government funded research. For example, the Department of Defense's ARPANET was a precursor of today's World Wide Web.

Prizes. Another way for the government to incentivize fundamental research is to give out prizes, which are a rather inexpensive way to motivate researchers hoping for recognition. The Economics Nobel Prize is one such example. In general, the motivations of researchers are complex, and probably not purely driven by profit seeking. For example, a very large community of developers contributes to open-source software, which is hard to rationalize from an orthodox (individualist) economic standpoint.

5.2.3 Model

In Paul Romer's endogenous growth model, there are two types of workers: research workers, whose number is L_{at} , and production workers, whose number is L_{yt} . We denote the share of research workers in total labor by l , so that:

$$L_{at} = lL$$

The number of production workers is simply the complement of that, so that:

$$L_{yt} = (1 - l)L.$$

As an example, if $l = 0.10$, then 10% of the labor force works in the R&D sector. For simplicity, we neglect the role of capital and capital accumulation, an issue that you will take up during sections. Therefore, production is simply given by:

$$Y_t = A_t L_{yt}$$

Finally, productivity is assumed to grow at a rate that is function of the productivity of the research sector z , overall productivity A_t , and the number of researchers in the research sector L_{at} :

$$\Delta A_{t+1} = z A_t L_{at}.$$

5.2.4 Solution

In order to solve this model, we may simply iterate on the production function for new ideas, as a function of the initial value for productivity A_0 (just as there was an initial value for capital K_0 in the Solow growth model), and using that the number of research workers is $L_{at} = lL$:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta A_{t+1} &= A_{t+1} - A_t = z A_t L_{at} \\ \Rightarrow A_{t+1} &= (1 + zL_{at})A_t \\ \Rightarrow A_{t+1} &= (1 + zlL) A_t \\ \Rightarrow A_t &= (1 + zlL)^t A_0.\end{aligned}$$

Replacing then L_{yt} in the production function with $L_{yt} = (1 - l)L$, as well as this endogenous level of productivity, we get:

$$\begin{aligned}Y_t &= A_t L_{yt} \\ &= (1 + zlL)^t A_0 L_{yt} \\ &= (1 + zlL)^t A_0 (1 - l)L \\ Y_t &= A_0 (1 - l)L (1 + zlL)^t\end{aligned}$$

Change in l . A change on the research share of workers has two opposing effect. On the one hand, there are less production workers available for production. Thus, there is a fall in L_{yt} , which tends to reduce Y_t . On the other, overall growth, which is here given by $g = zlL$, is then permanently higher.

5.2.5 Shortcomings

In Paul Romer's model, all economic growth comes from R&D. Despite its successes, this model however leaves a number of questions unanswered. For example, it is unclear why poor countries are not able to benefit from "ideas" which are available in rich countries. Ideas being a public good, they are potentially available for anyone to use. Then, productivity A_t should be quite similar in rich and poor countries. Moreover, the endogenous growth model does not really explain why economic growth took off where and when it took off (in the UK, at the beginning of the nineteenth century), a question we started out with.

If you want to know more, this Economist article gives a number of limitations on the theory of economic growth. In particular, economic historians are still debating the origins of the Industrial Revolution. Important factors that the endogenous growth model neglects are the relative importance of **secure property rights**, the extent to which cultures tolerate **personal ambition**, and other cultural or political factors, all of which certainly matter for economic growth. You may refer to the next section, if you wish to read more about economic growth.

Readings - To go further

Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine, "The Case against Patents," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 27, no. 1 (February 2013): 3–22.

Chad Jones, New ideas about new ideas: Paul Romer, Nobel laureate, *Vox Eu*, October 12, 2018.

Paul Krugman, Notes on Global Convergence (Wonkish and Off-Point), *New York Times*, October 20, 2018.

(Gated) Time to fix patents, *The Economist*, August 8 2015.

(Gated) A question of utility, *The Economist*, August 8, 2015.

(Gated) Economists understand little about the causes of growth, *The Economist*, April 12, 2018.

(Gated) Paul Romer and William Nordhaus win the economics Nobel, *The Economist*, Oct 13, 2018.

Lecture 6

The Labor Market and Unemployment

This lecture goes over three different models of the labor market, each of which has a different explanation for the phenomenon of unemployment:

- the Neoclassical model in section 6.1,
- the Keynesian model in section 6.2,
- the Bathtub model in section 6.3.

In this lecture, we examine each of them in turn.

6.1 The Neoclassical Model

6.1.1 Assumptions

Neoclassical economic theory is fundamentally based on the laws of supply and demand. In this theory, labor is treated as another good, which enters negatively in the utility function of workers because people would rather not work (therefore, labor is a “bad” rather than a “good”). Labor is also a useful input into production, which allows firms to sell consumption goods to workers. In the neoclassical theory, the real wage is determined at the intersection of supply and demand.

Labor Demand. Firms hire labor at price w , and sell the consumption good a price p . Assume that the production function is decreasing returns to scale with respect to labor (think for example, that the quantity of capital is fixed):

$$y = f(l).$$

Then, firms maximize their profits, and therefore solve:

$$\max_l \quad pf(l) - wl.$$

Labor Supply. Neoclassical theory of labor supply starts from a static problem of a consumer-worker choosing how much to work, and how much to consume. For example, assume that utility is strictly increasing in consumption, and strictly decreasing in the amount of labor supplied:

$$U(c, l) = u(c) - v(l),$$

so that the consumer-worker likes to consume, but does not like working. If the price of consumption is p , and assuming a static problem, the budget constraint of a worker/consumer is given by:

$$pc = wl.$$

You may think of w as the hourly wage, for example \$15/hour. Then l would be expressed in terms of the number of hours.

Warning. Labor Supply and Labor Demand are sometimes being mixed up. In the language of microeconomics, workers supply labor, and firms demand labor. What workers do demand is jobs, or job vacancies, which are supplied by firms.

6.1.2 Solution

Labor Demand. The problem of labor demand shown above leads to the following first-order condition:

$$pf'(l) - w = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad f'(l) = \frac{w}{p}.$$

This equation has a straightforward interpretation: at the optimum, the marginal product of labor - that is, how much is gained from using one more unit of labor in production $f'(l)$ - needs to be equal to how much that additional unit of labor costs to the firm, the real wage w/p . J.M. Keynes calls it the first fundamental postulate of classical economics in Chapter 2 of the General Theory.

Labor Supply. On the other hand, the problem of the consumer consists in maximizing utility under his budget constraint:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{c,l} \quad & u(c) - v(l), \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & p \cdot c = w \cdot l. \end{aligned}$$

Again, similarly to the two-period optimization problem of lecture 3, you may solve this optimization in four different ways:

1. You may compute the ratio of marginal utilities (the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labor) and state that it is equal to minus the real wage (because labor slackens the intertemporal budget constraint, and it appears on the right hand-side of the equal sign):

$$\frac{\partial U/\partial l}{\partial U/\partial c} = -\frac{w}{p} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \boxed{\frac{v'(l)}{u'(c)} = \frac{w}{p}}$$

2. You may apply the following intuitive economic argument. The marginal disutility from supplying one more unit of labor is $v'(l)$, for a worker already supplying l units of them. The marginal utility which is gained from doing so is given by the number of additional units of consumption one gets out of it, given by the real wage w/p , and by how much I value each one of these additional utilities of consumption is valued, given by marginal utility $u'(c)$. The total gain in utility from consumption is the unit value $u'(c)$ times the number of units w/p , which gives the result:

$$v'(l) = \frac{w}{p} u'(c) \quad \Rightarrow \quad \boxed{\frac{v'(l)}{u'(c)} = \frac{w}{p}.}$$

J.M. Keynes, who did not write one equation in his General Theory, calls this the second postulate of the classical economics, in Chapter 2: "The utility of the wage when a given volume of labour is employed is equal to the marginal disutility of that amount of employment."

3. You may substitute out l from the budget constraint, and optimize over the choice of consumption:

$$\max_c \quad u(c) - v\left(\frac{p}{w}c\right).$$

This implies:

$$u'(c) - \frac{p}{w}v'(l) = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \frac{v'(l)}{u'(c)} = \frac{w}{p}.$$

4. You may substitute out c from the budget constraint, and optimize over the choice of labor:

$$\max_l \quad u\left(\frac{w}{p}l\right) - v(l).$$

This implies:

$$\frac{w}{l}u'(c) - v'(l) = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \boxed{\frac{v'(l)}{u'(c)} = \frac{w}{p}}.$$

6.1.3 A Simple Example

Assumptions. Assume a Cobb-Douglas production function for $f(l)$, such that:

$$f(l) = Al^{1-\alpha}.$$

In the background, you can really think that the capital stock is exogenous and taken to be equal to $K = 1$, which would lead to this production function exactly.

Let us also assume linear utility for consumption (that is, people enjoy increasing utility equally, regardless of whether it is coming from the first dollar or the last one - this assumption is not realistic and is really made for simplicity), as well as a power function of disutility for work:

$$u(c) = c, \quad v(l) = B \frac{l^{1+\epsilon}}{1+\epsilon}$$

so that:

$$U(c, l) = c - B \frac{l^{1+\epsilon}}{1+\epsilon}.$$

Results. Using the above functional forms for $u(\cdot)$ and $v(\cdot)$ allows to write:

$$v'(l) = Bl^\epsilon, \quad u'(c) = 1, \quad \Rightarrow \quad Bl^\epsilon = \frac{w}{p}.$$

Labor supply $L^s(\cdot)$ as a function of the real wage w/p is thus given by:

$$l = \frac{1}{B^{1/\epsilon}} \left(\frac{w}{p} \right)^{1/\epsilon} \equiv L^s \left(\frac{w}{p} \right).$$

Moreover, using the above functional form for $f(\cdot)$ allows to write:

$$f'(l) = A(1-\alpha)l^{-\alpha} \quad \Rightarrow \quad A(1-\alpha)l^{-\alpha} = \frac{w}{p}.$$

Therefore, labor demand $L^d(\cdot)$ is given as a function of the real wage w/p by:

$$l = A^{1/\alpha} (1-\alpha)^{1/\alpha} \left(\frac{w}{p} \right)^{-1/\alpha} \equiv L^d \left(\frac{w}{p} \right).$$

To sum up, the neoclassical labor market is composed of the following labor supply and labor demand equations:

$$\begin{aligned} L^d \left(\frac{w}{p} \right) &= A^{1/\alpha} (1 - \alpha)^{1/\alpha} \left(\frac{w}{p} \right)^{-1/\alpha}, \\ L^s \left(\frac{w}{p} \right) &= \frac{1}{B^{1/\epsilon}} \left(\frac{w}{p} \right)^{1/\epsilon}. \end{aligned}$$

Market clearing implies that labor supply equals labor demand:

$$\begin{aligned} L^d \left(\frac{w}{p} \right) &= L^s \left(\frac{w}{p} \right) \\ \Rightarrow \quad A^{1/\alpha} (1 - \alpha)^{1/\alpha} \left(\frac{w}{p} \right)^{-1/\alpha} &= \frac{1}{B^{1/\epsilon}} \left(\frac{w}{p} \right)^{1/\epsilon} \\ \Rightarrow \quad \left(\frac{w}{p} \right)^{\frac{1}{\alpha} + \frac{1}{\epsilon}} &= (1 - \alpha)^{1/\alpha} A^{1/\alpha} B^{1/\epsilon} \\ \Rightarrow \quad \frac{w}{p} &= (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\alpha+\epsilon}} A^{\frac{\epsilon}{\alpha+\epsilon}} B^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\epsilon}}. \end{aligned}$$

We may use either labor supply or labor demand in order to express the equilibrium quantity of labor l . For example, let us use labor demand (as an exercise, you may check that using labor supply instead leads to the same expression):

$$\begin{aligned} l &= \frac{1}{B^{1/\epsilon}} \left(\frac{w}{p} \right)^{1/\epsilon} \\ &= \frac{1}{B^{1/\epsilon}} (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{\alpha+\epsilon}} A^{\frac{1}{\alpha+\epsilon}} B^{\frac{\alpha}{\epsilon(\alpha+\epsilon)}} \\ &= (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{\alpha+\epsilon}} A^{\frac{1}{\alpha+\epsilon}} B^{\frac{\alpha}{\epsilon(\alpha+\epsilon)} - \frac{1}{\epsilon}} \\ l &= (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{\alpha+\epsilon}} A^{\frac{1}{\alpha+\epsilon}} B^{-\frac{1}{\alpha+\epsilon}} \end{aligned}$$

6.1.4 An Example: A Shock to Labor Demand

Assume that firms all of a sudden become less productive: that is, A declines. This corresponds to a shift in the labor demand curve to the left (because A appears in the labor demand curve). As a consequence, the graph shows that clearly the equilibrium number of hours declines, and the real wage falls. The algebra above can also be used in order to show that a reduction in A both leads to a fall in the number of hours as well as to a fall in the real wage. Note that in the neoclassical model, there is nothing that explains why the fall in hours worked goes through the extensive margin (the number of people employed) rather than at the intensive margin (how intensively everyone works). In practice, some countries such as Germany have put in place work sharing programs during the depression, in order to share the reduction in employment equally among workers, rather than proceed to lay-off workers.

6.2 The “Keynesian” Model

There are two ways in which the neoclassical model above is not satisfying. Empirically, the real wage moves very little during recessions, compared to the increase in unemployment, an observation which is usually viewed as inconsistent with the neoclassical model. Moreover, and probably more importantly, the neoclassical model assumes that all unemployment is voluntary. In contrast, intuitively, the level of employment appears “too low” during recessions, in the sense that many people seem to be looking for work, but do not find one.




Figure 6.1: SHOCK TO LABOR DEMAND IN THE NEOCLASSICAL AND KEYNESIAN MODELS.

One potential explanation might be that wages are sticky (at least downwards). In that case, the graph shows that following a shock to labor demand, labor demand might be lower than labor supply: there is involuntary unemployment, in the sense that some workers want to work more than they do at the prevailing market wage. Workers are said to be “off their labor supply curve”, because it is the level of the demand for labor that determines the employment level.

The graph shows clearly that “Keynesian” unemployment is larger than Classical Unemployment: employment falls by more than if wages were flexible.

Finally, I use quotes for “Keynesian” because although John Maynard Keynes mentioned sticky wages in *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* as a potential cause for unemployment, his thought was much more complex, and he did not see a reduction in real wages as a cure for unemployment. Although rigid wages have become synonymous with Keynes’ thought in many textbooks, you should keep in mind that John Maynard Keynes’ thought was much more complex than this, and that J.M. Keynes actually was not in favor of a reduction in wages to cure unemployment problems (you can see for yourself directly in *The General Theory*). If you want to know more, *The Economist* has a great briefing on the natural rate of unemployment - however, we will not investigate these notions any further, so you are not responsible for the content of this article.

6.3 The Bathtub Model

A final view of unemployment consists in a mechanical, almost statistical model of the labor market, called the “bathtub” model of unemployment. This view recognizes that the labor market involves constant churning, which implies that there always are some workers who are in between jobs. It is called the bathtub model of unemployment because in some ways, the unemployment rate is quite similar to the height of the water in a bathtub.

6.3.1 Model

In the bathtub model of unemployment, there is a number L of people in the labor force. Jobs separate at a rate s , often called the **job separation rate**, and the rate at which unemployed people find new jobs is f , the **job finding rate**. For example, assuming that in a typical month, 20% of the unemployed find new jobs, then $f = 20\%$. If, on the other hand, 1% of the employed lose their jobs, then $s = 1\%$. Finally, the number of people unemployed is denoted by U_t and the number of people employed as E_t . The law of motion for the unemployment population is given by:

$$\Delta U_{t+1} = sE_t - fU_t.$$

6.3.2 Solution

Using the fact that people are either employed or unemployed:

$$E_t + U_t = L,$$

and plugging in the law of motion for U_t :

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta U_{t+1} &= U_{t+1} - U_t = s(L - U_t) - fU_t \\ \Rightarrow U_{t+1} &= (1 - s - f)U_t + sL. \end{aligned}$$

In the long run, we have that, the number of unemployed people U^* satisfies the following equation:

$$U_{t+1} = U_t = U^* \Rightarrow U^* = \frac{sL}{s + f}.$$

The corresponding long run unemployment rate u^* , that is the number of unemployed as a function of the total population, is then given by:

$$u^* = \frac{U^*}{L} = \frac{s}{f + s}.$$

Numerical Application. Using the above numerical values, a job separation rate of about $s = 1\%$, as well as a job finding rate of about $f = 20\%$, we get a value for long-run unemployment, sometimes called the natural rate of unemployment, equal to:

$$u^* = \frac{0.01}{0.2 + 0.01} \approx 4.8\%$$

Transition dynamics. Unlike with the Solow growth model of lecture 2, we can do more and ask how the unemployment rate converges to this steady-state level, using the law of motion for unemployment (this was impossible for the Solow growth model because the law of motion for capital was too complex):

$$\begin{aligned} U_{t+1} &= (1 - s - f)U_t + sL \\ \Rightarrow U_{t+1} - U^* &= (1 - s - f)(U_t - U^*) \\ \Rightarrow U_t &= U^* + (1 - s - f)^t(U_0 - U^*). \end{aligned}$$




Figure 6.2: MONTHLY HIRES AND SEPARATIONS, IN THOUSANDS. SOURCE: BLS-JOLTS.

6.3.3 Data on Job Churning

Data on job churning is collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (the Job Opening and Labor Turnover Survey, also known as JOLTS). You may in particular view the latest data on Job openings, Hires levels, Total separations, Quits, Layoffs and discharges.

The evolution of job openings and hire levels on the one hand, and total separations, quits, layoffs and discharges are plotted on the two figures below.

This data shows that there are many ways in which the bathtub model of unemployment is an oversimplification. First, the separation and job finding rates both fall substantially during recessions. Second, the notion of a “separation” is a bit more subtle in the real world: some separations are chosen from workers (quits), some of them are chosen by firms (layoffs). Third, the job finding rate is also endogenous, because not all job openings lead to hires.

Increased unemployment during recessions is explained by an increase in layoffs, but more importantly by a decline in job openings.

Readings - To go further

Several quotes in search of a theory, *The Economist*, January 17, 2011.

Blanchard Olivier, and Wolfers Justin. “The Role of Shocks and Institutions in the Rise of European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence.” *The Economic Journal* 110, no. 462 (December 25, 2001): 1–33.

What We Know About the 92 Million Americans Who Aren’t in the Labor Force, *Wall Street Journal*, Oct 21, 2015.

(Gated) “Central bankers’ holy grail: The Natural rate of unemployment”, *The Economist*, August 26, 2017.




Figure 6.3: MONTHLY JOB OPENINGS, LAYOFFS AND QUILTS, IN THOUSANDS. SOURCE: BLS-JOLTS.

Lecture 7

The Consumption Function and the Multiplier

This lecture opens a set of lectures on Keynesian economics. The neoclassical models of consumption, saving, investment, and the labor market that we have studied so far are quite close to what the mainstream paradigm was teaching when John Maynard Keynes started to think about these issues. J.M. Keynes refers to this paradigm as “classical”. Yet, according to him, this paradigm was not a *general* one, in that it did not apply to a case where there was an insufficient use of resources. According to him, the U.S. after the Great Depression was in such a situation, where the teaching of traditional economics was therefore “misleading and disastrous”. The first chapter of the General Theory starts with these words:

I have called this book the General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, placing the emphasis on the prefix general. The object of such a title is to contrast the character of my arguments and conclusions with those of the classical theory of the subject, upon which I was brought up and which dominates the economic thought, both practical and theoretical, of the governing and academic classes of this generation, as it has for a hundred years past. I shall argue that the postulates of the classical theory are applicable to a special case only and not to the general case, the situation which it assumes being a limiting point of the possible positions of equilibrium. Moreover, the characteristics of the special case assumed by the classical theory happen not to be those of the economic society in which we actually live, with the result that its teaching is misleading and disastrous if we attempt to apply it to the facts of experience.

According to J.M. Keynes, the type of models we have seen so far are *special* in that they only apply in a case where there is full employment of resources. In contrast, underutilization of resources requires a different approach. In the model that we will study today, consumption does not result from intertemporal optimization, as in lecture 3 and lecture 4 but from a mechanical “consumption function” relating consumption to current income. Investment is not be determined by the supply of saving as in the Solow growth model of lecture 2, but by the demand for investment by firms. Finally, there may exist involuntary unemployment, unlike in the neoclassical model of lecture 6. Workers are potentially off their labor supply curve: they would be willing to take a job at the current wage. In J.M. Keynes’ view of the world, an increase in demand can therefore potentially be met by an increase in supply, because some labor is idle and ready to be used in production.

During this lecture, I first go through the various components of aggregate demand in section 7.1. I then go through a presentation of the simple Keynesian goods market model in section 7.2, and then present a couple of variations on the Keynesian goods market model in section 7.3: automatic stabilizers, and “accelerator” effects of output on investment.

The assumptions and logic of the Keynesian theory may be a little disturbing at first:

The difficulty lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds.

7.1 The Demand for Goods

Consider the first accounting identity of lecture 1, showing the different components of the demand for goods:

$$Y = C + I + G + X - M.$$

The total demand for goods is determined by consumption demand, investment demand, government spending, and net exports (for example, China's total demand includes US' demand for Chinese products).

For simplicity, we shall assume for now that we are considering a closed economy - think, for example, of the world economy - so that there are no exports or imports:

$$X = M = 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad NX = 0.$$

This assumption, which is not satisfying as the policies we shall consider are national (fiscal policy, etc.), will be relaxed starting in lecture 11. In lecture 2 and lecture 4, output was also determined by the amount of available technology, as well as by the supply of labor L , and of capital K in the economy (the "supply side"):

$$Y = F(K, L).$$

For example, in the Solow growth model of lecture 2, where government spending was zero ($G = 0$), GDP was simultaneously equal to $F(K, L)$ as well as to $C + I$. This is what allowed us to derive the dynamics in the economy.

In the Keynesian model, output is determined **only by aggregate demand**. The underlying assumption is that there exists some idle resources which allow to accommodate any increase in demand by an increase in labor utilization. In order to show that output is determined by demand, we shall denote the total demand for goods by Z :

$$Z = C + I + G.$$

The Keynesian assumption then is that output is demand determined, so that:

$$Y = Z.$$

We shall now investigate these components of demand in turn.

7.1.1 Consumption Demand

The first (and largest) component of the demand for goods comes from consumption. Rather than starting from microeconomic principles of optimization under constraints, J.M. Keynes postulates a consumption function relating disposable income to consumption. In its most general form, consumption is simply a function of disposable income Y_D , disposable income being the income that remains once consumers have received transfers from the government and paid their taxes:

$$C = C(Y_D), \quad \frac{dC}{dY_D} > 0.$$

The positive derivative implies that when disposable income goes up, people buy more goods; when it goes down, they buy fewer goods. It is often useful to specify a functional form for this consumption function, such as:

$$C(Y_D) = c_0 + c_1 Y_D.$$

In this case, the consumption function has a linear relation. This linear relation has two parameters:

1. c_1 is called the **marginal propensity to consume**. It gives the effect of an additional dollar of income on consumption. For instance, if $c_1 = 0.7$ ($c_1 = 70\%$), then an additional dollar of disposable income increases consumption by 1 dollar times 0.7, or 70 cents. A natural restriction on c_1 is that it is positive: an increase in disposable income should (at least averaging across individuals) lead to an increase in consumption. Another natural restriction on c_1 is that it be less than 1: people are likely to save some of their increase in disposable income. Keynes presents this as follows in Chapter 10 of the General Theory:

Our normal psychological law that, when the real income of the community increases or decreases, its consumption will increase or decrease but not so fast, can, therefore, be translated - not, indeed, with absolute accuracy but subject to qualifications which are obvious and can easily be stated in a formally complete fashion into the propositions that ΔC_w and ΔY_w have the same sign, but $\Delta Y_w > \Delta C_w$, where C_w is the consumption in terms of wage-units. This is merely a repetition of the proposition already established in Chapter 3 above. Let us define, then, dC_w/dY_w as the marginal propensity to consume.

2. c_0 corresponds to what people would consume if their disposable income was equal to 0 (for instance, they would still need to eat). In most instances, they would still be able to eat by running down their saving, or borrowing from banks. In terms of the model, changes in c_0 should be thought of as everything that moves consumption without going through disposable income directly. This might therefore proxy for consumer confidence, the willingness of banks to lend to consumers, etc.

Finally, disposable income is defined as:

$$Y_D \equiv Y - T,$$

where Y is income and T is taxes paid minus government transfers received by consumers. Very often, we will refer to T as “taxes”, which will always imply “net taxes”, unless otherwise specified.

Finally, note that “income” includes here both labor income as well as capital income, and is therefore equal to GDP. The underlying assumption is that c_1 represents a weighted average of marginal propensity to consume across people with different incomes, and different types of incomes.

7.1.2 Investment Demand

The second component of the demand for goods is coming from investment demand. In the Solow growth model, investment was determined by saving. For the Keynesian model, we shall make two alternative assumptions about investment:

1. In the baseline version of the model, we shall assume that investment is fixed:

$$I = \bar{I}.$$

In order to remind ourselves that investment is fixed (or “exogenous”, that is, determined outside of the model), we shall denote investment by “I bar” \bar{I} .

2. In the investment accelerator version of the model, we shall assume in contrast that investment depends on output. This assumption is more realistic in practice: an Italian restaurant which has many customers is more likely to renovate it and to buy a new pizza oven. In this case, we will assume that investment depends on output in a linear way:

$$I = b_0 + b_1 Y.$$

7.1.3 Government Spending

The third and final component of demand in our closed economy model is government spending G . Together with net taxes T representing the tax-and-transfer system, G is a component of fiscal policy. We shall also take G as exogenous, but we will study the impact of alternative values for G for the determination of GDP, for example (when we talk about the multiplier).

7.2 The Simple Goods Market Model

The Simple Goods Market Model, also called the **(ZZ)-(YY) model**, assumes a closed economy, that investment is exogenous and equal to \bar{I} , an exogenous government spending G , and a consumption function given as above by:

$$C = c_0 + c_1(Y - T).$$

7.2.1 Algebraic derivation of the multiplier

(ZZ) curve. With these assumptions, and assuming a closed economy, the value of the demand for goods Z is:

$$\begin{aligned} Z &= C + \bar{I} + G \\ &= c_0 + c_1(Y - T) + \bar{I} + G \\ Z &= (c_0 + \bar{I} + G - c_1T) + c_1Y \end{aligned}$$

This determines a value for the demand for goods Z , as a function of aggregate income, or GDP Y , which defines the (ZZ) curve. The part of this demand which does not depend on income is called *autonomous spending* z_0 defined as:

$$z_0 = c_0 + \bar{I} + G - c_1T.$$

This autonomous spending z_0 is also the value of demand when income is equal to $Y = 0$. Therefore, the demand for goods Z is given as:

$$Z = \underbrace{(c_0 + \bar{I} + G - c_1T)}_{\text{Autonomous Spending } z_0} + \underbrace{c_1 Y}_{\text{MPC}}$$

(YY) curve. Equilibrium in the goods market requires that:

$$Z = Y.$$

Indeed, income is determined by the total demand for goods.

Equilibrium. Equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the (YY) and the (ZZ) curves, represented by point A on the Figure below. Replacing out $Z = Y$ in the expression for Z above indeed implies:

$$Y = (c_0 + \bar{I} + G - c_1T) + c_1Y.$$

Therefore, putting all Y terms of the left-hand side:

$$Y = \underbrace{\frac{1}{1 - c_1}}_{\text{Multiplier}} \times \underbrace{(c_0 + \bar{I} + G - c_1T)}_{\text{Autonomous Spending } z_0}.$$

Multiplier. Consider a change in autonomous spending $\Delta z_0 = z'_0 - z_0$ coming from a change in government spending $\Delta z_0 = \Delta G$, or from a change in net taxes $\Delta z_0 = -c_1\Delta T$. We have:

$$\Delta Y = \frac{\Delta z_0}{1 - c_1}.$$

By definition, the multiplier gives the increase in income which is brought about by the increase in autonomous spending. Therefore, the multiplier is given by:

$$\text{Multiplier} = \frac{1}{1 - c_1}.$$

As a consequence steepness of the (ZZ) curve determines the value for the multiplier. The closer to one the slope c_1 is, the higher the value of the Keynesian multiplier.




Figure 7.1: THE SIMPLE GOODS MARKET (ZZ)-(YY) MODEL.

Government expenditure multiplier; tax multiplier. An increase in government spending $\Delta G > 0$ leads to an increase in output given by:

$$\Delta Y = \frac{\Delta G}{1 - c_1}.$$

Thus, $1/(1 - c_1)$ is usually called the *government expenditure multiplier*.

On the other hand, a decrease in net taxes $\Delta T < 0$ leads to an increase in output given by:

$$\Delta Y = -\frac{c_1 \Delta T}{1 - c_1}.$$

For this reason, $c_1/(1 - c_1)$, or $-c_1/(1 - c_1)$ is sometimes called the tax multiplier.

7.2.2 Four interpretations

Why is the change in output higher than the change in autonomous spending? And why is it equal to $1/(1 - c_1)$, where c_1 is the marginal propensity to consume. There are actually four different ways to see this, 2 are algebraic, and 2 are geometric:

1. **Algebra.** The first way to see this is just, as above to equate output to demand $Y = Z$, which allows to get at the result.
2. **Infinite sum of a geometric series.** 1\$ of additional autonomous spending brings in a second round c_1 \$ increase in consumption, a third round c_1^2 \$ increase in consumption, which add up to:

$$\sum_{i=0}^n c_1^i = 1 + c_1 + c_1^2 + \dots + c_1^n = \frac{1 - c_1^{n+1}}{1 - c_1}.$$

Therefore, because $0 < c_1 < 1$, we have:

$$\text{Multiplier} = \sum_{i=0}^{+\infty} c_1^i = \frac{1}{1 - c_1}.$$




Figure 7.2: SIMPLE KEYNESIAN CROSS: GRAPHICAL INTERPRETATIONS.

3. **Graphical interpretation 1.** The left-hand panel of Figure 7.2 gives a graphical interpretation to this infinite geometric sum. This graphical interpretation makes it clear that:

$$Y' - Y = \sum_{i=0}^{+\infty} c_1^i = \frac{1}{1 - c_1}.$$

This graph should make clear why the model is called a “Keynesian cross”. This is because the (ZZ) and (YY) curves cross to determine output. This pedagogical device to visualize the Keynesian multiplier was introduced in 1948 by Paul Samuelson in his famous *Economics* textbook, to provide a geometric intuitive interpretation of Keynes’ ideas.

4. **Graphical interpretation 2.** The right-hand panel of Figure 7.2 gives a graphical interpretation which does not use a geometric sum. If m is the unknown value of the multiplier, then the geometry makes clear that m has to satisfy $m = 1 + mc_1$ which also gives the value for the multiplier:

$$m = 1 + mc_1 \Rightarrow m = \frac{1}{1 - c_1}.$$

7.3 Extensions of the Goods Market Model

There are multiple extensions of the Goods Market Model: one with automatic stabilizers presented in section 7.3.1, one with an accelerator effect of demand on investment presented in section 7.3.2.

7.3.1 Automatic Stabilizers

In practice, the tax and transfer system is designed in such a way that taxes strongly depend on the level of income: net taxes are said to be **procyclical**:

1. Many taxes, such as taxes on wage income, profits, capital gains, mechanically collect more in revenues when income rises: taxes are procyclical (they vary positively with the state of the business cycle).




Figure 7.3: VARIATIONS: AUTOMATIC STABILIZERS, ACCELERATOR EFFECT.

2. On the contrary, many transfers are countercyclical (they vary negatively with the state of the business cycle): when unemployment is high and income is low, more unemployment benefits or food stamps are being paid.

Overall, these two effects reinforce themselves so that net taxes are procyclical. In terms of the model, we model this by postulating a linear function for net taxes which depends on the value for income:

$$T = t_0 + t_1 Y,$$

where $t_1 \in [0, 1]$ indexes the cyclicity of net taxes with GDP.

For example, assume that $t_1 = 0.3$ or 30%. Then if income rises by 1 dollar, net taxes rise by 30 cents. Using this expression for taxes allows us to write:

$$\begin{aligned} Z &= C + \bar{I} + G \\ &= c_0 + c_1(Y - t_0 - t_1 Y) + \bar{I} + G \\ Z &= (c_0 - c_1 t_0 + \bar{I} + G) + ((1 - t_1) c_1) Y \end{aligned}$$

Using that $Y = Z$ we see that the multiplier is now $1/(1 - c_1(1 - t_1))$:

$$Y = \frac{1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1)} (c_0 - c_1 t_0 + \bar{I} + G)$$

The (ZZ) curve is less steep, and therefore the multiplier $Y' - Y$ is smaller.

7.3.2 “Accelerator” Effect

Another variation on the Goods Market model consists in recognizing that investment demand might also depend on income. Firms will invest more if they expect high income, and therefore high demand for their goods:

$$I = b_0 + b_1 Y.$$

Thus, the (ZZ)-curve now has a slope equal to $c_1 + b_1$:

$$\begin{aligned} Z &= C + I + G \\ &= c_0 + c_1(Y - T) + b_0 + b_1Y + G \\ Z &= (c_0 - c_1T + b_0 + G) + (c_1 + b_1)Y. \end{aligned}$$

Using $Z = Y$, we can conclude that the multiplier is $1/(1 - c_1 - b_1)$ if $c_1 + b_1 < 1$:

$$Y = \frac{1}{1 - (c_1 + b_1)} (c_0 - c_1T + b_0 + G)$$

In this case, the (ZZ) curve is steeper, and thus the multiplier $Y' - Y$ is larger. Note that if $c_1 + b_1 \geq 1$, then the multiplier is infinite. This, of course, shows the limits of the Keynesian model: it remains valid as long as output is constrained by aggregate demand. In this case, output will increase to a level such as it becomes constrained by supply, as in lecture 2.

Required Readings

Mankiw, N. Gregory. What would Keynes have done? *New York Times*, November 30, 2008

Readings - To go further

Keynes, John Maynard. The Economic Consequences of the Peace, 1919.

Keynes, John Maynard. Chapter 10 “The Marginal Propensity to Consume and the Multiplier”, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money*, 1936.

Robert Barro. Keynes Is Still Dead. *Wall Street Journal*. October 29, 1992.

Bruce Bartlett. Keynes Was Really A Conservative. *Forbes*. August 14, 2009.

What Is Keynesian Economics?, *Finance & Development*, September 2014, Sarwat Jahan, Ahmed Saber Mahmud, and Chris Papageorgiou.

Lecture 8

The Paradox of Thrift

The idea that thrift is always virtuous is very deeply ingrained in our culture. It is a matter of philosophy, morals, and sometimes even religion. For example, in the Walt Disney movie Mary Poppins, Michael is being lectured by a banker that he should not be “feeding the birds” but instead invest his tuppence “wisely in the bank” to “be part of railways through Africa; Dams across the Nile, fleets of ocean Greyhounds; Majestic, self-amortizing canals; Plantations of ripening tea” (interestingly, these capital investments are all abroad; we shall come back to this later).

```
# [1] "Sorry I don't know how to embed videos in PDF:"  
# [1] "https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XxyB29bDbBA"
```

However, the model of lecture 7 implies that saving might be detrimental to the economy, at least when the economy has some slack. This phenomenon was explained by J.M. Keynes in the *General Theory*:

For although the amount of his own saving is unlikely to have any significant influence on his own income, the reactions of the amount of his consumption on the incomes of others makes it impossible for all individuals simultaneously to save any given sums. Every such attempt to save more by reducing consumption will so affect incomes that the attempt necessarily defeats itself. It is, of course, just as impossible for the community as a whole to save less than the amount of current investment, since the attempt to do so will necessarily raise incomes to a level at which the sums which individuals choose to save add up to a figure exactly equal to the amount of investment.

In this lecture, we use the models of lecture 7 to understand that argument better. From the outset, we should note that the paradox of thrift was known before J.M. Keynes, perhaps in the Book of Proverbs:

There is that scattereth, and yet increaseth; and there is that withholdeth more than is meet, but it tendeth to poverty. (Proverbs 11:24)

More certainly, it was present as early as in Bernard Mandeville’s *The Fable of the Bees: or, Private Vices, Public Benefits* (1714):

As this prudent economy, which some people call Saving, is in private families the most certain method to increase an estate, so some imagine that, whether a country be barren or fruitful, the same method if generally pursued (which they think practicable) will have the same effect upon a whole nation, and that, for example, the English might be much richer than they are, if they would be as frugal as some of their neighbours. This, I think, is an error.

This idea was also stated by Thomas Malthus:

Adam Smith has stated that capitals are increased by parsimony, that every frugal man is a public benefactor, and that the increase of wealth depends upon the balance of produce above consumption. That these propositions are true to a great extent is perfectly unquestionable...

But it is quite obvious that they are not true to an indefinite extent, and that the principles of saving, pushed to excess, would destroy the motive to production. If every person were satisfied with the simplest food, the poorest clothing, and the meanest houses, it is certain that no other sort of food, clothing, and lodging would be in existence.

While it is quite certain that an adequate passion for consumption may fully keep up the proper proportion between supply and demand, whatever may be the powers of production, it appears to be quite as certain that a passion for accumulation must inevitably lead to a supply of commodities beyond what the structure and habits of such a society will permit to be consumed.

Thomas Malthus really was a forerunner of J.M. Keynes. He set himself out to explain why unemployment could occur, as well as to suggest steps which might be taken to eliminate it. He was inspired by events surrounding the post-Napoleonic wars period, during which time industrial depression in Britain was causing serious unemployment of labor and capital.

That this part of his thinking was not that original was in fact recognized by J.M. Keynes in Chapter 23 of the General Theory - Notes on Mercantilism, the usury laws, stamped money and theories of under-consumption, which I strongly encourage you to read (although you are not responsible for it). We will come back to it when we talk about open economy macroeconomics, starting in lecture 11

Back to our Keynesian goods market model of lecture 7, we shall now study the paradox of thrift in more detail. We will consider three ways in which an economy might save more, which are all relevant in practice:

1. an increase in the desire to save through a fall in autonomous consumption $\Delta c_0 < 0$.
2. an increase in public saving, also called **deficit reduction**, through a decrease in government spending $\Delta G < 0$.
3. an increase in public saving, also called **deficit reduction**, through an increase in taxes or a decrease in transfers $\Delta T > 0$.

We will show that these acts of saving have very similar detrimental effect on output, and therefore saving. We shall consider two models in which such a paradox of thrift arises:

- in the simple goods market model of lecture 7, we will show that attempts to save more, either by private individuals or by the government, are self-defeating, in the sense that saving does not move. This is presented in section 8.1.
- in the variation on the goods market model with an accelerator effect of investment where $I = b_0 + b_1 Y$, we will even show that attempts to save more are more self-defeating: they lead to lower saving in the aggregate. The “paradox of thrift” will appear very clearly: attempts to save more lead to less saving. This is presented in section 8.2.

8.1 Simple goods market model

Let us start from the simple goods market model:

$$\begin{aligned} C &= c_0 + c_1 Y_D \\ Y_D &= Y - T, \end{aligned}$$

where c_1 is the marginal propensity to consume out of disposable income Y_D , disposable income is income minus taxes, and investment $I = \bar{I}$ and government spending G are taken as given, as well as taxes T . There are several ways to show the “paradox of thrift” in this model. We investigate an increase in the desire to save, modeled as a reduction in c_0 $\Delta c_0 < 0$, as well as two attempts at deficit reduction in turn.

8.1.1 $\Delta c_0 < 0$

There are two ways to see that a fall in the desire to consume $\Delta c_0 < 0$, or equivalently an increase in the desire to save, may lead to an equal level of aggregate saving. One way is the most straightforward, but does not give much intuition for the result. The second way is more complex, but gives a very nice economic intuition.

Direct proof. The first way to see the paradox of thrift is simply to notice that investment is fixed and equal to \bar{I} by assumption. Since total saving equals private saving S plus public saving $T - G$, we can express private saving as a function of only fixed variables:

$$\bar{I} = S + (T - G) \Rightarrow S = \bar{I} - (T - G).$$

This proves the result ! In particular, even if there is a change in consumption of $\Delta c_0 < 0$, then private saving does has to be equal to $\bar{I} - (T - G)$ always and thus cannot move. However, this proof is a little bit disappointing and does not provide much intuition.

Intuitive Proof. For the more intuitive proof, we need to write the equations from the goods market model as well as equate output to demand $Y = Z$:

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= Z = C + I + G \\ Y &= c_0 + c_1(Y - T) + \bar{I} + G \end{aligned}$$

This leads to equilibrium output:

$$Y = \frac{1}{1 - c_1} (c_0 - c_1 T + \bar{I} + G).$$

This is the usual multiplier: for a given change in Δc_0 , the change in output is given by the direct effect on output, but also by all the successive new rounds, which add up to $\frac{\Delta c_0}{1 - c_1}$ in total. Thus, such a change in Δc_0 leads to a change in output of:

$$\Delta Y = \frac{\Delta c_0}{1 - c_1}.$$

Private saving is given by disposable income $Y - T$ minus consumption (what is earned, not paid in taxes, nor consumed, is saved), and therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} S &= Y - T - C \\ &= Y - T - c_0 - c_1(Y - T) \\ S &= -c_0 + (1 - c_1)(Y - T). \end{aligned}$$

What happens when people attempt to save more, say by lowering c_0 ? A change in consumption of $\Delta c_0 < 0$ clearly leads to:

- on the one hand, a *direct effect* on private saving that is given by $-\Delta c_0 > 0$ (private saving rises).
- on the other hand, an *indirect effect* going through the change in output whose magnitude was calculated above given by $\Delta[(1 - c_1)(Y - T)]$.

In other words, we may write:

$$\Delta S = \underbrace{\Delta(-c_0)}_{\text{direct effect}} + \underbrace{\Delta[(1 - c_1)(Y - T)]}_{\text{indirect effect}}.$$

Now, how large is the indirect effect? Some algebra allows to conclude that it is exactly the opposite of the direct effect:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta[(1 - c_1)(Y - T)] &= (1 - c_1)\Delta Y \\ &= (1 - c_1)\frac{\Delta c_0}{1 - c_1} \\ \Delta[(1 - c_1)(Y - T)] &= \Delta c_0. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the total effect on saving is:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta S &= \Delta(-c_0) + \Delta[(1 - c_1)(Y - T)] \\ &= -\Delta c_0 + \Delta c_0 \\ \Delta S &= 0\end{aligned}$$

8.1.2 Fall in spending $\Delta G < 0$

Again, there exists both a straightforward proof which does not explain much, and a proof providing more economic intuition. We start with the direct proof.

Direct Proof. The direct proof simply uses the investment equals saving identity:

$$\bar{I} = S + (T - G)$$

This implies that a fall in expenditure $\Delta G < 0$, and resulting increase in public saving must be matched by a fall in private saving. However, this proof is again, somewhat disappointing.

Intuitive Proof. Denote the fall in government spending by $\Delta G < 0$. This leads to a rise in public saving:

$$\Delta(T - G) = -\Delta G > 0.$$

However, this fall also leads to a fall in output, whose magnitude is given by the government spending multiplier. Indeed, we know that:

$$Y = \frac{1}{1 - c_1} (c_0 - c_1 T + \bar{I} + G),$$

which implies that the fall in output is:

$$\Delta Y = \frac{\Delta G}{1 - c_1}.$$

Private saving is given by disposable income $Y - T$ minus consumption (what is earned, not paid in taxes, nor consumed, is saved), and therefore:

$$\begin{aligned}S &= Y - T - C \\ &= Y - T - c_0 - c_1(Y - T) \\ S &= -c_0 + (1 - c_1)(Y - T).\end{aligned}$$

Therefore:

$$\Delta S = (1 - c_1)\Delta Y = \Delta G.$$

Thus, we have a fall in private saving whose magnitude is exactly matching the rise in public saving. Overall, the effect on total saving, and therefore investment is zero in this model:

$$\Delta I = \Delta S + \Delta(T - G) = 0.$$

8.1.3 Increase in net taxes $\Delta T > 0$

An increase in net taxes $\Delta T > 0$ can come both from an increase in taxes or a reduction in transfers. Again, there are two proofs. The direct proof is exactly the same as the one with $\Delta G < 0$, so we do not go over it. On the other hand, the intuitive proof is a bit different because taxes impact disposable income too.

Intuitive proof. If the government chooses to engage in deficit reduction through tax increases (or by reducing transfers), then denoting by $\Delta T > 0$ the increase in aggregate taxes, we have a rise in public saving given by: $\Delta(T - G) = \Delta T > 0$.

Again, this leads to a fall in private saving through two channels: a direct channel which goes through the mechanic reduction in disposable income, and a second channel which goes through the reduction in output, which lowers income. Again, the magnitude of the second channel can be computed using the above equation for output:

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= \frac{1}{1 - c_1} (c_0 - c_1 T + \bar{I} + G) \\ \Rightarrow \Delta Y &= -\frac{c_1}{1 - c_1} \Delta T \end{aligned}$$

Again, given the above expression for private saving:

$$S = -c_0 + (1 - c_1)(Y - T).$$

we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta S &= (1 - c_1)(\Delta Y - \Delta T) \\ &= (1 - c_1) \left(-\frac{c_1}{1 - c_1} \Delta T \right) - (1 - c_1) \Delta T \\ \Delta S &= \underbrace{-c_1 \Delta T}_{\text{Effect through output}} - \underbrace{(1 - c_1) \Delta T}_{\text{Reduction in disposable income}} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore:

$$\Delta S = -\Delta T.$$

Thus, we have a fall in private saving whose magnitude is exactly equal to the rise in public saving. Overall, the effect on total saving, and therefore investment is:

$$\Delta I = \Delta S + \Delta(T - G) = 0.$$

8.2 Extended goods market model

In the consumption and investment multiplier model, we get an even stronger paradox of thrift in that efforts by consumers to save more lead to declining saving. We thus start from the extended goods market model of lecture 7:

$$\begin{aligned} C &= c_0 + c_1(Y - T) \\ I &= b_0 + b_1 Y. \end{aligned}$$

Again, we investigate a fall in private saving first, and then two attempts at deficit reduction.

8.2.1 $\Delta c_0 < 0$

Direct proof. Again, let us write the investment = total saving identity:

$$I = S + (T - G) \Rightarrow S = I - (T - G).$$

We know that a fall in consumption of $\Delta c_0 < 0$ leads to a decline in output $\Delta Y < 0$, and therefore through the equation giving investment as a function of output, to a decline in investment since $\Delta I = b_1 \Delta Y$:

$$I = b_0 + b_1 Y \Rightarrow \Delta I = b_1 \Delta Y.$$

Because T and G are assumed to be fixed (so that public saving is fixed), the change in private saving is equal to the change in investment, and is therefore negative. Therefore, a fall in consumption, leads to a fall in private saving ! Again, that proof is probably not very intuitive. We now turn to the longer proof.

Intuitive proof. Again, we write that output equals demand, which allows to get an expression for output:

$$Y = \frac{1}{1 - c_1 - b_1} (c_0 + b_0 - c_1 T + G)$$

We have the usual multiplier, compounding the consumption and investment effects (it is assumed here that $c_1 + b_1 < 1$). Therefore, a given change in $\Delta c_0 < 0$ leads to decline in output of:

$$\Delta Y = \frac{\Delta c_0}{1 - c_1 - b_1}.$$

Again, one can show that $S = -c_0 + (1 - c_1)(Y - T)$ – see section 8.1:

$$\Delta S = \underbrace{\Delta(-c_0)}_{\text{direct effect}} + \underbrace{\Delta[(1 - c_1)(Y - T)]}_{\text{indirect effect}}$$

However, this time, the two effects do not exactly cancel out as the indirect effect is:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta[(1 - c_1)(Y - T)] &= (1 - c_1)\Delta Y \\ &= (1 - c_1)\frac{\Delta c_0}{1 - c_1 - b_1} \\ \Delta[(1 - c_1)(Y - T)] &= \frac{1 - c_1}{1 - c_1 - b_1}\Delta c_0. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the total effect on saving is negative:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta S &= \Delta(-c_0) + \Delta[(1 - c_1)(Y - T)] \\ &= -\Delta c_0 + \frac{1 - c_1}{1 - c_1 - b_1}\Delta c_0 \\ \Delta S &= \frac{b_1}{1 - c_1 - b_1}\Delta c_0 < 0 \end{aligned}$$

8.2.2 Fall in spending $\Delta G < 0$

Direct proof. We know that a rise in public saving, arising from either a decrease in government spending, or a rise in taxes, or a decrease in transfers, leads to a decline in output $\Delta Y < 0$, and therefore through the above equation giving investment as a function of output, to a decline in investment since $\Delta I = b_1 \Delta Y$:

$$I = b_0 + b_1 Y \Rightarrow \Delta I = b_1 \Delta Y < 0.$$

Therefore, a deficit reduction is clearly bad for investment. However, once again, this calculation does not really help understand what the above reasoning was wrong.

Intuitive proof. The fall in government spending $\Delta G < 0$ leads to a rise in public saving:

$$\Delta(T - G) = -\Delta G > 0.$$

However, this fall also leads to a fall in output, whose magnitude is given by the government spending multiplier. We write that output equals demand, to get an expression for output to get, once again, that:

$$Y = \frac{1}{1 - c_1 - b_1} (c_0 + b_0 - c_1 T + G)$$

So the fall in output is:

$$\Delta Y = \frac{\Delta G}{1 - c_1 - b_1}.$$

Once again, private saving is given by disposable income $Y - T$ minus consumption (what is earned, not paid in taxes, nor consumed, is saved), and therefore (see the previous sections):

$$S = -c_0 + (1 - c_1)(Y - T).$$

Therefore:

$$\Delta S = (1 - c_1)\Delta Y = \frac{1 - c_1}{1 - c_1 - b_1}\Delta G.$$

Thus, we have a fall in private saving whose magnitude is larger than the rise in public saving. Overall, the effect on total saving, and therefore investment is negative:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta I &= \Delta S + \Delta(T - G) \\ &= \frac{1 - c_1}{1 - c_1 - b_1}\Delta G - \Delta G \\ &= \frac{1 - c_1}{1 - c_1 - b_1}\Delta G - \frac{1 - c_1 - b_1}{1 - c_1 - b_1}\Delta G \\ &= \frac{1 - c_1 - (1 - c_1 - b_1)}{1 - c_1 - b_1}\Delta G \\ \Delta I &= \frac{b_1}{1 - c_1 - b_1}\Delta G < 0. \end{aligned}$$

8.2.3 Increase in net taxes $\Delta T > 0$

The direct proof is exactly similar at the one in the previous section. However, the intuitive proof is a bit difference.

Intuitive proof. If the government chooses to engage in deficit reduction through tax increases (or by reducing transfers), then denoting by $\Delta T > 0$ the increase in aggregate taxes, we have a rise in public saving given by:

$$\Delta(T - G) = \Delta T > 0.$$

Again, this leads to a fall in private saving through two channels: a direct channel which goes through the mechanic reduction in disposable income, and a second channel which goes through the reduction in output, which lowers income. Again, the magnitude of the second channel can be computed using the above equation for output:

$$\Delta Y = -\frac{c_1}{1 - c_1 - b_1}\Delta T.$$

Again, given the above expression for private saving:

$$S = -c_0 + (1 - c_1)(Y - T).$$

we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta S &= (1 - c_1)(\Delta Y - \Delta T) \\ &= (1 - c_1) \left(-\frac{c_1}{1 - c_1 - b_1}\Delta T \right) - (1 - c_1)\Delta T \\ \Delta S &= \underbrace{-\frac{c_1(1 - c_1)}{1 - c_1 - b_1}\Delta T}_{\text{Effect through output}} - \underbrace{(1 - c_1)\Delta T}_{\text{Reduction in disposable income}} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore:

$$\Delta S = -\frac{1 - b_1 - c_1 + b_1 c_1}{1 - c_1 - b_1}\Delta T.$$

Overall, the effect on total saving, and therefore investment is decreasing:

$$\Delta I = \Delta S + \Delta(T - G) = -\frac{b_1 c_1}{1 - c_1 - b_1}\Delta T < 0.$$

Readings - To go further

O'Leary, James J. "Malthus and Keynes." *Journal of Political Economy* 50, no. 6 (1942): 901–19.

Wikipedia, Paradox of thrift.

(Gated) Paul Krugman, The Paradox of Thrift – for real, *New York Times*, July 7, 2008.

Paul Krugman, When Consumers Capitulate, *New York Times*, October 31, 2008.

Robert J. Barro, Government Spending Is No Free Lunch, *Wall Street Journal*, January 22, 2009.

Paul Krugman, A Dark Age of Macroeconomics (wonkish), *New York Times*, Jan 27, 2009

Paul Krugman, Paradox of Thrift, *New York Times Blog*, February 3, 2009

Robert J. Barro, Stimulus Spending Keeps Failing; If austerity is so terrible, how come Germany and Sweden have done so well?, *Wall Street Journal*, May 9, 2012.

Paul Krugman, Greece As Victim, *New York Times*, June 18, 2012.

Lecture 9

Redistributive Policies

Keynesian economics provides a mechanism through which more redistribution might actually increase output overall, at the same time as it reduces inequality. The idea that the economy suffers from a shortage of aggregate demand coming from increases in inequality has been put forward recently by mainstream academics such as Raghuram Rajan, former chief economist of the IMF, and now governor at the Bank of England, as well as by Robert Reich, US Secretary of Labor from 1993 to 1997.

The idea that the MPC is influenced by the distribution of income and wealth comes back to J.M. Keynes in the *General Theory*:

Since the end of the nineteenth century significant progress towards the removal of very great disparities of wealth and income has been achieved through the instrument of direct taxation—income tax and surtax and death duties—especially in Great Britain. Many people would wish to see this process carried much further, but they are deterred by two considerations; partly by the fear of making skilful evasions too much worth while and also of diminishing unduly the motive towards risk-taking, but mainly, I think, by the belief that the growth of capital depends upon the strength of the motive towards individual saving and that for a large proportion of this growth we are dependent on the savings of the rich out of their superfluity. Our argument does not affect the first of these considerations. But it may considerably modify our attitude towards the second. For we have seen that, up to the point where full employment prevails, the growth of capital depends not at all on a low propensity to consume but is, on the contrary, held back by it; and only in conditions of full employment is a low propensity to consume conducive to the growth of capital. Moreover, experience suggests that in existing conditions saving by institutions and through sinking funds is more than adequate, and that measures for the redistribution of incomes in a way likely to raise the propensity to consume may prove positively favourable to the growth of capital.

This passage from J.M. Keynes in the *General Theory* is intuitive: as long as saving propensities are no longer an impediment to capital accumulation, redistributing income or wealth from low to high **Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC)** should lead to higher output. According to J.M. Keynes, this is in fact one reason for restricting the increase in inequality:

The State will have to exercise a guiding influence on the propensity to consume partly through its scheme of taxation. (...) Whilst, therefore, the enlargement of the functions of government, involved in the task of adjusting to one another the propensity to consume and the inducement to invest, would seem to a nineteenth-century publicist or to a contemporary American financier to be a terrific encroachment on individualism, I defend it, on the contrary, both as the only practicable means of avoiding the destruction of existing economic forms in their entirety and as the condition of the successful functioning of individual initiative.

During this lecture, we derive this result using the Keynesian model that was developed in lecture 7 and

lecture 8. One appeal of writing the equations is that we are not able to prove these assertions qualitatively, but we are also able to understand how important they are quantitatively. As we go along, we therefore attempt to put some actual numbers on all these arguments, to get a sense of the orders of magnitude. We shall investigate two types of policies:

- Income redistribution, from high to low income earners.
- Deficit-financed decreases in taxes, on high income earners or low income earners, financed by public debt.

9.1 Assumptions

9.1.1 Consumption and Income

Some minor modifications to the goods market model underlying lecture 7 and lecture 8 are in order, in order to think about stimulus policies in the presence of inequality. Instead of assuming one type of consumer, with the average income Y and a given Marginal Propensity to Consume (MPC) c_1 , we shall assume two types of workers. We assume that there are N workers (for practical purposes, think $N = 150$ million):

- A fraction λ of low income earners earns income \underline{y} , pays net taxes \underline{t} , and have an MPC equal to \underline{c}_1 such that:

$$\underline{c} = \underline{c}_0 + \underline{c}_1(\underline{y} - \underline{t}).$$

- A fraction $1 - \lambda$ of high income earners earns income \bar{y} , which is a multiple γ of low income earners' income, given by:

$$\bar{y} = \gamma \underline{y},$$

where γ is higher when there is more inequality. They each pay net taxes \bar{t} , and the MPC of the high income earners is \bar{c}_1 :

$$\bar{c} = \bar{c}_0 + \bar{c}_1(\bar{y} - \bar{t})$$

Moreover, we assume that high income earners have a lower MPC than low income earners, so that:

$$\bar{c}_1 < \underline{c}_1$$

9.1.2 Taxes

We also assume that taxes depend on output, both for low income earners:

$$\underline{t} = \underline{t}_0 + t_1 \underline{y}$$

as well as for high income earners:

$$\bar{t} = \bar{t}_0 + t_1 \bar{y}.$$

9.1.3 Investment

Finally, we assume that investment depends on output:

$$I = b_0 + b_1 Y$$

9.2 Aggregate Demand

9.2.1 Income

Since there is a fraction λ of low income earners, and the total population is N , the total income \underline{Y} captured by low income earners \underline{y} is:

$$\underline{Y} = \lambda N \underline{y}$$

Symmetrically, the total income \bar{Y} captured by high income earners is:

$$\bar{Y} = (1 - \lambda) N \bar{y}.$$

Total income is given by the sum of \underline{Y} , and \bar{Y} , which allows to express low income earners as a function of total income:

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= \underline{Y} + \bar{Y} \\ &= \lambda N \underline{y} + (1 - \lambda) N \bar{y} \\ &= \lambda N \underline{y} + (1 - \lambda) N \gamma \bar{y} \\ Y &= (\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \gamma) N \underline{y} \end{aligned}$$

This implies that low income earners' \underline{y} is given as a function of output per person Y/N and the parameters of the model by:

$$\underline{y} = \frac{1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \gamma} \frac{Y}{N}$$

As a consequence, high income' individual \bar{y} is given as a function of output per person Y/N and the parameters of the model by:

$$\bar{y} = \gamma \underline{y} = \frac{\gamma}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \gamma} \frac{Y}{N}.$$

The share of income captured by low income earners is:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\underline{Y}}{Y} &= \frac{\lambda N \underline{y}}{(\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \gamma) N \underline{y}} \\ \frac{\underline{Y}}{Y} &= \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \gamma}. \end{aligned}$$

The share of income captured by high income earners is:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\bar{Y}}{Y} &= \frac{(1 - \lambda) N \bar{y}}{(\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \gamma) N \underline{y}} \\ &= \frac{(1 - \lambda) \gamma N \bar{y}}{(\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \gamma) N \underline{y}} \\ \frac{\bar{Y}}{Y} &= \frac{(1 - \lambda) \gamma}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \gamma}. \end{aligned}$$

Numerical Application: Approximate the number of workers in the U.S. to about 150 million:

$$N = 150,000,000$$

and that GDP is 20 trillion. Therefore, GDP per worker on average is:

$$\frac{Y}{N} = \$133,333.33$$

Let us divide the population in two groups, the top 10% income share, and the bottom 90% income share, so that: $\lambda = 0.9$. Since the top 10% get approximately 50% of the income in the U.S. (the exact data is available here), this implies, using the formula above $\underline{Y}/Y = \lambda / (\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma)$:

$$\frac{0.9}{0.9 + 0.1 \cdot \gamma} = 0.5 \Rightarrow \gamma = 9.$$

This is actually very intuitive: if 90% of the population have the same income as 10% of the population (half of total income), then on average they are 9 times poorer. The average income for someone in the top 10% is then:

$$\bar{y} = \gamma \underline{y} = \frac{\gamma}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} \frac{Y}{N} = \$666,666.66$$

They are:

$$(1 - \lambda)N = 15,000,000.$$

While the average income for someone in the bottom 90% is:

$$\underline{y} = \frac{1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} \frac{Y}{N} = \$74,074.07.$$

They are:

$$\lambda N = 135,000,000.$$

9.2.2 Taxes

Aggregate taxes T are the sum of taxes paid by the low income earners \underline{T} and the high income earners \bar{T} :

$$\begin{aligned} T &= \underline{T} + \bar{T} \\ &= \lambda N \underline{t} + (1 - \lambda) N \bar{t} \\ &= \lambda N (\underline{t}_0 + t_1 \underline{y}) + (1 - \lambda) N (\bar{t}_0 + t_1 \bar{y}) \\ &= (\lambda N \underline{t}_0 + (1 - \lambda) N \bar{t}_0) + t_1 (\lambda N \underline{y} + (1 - \lambda) N \bar{y}) \\ T &= (\underline{T}_0 + \bar{T}_0) + t_1 Y \end{aligned}$$

The aggregate baseline level of taxes T_0 is:

$$T_0 \equiv \underline{T}_0 + \bar{T}_0 = \lambda N \underline{t}_0 + (1 - \lambda) N \bar{t}_0,$$

where baseline level of taxes for low and high income earners is given by:

$$\underline{T}_0 \equiv \lambda N \underline{t}_0, \quad \bar{T}_0 \equiv (1 - \lambda) N \bar{t}_0.$$

To conclude, total aggregate taxes are:

$$T = (\underline{T}_0 + \bar{T}_0) + t_1 Y.$$

9.2.3 Consumption

The challenging part, which differs from the models seen in lecture 7 and lecture 8, is to calculate aggregate consumption, which is composed both of the consumption by low income earners, and that by high income earners. Total consumption by the low income earners \underline{C} is such that:

$$\begin{aligned} \underline{C} &= \lambda N \underline{c} \\ &= \lambda N (\underline{c}_0 + \underline{c}_1 (\underline{y} - \underline{t})) \\ &= \lambda N \underline{c}_0 + \lambda N (1 - t_1) \underline{c}_1 \underline{y} - \lambda N \underline{c}_1 \underline{t}_0 \\ \underline{C} &= [\lambda N \underline{c}_0 - \lambda N \underline{c}_1 \underline{t}_0] + \frac{\lambda \underline{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} (1 - t_1) Y \end{aligned}$$

Symmetrically, consumption by the high income earners \bar{C} is such that:

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{C} &= (1 - \lambda)N\bar{c} \\ &= (1 - \lambda)N(\bar{c}_0 + \bar{c}_1(\bar{y} - \bar{t})) \\ &= (1 - \lambda)N\bar{c}_0 + (1 - \lambda)N(1 - t_1)\bar{c}_1\bar{y} - (1 - \lambda)N\bar{c}_1\bar{t}_0 \\ \bar{C} &= [(1 - \lambda)N\bar{c}_0 - (1 - \lambda)N\bar{c}_1\bar{t}_0] + \frac{(1 - \lambda)\gamma\bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma}(1 - t_1)Y\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, aggregate consumption $C = \underline{C} + \bar{C}$ is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}C &= \underline{C} + \bar{C} \\ &= [\lambda N\underline{c}_0 - \lambda N\underline{c}_1\bar{t}_0] + \frac{\lambda\underline{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma}(1 - t_1)Y + [(1 - \lambda)N\bar{c}_0 - (1 - \lambda)N\bar{c}_1\bar{t}_0] + \frac{(1 - \lambda)\gamma\bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma}(1 - t_1)Y \\ &= (\lambda N\underline{c}_0 + (1 - \lambda)N\bar{c}_0) - (\lambda N\underline{c}_1\bar{t}_0 + (1 - \lambda)N\bar{c}_1\bar{t}_0) + \frac{\lambda\underline{c}_1 + (1 - \lambda)\gamma\bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma}(1 - t_1)Y \\ C &= C_0 - (\underline{c}_1\underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1\bar{T}_0) + c_1(1 - t_1)Y.\end{aligned}$$

where we have defined the average MPC c_1 by:

$$c_1 \equiv \frac{\lambda\underline{c}_1 + (1 - \lambda)\gamma\bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma}.$$

the aggregate baseline level of consumption C_0 as:

$$C_0 \equiv \underline{C}_0 + \bar{C}_0 = \lambda N\underline{c}_0 + (1 - \lambda)N\bar{c}_0,$$

where the baseline level of consumption for low and high income earners is given by:

$$\underline{C}_0 \equiv \lambda N\underline{c}_0, \quad \bar{C}_0 \equiv (1 - \lambda)N\bar{c}_0.$$

To conclude, aggregate consumption is:

$$C = C_0 - (\underline{c}_1\underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1\bar{T}_0) + c_1(1 - t_1)Y.$$

9.2.4 Aggregating

We now are able to compute aggregate demand:

$$Z = C + I + G,$$

using the above expression for aggregate consumption C as well as the expression for I :

$$I = b_0 + b_1 Y.$$

We get:

$$\begin{aligned}Z &= C + I + G \\ &= C_0 - (\underline{c}_1\underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1\bar{T}_0) + c_1(1 - t_1)Y + b_0 + b_1 Y + G \\ Z &= [C_0 - (\underline{c}_1\underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1\bar{T}_0) + b_0 + G] + (c_1(1 - t_1) + b_1)Y\end{aligned}$$

Equating output to demand $Z = Y$ gives the value for output:

$$Y = \frac{1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1} [C_0 - \underline{c}_1\underline{T}_0 - \bar{c}_1\bar{T}_0 + b_0 + G]$$

9.3 Fiscal Policies

9.3.1 Redistribution

Assume that transfers to the low income earners are increased (or taxes decreased), so that $\Delta\underline{T}_0 < 0$, with an offsetting increase in taxes on high income earners such that $\Delta T_0 = \Delta\underline{T}_0 + \Delta\bar{T}_0 = 0$. We then have that $\Delta\bar{T}_0 = -\Delta\underline{T}_0 > 0$. This leads to a change in autonomous spending:

$$\Delta z_0 = -\underline{c}_1 \Delta\underline{T}_0 - \bar{c}_1 \Delta\bar{T}_0 \Rightarrow \Delta z_0 = (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1) \Delta\bar{T}_0 > 0.$$

That impulse leads to an increase in output given by:

$$\Delta Y = \frac{\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1} \Delta\bar{T}_0 > 0.$$

Using the value for aggregate taxes:

$$\begin{aligned} T &= (\underline{T}_0 + \bar{T}_0) + t_1 Y \\ \Rightarrow \Delta T &= \underbrace{\Delta\underline{T}_0 + \Delta\bar{T}_0}_{\Delta T_0 = 0} + t_1 \Delta Y. \end{aligned}$$

Finally:

$$\Delta T = \frac{t_1(\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1)}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1} \Delta\bar{T}_0.$$

Thus, public saving increase, there is a reduction in the deficit, in public debt, and therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta(T - G) &= \Delta T \\ \Delta(T - G) &= \frac{t_1(\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1)}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1} \Delta\bar{T}_0 \end{aligned}$$

Numerical Application: On top of the above numerical values, we assume that the marginal tax rate is 25% so that $t_1 = 1/4$. Therefore:

$$\underline{c}_1 = 1, \quad \bar{c}_1 = 1/3, \quad \gamma = 9, \quad \lambda = 0.9, \quad b_1 = 1/6, \quad t_1 = 1/4.$$

As shown above, this implies an average MPC given by $c_1 = 2/3$. Thus, a tax cut to low income earners financed by tax increases to high income earners leads to an increase in output given by the following multiplier:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1} &= \frac{1 - 1/3}{1 - (1 - 1/4) \cdot 2/3 - 1/6} \\ &= \frac{2/3}{1 - 1/2 - 1/6} \\ \frac{\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1} &= 2 \end{aligned}$$

This implies that if \$1 billion is transferred from high to low income earners, GDP rises by \$2 billion. Importantly, this does not necessarily imply it should be done: first, high income earners are clearly worse off. Second, this calculation based on high income earners' lower MPC does not take into account that they may be discouraged to create jobs and become entrepreneurs if they are taxed too much.

Because output increases, we get an improvement in the budget surplus as well, given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta(T - G) &= t_1 \cdot \frac{(\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1)}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1} \cdot \Delta\bar{T}_0 \\ &= \frac{1}{4} \cdot 2 \cdot 1 \\ \Delta(T - G) &= \frac{1}{2} \end{aligned}$$

or, 500 million dollar improvement.

Therefore, **\$1 billion dollar transfer from high to low income earners** leads to an improvement in the public **surplus of \$0.5 billion dollars**.

9.3.2 Tax cuts for high income earners

Assume (deficit-financed) tax cuts for high income earners $\Delta\bar{T}_0 < 0$, then output increases:

$$\Delta Y = -\frac{\bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1}\Delta\bar{T}_0 > 0$$

The impact on aggregate taxes is however ambiguous, because automatic stabilizers increase taxes:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta T &= \Delta\bar{T}_0 + \underbrace{\Delta\bar{T}_0}_{=0} + t_1\Delta Y \\ &= \Delta\bar{T}_0 - t_1\frac{\bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1}\Delta\bar{T}_0 \\ \Delta T &= \left(1 - \frac{t_1\bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1}\right)\Delta\bar{T}_0 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the impact on public saving is similarly ambiguous:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta(T - G) &= \Delta T \\ \Delta(T - G) &= \left(1 - \frac{t_1\bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1}\right)\Delta\bar{T}_0 \end{aligned}$$

There is an increase in output and, depending on parameters, there can be a government surplus or a government deficit.

Numerical Application: We assume:

$$\underline{c}_1 = 1, \quad \bar{c}_1 = 1/3, \quad \gamma = 9, \quad \lambda = 0.9, \quad b_1 = 1/6, \quad t_1 = 1/4.$$

This implies $c_1 = 2/3$. Thus, we may calculate the tax multiplier for tax cuts to high income earners, which is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1} &= \frac{1/3}{1 - (1 - 1/4) \cdot 2/3 - 1/6} \\ &= \frac{1/3}{1 - 1/2 - 1/6} \\ \frac{\bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1} &= 1 \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the impact on public saving is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta(T - G) &= \left(1 - \frac{t_1\bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1}\right)\Delta\bar{T}_0 \\ &= \left(1 - t_1 \cdot \frac{\bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1}\right)\Delta\bar{T}_0 \\ &= \left(1 - \frac{1}{4} \cdot 1\right) \cdot (-1) \\ \Delta(T - G) &= -\frac{3}{4} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, **\$1 billion dollar tax cut on high income earners** leads to an increase in the public **deficit of \$0.75 billion dollars**.

9.3.3 Tax cuts for low income earners

Assume (deficit-financed) tax cuts for low income earners $\Delta\underline{T}_0 < 0$, then output increases:

$$\Delta Y = -\frac{c_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1} \Delta \underline{T}_0 > 0.$$

The impact on aggregate taxes is however ambiguous:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta T &= \Delta \underline{T}_0 + \underbrace{\Delta \bar{T}_0}_{=0} + t_1 \Delta Y \\ &= \Delta \underline{T}_0 - t_1 \frac{c_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1} \Delta \underline{T}_0 \\ \Delta T &= \left(1 - \frac{t_1 c_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1}\right) \Delta \underline{T}_0\end{aligned}$$

The impact on public saving is similarly ambiguous:

$$\Delta(T - G) = \left(1 - \frac{t_1 c_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1}\right) \Delta \underline{T}_0$$

There is an increase in output and, depending on parameters, there can be a government surplus or a government deficit.

Numerical Application: We assume:

$$c_1 = 1, \quad \bar{c}_1 = 1/3, \quad \gamma = 9, \quad \lambda = 0.9, \quad b_1 = 1/6, \quad t_1 = 1/4.$$

This implies $c_1 = 2/3$. Thus, we may calculate the tax multiplier for tax cuts to low income earners, which is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{c_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1} &= \frac{1}{1 - (1 - 1/4) \cdot 2/3 - 1/6} \\ &= \frac{1}{1 - 1/2 - 1/6} \\ \frac{c_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1} &= 3\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the impact on public saving is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta(T - G) &= \left(1 - \frac{t_1 c_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1}\right) \Delta \underline{T}_0 \\ &= \left(1 - t_1 \cdot \frac{c_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1}\right) \Delta \underline{T}_0 \\ &= \left(1 - \frac{1}{4} \cdot 3\right) \cdot (-1) \\ \Delta(T - G) &= -\frac{1}{4}\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, **\$1 billion dollar tax cut on low income earners** leads to an increase in the public **deficit** of **\$0.25 billion dollars**.

Readings - To go further

“Secular Stagnation, Coalmines, Bubbles, and Larry Summers”, Paul Krugman, *New York Times* Blog Post, November 16, 2013.

“The Economic Hokum of ‘Secular Stagnation’ ”, John B. Taylor, *Wall Street Journal*, January 2, 2014.

“The Age of Secular Stagnation”, Larry Summers, *Foreign Affairs*, February 15, 2016.

“Inequality Is Slowing US Economic Growth: Faster Wage Growth for Low- and Middle-Wage Workers Is the Solution”, Josh Bivens, Economic Policy Institute, December 12, 2017.

Lecture 10

Public Debt, Say's Law

Until now, we have been talking about government spending and taxes as if the government could take on as much debt as it wants. But then, why doesn't the government just engage in more tax cutting and more government spending, or both? We alluded to a first reason when we talked about the consequences of having $1 - c_1 < b_1$, or the propensity to save be less than the propensity to invest. We argued then that we would never be in a Keynesian situation of deficient aggregate demand, so that multiplier effects would stop when facing constraints on supply. Similarly, if the government started to make public saving very negative (running a budget deficit), then it would similarly start facing constraints on what the economy can supply. For instance, if fiscal policy was too accommodative, and to the limit if G was set at too high a value, then supply constraints would start to bite: one example was given historically in the 1940s when the U.S. engaged in World War II. However, these levels of spending are clearly out of the question, and this is perhaps not what constrains the government from doing a little bit more spending, or a little bit more tax reductions.

Another potentially more pressing issue is that of the government deficit, and the impact of government debt on future generations. The Trump tax cuts which have just been enacted have reduced unemployment to historically low levels, and pushed GDP growth up to a level which has not been seen in a long time, as predicted by the Keynesian model; however, it also has raised U.S. public debt, and is being criticized mostly on these grounds. This makes sense: when government spending increases $\Delta G > 0$, this leads to a government deficit of equal magnitude: $\Delta(T - G) = -\Delta G < 0$. Similarly, a tax cut $\Delta T < 0$ leads to increased deficits given by $\Delta(T - G) = \Delta T < 0$.¹ One might worry that this debt will someday have to be repaid, and that the current generation is simply putting a burden on future generations. In this case, higher GDP today might only be thought of as leading to lower GDP in the future, when aggregate demand will be diminished.

During this lecture, we make three related points concerning government deficits and government debt:

1. We show first, without using any economic model, that simple accounting suggests that public debt is on a sustainable path whenever the real interest rate on public debt is lower than the rate of growth of GDP ($r < g$), a situation called “dynamic inefficiency” for reasons that will become clear later. (from problem set 4 you may already remember that the Golden Rule level of capital accumulation corresponded to $r = g$). I shall argue that real interest rates appear to be below the rate of growth of GDP, at least for now, so there does not seem to be cause for alarm - at least, until interest rates don’t rise more.
2. Second, I illustrate using an economic model that it is not true that public debt necessarily will need to be repaid eventually, so that government debt is not necessarily a burden on future generations - an

¹Note however that automatic stabilizers go against that: in problem set 6, we even saw that tax cuts sometimes can pay for themselves. However, this happens only if the multiplier is really very high. For example, if tax cuts benefit people with high marginal propensities to consume.

argument which is often made in the public debate. In the overlapping generations model of lecture 4, and provided that capital accumulation is above the Golden Rule level ($r < g$), so that there is **dynamic inefficiency**, public debt is never repaid, as there are always new generations coming along, who buy government debt when they are young and sell it to the next generation when old. This is sustainable whenever $r \leq g$, for reasons laid out in part one.

3. Third and last, we shall discuss the effects of larger government deficits on the economy, and contrast the Keynesian and Neoclassical views on this issue. In particular, Keynesian and Neoclassical economists have very different predictions for the impact of higher public deficits on investment spending. You may already have understood that by contrasting lectures 2 and 4 with lectures 7, 8 and 9. We discuss this and related issues surrounding the so-called Treasury View and Say's law in the last section of this lecture.

10.1 Sustainability of Public Debt

10.1.1 Law of motion for Public Debt

In this lecture, we denote everything in terms of goods, to avoid thinking about the complicated issues surrounding inflation. Let us denote by G_t the government spending at period t , and by T_t the taxes in period t . Let us also denote by $(G_t - T_t)$ the government (primary) deficit in period t , which is the excess of government expenditures over taxes levied by the government (thus, when $G_t - T_t > 0$, there is a deficit in the budget, so that the government must borrow). If the interest rate that the government pays is given by r_t , then the law of motion of government debt is given by:

$$B_t = (1 + r_t)B_{t-1} + G_t - T_t.$$

The **total** government deficit, which is equal to the change in government debt ΔB_t , is equal to the sum of **interest payments** and the **primary deficit** $G_t - T_t$:

$$\text{Deficit}_t = \Delta B_t = B_t - B_{t-1} = \underbrace{r_t B_{t-1}}_{\text{Interest Payments}} + \underbrace{G_t - T_t}_{\text{Primary Deficit}}$$

From the above equation, the evolution of the debt to GDP ratio B_t/Y_t :

$$\frac{B_t}{Y_t} = (1 + r_t) \frac{Y_{t-1}}{Y_t} \frac{B_{t-1}}{Y_{t-1}} + \frac{G_t - T_t}{Y_t}$$

Let us denote the debt to GDP ratio by b_t :

$$b_t \equiv \frac{B_t}{Y_t}.$$

Therefore:

$$b_t = (1 + r_t) \frac{Y_{t-1}}{Y_t} b_{t-1} + \frac{G_t - T_t}{Y_t}.$$

Assuming that GDP grows at rate g_Y , we have that:

$$\frac{Y_t}{Y_{t-1}} = 1 + g_Y.$$

Therefore:

$$b_t = \frac{1 + r_t}{1 + g_Y} b_{t-1} + \frac{G_t - T_t}{Y_t}.$$

10.1.2 Condition for Sustainability

A thought experiment is useful to think about the sustainability of public debt in this environment. Imagine that all future primary surpluses were equal to zero after $t = t_0$, that is:

$$\text{for all } t \geq t_0, \quad G_t = T_t,$$

and that real interest rates are constant after $t \geq t_0$:

$$r_t = r.$$

We then have that:

$$\text{for all } t \geq t_0, \quad b_t = \frac{1+r}{1+g_Y} b_{t-1}.$$

Then the debt to GDP ratio would be given by:

$$\text{for all } t \geq t_0, \quad b_t = \left(\frac{1+r}{1+g_Y} \right)^{t-t_0} b_{t_0}$$

There are three possible cases:

1. If $r < g_Y$ - a situation called dynamic inefficiency² - the debt to GDP ratio goes to 0. (Indeed, when $a < 1$, $a^t \rightarrow 0$ when $t \rightarrow +\infty$.) Therefore, the **debt to GDP ratio goes to zero**.
2. If $r = g_Y$, the debt to GDP ratio stays constant. Then, the **debt to GDP ratio stays constant**.
3. If $r > g_Y$, the debt to GDP ratio goes to infinity. Indeed, when $a > 1$, $a^t \rightarrow +\infty$ when $t \rightarrow +\infty$. Then, the **debt to GDP ratio goes to infinity**.

10.1.3 Is public debt sustainable in the U.S.?

Which of these three cases is relevant for the U.S. economy? Is public debt sustainable in the U.S.? How do the real interest rate r and the growth rate of GDP g_Y compare? Up until now, I would argue that it's fair to say that $r < g_Y$.

The real interest rate r can be measured in two ways:

1. Either using the nominal interest rate, and subtracting an average expected (or realized) inflation rate in order to get to a real interest rate. Figure 10.1 shows that the nominal interest rate has averaged around 2 to 3% recently, while inflation has been from 1 to 2% on average. This implies a real interest rate which is around 1%, perhaps 2%.
2. Or, one can measure the real interest rate by using the rate on **Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS)**. Figure 10.2 from FRED (the Federal Reserve Economic Data) shows that the real interest rate has recently been around 1% per year.

On the other hand, real GDP growth seems to be hovering around $g_Y \approx 2.5\%$. Real GDP per capita growth is variable, but it is usually estimated to be **around 1.5%**: $g_{Y/L} \approx 1.5\%$. It varies over time, however: it was around 3.0% per year on average in the 1960s, 2.1% in the 1970s, 2.4% in the 1980s, 2.2% in the 1990s,

²It might seem a bit contradictory that a situation where the debt to GDP ratio goes to 0 automatically is called inefficient - this seems like a rather positive state of affairs. However, we shall see in the next chapter through the overlapping-generations model, that "dynamic inefficiency" means here that the government should in fact be taking on even *more* government debt, to restore an equality between r and g_Y . You may also remember from Exercise 1 of problem set 4 - the solution is posted here - that an interest rate lower than the rate of growth implies that we are below the Golden Rule interest rate, so that the capital stock is too high, and consumption is too low.



Figure 10.1: 10-YEAR TREASURY RATE (SOURCE: FRED).



Figure 10.2: 10-YEAR TREASURY INFLATION PROTECTED SECURITIES RATE (SOURCE: FRED).




Figure 10.3: INTEREST PAYMENTS ON GOVERNMENT DEBT AS % OF GDP (SOURCE: FRED).

0.7% in the 2000s, and 0.9% from 2010 to 2017. On the other hand, the growth rate of population is around 1%: $g_L \approx 1.5\%$. Therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} g_Y &= g_{Y/L} + g_L \\ &\approx 1.5\% + 1\% \\ g_Y &\approx 2.5\%. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the ratio of government debt to GDP does not appear to be on an unsustainable path so far.

A final way to see that U.S. debt is not yet on an unsustainable path is to note that the ratio of interest payments to GDP is not particularly high historically, which is shown on Figure 10.3. This implies that if the primary deficit was reduced to zero, the debt to GDP ratio would not be on an explosive trajectory.

10.2 Public Debt in the Overlapping Generations Model

In this section, I illustrate using the overlapping-generations model of lecture 4 that public debt does not necessarily need to be repaid eventually, so that government debt is not necessarily a burden on future generations - an argument which we nonetheless often hear in the public debate. However, one precondition for this is naturally that the debt to GDP has to be stable. In other words, we need that $r^* \leq g_Y$. In the overlapping-generations model of lecture 4, we had $g_Y = 0$, since there was no long-run growth. So we want $r^* \leq 0$. In order to have a role for public debt, we will look at the model that we studied in problem set 3 called “Another Overlapping Generations Model” - the solution to this problem set was available here.

10.2.1 Overlapping Generations Model

Let us look at a simplified version of the overlapping generations model we looked at in lecture 4. For this model, we shall assume that people only care about old age consumption, and that they work only when young, receiving wage w_t . It does not really matter what the form of their utility function is with respect to

old age consumption, because they will save everything anyway:

$$U = u(c_{t+1}^o).$$

Denoting by r_t the (net) real interest rate, their intertemporal budget constraint is then given by:

$$c_t^y + \frac{c_{t+1}^o}{1+r_t} = w_t.$$

In this very simple environment, and because consumption in young age will always optimally be set to zero ($c_t^y = 0$), this implies:

$$c_{t+1}^o = (1+r_t)w_t.$$

Similarly to the previous time, we assume that the labor force is fixed to unity ($L_t = \bar{L} = 1$). The production function is Cobb-Douglas:

$$Y_t = K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}.$$

Together with the previous assumption of constant labor $L_t = 1$, this implies that:

$$Y_t = K_t^\alpha.$$

From firms' optimality conditions, the wage is just the marginal product of labor:

$$w_t = \frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial L_t} = (1-\alpha)K_t^\alpha L_t^{-\alpha} = (1-\alpha)K_t^\alpha.$$

Similarly as previously, we also get through firms' optimization on the amount of capital that:

$$r_t + \delta = \frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial K_t} = \alpha K_t^{\alpha-1}.$$

Finally, for simplicity, we shall sometimes assume that the depreciation rate is equal to $\delta = 1 = 100\%$. In other words, capital fully depreciates each period - this is reasonable if you take one unit of time to represent one generation, or about 30 years - remember that the depreciation rate for one year was ranging from 5% to 10%.

10.2.2 Without Government Debt

Let us first remind ourselves what happens in the absence of government debt in this model, as in lecture 4. In the absence of a government, we get even simpler expressions than the previous time. The law of motion for capital is given as follows:

$$\Delta K_{t+1} = w_t - \delta K_t.$$

Since w_t is a fraction $1-\alpha$ of output, this law of motion corresponds to the Solow growth model with $s = 1-\alpha$. The law of motion for capital is:

$$K_{t+1} = (1-\alpha)K_t^\alpha + (1-\delta)K_t.$$

This is a difference equation for sequence K_t which converges to a steady state value for the capital stock K^* such that:

$$\begin{aligned} \delta K^* &= (1-\alpha)(K^*)^\alpha \\ \Rightarrow K^* &= \frac{(1-\alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}. \end{aligned}$$

The steady state value for the interest rate r^* is then such that:

$$\begin{aligned} r^* + \delta &= \alpha(K^*)^{\alpha-1} \\ &= \alpha \left[\left(\frac{1-\alpha}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \right]^{\alpha-1} \\ r^* + \delta &= \frac{\delta \alpha}{1-\alpha} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the steady-state value of the interest rate r^* :

$$r^* = \frac{2\alpha - 1}{1 - \alpha} \delta.$$

which, note, is negative for $\alpha < 1/2$. The steady state value for output Y^* is then:

$$\begin{aligned} Y^* &= (K^*)^\alpha \\ Y^* &= \frac{(1 - \alpha)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}. \end{aligned}$$

The value for the wage w^* is:

$$\begin{aligned} w^* &= (1 - \alpha)(K^*)^\alpha \\ &= (1 - \alpha) \left(\frac{1 - \alpha}{\delta} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \\ w^* &= \frac{(1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}} \end{aligned}$$

Steady-state consumption of the old $(c^o)^*$ is thus given by:

$$\begin{aligned} (c^o)^* &= (1 + r^*)w^* \\ (c^o)^* &= \left(1 + \frac{2\alpha - 1}{1 - \alpha} \delta \right) (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \end{aligned}$$

Full depreciation ($\delta = 1$). Since one period here is one generation, a useful assumption is that capital fully depreciates in one period, so that $\delta = 1$. Then, the previous expressions are considerably more simple to work with:

$$\begin{aligned} K^* &= \frac{(1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}} = (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \\ r^* &= \frac{2\alpha - 1}{1 - \alpha} \delta = \frac{2\alpha - 1}{1 - \alpha} \\ Y^* &= \frac{(1 - \alpha)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}} = (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \\ w^* &= \frac{(1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}} = (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \\ (c^o)^* &= \left(1 + \frac{2\alpha - 1}{1 - \alpha} \delta \right) (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \\ &= \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \\ (c^o)^* &= \alpha (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \end{aligned}$$

Numerical Application. With $\delta = 1$ and $\alpha = 1/3$:

$$\begin{aligned} K^* &= (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} = \left(\frac{2}{3} \right)^{3/2} = \frac{2\sqrt{2}}{3\sqrt{3}} \\ r^* &= \frac{2\alpha - 1}{1 - \alpha} = \frac{-1/3}{2/3} = -\frac{1}{2} = -50\% \\ Y^* &= (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} = \left(\frac{2}{3} \right)^{1/2} = \frac{\sqrt{2}}{\sqrt{3}} \\ w^* &= (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} = \frac{2\sqrt{2}}{3\sqrt{3}} \\ (c^o)^* &= \alpha (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} = \frac{1}{3} \left(\frac{2}{3} \right)^{1/2} = \frac{\sqrt{2}}{3\sqrt{3}} \end{aligned}$$

10.2.3 With Government Debt

As we saw in lecture 2, and then again in lecture 4, because $r^* < 0$ we have that the quantity of capital is higher than the Golden Rule level of the capital stock, which is such that $r_g^* = 0$. Why, again, is the Golden rule interest rate equal to 0 when there is no growth? One quick way to understand it is to write that in the steady-state, the consumption of the old $(c^o)^*$ is supposed to be maximized (since the old are the only ones consuming). However, we also know that in the steady-state, total production $F(K^*, 1) = (K^*)^\alpha$ is used for two things: consuming (for the old) and repairing the capital stock (saving equals investment equals depreciation, as in the Solow growth model), so that:

$$(c^o)^* + \delta K^* = (K^*)^\alpha \Rightarrow (c^o)^* = (K^*)^\alpha - \delta K^*$$

Therefore, the Golden rule capital stock K_g^* , which maximizes $(c^o)^*$ solves:

$$\max_{K^*} (K^*)^\alpha - \delta K^*,$$

which implies that:

$$\alpha(K_g^*)^{\alpha-1} = \delta.$$

Moreover, we know that the marginal product of capital $\partial F(K^*, 1)/\partial K^* = \alpha(K_g^*)^{\alpha-1}$ is also equal to $r_g^* + \delta$, the gross return, from the firms' problem, which gives the following optimality condition:

$$\alpha(K_g^*)^{\alpha-1} = r_g^* + \delta.$$

Using these two last equalities allows to conclude that in this situation with no growth, the Golden rule interest rate is equal to zero since $r_g^* + \delta = \alpha(K_g^*)^{\alpha-1} = \delta$:

$$r_g^* = 0.$$

However, we saw in the previous section that the *equilibrium* interest rate r^* was negative, equal to -50%. Therefore, the capital stock is too high here. As we saw in lectures 2 and 4, one way to solve this problem would be to force everyone to save less, in order to decrease private saving; however this might be thought of as a little bit too intrusive. Another way to solve this problem is to use public debt (decrease public saving, to reduce total saving) in order to solve this problem of excess saving and excess investment.

In order to better understand which level of public debt is warranted, we look at the level of capital such that $r_g^* = 0$ - which again, is the golden rule interest rate, since the rate of growth of output is $g_Y = 0$. Thus, the corresponding Golden Rule level of the capital stock K_g^* is such that:

$$r_g^* + \delta = \alpha(K_g^*)^{\alpha-1} \Rightarrow_{r_g^*=0} \delta = \alpha(K_g^*)^{\alpha-1}$$

Therefore:

$$K_g^* = \frac{\alpha^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}.$$

The Golden rule steady-state value for output Y_g^* would be then:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_g^* &= (K_g^*)^\alpha \\ Y_g^* &= \frac{\alpha^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}. \end{aligned}$$

The value for the steady-state wage w_g^* is then:

$$\begin{aligned} w_g^* &= (1 - \alpha)(K^*)^\alpha \\ w_g^* &= (1 - \alpha)\frac{\alpha^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}} \end{aligned}$$

Steady-state consumption of the old $(c^o)_g^*$ is thus given by:

$$(c^o)_g^* = (1 + r^*)w_g^*$$

$$(c^o)_g^* = (1 - \alpha) \frac{\alpha^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}$$

If $\delta = 1$, then:

$$(c^o)_g^* = (1 - \alpha)\alpha^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

The question is how to we achieve this quantity of capital K_g^* ? The answer is that some public debt needs to be taken on by the government. Again, saving is equal to the wage w_g^* , and to the purchase of total assets, which includes both public debt whose quantity is given by B_g^* , and the capital stock whose quantity is K_g^* . Therefore, we may compute the level of the public debt which allows to reach this Golden-Rule level of capital accumulation:

$$B_g^* + K_g^* = w_g^* \Rightarrow B_g^* = w_g^* - K_g^*.$$

Substituting:

$$\begin{aligned} B_g^* &= w_g^* - K_g^* \\ &= (1 - \alpha) \frac{\alpha^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}} - \frac{\alpha^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}} \\ B_g^* &= \frac{\alpha^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}} \left(1 - \alpha - \frac{\alpha}{\delta}\right). \end{aligned}$$

Note that with $\delta = 1$, then this level of public debt is strictly positive when $\alpha < 1/2$.

Numerical Application. With $\alpha = 1/3$ and $\delta = 1$:

$$\begin{aligned} K_g^* &= \frac{\alpha^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}} = \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^{3/2} = \frac{1}{3\sqrt{3}} \\ r_g^* &= 0 \\ Y_g^* &= \frac{\alpha^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}} = \left(\frac{1}{3}\right)^{1/2} = \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}} \\ w_g^* &= (1 - \alpha) \frac{\alpha^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}}{\delta^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}} = \frac{2}{3} \sqrt{\frac{1}{3}} = \frac{2}{3\sqrt{3}} \\ (c^o)_g^* &= (1 + r_g^*)w_g^* = w_g^* = \frac{2}{3\sqrt{3}} \end{aligned}$$

Note that the steady-state consumption of the old $(c^o)_g^*$ is greater than the level of consumption achieved by the old without government debt since $2 > \sqrt{2}$. But what is amazing is that the level of capital in this case is actually lower than the level of capital in the previous section. The government can force the economy into this level of capital accumulation by taking on debt. The level of debt B_g^* that corresponds to that level of capital accumulation is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} B_g^* &= w_g^* - K_g^* \\ &= \frac{2}{3\sqrt{3}} - \frac{1}{3\sqrt{3}} \\ B_g^* &= \frac{1}{3\sqrt{3}}. \end{aligned}$$

The government can reach that level of debt by giving a transfer to the first generation of old, like the war veterans, who will then consume in the first period $t = 0$ an amount equal to:

$$c_0^o = \frac{\sqrt{2}}{3\sqrt{3}} + \frac{1}{3\sqrt{3}} = \frac{1 + \sqrt{2}}{3\sqrt{3}}.$$

All future generations thus consume more. With a lot of capital, there is such a thing as a free lunch! Public debt is a Ponzi scheme, but a beneficial one. Public debt allows to increase consumption for everyone, and it can be rolled over every period (note that the debt to GDP ratio stays constant, as GDP growth is zero in the long run, just as the long run interest rate is zero). This is true more generally even in the neoclassical model, provided that there is **dynamic inefficiency** ($r^* < g_Y$) to begin with.

10.3 The Treasury View, and Say's Law

The most controversial and also most important questions in macroeconomics revolve around the issue of the so-called **Treasury View**, and **Say's law**. These are probably the most difficult, controversial, but also the most important questions for macroeconomics.

10.3.1 Treasury View: The Effects of Deficit Spending on Investment

The *Treasury View* asserts that more government spending, either in the form of government purchases or of tax reductions, and therefore lower saving, necessarily leads to *crowd out* (reduce) an equal amount of investment spending. Conversely more saving, either by the government or by households, leads to more investment. The logic of this argument is rather straightforward: if there exists a finite amount of resources in the economy - in other words, output is supply-determined - then whatever is being saved goes to increase investment. Output is simply the sum of consumption, investment, and government spending, so that "necessarily" increasing government spending leads to crowd out either of every component:

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= C + I + G \\ \Rightarrow (Y - C - T) &= I + (G - T) \\ \Rightarrow (Y - C - T) + (T - G) &= I \end{aligned}$$

Therefore investment I equals total saving, private saving $S = Y - C - T$ plus public saving $T - G$:

$$I = \underbrace{(Y - C - T)}_{\text{Private Saving}} + \underbrace{(T - G)}_{\text{Public Saving}}$$

The reason why this view is called the **Treasury View** is that it was advanced in the 1930s, during the Great Depression, by the staff of the British Chancellor of the Exchequer, Winston Churchill. When defending his 1929 budget, Winston Churchill explained:

The orthodox Treasury view... is that when the Government borrows in the money market it becomes a new competitor with industry and engrosses to itself resources which would otherwise have been employed by private enterprise, and in the process raises the rent of money to all who have need of it.

What we have seen so far leads us to take a very contrasted perspective on the Treasury View:

- In the **Keynesian model** of lectures 7, 8, and 9, investment is not crowded out by public debt - in the simplest model of the goods market, investment is in fact fixed. In the accelerator model, $I = b_0 + b_1 Y$ so that investment depends only on sales, not on saving. According to this model, what the Treasury View misses is that output is not determined by supply, but it is instead determined by demand. Therefore, one cannot reason as if GDP was fixed: GDP is precisely what adjusts when saving is reduced, to maintain the equality between investment and total saving.
- In the **neoclassical model** of lectures 2 and 4 in contrast, investment is determined by total saving, and it moves flexibly in response to saving. According to this view, investment is indeed crowded out by public deficits. Note however that this does not mean that in the neoclassical model, government deficits are always bad. As we just saw, public deficits may be a good thing if the economy has too much capital to begin with.

This issue of the Treasury view was discussed a lot during the U.S. 2008 financial crisis, when policymakers were turning to economists for advice on the appropriate policy response. You can see some discussion of this issue in “Readings - To go further”. While Chicago economists were articulating the Treasury view in various different flavors, Keynesian economists were rejecting this notion very strongly - most notably Paul Krugman. Of course, whether the Treasury View is correct or not is ultimately an empirical question. We will present some empirical evidence on this issue during lecture 13.

10.3.2 Say's law: supply creates its own demand

Say's law, named after Jean-Baptiste Say (1767 - 1832), has been summarized by J.M. Keynes as a statement that “supply creates its own demand”. Jean-Baptiste Say's reasoning was straightforward:

It is worthwhile to remark that a product is no sooner created than it, from that instant, affords a market for other products to the full extent of its own value. When the producer has put the finishing hand to his product, he is most anxious to sell it immediately, lest its value should diminish in his hands. Nor is he less anxious to dispose of the money he may get for it; for the value of money is also perishable. But the only way of getting rid of money is in the purchase of some product or other. Thus the mere circumstance of creation of one product immediately opens a vent for other products.

Thus, in Say's opinion, supply created its own demand, and there could never be any aggregate demand shortages. In a briefing on Say's law, *The Economist* magazine writes:

In Say's time, as nowadays, the world economy combined strong technological progress with fitful demand, spurts of innovation with bouts of austerity. (...) On the other hand, global demand was damaged by failed ventures in South America and debilitated by the eventual downfall of Napoleon. In Britain government spending was cut by 40% after the Battle of Waterloo in 1815. Some 300,000 discharged soldiers and sailors were forced to seek alternative employment. The result was a tide of overcapacity, what Say's contemporaries called a “general glut”. Britain was accused of inundating foreign markets, from Italy to Brazil, much as China is blamed for dumping products today. In 1818 a visitor to America found “not a city, nor a town, in which the quantity of goods offered for sale is not infinitely greater than the means of the buyers”. It was this “general overstock of all the markets of the universe” that came to preoccupy Say and his critics. In trying to explain it, Say at first denied that a “general” glut could exist. Some goods can be oversupplied, he conceded. But goods in general cannot. His reasoning became known as Say's law: “it is production which opens a demand for products”, or, in a later, snappier formulation: supply creates its own demand.

Once again, we may contrast two very different perspectives on the Say's law:

- In the **Keynesian model** of lectures 7, 8, and 9, supply does not create its own demand, as some resources (labor or capital) are idle. This allows government spending or tax cuts to have an effect on GDP, by utilizing some of these resources. The reason is that in this model, the desire to save does not necessarily translate into more investment, since investment is fixed or given by the overall level of GDP, which is depressed by more saving. This was the paradox of thrift of lecture 8: instead of increasing investment, a higher desire to save actually reduces output, which ends up depressing saving.
- In the **neoclassical model** of lectures 2 and 4 in contrast, investment is determined by total saving, and it moves flexibly in response to saving. According to this view, there can indeed never be a general glut: consumption increases aggregate demand, but saving increases it too, by stimulating more investment. True, there might be “too much capital”, when the capital stock is higher than the Golden rule level, but this is not a “general glut”. Thus, supply can be thought of as indeed “creating its own demand”.

How you stand on those two issues (the Treasury View and Say's law) determines whether you are more a neoclassical or a Keynesian economist. As we have seen however, Keynesians and neoclassicals agree on one

thing: consumption is the sole purpose of all production, and there exists such a thing as “too much capital”, when $r^* < g_Y$. Whether that is the situation we are in, even after Donald Trump’s massive tax cuts, is still a controversial question.

Readings - To go further

Uriel H. Crocker and S. M. Macvane, “General Overproduction,” *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 1, no. 3 (1887): 362–66.

Robert J. Barro, Government Spending Is No Free Lunch, *Wall Street Journal*, January 22, 2009.

Paul Krugman, A Dark Age of Macroeconomics (wonkish), *New York Times*, Jan 27, 2009

Paul Krugman, Multipliers and Reality, *New York Times* Blog Post, June 3, 2015.

In Japan, the Government Gets Paid to Borrow Money, *Wall Street Journal*, March 1, 2016.

(Gated) Say’s Law: Supply Creates its Own Demand. *The Economist*, August 10, 2017.

(Gated) Overlapping Generations: Kicking the road down an endless road. *The Economist*, August 31, 2017.

(Gated) Why is macroeconomics so hard to teach? *The Economist*, August 9, 2018.

“U.S. on a course to spend more on debt than defense”, *Wall Street Journal*, November 11, 2018.

Lecture 11

The Open Economy and the Multiplier

In lectures 7, 8, 9 and 10, we have maintained that the economy was closed, a strong and unrealistic assumption. This assumption can only be justified when thinking about the world as a whole. However, the relevance of the theory is then considerably diminished, because fiscal policy such as government spending or the tax and transfer system, are largely decided at the national level.

One key idea of today's lecture is that in an open economy, Keynesian stimulus is less efficient, which is all the more true when the economy is more open. This result is intuitive: in an open economy, some of the increased aggregate demand by consumers is addressed to foreign products. J.M. Keynes describes this phenomenon in *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* as follows:

In an open system with foreign-trade relations, some part of the multiplier of the increased investment will accrue to the benefit of employment in foreign countries, since a proportion of the increased consumption will diminish our own country's favourable foreign balance; so that, if we consider only the effect on domestic employment as distinct from world employment, we must diminish the full figure of the multiplier. On the other hand our own country may recover a portion of this leakage through favourable repercussions due to the action of the multiplier in the foreign country in increasing its economic activity.

During this lecture, we will extend the extended goods market model of lecture 9 to allow for the importing and exporting of goods, as well as the potential for a deficit or a surplus in the trade balance NX . We will show that the value for the Keynesian multiplier is then reduced, all the more so that the economy is open.

Very importantly, you should not necessarily think of the economies we consider here as countries. States, counties, or even zipcodes, also are open economies (which share a fixed exchange rate with respect to other states, counties, or zipcodes). Thus, the model is applicable if, for example, California decides to engage in fiscal stimulus (by lowering state taxes, for instance). Of course, California is much more open than the U.S. as a whole, as California imports many products from other states (a quarter of its electricity, for example), and exports many products to other states (such as Google, Apple, or Facebook). Therefore, we shall see that California has much less power than the U.S. as a whole to stimulate aggregate demand.

11.1 Aggregate Demand in the Open Economy

11.1.1 Assumption: No Exchange Rates

In this lecture, we shall abstract from exchange rate considerations altogether (in terms of the notations which we shall introduce later, $\epsilon = 1$):

1. A literal way to interpret this assumption is to assume that **exchange rates are fixed**. This would be the case if a country has a fixed exchange rate regime vis-a-vis the rest of the world. This situation describes well Euro-area countries which share a common currency, or countries which peg their currencies to the dollar. This situation also describes the Gold Standard regime, or the “gold-exchange standard” Bretton Woods system before the Nixon Shock, when direct convertibility of the U.S. dollar to Gold was suspended.
2. Even if exchange rates are not fixed, we can already learn a lot by **focusing on quantities** (export and import volumes), and abstracting from exchange rates for now. We shall discuss exchange rate policy during some of the next lectures. In particular, even though exports and imports are clearly endogenous to exchange rates, it is useful to first ask what would happen if exchange rates could not move.

11.1.2 National Accounting

In the open economy, aggregate demand for U.S. goods has two additional components:

- exports X , which add to demand for U.S. goods. This additional demand originates from the spending of foreign countries.
- imports M , which subtract from demand for U.S. goods. (this additional demand is met by countries from which the U.S. imports)

Therefore, in the open economy, aggregate demand Z is given by:

$$Z = C + I + G + (X - M).$$

Net exports NX are defined as exports minus imports:

$$NX \equiv X - M.$$

Aggregate demand for U.S. goods is thus:

$$\boxed{Z = C + I + G + NX}.$$

11.2 Multiplier in the Open Economy

In this section, we will illustrate the aggregate demand leakage effect, using the simplest possible model. A natural assumption is that imports are a constant fraction of aggregate demand, so that:

$$M = m_1 Y.$$

For example, if the import penetration ratio is 15%, then $m_1 = 0.15$. This means that out of \$1 in additional demand, 15 cents is addressed to foreign products. A symmetric assumption is that exports are a constant fraction of foreign demand, denoted by Y^* . We denote the constant of proportionality by x_1 , for symmetry, so that:

$$X = x_1 Y^*.$$

We can already see that if aggregate demand abroad increases, then the home country has an aggregate demand boost, because it is able to sell more abroad.

11.2.1 Output in the Open Economy

We shall now use the most sophisticated model of the goods market, that seen in lecture 9.¹ Therefore, we shall assume a population of size N with two types of consumers, a fraction λ who earn a low income \underline{y} and a fraction $1 - \lambda$ with a high income $\bar{y} = \gamma\underline{y}$. They respectively consume $\underline{c} = \underline{c}_0 + \underline{c}_1(\underline{y} - t)$ with $t = \underline{t}_0 + t_1\underline{y}$, and $\bar{c} = \bar{c}_0 + \bar{c}_1(\bar{y} - \bar{t})$ with $\bar{t} = \bar{t}_0 + t_1\bar{y}$. Moreover, we assume that investment depends on output through $I = b_0 + b_1 Y$.

In lecture 9, we have shown that defining aggregate baseline taxes for the two groups as:

$$\underline{T}_0 \equiv \lambda N \underline{t}_0, \quad \bar{T}_0 \equiv (1 - \lambda) N \bar{t}_0,$$

aggregate taxes T satisfy:

$$T = (\underline{T}_0 + \bar{T}_0) + t_1 Y.$$

Moreover, defining the average MPC c_1 by:

$$c_1 \equiv \frac{\lambda c_1 + (1 - \lambda) \gamma \bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda) \gamma},$$

the aggregate baseline level of consumption C_0 as:

$$C_0 \equiv \underline{C}_0 + \bar{C}_0 = \lambda N \underline{c}_0 + (1 - \lambda) N \bar{c}_0,$$

where the baseline level of consumption for low and high income earners is given by:

$$\underline{C}_0 \equiv \lambda N \underline{c}_0, \quad \bar{C}_0 \equiv (1 - \lambda) N \bar{c}_0.$$

Aggregate consumption is:

$$C = C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + c_1(1 - t_1) Y.$$

We may now express total aggregate demand in the open economy as:

$$\begin{aligned} Z &= C + I + G + X - M \\ &= C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + c_1(1 - t_1) Y + b_0 + b_1 Y + G + x_1 Y^* - m_1 Y \\ Z &= [C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + b_0 + G + x_1 Y^*] + [c_1(1 - t_1) + b_1 - m_1] Y \end{aligned}$$

We can now write that aggregate demand equals income, or $Z = Y$, which leads to:

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= [C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + b_0 + G + x_1 Y^*] + [c_1(1 - t_1) + b_1 - m_1] Y \\ \Rightarrow (1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1) Y &= C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + b_0 + G + x_1 Y^* \end{aligned}$$

To conclude:

$$Y = \frac{1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} [C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + b_0 + G + x_1 Y^*]$$

11.2.2 Open Economy Multiplier

Denoting autonomous spending by z_0 as in lecture 7:

$$z_0 \equiv C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + b_0 + G + x_1 Y^*,$$

¹ Starting from the most general model allows to then look at particular cases if it need be, while the reverse is obviously not true.

we note that a given change in autonomous spending Δz_0 , which may arise for example from a change in government spending $\Delta z_0 = \Delta G$ leads to a change in output given by:

$$\Delta Y = \frac{\Delta z_0}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1}.$$

This implies the following value for the **open economy multiplier**:

$$\text{Multiplier} = \frac{1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1}.$$

We can see that the open economy multiplier is lower than the closed economy multiplier (which we get back here assuming that $m_1 = 0$):

$$\frac{1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} < \frac{1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1}.$$

Or:

$$\boxed{\text{Open Economy Multiplier} < \text{Closed Economy Multiplier}}$$

The economics of this result are very clear: in an open economy, some of the stimulus goes to increase imports, which does not stimulate production at home. This explains J.M. Keynes' observation we started out with:

In an open system with foreign-trade relations, some part of the multiplier of the increased investment will accrue to the benefit of employment in foreign countries, since a proportion of the increased consumption will diminish our own country's favourable foreign balance; so that, if we consider only the effect on domestic employment as distinct from world employment, we must diminish the full figure of the multiplier.

Numerical Application: If we assume that $m_1 = 1/6$, adding the numerical values used in lecture 9 for c_1 , b_1 and t_1 :

$$c_1 = \frac{2}{3}, \quad b_1 = \frac{1}{6}, \quad t_1 = \frac{1}{4}, \quad m_1 = \frac{1}{6}.$$

(note that the marginal propensity to consume is again here an average across the two groups, which could come from $\underline{c}_1 = 1$, $\bar{c}_1 = 1/3$, $\gamma = 9$, $\lambda = 0.9$ implying that $c_1 = 2/3$ as in lecture 9), then we may calculate the government spending multiplier:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} &= \frac{1}{1 - (1 - 1/4) \cdot 2/3 - 1/6 + 1/6} \\ &= \frac{1}{1 - 1/2} \\ \frac{1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} &= 2 \end{aligned}$$

This can be compared to the closed economy multiplier with $m_1 = 0$:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1} &= \frac{1}{1 - (1 - 1/4) \cdot 2/3 - 1/6} \\ &= \frac{1}{1 - 1/2 - 1/6} \\ \frac{1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1} &= 3 \end{aligned}$$

11.3 Twin Deficits?

Martin Feldstein, an economist who was serving as chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors and as chief economic advisor to Ronald Reagan from 1982 to 1984, coined the term “twin deficits” to describe the Reagan policies of large government deficits, caused by tax cuts and large military expenditures (he was actually very critical of these policies, as he was and still is a “deficit hawk”). At the time, the U.S. was experiencing a deficit in both the trade balance as well as in the government’s finances. How can we make sense of this twin deficit idea, using the very simple goods market model of the previous section? Do trade deficits always come in times of budget deficits?

11.3.1 “Saving Equals Investment” in the open economy

In the closed economy, total saving (private plus government) must equal investment:

$$S + (T - G) = I.$$

The logic is rather straightforward: when the economy is closed, increased capital accumulation can only come out of resources which have not been consumed. In the open-economy, the trade balance equals exactly the difference between total saving and total investment:

$$\boxed{NX = S + (T - G) - I}.$$

Just as the Saving Equals Investment Identity obtains using the national account identity in a closed economy, so does this previous relationship. We start from:

$$Y = C + I + G + NX$$

This leads to:

$$\begin{aligned} NX &= Y - C - G - I \\ &= (Y - C - T) + (T - G) - I \\ NX &= S + (T - G) - I. \end{aligned}$$

Logic of twin deficits. The logic of twin deficits is quite straightforward. Assuming **everything else equal**, a fall in the government surplus ($T - G$), or equivalently a rise in the government deficit, leads to a deterioration in the trade balance:

$$\boxed{\Delta(T - G) < 0 \Rightarrow NX < 0}.$$

However, things are never quite so simple in macroeconomics, as **everything tends to depend on everything else**; this is actually one reason why we write models with exogenous and endogenous variables. “Changing the budget deficit everything else equal” is not a concrete experiment, because whatever changes the budget deficit also typically affects private saving, and potentially investment. So let’s look more precisely at what may or may not lead to a twin deficit.

11.3.2 A Budget Deficit and a Trade Deficit

The question that always needs to be asked in macroeconomics is: what is exogenous, and what is endogenous? The government typically cannot legislate on the budget deficit directly: for example, the budget deficit depends on GDP through automatic stabilizers (which affect the amount of taxes that are levied); and many determinants of GDP are not directly under the government’s control.

However, the government does decide on government spending. Let us therefore look at what happens when the U.S. engage in military expenditures $\Delta G > 0$, as Reagan did at the beginning of the 1980s. We will see

that under “reasonable” assumptions on parameters, government expenditures lead to a twin deficit in the budget and in trade.

Let us look at GDP first. From section 11.2.1, we know that:

$$\Delta Y = \frac{\Delta G}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1}.$$

Because $T = (\underline{T}_0 + \bar{T}_0) + t_1 Y$, we have that:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta T &= t_1 \Delta Y \\ \Delta T &= \frac{t_1 \Delta G}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1}\end{aligned}$$

This implies that the public deficit is:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta(T - G) &= \Delta T \\ &= \Delta T - \Delta G \\ &= \frac{t_1 \Delta G}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} - \Delta G \\ \Delta(T - G) &= \left(\frac{t_1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} - 1 \right) \Delta G.\end{aligned}$$

In all generality, the sign for this is ambiguous. However, with “reasonable values” such as $c_1 = 2/3$, $t_1 = 1/4$, $b_1 = 1/6$ and $m_1 = 1/6$, the government multiplier is 2, so that with $t_1 = 1/4$, increases in government expenditures are not self-financing:

$$\frac{t_1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} - 1 = \frac{2}{4} - 1 = -\frac{1}{2}.$$

Therefore, the increase in taxes brought about by the Keynesian stimulus are not enough to offset the negative impact of government spending on the budget, so that overall:

$$\boxed{\Delta(T - G) < 0}.$$

The impact on the trade deficit can be computed directly using that net exports are $NX = x_1 Y^* - m_1 Y$, so that:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta NX &= -m_1 \Delta Y \\ \Delta NX &= -m_1 \frac{\Delta G}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1}\end{aligned}$$

This implies therefore that we also have a trade deficit:

$$\boxed{\Delta NX < 0}.$$

Intuition. However, what is somewhat frustrating with this way of computing the trade deficit, is that we don’t see the intuition that we started with: net exports are saving minus investment, so if government saving goes down, then necessarily net exports must go down. What is going on? We now write this equation in changes to try to get at this result:

$$\Delta NX = \Delta S + \Delta(T - G) - \Delta I.$$

What this equation shows is that there are two potential “moving parts” that the previous simplistic reasoning was not taking into account: one, saving might go up if output goes up, which helps create a trade surplus; two, investment might go up as well if output goes up, which might further aggravate the deficit. In order

to tell which of these forces dominate, we need to do some algebra. First, private saving is still given by disposable income minus consumption:

$$\begin{aligned} S &= Y - T - C \\ &= Y - ((\underline{T}_0 + \bar{T}_0) + t_1 Y) - (C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + c_1(1 - t_1)Y) \\ &= Y - t_1 Y - c_1(1 - t_1)Y - C_0 - (\underline{T}_0 + \bar{T}_0) + (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) \\ S &= (1 - t_1)(1 - c_1)Y - C_0 - (\underline{T}_0 + \bar{T}_0) + (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta S &= (1 - t_1)(1 - c_1)\Delta Y \\ \Delta S &= \frac{(1 - t_1)(1 - c_1)}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} \Delta G \end{aligned}$$

Again, as above, taxes also increase through automatic stabilizers. Because $T = (\underline{T}_0 + \bar{T}_0) + t_1 Y$, we have that:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta T &= t_1 \Delta Y \\ \Delta T &= \frac{t_1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} \Delta G \end{aligned}$$

Finally, investment increases by the following amount:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta I &= b_1 \Delta Y \\ \Delta I &= \frac{b_1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} \Delta G \end{aligned}$$

So finally, net exports minus investment is the sum of all these contributions:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta NX &= \Delta S + \Delta T - \Delta G - \Delta I \\ &= \frac{(1 - t_1)(1 - c_1) + t_1 - (1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1) - b_1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} \Delta G \\ &= \frac{1 - t_1 - c_1 + c_1 t_1 + t_1 - 1 + c_1 - c_1 t_1 + b_1 - m_1 - b_1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} \Delta G \\ \Delta NX &= -\frac{m_1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} \Delta G \end{aligned}$$

Naturally (but it's always nice to check !), we arrive at the same result in the end.

Numerical Application: If we assume again $m_1 = 1/6$, $c_1 = 2/3$, $b_1 = 1/6$, $t_1 = 1/4$, then again the multiplier $\Delta Y/\Delta G$ is (see above):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\Delta Y}{\Delta G} &= \frac{1}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} \\ &= \frac{1}{1 - (2/3) \cdot (1 - 1/4) - 1/6 + 1/6} \\ \frac{\Delta Y}{\Delta G} &= 2 \end{aligned}$$

Thus, if government spending increases by 1 so $\Delta G = 1$, we get $\Delta Y = 2$ for the increase in output. For the budget deficit, we get only $\Delta(T - G) = -1/2$:

- A direct effect $\Delta G = 1$.
- An indirect effect coming from automatic stabilizers, improving the budget situation $\Delta T = t_1 \Delta Y = 1/4 \cdot 2 = 1/2$.

For the trade deficit, we get $\Delta NX = -1/3$:

- A direct effect $\Delta G = 1$.

- An indirect effect coming from automatic stabilizers, improving the budget situation $\Delta T = t_1 \Delta Y = 1/4 \cdot 2 = 1/2$.
- An indirect effect increasing private saving, working to improve the trade balance $\Delta S = (1 - t_1) \cdot (1 - c_1) \cdot \Delta Y = (3/4) \cdot (1/3) \cdot 2 = 1/2$.
- An indirect effect increasing investment, working to worsen the trade balance $\Delta I = b_1 \Delta Y = 1/6 \cdot 2 = 1/3$.

The sum of all these contributions is:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta NX &= \Delta S + \Delta T - \Delta G - \Delta I \\ &= \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2} - 1 - \frac{1}{3} \\ \Delta NX &= -\frac{1}{3}.\end{aligned}$$

11.3.3 A Budget Surplus and a Trade Deficit

Another way to illustrate that “everything depends on everything” in macroeconomics is to show that trade deficits may actually very well come together with government surpluses. One such example is that of redistributive policies from the rich to the poor, which we studied in section 9.3.1. In one exercise, we imagined a reduction in taxes on the poor $\underline{\Delta T}_0 < 0$, with an offsetting increase in taxes on high income earners such that $\Delta T_0 = \underline{\Delta T}_0 + \bar{\Delta T}_0 = 0$. We then have that $\Delta \bar{T}_0 = -\underline{\Delta T}_0 > 0$. We showed that this impulse leads to an increase in output given by:

$$\Delta Y = \frac{\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1} \Delta \bar{T}_0 > 0.$$

In the case of the open economy, we get a very similar formula. Indeed, aggregate consumption is given as shown in lecture 9 by:

$$C = C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + c_1(1 - t_1)Y,$$

where we have defined the average MPC c_1 as a function of \underline{c}_1 and \bar{c}_1 by:

$$c_1 \equiv \frac{\lambda \underline{c}_1 + (1 - \lambda) \gamma \bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma}.$$

Using that Z is $C + I + G + X - M$, we get:

$$\begin{aligned}Z &= C + I + G + X - M \\ &= C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + c_1(1 - t_1)Y + b_0 + b_1 Y + G + x_1 Y^* - m_1 Y \\ Z &= [C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + b_0 + G + x_1 Y^*] + (c_1(1 - t_1) + b_1 - m_1) Y\end{aligned}$$

Equating output to demand $Z = Y$ gives the value for output:

$$Y = \frac{1}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1 + m_1} [C_0 - \underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 - \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0 + b_0 + G + x_1 Y^*]$$

A reduction in taxes on the poor $\underline{\Delta T}_0 < 0$, with an offsetting increase in taxes on high income earners such that $\Delta T_0 = \underline{\Delta T}_0 + \bar{\Delta T}_0 = 0$ therefore leads to a change in output given by:

$$\Delta Y = \frac{\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1 + m_1} \Delta \bar{T}_0 > 0.$$

Using the value for aggregate taxes $\underline{\Delta T}_0 + \bar{\Delta T}_0 = 0$, we now get that aggregate taxes are higher because of automatic stabilizers, just as in lecture 9:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta T &= \underline{\Delta T}_0 + \bar{\Delta T}_0 + t_1 \Delta Y \\ &= t_1 \Delta Y \\ \Delta T &= \frac{t_1 (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1)}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1 + m_1} \Delta \bar{T}_0 > 0.\end{aligned}$$

This unambiguously leads to a reduction in the public deficit, or an increase in public saving, as in lecture 9, because of automatic stabilizers:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta(T - G) &= \Delta T \\ \Delta(T - G) &= \frac{t_1(c_1 - \bar{c}_1)}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1 + m_1} \Delta \bar{T}_0 > 0.\end{aligned}$$

Finally, for the same reason as in the “twin deficits” case, an increase in output leads to a trade deficit because some of the additional demand of the low income falls on imported goods so that:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta NX &= -m_1 \Delta Y \\ \Delta NX &= -\frac{m_1(c_1 - \bar{c}_1)}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1 + m_1} \Delta \bar{T}_0 < 0\end{aligned}$$

In other words, we get a trade deficit but a budget surplus. As we shall see during the last lecture of the class, this situation corresponds very well to the U.S. case at the end of the 1990s.

Readings - To go further

Paul Krugman, “Trump’s Twin Deficits (Wonkish)”, *New York Times*, February 16, 2018.

Lecture 12

Monetary Policy

In the United States, the Federal Reserve System, a quasi-independant part of the government (at least up to now !), is responsible for setting monetary policy. The U.S. Federal Reserve chooses the level of the short term interest rate, called the *federal funds rate*. This short term interest rate impacts the economy through two main channels:

1. **the exchange rate channel.** By affecting the level of interest rates, the central bank is able to affect nominal exchange rates, and, at least in the short-run, real exchange rates (because prices are sticky). Lower interest rates lead to a lower nominal exchange rate, and therefore, in the short run, to a lower real exchange rate. Devaluations make exports more competitive, and imports more expensive: they may therefore increase exports and reduce imports.
2. **the credit channel.** In the U.S. and in the U.K., many homeowners borrow at a rate close to the rate set by the Federal Reserve. With adjustable rate mortgages, the payments of these borrowers automatically follow short term interest rates. When interest rates go up, these payments increase. When interest rates go down, these payments decrease. Moreover, most households may refinance their loans when interest rates go down; this also allows them to reduce their mortgage payments and increase their disposable income. Both these two effects stimulate aggregate demand and increase GDP.

12.1 The exchange rate channel

12.1.1 The Mundell Trilemma

According to the Mundell policy trilemma (also sometimes called *impossible trinity*), countries cannot have all three of the following at the same time:

1. Free capital mobility,
2. Monetary autonomy,
3. A fixed foreign exchange rate.

Most countries (apart from China) have found free capital mobility hard to give up, and so they have resorted to the following two options:

1. **Exchange rate targeting.** A clear case is that of countries which simply give up their currency. For example, countries in the Euro area cannot have an independant monetary policy as a result. Many emerging economies (such as Turkey, Argentina) also “peg to the dollar”: they have an exchange rate target in mind.

2. **Inflation targeting.** They then have free capital mobility and monetary autonomy. For example, the U.S., the U.K., Japan, the Euro area as a whole operate under such a system. These countries usually resort to *inflation targeting*: they seek to attain a particular value for inflation.

Note that the distinction above is a little bit theoretical and artificial, as many countries in practice adopt a mix of the above two options:

- Most inflation targeting central banks often operate with exchange rate concerns in mind, as well. For example, Donald Trump does not like when the value of the dollar fluctuates too much, especially when it is led to appreciate. Such a type of intervention is not consistent with pure inflation targeting.
- On the contrary, fixed exchange rate regimes sometimes collapse, when countries realize that they would like to take back the control of their own monetary policy. (as we shall see, one reason can be to devalue to restore their competitiveness) Such was the case in Argentina in 2001, which abandoned its peg to the dollar; and Greece was very close to leaving the Euro area for the same reason.

12.1.2 Nominal and Real Exchange Rates

The nominal exchange rate is the price of the domestic currency in terms of foreign currency. For example, and to fix ideas, the Euro-Dollar nominal exchange rate gives the number of euros that one dollar can buy. In other words, it is the price of the U.S. currency in terms of the European currency. On November 19, 2018, this price was:

$$E = 0.873 \text{ Euro / Dollar.}$$

When the price of dollars in terms of euros increases, the dollar becomes more expensive, and the nominal exchange rate appreciates.

The real exchange rate, on the other hand, is the price of domestic goods in terms foreign goods. For example, the Euro-Dollar real exchange rate gives the number of European goods that U.S. goods can buy. If P is the price of a given good in U.S. dollars, then $E \cdot P$ is a corresponding amount converted in Euros, which allows to buy $E \cdot P/P^*$ goods in U.S. dollars. This real exchange rate is denoted by ϵ :

$$\epsilon = \frac{E \cdot P}{P^*}.$$

An increase in ϵ corresponds to an appreciation of the real exchange rate. For example, if the price of a new MacBook Pro is \$2,650.90 inclusive of tax in the U.S., and the same MacBook Pro has a price equal to 2799 euros in Europe, then the real exchange rate of the U.S. dollar is given by:

$$\epsilon = \frac{0.873 \cdot 2650.90}{2799} = 0.827.$$

This real exchange rate implies that MacBook Pros are about 17% cheaper to buy in the U.S. than in Europe. When the nominal exchange rate of the U.S. dollar goes up, the real exchange rate also goes up: the purchasing power of Americans increases. Of course, MacBook Pros are just one of many examples of goods that can be bought both in the U.S. as well as in Europe. Other goods would give different values for the real exchange rate.

The Economist's Big Mac Index. *The Economist* magazine has developed a now popular gauge of real exchange rates, based on the price of Big Macs in different cities in the world, which allows to gauge the relative degree of “overvaluation” or “undervaluation” of a currency. Indeed, the Big Mac is available in a very large number of countries. For example, as John Travolta says, the French just call it “Le Big Mac”. Figure 12.1 shows the first version of this Big Mac Index. For example, the Big Mac was then worth 370 Japanese Yen, which given that the price of the Big Mac in the United States was \$1.6 at the time implied that if the prices of the Big Macs were equalized across countries, then 1 dollar should have been worth **370/1.6 = 231 yens** at the time. This is the column “Implied purchasing power parity of the dollar”. However, the observed yen-dollar exchange rate at the time was such that 1 dollar could in fact only buy

Big MacCurrencies				
Hamburger prices round the world				
Country	Price* in local currency	Implied† purchasing power parity of the dollar	Actual exchange rate Sept 1st	% over (+) or under (-) valuation of US\$
Australia	A\$1.75	1.09	1.64	+50
Belgium	BFr90	56	42	-25
Brazil	Cz\$2.5	7.80	13.80	+78
Britain	£1.10	0.69	0.67	-3
Canada	C\$1.89	1.18	1.39	+18
France	FFr16.4	10.30	6.65	-35
Hongkong	HK\$7.60	4.75	7.80	+64
Ireland	IR£1.18	0.74	0.74	-1
Japan	Y370	231	154	-33
Holland	Fl4.35	2.72	2.28	-16
Singapore	S\$2.80	1.75	2.15	+23
Spain	Ptas260	163	133	-18
Sweden	SKr16.5	10.30	6.87	-33
United States	\$1.60	—	—	—
W Germany	DM4.25	2.66	2.02	-24

Source: McDonald's. *Prices may vary slightly between branches. †Foreign price divided by dollar price.

Figure 12.1: FIRST VERSION OF THE BIG MAC INDEX, 1986.

154 yens at the time. This implied an undervaluation of the U.S. dollar equal to $(154 - 231)/231 = -33.3\%$ of what Big Macs should have suggested it should be.

Figure 12.2 shows more recent data for the Big Mac Index. It can be observed that GDP per person is a powerful predictor of the level of real exchange rates (at least according to big macs): richer countries have higher real exchange rates on average. You can see this when you do tourism: life is cheaper in poorer countries than in richer ones, when converted to a common currency.

12.1.3 Multilateral Exchange Rates

In practice, trade is not bilateral, which complicates somewhat the measurement of real exchange rates, and the assessment of competitiveness. Multilateral exchange rates require data on the geographic composition of different country's trades, in order to properly weight different exchange rates.

12.1.4 Uncovered Interest Parity

The uncovered interest parity relation is based on the assumption that capital can move freely. If this is so, then investors need to be indifferent between investing in the country's financial assets, at interest rate i_t , or in the foreign country's financial assets, at interest rate i_t^* .

For concreteness, and to fix ideas, consider a U.S. investor's decision thinking about holding U.S. one year bonds yielding i_t or U.K. one-year bonds yielding i_t^* instead. Arbitrage implies:

$$1 + i_t = (E_t) (1 + i_t^*) \left(\frac{1}{E_{t+1}^e} \right) \Rightarrow \boxed{1 + i_t = (1 + i_t^*) \frac{E_t}{E_{t+1}^e}},$$




Figure 12.2: SCREENSHOT OF THE ECONOMIST WEBSITE, 2018.

which is called the uncovered interest parity relation or the interest parity relation. This arbitrage relationship comes from trading off the following two options, which therefore must have the same returns:

- investing in the home country's bonds at interest rate i_t . One dollar then yields i_t .
- or alternatively, converting this dollar into pounds at exchange rate E_t , investing it in U.K. bonds, earning interest rate i_t^* , and then converting it back into dollars. With $E_t \cdot (1 + i_t^*)$ pounds, one expects to get $E_t \cdot (1 + i_t^*)/E_{t+1}^e$ dollars.

Assuming that expectations of future exchange rates are fixed at a certain level so that $E_{t+1}^e = \bar{E}$, then this equation implies that:

$$E_t = \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + i_t^*} \bar{E}.$$

Therefore:

- when the nominal interest rate goes up, the nominal exchange rate appreciates.
- when the nominal interest rate goes down, the nominal exchange rate depreciates.

As a consequence, the uncovered interest parity equation explains why an easing of monetary policy (lowering of interest rates i) leads to a depreciation of the currency, while a tightening of monetary policy (increase in interest rates) leads to an appreciation of the currency. To the extent that in the short run, movements of real exchange rates are largely determined by the movements of nominal exchange rates, we can understand how monetary policy can influence the level of real exchange rates. In turn, this impacts the competitiveness of its exports, and therefore potentially increases aggregate demand through the boost to net exports NX .

This relation also implies that if exchange rates are fixed, so that $\bar{E}_t = \bar{E}$, then interest rates need to be equalized across countries, or capital would move to the highest interest rate (remember, we assume free mobility of capital). Therefore:

$$\bar{E}_t = \bar{E} \Rightarrow i_t = i_t^*.$$

This implies that countries who want to fix their exchange rate, cannot have an independent monetary policy. The interest rate that they set needs to be the same as whichever countries they are fixing their exchange rate to. (this is a good depiction of emerging markets which peg their exchange rates to the dollar)

12.2 The Credit Channel

Another very important channel through which monetary policy works is through its effect on the U.S. mortgage markets. There is no better example of this than the last financial crisis.

In the U.S. and in the U.K., many homeowners borrow at a rate close to the rate set by the Federal Reserve. There are two ways through which monetary policy potentially affects aggregate demand of households:

1. With adjustable rate mortgages, the payments of these borrowers with a mortgage automatically follow short term interest rates. When interest rates go up, these payments increase. When interest rates go down, these payments decrease.
2. Even with fixed rate mortgages, most households may refinance their loans when interest rates go down; which provides a powerful potential stimulative effect of monetary policy. Indeed, refinancing then allows them to reduce their mortgage payments and increase disposable income. Of course, creditors lose on the other side, but they tend to have much lower marginal propensities to consume.

Figure 12.3¹ shows that the Federal Funds Rate were kept low for a very long time (Alan Greenspan was then Chairman of the Federal Reserve, from 1987 to 2006), which led to a lot of refinancing activity, and

¹ Figures 12.3 and 12.4 are taken from Chapter 17 of the Handbook of Macroeconomics, available here: <https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesmac.2016.06.001>.




Figure 12.3: FED FUNDS RATES. SOURCE: GUERRIERI, UHLIG (2016).

helped boost consumption.

It also led to the buying of many new homes. Many new homeowners were taking on loans at very low interest rates, not realizing that they would not be able to repay them when the Federal Reserve would move interest rates back up. Figure 12.4 shows that many delinquent borrowers during the crisis had indeed taken these adjustable rate mortgages. Starting in 2004, the Federal Reserve started raising interest rates, which increased the mortgage payments to households whose mortgages were reset. Some of them could not make these payments, and so had to default.

One factor was one of the Keynesian feedback effect we have been studying all along. Lower disposable income coming from rising interest rates led to lower aggregate demand, which increased unemployment, causing further declines in incomes, which in turn led to more bankruptcies, in a vicious cycle.

Michael Burry, a former UCLA undergraduate, saw it coming. Please watch his commencement speech on Figure ?? before the next lecture.

```
# [1] "Sorry I don't know how to embed videos in PDF:"
# [1] "https://www.youtube.com/embed/1CLhqj0zoyE"
```

Christian Bale plays Michael Burry in the *Big Short*. It really is a great movie, which is also very accurate on the economics, since it is based on Michael Lewis' outstanding book (see the references below). Below are two excerpts if you want to know more what happened - there are many more clips available on Youtube.²

```
# [1] "Sorry I don't know how to embed videos in PDF:"
# [1] "https://www.youtube.com/embed/Cxjdj5_5yNM"

# [1] "Sorry I don't know how to embed videos in PDF:"
# [1] "https://www.youtube.com/embed/MesrrYyuoa4"
```

²Of course, none of this is considered to be examinable.




Figure 12.4: DELINQUENCY RATES ON MORTGAGES: PRIME, SUBPRIME, ADJUSTABLE, FIXED. SOURCE: GUERRIERI, UHLIG (2016).

Readings - To go further

(Book for Purchase) Michael Lewis, “The Big Short: Inside the Doomsday Machine” (W. W. Norton & Company, 2011).

(Book for Purchase) Gregory Zuckerman, “The Greatest Trade Ever: The Behind-the-Scenes Story of How John Paulson Defied Wall Street and Made Financial History” (Crown Publishing Group, 2009).

Michael J. Burry, “I Saw the Crisis Coming. Why Didn’t the Fed?”, *The New York Times*, April 4, 2010.

Dani Rodrik, “The Globalization Paradox: Why Global Markets, States, and Democracy Can’t Coexist”, Oxford University Press, 2012.

Christopher Condon, “All The Trump Quotes on Powell as Attacks on Fed Intensify”, Bloomberg, November 28, 2018.

Lecture 13

Theoretical Controversies

My lecture notes give a partial assessment of the field of macroeconomics, and leave out important theoretical controversies which I would like to talk about today.¹ As *The Economist Magazine* reported in a recent article on the teaching of macroeconomics titled “Why is macroeconomics so hard to teach?”:

Macroeconomics is difficult to teach partly because its theorists (classical, Keynesian, monetarist, New Classical and New Keynesian, among others) disagree about so much. It is difficult also because the textbooks disagree about so little. To reach the widest possible audience, most cover similar material: a miscellany of models that are not always consistent with each other or even with themselves. The result is that many professors must teach things they do not believe.

During this lecture, I would like to clarify what the main theoretical controversies in the field of macroeconomics are. Such controversies often revolve around even the most basic questions, such as what the cause of unemployment is, whether we should have fiscal stimulus when a recession comes, whether the trade deficit is a problem or whether public debt is too high. Macroeconomic experts and policy wonks are far from knowing everything, even though some of them sometimes tend to talk very assertively.² Inevitably, this lecture will therefore be a patchwork of different approaches, and I will be asking more questions than I can answer. I will try to give you a “map of the land” of what the theoretical controversies are. I think it should be useful for you to read the *Wall Street Journal*, *The Economist*, *The New York Times*, and also hopefully for you to become more informed citizens.

13.1 Austrian VS Keynesian Economics

Figure ?? is an educational video to give you the main debate between the “Keynesian” and the “Austrian” school of macroeconomics, between impersonations of John Maynard Keynes and Friedrich Hayek (the lyrics are here). For the Austrian school of thought, with a rather pro-market leaning, the problem with recessions is not the bust but the preceding boom. Therefore, according to these economists, doing a fiscal stimulus, or making monetary policy more accommodative during a crisis, can only make macroeconomic problems worse. According to Austrian economists, business cycles are caused by malinvestments, and too low interest rates during the boom phase. This view is opposite to Keynesian economics. This view is very influential in some policy circles.

[1] "Sorry I don't know how to embed videos in PDF:"

¹This is one reason why I have chosen to not use a textbook, and write my own lecture notes. Another reason is cost. The inflation rate for college textbooks has been $(914.9/315.9)^{1/16} - 1 \approx 6.9\%$ on average between 2000 and 2016 (a 16-year period), according to this data. At the same time, CPI inflation between 2000 and 2016 has been $(244.5/178.8)^{1/16} - 1 \approx 2\%$ on average (see here).

²According to Joan Robinson: “The purpose of studying economics is not to acquire a set of ready-made answers to economic questions, but to learn how to avoid being deceived by economists.”

```
# [1] "https://www.youtube.com/embed/d0nERTFo-Sk"
```

You should also note that the Keynesian view is represented in this video as the view that unemployment is related to “sticky wages”. Although I briefly alluded to this during lecture 6 when we studied the labor market, and the cause of unemployment, we never mentioned this issue in lectures 7, 8, 9, 10. This is the issue we take up now.

13.2 Short-run Keynes: The Neoclassical Synthesis

Many Keynesian economists, though not all, have come to adopt a vision of Keynesian economics based on what is called the “neoclassical synthesis”, sometimes also called “American Keynesianism”, or new-Keynesian economics. To quote from the third edition of his *Economics* textbook, Paul Samuelson, a major proponent of that approach, was writing in 1955 that:

In recent years 90 percent of American economists have stopped being ‘Keynesian economists’ or ‘anti-Keynesian economists.’ Instead they have worked towards a synthesis of whatever is valuable in older economics and in modern theories of income determination. The result might be called neo-classical synthesis and is accepted in its broad outlines by all but about 5 per cent of extreme left wing and right wing writers. (Samuelson 1955: 212)

This school of thought holds that the economy is Keynesian in the short-run, and Neoclassical in the long run. This approach is often taught in *Intermediate Macro courses*, including Olivier Blanchard’s *Macroeconomics* textbook, in the form of what is called the AS-AD approach. What I would then have taught you is that in the long run, output is determined by technology; while in the short-run, it is determined by aggregate demand (government spending, disposable income, etc.). According to this view of the macroeconomy, aggregate demand may determine output in the short run because prices are sticky.³

One key prediction of this approach to Keynesian macroeconomics is that there is then a trade-off between output (or equivalently, unemployment and aggregate demand) and inflation. This trade-off is called the *Phillips Curve* (after William Phillips who first documented the correlation), and corresponds to a negative relationship between unemployment and inflation in the time series: when unemployment is high, inflation is low, while when unemployment is low, inflation is high. Paul Samuelson and Robert Solow documented the same statistical fact for the United States. For proponents of the neoclassical synthesis, this can be explained by the fact that increases in aggregate demand both decrease unemployment in the short run and lead to inflation in the longer run. Therefore, lower unemployment can only be achieved at the expense of lower future unemployment.

In the 1970s, the Phillips Curve, or the negative relationship between unemployment and inflation, started to break down. Keynesian economists who had embraced the neoclassical synthesis were caught off guard. Keynesian economics started to lose its appeal, even though the version of Keynesian economics which was then rejected had very little resemblance to J.M. Keynes’ original vision. As we saw during this class, J.M. Keynes was actually much more worried about the issue of too much capital accumulation, or an excess of saving over investment, than about sticky wages. To J.M. Keynes, if wages were lowered (the way that neoclassical economics would say they should be, following a labor demand shock), then aggregate demand problems would be even more severe, and as a result even more unemployment would follow.

13.3 Neoclassical Economics

Given this failure of the neoclassical synthesis, neoclassical economists, and particularly the Chicago school, started to question the very appeal of Keynesian Economics. In a provocative article titled “After Keynesian

³To be more precise, according to the neoclassical approach, this is why output can be determined by demand. Firms have market power so that they set a price at a markup over marginal cost. In the short-run, when they face higher demand, they cannot increase their price. However, they are willing to supply the corresponding quantity at the old price, because their marginal costs are still lower than the price they charge (since they had market power).

Macroeconomics”, Thomas Sargent and Robert Lucas famously asserted:

That these predictions were wildly incorrect and that the doctrine on which they were based is fundamentally flawed are now simple matters of fact involving no novelties in economic theory. The task now facing contemporary students of the business cycle is to sort through the wreckage, determining which features of that remarkable intellectual event called the Keynesian Revolution can be salvaged and put to good use and which others must be discarded.

This revival of neoclassical economics, noting the failure of the Phillips curve in particular, consisted in rejecting all views of the economy based on aggregate demand. This approach to macroeconomics culminated in the Real Business Cycle approach, according to which all fluctuations in output were caused by technological “supply” shocks. This approach is in turn based on a strong view of agents’ rationality, and in particular of the “Ricardian equivalence view”, according to which decreases in taxes have no effects on consumption because consumers rationally anticipate future taxes to come (as we have seen, in the overlapping generations model, such taxes never come, since public debt is always rolled over).

13.4 Long-run Keynes: Secular stagnation

As much as the neoclassicals were right about the failure of sticky price Keynesian economics, I believe that it is very hard to et the same time deny that aggregate demand does have effects on the economy. We shall see a lot of evidence in the next lecture suggesting that output is not determined only by supply forces, but also by marginal propensities to consume and disposable income. An alternative approach to Keynesian economics, and one which is not based on sticky prices, revolved around ideas related to the issue of “secular stagnation.” According to this view, output may be determined by demand, even in the longer run.

Before he left academia for the policy world, after an exceptionally rapid career which led him to become a tenured professor at Harvard University at age 28, Lawrence Summers wrote a piece called “Should Keynesian Economics Dispense with the Phillips curve” (you can read the first pages of this paper on Google Books), in which he was already criticizing the sticky price approach to macroeconomics, as well as proposing a vision of Keynesian economics based on long-run aggregate demand effects.

Larry Summers has recently debated with Olivier Blanchard, a proponent of the New-Keynesian approach to macroeconomics, in December 2017, at the Peterson Institute of International Economics. Their debate very much reflects the short-run versus long-run approach to Keynesian economics which I just alluded to. In the video debating Olivier Blanchard, Larry Summers expresses some of the ideas that we have been exposed to in this class:

I believe that rather than excessive demand yielding to temptation, the larger issue will be insufficient demand produced by a variety of forces that lead to a chronic excess of saving over investment. I would cite as evidence for that concern three types of evidence. First, we have been below target inflation for a long time. Second, the behavior or real interest rates is close to zero over the next 10 years, is substantially suggestive of excess saving over investment. Third, the difficulty now over a long period of time in seeing strong and adequate growth consistent with stable financial conditions.

```
# [1] "Sorry I don't know how to embed videos in PDF:"  
# [1] " https://www.youtube.com/embed/4YwmUg454wI"
```

Larry Summers’ remark is based on the observation that aggregate demand has recently often been boosted by either credit or equity financial bubbles. The 2007-2009 financial crisis was indeed caused by the inability to repay of many homeowners who had taken on too much credit. Coming back to the Keynes vs. Hayek debate, one view could have been the Hayekian, malinvestment, view. Another could simply be that with “too much savings”, or an excess of saving over investment, investors were just investing in these very risky securities because they could not find profitable investment opportunities elsewhere.

Finally, note that the Keynesian view of macroeconomics leads one to have a balanced approach to lenders

/ creditors relationship. One view is that homeowners were too irresponsible in taking out loans which they would not be able to repay. The same argument has been made about Greece. But if one has the view that saving is plentiful, then investors are actually pushing borrowers to borrow because they need some “parking spaces” for their money. According to this view, it is also the reason why financial assets are subject to so frequent booms and busts: investors buy overvalued assets, because they have no better option in a world of scarce investment opportunities.

Next lecture will be devoted to trying to sort out some of these issues using data. Although we shall not be able to conclude definitely, I will show you empirical macroeconomics research as it is currently being done; and show you that data is consistently coming in, which unambiguously points to a view of the economy where aggregate demand have long lasting effects, just as the models studied in this class suggest they would.

Readings - To go further

Robert E. Lucas and Thomas J. Sargent, “After Keynesian Macroeconomics,” Federal Reserve Bank Minneapolis Quarterly Review, no. Spr (1979).

Lawrence H. Summers, “Should Keynesian Economics Dispense with the Phillips Curve?,” in Issues in Contemporary Economics, International Economic Association Series (Palgrave Macmillan, London, 1991), 3–20.

“Secular Stagnation, Coalmines, Bubbles, and Larry Summers”, Paul Krugman, *New York Times* Blog Post, November 16, 2013.

“The Economic Hokum of ‘Secular Stagnation’ ”, John B. Taylor, *Wall Street Journal*, January 2, 2014.

“The Age of Secular Stagnation”, Larry Summers, *Foreign Affairs*, February 15, 2016.

(Gated) “Why is macroeconomics so hard to teach?” *The Economist*, August 9, 2018.

Lecture 14

Empirical Macroeconomics

As we have seen in lecture 13, macroeconomic theory alone often does not allow to conclude on the major issues that macroeconomists are trying to answer. For example, as we saw in problem set 8, models based on aggregate supply suggest that we should cut taxes on high income earners, while models based on aggregate demand suggest the opposite, based on different groups' marginal propensities to consume.

Fortunately, macroeconomists are increasingly turning to empirical work to try and address these questions. During this lecture, I shall try to give you a very brief introduction to the rapidly expanding field of empirical macroeconomics.¹ This field is rapidly evolving - most of the studies I will present to you are less than 10 years old. As I told you in the beginning of this class, macroeconomics is a rapidly changing field, where textbooks and views of the world are fast considered outdated. Thus, you should keep an open mind, and regularly update your knowledge of macroeconomics by reading *The Economist Magazine* for instance, which is usually good at covering the most up-to-date macroeconomics research.

Macroeconomists have three types of methodologies at their disposal, in order to try and answer these empirical questions, which we will review in turn. We will see that each one of these studies has advantages and drawbacks:

1. Aggregate Studies (Section 14.1).
2. Individual-Level Studies (Section 14.2).
3. Cross-Sectional Studies (Section 14.3).

All may be used to assess what probably the most important questions are, that is the effect of fiscal policy on the macroeconomy.

14.1 Aggregate Studies

14.1.1 Government Spending Multipliers

John Maynard Keynes' criticism of classical theory was born out of empirical observation of aggregate relationships. In "What has become of the Keynesian Revolution", Joan Robinson reminded us of the political context in the UK at the beginning of the twentieth century, particularly following periods of high unemployment:

When Lloyd George proposed a campaign to reduce unemployment (which was then at the figure of one million or more) by expenditure on public works, he was answered by the famous "Treasury

¹I wish I was able to do more than just one lecture on that. Unfortunately, the title in the UCLA Registrar is "Macroeconomic Theory", so I had to focus mostly on different macroeconomic theories, rather than on the supporting evidence.

View" that there is a certain amount of saving at any moment, available to finance investment, and if the government borrows a part, there will be so much the less for industry.

Joan Robinson reminds us that unfortunately (for mankind, and for people like me who would like to believe in the power of ideas), the nazis were a forerunner of J.M. Keynes, in that they had implemented Keynesian ideas way before these ideas had become mainstream:

Meanwhile the Nazis had been proving Lloyd George's point with a vengeance. It was a joke in Germany that Hitler was planning to give employment in straightening the Crooked Lake, painting the Black Forest white and putting down linoleum in the Polish Corridor. The Treasury view was that his unsound policies would soon bring him down. But the little group of Keynesians was despondent and frustrated.

Probably the final empirical observation which led skeptics to definitively adopt Keynes' ideas was the massive government spending which was undertaken in the U.S. during World War II, which put an end to the long-lasting depression which the U.S. never really came out of.

Since then, many studies have used government spending during wars in order to try to estimate the effect of government purchases on the macroeconomy. The reason for looking at wartime spending, is that wars are not usually supposed to be undertaken for reasons of macroeconomic stabilization. In contrast, most other discretionary government spending programs usually are meant to stabilize the economy. More generally, macroeconomists do not get to run "experiments", with a clean treatment and control group like in medical research: periods in which government spending happens are usually different from periods when they don't. This is why research progress in macroeconomics has been so slow and that disagreement is still so important. (although it is narrowing)

A substantial amount of progress has been made since the 2007-2009 financial crisis, particularly following the various government spending programs which have been implemented throughout the world, and which provide a large number of new case studies. If you want to know more about government spending multipliers, and where macroeconomics research is right now on that issue, you may watch the video below of Valerie Ramey (Figure ??), one of the world's most distinguished experts on the topic. Of course, this is not exam material, and you are not required to know anything more about aggregate studies concerning government spending multipliers.

```
# [1] "Sorry I don't know how to embed videos in PDF:"  
# [1] " https://vimeo.com/282850449"
```

14.1.2 Tax Multipliers

Event studies. Donald Trump just passed a large tax cut through Congress (mostly in favor of high income earners). One approach to measuring the tax multiplier could simply be to look at what the effect on GDP growth will be of this tax cut, after it has been enacted. However, this approach (which is very much one that you will read about in the *New York Times*, or the *Wall Street Journal*, or on Donald Trump's Twitter account!) is questionable, at least on two grounds:

1. The main issue is to know what the counterfactual would have been had Donald Trump not passed his tax cut. Many things happened in the meantime (this for example), so that the increase in GDP could not be due to the tax cut, but to other events which happened simultaneously. The tax cut which Donald Trump passed was not large enough for us to conclude without any ambiguity.
2. A second potential worry could be that Donald Trump may have decided on passing the tax cut for a reason; and that reason may have been that the economy was depressed to begin with. But if depressions tend to end without any government action, then the fact that the economy has rebounded could mistakenly be attributed to the tax cut, while it was more a return to normal. For this reason as well, it is very hard to conclude from one observation only.

Narrative approach. A more sophisticated version of the *event study* approach described above is called the *narrative approach*. It is exemplified by a paper of Romer and Romer (2010) in the *American Economic*




Figure 14.1: IMPACT ON GDP OF A 1% OF GDP AGGREGATE TAX INCREASE. SOURCE: ROMER, ROMER (2010).

*Review.*² It is called “narrative” because the method consists in studying the motivation for each tax change, and focus on those tax changes that were not taken for the purpose of macroeconomic stabilization (“exogenous” tax changes). This addresses the second worry in the “event study” approach, that tax changes were not passed at random times. Second, studying many tax changes instead of just one, allows to address the first worry. With many tax cuts, other potential events happening simultaneously should average out to zero, and all the more that many of these events are being considered. Based on such an approach, the tax multiplier has been estimated to be quite large, on the order of 3. In other words, as shown in Figure 14.1, a 1% of GDP tax cut leads to a reduction in GDP of 2-3% over an horizon of 3 years. But let me quote Christina Romer, then head of the Council of Economic Advisors to the U.S. President, in her speech at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, on February 27, 2009:

To address the problem of omitted variables, David and I used narrative evidence to isolate tax changes uncorrelated with other factors affecting output. We read Congressional reports, Presidential speeches, the Economic Reports of the President, and other documents to identify relatively exogenous tax changes. We found that the estimated effect of these changes is very large. A tax cut of 1% of GDP raises GDP by between 2 and 3% over the next three years.

The exact list of tax changes that Christina Romer and David Romer have considered is given on Figure 14.2, in a Table assembled by Owen Zidar, an assistant professor at Princeton University, whose study I shall talk about in Section 14.3. This table gives the motivation for these tax changes: most of the tax increases are taken to reduce the budget deficit, and most of the tax cuts are taken to improve the long-term prospect of the U.S. economy.

Finally, Christina Romer and David Romer are also able to look at the effects of these tax increases on each individual component of aggregate demand. Panel A of figure 14.3 shows what the effects are of a 1% of GDP tax increase on consumption, investment and GDP: as we saw during this class, aggregate consumption declines, presumably a disposable income effect, investment declines because consumers demand less goods. Panel D of figure 14.3 shows that imports also decrease following a tax increase: some of the fall in demand implies also less demand for foreign goods. Something which we did not expect from lecture 11 is the

²Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer, “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks,” American Economic Review 100, no. 3 (June 2010): 763–801. <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.3.763>

Legislation	Year	Motivation	Endogeneity	Size (% GDP)
Revenue Act of 1948	1948	Long run	Exogenous	-1.86
Social Security Amendments of 1947	1950	Deficit	Exogenous	0.26
Internal Revenue Code of 1954	1954	Long run	Exogenous	-0.37
Social Security Amendments of 1958	1960	Deficit	Exogenous	0.36
Social Security Amendments of 1961	1963	Deficit	Exogenous	0.86
Revenue Act of 1964	1964	Long run	Exogenous	-1.27
Social Security Amendment of 1967	1971	Deficit	Exogenous	-0.02
Revenue Act of 1971	1972	Long run	Exogenous	-0.73
Tax Reform Act of 1976	1976	Long run	Exogenous	0.13
Tax Reduction and Simplification Act 1977	1977	Long run	Exogenous	-0.38
1972 Changes to Social Security	1978	Deficit	Exogenous	0.13
Revenue Act of 1978	1979	Long run	Exogenous	-0.39
Social Security Amendment of 1977	1981	Long run	Exogenous	0.40
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981	1982	Long run	Exogenous	-1.33
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981	1983	Long run	Exogenous	-0.87
Social Security Amendments of 1983	1984	Deficit	Exogenous	-0.41
Social Security Amendments of 1983	1985	Deficit	Exogenous	0.21
Tax Reform Act of 1986	1986	Long run	Exogenous	0.60
Tax Reform Act of 1986	1987	Long run	Exogenous	-0.57
Social Security Amendments of 1983	1988	Deficit	Exogenous	0.37
Social Security Amendments of 1983	1990	Deficit	Exogenous	0.18
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990	1991	Deficit	Endogenous	0.00
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993	1993	Deficit	Exogenous	0.42
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993	1994	Deficit	Exogenous	0.19
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001	2002	Long run	Exogenous	-0.77
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003	2003	Long run	Exogenous	-1.13
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003	2004	Long run	Endogenous	0.00
Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003	2005	Long run	Exogenous	0.54

Figure 14.2: LIST OF MAJOR U.S. TAX CHANGES IN ROMER, ROMER (2010). SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).




Figure 14.3: IMPACT ON INDIVIDUAL COMPONENTS OF GDP OF A 1% OF GDP AGGREGATE TAX INCREASE. SOURCE: ROMER, ROMER (2010).

behavior of exports, which slightly increase following a tax increase. This could be coming from the behavior of monetary policy, which may accommodate the negative fiscal shocks through lower interest rates (thus depreciating the dollar, and boosting exports). Finally, Panel B and C of figure 14.3 you cannot interpret, as we did not go into this level of detail: however you can note that the fall in consumption comes mostly from durables (like autos), which people stop purchasing first when they have a fall in their disposable income.

14.1.3 Advantages and Drawbacks

Aggregate studies such as Christina and David Romer's have advantages and drawbacks:

- On the positive side, aggregate studies are very transparent and simple. The results from these studies does not depend at all on economic theory, so that they may convince on either side of the political spectrum. They do not depend on people's macroeconomic views (whether they believe in Say's law, the Treasury View, and what not) and only "let the data speak."
- On the negative side, these studies are not always conclusive. They almost always are very noisy, in that we only have a handful episodes to look at. Finally, they do not allow to respond to more precise questions such as what is the impact of a tax cut on the bottom 90% versus that of a tax cut on the bottom 10%. The reason is that the episodes of tax cuts or tax increases are very few. Episodes where tax cuts are specifically on the rich or the poor are even more rare.

14.2 Individual-Level Studies

Individual-level studies allow to estimate key parameters that macroeconomists use in their models. Thus, this approach combines a mix of data and theory. The data allows to inform on parameters such as:

- the Marginal Propensity to Consume c_1 , which is key for the **demand-side** view of tax cuts.

- the “labor supply elasticity” $1/\epsilon$, which is key for the **supply-side** view of tax cuts, while on the other hand, theory is still useful in order to estimate tax and government multipliers as a function of these parameters, for example.

14.2.1 Labor Supply Elasticity

As we saw in problem set 8, many supply-side economists like Robert Barro take the view that tax cuts work not through disposable income effects, not through “heaping money” to people, but through reductions in their marginal tax rates, which incentivize them to work harder. Individual-level studies allow to very precisely estimate the importance of these effects, which Robert Barro believes to be sufficiently large to explain the bulk of tax multipliers.

In the spirit of lecture 6 and problem set 8, let us consider again the utility function of a consumer-worker deciding how much to work, and whose utility of consuming c and working a number of hours equal to l is given by:

$$U(c, l) = c - B \frac{l^{1+\epsilon}}{1+\epsilon}.$$

Further assume a linear tax rate on all income, and that this rate is given by τ (in problem set 8, we had something more complex, with a bracket system, as well as a baseline level of consumption c_0), so that the budget constraint is:

$$p \cdot c = (1 - \tau) \cdot w \cdot l.$$

The consumer-worker who chooses his number of hours does so in order to maximize the following utility:

$$\max_l \quad (1 - \tau) \frac{w}{p} l - B \frac{l^{1+\epsilon}}{1+\epsilon}$$

leading to the following optimality condition:

$$(1 - \tau) \frac{w}{p} l = B l^\epsilon.$$

As in problem set 8, assume that the labor demand side is constituted of firms with a linear technology $f(l) = A \cdot l$, which set the level of the real wage (again, see problem set 8 for detail) equal to their labor productivity, so that:

$$\frac{w}{p} = A.$$

As a consequence, the number of hours supply by the worker is simply given by:

$$l = (1 - \tau)^{1/\epsilon} \frac{A^{1/\epsilon}}{B^{1/\epsilon}}.$$

Finally, income is given by the real wage times the number of hours:

$$\begin{aligned} y &= \frac{w}{p} \cdot l \\ &= A \cdot l \\ y &= (1 - \tau)^{1/\epsilon} \frac{A^{1/\epsilon+1}}{B^{1/\epsilon}}. \end{aligned}$$

Taking logs, we get income as a function of the tax rate τ , as well as A and B :

$$\log(y) = \frac{1}{\epsilon} \log(1 - \tau) + \left(\frac{1}{\epsilon} + 1 \right) \log A - \frac{1}{\epsilon} \log B.$$

As we saw in problem set 8, a change in taxes leads to a change in income such that:

$$\frac{d \log(y)}{d\tau} = -\frac{1}{\epsilon(1-\tau)}.$$

This formula allows to calculate $1/\epsilon$ as a function of observed income responses to marginal tax changes. For example, imagine that we observe that when an individual's marginal tax rate is decreased by 5% from 50% to 45%, this person has an increase in pre-tax income given by 5%. We would then be able to calculate a value for $1/\epsilon$:

$$\frac{1}{\epsilon} = (1 - \tau) \frac{\Delta Y}{-\Delta \tau}.$$

In this example:

$$\frac{1}{\epsilon} = \left(1 - \frac{1}{2}\right) \cdot \frac{0.05}{0.05} = \frac{1}{2}.$$

This corresponds to the situation of problem set 8. $1/\epsilon$ is called the labor supply elasticity: the higher this number, the more income tends to respond a lot to changes in taxes (look at the formula above). According to supply-side economists like Robert Barro, this elasticity is rather high.

An emerging consensus is that this elasticity, which is precisely measured, is however not large enough to explain why tax cuts have such large effects. The maximum consensus estimate is 0.5, according to Raj Chetty and his coauthors (see here). Therefore, tax cuts must have aggregate demand effects, as Keynesian theory predicts.

14.2.2 Marginal Propensity to Consume

The marginal propensity to consume c_1 is another such parameter, which is more relevant for the aggregate demand view of macroeconomics. But before we move to estimates of the Marginal Propensity to Consume, I shall now come back to something which was henceforth hidden under the rug. There does not only exist one Marginal Propensity to Consume but there are many such propensity to consume, depending on how persistent tax changes are.

As we saw in lecture 3, according to the neoclassical view of consumption, the marginal propensity to consume for a one year change in income, if the planning horizon is 30 years, is given by $1/30$. The intuition is simple: people are supposed to be rational, look far into the future, and consume as a function of the present discounted value of their future income.

In contrast, if the tax shock is permanent, then people are expected to consume a much larger fraction of this additional income. In the case of low income people, they would even consume 100% of this income. In the case of higher income people, they would perhaps save a fraction of that, for example if they want to bequeath wealth to their children, or alternatively if they just do not know what to do with this additional money (see lecture 4 for a complete discussion of why rich people save).

I now describe the results from a recent study by Tullio Jappelli and Luigi Pistaferri called "Fiscal Policy and MPC Heterogeneity." The marginal propensity to consume (MPC) which we look at here is the one which concerns a temporary income shock. This is relevant for the case of a temporary fiscal stimulus. The data in Figure 14.4 and Figure 14.5 show three things: that the MPC varies considerably across individuals, that it varies significantly as a function of their income, and more importantly, that it is much larger on average than the theory of rational consumers would lead us to believe (it is closer to 25% than to 3%).

14.3 Cross-Sectional Studies

Finally, of all methods, cross-sectional studies are probably the most promising, and are increasingly being used to arrive at credible estimate of fiscal multipliers.




Figure 14.4: SELF-REPORTED MPC FROM TRANSITORY INCOME SHOCK. SOURCE: JAPPELLI, PISTAFERRI (2014).




Figure 14.5: AVERAGE MPC BY CASH-ON-HAND PERCENTILES. SOURCE: JAPPELLI, PISTAFERRI (2014).




Figure 14.6: VARIOUS TYPES OF U.S. TAX REFORMS. SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).

1992 Schedule			1993 Schedule		
Tax Rate	Bracket Min	Bracket Max	Marginal Tax Rate	Bracket Min	Bracket Max
15%	\$ 0	\$35,800	15%	\$ 0	\$36,900
28%	\$35,800	\$86,500	28%	\$36,900	\$89,150
31%	\$86,500	-	31%	\$89,150	\$140,000
			36%	\$140,000	\$250,000
			39.6%	\$250,000	-

Figure 14.7: AN EXAMPLE OF TAX INCREASE ON HIGH INCOME EARNERS: 1992 AND 1993 INCOME TAX SCHEDULES. SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).

In a forthcoming *Journal of Political Economy* paper, Owen Zidar, an assistant professor at Princeton University, has estimated the effect of tax cuts, as Romer and Romer (2010), using state-level variation as an identification strategy. Variation in the income distribution across U.S. states leads to heterogeneous regional impacts of federal income tax changes. For instance, Connecticut, whose share of top-income taxpayers is nearly twice that of the typical state, faced relatively larger shocks to high-income earners after the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, which raised top-income tax rates.

Figure 14.6 shows that different tax reforms lead to very different redistributive effects on various groups in the population. In 1982, the tax cut mostly benefited higher income households. In 1993 in contrast, Bill Clinton's tax bill led to a substantial increase in high earners' taxes. The schedule that he chose is shown on Figure 14.7.

The estimated effects of such tax reforms on employment to population ratios, employment, and real GDP are shown on Figure 14.10, Figure 14.11 and 14.12.




Figure 14.8: FEDERAL INCOME AND PAYROLL TAX CHANGES BY AGI QUINTILE. SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).




Figure 14.9: SHARE OF HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS. SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).




Figure 14.10: EMPLOYMENT TO POPULATION RATIO. SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).




Figure 14.11: EMPLOYMENT. SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).




Figure 14.12: NOMINAL GDP, REAL GDP, PRICE INDEXES. SOURCE: ZIDAR (2018).

Readings - To go further

Joan Robinson, "What Has Become of the Keynesian Revolution?," *Challenge* 16, no. 6 (January 1, 1974): 6–11.

Christina Romer. "The Case for Fiscal Stimulus: The Likely Effects of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act," Speech at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, February 27, 2009.

Christina D. Romer and David H. Romer, "The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks," *American Economic Review* 100, no. 3 (June 2010): 763–801.

Raj Chetty et al., "Are Micro and Macro Labor Supply Elasticities Consistent? A Review of Evidence on the Intensive and Extensive Margins," *American Economic Review* 101, no. 3 (May 2011): 471–75.

Antonio Acconcia, Giancarlo Corsetti, and Saverio Simonelli, "Mafia and Public Spending: Evidence on the Fiscal Multiplier from a Quasi-Experiment," *American Economic Review* 104, no. 7 (July 2014): 2185–2209

Tullio Jappelli and Luigi Pistaferri, "Fiscal Policy and MPC Heterogeneity," *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 6, no. 4 (October 2014): 107–36.

Lecture 15

A Macroeconomic History of the U.S.

During this concluding lecture, we will go through a very short overview of U.S.'s post 1929 macroeconomic history, around plots of various macroeconomic time series. Figure 15.1 shows the evolution of real GDP in the U.S., which we started the class with in lecture 1. We now know that the growth of real GDP over the long run is explained by the growth in technology (lecture 5), population growth, and that the U.S. likely has exhausted the possibilities brought about by capital accumulation. In lectures 4 and 10 we even have suggested that the U.S. perhaps has in fact accumulated too much capital, and that if interest rates are lower than the growth rate, public debt is perhaps not such a problematic issue after all. During this lecture, we conclude by touching upon four related topics:

- The success of Keynesian Economics following the Crash of 1929 in section 15.1.
- Post-war Macroeconomic Performance of the U.S. by party of the President in section 15.2.
- U.S. Fiscal Policy towards different income groups in section 15.3.
- A cautionary note on the potential negative effects of trade deficits created by Keynesian policies in section 15.4.

15.1 The success of Keynesian Economics

Figure 15.1 shows that overall growth in standards of living did not occur without ups and downs. The most evident on this picture probably is the Great Depression starting in 1929; compared to that episode, the Great Recession of 2007-2009 looks like a minor recession. I believe that one reason why the 2007-2009 financial crisis did not turn as bad as the 1929 crisis, is that an important fiscal stimulus was implemented, which prevented a further slump.

In contrast, the response to the 1929 crisis was initially very different. Figure 15.2 shows the Cyclically Adjusted Price to Earnings Ratio on the U.S. Stock Market from 1920 to 1936. On this graph, we can very clearly see the 1929 "Big Crash" which started the Great Depression in the United States.

Then U.S. president Herbert Hoover from 1929 to 1933 decided to raise taxes substantially in order to restore the balance in the budget. This policy was largely unsuccessful, and led to very high unemployment rates (higher than 20%), just as Keynesian theory predicts it would. It also led to deflation (a negative inflation rate) as shown on Figure 15.3. In 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt left the Gold Standard (leading to a de-facto devaluation in the dollar, which was expansionary) and started a set of expansionary fiscal policies usually referred to as the "New Deal".

The same discussions on whether to balance the budget or not to restore financial balance, was taking place in the United Kingdom as well. J.M. Keynes took a very active role in all these discussions - well before in fact, he started to write the *General Theory*. You can read many of the articles he wrote at the time in *Essays in Persuasion*.



Figure 15.1: U.S. REAL GDP (1929-2018).



Figure 15.2: U.S. STOCK MARKET (1920-1936).




Figure 15.3: U.S. PRICE LEVEL (1917-1939).

Joan Robinson, in “What Has Become of the Keynesian Revolution?”, summarizes this episode:

In 1931, when the world crisis had produced a sharp increase in the deficit on the U.K. balance of payments, the appropriate remedy (approved as much by the unlucky Labour government as by the Bank of England) was to cut expenditure so as to balance the budget. These were the orthodox views that prevailed in the realm of public policy.

At the time, the Treasury View prevailed (see lecture 10 for a definition):

In those years British orthodoxy was still dominated by nostalgia for the world before 1914. Then there was normality and equilibrium. To get back to that happy state, its institutions and its policies should be restored - keep to the gold standard at the old sterling parity, balance the budget, maintain free trade and observe the strictest laissez faire in the relations of government with industry. When Lloyd George proposed a campaign to reduce unemployment (which was then at the figure of one million or more) by expenditure on public works, he was answered by the famous “Treasury View” that there is a certain amount of saving at any moment, available to finance investment, and if the government borrows a part, there will be so much the less for industry.

Joan Robinson also reminds us that Keynes was not being heard at the time. In fact, it is very disheartening that the Nazis implemented the first fiscal stimulus programs, way before Roosevelt:

Meanwhile the Nazis had been proving Lloyd George’s point with a vengeance. It was a joke in Germany that Hitler was planning to give employment in straightening the Crooked Lake, painting the Black Forest white and putting down linoleum in the Polish Corridor. The Treasury view was that his unsound policies would soon bring him down. But the little group of Keynesians was despondent and frustrated. We were getting the theory clear at last, but it was going to be too late.

Finally, before we end this class, I want to make clear that J.M. Keynes was actually trying to save capitalism from communism which then was a threatening credible alternative:

There is a kind of simpleminded Marxist who has a great resentment against Keynes because he is held responsible for saving capitalism from destroying itself in another great slump. This is often made an excuse for not understanding the theory of effective demand, although Michal Kalecki derived pretty well the same analytical system as Keynes from Marx’s premises. Moreover it




Figure 15.4: AVERAGE GDP GROWTH. SOURCE: BLINDER, WATSON (2016).

implies that capitalists are so stupid that they would fail to learn from their experiences during the war that government outlay maintains profits unless they had Keynes to point it out to them.

But what was the political tendency of the General Theory? Keynes himself described it as “moderately conservative,” but this was intended as a paradox, for the whole book is a polemic against established ideas. His own mood often swung from left to right. Capitalism was in some ways repugnant to him, but Stalinism was much worse. In his last years, certainly, the right predominated. When I teased him about accepting a peerage he replied that after sixty, one had to become respectable. But his basic view of life was aesthetic rather than political. He hated unemployment because it was stupid and poverty because it was ugly. He was disgusted by the commercialism of modern life. (It is true he enjoyed making money for his College and for himself but only as long as it did not take up much time.) He indulged in an agreeable vision of a world where economics has ceased to be important and our grandchildren can begin to lead a civilized life.

15.2 Post-war Macroeconomic Performance

One angle to approach the U.S. post-war macroeconomic performance is to study the economic results of different presidents based on their party of origin. In an *American Economic Review* article (the top scholarly publication of the economics profession), Alan Blinder and Mark Watson use time series techniques to investigate this issue scientifically.

The results are provocative. As Figures 15.4 and 15.5 show, Democratic presidents have a significantly better economic record than Republican presidents. Figure 15.6 shows that this is mostly explained by their differential macroeconomic performance in the first years of their presidency.

However, Alan Blinder and Mark Watson also investigate the source of this difference, using the various variables that are typically thought to be associated to good macroeconomic performance. They conclude that:

The answer is not found in technical time series matters nor in systematically more expansionary monetary or fiscal policy under Democrats. Rather, it appears that the Democratic edge stems mainly from more benign oil shocks, superior total factor productivity (TFP) performance, a more favorable international environment, and perhaps more optimistic consumer expectations about the near-term future.

Variable	Democratic	Republican	Difference	<i>p</i> -value
<i>Panel A. Other output measures</i>				
GDP per capita (GR)	3.09 (0.47) [0.42]	1.35 (0.35) [0.45]	1.73 (0.59) [0.61]	0.01
Nonfarm business output (GR)	4.81 (0.56) [0.52]	2.65 (0.43) [0.61]	2.15 (0.71) [0.80]	0.01
Industrial production (GR)	5.57 (0.95) [0.84]	1.79 (0.62) [0.93]	3.78 (1.13) [1.24]	0.00
<i>Panel B. Employment and unemployment</i>				
Employment (payroll) (GR)	2.59 (0.41) [0.36]	1.17 (0.32) [0.38]	1.42 (0.52) [0.49]	0.02
Employee hours (NFB) (GR)	2.22 (0.31) [0.39]	0.57 (0.38) [0.50]	1.65 (0.49) [0.58]	0.01
Employment (HH) (GR)	1.76 (0.28) [0.25]	1.20 (0.26) [0.31]	0.56 (0.38) [0.37]	0.17
Unemployment rate (level, PP)	5.64 (0.67) [0.41]	6.01 (0.41) [0.29]	-0.38 (0.78) [0.47]	0.62
Unemployment rate (change, PP)	-0.83 (0.42)	1.09 (0.45)	-1.92 (0.62)	0.01
<i>Panel C. Stock returns and corporate profits</i>				
Returns S&P500 Index (PP)	8.35 (2.12) [2.56]	2.70 (2.84) [3.20]	5.65 (3.55) [4.22]	0.15
Corporate profits (share of GDI)	5.61 (0.31) [0.22]	4.74 (0.20) [0.16]	0.87 (0.37) [0.27]	0.03
<i>Panel D. Real wages and productivity</i>				
Compensation/hour (GR)	1.78 (0.55) [0.36]	1.43 (0.34) [0.27]	0.35 (0.65) [0.44]	0.57
Output/hour NFB (GR)	2.53 (0.46) [0.38]	2.06 (0.29) [0.29]	0.47 (0.54) [0.49]	0.37
TFP (GR)	1.89 (0.47) [0.37]	0.84 (0.30) [0.35]	1.05 (0.55) [0.52]	0.07
<i>Panel E. Structural government surplus</i>				
Surplus/pot. GDP (PP)	-2.09 (0.87) [0.51]	-2.78 (0.22) [0.26]	0.69 (0.89) [0.54]	0.30
<i>Panel F. Inflation</i>				
Inflation PCED (level, PP)	2.97 (0.95) [0.59]	3.32 (0.63) [0.41]	-0.35 (1.14) [0.68]	0.73
Inflation GDPD (level, PP)	2.89 (0.88) [0.55]	3.44 (0.60) [0.39]	-0.55 (1.06) [0.63]	0.59
Inflation PCED (change, PP)	1.06 (0.67)	-0.83 (0.87)	1.89 (1.10)	0.12
Inflation GDPD (change, PP)	0.93 (0.69)	-0.81 (0.85)	1.74 (1.09)	0.15
<i>Panel G. Interest rates</i>				
Three month T-bill rate (level, PP)	4.01 (1.10) [0.66]	4.87 (0.92) [0.58]	-0.86 (1.44) [0.82]	0.56
Federal funds rate (level, PP)	4.75 (1.36) [0.82]	5.55 (1.10) [0.69]	-0.79 (1.75) [0.99]	0.54
Three month T-bill rate (change, PP)	1.75 (0.91)	-1.47 (0.59)	3.22 (1.09)	0.00
Federal funds rate (change, PP)	2.34 (1.37)	-2.09 (0.72)	4.42 (1.55)	0.00
Ten-year/three-month term spread (PP)	1.17 (0.37) [0.25]	1.65 (0.22) [0.20]	-0.48 (0.43) [0.30]	0.25
Baa-Aaa spread (PP)	0.80 (0.11) [0.07]	1.08 (0.11) [0.08]	-0.29 (0.15) [0.10]	0.09

Figure 15.5: AVERAGE VALUES OF MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES BY PARTY OF PRESIDENT. SOURCE: BLINDER, WATSON (2016).




Figure 15.6: GROWTH RATES BY YEAR, WITHIN PRESIDENTIAL TERMS. SOURCE: BLINDER, WATSON (2016).

This result should be apparent on Panel E of Figure 15.7. This shows that the Romer and Romer (2010) tax series presented in Lecture 14 does not explain the relative performance of Democrats versus Republicans. Note however that these results do not account for the differential impacts of taxes on high income and low income earners shown by Zidar (2018), which we looked at in lecture 14.

15.3 U.S. Fiscal Policy

As we saw in lecture 9, fiscal policy is an important factor to take into account if we want to understand macroeconomic policy. In particular, it is important to look at the change in fiscal policy for different (pre-tax) income groups:

- Average tax rates for Top 1% and the Bottom 50%. (Figure 15.8)
- Average tax rates for the Top 10% and the Bottom 90%. (Figure 15.9)
- Average tax rates for the Top 1%, the Top 0.5%, and the Top 0.01%. (Figure 15.10)
- Top Marginal tax rates. (Figure 15.11)

15.4 Trade Deficits and Manufacturing Decline

I shall conclude this class on a cautionary tale on aggregate demand stimulating policies. As we have seen in lecture 11, these policies have the unintended consequence of raising the U.S. trade deficit.

Although many economists usually take a benign view of trade deficits in general, and deindustrialization in particular, I am again more agnostic. Trade deficits distort the structure of production towards services, as to a first approximation only goods can be imported. I believe that the negative consequences of the fall in the manufacturing sector has hurt some communities substantially, and may largely explain the rise of Donald Trump. This section presents some evidence in this direction.

Shock	Sample period	Total D-R gap	Explained D-R gap	
			Distributed lag specification	
			Common	Party-specific
<i>Panel A. Oil</i>				
Prices (Hamilton)	1949:II–2013:I	1.79 (0.64)	0.49 (0.10)	0.51 (0.11) [0.72]
Quantities (Kilian)	1972:III–2004:III	0.81 (0.75)	0.21 (0.19)	0.40 (0.18) [0.00]
<i>Panel B. Productivity</i>				
TFP (util. adj., Fernald)	1949:II–2013:I	1.79 (0.64)	0.05 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02) [0.65]
Labor prod. (LR-VAR)	1950:III–2013:I	1.72 (0.62)	0.20 (0.08)	0.16 (0.07) [0.07]
TFP (LR-VAR)	1950:III–2013:I	1.72 (0.62)	0.29 (0.05)	0.29 (0.05) [0.99]
TFP (util. adj. by authors)	1950:III–2013:I	1.72 (0.62)	0.50 (0.07)	0.50 (0.07) [0.15]
<i>Panel C. Defense spending</i>				
Ramey	1949:II–2013:I	1.79 (0.64)	0.21 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.44) [0.70]
Fisher-Peters	1949:II–2008:IV	2.12 (0.65)	0.02 (0.06)	0.02 (0.05) [0.59]
<i>Panel D. International</i>				
GDP growth Europe	1963:IV–2013:I	1.18 (0.65)	0.03 (0.16)	0.04 (0.15) [0.27]
Exchange rates	1975:IV–2013:I	0.64 (0.69)	0.00 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.07) [0.01]
<i>Panel E. Taxes</i>				
Romer and Romer	1949:II–2007:IV	1.97 (0.64)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.01 (0.04) [0.17]
<i>Panel F. Monetary policy</i>				
Romer and Romer	1970:III–1996:IV	0.47 (0.95)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.15 (0.13) [0.43]
SVAR (Sims and Zha)	1961:IV–2003:I	1.49 (0.70)	0.05 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.12) [0.03]
SVAR (authors)	1957:II–2008:IV	1.77 (0.64)	-0.23 (0.12)	-0.32 (0.12) [0.20]
<i>Panel G. Interest rates and loan surveys</i>				
Baa-Aaa spread	1950:I–2013:I	1.91 (0.67)	0.25 (0.18)	0.17 (0.19) [0.00]
GZ spread	1975:III–2012:IV	0.60 (0.70)	0.51 (0.21)	0.34 (0.16) [0.10]
TED spread	1973:III–2013:I	0.90 (0.69)	0.16 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07) [0.00]
FRB SLOOS	1972:III–2013:I	0.74 (0.67)	-0.11 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.07) [0.00]
<i>Panel H. Consumer sentiment, expectations, and uncertainty</i>				
Consumer sentiment	1962:III–2013:I	1.24 (0.64)	0.05 (0.05)	0.04 (0.05) [0.05]
Consumer expectations	1962:III–2013:I	1.24 (0.64)	0.23 (0.11)	0.17 (0.10) [0.08]
Uncertainty Index (BBD)	1950:I–2013:IV	1.91 (0.67)	-0.13 (0.06)	-0.14 (0.06) [0.19]
Uncertainty Index (JLN)	1963:I–2013:IV	1.26 (0.64)	0.18 (0.09)	0.17 (0.09) [0.27]

Figure 15.7: EXPLAINING THE DEMOCRAT-REPUBLICAN GROWTH GAP. SOURCE: BLINDER, WATSON (2016).




Figure 15.8: AVERAGE TAX RATES: TOP 1%, BOTTOM 50%. SOURCE: PIKETTY ET AL. (2017).




Figure 15.9: >AVERAGE TAX RATES: TOP 10%, BOTTOM 90%. SOURCE: PIKETTY ET AL. (2017).




Figure 15.10: AVERAGE TAX RATES: TOP 1%, TOP 0.5%, TOP 0.1%. SOURCE: PIKETTY ET AL. (2017).




Figure 15.11: TOP MARGINAL TAX RATES, INCOME SHARES. SOURCE: PIKETTY ET AL. (2014).




Figure 15.12: NET EXPORTS AS A SHARE OF GDP FROM NIPA (BEA).




Figure 15.13: BUDGET SURPLUS (% OF GDP).

Figures ?? and 15.13 show the growing trade deficit since the 1980s, which occurred whether or not there was a budget deficit. In 1993-2001, the progressivity of the tax system was substantially increased, which led to an improvement in the fiscal situation, but also to an overall boost in aggregate demand, increasing the trade deficit further.

Why should we potentially care about growing trade deficits, and a shrinking manufacturing sector? Paul Krugman gave the arguments of people worried about the U.S. trade deficit in a 1994 *Foreign Affairs* article titled “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession”:

In a recent article published in Japan, Lester Thurow explained to his audience that reducing the Japanese trade surplus with the United States. U.S. real wages, he pointed out, had fallen six percent during the Reagan and Bush years, and the reason was that trade deficits in manufactured goods had forced workers out of high-paying manufacturing jobs into much lower-paying service jobs. This is not an original view; it is very widely held.

One reason, which I believe is potentially valid, is that manufacturing jobs provide high-paying jobs for people who did not go to college. Jobs in the service sector are, in contrast, not as well paid. If you want

the opposite side of the argument, you should read “Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession” by Paul Krugman, or his book on the topic “Pop Internationalism” (see the references below).

J.M. Keynes was in fact very aware of that risk, and was taking it more seriously than mainstream contemporary economists. For that reason, J.M. Keynes’ preference was always going back and forth between free trade and protection.¹ In Proposals for a Revenue Tariff, included in *Essays in Persuasion* he was arguing in favor of a revenue tariff:

But the main decision which seems to me to-day to be absolutely forced on any wise Chancellor of the Exchequer, whatever his beliefs about Protection, is the introduction of a substantial revenue tariff. It is certain that there is no other measure all the immediate consequences of which will be favourable and appropriate. The tariff which I have in mind would include no discriminating protective taxes, but would cover as wide a field as possible at a flat rate or perhaps two flat rates, each applicable to wide categories of goods.

The reason, for him, was to prevent a further trade deficit:

I am of the opinion that a policy of expansion, though desirable, is not safe or practicable to-day, unless it is accompanied by other measures which would neutralise its dangers. Let me remind the reader what these dangers are. There is the burden on the trade balance, the burden on the Budget, and the effect on confidence. If the policy of expansion were to justify itself eventually by increasing materially the level of profits and the volume of employment, the net effect on the Budget and on confidence would in the end be favourable and perhaps very favourable. But this might not be the initial effect.

He added:

Compared with any alternative which is open to us, this measure is unique in that it would at the same time relieve the pressing problems of the Budget and restore business confidence. I do not believe that a wise and prudent Budget can be framed to-day without recourse to a revenue tariff. But this is not its only advantage. In so far as it leads to the substitution of home-produced goods for goods previously imported, it will increase employment in this country. At the same time, by relieving the pressure on the balance of trade it will provide a much-needed margin to pay for the additional imports which a policy of expansion will require and to finance loans by London to necessitous debtor countries. In these ways, the buying power which we take away from the rest of the world by restricting certain imports we shall restore to it with the other hand. Some fanatical Free Traders might allege that the adverse effect of import duties on our exports would neutralise all this; but it would not be true.

Regardless of one’s view on the issue of declining manufacturing employment, it is a fact that, at least since 2000, manufacturing employment has been fast declining as shown on Figure 15.14.

I will end the with four pictures, which to my mind suggest a potential problem with the decline in manufacturing employment, linked to aggregate demand stimulating policies. To me, these potential issues may explain the rise of Donald Trump, and his election.

- Figure 15.15 shows the employment rate of prime-age individuals. You can see that the employment of non-college men has fallen by approximately 5 percentage points since 1980.
- Figure 15.16 shows monthly U.S. Employment in millions. Manufacturing employment has steadily fallen from 1980 to 2015.
- Figure 15.17 plots the construction, manufacturing, and nonemployment shares of employment for noncollege men. It shows that during the 2000s boom, the construction sector masked the decline in manufacturing sector, as many noncollege men went to construction instead of manufacturing. Obviously, this state of affairs ended with the financial crisis in 2007-2009.

¹If you are interested, you may read more about it in Barry Eichengreen, “Keynes and Protection,” *The Journal of Economic History* 44, no. 2 (1984): 363–73 here: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2120714>.




Figure 15.14: MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT. SOURCE: CHARLES ET AL. (2018).

- Figure 15.18 shows the relationship between manufacturing decline and the opioid crisis. Regions which were most hurt by the decline in manufacturing are those where the opioid crisis is more severe. Other studies have shown a link between the fall in manufacturing employment and the rise of Donald Trump.

Again, if you want to read the arguments of those who think that trade deficits are not a problem, I strongly encourage you to read both Paul Krugman's 1994 article in *Foreign Affairs*, as well as his book "Pop Internationalism." In my opinion, the issues related to aggregate demand stimulating policies' impact on the trade balance are here to stay. Time will tell.

Readings - To go further

J.M. Keynes, Essays in Persuasion (Springer, 1931).

Joan Robinson, "What Has Become of the Keynesian Revolution?," Challenge 16, no. 6 (January 1, 1974): 6–11.

Barry Eichengreen, "Keynes and Protection," The Journal of Economic History 44, no. 2 (1984): 363–73.

Paul Krugman, "Competitiveness: A Dangerous Obsession," Foreign Affairs, March 1, 1994.

(Book) Paul R. Krugman, Pop Internationalism (MIT Press, 1997).

Alan S. Blinder and Mark W. Watson, "Presidents and the US Economy: An Econometric Exploration," American Economic Review 106, no. 4 (April 2016): 1015–45.

Kerwin Kofi Charles, Erik Hurst, and Matthew J. Notowidigdo, "The Masking of the Decline in Manufacturing Employment by the Housing Bubble," Journal of Economic Perspectives 30, no. 2 (May 2016): 179–200.




Figure 15.15: EMPLOYMENT RATE, PRIME-AGE INDIVIDUALS, 1980–2015. SOURCE: CHARLES ET AL. (2016).




Figure 15.16: TOTAL MONTHLY U.S. EMPLOYMENT. SOURCE: CHARLES ET AL. (2016).




Figure 15.17: CONSTRUCTION, MANUFACTURING, AND NONEMPLOYMENT SHARES, NONCOLLEGE MEN.
SOURCE: CHARLES ET AL. (2016).




Figure 15.18: MANUFACTURING DECLINE AND OPIOID CRISIS. SOURCE: CHARLES ET AL. (2018).

Kerwin Kofi Charles, Erik Hurst, and Mariel Schwartz, “The Transformation of Manufacturing and the Decline in U.S. Employment,” Working Paper (National Bureau of Economic Research, March 2018).

Appendix A

Problem Set 1

A.1 Geometric Sums

1. Calculate the following geometric sum, when $x \neq 1$, as a function of x^{n+1} in particular:

$$\sum_{i=0}^n x^i = 1 + x + x^2 + \dots + x^n$$

2. State a condition on x such that the infinite geometric sum (when $n \rightarrow \infty$) has a finite value.
3. Assuming that this geometric sum is finite, calculate:

$$\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} x^i = 1 + x + x^2 + \dots + x^n + \dots$$

4. More generally, for m a positive integer, calculate:

$$\sum_{i=m}^n x^i = x^m + x^{m+1} + \dots + x^n$$

5. What is the present discounted value of an infinite stream of incomes, which grows at rate $g = 2\%$, starts at $y_0 = 90000$, if the interest rate is $i = 3\%$?

A.2 Taylor Approximations

1. If x is small, show that:

$$(1+x)^n \approx 1 + nx.$$

2. If x and y are small, then show that:

$$(1+x)(1+y) \approx 1 + x + y.$$

3. If x and y are small, then show that:

$$\frac{1+x}{1+y} \approx 1 + x - y.$$

4. Your savings account offers a nominal interest rate of 1%. Meanwhile, annual inflation is 1.5%. What is an exact value for the real interest rate, defined as the rate of increase in your purchasing power if you leave your money in the bank? What is an approximate value for this real interest rate, using one of the previous formulas?

A.3 Growth Rates

1. If y_t grows at a constant rate g during a given period, then show that the growth G of y_t after T periods is:

$$G = \frac{y_T}{y_0} - 1 = (1 + g)^T - 1.$$

2. Conversely, if the growth rate of y_t after T periods is G , then show that the average growth rate of y_t per period is:

$$g = \frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t} - 1 = (1 + G)^{1/T} - 1.$$

3. If your annual return on your savings rate is 1%, what is your daily return (assuming a year is 365 days)? How much do you then give up each day by leaving \$100K on a zero interest checking account?

Appendix B

Problem Set 2

B.1 Solow Growth Model if $\alpha = 1/2$ and $A = 1/2$

Suppose that the production function is such that $A = 1/2$ (often, we assume that $A = 1$) and $\alpha = 1/2$:

$$Y = \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{K}\sqrt{L}$$

1. Derive the steady-state levels of output per worker and capital per worker in terms of the saving rate, s , and the depreciation rate, δ .
2. Derive the equation for steady-state output per worker and steady-state consumption per worker in terms of s and δ .
3. Suppose that $\delta = 0.05$. With your favorite spreadsheet software, compute steady-state output per worker and steady-state consumption per worker for $s = 0; s = 0.1; s = 0.2; s = 1$. Explain the intuition behind your results.
4. Use your favorite spreadsheet software to graph the steady-state level of output per worker and the steady-state level of consumption per worker as a function of the saving rate (i.e., measure the saving rate on the horizontal axis of your graph and the corresponding values of output per worker and consumption per worker on the vertical axis).
5. Does the graph show that there is a value of s that maximizes output per worker? Does the graph show that there is a value of s that maximizes consumption per worker? If so, what is this value?

B.2 Solow Growth Model if $\alpha = 1/3$

Suppose that the economy's production function is given by

$$Y = K^\alpha L^{1-\alpha}$$

and assume that $\alpha = 1/3$.

1. Is this production function characterized by constant returns to scale? Explain.
2. Are there decreasing returns to capital?
3. Are there decreasing returns to labor?
4. Transform the production function into a relation between output per worker and capital per worker.

5. For a given saving rate, s , and depreciation rate, δ , give an expression for capital per worker in the steady state.
6. Give an expression for output per worker in the steady state.
7. Solve for the steady-state level of output per worker when $s = 0.32$ and $\delta = 0.08$.
8. Suppose that the depreciation rate remains constant at $\delta = 0.08$, while the saving rate is reduced by half, to $s = 0.16$. What is the new steady-state output per worker?

B.3 An increase in the depreciation rate

Continuing with the logic from the previous problem, suppose that the economy's production function is given by

$$Y = K^\alpha L^{1-\alpha}$$

with $\alpha = 1/3$ and that both the saving rate, s , and the depreciation rate, δ are equal to 0.10.

1. What is the steady-state level of capital per worker?
2. What is the steady-state level of output per worker? Suppose that the economy is in steady state and that, in period t , the depreciation rate increases permanently from 0.10 to 0.20.
3. What will be the new steady-state levels of capital per worker and output per worker?
4. Compute the path of capital per worker and output per worker over the first three periods after the change in the depreciation rate.

B.4 Deficits and the capital stock

Suppose that the production function is given by:

$$Y = \sqrt{K} \sqrt{L}$$

1. Show that the steady-state capital stock per worker and output per worker are given by:

$$\frac{K^*}{L} = \left(\frac{s}{\delta}\right)^2 \quad \text{and} \quad \frac{Y^*}{L} = \frac{s}{\delta}.$$

2. Suppose that the saving rate, s , is initially 15 % per year, and the depreciation rate, δ , is 7.5 %. What is the steady-state capital stock per worker? What is steady-state output per worker?
3. Suppose that there is a government deficit of 5% of GDP and that the government eliminates this deficit. Assume that private saving is unchanged so that total saving increases to 20%. What is the new steady-state capital stock per worker? What is the new steady-state output per worker? How does this compare to your answer to part 2?

B.5 U.S. saving and government deficits

This question continues the logic of the previous question, to explore the implications of the U.S. government budget deficit for the long-run capital stock.

1. The World Bank reports gross domestic saving rate by country and year. The Web site is <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDS.TOTL.ZS>. Find the most recent number for the United States. What is the total saving rate in the United States as a percentage of GDP? Using the depreciation rate and the logic from the previous problem, what would be the steady-state capital stock per worker? What would be steady-state output per worker?
2. Go to the most recent Economic Report of the President (ERP) and find the most recent federal deficit as a percentage of GDP. In the 2015 ERP, this is found in Table B-20. Using the reasoning from the previous problem, suppose that the federal budget deficit was eliminated and there was no change in private saving. What would be the effect on the long-run capital stock per worker? What would be the effect on long-run output per worker?
3. Return to the World Bank table of gross domestic saving rates. How does the saving rate in China compare to the saving rate in the United States?

Appendix C

Problem Set 3

C.1 Two-period Intertemporal Optimization

Consider the model of lecture 3 again. Instead of logarithmic preferences, assume that preferences are given by:

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma},$$

1. Under what condition on σ is this an increasing and concave utility function?

2. Show using 4 different methods that:

$$\frac{\beta u'(c_1)}{u'(c_0)} = \frac{1}{1+r}$$

3. Using the equation in question 1, what is the ratio c_1/c_0 ?
4. Replace in the intertemporal budget constraint to find an implicit equation for c_1 . Do the same for c_0 .
5. Assume that $\sigma = 1/2$, and $f_0 = 0$, $y_0 = \$90,000$, $y_1 = 0$, $\beta = 1$. What are c_0 and c_1 if $r = 1\%$? What about if $r = 2\%$? How much does c_0 change then? How much in percentage terms?
6. Same questions if $\sigma = 1$.
7. Same questions if $\sigma = 2$.
8. Compare the changes in c_0 following an increase in the real interest rates in questions 5, 6, 7. Comment.

C.2 Another Overlapping Generations model

Consider the model of lecture 4 again, with one small twist: agents care only about old age consumption. In other words, their utility functions are given by:

$$U = u(c_{t+1}^o).$$

Our goal is to derive the law of motion for the capital stock K_t , that is, a function relating K_{t+1} to K_t and the parameters of the model.

1. Why can the utility function be left unspecified for computing the level of saving?
2. Derive the law of motion for capital.

3. What is the corresponding value of the saving rate in the Solow model?
4. Provide a condition on α such that the capital stock is below the Golden Rule level.
5. Is that condition likely to be satisfied?

Appendix D

Problem Set 4

D.1 The Solow Growth Model with Exogenous Growth

Consider the Solow growth model of Lecture 2, with however two small changes. Assume that the production function is given by:

$$F(K_t, L_t) = A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha},$$

where productivity A_t grows exogenously at rate g and $A_0 = 1$:

$$A_t = (1 + g)^t.$$

Moreover, assume that the labor force also grows at a rate n and $L_0 = 1$, so that at any time t :

$$L_t = (1 + n)^t.$$

1. Write the law of motion for capital K_t .

2. Define k_t as:

$$k_t \equiv \frac{K_t}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t},$$

and write a law of motion for k_t . Assume that n , and g are small in order to simplify this law of motion.

Hint: if n and g are small then: $(1 + g)^{1/(1-\alpha)}(1 + n) \approx 1 + \frac{1}{1-\alpha}g + n$.

3. Show that k_t converges to a steady-state k^* . Compute k^* .
4. When k_t has reached a steady-state, the economy is said to be on a **balanced growth path**. On this balanced growth path, what is the rate of growth of Y_t , C_t , K_t , K_t/Y_t , K_t/L_t , w_t , $w_t L_t$ and $w_t L_t/Y_t$? Denoting by R_t the marginal product of capital, what is the rate of growth of R_t , $R_t K_t$, and $R_t K_t/Y_t$?
5. Compute y^* and c^* corresponding to steady-state k^* with:

$$y_t \equiv \frac{Y_t}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} \quad \text{and} \quad c_t \equiv \frac{C_t}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t}.$$

6. What is the saving rate which maximizes c^* ? (Golden Rule level of capital accumulation)
7. What is then the value of the marginal product of capital R^* ?

D.2 The Neoclassical Labor Market Model

Consider the neoclassical labor market model of lecture 6. Assume that preferences and the production function are as in lecture 6:

$$U(c, l) = c - B \frac{l^{1+\epsilon}}{1+\epsilon}, \quad f(l) = Al^{1-\alpha}.$$

Denote the wage by w , and the price of consumption by p .

1. Derive the Labor Demand curve.
2. Assume that $\alpha = 1/3$ and $A = 2$. Using your favorite spreadsheet software, plot this demand curve in a $(l, w/p)$ plane - that is, putting l on the x-axis and w/p on the y-axis.
3. Take logs of both sides. What does the demand curve look like in a $(\log(l), \log(w/p))$ plane? What is the slope of the demand curve equal to? If α is higher, is the demand curve steeper or flatter? What shifts the demand curve to the left or to the right?
4. Derive the Labor Supply curve.
5. Assume that $\epsilon = 5$ and $B = 2$. Using your favorite spreadsheet software, plot this supply curve in a $(l, w/p)$ plane - that is, putting l on the x-axis and w/p on the y-axis. Add the supply curve to the demand curve of question 2.
6. Take logs of both sides. What does the supply curve look like in a $(\log(l), \log(w/p))$ plane? What is the slope of the supply curve equal to? If ϵ is higher, is the supply curve steeper or flatter? What shifts the supply curve to the left, or to the right?
7. Assume that productivity A decreases by 5%, to $A = 1.9$. What is the effect on the quantity of employment, and on the real wage? If α is higher, is that effect larger or smaller? What is the economic intuition?
8. Assume that leisure becomes relatively more attractive relative to working (think of Facebook, Netflix, etc.), so that B increases by 10% (the disutility of work increases). What is the effect on the quantity of employment, and on the real wage? If ϵ is higher, is that effect larger or smaller? What is the economic intuition for this?

D.3 The “Keynesian” Labor Market Model

Consider the neoclassical labor market model of the previous problem.

1. Assume that productivity A decreases by 5%, but that real wages w/p are rigid. Compute the change in the quantity of employment following a fall in productivity.
2. Compare the effect with question 7 in the previous problem. Explain.
3. Assume that leisure becomes relatively more attractive relative to working, so that B increases by 10%. Compute the change in the quantity of employment following a increase in leisure attractiveness.
4. Compare the effect with question 8 in the previous problem. Explain.

D.4 The Bathtub model

Consider the bathtub model of lecture 6. Assume a monthly job separation rate equal to $s = 1\%$, and a monthly job finding rate equal to $f = 20\%$. Assume that the labor force is given by $L = 159$ million.

1. Derive the steady-state unemployment rate. How many people are unemployed in the steady-state? How many people lose their jobs every month? How many people find a job every month?

2. Assume that the economy starts with an unemployment rate equal to $u_0 = 8\%$. Using your favorite spreadsheet software, show the evolution of the unemployment rate over time. How long before the unemployment rate reaches 5%?
3. If $s = 2\%$ instead, which job finding rate f gives the same steady-state unemployment rate?
4. Assuming the separation rate and the job finding rate are given from question 3, answer question 2 again.
5. Explain why an economy with more churning (that is, faster reallocation) - think of the US versus Europe - has a faster recovery in terms of unemployment after a recession. *Note:* A recession could be coming from a temporary increase in the job separation rate, or a temporary decrease in the job finding rate, which then goes back to its original value.

Appendix E

Problem Set 5

E.1 Gregory N. Mankiw - NYT - Nov 30, 2008

This exercise is based on the following *New York Times* article, which Gregory N. Mankiw wrote a bit more than 2 months after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers (to which we shall come back at the end of the class). The *New York Times* articles are gated after you have read your monthly quota, but archives are available through UCLA on ProQuest:

Mankiw, N. Gregory. What would Keynes have done? *New York Times*, November 30, 2008

1. According to Gregory N. Mankiw, which factors contributed to hold back consumption? Can you interpret these factors in terms of changes in c_0 ?
2. Gregory N. Mankiw mentions the “paradox of thrift”. Which model that we saw in the class makes most sense of his explanations?
3. Concerning saving, one of the arguments that Gregory N. Mankiw makes is more neoclassical. Which one is it?
4. What is Gregory N. Mankiw most concerned about though?

E.2 Procyclical Government spending

Consider the basic goods market model of Lecture 7: consumption is linear in disposable income, disposable income is income minus taxes, investment is exogenous and equal to \bar{I} , and taxes are exogenous as well. However, government spending depends on the level of output. For example, the government systematically spends more when GDP is higher (it builds new roads, hires new teachers, etc.), and conversely when GDP is lower (it then stops construction projects, fires teachers, etc.). Thus, government spending is given by the following equation, with $g_1 > 0$:

$$G = g_0 + g_1 Y$$

1. Solve for equilibrium output.
2. If $g_1 + c_1 < 1$, what is the value of the tax multiplier? (the tax multiplier is equal to the increase in output following from a \$1 decrease in taxes) If $g_1 > 0$, is the multiplier higher or lower than when government spending does not depend on GDP ($g_1 = 0$)? What is the intuition for this?
3. Does this kind of policy appear like a good policy?
4. Give both a graphical as well as an algebraic justification for the value of the multiplier.

5. What happens if $g_1 + c_1 > 1$? Explain using the multiplier intuition.

E.3 Accelerator and Automatic Stabilizer

Consider the basic goods market model of Lecture 7: consumption is linear in disposable income with a Marginal Propensity to Consume equal to c_1 , disposable income is income minus taxes. However, we assume an accelerator effect of demand on investment (investment depends on sales):

$$I = b_0 + b_1 Y,$$

as well as the presence of automatic stabilizers:

$$T = t_0 + t_1 Y.$$

1. Solve for equilibrium output.
2. Find a condition on b_1 , c_1 , and t_1 such that the multiplier stays finite.
3. What happens if the multiplier is infinite? Does GDP become infinite?
4. Give both a graphical as well as an algebraic justification for the value of the multiplier.

Appendix F

Problem Set 6

Another Numerical Example

During lecture 9, we studied the aggregate demand effects of tax cuts on the bottom 90% financed by tax increases on the top 10%. In this problem, we study another example of these aggregate demand effects, looking at redistribution from the top 1% income share to the bottom 99%. *An important warning:* Again, note that this model only has Keynesian, aggregate demand effects. However, raising taxes on high income earners certainly has effects on the supply side as well. Raising taxes on the top 1% probably also has effects on entrepreneurship, incentives to take risk and create jobs, which are not taken into account here. (Symmetrically, changing taxes on the bottom 99% also may have effects on their incentives to work.) Whether these supply effects are sufficiently large to offset and perhaps even overturn the aggregate demand effects we focus on here is controversial, subject to heated debates and outside of the scope of the class.

To illustrate the effects on aggregate demand of redistributive policies between the top 1% and the bottom 99%, we now use the same notations as in lecture 9. There is a share $\lambda = 99\%$ of population N who are in the bottom 99%, who earn individual income \underline{y} , pay net taxes $\underline{t} = \underline{t}_0 + t_1\underline{y}$, have an MPC \underline{c}_1 , baseline consumption \underline{c}_0 . Notations for high income are similar, but with bars: \bar{y} , $\bar{t} = \bar{t}_0 + t_1\bar{y}$, \bar{c}_1 , \bar{c}_0 . Total GDP is Y , investment is $I = b_0 + b_1Y$, government spending is exogenous and equal to G .

1. Use Google to find out how much income would put you in the top 1%.
2. The World Income Database suggests that the top 1% captures approximately 20% of total U.S. income in 2017, while it was approximately 10% in 1980. Using the notations of the class, what is $\gamma = \bar{y}/\underline{y}$?
3. Compute aggregate consumption $C = \underline{C} + \bar{C}$, as in lecture 9, using the following notations:

$$\begin{aligned} c_1 &\equiv \frac{\lambda \underline{c}_1 + (1 - \lambda) \gamma \bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} \\ C_0 &\equiv \lambda N \underline{c}_0 + (1 - \lambda) N \bar{c}_0 \\ \underline{T}_0 &\equiv \lambda N \underline{t}_0 \\ \bar{T}_0 &\equiv (1 - \lambda) N \bar{t}_0. \end{aligned}$$

4. What is an economic interpretation for c_1 ? Calculate c_1 if $\underline{c}_1 = 1$ and $\bar{c}_1 = 1/4$.
5. Using the expression for I , and for aggregate consumption C , compute Y .
6. Assume that $t_1 = 1/4$ and $b_1 = 1/6$. Compute the impact on GDP of a 100 billion dollars tax cut on the top 1%. What is the impact on the government deficit of such a cut?
7. Assume that $t_1 = 1/4$ and $b_1 = 1/6$. Compute the impact on GDP of a 100 billion dollars tax cut on the bottom 99%. What is the impact on the government deficit of such a cut?

8. Assume that $t_1 = 1/4$ and $b_1 = 1/6$. Compute the impact on GDP of a transfer of 100 billion dollars from the top 1% to the bottom 99%. What is the impact on the government deficit of such a transfer?
9. What happens if there are no automatic stabilizers in this economy ($t_1 = 0$)? Explain.

Appendix G

Problem Set 7

Another overlapping-generations model with government debt

In this exercise, we consider the same problem as in lecture 10, except that lifetime utility is logarithmic with $\beta = 2$ (that is, people are patient instead of impatient, so they tend to save a lot):

$$U = \log(c_t^y) + 2 \log(c_{t+1}^o)$$

We denote the (net) real interest rate by r_t so that the intertemporal budget constraint is:

$$c_t^y + \frac{c_{t+1}^o}{1+r_t} = w_t.$$

Other than that, we still assume a Cobb-Douglas production function with $\alpha = 1/3$, so that:

$$Y_t = K_t^{1/3} L_t^{2/3}.$$

We assume that the labor force is constant so that $L_t = 1$. The depreciation rate is still $\delta = 1 = 100\%$.

1. Compute c_{t+1}^o and c_t^y as a function of the wage w_t .
2. What is the law of motion for the capital stock?
3. Compute the steady-state capital stock K^* , the (net) steady-state real interest rate r^* , the steady-state output Y^* , the steady-state wage w^* , and the steady-state consumption of the young $(c^y)^*$ and of the old $(c^o)^*$.
4. Compute the Golden Rule (net) interest rate r_g^* , the Golden Rule capital stock K_g^* , the Golden Rule output Y_g^* , the Golden Rule wage w_g^* , and the Golden Rule consumption of the young $(c^y)_g^*$ and of the old $(c^o)_g^*$.
5. Compare the Golden Rule and steady-state levels, and give an economic intuition.
6. What level of government debt B_g^* brings the capital stock to the Golden Rule level ?
7. Starting from the steady-state situation of question 3, assume that the government gives this money to retirees, taking on government debt. How much is this (lucky) generation of retirees able to consume ?
8. Why is national debt a Ponzi scheme here? Is it bad ?
9. Assume that the government puts in place a pay-as-you-go system, such as Social Security (think of OASDI), giving retirees an amount B_g^* each period (where B_g^* is the same level of government debt as the one found in question 6), and taxing the young an equal amount B_g^* . Compare this situation to question 7. What are the differences and similarities?

10. What is the difference between pay-as-you-go financing and deficit financing ? Explain why government debt is not a very meaningful statistic.

Appendix H

Problem Set 8

H.1 Optimal Taxation: The “Supply Side” (Neoclassical) View

Let us go back to the labor market model of lecture 6. Denoting the (hourly) wage by w , the price of consumption by p , and the number of hours (per year) by l , assume that moreover $\alpha = 0$ so that:

$$U(c, l) = c - B \frac{l^{1+\epsilon}}{1+\epsilon}, \quad f(l) = Al^{1-\alpha} = Al.$$

1. Derive the Labor Demand curve.
2. For labor supply, assume that the tax and transfer system is such that τ is the marginal tax rate, and c_0 is a real subsistence level of income given by the government: $pc = (1 - \tau)wl + pc_0$. Derive the Labor Supply curve.
3. Express the number of hours worked per year l , as well real annual pre-tax income $y = (w/p) \cdot l$, as a function of the parameters of the model.
4. Compute the number of hours worked per year \underline{l} , as well as real pre-tax income \underline{y} if $\epsilon = 2$, $\tau = 1/4$, $\underline{A} = 1000000/28188 \approx 35.5$, $\underline{B} = 3000000/491569855488 \approx 6.1 \cdot 10^{-6}$.
5. Compute the number of hours worked per year \bar{l} , as well as real pre-tax income \bar{y} if $\epsilon = 2$, $\bar{\tau} = 1/2$, $\bar{A} = 1000000/6264 \approx 159.6$, $\bar{B} = 3000000/655426473984 \approx 4.6 \cdot 10^{-6}$.
6. Assume that the labor force is $N = 150$ million, with a fraction $\lambda = 0.9$ of the type described in question 4, and a fraction $1 - \lambda = 0.1$ of the type described in question 5. What is total output in the economy?
7. Assume that the tax system has two marginal tax rates: one 25% marginal tax rate above 25K, one 50% marginal tax rate above 200K and that $c_0 = 5K$. In other words, if income is y then taxes are:

$$T(y) = -5K + 0.25 \cdot \max\{y - 25K, 0\} + 0.25 \cdot \max\{y - 200K, 0\}.$$

Assume a tax reform that lowers the marginal tax rate on the richest by 5 points. How much is the total tax cut? What is the impact on GDP?

8. Assume a tax reform that lowers the marginal tax rate on the poorest by 5 points (and on the poorest only, even though in reality it would also change how much the rich pay in taxes). How much is the total tax cut? What is the impact on GDP?

H.2 Paul Krugman VS Robert Barro on the Bush tax cuts

Watch this debate between Paul Krugman and Robert Barro, moderated by Charlie Rose.

```
# [1] "Sorry I don't know how to embed videos in PDF"  
# [1] "Use the html version, or the link: https://www.youtube.com/embed/077G0SaJv5M"
```

1. Explain Robert Barro's view on taxes, using the previous exercise.
2. What is Paul Krugman's take on taxes?
3. What is the discussion on public debt, and the deficit ? Explain.
4. From 11:26 Robert Barro suggests to move from pay-as-you-go to “personal accounts”. Explain their discussion in terms of problem set 7.

Appendix I

Problem Set 9

I.1 A Budget Surplus and a Trade Deficit

The aim of this exercise is to better understand why, despite the first budget surplus in over 20 years, the U.S. still experienced a large trade deficit at the end of Bill Clinton's presidency from 1998 to 2001.

```
# [1] "Sorry I don't know how to embed videos in PDF"  
# [1] "Use the html version, or the link: https://www.youtube.com/embed/mHsfB5LZvA4"
```

We consider again the schematic redistributive policies from the rich to the poor, which we studied in lecture 9. We consider a reduction in taxes on the poor $\Delta\underline{T}_0 < 0$, with an offsetting increase in taxes on high income earners such that $\Delta T_0 = \Delta\underline{T}_0 + \Delta\bar{T}_0 = 0$. We then have that $\Delta\bar{T}_0 = -\Delta\underline{T}_0 > 0$.

1. What is the effect of redistribution on ΔY ?
2. What is the effect on the budget deficit of such a redistribution?
3. Using directly that $\Delta NX = -m_1\Delta Y$, compute the trade deficit.
4. We shall now decompose the trade deficit into saving and investment, to better understand the intuition behind the counterintuitive result. Compute first ΔI . Does it contribute to explaining the puzzle?
5. Compute now private saving ΔS . Does it contribute to explaining the puzzle?
6. Compute the net effect, total saving minus investment.
7. Assuming that $m_1 = 1/6$, $b_1 = 1/6$, $t_1 = 1/4$, $\underline{c}_1 = 1$, $\bar{c}_1 = 1/3$, $\gamma = 9$, $\lambda = 0.9$, what is the size of each component?

I.2 Coordination of Economic Policies

In this exercise, we shall consider the coordination of aggregate demand stimulating policies. We assume that consumption is given by $C = 10 + 0.8(Y - T)$, investment is given by $I = 8 + 0.1Y$, government spending is given by $G = g_0 + 0.1Y$, taxes are given by $T = 10 + 0.5Y$, and imports and exports are given by $M = 0.1Y$ and $X = 0.1Y^*$, where Y^* denotes foreign output. We're trying to give one potential justification for Donald Trump's complaints to Germany (and China) - watch the video below.

```
# [1] "Sorry I don't know how to embed videos in PDF"  
# [1] "Use the html version, or the link: https://www.youtube.com/embed/4I97fq8DorE"
```

1. Given Y^* , what is equilibrium output in the domestic economy?

2. What is the multiplier in this economy, assuming that foreign output is given? (which cannot be true)
3. If we were to close the economy - so exports and imports were identical, and net exports always equal 0. What would the multiplier then be?
4. Assume that the foreign economy is characterized by the same equations as the domestic economy (with asterisks reversed). Use the two sets of equations to solve for equilibrium output of each country.
5. What is the multiplier for each country now? Why is it different from the open economy multiplier in question 2?
6. Write a geometric series to explain the intuition for the spillovers.
7. What is the impact on Germany's budget of a rise in U.S.'s government spending?
8. What is the multiplier for a coordinated increase in government spending, such that $\Delta g_0 = \Delta g_0^*$?
9. Is the multiplier then higher or lower than in the previous question? What is the economic intuition?
10. Why is there a free-rider problem?
11. Watch this statement by Donald Trump. Why might this exercise be an explanation for Donald Trump's complaints on Germany's (and China's) economic policies?

Appendix J

Problem Set 1 - Solution

J.1 Geometric Sums

1. Let us denote the geometric sum of interest by S :

$$S = \sum_{i=0}^n x^i = 1 + x + x^2 + \dots + x^n.$$

The trick to calculate this sum is to multiply it by x , which allows to get:

$$xS = x + x^2 + x^3 + \dots + x^{n+1}.$$

We can see that this is almost the same sum as the previous one except for the first term, which is missing, and the last term, which was absent from S , therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} xS &= -1 + 1 + x + x^2 + \dots + x^n + x^{n+1} \\ xS &= -1 + S + x^{n+1} \end{aligned}$$

This implies (for $x \neq 1$):

$$1 - x^{n+1} = (1 - x)S \quad \Rightarrow \quad S = \frac{1 - x^{n+1}}{1 - x}.$$

2. For S to have a finite value when $n \rightarrow \infty$, we need that x^{n+1} stays finite. This happens when:

$$|x| < 1.$$

In the knife edge case when $x = 1$, the sum goes to infinity since it is then equal to $n + 1$. If $x = -1$, then the sum oscillates between 1 and -1 and does not have a limit when n goes to infinity.

3. From question 1 and 2, we know that when $|x| < 1$, $x^{n+1} \rightarrow 0$ when $n \rightarrow \infty$, and therefore:

$$\sum_{i=0}^{\infty} x^i = 1 + x + x^2 + \dots + x^n + \dots = \frac{1}{1 - x}.$$

4. We just factor in x^m and then use the formula in question 1:

$$\begin{aligned}\sum_{i=m}^n x^i &= x^m + x^{m+1} + \dots + x^n \\&= x^m (1 + x + \dots + x^{n-m}) \\&= x^m \frac{1 - x^{n-m+1}}{1 - x} \\&\sum_{i=m}^n x^i = \frac{x^m - x^{n+1}}{1 - x}.\end{aligned}$$

5. The present discounted value of an infinite stream of incomes, which grows at rate $g = 2\%$, starts at $y_0 = 90000$, if the interest rate is $i = 3\%$ is:

$$y_0 + y_0 \frac{1+g}{1+i} + y_0 \frac{(1+g)^2}{(1+i)^2} + \dots$$

Using the formula found in question 3 with $x = (1+g)/(1+i)$, we get:

$$y_0 + y_0 \frac{1+g}{1+i} + y_0 \frac{(1+g)^2}{(1+i)^2} + \dots = y_0 \frac{1}{1 - \frac{1+g}{1+i}} = \frac{y_0(1+i)}{i-g}$$

A numerical application gives (see Google Sheet):

$$\frac{y_0(1+i)}{i-g} = \frac{90000 * (1+0.03)}{0.03 - 0.02} = 9270000.$$

J.2 Taylor Approximations

1. We have:

$$(1+x)^n = \sum_{k=0}^n \binom{n}{k} \cdot x^k$$

When x is small, all the x^k terms for $k \geq 2$ are negligible, and therefore:

$$(1+x)^n \approx 1 + \binom{n}{1} x = 1 + nx.$$

If you do not know what $\binom{n}{k}$ means, that is fine too. You can prove the same result using recursion. For $n = 1$, we know that $(1+x)^1 = 1 + x$ (obviously). Assume that the approximation is true for n , or that $(1+x)^n \approx 1 + nx$, let's prove that it is true for $n+1$:

$$\begin{aligned}(1+x)^{n+1} &= (1+x)^n (1+x) \\&\approx (1+nx)(1+x) \\&\approx 1 + (n+1)x + nx^2 \\(1+x)^{n+1} &\approx 1 + (n+1)x\end{aligned}$$

which proves the proposition for $n+1$. Thus, the Taylor approximation is true for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

2. We have:

$$(1+x)(1+y) = 1 + x + y + xy.$$

When x and y are both small, then xy is negligible, which gives the result:

$$(1+x)(1+y) \approx 1 + x + y.$$

3. Using the formula proven in Problem 1, we get that:

$$\frac{1}{1+y} = 1 - y + y^2 - y^3 + \dots$$

When x and y are both small, all terms of the product are negligible except for first-order terms:

$$\frac{1+x}{1+y} \approx 1 + x - y.$$

4. Denote the price level by p_t (that is, in dollars, the price of a representative basket of goods). Inflation π_t at time t is defined as the rate of growth of this price level between t and $t+1$:

$$\frac{p_{t+1}}{p_t} = 1 + \pi_t.$$

If you leave one dollar at the bank, and if the nominal interest rate is given by i_t , then you end up at the end of the period with $1 + i_t$ dollars at the bank. With this, you can buy a quantity of goods given by $(1 + i_t)/p_{t+1}$. If you buy a quantity of goods at time t , then you get a number of goods equal to $1/p_t$. Thus, the rate of increase in your purchasing power if you leave your money in the bank is given by:

$$\frac{(1 + i_t)/p_{t+1}}{1/p_t} = \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + \pi_t}.$$

An exact value for the real interest rate is thus:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + \pi_t} - 1 &= \frac{1 + 0.01}{1 + 0.015} - 1 \\ &= -0.00492610837 \\ \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + \pi_t} - 1 &= -0.492610837\%. \end{aligned}$$

An approximate value from the above formula is:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + \pi_t} - 1 &\approx 1 + i_t - \pi_t - 1 \\ &\approx 0.01 - 0.015 \\ \frac{1 + i_t}{1 + \pi_t} - 1 &\approx -0.5\%. \end{aligned}$$

This is not such a bad approximation.

J.3 Growth Rates

1. Iterating on the formula:

$$y_{t+1} = (1 + g)y_t \Rightarrow y_T = (1 + g)^T y_0,$$

allows to find the result:

$$G = \frac{y_T}{y_0} - 1 = (1 + g)^T - 1.$$

2. Again, inverting the previous relation:

$$G = (1 + g)^T - 1,$$

allows to find:

$$g = \frac{y_{t+1}}{y_t} - 1 = (1 + G)^{1/T} - 1.$$

3. Applying the previous formula allows to get (see Google Sheet):

$$\begin{aligned}g &= (1 + 0.01)^{1/365} - 1 \\&= 0.00002726155 \\g &= 0.0027\%\end{aligned}$$

You give up approximately \$2.7 every day (your bank most likely is investing this money on your behalf, so you are rather giving this money to your bank):

$$0.00002726155 * 100000 = 2.7.$$

Appendix K

Problem Set 2 - Solution

K.1 Solow Growth Model if $\alpha = 1/2$ and $A = 1/2$

1. We write the law of motion for capital:

$$\begin{aligned} K_{t+1} &= (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t \\ &= (1 - \delta)K_t + sY_t \\ K_{t+1} &= (1 - \delta)K_t + \frac{s}{2}\sqrt{K_t}\sqrt{L} \\ \frac{K_{t+1}}{L} &= (1 - \delta)\frac{K_t}{L} + \frac{s}{2}\sqrt{\frac{K_t}{L}} \end{aligned}$$

In steady state, we can then get steady-state capital per worker:

$$\delta\frac{K^*}{L} = \frac{s}{2}\sqrt{\frac{K^*}{L}} \Rightarrow \boxed{\frac{K^*}{L} = \left(\frac{s}{2\delta}\right)^2}.$$

This implies an expression for steady-state output per worker:

$$\frac{Y^*}{L} = \frac{1}{2}\sqrt{\frac{K^*}{L}} \Rightarrow \boxed{\frac{Y^*}{L} = \frac{s}{4\delta}}.$$

2. From the previous expression for steady-state output per worker, we can get steady-state consumption per worker:

$$\frac{C^*}{L} = (1 - s)\frac{Y^*}{L} \Rightarrow \boxed{\frac{C^*}{L} = \frac{s(1 - s)}{4\delta}}.$$

3. I used Google Sheets, and the result is available here. The intuition for why steady-state output per worker is a monotone function of the saving rate is that more investment always leads to a higher capital stock, which leads to higher output per worker. However, the effect of saving on steady-state consumption is ambiguous. It should be intuitive that if saving is equal to 0%, or 100%, consumption per worker is zero: in the first case, because there is no capital and therefore no production; in the second case, because everything is saved and there is nothing left to consumption. Thus, there is a limit to how much capital should be accumulated, at least for consumption purposes.

s	Y/L	C/L
0	0	0

s	Y/L	C/L
0.1	0.5	0.45
0.2	1	0.8
1	5	0

4. Again, I used Google Sheets, and the result is available [here](#).
5. It should be clear from the Google Sheet that $s = 1$ maximizes output per worker, and that $s = 0.5$ maximizes consumption per worker.

K.2 Solow Growth Model if $\alpha = 1/3$

1. Yes, there are constant returns to scale. When one doubles all inputs, one gets double the output. This is true more generally for any x :

$$F(xK, xL) = (xK)^{\alpha} (xL)^{1-\alpha} = xK^{\alpha} L^{1-\alpha} = xF(K, L).$$

2. Yes, returns are decreasing with respect to capital. The reason is that the derivative of the production function with respect to the capital stock, which is:

$$\frac{\partial F}{\partial K} = \alpha K^{\alpha-1} L^{1-\alpha},$$

is decreasing in the amount of capital (indeed, since $\alpha = 1/3$ we have that the exponent on K is $-2/3$, so that this is a decreasing function). This implies that the “gross returns to capital”, defined as the additional production allowed by one additional unit of capital, given by the derivative $\partial F/\partial K$, are decreasing in K . Another way to see this is to note that the production function is concave in the capital stock, as the second derivative is negative:

$$\frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial K^2} = \alpha(\alpha - 1)K^{\alpha-2} L^{1-\alpha} < 0$$

which is just another characterization of decreasing returns. This is because $\alpha - 1 = -2/3$ which is negative. See lecture 2 for more detail.

3. Yes, returns are decreasing with respect to labor, for the same reason as returns are decreasing with respect to capital. The reason is that the derivative of the production function with respect to the amount of labor (number of employees, or number of hours), which is:

$$\frac{\partial F}{\partial L} = (1 - \alpha)K^{\alpha} L^{-\alpha},$$

is decreasing in the amount of labor (indeed, since $\alpha = 1/3$ we have that the exponent on L is $-1/3$, so that this is a decreasing function). This implies that the “returns to labor”, defined as the additional production allowed by one additional unit of labor, given by the derivative $\partial F/\partial L$, are decreasing in L . Another way to see this is to note that the production function is concave in the stock of labor, as the second derivative is negative:

$$\frac{\partial^2 F}{\partial L^2} = -(1 - \alpha)\alpha K^{\alpha} L^{-\alpha-1} < 0$$

which is just another characterization of decreasing returns. See Lecture 2 for more detail.

4. Dividing the LHS and the RHS by L :

$$\frac{Y}{L} = \frac{K^{\alpha} L^{1-\alpha}}{L} = \left(\frac{K}{L}\right)^{\alpha} = F\left(\frac{K}{L}, 1\right).$$

Defining the intensive form of the production function by $f(\cdot)$:

$$f(k) \equiv F(k, 1),$$

we can then write:

$$\frac{Y}{L} = f\left(\frac{K}{L}\right).$$

5. Again, we write the law of motion of the capital stock as:

$$\begin{aligned} K_{t+1} &= (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t \\ K_{t+1} &= (1 - \delta)K_t + sK_t^{1/3}L^{2/3} \end{aligned}$$

Dividing both sides by L :

$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{L} = (1 - \delta)\frac{K_t}{L} + s\left(\frac{K_t}{L}\right)^{1/3}.$$

In steady state,

$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{L} = \frac{K_t}{L} = \frac{K^*}{L},$$

This implies:

$$\delta \frac{K^*}{L} = s\left(\frac{K^*}{L}\right)^{1/3} \Rightarrow \boxed{\frac{K^*}{L} = \left(\frac{s}{\delta}\right)^{3/2}}$$

6. Using that: $Y^* = K^{*1/3}L^{2/3}$, we have:

$$\frac{Y^*}{L} = \left(\frac{K^*}{L}\right)^{1/3} \Rightarrow \boxed{\frac{Y^*}{L} = \sqrt[3]{\frac{s}{\delta}}}.$$

7. A straightforward numerical application gives:

$$\frac{Y^*}{L} = \sqrt[3]{\frac{0.32}{0.08}} = \sqrt[3]{4} = 2$$

8. If the saving rate declines to 16, then:

$$\frac{Y^*}{L} = \sqrt[3]{\frac{s}{\delta}} = \sqrt[3]{\frac{0.16}{0.08}} = \sqrt[3]{2}$$

K.3 An increase in the depreciation rate in the Solow growth model

1. The steady-state level of capital per worker is:

$$\frac{K^*}{L} = \left(\frac{s}{\delta}\right)^{3/2} = \left(\frac{0.10}{0.10}\right)^{3/2} = 1.$$

2. The steady-state level of output per worker is:

$$\frac{Y^*}{L} = \sqrt[3]{\frac{s}{\delta}} = \sqrt[3]{\frac{0.10}{0.10}} = 1.$$

3. The new steady-state levels of capital per worker and output per worker will be:

$$\frac{K^*}{L} = \left(\frac{s}{\delta}\right)^{3/2} = \left(\frac{0.10}{0.20}\right)^{3/2} \approx 0.35,$$

$$\frac{Y^*}{L} = \sqrt{\frac{s}{\delta}} = \sqrt{\frac{0.10}{0.20}} \approx 0.71.$$

4. We know the evolution of capital per worker is:

$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{L} = (1 - \delta) \frac{K_t}{L} + s \left(\frac{K_t}{L}\right)^{1/3}.$$

Starting from $\frac{K_0}{L} = 1$, with $s = 0.10$, $\delta = 0.20$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{K_1}{L} &= (1 - \delta) \frac{K_0}{L} + s \left(\frac{K_0}{L}\right)^{1/3} = 0.9 \\ \frac{K_2}{L} &= (1 - \delta) \frac{K_1}{L} + s \left(\frac{K_1}{L}\right)^{1/3} \approx 0.82 \\ \frac{K_3}{L} &= (1 - \delta) \frac{K_2}{L} + s \left(\frac{K_2}{L}\right)^{1/3} \approx 0.75 \end{aligned}$$

For more iterations, you may use Google Sheets: the result is available here. You should see that it indeed converges to the above values. From there, we may calculate the path of output per worker:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{Y_1}{L} &= \left(\frac{K_1}{L}\right)^{1/3} \approx 0.97 \\ \frac{Y_2}{L} &= \left(\frac{K_2}{L}\right)^{1/3} \approx 0.93 \\ \frac{Y_3}{L} &= \left(\frac{K_3}{L}\right)^{1/3} \approx 0.91. \end{aligned}$$

For more iterations, you may use Google Sheets: the result is available here.

K.4 Deficits and the capital stock

1. Using the law of motion for the capital stock:

$$\begin{aligned} K_{t+1} &= (1 - \delta)K_t + I_t \\ &= (1 - \delta)K_t + sY_t \\ K_{t+1} &= (1 - \delta)K_t + s\sqrt{K_t}\sqrt{L}, \end{aligned}$$

Dividing both sides by L :

$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{L} = (1 - \delta) \frac{K_t}{L} + s \sqrt{\frac{K_t}{L}}$$

In the steady state:

$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{L} = \frac{K_t}{L} = \frac{K^*}{L},$$

so we have:

$$\delta \frac{K^*}{L} = s \sqrt{\frac{K^*}{L}}$$

Therefore:

$$\frac{K^*}{L} = \left(\frac{s}{\delta}\right)^2$$

Using the production function:

$$\frac{Y^*}{L} = \sqrt{\frac{K^*}{L}} = \frac{s}{\delta}.$$

2. The steady-state capital stock per worker is given by:

$$\frac{K^*}{L} = \left(\frac{s}{\delta}\right)^2 = \left(\frac{15\%}{7.5\%}\right)^2 = 4$$

The steady-state output per worker is given by:

$$\frac{Y^*}{L} = \frac{s}{\delta} = \frac{15\%}{7.5\%} = 2.$$

3. The new steady-state capital stock per worker is:

$$\frac{K^*}{L} = \left(\frac{s}{\delta}\right)^2 = \left(\frac{20\%}{7.5\%}\right)^2 \approx 7.11$$

The new steady-state output per worker is:

$$\frac{Y^*}{L} = \frac{s}{\delta} = \frac{20\%}{7.5\%} \approx 2.67.$$

Therefore, both the capital per worker and the output per worker increase.

K.5 U.S. saving and government deficits

1. According to <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDS.TOTL.ZS>, the national saving rate was approximately 16.9% in 2016. The steady-state capital stock per worker is given by:

$$\frac{K^*}{L} = \left(\frac{s}{\delta}\right)^2 = \left(\frac{16.9\%}{7.5\%}\right)^2 \approx 5.08.$$

The steady-state output per worker is:

$$\frac{Y^*}{L} = \frac{s}{\delta} = \frac{16.9\%}{7.5\%} \approx 2.25.$$

2. For fiscal year 2017, the federal fiscal deficit was 3.5% percent of GDP. Assuming that the federal budget deficit was eliminated and there was no change in private saving, the saving rate would change from 16.9% to $16.9\% + 3.5\% = 20.4\%$. The new steady-state capital stock per worker would be:

$$\frac{K^*}{L} = \left(\frac{s}{\delta}\right)^2 = \left(\frac{20.4\%}{7.5\%}\right)^2 \approx 7.40$$

which increases by 45.67%. The new steady-state output per worker would be:

$$\frac{Y}{L} = \frac{s}{\delta} = \frac{20.4\%}{7.5\%} = 2.72,$$

which increases by 20.89%.

3. The saving rate in China was 46.54% in year 2016, which is much higher than the saving rate in the United States. This is perhaps not that surprising according to the Solow model, as China is still in the process of catching up. At the same time, it is not clear that what China was lacking before was capital, rather than market-oriented economic reforms.

Appendix L

Problem Set 3 - Solution

L.1 Two-period Intertemporal Optimization

- Given the expression for the utility function:

$$u(c) = \frac{c^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma},$$

we know that marginal utility is:

$$u'(c) = c^{-\sigma},$$

while the derivative of marginal utility is:

$$u''(c) = -\sigma c^{-\sigma-1}.$$

Thus, because $u''(.)$ must be negative for the function to be concave, we have $\sigma > 0$.

- This is straight from lecture 3.
- Using the equation from question 2, we can write:

$$\frac{\beta c_1^{-\sigma}}{c_0^{-\sigma}} = \frac{1}{1+r} \quad \Rightarrow \quad \frac{c_1}{c_0} = \beta^{1/\sigma} (1+r)^{1/\sigma}$$

- The intertemporal budget constraint is:

$$c_0 + \frac{c_1}{1+r} = f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r},$$

and therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} \left(1 + \beta^{1/\sigma} (1+r)^{1/\sigma-1}\right) c_0 &= f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r} \\ \Rightarrow c_0 &= \frac{1}{1 + \beta^{1/\sigma} (1+r)^{1/\sigma-1}} \left(f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r}\right). \end{aligned}$$

which implies:

$$c_1 = \frac{\beta^{1/\sigma} (1+r)^{1/\sigma}}{1 + \beta^{1/\sigma} (1+r)^{1/\sigma-1}} \left(f_0 + y_0 + \frac{y_1}{1+r}\right)$$

- Assume $\sigma = 1/2$. If $r = 1\%$, then according to this Google Spreadsheet, c_0 is equal to \$44,776, and c_1 is equal to \$45,676. If $r = 2\%$, then c_0 is equal to \$44,554 and c_1 is equal to \$46,354. Consumption c_0 thus falls by \$222, approximately -0.5% in percentage terms.

6. Assume $\sigma = 1$. If $r = 1\%$, then according to this Google Spreadsheet, c_0 is equal to \$45,000 and c_1 is \$45,450. If $r = 2\%$, then c_0 is equal to \$45,000 and c_1 is equal to \$45,900. Consumption c_0 does not change, this is the case we have seen in class. **Remark.** Note that this case is the one we saw in the class, because when σ approaches 1, we have:

$$\lim_{\sigma \rightarrow 1} \frac{c^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma} = \log(c).$$

You can see this in many different ways. The simplest way is to write that:

$$c^{1-\sigma} = e^{(1-\sigma)\log(c)} = \exp((1-\sigma)\log(c)).$$

Then, we use that:

$$\lim_{x \rightarrow 0} \frac{e^{ax} - 1}{x} = a$$

Indeed, the limit of $(e^{ax} - 1)/x$ when x goes to 0 is by definition the derivative of e^{ax} at $x = 0$. Thus, since the derivative of e^{ax} is ae^{ax} , we get that the derivative at $x = 0$ of e^{ax} is a . Using that formula for $x = 1 - \sigma$ and $a = \log(c)$ allows to show:

$$\lim_{(1-\sigma) \rightarrow 0} \frac{e^{\log(c)(1-\sigma)} - 1}{1 - \sigma} = \log(c)$$

Therefore, we get:

$$\lim_{\sigma \rightarrow 1} \frac{c^{1-\sigma} - 1}{1 - \sigma} = \log(c).$$

7. Assume $\sigma = 2$. If $r = 1\%$, then according to this Google Spreadsheet, c_0 is equal to \$45,112 and c_1 is equal to \$45,337. If $r = 2\%$, then c_0 is equal to \$45,223 and c_1 is equal to \$45,673. Consumption c_0 increases by \$111, or approximately 0.25%.
8. Whether an increase in real interest rates leads to a fall or an increase in consumption depends on σ , which can be seen on this formula (it is crucial for this that $y_1 = 0$, or that second-period income is zero):

$$c_0 = \frac{1}{1 + \beta^{1/\sigma}(1+r)^{1/\sigma-1}} (f_0 + y_0).$$

When $1/\sigma - 1 > 0$, or $\sigma < 1$, an increase in the real interest rate leads to lower consumption today, and more saving. Conversely, when $1/\sigma - 1 < 0$, or $\sigma > 1$, an increase in the real interest rate leads to higher consumption today, and less saving. Finally, when $\sigma = 1$, the interest rate has no effect on current consumption c_0 or saving.

L.2 Another Overlapping Generations model

1. Agents care only about old age consumption, so they save everything, regardless of what the utility function is.
2. Since they save everything, saving is equal to the wage, and thus:

$$S_t = w_t.$$

The wage paid by employers, given that $L = 1$, is:

$$w_t = (1 - \alpha)K_t^\alpha L^{-\alpha} = (1 - \alpha)K_t^\alpha = (1 - \alpha)Y_t.$$

This implies, in turn, the following law of motion for the capital stock:

$$\Delta K_{t+1} = S_t - \delta K_t = (1 - \alpha)Y_t - \delta K_t.$$

3. The corresponding value of the saving rate in the Solow model is:

$$s = 1 - \alpha.$$

4. The Golden rule level of capital accumulation is characterized by a level of the saving rate equal to α . Thus, to be below the Golden Rule level of capital accumulation, the saving rate must be lower than that:

$$1 - \alpha < \alpha.$$

This, in turn, implies:

$$\alpha > \frac{1}{2}.$$

5. This condition is likely not satisfied, as we saw in lecture 1. Thus, there is too much saving in this situation.

Appendix M

Problem Set 4 - Solution

M.1 The Solow Model with Exogenous Growth

- The saving rate is exogenous and equal to s in the Solow growth model, and the depreciation rate is δ . Therefore, the law of motion for capital is:

$$\Delta K_{t+1} = K_{t+1} - K_t = sY_t - \delta K_t.$$

Using the value for Y_t , we get:

$$K_{t+1} = sA_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha} + (1 - \delta)K_t.$$

which is a law of motion for K_t : a value for K_{t+1} as a function of K_t and the exogenous parameters in the model.

- Defining k_t as:

$$k_t \equiv \frac{K_t}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t},$$

as is suggested, we divide both the left-hand side and the right-hand side of the equation by $A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t$. This gives:

$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} = s \frac{A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} + (1 - \delta) \frac{K_t}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t}$$

We may proceed to a simplification of the first term on the right-hand side by putting the A_t and the $L_t^{1-\alpha}$ from the numerator to the denominator (using that $f/g = 1/(g/f)$):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} &= \frac{K_t^\alpha}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)-1} L_t^{1-(1-\alpha)}} \\ &= \frac{K_t^\alpha}{A_t^{\alpha/(1-\alpha)} L_t^\alpha} \\ \frac{A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} &= \left(\frac{K_t}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} \right)^\alpha. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, replacing out the expression for the first term on the right-hand side allows to write:

$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} = s \left(\frac{K_t}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} \right)^\alpha + (1 - \delta) \frac{K_t}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t}.$$

And therefore, the right-hand side is now expressed only a function of k_t :

$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} = sk_t^\alpha + (1 - \delta)k_t.$$

The left-hand side of the equation can also be simplified (we want to express it also only as a function of k_t (or rather, k_{t+1}):

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{K_{t+1}}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} &= \frac{A_{t+1}^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_{t+1}}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} \cdot \frac{K_{t+1}}{A_{t+1}^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_{t+1}} \\ \frac{K_{t+1}}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} &= (1 + g)^{1/(1-\alpha)}(1 + n)k_{t+1}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore:

$$(1 + g)^{1/(1-\alpha)}(1 + n)k_{t+1} = sk_t^\alpha + (1 - \delta)k_t.$$

If g and n are small then:

$$(1 + g)^{1/(1-\alpha)}(1 + n) \approx 1 + \frac{1}{1 - \alpha}g + n.$$

Thus:

$$\left(1 + \frac{1}{1 - \alpha}g + n\right) k_{t+1} \approx sk_t^\alpha + (1 - \delta)k_t.$$

A law of motion for k_{t+1} is thus (we use equal signs now, even though it is really an approximation):

$$k_{t+1} = \frac{s}{1 + g/(1 - \alpha) + n} k_t^\alpha + \frac{1 - \delta}{1 + g/(1 - \alpha) + n} k_t.$$

3. The steady-state is such that:

$$\left(1 + \frac{1}{1 - \alpha}g + n\right) k^* = s(k^*)^\alpha + (1 - \delta)k^*.$$

Therefore:

$$\left(\delta + \frac{1}{1 - \alpha}g + n\right) k^* = s(k^*)^\alpha.$$

Finally, this gives k^* :

$$k^* = \left(\frac{s}{\delta + g/(1 - \alpha) + n}\right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}.$$

4. In this exercise, we make intensive use of the following rules on growth rates:

$$g_{XY} = g_X + g_Y$$

$$g_{X/Y} = g_X - g_Y$$

$$g_{X^a} = ag_X.$$

On the balanced growth path:

$$\frac{K_t}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} = k^* \Rightarrow K_t = k^* A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t.$$

We may apply the rule above on products ($g_{XY} = g_X + g_Y$) to see that the growth rate of K_t is the growth rate of $A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)}$ plus the growth rate of L_t , since k^* is simply a constant which does not grow. In turn, using the rule on “powers” (that is $g_{X^a} = ag_X$, with $a = 1/(1 - \alpha)$) we get that the growth

rate of $A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)}$ is the growth rate of A_t times $1/(1-\alpha)$. Finally, the growth rate of A_t is g and the growth rate of L_t is n by assumption. Thus, finally:

$$\begin{aligned} g_K &= g_{A^{1/(1-\alpha)}L} \\ &= g_{A^{1/(1-\alpha)}} + g_L \\ &= \frac{1}{1-\alpha}g_A + g_L \\ g_K &= \frac{1}{1-\alpha}g + n \end{aligned}$$

Output is given by:

$$Y_t = A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{1-\alpha}$$

Therefore, the rate of growth of output is:

$$\begin{aligned} g_Y &= g + \alpha g_K + (1-\alpha)g_L \\ &= g + \alpha \left(n + \frac{1}{1-\alpha}g \right) + (1-\alpha)n \\ &= g + \alpha n + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}g + (1-\alpha)n \\ &= [\alpha n + (1-\alpha)n] + \left[g + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}g \right] \\ g_Y &= n + \frac{1}{1-\alpha}g. \end{aligned}$$

C_t grows at the same rate as Y_t since $C_t = (1-s)Y_t$, thus:

$$\begin{aligned} g_C &= g_Y \\ g_C &= n + \frac{1}{1-\alpha}g. \end{aligned}$$

The rate of growth of K_t/Y_t is zero since Y_t and k_t grow at the same rate:

$$\begin{aligned} g_{K/Y} &= g_K - g_Y \\ &= \left(\frac{1}{1-\alpha}g + n \right) - \left(n + \frac{1}{1-\alpha}g \right) \\ g_{K/Y} &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

The rate of growth of K_t/L_t is:

$$\begin{aligned} g_{K/L} &= g_K - g_L \\ &= \left(\frac{1}{1-\alpha}g + n \right) - n \\ g_{K/L} &= \frac{1}{1-\alpha}g. \end{aligned}$$

The wage is equal to the marginal product of labor from firms' optimality condition, as in lecture 1:

$$\begin{aligned} w_t &= \frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial L_t} \\ &= (1-\alpha)A_t K_t^\alpha L_t^{-\alpha} \\ w_t &= (1-\alpha)A_t \left(\frac{K_t}{L_t} \right)^\alpha. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the rate of growth of w_t is:

$$\begin{aligned} g_w &= g_A + \alpha g_{K/L} \\ &= g + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}g \\ g_w &= \frac{1}{1-\alpha}g. \end{aligned}$$

The rate of growth of $w_t L_t$ is the sum of that of w and that of L_t thus:

$$\begin{aligned} g_{wL} &= g_w + g_L \\ g_{wL} &= \frac{1}{1-\alpha}g + n. \end{aligned}$$

The marginal product of capital R_t is:

$$\begin{aligned} R_t &= \frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial K_t} \\ &= \alpha A_t K_t^{\alpha-1} L_t^{1-\alpha} \\ R_t &= \alpha A_t \left(\frac{K_t}{L_t} \right)^{\alpha-1}. \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the rate of growth of the marginal product of capital R_t is:

$$\begin{aligned} g_R &= g_A + (\alpha - 1)g_{K/L} \\ &= g + \frac{\alpha - 1}{1 - \alpha}g \\ &= g - g \\ g_R &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

The rate of growth of capital income $R_t K_t$ is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} g_{RK} &= g_R + g_K \\ g_{RK} &= n + \frac{g}{1 - \alpha}. \end{aligned}$$

Finally, the growth in the labor share $w_t L_t$ and that in the capital share $R_t K_t$ are equal to zero which can be inferred from the fact that they are constant with a Cobb-Douglas production function, or that the growth of $w_t L_t$ and $r_t K_t$ are equal to that of output.

5. Using the expression for y_t allows to write what is called the *intensive form* of the production function:

$$\begin{aligned} y_t &= \frac{Y_t}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} \\ &= \left(\frac{K_t}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} \right)^\alpha \\ y_t &= k_t^\alpha. \end{aligned}$$

This implies that the relationship applies also to the steady state, and allows us to calculate steady-state y^* corresponding to steady-state k^* :

$$y^* = (k^*)^\alpha$$

From question 3, we replace out k^* in the equation above which gives directly:

$$y^* = \left(\frac{s}{\delta + g/(1 - \alpha) + n} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}.$$

Finally, using that $C_t = (1 - s)Y_t$ and dividing on both sides by $A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t$ gives:

$$\frac{C_t}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} = (1 - s) \frac{Y_t}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t}.$$

Using the given definitions for c_t and y_t , this implies that:

$$c_t = (1 - s)y_t.$$

From this we can see that this relationship applies also to steady states so that:

$$c^* = (1 - s)y^*.$$

Thus, replacing y^* by its expression from previously:

$$c^* = (1 - s) \left(\frac{s}{\delta + g/(1 - \alpha) + n} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}.$$

6. Just as in the Solow growth model of lecture 2, we see that we have a constant times a function of s , which simplifies the maximization problem a lot:

$$c^* = \frac{1}{(\delta + g/(1 - \alpha) + n)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}} (1 - s)s^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}$$

We are thus led to maximize only the part which depends on s (if you are not convinced, you can leave the constant there, your calculations will just be more complicated!):

$$\max_s \quad (1 - s)s^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}}.$$

Taking the first-order condition as in lecture 2:

$$\begin{aligned} -s^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}(1-s)s^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}-1} &= 0 \quad \Rightarrow \quad \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \frac{1-s}{s} = 1 \\ \Rightarrow \quad \alpha - \alpha s &= s - \alpha s \quad \Rightarrow \quad \boxed{s = \alpha}. \end{aligned}$$

7. The marginal product of capital R_t is then equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} R_t &= \alpha A_t \left(\frac{K_t}{L_t} \right)^{\alpha-1} \\ &= \alpha \left(\frac{K_t}{A_t^{1/(1-\alpha)} L_t} \right)^{\alpha-1} \\ R_t &= \alpha k_t^{\alpha-1}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, in the steady state, using the above expression for k^* (question 3) we get:

$$\begin{aligned} R^* &= \alpha \left[\left(\frac{s}{\delta + g/(1 - \alpha) + n} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \right]^{\alpha-1} \\ &= \alpha \frac{\delta + g/(1 - \alpha) + n}{s} \\ &= \delta + g/(1 - \alpha) + n \\ R^* &= \frac{\alpha}{s} (\delta + g_Y). \end{aligned}$$

where we have used that the rate of growth of output g_Y is given by $g_Y = g/(1 - \alpha) + n$ which was proved in an earlier question. Using that $s = \alpha$ at the Golden Rule, we get an expression for the steady-state marginal product of capital:

$$s = \alpha \quad \Rightarrow \quad \boxed{R^* = \delta + g_Y}.$$

Finally, note that the net interest rate at the Golden Rule $R^* - \delta$, which is often denoted by r^* needs to be equal to the rate of growth of output g_Y , to be at the Golden Rule level of capital accumulation:

$$\boxed{r^* = R^* - \delta = g_Y}.$$

We shall encounter this condition again in lecture 10 when we study the sustainability of public debt.

M.2 The Neoclassical Labor Market Model

1. This is straight from lecture 6. Labor demand is:

$$l = A^{1/\alpha} (1 - \alpha)^{1/\alpha} \left(\frac{w}{p} \right)^{-1/\alpha}.$$

Note: If asked about this during an exam, you are required to provide the different steps. And you are not supposed to memorize this formula.

2. See the spreadsheet.

3. Taking logs on both sides leads to:

$$\log(l) = \frac{1}{\alpha} \log A + \frac{1}{\alpha} \log(1 - \alpha) - \frac{1}{\alpha} \log \left(\frac{w}{p} \right).$$

Expressing the log of the real wage as a function of the log of labor demand, since the real wage is on the *y*-axis:

$$\boxed{\log \left(\frac{w}{p} \right) = [\log A + \log(1 - \alpha)] - \alpha \log(l)}.$$

Therefore, it is clear that the slope of the labor demand curve is given by α . If α is higher, then the labor demand curve is steeper. This result is intuitive: as α is higher, returns to scale become more and more decreasing with respect to labor (if $\alpha = 0$, technology is constant returns in labor in contrast). Therefore, a higher quantity of labor is hired by the firm only if the real wage becomes substantially lower. (in order to “make up for” the decreasing returns) An increase in A clearly shifts the labor demand curve to the **right**: for a given amount of labor hired, a higher productivity implies a higher real wage, both intuitively as well as in the algebra. When the labor demand curve moves to the right, then we move *along the labor supply curve*, towards higher values of employment and higher real wages. A decrease in A , in contrast, shifts the labor demand curve to the **left**, then we move down lower values of employment and lower real wages, along the labor supply curve.

4. Again, this is straight from lecture 6. Labor supply is:

$$l = \frac{1}{B^{1/\epsilon}} \left(\frac{w}{p} \right)^{1/\epsilon}.$$

Note: If asked about this during an exam, you are required to provide the different steps. And you are not supposed to memorize this formula.

5. See the spreadsheet. However, in order to plot the two curves on the same graphs, it is best to invert these relationship and to express the real wage as a function of labor demand

$$\frac{w}{p} = A(1 - \alpha)l^{-\alpha},$$

and the real wage as a function of labor supply:

$$\frac{w}{p} = Bl^\epsilon.$$

Again, see the second sheet of the spreadsheet for a plot where both labor supply and labor demand appear.

6. The labor supply curve is also a line in a $(\log(l), \log(w/p))$ plane, because we have a linear relationship between the log labor supply and the log real wage:

$$\boxed{\log \left(\frac{w}{p} \right) = \log B + \epsilon \log(l)}.$$

The slope of this supply curve on a log-log graph is given by ϵ . If ϵ is larger, the slope is larger. This is intuitive: if the disutility of labor is more convex, then people dislike more working extra hours, and need to be compensated by a much higher real wage to do it. Clearly, if B increases, the labor supply curve moves to the left: people get more disutility from working, and they need to be compensated by a higher real wage to work the same number of hours. On the contrary, when B decreases, people enjoy working much more, and so employers may pay them a low wage to do so.

7. There are many ways to answer this question. I will provide just two. One is to derive the expressions in lecture 6, using the original versions of labor supply and demand (without logs). The real wage is:

$$\frac{w}{p} = (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\alpha+\epsilon}} A^{\frac{\epsilon}{\alpha+\epsilon}} B^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha+\epsilon}}.$$

The level of employment:

$$l = (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{\alpha+\epsilon}} A^{\frac{1}{\alpha+\epsilon}} B^{-\frac{1}{\alpha+\epsilon}}$$

Using the spreadsheet, and plugging in the values for $A_1 = 2$, $A_2 = 1.9$, we get:

$$\begin{aligned} l_1 &= 0.9267933073, & \left(\frac{w}{p}\right)_1 &= 1.367553862 \\ l_2 &= 0.9179226047, & \left(\frac{w}{p}\right)_2 &= 1.303347791 \end{aligned}$$

The effects of employment of a change in A given by $(A_2 - A_1)/A_1 = -5\%$, are thus a fall in employment and in real wages given by:

$$\frac{l_2 - l_1}{l_1} = -0.96\%, \quad \frac{\left(\frac{w}{p}\right)_2 - \left(\frac{w}{p}\right)_1}{\left(\frac{w}{p}\right)_1} = -4.69\%.$$

In log changes:

$$\log(l_2) - \log(l_1) = -0.96\%, \quad \log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right)_2 - \log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right)_1 = -4.81\%.$$

Or we combine the logged versions of these same equations:

$$\log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right) = [\log A + \log(1 - \alpha)] - \alpha \log(l).$$

and labor supply:

$$\log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right) = \log B + \epsilon \log(l)$$

we get that:

$$\begin{aligned} \log B + \epsilon \log(l) &= [\log A + \log(1 - \alpha)] - \alpha \log(l) \\ \Rightarrow \log(l) &= \frac{1}{\epsilon + \alpha} [\log A + \log(1 - \alpha) - \log B] \end{aligned}$$

We may use either the labor demand curve or the labor supply curve to compute the real wage (if everything goes well, they should both give the same answer). We can plug it back in the supply curve:

$$\begin{aligned} \log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right) &= \log B + \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon + \alpha} [\log A + \log(1 - \alpha) - \log B] \\ \log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right) &= \frac{\alpha}{\epsilon + \alpha} \log B + \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon + \alpha} \log A + \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon + \alpha} \log(1 - \alpha) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, we get the equilibrium employment:

$$\log(l) = \frac{1}{\epsilon + \alpha} [\log A + \log(1 - \alpha) - \log B],$$

as well as the equilibrium real wage:

$$\log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right) = \frac{\alpha}{\epsilon + \alpha} \log B + \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon + \alpha} \log A + \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon + \alpha} \log(1 - \alpha).$$

This implies that, following a change in productivity A :

$$\Delta \log(l) = \frac{1}{\epsilon + \alpha} \Delta \log A$$

$$\Delta \log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right) = \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon + \alpha} \Delta \log A$$

The change in A in log points is:

$$\Delta \log A = \log(A_2) - \log(A_1) = -5.13\%.$$

Therefore, in log changes:

$$\log(l_2) - \log(l_1) = -0.96\%, \quad \log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right)_2 - \log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right)_1 = -4.81\%.$$

If α is higher, then from the above formula the change in employment and in the real wage is lower:

$$\Delta \log(l) = \frac{1}{\epsilon + \alpha} \Delta \log A$$

$$\Delta \log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right) = \frac{\epsilon}{\epsilon + \alpha} \Delta \log A$$

The economic intuition is that a change in A shifts the labor demand curve, and leads to a movement along the labor supply curve. However, the size of this shock is dampened, the larger the amount of decreasing returns to scale. Graphically, the shift in the labor demand curve from a given change shift along the y-axis is lower when the slope is larger. This is shown on the two figures below, showing the shift in the labor demand curve from a given change in A (along the y-axis), when α is low (low decreasing returns) on the left hand side and when α is high (high decreasing returns) on the right hand side. *Note:* You may play around with the spreadsheet to see what happens when parameters are changed.

8. (Warning! if this idea of an increase in leisure attractiveness seems a bit peculiar to you, it also seems odd to me. But it has been proposed by some economists as an explanation for unemployment, to explain why the real wage did not fall that much during the recession.) Similar calculations on the spreadsheet and using the same formulas:

$$\frac{w}{p} = (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{\epsilon}{\alpha + \epsilon}} A^{\frac{\epsilon}{\alpha + \epsilon}} B^{\frac{\alpha}{\alpha + \epsilon}}.$$

The level of employment is:

$$l = (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{\alpha + \epsilon}} A^{\frac{1}{\alpha + \epsilon}} B^{-\frac{1}{\alpha + \epsilon}}$$

imply that a 10% increase in B leads to a reduction in employment and an increase in real wages given by:

$$\log(l_2) - \log(l_1) = -1.79\%, \quad \log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right)_2 - \log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right)_1 = 0.60\%.$$

If ϵ is higher, then the effect on both employment and real wages is smaller in absolute value. Again, this is intuitive: if labor supply is steeper to begin with, then a given increase in B does not lead to as much of a shift in the labor supply curve. Thus, the move along the labor demand curve towards lower employment and higher wages is not as important then. This is shown on the two figures below, where the increase in leisure attractiveness is the same across the two experiments: on the left-hand side, epsilon is low, while on the right hand side, epsilon is high. *Note:* Again, you may play around with the spreadsheet to see what happens when parameters are changed.




Figure M.1: LABOR MARKET: PRODUCTIVITY SHOCK.




Figure M.2: LABOR MARKET: LAZINESS SHOCK.

M.3 The “Keynesian” Labor Market Model

- One way to answer this question is to note that with a fall in productivity, the labor demand curve will shift to the left (as in lecture 6). If real wages are rigid, then workers are off their labor supply curve (they would like to work more at the current wage) but still on firms' labor demand curve:

$$\log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right) = [\log A + \log(1 - \alpha)] - \alpha \log(l).$$

For a given change in $\Delta \log A$, the change in employment is therefore simply given by the previous expression through:

$$\Delta \log(l) = \frac{\Delta \log A}{\alpha}.$$

In contrast, in the previous case, with flexible wages, the change in employment following a productivity shock was only:

$$\Delta \log(l) = \frac{\Delta \log A}{\epsilon + \alpha}.$$

Given a change in productivity of 5%, which goes from 2 to 1.9, or $\log(1.9) - \log(2) = 5.13\%$ in log points, we get a drop of 15.39% in log points in employment:

$$\log(l_2) - \log(l_1) = -15.39\%.$$

- In question 7 of the previous exercise, we got in contrast a change:

$$\log(l_2) - \log(l_1) = -0.96\%,$$

a much smaller number. The intuition was that the wage falling incentivizes employers to hire more workers. Here, in contrast, because the wage is “too high” and cannot fall by definition, employers do not want to hire them.

- We know from lecture 6 that if leisure becomes more attractive, then employment must fall and the real wage must rise. We imagine here that wages are sticky upwards. Then, people will be off firms' labor demand curves, but on their labor supply curves. Thus, it is still true that:

$$\log\left(\frac{w}{p}\right) = \log B + \epsilon \log(l).$$

For a given change in $\Delta \log B$, given that wages are sticky, the change in employment is therefore simply given by the previous expression through:

$$\Delta \log(l) = -\frac{\Delta \log B}{\epsilon}.$$

In contrast, in the previous case, with flexible wages, the change in employment following a B shock was only:

$$\Delta \log(l) = -\frac{\Delta \log B}{\epsilon + \alpha}.$$

Given an increase in B of 10%, which goes from 2 to 2.2, or $\log(2.2) - \log(2) = 9.53\%$ in log points, we get a drop of 1.91% in log points in employment:

$$\log(l_2) - \log(l_1) = -1.91\%.$$

- In question 8 of the previous exercise, we got in contrast a change:

$$\log(l_2) - \log(l_1) = -1.79\%,$$

a somewhat smaller number. The intuition was that the wage increasing would have incentivized workers to work more. But because wages are sticky, this did not happen.

M.4 The Bathtub model

Assume a monthly job separation rate equal to $s = 1\%$, and a monthly job finding rate equal to $f = 20\%$. Assume that the labor force is given by $L = 159$ million.

1. The steady state unemployment rate is obtained by equating separations and job findings in the steady state, so that:

$$\begin{aligned} sE^* &= fU^* \Rightarrow sL - sU^* = fU^* \\ \Rightarrow U^* &= \frac{s}{s+f}L \Rightarrow u^* = \frac{s}{s+f}. \end{aligned}$$

The steady state unemployment rate u^* , number of people unemployed U^* , and number of people losing or finding a job each month, are given by (see the spreadsheet):

$$u^* = 4.76\%, \quad U^* = 7,571,429, \quad fU^* = 1,514,286.$$

2. Again, there are many ways we can proceed here. One is to use the spreadsheet to iterate on the law of motion, that is calculate u_{t+1} as a function of u_t and then see graphically when the given unemployment rate is reached. The law of motion is:

$$U_{t+1} - U_t = s(L - U_t) - fU_t.$$

Thus (see lecture 6):

$$U_{t+1} = sL + (1 - s - f)U_t.$$

Dividing both sides by L , and denoting by $u_t = U_t/L$ the *rate* of unemployment:

$$u_{t+1} = s + (1 - s - f)u_t.$$

We find that the unemployment rate reaches 5% after approximately **11 months** (the unit of time is one month). A second method is to do a bit of algebra before using the computer. We write the law of motion for unemployment (again, see lecture 6 for details):

$$\begin{aligned} U_{t+1} - U_t &= s(L - U_t) - fU_t \\ \Rightarrow U_t - U^* &= (1 - s - f)^t (U_0 - U^*). \end{aligned}$$

Dividing everything by L gives everything in terms of unemployment *rates*:

$$u_t = (1 - s - f)^t (u_0 - u^*) + u^*.$$

Thus, starting from an unemployment rate u_0 it is possible to get a value for all subsequent u_t , using the above formula. We may then use the spreadsheet to compute this and find that the unemployment rate reaches 5% after approximately. Again find that the unemployment rate reaches 5% after approximately **11 months** (the unit of time is one month). A third method is to in fact do all the algebra and calculate the time T we are looking for explicitly. We are looking for T such that $u_t \leq \bar{u} = 5\%$ for $t \geq T$. This implies:

$$\begin{aligned} (1 - s - f)^t (u_0 - u^*) + u^* &\leq \bar{u} \\ \Rightarrow (1 - s - f)^t &\leq \frac{\bar{u} - u^*}{u_0 - u^*} \\ \Rightarrow t \log(1 - s - f) &\leq \log \frac{\bar{u} - u^*}{u_0 - u^*} \\ \Rightarrow t &\geq \frac{\log \frac{\bar{u} - u^*}{u_0 - u^*}}{\log(1 - s - f)}. \end{aligned}$$

(be careful, $\log(1 - s - f)$ is negative because $1 - s - f$ is lower than 1 so you have to change the inequality from \leq to \geq). A numerical application using the spreadsheet shows that this condition means:

$$t \geq 11.07.$$

The advantage of this method is we know exactly when the unemployment rate reaches 5%. After 11.07 months ! (given the simplicity of the model, displaying the second digit does not make much sense, though)

3. We are looking for f such that:

$$u^* = \frac{s}{s+f} \Rightarrow f = \frac{s}{u^*} - s,$$

which implies using these numbers that:

$$f = 40\%.$$

This is intuitive: you have double the separation rate, you want double the job finding rate for the unemployment rate to be the same in the steady-state. Indeed, in the steady state:

$$sE^* = fU^*.$$

Therefore, if the unemployment rate is the same, then if s doubles f must double as well.

4. See question 2. The spreadsheet should give all the answers. We find:

$$t \geq 4.79.$$

Thus, the unemployment rate reaches 5% after approximately 5 months.

5. The answer is very much contained in questions 2 and 4. If the rates of job separations and job finding are higher like they typically are in America, the unemployment rate reaches its steady-state value faster. This may explain why the United States are able to recover faster from shocks than, say, Spain or Italy (at least in terms of unemployment rates). Here is some supporting evidence that the unemployment rate is more persistent in Europe than in America:

<https://db.nomics.world/OECD/EO/USA.UNR.Q>

<https://db.nomics.world/OECD/EO/ESP.UNR.Q>

<https://db.nomics.world/OECD/EO/ITA.UNR.Q>

Appendix N

Problem Set 5 - Solution

N.1 Gregory N. Mankiw - NYT - Nov 30, 2008

1. According to Gregory N. Mankiw, the factors contributing to hold back consumption are low consumer confidence and “wait and see” behavior caused by falling house price values, shrinking 401(k) balances (due to the fall of the stock market, my addition) and increased unemployment. Yes, these factors can be interpreted in terms of a fall in c_0 , since they reduce consumption for a given level of income Y .
2. Gregory N. Mankiw writes: “Keynesian theory suggests a”paradox of thrift.” If all households try to save more, a short-run result could be lower aggregate demand and thus lower national income. Reduced incomes, in turn, could prevent households from reaching their new saving goals.” This is exactly the type of phenomenon which we explained in lecture 8: if there is a fall in c_0 , then output falls and saving falls as a result. Because investment is fixed and equal to \bar{I} , output decreases until saving equals investment again.
3. The neoclassical comment of the article is: “In normal times, a fall in consumption could be met by an increase in investment, which includes spending by businesses on plant and equipment and by households on new homes.” This is the usual logic of the Solow (1956) model, for instance. What happens in this model is that saving in fact determines investment entirely. The way this happens through market mechanisms is that the interest rate falls to equate demand and supply of capital. The cost of capital falls down to the point where firms and households want to invest enough to make productive use of all this saving. This logic is somewhat contradictory with the “paradox of thrift” logic, according to which investment is fixed or even increasing with demand (and the interest rate does not clear markets).
4. Gregory N. Mankiw is very concerned about “the long-term fiscal picture. Increased government spending may be a good short-run fix, but it would add to the budget deficit. The baby boomers are now starting to retire and claim Social Security and Medicare benefits. Any increase in the national debt will make fulfilling those unfunded promises harder in coming years.” We will talk about this potential issue during lecture 10.

N.2 Procyclical Government Spending

1. We write that Output = Demand:

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= Z = C + \bar{I} + G \\ Y &= c_0 + c_1(Y - T) + \bar{I} + g_0 + g_1 Y \\ Y &= (c_0 - c_1 T + g_0 + \bar{I}) + (c_1 + g_1) Y \\ \Rightarrow Y &= \frac{1}{1 - c_1 - g_1} (c_0 - c_1 T + g_0 + \bar{I}). \end{aligned}$$

2. The tax multiplier is found by computing the change ΔY in output corresponding to a given change ΔT in taxes:

$$\Delta Y = -\frac{c_1}{1 - c_1 - g_1} \Delta T$$

Therefore, if $\Delta T = -\$1$, the change in output is $\frac{c_1}{1 - c_1 - g_1}$. Therefore:

$$\boxed{\text{Tax Multiplier} = \frac{c_1}{1 - c_1 - g_1}}.$$

The multiplier is higher in this economy than when government spending does not depend on GDP since:

$$\frac{c_1}{1 - c_1 - g_1} > \frac{c_1}{1 - c_1}.$$

The intuition is that government spending automatically increases when GDP increases, which increases demand further. Thus, the multiplier is higher.

3. This policy appears to be the opposite of what automatic stabilizers are doing, which is to stabilize the economy. The government is having a very procyclical policy, which means that when things go well, it is spending more and therefore helping things go even better; while when things go wrong, it is making it worse by cutting spending. This is clearly not a good policy ! Note however that this is the policy you end up having if you follow a fixed deficit rule, for instance. With a fixed deficit rule, $T - G$ needs to be constant. If T depend on GDP through automatic stabilizers, through $T = t_0 + t_1 Y$ then by construction G needs to respond as well, and it needs to be that $g_1 = t_1$.
4. The (ZZ) curve in this problem has a slope equal to $c_1 + g_1$. The impulse to autonomous spending is given by $\$c_1$, since one dollar of decreased taxes leads to an increase in consumption equal c_1 . This increase leads to a second round of increased consumption and investment $c_1(c_1 + g_1)$, and so on:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Tax Multiplier} &= c_1 + c_1(c_1 + g_1) + c_1(c_1 + g_1)^2 + \dots + c_1(c_1 + g_1)^n + \dots \\ &= c_1 (1 + (c_1 + g_1) + (c_1 + g_1)^2 + \dots + (c_1 + g_1)^n + \dots) \\ \text{Tax Multiplier} &= c_1 \sum_{i=0}^{+\infty} (c_1 + g_1)^i = \frac{c_1}{1 - c_1 - g_1} \end{aligned}$$

A graphical justification for the multiplier is given below. The initial impulse is given by c_1 . A fraction $c_1 + g_1$ of the additional income injected in the economy is being consumed, so that adds $c_1(c_1 + g_1)$. This repeats itself in a loop, and all of these effects are summed up, so that the total effect is:

$$c_1 + c_1(c_1 + g_1)$$

5. If $g_1 + c_1 > 1$, then each new round of spending leads to an even greater new round of new income and new spending. Therefore, the above infinite sum is then infinite, and the tax multiplier is infinite:

$$\text{Tax Multiplier} = c_1 \sum_{i=0}^{+\infty} (c_1 + g_1)^i = +\infty.$$




Figure N.1: GRAPHICAL INTERPRETATION FOR THE MULTIPLIER.

Of course, this is not possible. Therefore, this just means that output cannot be demand-determined and that it is always constrained by supply (the amount of inputs there is in the economy).

N.3 Accelerator and Automatic Stabilizer

1. We have both an automatic stabilizer as well as an accelerator effect of investment. We write, again, the total demand for goods Z and then equate demand to output so that $Y = Z$:

$$\begin{aligned}
 Y &= Z = C + \bar{I} + G \\
 Y &= c_0 + c_1 Y - c_1 t_0 - c_1 t_1 Y + b_0 + b_1 Y + G \\
 Y &= (c_0 - c_1 t_0 + b_0 + G) + (c_1(1 - t_1) + b_1) Y \\
 \Rightarrow Y &= \frac{1}{1 - b_1 - c_1(1 - t_1)} (c_0 - c_1 t_0 + b_0 + G).
 \end{aligned}$$

2. The condition is now given by:

$$b_1 + c_1(1 - t_1) < 1.$$

3. If this condition isn't satisfied, then the multiplier becomes infinite: one dollar of stimulus leads to more than 1 dollar in additional spending, etc. This leads to an infinite sum. This does not, of course, mean that GDP becomes infinite. It just means that output cannot be constrained by demand, and that the Keynesian model no longer applies. Such an economy should always be neoclassical, in other words GDP should always be limited by available factors of production (capital and labor).

4. The graph is very similar to the usual one, only that the slope is $b_1 + c_1(1 - t_1)$. (if asked for it in an exam, you need to provide it) The geometric sum is:

$$1 + (b_1 + c_1(1 - t_1)) + (b_1 + c_1(1 - t_1))^2 + \dots = \frac{1}{1 - b_1 - c_1(1 - t_1)}.$$

(again, you will need to provide the multiplier intuition when asked for it in an exam)

Appendix O

Problem Set 6 - Solution

Another Numerical Example

- For a household, the threshold to be in the top 1% is around **\$421,926** according to the Economic Policy Institute. Let me Google that for you: <http://bfy.tw/KhF4>.
- Using the given notations (and those of lecture 9), total income is the sum of the top 1% income and that of the bottom 99%:

$$Y = \lambda N\underline{y} + (1 - \lambda)N\bar{y}.$$

Since $\bar{y} = \gamma\underline{y}$ we have:

$$Y = \lambda N\underline{y} + (1 - \lambda)N\gamma\underline{y}.$$

The total income for the bottom 99% \underline{Y} is given by:

$$\underline{Y} = \lambda N\underline{y}.$$

Therefore, the share of total income captured by the bottom 99% is:

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\underline{Y}}{Y} &= \frac{\lambda N\underline{y}}{\lambda N\underline{y} + (1 - \lambda)N\gamma\underline{y}} \\ \frac{\underline{Y}}{Y} &= \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma}\end{aligned}$$

Denoting by ν the share of income going to the low income:

$$\begin{aligned}\nu &\equiv \frac{\underline{Y}}{Y} \\ \nu &= \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma}\end{aligned}$$

Solving for γ :

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\lambda}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} &= \nu \quad \Rightarrow \quad \lambda = \lambda \cdot \nu + (1 - \lambda)\gamma \cdot \nu \\ \Rightarrow \quad \lambda \cdot (1 - \nu) &= \gamma \cdot (1 - \lambda) \cdot \nu \quad \Rightarrow \quad \boxed{\gamma = \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} \frac{1 - \nu}{\nu}}\end{aligned}$$

A numerical application is $\nu = 0.8$ and $\lambda = 0.99$ so that:

$$\begin{aligned}\gamma &= \frac{0.99}{1 - 0.99} \frac{1 - 0.8}{0.8} \\ &= \frac{99}{4} \\ &= 24.75\end{aligned}$$

This implies that on average, high income earners in the top 1% are approximately **25 times richer** (exactly 24.75 times richer) than low income earners in the bottom 99% (note that you can use the above formula to recover the $\gamma = 9$ from the class, using $\lambda = 0.9$ and $\nu = 0.5$ since $\gamma = 0.9/0.1 \cdot 0.5/0.5 = 9$).

3. Total consumption by the low income earners \underline{C} is such that:

$$\begin{aligned}\underline{C} &= \lambda N \underline{c} \\ &= \lambda N (\underline{c}_0 + \underline{c}_1 (\underline{y} - \underline{t})) \\ &= \lambda N \underline{c}_0 + \lambda N (1 - t_1) \underline{c}_1 \underline{y} - \lambda N \underline{c}_1 \underline{t}_0 \\ \underline{C} &= [\lambda N \underline{c}_0 - \lambda N \underline{c}_1 \underline{t}_0] + \frac{\lambda \underline{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} (1 - t_1) Y\end{aligned}$$

Symmetrically, consumption by the high income earners \bar{C} is such that:

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{C} &= (1 - \lambda) N \bar{c} \\ &= (1 - \lambda) N (\bar{c}_0 + \bar{c}_1 (\bar{y} - \bar{t})) \\ &= (1 - \lambda) N \bar{c}_0 + (1 - \lambda) N (1 - t_1) \bar{c}_1 \bar{y} - (1 - \lambda) N \bar{c}_1 \bar{t}_0 \\ \bar{C} &= [(1 - \lambda) N \bar{c}_0 - (1 - \lambda) N \bar{c}_1 \bar{t}_0] + \frac{(1 - \lambda) \gamma \bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} (1 - t_1) Y\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, aggregate consumption $C = \underline{C} + \bar{C}$ is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}C &= \underline{C} + \bar{C} \\ &= [\lambda N \underline{c}_0 - \lambda N \underline{c}_1 \underline{t}_0] + \frac{\lambda \underline{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} (1 - t_1) Y + [(1 - \lambda) N \bar{c}_0 - (1 - \lambda) N \bar{c}_1 \bar{t}_0] + \frac{(1 - \lambda) \gamma \bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} (1 - t_1) Y \\ &= (\lambda N \underline{c}_0 + (1 - \lambda) N \bar{c}_0) - (\lambda N \underline{c}_1 \underline{t}_0 + (1 - \lambda) N \bar{c}_1 \bar{t}_0) + \frac{\lambda \underline{c}_1 + (1 - \lambda) \gamma \bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} (1 - t_1) Y \\ &= [\lambda N \underline{c}_0 + (1 - \lambda) N \bar{c}_0] - [\underline{c}_1 (\lambda N \underline{t}_0 + \bar{c}_1 ((1 - \lambda) N \bar{t}_0))] + \frac{\lambda \underline{c}_1 + (1 - \lambda) \gamma \bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} (1 - t_1) Y \\ C &= C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + c_1 (1 - t_1) Y.\end{aligned}$$

where we have used the suggested notations:

$$\begin{aligned}C_0 &\equiv \lambda N \underline{c}_0 + (1 - \lambda) N \bar{c}_0 \\ \underline{T}_0 &\equiv \lambda N \underline{t}_0 \\ \bar{T}_0 &\equiv (1 - \lambda) N \bar{t}_0 \\ c_1 &\equiv \frac{\lambda \underline{c}_1 + (1 - \lambda) \gamma \bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma}.\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, aggregate consumption is given by:

$$C = C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + c_1 (1 - t_1) Y.$$

4. c_1 is the average marginal propensity to consume, where the marginal propensity to consume of each group \underline{c}_1 and \bar{c}_1 is weighted by their share of income in the population \underline{Y}/Y and \bar{Y}/Y :

$$\begin{aligned}c_1 &= \frac{\lambda \underline{c}_1 + (1 - \lambda) \gamma \bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} \\ &= \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} \underline{c}_1 + \frac{(1 - \lambda)\gamma}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} \bar{c}_1 \\ c_1 &= \frac{Y}{\bar{Y}} \underline{c}_1 + \frac{\bar{Y}}{Y} \bar{c}_1\end{aligned}$$

This has a straightforward economic interpretation: for each additional dollar of output, a fraction \underline{Y}/Y goes to low income earners who consume a fraction \underline{c}_1 , and a fraction \bar{Y}/Y goes to high income earners who consume a fraction \bar{c}_1 . The average propensity to consume is the sum of these two fractions. We can then simply compute the average marginal propensity to consume when $\underline{c}_1 = 1$ and $\bar{c}_1 = 1/4$:

$$\begin{aligned} c_1 &= \frac{\underline{Y}}{Y} \underline{c}_1 + \frac{\bar{Y}}{Y} \bar{c}_1 \\ &= \frac{4}{5} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{5} \cdot \frac{1}{4} \\ c_1 &= \frac{17}{20} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore the average propensity to consume is:

$$c_1 = 0.85.$$

5. Using the expression for aggregate consumption C in question 3., and that $I = b_0 + b_1 Y$, and plugging it into total aggregate demand Z yields:

$$\begin{aligned} Z &= C + I + G \\ &= C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + c_1(1 - t_1)Y + b_0 + b_1 Y + G \\ Z &= [C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + b_0 + G] + (c_1(1 - t_1) + b_1)Y \end{aligned}$$

Equating aggregate demand to aggregate income $Z = Y$ gives the value for output (see the lecture notes for details):

$$Y = \frac{1}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1} [C_0 - \underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 - \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0 + b_0 + G]$$

6. As in lecture 9, a 100 billion dollars tax cut on the top 1% $\Delta \bar{T}_0 = -100$ leads to an increase in GDP given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta Y &= \frac{-\bar{c}_1 \Delta \bar{T}_0}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1} \\ &= \frac{-1/4 \cdot (-100 \text{ billion})}{1 - 0.85 \cdot 0.75 - 1/6} \\ \Delta Y &\approx 127.6 \text{ billion.} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, according to these numbers, we get a **127.6 billion dollars** increase in GDP. The impact on the government surplus is given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta(T - G) &= \Delta T \\ &= \Delta \bar{T}_0 + \Delta \underline{T}_0 + t_1 \Delta Y \\ &= \Delta \bar{T}_0 + t_1 \Delta Y \\ &\approx -100 + \frac{1}{4} \cdot 127.6 \\ \Delta(T - G) &\approx -68.1 \text{ billion} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, we get a **68.1 billion dollars** increase in the government deficit.

7. A 100 billion dollars tax cut on the bottom 99% $\Delta \underline{T}_0 = -100$ leads to an increase in GDP given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta Y &= \frac{-\underline{c}_1 \Delta \underline{T}_0}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1} \\ &= \frac{-1 \cdot (-100 \text{ billion})}{1 - 0.85 \cdot 0.75 - 1/6} \\ \Delta Y &\approx 510.6 \text{ billion.} \end{aligned}$$

Thus, according to these numbers, we get a **510.6 billion dollars** increase in GDP. The impact on the government surplus is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta(T - G) &= \Delta T \\ &= \Delta\bar{T}_0 + \Delta\underline{T}_0 + t_1\Delta Y \\ &= \Delta\underline{T}_0 + t_1\Delta Y \\ &\approx -100 + \frac{1}{4} \cdot 510.6 \\ \Delta(T - G) &\approx 27.6 \text{ billion}\end{aligned}$$

Thus, despite the 100 billion dollars tax cut, we get a **27.6 billion dollars** increase in the government surplus, or a reduction in the government deficit. In this situation, tax cuts **more than pay for themselves**. This seems like a much better policy than the tax reduction on the rich. However, we will see in the next lectures that things are not so straightforward.

8. Finally, a 100 billion dollars tax cut on the bottom 99% $\Delta\underline{T}_0 = -100$ financed by a 100 billion tax increase on the top 1% $\Delta\bar{T}_0 = 100$ leads to an increase in GDP given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta Y &= \frac{(c_1 - \bar{c}_1)\Delta\bar{T}_0}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1} \\ &= \frac{(1 - 1/4) \cdot (100 \text{ billion})}{1 - 0.85 \cdot 0.75 - 1/6} \\ \Delta Y &\approx 383.0 \text{ billion}\end{aligned}$$

Thus, according to these numbers, we get a **383.0 billion dollars** increase in GDP. The impact on the government surplus is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta(T - G) &= \Delta T \\ &= \Delta\bar{T}_0 + \Delta\underline{T}_0 + t_1\Delta Y \\ &= t_1\Delta Y \\ &\approx \frac{1}{4} \cdot 383.0 \\ \Delta(T - G) &\approx 95.7 \text{ billion}\end{aligned}$$

We get a **95.7 billion dollars** increase in the government surplus, or a reduction in the government deficit.

9. If there are no automatic stabilizers ($t_1 = 0$), then the multiplier apparently becomes infinite since $1 - c_1 - b_1 = 1 - 0.85 - 1/6 < 0$. However, this is impossible, as there are only finite resources in the economy. Therefore, this implies that output is determined by supply constraints (amount of labor, capital, and technology), as in the Solow growth model, and that the Keynesian type of analysis no longer applies.

In fact, as I said during the lecture, this result is intuitive. If $1 - c_1 < b_1$, then this implies that the marginal propensity to invest b_1 is higher than the marginal propensity to save $1 - c_1$. As a result, we never get to a Keynesian situation of “too much saving”.

Appendix P

Problem Set 7 - Solution

Another overlapping-generations model with government debt

- We could use the expressions derived in lecture 3 for a 2-period consumption problem, since utility is logarithmic with $\beta = 2$. However, we will instead derive the formulas from scratch, using the same techniques we used in that lecture (and so should you during an exam). The problem we are looking to solve is the following:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{c_t^y, c_{t+1}^o} \quad & \log(c_t^y) + 2 \log(c_{t+1}^o) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & c_t^y + \frac{c_{t+1}^o}{1+r_t} = w_t. \end{aligned}$$

Again, there are many methods through which we could potentially solve this problem. We can just use the ratio of marginal utilities to get the optimality condition:

$$\frac{1/c_t^y}{2/c_{t+1}^o} = 1 + r_t \Rightarrow c_{t+1}^o = 2(1 + r_t)c_t^y.$$

Plugging back in the intertemporal budget constraint:

$$\begin{aligned} c_t^y + \frac{c_{t+1}^o}{1+r_t} = w_t \Rightarrow c_t^y + 2c_t^y = w_t \\ \Rightarrow \boxed{c_t^y = \frac{w_t}{3}}. \end{aligned}$$

And finally, plugging this in the optimality condition:

$$\boxed{c_{t+1}^o = 2(1 + r_t)c_t^y \Rightarrow c_{t+1}^o = (1 + r_t)\frac{2w_t}{3}.}$$

- Saving is given by $w_t - c_t^y = 2w_t/3$ and depreciation is $\delta = 1$, and therefore the law of motion of the capital stock is:

$$K_{t+1} - K_t = \frac{2w_t}{3} - K_t.$$

From firms' optimality condition, the wage is just the marginal product of labor:

$$w_t = \frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial L_t} = \frac{2}{3} K_t^{1/3} L_t^{-1/3} = \frac{2}{3} K_t^{1/3}.$$

Therefore, we get finally the following law of motion for capital:

$$K_{t+1} = \frac{4}{9} K_t^{1/3}.$$

3. The steady-state capital stock K^* is such that:

$$\begin{aligned} K^* &= \frac{4}{9}(K^*)^{1/3} \Rightarrow (K^*)^{2/3} = \frac{4}{9} \\ \Rightarrow K^* &= \left(\frac{4}{9}\right)^{3/2} \Rightarrow K^* = \left(\frac{2}{3}\right)^3 \Rightarrow \boxed{K^* = \frac{8}{27}}. \end{aligned}$$

The (net) steady-state real interest rate r^* is given by the fact that the marginal product of capital is equal to $r^* + \delta$, which is $1 + r^*$ here:

$$1 + r^* = \frac{1}{3}(K^*)^{-2/3} \Rightarrow r^* = \frac{1}{3} \frac{1}{(K^*)^{2/3}} - 1$$

Thus, using the above expression that $(K^*)^{2/3} = \frac{4}{9}$, we get:

$$r^* = \frac{1}{3} \cdot \frac{9}{4} - 1 \Rightarrow \boxed{r^* = -25\%}$$

Comment: you may think that this interest rate is counterfactually way too low. However, remember that one period is a generation here. (that is, the age at which people have a child on average, about 30 years) The corresponding annual interest rate is thus:

$$(1 + r^*)^{1/30} - 1 \approx -0.95\%.$$

Steady-state output Y^* is given by the production function:

$$Y^* = (K^*)^{1/3} = \left(\frac{8}{27}\right)^{1/3} \Rightarrow \boxed{Y^* = \frac{2}{3}}$$

the steady-state wage w^* is given by the marginal product of labor evaluated at the steady-state capital stock:

$$w^* = \frac{2}{3}(K^*)^{1/3} = \frac{2}{3}Y^* \Rightarrow \boxed{w^* = \frac{4}{9}}.$$

The steady-state consumption of the young is:

$$(c^y)^* = \frac{1}{3}w^* \Rightarrow \boxed{(c^y)^* = \frac{4}{27}}.$$

The steady-state consumption of the old is:

$$(c^o)^* = (1 + r^*) \frac{2w^*}{3} = \frac{3}{4} \cdot \frac{8}{27} = \frac{3}{9} \Rightarrow \boxed{(c^o)^* = \frac{2}{9}}$$

4. The Golden Rule (net) interest rate r_g^* is given by $r_g^* = 0$, again because there is no growth. Using this and plugging back to get an expression for $(K^*)_g$:

$$1 + r_g^* = \frac{1}{3}(K_g^*)^{-2/3} \Rightarrow K_g^* = \frac{1}{3^{3/2}} \Rightarrow \boxed{K_g^* = \frac{1}{3\sqrt{3}}}$$

The Golden Rule output Y_g^* is then given by the production function:

$$Y_g^* = (K_g^*)^{1/3} = \left(\frac{1}{3^{3/2}}\right)^{1/3} = \frac{1}{3^{1/2}} \Rightarrow \boxed{Y_g^* = \frac{1}{\sqrt{3}}}$$

The Golden Rule wage w_g^* is:

$$w_g^* = \frac{2}{3}(K_g^*)^{1/3} = \frac{2}{3}Y_g^* \Rightarrow \boxed{w_g^* = \frac{2}{3\sqrt{3}}}.$$

The Golden Rule consumption of the young is:

$$(c^y)_g^* = \frac{1}{3}w_g^* \Rightarrow (c^y)_g^* = \frac{2}{9\sqrt{3}}.$$

The Golden Rule consumption of the old is:

$$(c^o)_g^* = \frac{2}{3}w_g^* \Rightarrow (c^o)_g^* = \frac{4}{9\sqrt{3}}.$$

5. We have the following inequalities:

$$\begin{aligned} r_g^* &> r^* \\ K_g^* &< K^* \\ Y_g^* &< Y^* \\ w_g^* &< w^* \\ (c^y)_g^* &< (c^y)^* \quad \text{since } \frac{2}{9\sqrt{3}} < \frac{4}{27} \Leftrightarrow \sqrt{3} < 2 \\ (c^o)_g^* &> (c^o)^* \quad \text{since } \frac{4}{9\sqrt{3}} > \frac{2}{9} \Leftrightarrow 2 > \sqrt{3} \end{aligned}$$

The economic intuition is that the capital stock is at a lower steady-state under the Golden-Rule, so that the marginal product of capital is higher, output is lower, and the wage is lower. For consumption, it is higher when old under the Golden Rule (because the return is higher, which more than compensates for the lowest wage) and lower when young because the wage is lower. Overall, the Golden-Rule steady-state utility is given by:

$$U_g^* = \log(c^y)_g^* + 2 \log(c^o)_g^* = \log \frac{2}{9\sqrt{3}} + 2 \log \frac{4}{9\sqrt{3}}$$

While the steady-state utility is:

$$U^* = \log(c^y)^* + 2 \log(c^o)^* = \log \frac{4}{27} + 2 \log \frac{2}{9}$$

We compute $U_g^* - U^*$ to see which steady-state utility is greater:

$$\begin{aligned} U_g^* - U^* &= \log \frac{2}{9\sqrt{3}} + 2 \log \frac{4}{9\sqrt{3}} - \log \frac{4}{27} - 2 \log \frac{2}{9} \\ &= \log \left[\frac{2}{9\sqrt{3}} \cdot \left(\frac{4}{9\sqrt{3}} \right)^2 \cdot \frac{27}{4} \cdot \left(\frac{9}{2} \right)^2 \right] \\ &= \log \left[\frac{2 \cdot 4^2 \cdot 27 \cdot 9^2}{9\sqrt{3} \cdot 9^2 \cdot 3 \cdot 4 \cdot 4} \right] \\ U_g^* - U^* &= \log \frac{2}{\sqrt{3}} > \log \frac{2}{\sqrt{4}} = \log 1 = 0 \end{aligned}$$

Thus, we conclude that the Golden Rule level of steady-state utility is higher than the equilibrium level of steady-state utility since:

$$U_g^* - U^* > 0 \Rightarrow U_g^* > U^*.$$

The economic intuition for these results is as follows. First, the steady-state level of the interest rate was $r^* = -25\%$ - so, again, around -1% per year - which as we know now is below the Golden Rule interest rate, which is 0, in an economy which has zero growth in the long run. Moreover, we also know that the gross interest rate $R^* = 1 + r^*$ is decreasing in the quantity of capital, because of decreasing

returns to capital. Therefore, if the net interest rate is higher at the Golden Rule, then necessarily the capital stock is smaller. But if the capital stock is smaller then by virtue of $Y = K^{1/3}$ we know that output is also smaller. For the same reason, we know that the wage, which is a fraction $2/3$ of output, is also smaller.

6. As in lecture 10, we know that the level of government debt B_g^* which brings the capital stock to the Golden Rule level is that which implies that when savers save $2/3$ of their young age wage, they are able to exactly buy the quantity of capital corresponding to the Golden Rule level, as well as that public debt. Thus, we get an equation that B_g^* must satisfy (note the difference with the lecture notes: this time not all the wage is saved, but only a fraction $2/3$):

$$B_g^* + K_g^* = \frac{2}{3}w_g^* \Rightarrow B_g^* = \frac{2}{3}w_g^* - K_g^*.$$

Substituting:

$$\begin{aligned} B_g^* &= \frac{2}{3}w_g^* - K_g^* \\ &= \frac{2}{3} \cdot \frac{2}{3\sqrt{3}} - \frac{1}{3\sqrt{3}} \\ &= \left(\frac{4}{3} - 1\right) \cdot \frac{1}{3\sqrt{3}} \\ B_g^* &= \frac{1}{9\sqrt{3}}. \end{aligned}$$

Note that this is considerably less government debt than in the lecture notes: this makes sense, as the dynamic inefficiency problem is considerably less severe here.

7. The lucky generation of retirees is able to consume the sum of what that generation would have consumed anyway, since these savings come to fruition when they are old, plus what the government gives them:

$$c_0^o = \frac{2}{9} + \frac{1}{9\sqrt{3}} = \frac{2\sqrt{3} + 1}{9\sqrt{3}}.$$

8. Public debt is often criticized as a “Ponzi scheme”, a negative term which is named after Charles Ponzi, who became famous for creating this fraudulent system. (although apparently, he was not really the first) A Ponzi scheme is a form of fraud, through which a money manager pays very big profits to earlier investors (higher than the market interest rate), making them think he is a really good investor, while in fact he is just able to pay these returns by raising funds from new investors. A more recent example is Bernie Madoff (*The Wizard of Lies* is an ok HBO movie where De Niro plays Bernie Madoff). Public debt is also a Ponzi scheme in the overlapping generations model, in the sense that the government in fact never intends to fully repay all investors: it is always raising new money from the young generation, and using this money to reimburse the old one. However, this Ponzi scheme is actually good because it solves the issue of overaccumulation of capital, and allows everyone to consume more.
9. If the government puts in place a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system, giving retirees an amount B_g^* each period (where B_g^* is the same level of government debt as the one found in question 6), and taxing the young an equal amount B_g^* , then the money which is left for the young to invest in capital is given by $2/3 \cdot w_g^* - B_g^*$, the income after tax, so that the level of capital accumulation is still K_g^* . When old, the government gives them what they would have gotten from investing in government debt had they not been taxed. Therefore, in terms of consumption, capital accumulation, everything “real”, it is exactly the same situation. In terms of financial accounting however, the young used to have savings on their books (in the form of government debt), which they do not have anymore: nothing appears on their bank accounts. They have “implicit assets” in the sense that the government owes them whatever they gave contributed. Symmetrically, it does not look like the government has any debt, while it actually has “implicit liabilities”: it owes the young whatever it has been taxing them.
10. Here, there really is no difference between pay-as-you-go financing and deficit financing, except that one appears on the government’s books (deficit financing), while the other does not (pay-as-you-go

financing). Pay-as-you-go is thus an implicit government liability: instead of having promised to repay creditors, the government has promised to repay future retirees who have put money in the system when they were working. This helps understand why government debt is not a very meaningful statistic: by reclassifying some of its liabilities as pension liabilities, the government is able to reduce its government debt. A forceful proponent of including pay-as-you-go liabilities into government debt numbers is Lawrence Kotlikoff, an economist at Boston University. You can read here his very dismal assessment of the current U.S. fiscal outlook. As you now know, I am not as concerned as he is. As I said during the class, what matters really is the value for real interest rates compared to growth rates, in order to understand whether this debt can actually be rolled over indefinitely or not. Don't hesitate to let me know if you feel strongly in the opposite direction, and find my arguments unpersuasive !

Appendix Q

Problem Set 8 - Solution

Q.1 Optimal Taxation: The Supply Side View

1. The firm's problem is to maximize:

$$\max_l \quad p \cdot f(l) - w \cdot l.$$

Given that $f(l) = A \cdot l$, the firm equivalently maximizes:

$$\max_l \quad p \cdot A \cdot l - w \cdot l.$$

One way to get the result is, as usual, to take the first-order condition to this problem:

$$\frac{w}{p} = A.$$

However, I should warn you here that we should actually not be taking a first-order condition. A mathematician would be right in saying that this is wrong: the objective function is linear, and so the above function does not have a maximum! At the same time, doing so does lead to the "right solution". The real wage equals labor productivity in the end. What is going on here? One intuitive way to see this is to say that for any α , however small, then with $f(l) = Al^{1-\alpha}$ we would get $w/p = A \cdot l^{-\alpha}$ as a first order condition. Taking then the limit of α to 0 then leads to the above result since then $l^{-\alpha} \approx 1$. However, unfortunately, this is not a valid mathematical proof.¹ So how do we think of what happens if the technology is completely linear? How do we think of an equilibrium in that case? The proper economic reasoning is as follows:

- if we had $p \cdot A > w$, then the marginal gain of hiring an additional worker would be higher than the marginal cost of doing so, whatever l . Therefore, firms would like to hire an infinity of workers, and the solution would be $l = +\infty$. This is not a competitive equilibrium, because this level of demand can never be equal to supply.
- if we had $p \cdot A < w$, then the marginal gain of hiring an additional worker would be lower than the marginal cost of doing so, whatever l . Therefore, the optimal thing for the firm to maximize its profit would be to hire no worker $l = 0$. This is not a competitive equilibrium either, because this level of demand is not equal to supply either. As a consequence:

$$p \cdot A = w \quad \Rightarrow \quad \boxed{\frac{w}{p} = A}.$$

¹There is no theorem in mathematics which says that the limit of the maxima of many functions converges to the maximum of the limit of these functions. I said "unfortunately", but this is fortunate actually, as we just found a counterexample in this exercise: the limit of the functions does not, in fact, have a maximum!

The labor demand curve is said to be infinitely elastic. *Note.* You should note that with $w/p = A$, the firms' profit is 0 regardless of what l it chooses. Thus, the firm produces, potentially at a scale consistent with market clearing, but in terms of profit it is indifferent between producing or not.

2. Writing that $c = c_0 + (1 - \tau) \cdot (w/p) \cdot l$ and plugging the value of c into the worker's optimization problem:

$$\max_l \quad c_0 + (1 - \tau) \frac{w}{p} l - B \frac{l^{1+\epsilon}}{1+\epsilon}$$

The first-order condition (which we can take here as long as $\epsilon > 0$) implies:

$$(1 - \tau) \cdot \frac{w}{p} = B \cdot l^\epsilon \quad \Rightarrow \quad \boxed{l = \frac{(1 - \tau)^{1/\epsilon}}{B^{1/\epsilon}} \left(\frac{w}{p} \right)^{1/\epsilon}}$$

3. The number of hours worked is given by replacing out the real wage w/p from the labor demand equation to the labor supply equation, so that:

$$\boxed{l = (1 - \tau)^{1/\epsilon} \frac{A^{1/\epsilon}}{B^{1/\epsilon}}}.$$

Real pre-tax income is when simply given by the real wage times the number of hours. Since the real wage is simply A , we get:

$$y = \frac{w}{p} \cdot l = A \cdot (1 - \tau)^{1/\epsilon} \frac{A^{1/\epsilon}}{B^{1/\epsilon}}.$$

Finally:

$$\boxed{y = (1 - \tau)^{1/\epsilon} \frac{A^{1/\epsilon+1}}{B^{1/\epsilon}}}.$$

4. A numerical application shown on the Google Spreadsheet implies that:

$$\underline{l} = (1 - \tau)^{1/\epsilon} \frac{A^{1/\epsilon}}{B^{1/\epsilon}}.$$

Therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} \underline{l} &= \left(1 - \frac{1}{4}\right)^{1/2} \left(\frac{1000000}{28188}\right)^{1/2} \left(\frac{491569855488}{3000000}\right)^{1/2} \\ &= 2088. \end{aligned}$$

Note that under the assumption of 281 business days in a year, this implies **8 hours a day** of work. *Note:* Of course, this did not happen by random chance. This explains the weird-looking numbers for A and B in the examples. I reversed engineered A and B so that people in the model would happen to work a realistic number of hours.² According to the Google Spreadsheet, income is then given by:

$$\begin{aligned} \underline{y} &= \underline{Al} \\ &= \frac{1000000}{28188} \cdot 2088 \\ &\approx 74074.07 \end{aligned}$$

Again, I reversed engineered the examples so that you would get the income of low-income people in lecture 9.

²This is also how economists work in practice. Economists rarely observe preferences directly (outside of a lab where they would run experiments), but only the choices that people make. (which comes from a variety of sources: surveys, administrative data, etc.) Therefore, they rationalize people's choices picking values for the parameters in their models, so that their models are able to match people's behavior.

5. We note that this group has a lower disutility of working B (which could again, provy for many things: education, religion, work ethic, etc.) - and also a higher productivity per hour A . Therefore they work more - both because they are more productive and because they have a lower disutility of working:

$$\bar{l} = \left(1 - \frac{1}{2}\right)^{1/2} \left(\frac{1000000}{6264}\right)^{1/2} \left(\frac{218475491328}{1000000}\right)^{1/2}$$

$$\bar{l} = 4176.$$

Note that under the assumption of 281 business days in a year, this implies 16 hours a day of work on average (more likely on weekends, or during Thanksgiving!). Income is then given by:

$$\bar{y} = \bar{A} \cdot \bar{l}$$

$$= \frac{1000000}{6264} \cdot 4176$$

$$\bar{y} \approx 666666.66$$

6. Total output is 20 trillion, 10 trillion coming from the bottom 90% and 10 trillion coming from the top 10%. In million dollars, output of the bottom 90% is:

$$\underline{Y} = \lambda N \cdot \underline{y}$$

$$\approx (135 \cdot 10^6) \cdot 74074.07$$

$$= 10 \cdot 10^{12}$$

$$\underline{Y} = 10 \text{ trillion}$$

In million dollars, output of the top 10% is:

$$\bar{Y} = (1 - \lambda)N \cdot \bar{y}$$

$$\approx (15 \cdot 10^6) \cdot 666666.66$$

$$= 10 \cdot 10^{12}$$

$$\bar{Y} = 10 \text{ trillion}$$

7. According to the Google Spreadsheet, an individual earning \underline{y} pays taxes given by:

$$\underline{t} \approx -5000 + 0.25 \cdot (74074.07 - 25000)$$

$$\approx -5000 + 12268$$

$$\underline{t} \approx 7268$$

which means that this individual pays \$7,268 on average per year in taxes. The total taxes paid by this group are:

$$\underline{T} = \lambda N \cdot \underline{t}$$

$$\approx (135 \cdot 10^6) \cdot 7268$$

$$\approx 981 \cdot 10^9$$

$$\underline{T} \approx 981 \text{ billion}$$

The Google Spreadsheet shows that lowering the bottom marginal tax rate leads to an increase in hours worked by the bottom 90%, which now is:

$$\underline{l} = \left(1 - \frac{20}{100}\right)^{1/2} \left(\frac{1000000}{28188}\right)^{1/2} \left(\frac{491569855488}{3000000}\right)^{1/2}$$

$$\underline{l} \approx 2156.5$$

The change in hours is therefore:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta\underline{h} &\approx 2156.5 - 2088 \\ \Delta\underline{h} &\approx 68.5\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, given the lowering of taxes, people decide to work **68.5 hours** more per year - which, accounting for 281 business days in a year, means approximately **15 minutes** more per day. Given the productivity of low income people, which is \$35.5 an hour on average (low income here is the bottom 90 %, so their income is not that low!), the increase in annual income given these 15 more minutes of work per day is \$2431.75 annual since:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta\underline{y} &= \underline{A} \cdot \Delta\underline{h} \\ &\approx 35.5 \cdot 68.5 \\ \Delta\underline{y} &\approx 2431.75.\end{aligned}$$

Since there are 135 million people who work this much more, then the total impact on GDP is:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta\underline{Y} &= \lambda N \cdot \Delta\underline{y} \\ &\approx (135 \cdot 10^6) \cdot 2431.75 \\ &\approx 328 \cdot 10^9 \\ \Delta\underline{Y} &\approx 328 \text{ billion.}\end{aligned}$$

Because the tax cut leads people to work more, it in turns leads to higher tax receipts - there is higher GDP. Thus, there are two concepts of multipliers: there is the ex-ante multiplier, calculated with respect to the change in tax receipts if hours did not change, and there is the ex-post multiplier, calculated with respect to the actual change in tax receipts.

Ex-ante tax cut. The *ex-ante tax cut* is the tax cut which corresponds to the change in taxes that results from the change in marginal tax rates, assuming that people do not adjust their number of hours. In other words, we assume that their income still is $\underline{y} = 74074.07$, and that the marginal tax rate is reduced from 25% to 20%, which applies on all income above \$25,000 (we have a bracket system). Thus, the change in individual taxes is:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta t &\approx -(74074.07 - 25000) \cdot 0.05 \\ \Delta\underline{t} &\approx -2453.7.\end{aligned}$$

Everyone's taxes in the bottom 90% is thus reduced by \$2,453.7. Therefore, the change in aggregate taxes is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta\underline{T} &= \lambda N \cdot \Delta\underline{t} \\ &\approx -(135 \cdot 10^6) \cdot 2453.7 \\ &\approx -331 \cdot 10^9 \\ \Delta\underline{T} &\approx -331 \text{ billion.}\end{aligned}$$

Thus, the ex-ante cost of the policy is a fall in tax receipts of $\Delta\underline{T} \approx 331 \text{ billion}$. The ex-ante multiplier is:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Ex-ante Multiplier} &= -\frac{\Delta\underline{Y}}{\Delta\underline{T}} \\ &\approx \frac{328}{331} \\ \text{Ex-ante Multiplier} &\approx 0.99.\end{aligned}$$

Ex-post tax cut. The *ex-post tax cut* is calculated taking into account that the tax reform is cheaper in reality because people increase their labor hours, and they are taxed on this additional income. In other words, there are two effects from the tax cut. First, the marginal tax rate is reduced from 25% to 20%, which applies on all income above \$25,000, until the old income $\underline{y} = 74074.07$, so on the portion

$\underline{y} - 25000$. Second, all additional income $\Delta \underline{y}$ is taxed at the marginal tax rate which is now 20%. Thus, the change in individual taxes is:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta \underline{t} &\approx -(\underline{y} - 25000) \cdot 0.05 + \Delta \underline{y} \cdot 0.20 \\ &\approx -(74074.07 - 25000) \cdot 0.05 + \Delta \underline{y} \cdot 0.20 \\ &\approx -2453.7 + 2431.75 \cdot 0.20 \\ &\approx -2453.7 + 486.35 \\ \Delta \underline{t} &\approx -1967.35.\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the change in aggregate taxes is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta \underline{T} &= \lambda N \cdot \Delta \underline{t} \\ &\approx -(135 \cdot 10^6) \cdot 1967.35 \\ &\approx -266 \cdot 10^9 \\ \Delta \underline{T} &\approx -266 \text{ billion.}\end{aligned}$$

Thus, the ex-post cost of the policy is a fall in tax receipts of $\Delta \underline{T} \approx 266$ billion. The **ex-post multiplier** is:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Ex-post Multiplier} &= -\frac{\Delta Y}{\Delta \underline{T}} \\ &\approx \frac{328}{266} \\ \text{Ex-post Multiplier} &\approx 1.23.\end{aligned}$$

8. According to the Google Spreadsheet, an individual earning $\bar{y} = 666,666$ pays taxes given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{t} &= -5000 + 0.25 \cdot (200000 - 25000) + 0.5 \cdot (666666 - 200000) \\ &\approx -5000 + 43750 + 233333 \\ \bar{t} &\approx 272083\end{aligned}$$

which means that people in the top 10% pay \$272,083 on average in taxes per year. The total paid by this group is:

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{T} &= (1 - \lambda)N \cdot \bar{t} \\ &\approx (15 \cdot 10^6) \cdot 272083 \\ &\approx 4081 \cdot 10^9 \\ \bar{T} &\approx 4081 \text{ billion}\end{aligned}$$

The Google Spreadsheet shows that lowering the bottom marginal tax rate leads to an increase in hours worked by the bottom 90%, which now is:

$$\begin{aligned}\bar{l} &= \left(1 - \frac{45}{100}\right)^{1/2} \left(\frac{1000000}{6264}\right)^{1/2} \left(\frac{218475491328}{1000000}\right)^{1/2} \\ \bar{l} &\approx 4379.8\end{aligned}$$

The change in hours is therefore:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta \bar{h} &\approx 4379.8 - 4176 \\ \Delta \bar{h} &\approx 203.8\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, given the lowering of taxes, high income earners decide to work **203.8 hours** more per year - which, accounting for 281 business days in a year, means approximately **45 minutes** more per day (note that this is more than twice the increase, so it is higher in percentage terms). Given the

productivity of high income people, which is \$159.64/hour on average, the increase in annual income given these 45 more minutes of work per day is \$32,534.6 annual since:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta\bar{y} &= \bar{A} \cdot \Delta\bar{h} \\ &\approx 159.64 \cdot 203.8 \\ \Delta\bar{y} &\approx 32534.6\end{aligned}$$

Since there are 15 million people who work this much more, then the total impact on GDP is 15 million times that additional income, which is 488 billion:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta\bar{Y} &= (1 - \lambda)N \cdot \Delta\bar{y} \\ &\approx (15 \cdot 10^6) \cdot 32534.6 \\ &\approx 488 \cdot 10^9 \\ \Delta\bar{Y} &\approx 488 \text{ billion.}\end{aligned}$$

Because the tax cut leads high income earners to work more, it in turns leads to higher tax receipts - there is higher GDP. Again, there are two concepts of multipliers: there is the ex-ante multiplier, calculated with respect to the change in tax receipts if hours did not change, and there is the ex-post multiplier, calculated with respect to the actual change in tax receipts.

Ex-ante tax cut. The *ex-ante tax cut* is the tax cut which corresponds to the change in taxes that results from the change in marginal tax rates, assuming that people do not adjust their number of hours. In other words, we assume that their income still is $\bar{y} = 666666$, and that the marginal tax rate is reduced from 50% to 45%, which applies on all income above \$200000 (we have a bracket system). Thus, the change in individual taxes is:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta\bar{t} &\approx -(666666 - 200000) \cdot 0.05 \\ \Delta\bar{t} &\approx -23333.3.\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the change in aggregate taxes is given by 15 million times that, or 350 billion:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta\bar{T} &= (1 - \lambda)N \cdot \Delta\bar{t} \\ &\approx -(1 - \lambda)N \cdot 23333.3 \\ &\approx -(15 \cdot 10^6) \cdot 23333.3 \\ &\approx -350 \cdot 10^9 \\ \Delta\bar{T} &\approx -350 \text{ billion.}\end{aligned}$$

Thus, the ex-ante cost of the policy is a fall in tax receipts of $\Delta\bar{T} \approx 350$ billion. The ex-ante supply-side multiplier is the ratio of the change in GDP:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Ex-ante Multiplier} &= -\frac{\Delta\bar{Y}}{\Delta\bar{T}} \\ &\approx \frac{488}{350} \\ \text{Ex-ante Multiplier} &\approx 1.39.\end{aligned}$$

Ex-post tax cut. The *ex-post tax cut* is calculated taking into account that the tax reform is cheaper in reality because high income earners increase their labor hours, and they are taxed on this additional income. In other words, there are two effects from the tax cut. First, the marginal tax rate is reduced from 50% to 45%, which applies on all income above \$200,000, until the old income $\bar{y} = 666666.66$. Second, all additional income is taxed at rate which is now 45%. Thus, the fall in individual taxes is:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta\bar{t} &\approx -(666666.66 - 200000) \cdot 0.05 + \Delta\bar{y} \cdot 0.45 \\ &\approx -23333.33 + 32534.6 \cdot 0.45 \\ &\approx -23333.33 + 14640.57 \\ \Delta\bar{t} &\approx -8692.76.\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the ex-post change in aggregate taxes is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta\bar{T} &= (1 - \lambda)N \cdot \Delta\bar{\tau} \\ &\approx -(1 - \lambda)N \cdot 8692.76 \\ &\approx -(15 \cdot 10^6) \cdot 8692.76 \\ &\approx -130 \cdot 10^9 \\ \Delta\bar{T} &\approx -130 \text{ billion.}\end{aligned}$$

Thus, the ex-post cost of the policy is a fall in tax receipts of $\Delta\bar{T} \approx 130$ billion. The **ex-post supply side multiplier** is:

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Ex-post Multiplier} &= -\frac{\Delta\bar{Y}}{\Delta\bar{T}} \\ &\approx \frac{488}{130} \\ \text{Ex-post Multiplier} &\approx 3.74.\end{aligned}$$

In both cases, in the neoclassical view, it is better to cut taxes on high income people than on low income people (the opposite as from an aggregate demand perspective). I will explain why in the solution to the next exercise (as Robert Barro says, it is because marginal tax rates are initially higher).

Q.2 Paul Krugman VS Robert Barro on the Bush tax cuts

1. A transcript of the interview is available on Mark Thoma's *Economists's View* blog. Robert Barro's view on taxes is in line with the previous exercise. He believes that what matters is incentives, and he has a purely "supply side" view of taxes:

And the basic way you do that is you cut the taxes where they start out having the highest rates. Now, a lot of that at the moment is among the rich people. It used to be it was more at the poor people. Though we've actually done a lot on that with respect to the earned income tax credits, so it is not so true now. But the way you really enhance the economy and make it work better is by cutting tax rates where they start out being the highest, because that is where the government is initially distorting the situation the most.

This is what we have found in the previous exercise where output was completely determined by the supply side. Cuts on the high income were more efficient than cuts on the low income in the calculations above. Robert Barro says that the reason why tax cuts work so well on the high income, is because taxes on the rich are initially higher so "that is where the government is initially distorting the situation the most." How can we understand the logic of his argument? In fact, there are some mathematics behind Robert Barro's comment (he was a physics major at Caltech). Recall that we found that income (which adjusts based on labor supply) is given as a function of taxes as:

$$y = (1 - \tau)^{1/\epsilon} \frac{A^{1/\epsilon+1}}{B^{1/\epsilon}}$$

Taking logs of this expression, as we often do when we are dealing with power functions (as in the problem set on the labor market):

$$\log(y) = \frac{1}{\epsilon} \log(1 - \tau) + \left(\frac{1}{\epsilon} + 1\right) \log A - \frac{1}{\epsilon} \log B.$$

Therefore, a change in marginal taxes τ leads to a change in y given by:

$$\frac{d \log(y)}{d\tau} = \frac{1}{\epsilon} \frac{d \log(1 - \tau)}{d\tau}.$$

The derivative of $\log(1 - \tau)$ with respect to τ is:

$$\frac{d \log(1 - \tau)}{d\tau} = -\frac{1}{1 - \tau}$$

Therefore, a change in τ leads to a change in y given by:

$$\boxed{\frac{d \log(y)}{d\tau} = -\frac{1}{\epsilon(1 - \tau)}}.$$

Therefore, the percentage change in income for a person is an increasing function of τ , or what is marginal tax rate initially is. So Robert Barro is validated in his statement that the government should cut taxes where marginal tax rates are initially the highest. For example, for $\epsilon = 2$ as above, and $\tau = 0.5$, we get a percentage change in income of

$$\frac{1}{2 \cdot (1 - 0.5)} = 1$$

or 1% for a change in marginal tax rate of 1%. For $\tau = 0.25$, we get a percentage change in income of

$$\frac{1}{2 \cdot (1 - 0.25)} = 0.66$$

or 0.66% for a change in marginal tax rate of 1%.

On the other hand, Robert Barro does not like Keynesian stimulus at all, which he views as just “heaping money” to people. To him, tax cuts must be used in order to increase the incentives to work (or rather, lower the disincentives to work):

And I should distinguish a lot between the 2003 and 2001 tax cut plans. They are really quite different. The big thing about the 2003 plan is that it didn't just heap money to people. It didn't just particularly give money to people at increased incentives to do things. It did that particularly by accelerating the marginal income tax rate cuts.

2. On the contrary, Paul Krugman, when asked by Charlie Rose “If, in fact, Senator Kerry is elected, and if, in fact, he is able to go forward with his program to roll back tax cuts for those making more than \$200,000 a year, what impact do you think it will have on the economy and reducing the deficit?” responds:

I don't think it would have a negative effect. Because I think that we have a problem of demand, not supply. And we have a problem of spending, not incentives. And since, in fact, Kerry is proposing to use the bulk of any additional revenue for new government programs, doesn't do much for the deficit, actually. But it also doesn't do anything to depress spending. And at the point about the scale of it, the scale of what Kerry is proposing is, in fact, almost identical to the Clinton '93 tax increase, which did not exactly sink the U.S. economy. So, you know, you can't make the case that this is a major thing one way or the other.

Paul Krugman does not think that higher taxes on the rich are very detrimental to the economy. For him, the economy suffers more from a lack of demand, of spending, than from the types of incentive effects in the previous exercise.

3. Perhaps paradoxically, Paul Krugman worries a lot more about rising public debt than Robert Barro. In particular, he worries that the reason why tax cuts on the rich are made is to later “starve the beast”:

Robert, you have written about and you are supporting starve-the-beast as a doctrine, cut revenues and then we can use that to squeeze down government spending. You know, I'm not in favor of that. I think that the government does important stuff. And I don't think there is a lot of ... basically, we have this \$400 billion deficit. It's not going to go away simply through economic growth, it has to be some combination of either spending cuts or increased revenue. And I don't like these tax cuts, which ... will eventually force a cut in programs that I think are very important to people's lives.

But he does not want to see expenditures phased out:

I want to maintain the social insurance institutions. I want to maintain Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. And I want some from further expansion of health insurance. So I say look, you know, we don't have enough revenue as is. I don't want more tax cuts that will further undermine the revenue base that makes it possible to have these programs stand off some of the rough edges of capitalism. (...) I just have to say, what kind of conservative, or better what kind of Republican is Bush? And the answer, of course, is he is a banana Republican. Just look at the fiscal irresponsibility.

On the contrary, Robert Barro is not that worried about public debt. He likes that tax cuts help provide incentives to work, as in the previous exercise. He says:

You can't go that crazy about the deficit. It's a little over 3 percent of the GDP now.

As we will see during the following lectures, Robert Barro believes in "Ricardian" equivalence: he thinks that rational optimizers anticipate future tax increases to come, and that they will offset by an increase in private saving the tax increases done by the government.³

4. Robert Barro suggests at the end of the interview some reforms on the Social Security side "in terms of introducing some kind of private accounts, not changing the pensions for the existing retired people or people close to it, but down the road, people who are younger." This is how he justifies his position:

Well, that is something that has to be argued out. But you know, you can imagine going up to somebody in early 40, but that's something you would have to go through. But the idea would be to have a transition where a lot more in the next generation is going to be in terms of personal accounts, rather than the kind of plan that we've had since the 1930s.

Paul Krugman, on the other hand, has the following view:

Well, I think it is a terrible idea, but even aside from that, it is very expensive. Because the real problem in any of these things, is what about somebody – well, my age, your age, we have been paying into the system all our lives. We don't have a private account. Where is the money going to come from to pay for our retirement? You and I don't need it, but a lot of people do. And then you start to say well, we're going to finance that. Anyway you cut it, you need several trillion dollars of additional money injected into the system to make any of these things work, to cover the transition. I don't think it is a good idea to do it in any case, but to cover this transition for all the people who've been paying into what has been a pay-as-you-go program, where each generation supports the previous generation in its retirement.

Finally, Robert Barro compares the pay-as-you-go system the U.S. currently has to implicit public debt:

What you have now is a situation where there is a big public debt out there in the form of future Social Security payments. So it's not an official part of the public debt, but it's just like it. And, of course, the transition is where you increase the literal debt in order to fund it, you have to borrow. But you're replacing implicit debt, which is the pension payments you are owing, with explicit debt.

As we have seen in problem set 7, this discussion on the pay-as-you-go makes perfect sense in terms of the overlapping-generations model. Robert Barro wants to see life-cycle contribute to capital accumulation, and phase-out progressively the current system of pay-as-you-go. Of course, as Paul Krugman points out, promises have been made to the current generation of retirees, which means that public debt would need to be taken on by the government in order to pay these pension benefits (if the new young generation now invests their saving in private accounts, then they cannot at the same time contribute to the pay-as-you-go

³The fact that high income earners do not increase their consumption much following tax cuts is not necessarily due to the fact that they expect future taxes to come. Another candidate explanation is simply that they have a lower marginal propensity to consume - which, in turn, might come from the various reasons outlined in lecture 4. They may have utility for wealth, in the form of prestige, or just the joy of owning. Or, in the case of the extremely rich, they simply would not know what to do with this money.

system). Therefore, privatizing social security would merely make existing government liabilities more visible, by transforming them from implicit liabilities into explicit liabilities.

Appendix R

Problem Set 9 - Solution

R.1 A Budget Surplus and a Trade Deficit

- Aggregate consumption is given as shown in lecture 9 by:

$$C = C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + c_1(1 - t_1)Y,$$

where we have defined the average MPC c_1 as a function of \underline{c}_1 and \bar{c}_1 by:

$$c_1 \equiv \frac{\lambda \underline{c}_1 + (1 - \lambda) \gamma \bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma}.$$

Using that Z is $C + I + G + X - M$, we get:

$$\begin{aligned} Z &= C + I + G + X - M \\ &= C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + c_1(1 - t_1)Y + b_0 + b_1 Y + G + x_1 Y^* - m_1 Y \\ Z &= [C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + b_0 + G + x_1 Y^*] + (c_1(1 - t_1) + b_1 - m_1) Y \end{aligned}$$

Equating output to demand $Z = Y$ gives the value for output:

$$Y = \frac{1}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1 + m_1} [C_0 - \underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 - \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0 + b_0 + G + x_1 Y^*].$$

A reduction in taxes on the poor $\Delta \underline{T}_0 < 0$, with an offsetting increase in taxes on high income earners $\Delta \bar{T}_0 = -\Delta \underline{T}_0$ such that aggregate taxes are zero ($\Delta T_0 = \Delta \underline{T}_0 + \Delta \bar{T}_0 = 0$) therefore leads to a change in output given by:

$$\boxed{\Delta Y = \frac{\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1 + m_1} \Delta \bar{T}_0}.$$

- Using the value for aggregate taxes $\Delta \underline{T}_0 + \Delta \bar{T}_0 = 0$, we now get that aggregate taxes are higher because of automatic stabilizers, just as in lecture 9:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta T &= \Delta \underline{T}_0 + \Delta \bar{T}_0 + t_1 \Delta Y \\ &= t_1 \Delta Y \\ \Delta T &= \frac{t_1 (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1)}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1 + m_1} \Delta \bar{T}_0 > 0. \end{aligned}$$

This unambiguously leads to a reduction in the public deficit, or an increase in public saving, as in lecture 9, because of automatic stabilizers, since $\Delta(T - G) = \Delta T$:

$$\boxed{\Delta(T - G) = \frac{t_1 (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1)}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1 + m_1} \Delta \bar{T}_0}.$$

3. An increase in output leads to a trade deficit because some of the additional demand of the low income falls on imported goods so that $\Delta NX = -m_1 \Delta Y$ which implies:

$$\boxed{\Delta NX = -\frac{m_1 (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1)}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1 + m_1} \Delta \bar{T}_0}.$$

Therefore, since $\Delta \bar{T}_0 > 0$, we have both a trade deficit and a budget surplus:

$$\boxed{\Delta NX < 0, \quad \Delta(T - G) > 0}.$$

4. Again, the change in net exports NX are equal to the change in total saving minus the change in investment:

$$\Delta NX = \Delta S + \Delta(T - G) - \Delta I.$$

Therefore, the fact that an increase in the government surplus comes together with a trade deficit is somewhat of a puzzle: everything else being equal, an increase in government surplus should lead to a trade surplus, because it increases total saving. (everything else equal $\Delta NX = \Delta(T - G)$) In order to understand this “puzzle”, we first compute the change in investment, which depends on output through $I = b_0 + b_1 Y$ so that $\Delta I = b_1 \Delta Y$, implying:

$$\boxed{\Delta I = \frac{b_1 (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1)}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1 + m_1} \Delta \bar{T}_0 > 0}.$$

The increase in investment consecutive to redistributive policies does contribute to explaining the puzzle. Indeed, there was an investment boom at the end of Bill Clinton’s presidency. For example, you can read this Paul Krugman op-ed, where he gives this argument:

At the time, Martin Feldstein famously linked the two, calling them “twin deficits.” While this oversimplified matters – in the late 1990s we ran both budget surpluses and trade deficits, thanks to booming investment – the logic made sense.

5. Private saving S is:

$$\begin{aligned} S &= Y - T - C \\ &= Y - ((\underline{T}_0 + \bar{T}_0) + t_1 Y) - (C_0 - (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) + c_1(1 - t_1)Y) \\ &= Y - t_1 Y - c_1(1 - t_1)Y - C_0 - (\underline{T}_0 + \bar{T}_0) + (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) \\ S &= (1 - t_1)(1 - c_1)Y - C_0 - (\underline{T}_0 + \bar{T}_0) + (\underline{c}_1 \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \bar{T}_0) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, :

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta S &= (1 - t_1)(1 - c_1)\Delta Y + \underline{c}_1 \Delta \underline{T}_0 + \bar{c}_1 \Delta \bar{T}_0 \\ &= \frac{(1 - t_1)(1 - c_1) (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1)}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1 + m_1} \Delta \bar{T}_0 - (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1) \Delta \bar{T}_0 \\ &= \left[\frac{(1 - t_1)(1 - c_1)}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1 + m_1} - 1 \right] (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1) \Delta \bar{T}_0 \\ &= \left[\frac{(1 - t_1)(1 - c_1) - (1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1 + m_1)}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1 + m_1} \right] (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1) \Delta \bar{T}_0 \\ &= \left[\frac{-t_1 + b_1 - m_1}{1 - (1 - t_1) c_1 - b_1 + m_1} \right] (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1) \Delta \bar{T}_0 \\ \Delta S &= \frac{(-t_1 + b_1 - m_1) (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1)}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} \Delta \bar{T}_0 \end{aligned}$$

The sign of the change in private saving is ambiguous:

$$\boxed{\Delta S = \frac{(-t_1 + b_1 - m_1) (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1)}{1 - c_1(1 - t_1) - b_1 + m_1} \Delta \bar{T}_0}.$$

However, if $m_1 = b_1$ as in the numerical application, then private saving decreases, which also contributes to explaining the puzzle: private saving move against public saving, which tends to increase the trade deficit.

6. The net effect on net exports can be given as:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta NX &= \Delta S + \Delta(T - G) + \Delta I \\ &= \frac{(-t_1 + b_1 - m_1) + t_1 - b_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1 + m_1} (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1) \Delta \bar{T}_0 \\ \Delta NX &= -\frac{m_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1 + m_1} (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1) \Delta \bar{T}_0\end{aligned}$$

We find the same expression as in question 3:

$$\Delta NX = -\frac{m_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1 + m_1} (\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1) \Delta \bar{T}_0$$

7. Assuming that $m_1 = 1/6$, $b_1 = 1/6$, $t_1 = 1/4$, $\underline{c}_1 = 1$, $\bar{c}_1 = 1/3$, $\gamma = 9$, $\lambda = 0.9$, the average marginal propensity to consume is:

$$\begin{aligned}c_1 &= \frac{\lambda \underline{c}_1 + (1 - \lambda)\gamma \bar{c}_1}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} \\ &= \frac{\lambda}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} \underline{c}_1 + \frac{(1 - \lambda)\gamma}{\lambda + (1 - \lambda)\gamma} \bar{c}_1 \\ &= \frac{0.9}{0.9 + 0.1 \cdot 9} \cdot 1 + \frac{0.1 \cdot 9}{0.9 + 0.1 \cdot 9} \cdot \frac{1}{3} \\ &= \frac{1}{2} \cdot 1 + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{1}{3} \\ c_1 &= \frac{2}{3}.\end{aligned}$$

If redistribution is given by $\Delta \bar{T}_0 = 1$, we get an increase in output which is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta Y &= \frac{\underline{c}_1 - \bar{c}_1}{1 - (1 - t_1)c_1 - b_1 + m_1} \Delta \bar{T}_0 \\ &= \frac{1}{1 - (2/3) \cdot (1 - 1/4) - 1/6 + 1/6} \cdot \left(1 - \frac{1}{3}\right) \cdot 1 \\ &= 2 \cdot \frac{2}{3} \cdot 1 \\ \Delta Y &= \frac{4}{3}\end{aligned}$$

The change in the trade balance ΔNX can be decomposed as:

- A change in private saving ΔS :

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta S &= (-t_1 + b_1 - m_1) \cdot \Delta Y \\ &= \left(-\frac{1}{4} + \frac{1}{6} - \frac{1}{6}\right) \cdot \frac{4}{3} \\ \Delta S &= -\frac{1}{3}\end{aligned}$$

- A change in public saving $\Delta(T - G)$:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta(T - G) &= t_1 \cdot \Delta Y \\ &= \frac{1}{4} \cdot \frac{4}{3} \\ \Delta(T - G) &= \frac{1}{3}\end{aligned}$$

- A change in investment ΔI :

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta I &= b_1 \cdot \Delta Y \\ &= \frac{1}{6} \cdot \frac{4}{3} \\ \Delta I &= \frac{2}{9}.\end{aligned}$$

The sum of all these contributions is:

$$\boxed{\Delta NX = \Delta S + \Delta(T - G) - \Delta I = -\frac{1}{3} + \frac{1}{3} - \frac{2}{9} = -\frac{2}{9}.}$$

Note that this same expression can be obtained using that $\Delta NX = -m_1 \Delta Y$ directly:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta NX &= -m_1 \Delta Y \\ &= -\frac{1}{6} \cdot \frac{4}{3} \\ \Delta NX &= -\frac{2}{9}.\end{aligned}$$

R.2 Coordination of Economic Policies

- Given Y^* , aggregate demand is:

$$\begin{aligned}Z &= C + I + G + X - M \\ &= (10 + 0.8 \cdot (Y - T)) + (8 + 0.1Y) + (g_0 + 0.1Y) + 0.1Y^* - 0.1Y \\ &= 10 + 0.8 \cdot (Y - 10 - 0.5Y) + 8 + 0.1Y + g_0 + 0.1Y + 0.1Y^* - 0.1Y \\ Z &= 0.5Y + 10 + g_0 + 0.1Y^*\end{aligned}$$

Setting $Y = Z$ gives:

$$\boxed{Y = 20 + 2 \cdot g_0 + 0.2 \cdot Y^*}.$$

- Assuming that foreign output is given, the multiplier is 2 since:

$$\boxed{\Delta Y = 2 \cdot \Delta g_0}.$$

Note that foreign output cannot be fixed when government spending changes in the home economy: because of imports, a stimulus in the home economy necessarily increases output in the foreign economy. The rest of this problem shows why.

- If we were to close the economy, then demand would be:

$$\begin{aligned}Z &= C + I + G \\ &= 10 + 0.8(Y - 10 - 0.5Y) + 8 + 0.1Y + g_0 + 0.1Y \\ Z &= 0.6Y + 10 + g_0\end{aligned}$$

Setting $Y = Z$ gives:

$$\boxed{Y = 25 + 2.5 \cdot g_0}.$$

Therefore, the multiplier is 2.5 since

$$\boxed{\Delta Y = 2.5 \cdot \Delta g_0}.$$

In a closed economy, the multiplier would be higher because all the increase in income would be feeding domestic demand: there would be no “leakage” of aggregate demand.

4. We similarly have: $Y^* = 20 + 2g_0^* + 0.2Y$. Therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= 20 + 2g_0 + 0.2Y^* \\ &= 20 + 2g_0 + 0.2(20 + 2g_0^* + 0.2Y) \\ Y &= 24 + 2g_0 + 0.4g_0^* + 0.04Y \end{aligned}$$

This gives output Y , and symmetrically foreign output Y^* :

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= \frac{24}{0.96} + \frac{2}{0.96}g_0 + \frac{0.4}{0.96}g_0^* \\ Y^* &= \frac{24}{0.96} + \frac{2}{0.96}g_0^* + \frac{0.4}{0.96}g_0. \end{aligned}$$

Finally:

$$Y \approx 25 + 2.08 \cdot g_0 + 0.42 \cdot g_0^* \quad Y^* \approx 25 + 2.08 \cdot g_0^* + 0.42 \cdot g_0.$$

5. The multiplier is now given by $2/0.96 \approx 2.08$. Indeed:

$$\Delta Y = \frac{2}{0.96} \Delta g_0 \approx 2.08 \cdot \Delta g_0.$$

This is higher than 2. The reason is that increasing G in the home economy increases M from the foreign economy and therefore, Y in the foreign economy, which in turn increases demand for X in the home economy.

6. We have the following two equations for Y and Y^* :

$$Y = 20 + 2 \cdot g_0 + 0.2 \cdot Y^*$$

and:

$$Y^* = 20 + 2 \cdot g_0^* + 0.2 \cdot Y.$$

The second equation says that whenever output increases by \$1 in the home economy, this leads output to increase by \$0.2 in the foreign economy. In turn, this increase of \$0.2 in the foreign economy leads to an increase of $\$0.2 \cdot 0.2 = 0.04$ in the home economy. Therefore, when output increases by \$1 in the home economy, then through the spillover effects it leads to an increase in \$0.04 in the home economy. In turn, this \$0.04 increase leads to a further $\$0.04 \cdot 0.04 = 0.04^2$ increase, etc. Finally, we get a total spillover effect for 1 dollar given by:

$$1 + 0.2 \cdot 0.2 + (0.2 \cdot 0.2)^2 + \dots = \frac{1}{1 - 0.04} = \frac{1}{0.96} \approx 1.04.$$

This explains why the open economy multiplier is $1/0.96$ times the closed economy multiplier, so that:

$$\Delta Y = \frac{2}{0.96} \cdot \Delta g_0 \approx 2.08 \cdot \Delta g_0.$$

7. U.S.'s government spending increases Germany's exports, and after the multiple rounds:

$$\Delta Y^* = 0.42 \cdot \Delta g.$$

The impact on Germany's surplus is:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta(T^* - G^*) &= \Delta T^* - \Delta G^* \\ &= 0.5 \cdot \Delta Y^* - 0.1 \cdot \Delta Y^* \\ &= 0.4 \cdot \Delta Y^* \\ &= 0.4 \cdot 0.42 \cdot \Delta g \\ \Delta(T^* - G^*) &= 0.168 \cdot \Delta g \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, U.S.'s government spending leads to a surplus in Germany's budget, given as a function of U.S.'s increase in government spending by:

$$\boxed{\Delta(T^* - G^*) = 0.168 \cdot \Delta g}.$$

8. The multiplier for a coordinated increase in government spending, such that $\Delta g_0 = \Delta g_0^*$ is given by:

$$\begin{aligned}\Delta Y &= \frac{2}{0.96} \Delta g_0 + \frac{0.4}{0.96} \Delta g_0^* \\ &= \frac{2.4}{0.96} \Delta g_0 \\ \Delta Y &= 2.5 \cdot \Delta g_0\end{aligned}$$

The multiplier for a coordinated increase in government spending is 2.5. Note that this is equal to the closed economy multiplier, which is intuitive.

9. The multiplier is higher. If government spending is coordinated, then exports in the home economy increase, which contributes to boosting output further. The aggregate demand leakage, increasing imports, is offset by an expansion abroad, increasing exports.
10. There is a free-rider problem because all countries have an incentive to wait other countries to do more Keynesian stimulus. When the U.S. does a Keynesian stimulus, this stimulus benefits Germany in the form of increased GDP in Germany, and their government surplus. Therefore, this non-cooperative game can lead to too little stimulus.
11. Donald Trump believes that Germany is not doing enough to boost aggregate demand, and that this explains the U.S.'s unfavorable trade balance. Again, whether you think that his complaint is legitimate depends on whether you think that global aggregate demand is deficient, or not. Many economists take the view that if Germany is willing to lend to the U.S., and always produce more than it consumes, then Germany is not acting in its best interest, and the U.S. should simply be consuming these "free" goods (same with China). As you know, I am more agnostic. I think that the question is whether supply indeed creates its own demand, and whether people care more about production or about consumption. This controversy dates back to at least Adam Smith against the mercantilists, in the eighteenth century.